WEBVTT - Labor Fights and the Miami Tech Boom... or Bust? 0:00:01.280 --> 0:00:05.280 You're listening to the Bloomberg Opinion podcast counts Saturdays at 0:00:05.280 --> 0:00:08.400 one in seven pm Eastern on Bloomberg dot Com, the 0:00:08.480 --> 0:00:11.600 iHeartRadio app, and the Bloomberg Business App, or listen on 0:00:11.680 --> 0:00:13.760 demand wherever you get your podcasts. 0:00:15.400 --> 0:00:18.919 Welcome to Bloomberg Opinion. I'm Amy Morris. This week, we 0:00:18.960 --> 0:00:21.760 are looking at the blockade in the Senate that hamstrung 0:00:21.840 --> 0:00:26.640 military promotions and how that has exposed flaws in how 0:00:26.680 --> 0:00:30.800 the Senate conducts its business. Also, is Miami the next 0:00:30.840 --> 0:00:33.680 Silicon Valley? For a while it looked like that might 0:00:33.720 --> 0:00:36.880 be the case, but was it all hype? And we'll 0:00:36.960 --> 0:00:40.560 learn how artificial intelligence might be able to help scientists 0:00:40.880 --> 0:00:44.519 track down the causes of diseases. But we begin with 0:00:44.680 --> 0:00:48.240 labor activity. And while some contracts are resolved and others 0:00:48.320 --> 0:00:51.400 are still being debated, there is more concern now that 0:00:51.520 --> 0:00:54.760 more labor strife is coming to the US economy and 0:00:54.800 --> 0:00:58.440 it's not cheap. Judy Ansel is the retired director of 0:00:58.440 --> 0:01:02.120 the Institute for Labor Studies. She predicted the impact of 0:01:02.200 --> 0:01:03.720 the UAW strike. 0:01:03.920 --> 0:01:07.400 It will cause a shortage of cars, and so if 0:01:07.400 --> 0:01:09.319 somebody wants to buy a car, it's going to be 0:01:09.360 --> 0:01:12.760 more difficult to do that. It's going to lower. 0:01:12.480 --> 0:01:17.240 Spending, consumer spending as people tighten their belts. 0:01:17.640 --> 0:01:20.440 And we're pleased to welcome Betsy Stevenson to the show. 0:01:20.480 --> 0:01:23.440 She is a Bloomberg View columnist and an associate professor 0:01:23.480 --> 0:01:27.039 of public policy and economics at the University of Michigan. Now. 0:01:27.040 --> 0:01:29.920 She was on the President's Council of Economic Advisors and 0:01:30.120 --> 0:01:33.560 was chief economist at the US Department of Labor, and 0:01:33.640 --> 0:01:35.880 we are very happy to welcome her to the show. 0:01:36.600 --> 0:01:39.880 Doctor Stevenson, thank you so much for joining us. And 0:01:39.959 --> 0:01:43.200 as you explain in your column on the Bloomberg terminal 0:01:43.480 --> 0:01:47.200 labor strikes, they are not cheap. They idle equipment. You've 0:01:47.240 --> 0:01:51.640 got lost wages, lost shareholder profits, all of this impacting 0:01:51.720 --> 0:01:55.400 economic growth and inflation. But we've seen so much of 0:01:55.440 --> 0:01:58.720 this action of late. Why has this been happening if 0:01:58.760 --> 0:01:59.640 it's so expensive. 0:01:59.760 --> 0:02:03.240 It is worth keeping in mind that in the United 0:02:03.280 --> 0:02:06.320 States we actually rarely see these kind of labor actions 0:02:06.360 --> 0:02:10.600 compared to Europe. So we're thinking, wow, we're seeing a lot, 0:02:11.080 --> 0:02:14.120 but it's not a lot compared to other countries, but 0:02:14.160 --> 0:02:16.840 it is a lot for us. And in fact, the 0:02:17.080 --> 0:02:20.959 number of labor actions was up fifty percent and twenty 0:02:21.000 --> 0:02:24.679 twenty two over twenty twenty one, and we're actually already 0:02:24.760 --> 0:02:27.639 have as many labor actions in twenty twenty three as 0:02:27.639 --> 0:02:30.200 we had in twenty twenty two, so clearly we're going 0:02:30.280 --> 0:02:35.600 to see it up again this year. Why are American workers, 0:02:35.680 --> 0:02:40.639 who usually are able to negotiate deals striking And I 0:02:40.720 --> 0:02:45.239 think the reason is that we're just in a very 0:02:45.480 --> 0:02:48.920 uncertain labor market right now. There's been a lot of 0:02:49.080 --> 0:02:54.320 change over the last twenty years. Workers have lost bargaining power. 0:02:54.360 --> 0:02:59.720 We've seen a shift in wages towards people who would 0:03:00.760 --> 0:03:03.280 economists would call the owners of capital, the people who 0:03:03.320 --> 0:03:06.840 own the equipment, what normal people would call things like shareholders. 0:03:06.919 --> 0:03:12.800 So shareholders are getting these and CEOs are getting great pay, 0:03:12.919 --> 0:03:16.200 but the workers pay as a share of the earnings. 0:03:16.240 --> 0:03:19.720 It's gotten smaller and smaller. That actually turned around a 0:03:19.760 --> 0:03:24.480 little bit during COVID, and it led to a lot 0:03:24.520 --> 0:03:27.040 of people saying that this was a new period where 0:03:27.080 --> 0:03:30.320 workers had a lot of bargaining power. And I think 0:03:30.360 --> 0:03:34.840 that in this uncertain environment, everybody wants to test, well, 0:03:35.320 --> 0:03:40.119 how much can we possibly get as a union unionized workforce, 0:03:40.560 --> 0:03:43.560 and employers are a little reluctant to give because they're 0:03:43.600 --> 0:03:46.280 not sure how much they do need to give, because 0:03:46.320 --> 0:03:49.640 they're looking at twenty years of workers not having a 0:03:49.680 --> 0:03:52.440 lot of bargaining power and wondering did they really have 0:03:52.480 --> 0:03:55.640 a lot of bargaining power right now? I know, unemployments 0:03:55.720 --> 0:03:59.680 really low, but you know, it seems like the labor 0:03:59.720 --> 0:04:03.560 market slowing. So I think it's that uncertainty, no one 0:04:03.600 --> 0:04:07.480 really knowing how much they should give up, that is 0:04:07.600 --> 0:04:09.440 leading to all these labor actions. 0:04:09.800 --> 0:04:12.040 Isn't it funny that some people think, oh, I know, 0:04:12.160 --> 0:04:14.080 I don't know how much I should give up, so 0:04:14.120 --> 0:04:17.240 I should push harder in this uncertainty, whereas there are 0:04:17.279 --> 0:04:20.280 others who would think I can't push harder because of 0:04:20.320 --> 0:04:22.760 the uncertainty. It seems like that would have been a 0:04:22.760 --> 0:04:24.120 flip side of that coin. 0:04:24.440 --> 0:04:27.719 Not necessarily. If you think that this is your one 0:04:27.880 --> 0:04:32.240 chance to actually claw back, Let's take the UAW. They 0:04:32.279 --> 0:04:34.720 make huge concessions in two thousand and eight, when it 0:04:34.760 --> 0:04:38.560 looked like the American auto industry was on the verge 0:04:38.560 --> 0:04:42.800 of collapse. This might be their only opportunity, this opportunity 0:04:42.880 --> 0:04:46.680 to get some of those concessions back. It's not clear 0:04:46.920 --> 0:04:48.960 whether they'll be able to and how much they'll be 0:04:49.000 --> 0:04:54.000 able to. That's what I mean by uncertainty. But if 0:04:54.120 --> 0:04:56.800 now's your best shot, you ought to make a run 0:04:56.839 --> 0:04:59.960 at it, because otherwise you may never get those concent 0:05:00.160 --> 0:05:00.760 shionts back. 0:05:00.960 --> 0:05:04.160 So with that overlay, you do anticipate more labor action 0:05:04.320 --> 0:05:06.480 coming into this year and maybe next year as well. 0:05:07.320 --> 0:05:07.479 You know. 0:05:07.520 --> 0:05:10.640 The the analogy here is to think about, you know, 0:05:10.920 --> 0:05:16.200 when somebody has been accused of a crime, when is 0:05:16.240 --> 0:05:20.080 their lawyer going to suggest that they take a plea deal? Well, 0:05:20.080 --> 0:05:22.359 when it's pretty obvious that they're going to be convicted, 0:05:22.960 --> 0:05:26.080 and you know, you might as well reduce the risk 0:05:26.160 --> 0:05:29.000 by and the cost and the expense of a long 0:05:29.080 --> 0:05:33.039 trial by just coming to an agreement and negotiating a 0:05:33.040 --> 0:05:37.600 plea deal. Similarly, when we see, you know, unions have 0:05:37.640 --> 0:05:41.360 to negotiate their contract with their employers, if everybody sort 0:05:41.400 --> 0:05:43.799 of understands what the outcome is going to be, why 0:05:43.839 --> 0:05:46.080 have all the cost of a strike or a labor 0:05:46.120 --> 0:05:51.000 action just negotiate the deal. What the problem is right now? 0:05:51.040 --> 0:05:55.320 I think it's that environment where it's just not clear 0:05:56.120 --> 0:06:00.840 that I think helps fuel makes it harder to come 0:06:00.839 --> 0:06:03.599 to agreement. And then what we're doing with unions is 0:06:03.640 --> 0:06:07.920 we're layering on a really pivotal time for unions. We're 0:06:08.000 --> 0:06:12.440 hearing that Americans are supporting unions more than they have, 0:06:12.960 --> 0:06:17.719 you know, in fifty years, and so that public approval 0:06:17.760 --> 0:06:20.520 of labor unions remains near highs last seen in the 0:06:20.560 --> 0:06:25.640 mid nineteen sixties. But at the same time, the unionization rate, 0:06:25.839 --> 0:06:29.440 the share of workers in the US economy that are 0:06:29.480 --> 0:06:32.000 members of unions, hid an all time low last year. 0:06:32.560 --> 0:06:35.880 So if unions are going to play an important role 0:06:36.040 --> 0:06:38.920 in the American labor market, they need some big wins 0:06:39.160 --> 0:06:42.960 this year. They need to show that they're there playing 0:06:42.960 --> 0:06:48.840 an important role preserving wages, setting a reasonable standard of living, 0:06:49.040 --> 0:06:53.400 helping to set hours. They want to prove themselves in 0:06:53.520 --> 0:06:56.440 this moment so that they can continue with that public 0:06:56.520 --> 0:07:00.640 approval and then hopefully actually bring more union and members 0:07:01.480 --> 0:07:04.720 on board. Because only six percent of private sector workers 0:07:04.760 --> 0:07:08.560 belong to a union, that's why strikes are not part 0:07:08.560 --> 0:07:11.480 of the everyday economy in the United States is we 0:07:11.560 --> 0:07:15.440 just don't have that many workers who are in unions 0:07:15.440 --> 0:07:19.960 who could potentially strike. What we're seeing is the small 0:07:20.040 --> 0:07:23.400 share of American workers who belong to unions trying to 0:07:23.440 --> 0:07:28.000 flex as much power as they can to prove their 0:07:28.280 --> 0:07:31.480 role in the economy as well as to try to 0:07:31.600 --> 0:07:36.080 halt some of the slide and wages for middle class 0:07:36.120 --> 0:07:38.080 workers that's been going on for decades. 0:07:38.400 --> 0:07:41.480 And we are talking with Professor Betsy Stevenson, former member 0:07:41.480 --> 0:07:44.920 of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and Chief Economists 0:07:44.920 --> 0:07:48.320 at the Department of Labor. I want to boil this 0:07:48.480 --> 0:07:51.240 all down to a cause, if that's possible. You were 0:07:51.280 --> 0:07:54.720 talking about bargaining power and what workers feel like they 0:07:54.760 --> 0:07:56.320 may be able to do and how they can push 0:07:56.400 --> 0:07:59.280 back is part of this because of the pandemic and 0:07:59.320 --> 0:07:59.960 the shutdown. 0:08:00.640 --> 0:08:03.240 What we saw coming out of the pandemic was just 0:08:03.640 --> 0:08:07.440 enormous change in the labor market. The way people do 0:08:07.560 --> 0:08:10.400 their work changed, so lots of people were all of 0:08:10.440 --> 0:08:13.520 a sudden able to work from home. Of course, people 0:08:13.560 --> 0:08:16.080 who work on the factory floor are not able to 0:08:16.120 --> 0:08:19.400 work from home, So now there's a greater schism between 0:08:19.760 --> 0:08:23.120 people who do office jobs where they can now do 0:08:23.200 --> 0:08:26.400 them at least partially from home, and people who need 0:08:26.440 --> 0:08:29.600 to do in person jobs. There was also just a 0:08:29.720 --> 0:08:33.400 change in how American consumers buy things with a shift 0:08:33.440 --> 0:08:37.320 towards goods and away from services. That also really changed 0:08:37.480 --> 0:08:40.840 the demand for workers, and people's preferences for the type 0:08:40.840 --> 0:08:43.800 of work they wanted to do were shaped by the pandemic. 0:08:43.880 --> 0:08:46.760 So coming out of the pandemic, we had a lot 0:08:46.800 --> 0:08:50.960 of change underway in the labor market. And one of 0:08:51.000 --> 0:08:53.319 the other things we saw coming out of the pandemic 0:08:53.800 --> 0:08:59.640 was demand came back faster than supply. That's the best 0:08:59.679 --> 0:09:03.040 way to to explain why we had inflation. People wanted 0:09:03.040 --> 0:09:08.520 to buy things before really sellers were able to fully 0:09:08.600 --> 0:09:11.640 meet the supply of the things people wanted to buy. 0:09:11.960 --> 0:09:17.199 That ended up pushing up prices. And the result of 0:09:17.240 --> 0:09:22.240 inflation is that some people made more money and some 0:09:22.280 --> 0:09:25.760 people didn't. And that's one of the problems with inflation. 0:09:26.440 --> 0:09:28.960 You know, inflation is a generalized rise in prices, so 0:09:29.000 --> 0:09:32.000 it means that wages are going up too, but not 0:09:32.040 --> 0:09:34.400 everybody's wages are going up equally. And one of the 0:09:34.440 --> 0:09:37.760 things we saw with unionized workers was that their wages 0:09:37.840 --> 0:09:42.800 did not rise as rapidly as non unionized workers. And 0:09:42.880 --> 0:09:46.839 as a result, there are a lot of unionized workers 0:09:46.880 --> 0:09:49.920 for whom, you know, in terms of the stuff they 0:09:50.000 --> 0:09:54.520 can buy what economists call real wages. They're earning less 0:09:54.559 --> 0:09:57.880 today than they were in twenty nineteen, and so obviously 0:09:57.880 --> 0:10:01.959 that's a fight worth having. A lot of unionized workers 0:10:02.360 --> 0:10:05.040 they've been you know, particularly if you're talking about a 0:10:05.040 --> 0:10:07.800 big union like the auto industry. You know, they're often 0:10:07.920 --> 0:10:11.200 multi generational auto workers, so they don't really want to 0:10:11.280 --> 0:10:14.760 change jobs, but they do want to make sure that 0:10:14.840 --> 0:10:17.640 they're not getting left behind. Because the people who have 0:10:17.720 --> 0:10:20.560 been changing jobs in this economy, their real wages have 0:10:20.640 --> 0:10:23.520 been growing. They can buy more stuff today with their 0:10:23.559 --> 0:10:27.080 earnings than they could buy in twenty nineteen. That's not 0:10:27.160 --> 0:10:31.120 true for workers who haven't changed jobs. And that's why 0:10:31.800 --> 0:10:34.400 if you're in a job that you've been in for 0:10:34.440 --> 0:10:38.120 a long time, are probably going to push really hard 0:10:38.720 --> 0:10:42.240 for a wage increase so that you're not falling behind. 0:10:42.480 --> 0:10:46.360 Betsy Stevenson, a Bloomberg View columnist and Associate professor of 0:10:46.360 --> 0:10:49.200 public policy and economics at the University of Michigan. It 0:10:49.280 --> 0:10:51.360 has been a pleasure. Thank you so much for taking 0:10:51.360 --> 0:10:52.000 the time with us. 0:10:52.280 --> 0:10:53.280 It's great talking with you. 0:10:53.559 --> 0:10:53.679 Now. 0:10:53.679 --> 0:10:55.400 Coming up, we're going to look at how a blockade 0:10:55.440 --> 0:11:00.000 by a Republican senator exposed some flaws in how lawmakers negotiate. 0:11:00.320 --> 0:11:01.920 You're listening to Bloomberg Opinion. 0:11:13.800 --> 0:11:17.599 You're listening to the Bloomberg Opinion podcast. Catch us Saturdays 0:11:17.640 --> 0:11:20.800 at one and seven pm Eastern on Bloomberg dot Com, 0:11:20.840 --> 0:11:23.960 the iHeartRadio app and the Bloomberg Business app, or listen 0:11:24.040 --> 0:11:26.280 on demand wherever you get your podcasts. 0:11:28.679 --> 0:11:32.400 You're listening to Bloomberg Opinion. I'm Amy Morris. After weeks 0:11:32.440 --> 0:11:35.680 of a blockade by Senator Tommy Turboville of Alabama, the 0:11:35.880 --> 0:11:39.559 Senate finally was able to approve some military promotions, three 0:11:39.679 --> 0:11:42.679 very important ones, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 0:11:42.679 --> 0:11:45.960 of Staff. Now that's a victory for the Pentagon, but 0:11:46.000 --> 0:11:49.400 the way it happened is really a defeat for the Senate. 0:11:49.640 --> 0:11:53.719 Even after those promotions were approved, Senator Tommy Turberville, who 0:11:53.760 --> 0:11:57.240 was behind those blocks, doubled down on the blocks and 0:11:57.280 --> 0:11:59.000 the filibusters. 0:11:58.400 --> 0:12:04.600 Oh remaining place. The Pentagon's illegal abortion policy remains in place. 0:12:06.080 --> 0:12:09.120 If the Pentagon lifts the policy, then I will lift 0:12:09.160 --> 0:12:10.480 my hole as easy as that. 0:12:10.720 --> 0:12:13.160 So the Senator, they're saying that those holds will continue, 0:12:13.160 --> 0:12:15.640 and you can bet that's going to have larger implications 0:12:16.000 --> 0:12:19.080 let's talk about it with Bloomberg opinion columnist Jonathan Bernstein. 0:12:19.120 --> 0:12:23.400 He covers politics and policy and joins us. Now, Jonathan, 0:12:23.520 --> 0:12:27.360 what does this tell us about how the Senate operates? 0:12:28.600 --> 0:12:32.959 Well, the nominations process really has sort of broken down. 0:12:34.000 --> 0:12:36.480 You know, putting a hole on something that is a 0:12:36.520 --> 0:12:41.760 senator essentially threatening to filibuster or filibustering by threatening to 0:12:41.760 --> 0:12:45.760 filibuster is a time honored Senate tradition goes back fifty 0:12:45.840 --> 0:12:48.400 years or so, and then other ways goes back more 0:12:48.440 --> 0:12:51.640 than that, and it allows individual senators to really have 0:12:51.720 --> 0:12:55.200 a say, which is potentially a very good thing. But 0:12:55.320 --> 0:12:59.760 what's happening now is that there's a basically a hold 0:12:59.840 --> 0:13:05.560 on everything. That's been true of executive branch and judicial 0:13:05.640 --> 0:13:09.040 nominations for some time now. But at least there's only 0:13:09.160 --> 0:13:12.520 there's enough time to get to process all of those 0:13:12.559 --> 0:13:17.199 one by one. There are hundreds of these military promotions 0:13:17.240 --> 0:13:20.320 that have to get done. They're normally all done in 0:13:20.400 --> 0:13:21.080 one batch. 0:13:22.440 --> 0:13:22.640 You know. 0:13:23.080 --> 0:13:25.720 The chairman of the committee comes and says, you know, 0:13:25.760 --> 0:13:28.400 I want, you know, as consent to consider on block 0:13:29.920 --> 0:13:33.400 the following nominations, and they list the numbers they get 0:13:33.480 --> 0:13:37.560 numbered by and they'll say, you know, eleven thirty five 0:13:37.679 --> 0:13:42.040 through twelve seventy four, and everybody will give their consent 0:13:42.520 --> 0:13:48.000 and that's it. It's done. Instead, Tuberville is making them 0:13:48.000 --> 0:13:51.640 go one by one, and that's what they did on 0:13:51.679 --> 0:13:57.560 these three exceptions. They it took them two days. I'll 0:13:57.559 --> 0:14:00.960 sendate time to consider the chairman and joy to staff 0:14:00.960 --> 0:14:05.840 and two others. You can't do hundreds of military promotions 0:14:07.240 --> 0:14:09.880 taking you know, taking up sent a time like that. 0:14:10.280 --> 0:14:14.160 So there's stopped. There's no real means for the Senate 0:14:14.160 --> 0:14:16.800 to do it unless they change procedures. 0:14:18.040 --> 0:14:20.400 Now, you had mentioned that this is a tried and 0:14:20.480 --> 0:14:23.400 true sort of technique that the Senate has used before 0:14:23.720 --> 0:14:27.800 a procedural move, and usually a member uses it to 0:14:27.920 --> 0:14:30.640 influence policy or make a point or what have you. 0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:33.360 But this feels different. How is it different? 0:14:34.440 --> 0:14:37.720 Well, it's different because there's a few things. One is 0:14:39.520 --> 0:14:42.680 that it's that he's using military promotions that's been done before, 0:14:42.680 --> 0:14:46.280 but very rarely and usually temporarily. Typically, you put a 0:14:46.320 --> 0:14:49.920 hold on a nominee to you know, in this case, 0:14:49.960 --> 0:14:54.880 you could do a civilian Department of Defense position and 0:14:54.960 --> 0:14:57.840 say I'm going to put a hold on the assistant 0:14:57.880 --> 0:15:04.360 Secretary of whatever until you consider my point. The second 0:15:04.400 --> 0:15:09.400 thing is that usually it's bargaining for some sort of 0:15:09.520 --> 0:15:12.880 deal that can be made. So you know, often it's 0:15:12.920 --> 0:15:16.200 something for your home state, and you know, this national 0:15:16.240 --> 0:15:20.320 policy treats my state really unfairly. Let's make a deal 0:15:20.360 --> 0:15:23.840 to do something about it. That's a positive thing for 0:15:24.240 --> 0:15:28.600 US democracy. In my view. It sometimes means that your senator, 0:15:28.840 --> 0:15:30.440 you know, if you get their attention, you get special 0:15:30.440 --> 0:15:33.480 treatment for the state. But that's not unreasonable, and then 0:15:33.520 --> 0:15:35.840 they get a deal and they take off the whole. 0:15:37.640 --> 0:15:37.840 You know. 0:15:38.080 --> 0:15:43.720 Also, it's usually something which because it's something small and 0:15:44.240 --> 0:15:48.080 that most people don't care about, typically you can make 0:15:48.120 --> 0:15:51.240 a deal. This is something which is a policy that 0:15:52.240 --> 0:15:54.280 Tuberville is in the minority of. You know, we have 0:15:54.320 --> 0:16:00.800 a democratic majority in the Senate. There's probably fifty three 0:16:01.120 --> 0:16:07.320 or more senators who approve of the DoD policy on 0:16:07.400 --> 0:16:12.920 abortion and or on military travel for to be able 0:16:12.920 --> 0:16:15.480 to give him abortion. And so he's saying, well, I 0:16:15.520 --> 0:16:20.040 don't care that I'm the minority on this and that 0:16:20.120 --> 0:16:22.240 people on the other side feel as strongly as I do. 0:16:22.760 --> 0:16:26.120 I'm going to just shut down this whole process because 0:16:26.720 --> 0:16:29.520 I want because I can't. And the problem with that 0:16:29.680 --> 0:16:31.200 is that the other side can do the same thing 0:16:31.320 --> 0:16:34.760 and then you just nothing happens, and that's not a 0:16:34.800 --> 0:16:35.880 healthy process. 0:16:36.720 --> 0:16:39.800 And as you alluded to just now, Republicans oppose the 0:16:39.840 --> 0:16:42.160 way he is doing this and with whom he is 0:16:42.200 --> 0:16:45.000 doing this. And what I mean is Republicans aren't usually 0:16:45.000 --> 0:16:46.520 the ones who are going to go head to head 0:16:46.520 --> 0:16:49.160 with the Pentagon, right, They're not usually the ones who 0:16:49.200 --> 0:16:55.280 don't sign onto any kind of military spending, support promotions, 0:16:55.320 --> 0:16:58.560 that sort of thing. They're usually in lockstep. So a 0:16:58.600 --> 0:17:01.320 lot of them don't like a stretch, but why are 0:17:01.320 --> 0:17:02.480 they going along with it? 0:17:03.120 --> 0:17:05.840 Generally? The problem is that to do anything about this, 0:17:05.920 --> 0:17:08.960 there's two ways, you knew it. They could pressure him 0:17:09.240 --> 0:17:12.959 within the party and perhaps make him back down, but 0:17:13.000 --> 0:17:14.800 you know, it's not the same Republican party that we 0:17:14.960 --> 0:17:17.800 had ten or twenty or thirty years ago. A lot 0:17:17.800 --> 0:17:21.560 of Republicans now are perfectly happy with bashing the Pentagon. 0:17:22.040 --> 0:17:24.879 The other piece of it is that to change you 0:17:24.880 --> 0:17:27.640 could just change of procedures. You could say, well, we're 0:17:27.680 --> 0:17:31.040 going to make it a rule or a procedure that 0:17:31.400 --> 0:17:34.480 without asking for consent, you can consider all of these 0:17:34.800 --> 0:17:37.760 all these promotions together. But the problem with that is 0:17:37.800 --> 0:17:40.639 that it means that individual senators would be would be 0:17:40.720 --> 0:17:44.640 voting to take away their future rights. And senators don't 0:17:44.680 --> 0:17:47.080 like taking away their individual rights. They're very proud of 0:17:48.040 --> 0:17:53.600 there and jealous of their status as US senators. It's 0:17:53.680 --> 0:17:56.439 possible that we're going to move to a place where 0:17:56.920 --> 0:17:59.280 the Senate just can't work that way anymore. That seems 0:17:59.320 --> 0:18:03.120 to be what's happened with nominations, and you know they're 0:18:03.200 --> 0:18:05.639 losing something if they do it. I know people think, well, 0:18:05.680 --> 0:18:08.359 those individual centers should be able to block things like this, 0:18:09.000 --> 0:18:12.160 but there really is a good reason for it if 0:18:12.160 --> 0:18:14.760 it works, but the Senate, individual senators have to show 0:18:14.800 --> 0:18:17.040 some restraint, and that's just not happening. 0:18:17.320 --> 0:18:20.560 And we're talking with Bloomberg opinion columnist Jonathan Bernstein about 0:18:20.560 --> 0:18:24.639 how the Pentagon and this blocking process has exposed some 0:18:24.680 --> 0:18:27.960 flaws and how the Senate conducts its business. A shifting 0:18:27.960 --> 0:18:30.679 gear is just a little bit from one side to 0:18:30.720 --> 0:18:32.520 the other. You make the point in your column that 0:18:32.600 --> 0:18:36.080 the whole point of the confirmation process not the ability 0:18:36.080 --> 0:18:37.879 to fill a buster or put a hold on something, 0:18:37.920 --> 0:18:41.640 but the confirmation process itself is to restrict the authority 0:18:41.640 --> 0:18:44.840 of the president and empower the Senate, and this tactic, 0:18:45.440 --> 0:18:49.000 when not used the way it was intended, may undermine that. 0:18:49.160 --> 0:18:52.600 How So, yeah, you know one of the things, well, okay, 0:18:52.640 --> 0:18:55.159 so we have these hundreds of promotions, you can't do 0:18:55.200 --> 0:18:57.080 them individually on the Senate floor. You have to do 0:18:57.119 --> 0:19:01.600 them in bulked. If that can't work because individual senators 0:19:02.160 --> 0:19:06.080 won't do it, then what's going to happen is eventually 0:19:06.119 --> 0:19:08.920 that's going to go away, and and you know, you'll 0:19:09.560 --> 0:19:13.080 there'll be a rule that you'll have to have the 0:19:13.160 --> 0:19:17.440 promotions done. It's it's happens all the time, or suggests 0:19:17.480 --> 0:19:22.119 I'll have for executive branch nominations, especially. You know, we 0:19:23.359 --> 0:19:28.760 have way more political people in our executive branch agencies 0:19:29.200 --> 0:19:32.960 and departments than comparable democracies do. And it's a real 0:19:33.119 --> 0:19:36.600 democratic strength in my view, because it means that the 0:19:36.640 --> 0:19:39.600 executive branch isn't just the tool of the presidency, and 0:19:39.640 --> 0:19:43.520 it's also not just permanent bureaucracy. Congress has a role 0:19:43.520 --> 0:19:47.800 in it too. But if Congress can't do the the job, 0:19:47.880 --> 0:19:50.359 then what you're going to get is calls for fewer 0:19:50.400 --> 0:19:55.080 and fewer Senate confirmed people which is either going to 0:19:55.119 --> 0:19:57.800 mean the president appoints them or that they'll be part 0:19:57.840 --> 0:20:00.560 of the permanent bureacracy themselves. And neither of those is 0:20:00.560 --> 0:20:04.760 really good for US democracy, because instead of Congress and 0:20:04.840 --> 0:20:09.080 the President and the bureaucracy all constraining each other, Congress 0:20:09.119 --> 0:20:12.200 will be cut out of it to a larger extent. 0:20:12.280 --> 0:20:15.960 The already is Bloomberg Opinion columnist Jonathan Bernstein, and coming 0:20:16.040 --> 0:20:19.439 up we'll learn how Miami could have been the next 0:20:19.480 --> 0:20:23.000 silicon valley. In fact, it may still hold some promise 0:20:23.080 --> 0:20:26.040 for becoming the next big tech sector. Don't forget. We're 0:20:26.080 --> 0:20:29.480 available as a podcast on Apple, Spotify or your favorite 0:20:29.480 --> 0:20:32.399 podcast platform. This is Bloomberg Opinion. 0:20:43.760 --> 0:20:47.600 You're listening to the Bloomberg Opinion podcast. Can't just Saturdays 0:20:47.600 --> 0:20:50.760 at one in seven pm Eastern on Bloomberg dot Com, 0:20:50.800 --> 0:20:53.960 the iHeartRadio app and the Bloomberg Business app, or listen 0:20:54.000 --> 0:20:56.240 on demand wherever you get your podcasts. 0:20:58.119 --> 0:21:00.360 This is Bloomberg Opinion. I may need more. Where As 0:21:00.560 --> 0:21:04.400 the Miami area has always been prone to hype cycles, 0:21:04.440 --> 0:21:07.240 and the great tech boom of recent years is the 0:21:07.320 --> 0:21:10.119 latest example. Now, for months, you may recall there was 0:21:10.160 --> 0:21:12.919 this popular narrative that the region could become a viable 0:21:12.960 --> 0:21:17.720 alternative to say Silicon Valley. That's mostly fizzled, but there 0:21:17.720 --> 0:21:20.600 appears to be some lingering promise. Let's talk about it now. 0:21:20.600 --> 0:21:24.040 Bloomberg opinion columnist Jonathan Levin has served as the Miami 0:21:24.080 --> 0:21:26.440 bureau gy for Bloomberg in the past, and he joins 0:21:26.520 --> 0:21:30.320 us now. He knows the area quite well. Jonathan, was 0:21:30.400 --> 0:21:33.879 all of that talk about replacing or at least supplementing 0:21:33.920 --> 0:21:36.840 Silicon Valley puffery? Or was there something there? 0:21:37.280 --> 0:21:39.119 Yeah? Kind of sort of. So all of this is 0:21:39.160 --> 0:21:43.199 started during the COVID nineteen pandemic when City of Miami 0:21:43.240 --> 0:21:47.040 Mayor Francis Suarez got on social media and started talking 0:21:47.080 --> 0:21:52.800 about how you venture capitalists, tech entrepreneurs should move from 0:21:52.960 --> 0:21:57.280 San Francisco to Miami, you know. And I think part 0:21:57.280 --> 0:22:00.440 of it was always a little bit political, quite Frankly, 0:22:01.560 --> 0:22:05.000 Francis is a Republican. Of course, he ran for the 0:22:05.119 --> 0:22:09.720 Republican and nomination for president very briefly, and there was this, 0:22:10.160 --> 0:22:13.359 you know, pervasive narrative that they were all trying to 0:22:13.400 --> 0:22:16.760 push like kind of come to the Free State of Florida. 0:22:17.000 --> 0:22:17.239 You know. 0:22:17.359 --> 0:22:20.879 San Francisco is such a disaster. So there was a 0:22:20.880 --> 0:22:24.600 lot of politics, and they tried to convince us that 0:22:24.640 --> 0:22:27.719 it was also an economic narrative. But all that was 0:22:27.760 --> 0:22:32.880 happening and then suddenly the number the VC investment numbers 0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:35.880 in South Florida actually start to go up a lot, 0:22:36.160 --> 0:22:38.120 and so you said, wait a minute, maybe is there 0:22:38.160 --> 0:22:43.040 actually something to this. Right, So the magnitude I'm talking 0:22:43.040 --> 0:22:47.320 about is like South Florida has always been like a 0:22:47.359 --> 0:22:50.880 third tier VC market, So on a trailing twelve month 0:22:50.960 --> 0:22:54.080 basis before the pandemic, they were doing something on the 0:22:54.160 --> 0:22:57.879 order of like two billion dollars for twelve month period 0:22:57.920 --> 0:23:02.520 in terms of VC capital injected. It jumped all the 0:23:02.560 --> 0:23:07.399 way up. At the peak this is sort of early 0:23:07.440 --> 0:23:10.840 to mid twenty twenty two to eight billion dollars, so quadrupling. 0:23:10.920 --> 0:23:15.639 So you say, maybe there was actually something going on there. 0:23:16.480 --> 0:23:20.200 But you take a step back and you realize that 0:23:20.680 --> 0:23:26.040 some of the development officials and politicians were maybe playing 0:23:26.119 --> 0:23:28.560 with the numbers a little bit to their advantage. So 0:23:28.680 --> 0:23:33.080 part of the story is VC boomed everywhere, right, and 0:23:33.680 --> 0:23:37.280 tons of cities were beneficiars of this. At the same 0:23:37.320 --> 0:23:42.000 time the VC was booming everywhere, you also had the 0:23:42.040 --> 0:23:47.879 COVID work from anywhere phenomenon which made beneficiaries of a 0:23:47.920 --> 0:23:54.400 lot of cities, not just Miami, but also some cities 0:23:54.440 --> 0:23:57.600 that I think you would say are quite counter narrative 0:23:57.680 --> 0:24:01.360 to this. You know, liberal cities are a mess. Come 0:24:01.400 --> 0:24:04.680 to the free State of Florida narrative. Chicago, for instance, 0:24:05.640 --> 0:24:08.600 big boom during that period. You can also look at 0:24:08.640 --> 0:24:13.679