WEBVTT - 06: Amazon's Deals with Global Intelligence Agencies

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<v Speaker 1>I want to thank every Amazon employee and every Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>customer because you guys paid progress, you guys paid problems.

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<v Speaker 1>This is megaco an investigative podcast exposing some of the

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<v Speaker 1>world's most unethical corporations. This series is about Amazon. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Jake Hanrahan, journalists and documentary filmmaker. Megacorp is produced by

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<v Speaker 1>H eleven for cool Zone Media. In the last episode,

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<v Speaker 1>we looked at how Amazon is spying on its customers

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<v Speaker 1>through its home security technology. Today, though, we'll be looking

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<v Speaker 1>at Amazon's dealings with the actual spy agencies, specifically America's

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<v Speaker 1>CIA and the UK's m I five and m I six.

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<v Speaker 1>To understand how Amazon works with these intelligence agencies, for

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<v Speaker 1>we need to look into Amazon Web Services or a WUS.

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<v Speaker 1>AWS will feature a lot in this episode, so let's

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<v Speaker 1>hear what Amazon has to say about it. AWS is

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<v Speaker 1>the world's most comprehensive and broadly adopted cloud platform. Millions

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<v Speaker 1>of customers trust AWS to power their infrastructure and applications.

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<v Speaker 1>Organizations of every type in size are using AWS to

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<v Speaker 1>lower costs, become more agile, and innovate faster. AWS gives

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<v Speaker 1>you more services and more features within those services than

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<v Speaker 1>any other cloud provider. This makes it faster, easier, and

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<v Speaker 1>more cost effective to move your existing applications to the

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<v Speaker 1>cloud and to build anything you can imagine, from infrastructure

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<v Speaker 1>technologies like compute, storage and databases to emerging technologies such

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<v Speaker 1>as machine learning and artificial intelligence, data lakes and analytics,

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<v Speaker 1>and Internet of things. Building on AWS means you can

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<v Speaker 1>choose the right tool for the jar. With AWS, you

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<v Speaker 1>can leverage the latest technologies to experiment and innovate more quickly.

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<v Speaker 1>We are continually accelerating our pace of innovation to invent

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<v Speaker 1>entirely new technologies you can use to transform your business.

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<v Speaker 1>Our infrastructure is built to satisfy the security standards of

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<v Speaker 1>the most risk sensitive organizations. To put it simply, AWS

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<v Speaker 1>is the world's most used cloud computing platform, the cloud

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<v Speaker 1>being a technology that allows users to access the same

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<v Speaker 1>files and applications from almost any device wherever they are.

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<v Speaker 1>So what does Amazon's AWS have to do with the CIA. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>in Amazon secured a contract to build the c I,

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<v Speaker 1>a six hundred million dollar cloud computing technology that would

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<v Speaker 1>service all seventeen of the U S Intelligence agencies. Those

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<v Speaker 1>agencies benefiting from Amazon's cloud technology are as follows. The

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<v Speaker 1>Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, the

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<v Speaker 1>National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the

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<v Speaker 1>Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Drug

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<v Speaker 1>Enforcement Administration, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy,

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<v Speaker 1>the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, Air

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<v Speaker 1>Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Army Military Intelligence, the Office

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<v Speaker 1>of Naval Intelligence, the Marine Corps Intelligence, and the Coast

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<v Speaker 1>Guard Intelligence. Every one of those agencies is using AWS

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<v Speaker 1>created services by Amazon, the same company who has had

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<v Speaker 1>scandal after scandal regarding the improper use of the data, video,

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<v Speaker 1>and sound files of millions of people across the world

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<v Speaker 1>that they have stored in their cloud via their home

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<v Speaker 1>security products the Chat. Amazon's deal with the CIA to

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<v Speaker 1>build them a robust cloud computing technology was first handled

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<v Speaker 1>in secret. When it became public, there were a few

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<v Speaker 1>interesting legal issues, as explained in an Atlantic article about

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<v Speaker 1>the deal by Frank Concole Quote. After weighing bids from

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon Web Services, IBM, and an unnamed third vendor, the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA awarded a contract to a WS worth up to

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<v Speaker 1>six hundred million dollars over a period of up to

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<v Speaker 1>ten years. IBM filed a bid protest with g a

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<v Speaker 1>O that the watchdog eventually upheld in June, forcing the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA to reopen bids to both companies for the contract.

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<v Speaker 1>A legal struggle between Amazon and Big Blue ensued, and

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<v Speaker 1>a WS filed a lawsuit against the federal government in July,

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<v Speaker 1>claiming the g a O sus statement was a flawed decision.

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<v Speaker 1>In October, US Court of Federal Claims, Judge Thomas Wheeler

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<v Speaker 1>sided with Amazon and overturned g ao's decision to force

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<v Speaker 1>the CIA to read but the contrast, Big Blue went home.

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<v Speaker 1>A WS claimed a victory under the deal's original financial specs.

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<v Speaker 1>Nearly eighteen months after the procurement was first released, the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA and Amazon went to work end quote. Now to

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<v Speaker 1>give you an idea of how big this Amazon CIA

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<v Speaker 1>deal was, let me tell you what the c i

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<v Speaker 1>A Chief Information Officer, Douglas Wolfe said about it. He

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<v Speaker 1>called it, quote one of the most important technology procurements

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<v Speaker 1>in recent history. End quote. Well, you might be thinking, well,

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<v Speaker 1>it's the CIA simply leasing technology from Amazon. Bear in

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<v Speaker 1>mind that the Amazon engineers oversee all the hardware for

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<v Speaker 1>this CIA cloud tech. Why Well, because a w S

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<v Speaker 1>actually owns the hardware, and they're the ones responsible for

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<v Speaker 1>maintaining it. That said, let's take a look at some

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<v Speaker 1>of the previous security issues Amazon has had with online security,

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<v Speaker 1>including hearts of its a WS technology. January, hacker broke

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<v Speaker 1>the security of an Amazon owned online store, exposing the

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<v Speaker 1>information twenty four million customers. December fourteen, hackers from Anonymous

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<v Speaker 1>leaked thirteen thousand user names and passwords for Amazon accounts,

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<v Speaker 1>along with several other websites. November twenty fifteen, Amazon found

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<v Speaker 1>a credible security risk was forced to reset the past

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<v Speaker 1>words of thousands of its users. July hacker claimed to

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<v Speaker 1>a brief an Amazon server to obtain the personal details

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<v Speaker 1>of eighty thousand Kindle users. Amazon said the breach wasn't legit,

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<v Speaker 1>to which the hacker responded saying the server was owned

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<v Speaker 1>by Amazon and that the details could be used to

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<v Speaker 1>disable all of the leaked accounts. November eighteen, a major

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<v Speaker 1>data breach of customer information was announced, in which Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>claimed a technical issue led to customers private information accidentally

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<v Speaker 1>being posted online. This information included customers names and email addresses. July,

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<v Speaker 1>a Capital One server using Amazon's a WS was hacked

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<v Speaker 1>by a former Amazon employee. Information of over one million

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<v Speaker 1>customers was exposed, including social security numbers, bank account numbers,

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<v Speaker 1>credit card transaction records, and credit scores. The hacker was

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<v Speaker 1>allegedly an AWS systems engineer. Amazon denied any responsibility for

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<v Speaker 1>the attack. September, Amazon users in Japan begin to see

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<v Speaker 1>the order histories, purchase details, shopper names, and delivery addresses

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<v Speaker 1>of other Amazon customers. There were nothing to do with them.

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<v Speaker 1>This lasted a few days until Amazon said they'd fix

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<v Speaker 1>the problem without fully explaining what had happened. January twenty,

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<v Speaker 1>several Amazon employees were fired after it was discovered they'd

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<v Speaker 1>been sharing sensitive customer data with a third party. Several

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<v Speaker 1>customer email addresses and phone numbers were later leaked online. Again,

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<v Speaker 1>Amazon has never fully explained what happened with this incident. February,

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<v Speaker 1>a large AWS database that wasn't secured was discovered online.

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<v Speaker 1>It held sensitive data or millions of customers in Europe

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<v Speaker 1>for Amazon and for other companies. Names, addresses, emails, phone numbers,

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<v Speaker 1>payment histories, invoice links, and partial credit card numbers were

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<v Speaker 1>all left unsecured. As well as this and Amazon Marketplace

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<v Speaker 1>web Services authentication token was in the database. As well

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<v Speaker 1>as an a w S access key I D. October

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<v Speaker 1>twenty more Amazon employees were fired over a separate incident,

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<v Speaker 1>but they've been leaking Amazon customer email addresses to a

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<v Speaker 1>third party one line. February one third party gained access

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<v Speaker 1>to logitechs AWS cloud server, which contained backup files to

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<v Speaker 1>customer management of risk and compliance data for security matters.

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<v Speaker 1>October one hacker posted one d and twenty eight gigabytes

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<v Speaker 1>of leaked files from Amazon's Twitch streaming service to a

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<v Speaker 1>four Chan message board. The files included Twitches source code,

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<v Speaker 1>earnings numbers for streamers, and much more. For the job. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>I know there was a long list, but it was

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<v Speaker 1>worth going into detail when you consider it's all related

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<v Speaker 1>to the company that ran a six hundred million dollar

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<v Speaker 1>cloud text service for the c I, a arguably the

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<v Speaker 1>most active intelligence agency on Earth. Now, if you're wondering

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<v Speaker 1>where I'm going with this, things might become clearer when

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<v Speaker 1>we take a look at some of the ways in

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<v Speaker 1>which the CIA themselves have spied on people across the world.

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<v Speaker 1>This project mocking Bird in nineteen sixty three, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>Mockingbird was a c I a wire tapping operation initiated

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<v Speaker 1>by then President John F. Kennedy, the CIA secretly listened

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<v Speaker 1>into the phone conversations of journalists to uncover their sources.

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<v Speaker 1>Then there's the time in nineteen sixty nine when the

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<v Speaker 1>CIA wire tapped anti war activists who were opposed to

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<v Speaker 1>the conflict in Vietnam. Frankly, there are many examples of

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<v Speaker 1>US intelligence agencies spying on its own citizens. One of

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<v Speaker 1>the most notorious was exposed by whistleblower Edwards Snowden, who

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<v Speaker 1>showed through stolen documents that the n s A was

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<v Speaker 1>spying on millions of Americans. Privacy is what gives you

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<v Speaker 1>the ability to share with the world who you are

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<v Speaker 1>on your own terms. Privacy is the fountain head of

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<v Speaker 1>all others. Front of speech doesn't have a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>meaning if you can't have a quiet space, a space

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<v Speaker 1>within yourself, within your mind, within the community of your

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<v Speaker 1>friends with you to decide what it is that you

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<v Speaker 1>actually want to say. Without privacy, you don't have anything

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<v Speaker 1>for yourself. Arguing that you don't care about privacy because

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<v Speaker 1>you have nothing to hide is like arguing that you

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<v Speaker 1>don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>if you believe that the n s a, the CIA

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<v Speaker 1>and all the others have moved past all that and

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<v Speaker 1>would never do it again. Then I guess sleep easy. However,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's worth considering that the next wave of

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<v Speaker 1>technology will probably be used by intelligence agencies the same

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<v Speaker 1>way or the others were. What we do know is this, Amazon,

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<v Speaker 1>a gigantic global company that pretty much openly has no

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<v Speaker 1>scruples when it comes to abusing its workers and spying

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<v Speaker 1>on its customers, has contracts were of the CIA to

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<v Speaker 1>run a cloud network for the data of all seventeen

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<v Speaker 1>of its intelligence agencies, agencies that also have no scruples

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<v Speaker 1>on spying on people and harvesting data to serve its

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<v Speaker 1>own purposes. But don't worry, I'm not about to go

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<v Speaker 1>all conspiracy theorists on you. But honestly, it is no

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<v Speaker 1>secret that the lines between big tech government agencies and

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<v Speaker 1>mega corporations are becoming increasingly blurred. Facebook and Twitter's constant

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<v Speaker 1>compliance with both totalitarian regimes and global intelligence agencies has

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<v Speaker 1>proved this time and again. As we can see, Amazon

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<v Speaker 1>is certainly no stranger to this game either. In less

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<v Speaker 1>than thirty years since it was founded, Amazon went from

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<v Speaker 1>a company that sells cheap books to one that builds

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<v Speaker 1>cloud storage databases for the CIA and willingly gives the

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<v Speaker 1>US police access to its customers home security networks during

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<v Speaker 1>civil rights protests. When you put all of this into context,

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<v Speaker 1>I think personally that it starts to feel like we're

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<v Speaker 1>already running full pel into a grim corporate dystopia. But

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<v Speaker 1>that's me. I'm quite cynical now, Americans, don't worry. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not just you lot that have Amazon team and not

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<v Speaker 1>with your intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, the same thing is happening

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<v Speaker 1>in my country in the UK. Last year in one

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<v Speaker 1>it was revealed in the British media that the country's

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<v Speaker 1>three main intelligence agencies had contracted Amazon's a WS to

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<v Speaker 1>host classified data in a deal that the Financial Times

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<v Speaker 1>newspaper said was quote aimed at boosting the use of data,

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<v Speaker 1>analytics and artificial intelligence for espionage end quote. The technology

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<v Speaker 1>has been taken on by Britain's Government Communications Headquarters or

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<v Speaker 1>g h c Q, and it will also be used

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<v Speaker 1>by Britain's the intel agencies, the Secret Intelligence Service or

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<v Speaker 1>m I six and the Security Service m I five.

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<v Speaker 1>It will also be used by the Ministry of Defence

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<v Speaker 1>in joint operations I think. The following quote from the

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<v Speaker 1>f T sums up many concerns in Britain when it

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<v Speaker 1>comes to this deal. Quote. The contract is likely to

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<v Speaker 1>ignite concerns over sovereignty given that a vast amount of

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<v Speaker 1>the UK's most secret data will be hosted by a

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<v Speaker 1>single U S tech company. The agreement, estimated by industry

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<v Speaker 1>experts to be worth five hundred million pounds to one

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<v Speaker 1>billion pounds over the next decade, was signed this year.

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<v Speaker 1>According to four people familiar with the discussions. However, the

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<v Speaker 1>details are closely guarded and we're not intended to be

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<v Speaker 1>made public end quote. At least when in the US

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<v Speaker 1>the CIA did their deal with Amazon, the figures were

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<v Speaker 1>out there for the public to see. For us here

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<v Speaker 1>in the UK, we're not even allowed to know how

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<v Speaker 1>much of our money as taxpayers went into this deal

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<v Speaker 1>with Amazon, and they didn't even want the details to

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<v Speaker 1>get out at all. Sadly, this level of secrecy and

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<v Speaker 1>audacity from our government is nothing new. Despite the utterly

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<v Speaker 1>negligent lack of coverage on this in the mainstream media,

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<v Speaker 1>the UK is actually slowly becoming an increasingly authoritarian country.

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<v Speaker 1>This isn't a political earbashion either, don't worry, this is

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<v Speaker 1>just an objective fact. Take, for example, the current government's

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<v Speaker 1>plans to introduce something called the Police, Crime, Sentencing and

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<v Speaker 1>Court Bill. It's a long bill, but to sum it up,

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<v Speaker 1>it's effectively an openly authoritarian plan put forward by the

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<v Speaker 1>Tory government to criminalize protests, even completely peaceful ones. It

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<v Speaker 1>will give police the powers to shut down any protest

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<v Speaker 1>based on extremely vague parameters such as noise levels. So

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<v Speaker 1>if it passes, you could literally be legally arrested by

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<v Speaker 1>the police for simply banging a drum at a protest.

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<v Speaker 1>The bill has passed its first round of votes and

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<v Speaker 1>will almost definitely be made into law. Once that's passed,

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<v Speaker 1>the data collected on all protesters will no doubt end

0:16:22.400 --> 0:16:26.600
<v Speaker 1>up processed in the new AWS cloud contracted to Amazon

0:16:26.920 --> 0:16:30.840
<v Speaker 1>by the British government for an undisclosed fee. In this

0:16:30.960 --> 0:16:35.600
<v Speaker 1>hypothetical situation, you could argue that Amazon would essentially become

0:16:35.640 --> 0:16:39.600
<v Speaker 1>a tool for the blatant degradation of a free society.

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<v Speaker 1>I mentioned all of this because I think when you

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<v Speaker 1>look at the grand scheme of things, it all starts

0:16:44.720 --> 0:16:47.680
<v Speaker 1>to tie into each other. I think that becomes even

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:50.040
<v Speaker 1>clearer when you look at what some of this new

0:16:50.080 --> 0:16:54.240
<v Speaker 1>Amazon a WS built technology will be used for. It

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<v Speaker 1>will quote enable spiers to share data more easily from

0:16:58.240 --> 0:17:04.320
<v Speaker 1>field locations overseas and power specialist applications such as speech recognition,

0:17:04.640 --> 0:17:09.240
<v Speaker 1>which can spot and translate particular voices from ours worth

0:17:09.320 --> 0:17:14.800
<v Speaker 1>of intercepted recordings end quote. As we know, governments often

0:17:14.920 --> 0:17:18.560
<v Speaker 1>use spy technology like this to keep tabs on its

0:17:18.640 --> 0:17:30.800
<v Speaker 1>own citizens. Got you saying? The executive director of Privacy,

0:17:30.880 --> 0:17:34.920
<v Speaker 1>International charity that defends and promotes the right to privacy

0:17:34.960 --> 0:17:39.240
<v Speaker 1>across the world, said the following quote. This is yet

0:17:39.320 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 1>another worrying public private partnership agreed in secret. If this

0:17:43.920 --> 0:17:47.240
<v Speaker 1>contract goes through, Amazon will be positioned as the go

0:17:47.400 --> 0:17:51.960
<v Speaker 1>to cloud provider for the world's intelligence agencies. Amazon has

0:17:52.000 --> 0:17:56.120
<v Speaker 1>to answer for itself which country security services it would

0:17:56.119 --> 0:17:59.600
<v Speaker 1>be prepared to work for. Ends quote. I think he's

0:17:59.600 --> 0:18:02.280
<v Speaker 1>got a good point there. Now very in mind, this

0:18:02.400 --> 0:18:06.440
<v Speaker 1>Amazon a w S deal is all backed by Jeremy Fleming,

0:18:06.800 --> 0:18:10.120
<v Speaker 1>the director of g h c Q, who was said

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<v Speaker 1>he wants to put artificial intelligence at quote the heart

0:18:14.760 --> 0:18:19.080
<v Speaker 1>of British spy agencies. Now trust me, it's not just

0:18:19.240 --> 0:18:21.920
<v Speaker 1>me who sees a problem with this a w S

0:18:22.080 --> 0:18:25.320
<v Speaker 1>spy cloud. Even British MPs have kicked up a fuss

0:18:25.440 --> 0:18:30.320
<v Speaker 1>in Parliament over it. Politicians from Labor, the British opposition party,

0:18:30.760 --> 0:18:34.560
<v Speaker 1>have demanded that PRETP tell the Home Secretary explain why

0:18:34.640 --> 0:18:38.080
<v Speaker 1>Britain will be using a US based company for our

0:18:38.200 --> 0:18:42.760
<v Speaker 1>most secretive information. They're also asking if any risk assessment

0:18:42.800 --> 0:18:46.040
<v Speaker 1>was done before this deal was put into motion. One

0:18:46.119 --> 0:18:49.840
<v Speaker 1>Labor MP named Conor mcgin wrote in a letter saying

0:18:50.040 --> 0:18:54.520
<v Speaker 1>quote these reports are deeply concerning and raised serious questions

0:18:54.560 --> 0:18:58.160
<v Speaker 1>about the wider security safeguards in place when it comes

0:18:58.160 --> 0:19:01.520
<v Speaker 1>to the potential risks of outsource in critical elements of

0:19:01.680 --> 0:19:08.200
<v Speaker 1>UK national security infrastructure to non UK based companies end quote. Now,

0:19:08.240 --> 0:19:10.720
<v Speaker 1>if you look at the history of Britain, outsourcing is

0:19:10.800 --> 0:19:15.639
<v Speaker 1>hardly something politicians have cared about before. For example, Margaret Thatcher,

0:19:15.800 --> 0:19:19.600
<v Speaker 1>the now deceased former Prime minister, decimated the north of

0:19:19.640 --> 0:19:24.480
<v Speaker 1>the country through outsourcing. But I digress now. The response

0:19:24.560 --> 0:19:27.920
<v Speaker 1>from the government to the Amazon a w S UK

0:19:28.040 --> 0:19:33.240
<v Speaker 1>spy cloud was frankly a bit blunt and unhelpful. A

0:19:33.440 --> 0:19:38.359
<v Speaker 1>British government spokesman said the following quote, I'm not going

0:19:38.400 --> 0:19:41.720
<v Speaker 1>to comment on the technology used by intelligence services for

0:19:41.800 --> 0:19:47.960
<v Speaker 1>both security and commercial sensitivity reasons end quote. Amazon, for

0:19:48.000 --> 0:19:52.000
<v Speaker 1>their part, declined to comment entirely. Now, I think one

0:19:52.000 --> 0:19:56.320
<v Speaker 1>thing that's worth considering once all these a WS spy

0:19:56.440 --> 0:20:00.879
<v Speaker 1>agency clouds are up and running is what if there's

0:20:00.920 --> 0:20:05.240
<v Speaker 1>a major outage. Well, in December twenty one, there was

0:20:05.359 --> 0:20:09.440
<v Speaker 1>a major a WS outage, Amazon's web server suffering a

0:20:09.560 --> 0:20:13.159
<v Speaker 1>crippling outage today delivery trucks halted for a time and

0:20:13.240 --> 0:20:15.840
<v Speaker 1>taking parts of the Internet with it. The problem not

0:20:15.880 --> 0:20:20.240
<v Speaker 1>only affecting Amazon, but reportedly many other major services, including Netflix,

0:20:20.320 --> 0:20:23.159
<v Speaker 1>Disney Plus, and some of the smart devices right in

0:20:23.200 --> 0:20:27.720
<v Speaker 1>your own home. That massive Amazon server outage temporarily crippling

0:20:27.800 --> 0:20:31.160
<v Speaker 1>some of the world's most popular online services. It went

0:20:31.240 --> 0:20:33.880
<v Speaker 1>through over the JIB. The service was down for several

0:20:33.920 --> 0:20:37.280
<v Speaker 1>hours after a loss of power at one single data

0:20:37.359 --> 0:20:41.000
<v Speaker 1>center in the US. The knock on effect was massive.

0:20:41.600 --> 0:20:45.760
<v Speaker 1>The PlayStation network went down, Zoom went down, Slack went down,

0:20:45.960 --> 0:20:51.160
<v Speaker 1>so did Hulu, Disney, Imager, Epic Games, Grinder, Asana, Netflix,

0:20:51.240 --> 0:20:56.760
<v Speaker 1>and many more applications and sites. It affected many services

0:20:56.840 --> 0:21:00.640
<v Speaker 1>for hours, and this was actually the third a WS

0:21:00.720 --> 0:21:04.560
<v Speaker 1>outage in the space of four weeks. What happens if

0:21:04.600 --> 0:21:08.639
<v Speaker 1>the secret intelligence clouds of the world's most powerful countries

0:21:09.040 --> 0:21:13.440
<v Speaker 1>get an AWS style outage. My guess is it would

0:21:13.440 --> 0:21:16.280
<v Speaker 1>be much worse than not being able to play Halo

0:21:16.440 --> 0:21:21.200
<v Speaker 1>for a few hours. So we know Amazon is spying

0:21:21.240 --> 0:21:25.000
<v Speaker 1>on customers in their homes and is now helping actual

0:21:25.119 --> 0:21:30.000
<v Speaker 1>spy agencies spy on people across the world. Now, let's

0:21:30.040 --> 0:21:32.840
<v Speaker 1>be real. The world is a big, bad place and

0:21:32.880 --> 0:21:37.520
<v Speaker 1>there will always be some need for espionage. Otherwise, every

0:21:37.560 --> 0:21:40.720
<v Speaker 1>hostile country would have the drop on each other, Militants

0:21:40.760 --> 0:21:43.359
<v Speaker 1>would be able to attack innocent people at will, and

0:21:43.400 --> 0:21:46.360
<v Speaker 1>it will probably be more chaotic than it already is.

0:21:47.080 --> 0:21:49.600
<v Speaker 1>But I think we have to ask ourselves, knowing what

0:21:49.680 --> 0:21:53.159
<v Speaker 1>we know about Amazon, do we really want them to

0:21:53.280 --> 0:21:57.679
<v Speaker 1>become the new Big Brother. Well, as we've spoken about

0:21:57.720 --> 0:22:01.320
<v Speaker 1>in this episode, that becomes a really we won't even

0:22:01.400 --> 0:22:06.720
<v Speaker 1>have a choice in the matter. On the next episode

0:22:06.800 --> 0:22:09.920
<v Speaker 1>of Mega Corp, we'll be looking at Jeff bezos quest

0:22:09.920 --> 0:22:13.560
<v Speaker 1>to dominate space and the questionable dealings of his Blue

0:22:13.600 --> 0:22:20.960
<v Speaker 1>origin commercial rocket company. Megacorp is made by my production

0:22:21.000 --> 0:22:26.240
<v Speaker 1>company H eleven for Cool Zone Media. It's written, researched,

0:22:26.359 --> 0:22:31.320
<v Speaker 1>and produced by myself, Jake Hanrahan. It was also produced

0:22:31.320 --> 0:22:37.000
<v Speaker 1>by Sophie Lichtman. Music is by some Black, graphics by

0:22:37.080 --> 0:22:41.720
<v Speaker 1>Adam Doyle and sound engineering by Splicing Block. If you

0:22:41.720 --> 0:22:44.639
<v Speaker 1>want to get in touch, follow me on social media

0:22:45.160 --> 0:22:50.679
<v Speaker 1>at Jake Underscore Hanrahan. That's h a n A h

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<v Speaker 1>A n