1 00:00:04,120 --> 00:00:07,160 Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how 2 00:00:07,200 --> 00:00:13,840 Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. 3 00:00:13,840 --> 00:00:16,400 Speaker 1: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with 4 00:00:16,440 --> 00:00:20,160 Speaker 1: how Stuff Works in the Love all Things Tech and 5 00:00:20,320 --> 00:00:23,520 Speaker 1: tech Stuff. Listener Tyler wrote in to ask me if 6 00:00:23,560 --> 00:00:29,640 Speaker 1: I could do an episode about the dark Web. Yay. Now, 7 00:00:29,680 --> 00:00:33,000 Speaker 1: I've done episodes in the past relating to the dark Web. 8 00:00:33,040 --> 00:00:34,760 Speaker 1: I've talked about what the dark web is, but I 9 00:00:34,800 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 1: figured revisiting it is a good idea. That's one of 10 00:00:37,000 --> 00:00:39,600 Speaker 1: those topics that tends to be in and now the 11 00:00:39,600 --> 00:00:42,199 Speaker 1: news pretty frequently. In fact, the day that I record this, 12 00:00:42,880 --> 00:00:47,240 Speaker 1: a couple of different news stories came out about relating 13 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:51,360 Speaker 1: to the dark Web. And when people start bandying about 14 00:00:51,400 --> 00:00:54,600 Speaker 1: that name, uh, a lot of different ideas come to mind. 15 00:00:55,000 --> 00:00:57,240 Speaker 1: So what is it all about? That's what we're going 16 00:00:57,280 --> 00:00:59,279 Speaker 1: to try and answer. The very name conjures up this 17 00:00:59,320 --> 00:01:02,200 Speaker 1: idea of a egal goods and services, kind of a 18 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:07,360 Speaker 1: black market for the Internet, and that's definitely a part 19 00:01:07,800 --> 00:01:09,679 Speaker 1: of the dark Web. In fact, you might argue it 20 00:01:09,760 --> 00:01:11,360 Speaker 1: is a very large part of the dark Web, but 21 00:01:11,400 --> 00:01:15,959 Speaker 1: it is not the whole picture. So here we go. First, 22 00:01:16,959 --> 00:01:19,600 Speaker 1: it's good to remind ourselves of how the world Wide 23 00:01:19,600 --> 00:01:23,440 Speaker 1: Web tends to work. The web we typically use on 24 00:01:23,480 --> 00:01:27,839 Speaker 1: a day to day basis, So your average Internet user, 25 00:01:28,000 --> 00:01:32,840 Speaker 1: not someone who's a hacker or is trying to evade detection, 26 00:01:33,080 --> 00:01:37,039 Speaker 1: just your average person. When this average person makes a 27 00:01:37,080 --> 00:01:40,520 Speaker 1: regular run of the mill website so that they're creating 28 00:01:40,560 --> 00:01:43,080 Speaker 1: their own website, he or she will build out this 29 00:01:43,160 --> 00:01:46,600 Speaker 1: site and create links between pages on the site so 30 00:01:46,680 --> 00:01:50,720 Speaker 1: you can navigate easily across the different pages. Maybe they 31 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:54,320 Speaker 1: include some links out to a few other sites that 32 00:01:54,400 --> 00:01:58,520 Speaker 1: are of a related topic or interest. Maybe some of 33 00:01:58,520 --> 00:02:00,840 Speaker 1: those sites are owned by that same person, maybe they're 34 00:02:00,880 --> 00:02:03,760 Speaker 1: owned by different people. Then they might build out some 35 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:07,880 Speaker 1: meta data on their web pages. This helps tag those 36 00:02:07,880 --> 00:02:12,799 Speaker 1: pages to indicate what the site is actually about. Now, 37 00:02:12,840 --> 00:02:16,600 Speaker 1: assuming there are no incoming links to this website, Let's 38 00:02:16,600 --> 00:02:21,400 Speaker 1: say you're Logic a brand new website and there there's 39 00:02:21,440 --> 00:02:24,160 Speaker 1: no connection with anything else yet, like no one else 40 00:02:24,160 --> 00:02:27,560 Speaker 1: has any incoming links to your site, then you might 41 00:02:27,600 --> 00:02:31,360 Speaker 1: want to use a tool like Google's search console to 42 00:02:31,720 --> 00:02:34,440 Speaker 1: fetch the U r L of your website. You know 43 00:02:34,480 --> 00:02:37,280 Speaker 1: you've established it, you've got it launched on the server 44 00:02:38,000 --> 00:02:40,400 Speaker 1: you fetch the u r L using that tool, and 45 00:02:40,440 --> 00:02:44,519 Speaker 1: that will help index your website and Google's search index, 46 00:02:45,080 --> 00:02:48,040 Speaker 1: and that tells Google where the website is and what's 47 00:02:48,120 --> 00:02:51,400 Speaker 1: on it. Then Google can sent its crawlers to explore 48 00:02:51,440 --> 00:02:53,280 Speaker 1: your site, follow all the links to all the different 49 00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:55,760 Speaker 1: pages and build out a better understanding of what the 50 00:02:55,760 --> 00:02:59,280 Speaker 1: site is about, including those individual pages, and put them 51 00:02:59,280 --> 00:03:04,200 Speaker 1: all in search. And these links between pages and between 52 00:03:04,240 --> 00:03:09,120 Speaker 1: sites are really important. The links are the web in 53 00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:11,920 Speaker 1: Worldwide Web right, we call it a web because they 54 00:03:11,960 --> 00:03:15,119 Speaker 1: are all these different links between different pages. So it's 55 00:03:15,160 --> 00:03:17,840 Speaker 1: not just how you can navigate from one page or 56 00:03:17,960 --> 00:03:21,519 Speaker 1: site to another, but it's also how search engines can 57 00:03:21,760 --> 00:03:25,080 Speaker 1: find an index sites to include in search results. They 58 00:03:25,120 --> 00:03:29,720 Speaker 1: send out these automatic crawlers that crawl the web and 59 00:03:29,800 --> 00:03:33,119 Speaker 1: index everything. Ranking high in search is a really good 60 00:03:33,160 --> 00:03:36,280 Speaker 1: way to get traffic to your site generally, not as 61 00:03:37,120 --> 00:03:39,120 Speaker 1: not as good a way as it used to be, actually, 62 00:03:39,160 --> 00:03:42,440 Speaker 1: because the way that people get their links to go 63 00:03:42,640 --> 00:03:46,440 Speaker 1: visit stuff changes over time. But you want to use 64 00:03:46,520 --> 00:03:50,560 Speaker 1: good search engine optimization. Now that's tricky because there are 65 00:03:50,560 --> 00:03:55,200 Speaker 1: different search engines, and different search engines have different priorities 66 00:03:55,600 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: as to what is important for ranking and search. They 67 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:04,200 Speaker 1: have different algorithms, and these can change without notice. So 68 00:04:04,280 --> 00:04:07,480 Speaker 1: one day your site might rank really well in a 69 00:04:07,520 --> 00:04:10,040 Speaker 1: particular search engine, and then the next day it suddenly 70 00:04:10,120 --> 00:04:12,400 Speaker 1: is pushed to the third page or lower, and no 71 00:04:12,440 --> 00:04:16,040 Speaker 1: one's seeing it when they search for whatever the terms are. Now, 72 00:04:16,080 --> 00:04:19,640 Speaker 1: all of this assumes that you want people to easily 73 00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:22,159 Speaker 1: find your stuff in the first place, that you want 74 00:04:22,160 --> 00:04:26,599 Speaker 1: to be part of this surface web. You want search 75 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:28,760 Speaker 1: engines to index your site and make it easier for 76 00:04:28,800 --> 00:04:32,360 Speaker 1: traffic to come to you. Your website is part of 77 00:04:32,400 --> 00:04:35,240 Speaker 1: this surface web, the stuff that's really easy to find 78 00:04:35,240 --> 00:04:40,200 Speaker 1: and navigate to on purpose, it was made intentionally that way. Now, 79 00:04:40,279 --> 00:04:44,120 Speaker 1: in actuality, that represents a very small percentage of all 80 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:47,680 Speaker 1: the information that is on the web. And if you 81 00:04:47,720 --> 00:04:50,200 Speaker 1: think of it, it's kind of like an iceberg, right. 82 00:04:50,279 --> 00:04:53,120 Speaker 1: The part you see above the water is only a 83 00:04:53,200 --> 00:04:58,119 Speaker 1: tiny fraction of the entire iceberg. Most of the mass 84 00:04:58,120 --> 00:05:01,720 Speaker 1: of the iceberg is out of So it is with 85 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:04,599 Speaker 1: the Worldwide Web. You've got the surface web, the stuff 86 00:05:04,600 --> 00:05:08,200 Speaker 1: you can see. That's a tiny percentage. What if you 87 00:05:08,880 --> 00:05:12,200 Speaker 1: don't want to be found so easily, Maybe you're creating 88 00:05:12,320 --> 00:05:16,840 Speaker 1: a database and that database has information in it that's important, 89 00:05:17,000 --> 00:05:18,960 Speaker 1: and you want certain people to be able to get 90 00:05:19,040 --> 00:05:21,360 Speaker 1: to it very easily, but you don't want the whole 91 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:24,599 Speaker 1: world to get there. Right, it's not that there's anything 92 00:05:24,600 --> 00:05:27,720 Speaker 1: wrong in the database. Maybe there's proprietary information. Maybe you 93 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:31,040 Speaker 1: work for a company and you've built out a database 94 00:05:31,320 --> 00:05:34,839 Speaker 1: that needs to be web accessible because people in your 95 00:05:34,920 --> 00:05:37,800 Speaker 1: company may be trusted partners. They need to have access 96 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:40,280 Speaker 1: to this information. But you don't want the general public 97 00:05:40,320 --> 00:05:44,719 Speaker 1: to get it. You want to limit people. Well, there 98 00:05:44,760 --> 00:05:47,080 Speaker 1: are a couple of ways you can do this. One 99 00:05:47,160 --> 00:05:49,880 Speaker 1: is you can include some code in your HTML to 100 00:05:49,920 --> 00:05:53,080 Speaker 1: prevent your site from being indexed by search engines. There's 101 00:05:53,120 --> 00:05:56,919 Speaker 1: a meta tag called no index all one word no 102 00:05:57,040 --> 00:06:00,320 Speaker 1: index that tells search butts you don't want that site 103 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:03,680 Speaker 1: to be included on search results page. But that's kind 104 00:06:03,680 --> 00:06:06,560 Speaker 1: of a minor form of protection. It does not stop 105 00:06:06,640 --> 00:06:11,200 Speaker 1: other sites from linking straight to yours. Right, So I 106 00:06:11,279 --> 00:06:15,080 Speaker 1: might not show up on anyone's search engine. But let's 107 00:06:15,120 --> 00:06:18,360 Speaker 1: say I've created this database and I don't have any 108 00:06:18,360 --> 00:06:20,479 Speaker 1: other protection on it other than the fact that I've 109 00:06:20,520 --> 00:06:23,080 Speaker 1: told it not to get indexed in any search engines. 110 00:06:23,720 --> 00:06:26,520 Speaker 1: There's nothing stopping someone else from creating a link to 111 00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:29,440 Speaker 1: my database that would still send people straight there. Right. 112 00:06:30,160 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 1: This section of the web that is blocked off from 113 00:06:32,279 --> 00:06:35,839 Speaker 1: search engines in general is what we would call the 114 00:06:35,960 --> 00:06:39,840 Speaker 1: deep web. So this is underneath the water in that 115 00:06:39,880 --> 00:06:43,159 Speaker 1: iceberg metaphor. The deep web has tons of stuff in it, 116 00:06:43,880 --> 00:06:47,520 Speaker 1: including stuff that's important but probably not very interesting for 117 00:06:47,600 --> 00:06:50,640 Speaker 1: the general public, like those databases I was talking about 118 00:06:50,800 --> 00:06:53,839 Speaker 1: that would be really important for some people and probably 119 00:06:53,920 --> 00:06:57,440 Speaker 1: of no interest at all to of the of the 120 00:06:57,480 --> 00:07:00,240 Speaker 1: population out there. The only way to navigate the air 121 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:03,280 Speaker 1: is to type in the specific U r L in 122 00:07:03,320 --> 00:07:07,360 Speaker 1: a web browser, and it may likely have other forms 123 00:07:07,360 --> 00:07:10,360 Speaker 1: of security, such as a password login page where you 124 00:07:10,400 --> 00:07:13,320 Speaker 1: have to have an account in order to gain access 125 00:07:13,360 --> 00:07:16,800 Speaker 1: to whatever is behind that, but you can't get there 126 00:07:16,920 --> 00:07:20,200 Speaker 1: unless you already know the address. Uh. It would be 127 00:07:20,240 --> 00:07:23,880 Speaker 1: like navigating to a secret location on a map, and 128 00:07:23,920 --> 00:07:26,360 Speaker 1: the only way you can get to the secret location 129 00:07:26,760 --> 00:07:31,440 Speaker 1: is if you already know where it is. Then beyond 130 00:07:31,520 --> 00:07:34,360 Speaker 1: the deep web is the dark web. This is a 131 00:07:34,440 --> 00:07:39,960 Speaker 1: subsection of the deep web. Unlike the deep web, you 132 00:07:40,080 --> 00:07:42,800 Speaker 1: cannot navigate to sites on the dark Web through normal 133 00:07:42,880 --> 00:07:47,600 Speaker 1: web browsers. Typically you would need special dark web browsers, 134 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:50,920 Speaker 1: the most well known of which is Tour, the tour 135 00:07:51,160 --> 00:07:55,040 Speaker 1: browser bundle. Tour stands for a couple of different things. Actually, 136 00:07:55,040 --> 00:07:57,440 Speaker 1: we'll get into that. A lot of shady stuff can 137 00:07:57,440 --> 00:08:01,960 Speaker 1: happen on the dark web. It's not all illegal activity, 138 00:08:02,120 --> 00:08:07,040 Speaker 1: but a lot of it definitely is illegal activity. And 139 00:08:07,040 --> 00:08:10,400 Speaker 1: there are tons of bad actors out there on the 140 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:13,200 Speaker 1: dark Web. I'm not talking about people who do really 141 00:08:13,320 --> 00:08:17,120 Speaker 1: crappy performances and movies and film and television and plays 142 00:08:17,120 --> 00:08:20,720 Speaker 1: and stuff. I mean people who are out to exploit 143 00:08:20,840 --> 00:08:24,320 Speaker 1: other people and companies, people who are out to steal 144 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:28,200 Speaker 1: information for profit or cause mischief. There are a lot 145 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:30,840 Speaker 1: of them on the dark web. These are people or 146 00:08:30,920 --> 00:08:34,360 Speaker 1: groups who deal in data. They look for careless folks 147 00:08:34,360 --> 00:08:37,839 Speaker 1: who do not protect their information very well. Even something 148 00:08:37,880 --> 00:08:41,079 Speaker 1: is seemingly boring as an IP address can be dangerous 149 00:08:41,200 --> 00:08:44,360 Speaker 1: in their hands. And because a ton of stuff on 150 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:48,760 Speaker 1: the dark web is at least of questionable legality, you 151 00:08:48,840 --> 00:08:52,120 Speaker 1: probably don't want to leave a trail of where you've been. 152 00:08:52,440 --> 00:08:55,320 Speaker 1: If you visit the dark web. Your Internet service provider 153 00:08:55,480 --> 00:08:58,400 Speaker 1: would have a record of this, and then perhaps someday 154 00:08:58,520 --> 00:09:01,360 Speaker 1: law enforcement officials serve that I s P with an 155 00:09:01,440 --> 00:09:05,000 Speaker 1: order to hand over data. Maybe you did nothing wrong. 156 00:09:05,200 --> 00:09:08,040 Speaker 1: Maybe all you were doing was just being curious and 157 00:09:08,080 --> 00:09:10,120 Speaker 1: seeing what happens to be out there on the deep 158 00:09:10,160 --> 00:09:13,400 Speaker 1: web or the dark web. And then you're just looking around. 159 00:09:13,720 --> 00:09:16,520 Speaker 1: But now you've got a trail. The I s P 160 00:09:17,360 --> 00:09:20,360 Speaker 1: knows that you went there, and now the fuzzes on 161 00:09:20,400 --> 00:09:24,000 Speaker 1: your tail because you didn't cover it tracks. So there's 162 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:26,760 Speaker 1: another element to visiting the dark web that you'll here 163 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:29,560 Speaker 1: mentioned all the time, and that would be VPNs or 164 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 1: virtual private networks. Those act as sort of a stopper 165 00:09:33,480 --> 00:09:37,000 Speaker 1: between you and the dark web. There's actually a couple 166 00:09:37,040 --> 00:09:40,400 Speaker 1: of different stoppers, because tour itself acts as a stopper. 167 00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:44,520 Speaker 1: But the VbN is there to help provide a little 168 00:09:44,520 --> 00:09:47,480 Speaker 1: protection between you and your Internet service provider. You lug 169 00:09:47,640 --> 00:09:51,079 Speaker 1: into the VPN and that assigns you an I P 170 00:09:51,360 --> 00:09:55,840 Speaker 1: address that is not the one that your machine actually has. Uh. 171 00:09:56,000 --> 00:09:58,480 Speaker 1: This is the VPN is acting on your behalf. It's 172 00:09:58,520 --> 00:10:02,040 Speaker 1: acting as your proxy. So you're signed into the VPN, 173 00:10:02,400 --> 00:10:05,440 Speaker 1: it assigns you an IP address, perhaps one that belongs 174 00:10:05,480 --> 00:10:07,959 Speaker 1: to a machine that would be in a totally different country. 175 00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:11,040 Speaker 1: So the IP address would indicate that you are perhaps 176 00:10:11,040 --> 00:10:13,000 Speaker 1: in a completely different part of the world. It might 177 00:10:13,040 --> 00:10:15,880 Speaker 1: be that you're in Topeka, Kansas, but you log into 178 00:10:15,920 --> 00:10:18,439 Speaker 1: a VPN and it assigns you an IP address that 179 00:10:18,480 --> 00:10:21,960 Speaker 1: makes it look like you are in Singapore. So then 180 00:10:22,600 --> 00:10:27,200 Speaker 1: you are able to visit sites through this VPN and 181 00:10:27,559 --> 00:10:30,679 Speaker 1: from the perspective of the people on the other end 182 00:10:30,720 --> 00:10:33,400 Speaker 1: of this, on the site end, Let's say that you're 183 00:10:33,440 --> 00:10:37,200 Speaker 1: going to navigate to let's just pick an innocent website. 184 00:10:37,280 --> 00:10:38,960 Speaker 1: Let's say you're going to how Stuff Works, and you're 185 00:10:39,040 --> 00:10:42,080 Speaker 1: using a VPN in order to do it. Then when 186 00:10:42,120 --> 00:10:45,040 Speaker 1: you contact How stuff Works as server through the VPN, 187 00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:48,840 Speaker 1: how stuff works is server is getting the IP address 188 00:10:48,920 --> 00:10:53,440 Speaker 1: the VPN has provided, not your personal IP address, not 189 00:10:53,480 --> 00:10:57,439 Speaker 1: your machines IP address, but rather the one from the VPN. 190 00:10:57,800 --> 00:11:00,800 Speaker 1: So How Stuff Works is sending information back to the 191 00:11:00,920 --> 00:11:04,600 Speaker 1: VPN via that i P address, and the VPN then 192 00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:08,880 Speaker 1: relays that to you. That's a level of protection so 193 00:11:09,160 --> 00:11:12,440 Speaker 1: that the I s P all all they can see 194 00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:15,079 Speaker 1: is that you're connecting to this virtual private network. They 195 00:11:15,080 --> 00:11:17,960 Speaker 1: can't see, you know, what else is going on there 196 00:11:17,960 --> 00:11:21,360 Speaker 1: because everything else is going through there. Uh, but tour 197 00:11:21,440 --> 00:11:23,680 Speaker 1: adds another layer of protection. I'll talk more about that 198 00:11:23,720 --> 00:11:26,800 Speaker 1: in a second. But visiting the dark web is risky. 199 00:11:27,040 --> 00:11:30,400 Speaker 1: Maybe you're trying to do something that isn't really legal, 200 00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:33,679 Speaker 1: Maybe you're encountering the scum and villainy of the Internet. 201 00:11:33,760 --> 00:11:36,560 Speaker 1: Maybe you're doing something totally on the up and up. 202 00:11:36,600 --> 00:11:39,160 Speaker 1: But just because it's the dark web, it cast suspicion 203 00:11:39,240 --> 00:11:42,040 Speaker 1: on you. You've got to be careful. And there are 204 00:11:42,040 --> 00:11:44,240 Speaker 1: plenty of people who suggest you use a vp N 205 00:11:44,520 --> 00:11:47,000 Speaker 1: all the time, by the way, not just when you 206 00:11:47,040 --> 00:11:49,760 Speaker 1: go visit the dark web, but rather go ahead and 207 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:53,000 Speaker 1: use a VPN whenever you browse the Internet, which is 208 00:11:53,000 --> 00:11:56,439 Speaker 1: not necessarily a bad idea if you value your privacy. 209 00:11:56,679 --> 00:11:59,160 Speaker 1: It can help keep your browsing activity private from your 210 00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:02,880 Speaker 1: Internet search provider our service provider rather, and thus you 211 00:12:02,920 --> 00:12:05,480 Speaker 1: don't have to worry about them seeing what kind of 212 00:12:05,480 --> 00:12:08,800 Speaker 1: stuff you're looking at. Let's say that you're looking at 213 00:12:08,840 --> 00:12:11,720 Speaker 1: a different Internet service provider and you don't want your 214 00:12:11,800 --> 00:12:14,280 Speaker 1: current one to know. It could be something as simple 215 00:12:14,280 --> 00:12:17,679 Speaker 1: as that. However, using a VPN does tend to slow 216 00:12:17,720 --> 00:12:20,880 Speaker 1: things down a bit, so pages load load more slowly. 217 00:12:21,120 --> 00:12:24,000 Speaker 1: You'll get your content more slowly than you would if 218 00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:28,000 Speaker 1: you directly directly connected, So you balance privacy with how 219 00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:31,800 Speaker 1: quickly pages load and how quickly you get the content. Also, 220 00:12:32,080 --> 00:12:36,200 Speaker 1: a good VPN tends to be subscription service. You you 221 00:12:36,240 --> 00:12:39,760 Speaker 1: pay a monthly fee in order to use the VPN, 222 00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:42,640 Speaker 1: and you get what you pay for. A good VPN 223 00:12:43,120 --> 00:12:46,719 Speaker 1: will not keep log files. For example, because of a 224 00:12:46,880 --> 00:12:50,920 Speaker 1: VPNs keeping log files, then your activity is still being logged, 225 00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:52,840 Speaker 1: and it's just being logged at the VPN level, not 226 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:56,439 Speaker 1: the I s B level. So dark web enthusiasts tend 227 00:12:56,520 --> 00:13:02,240 Speaker 1: to go towards VPNs that are reputable, that don't keep 228 00:13:02,280 --> 00:13:06,840 Speaker 1: log files and they are subscription based because they they 229 00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:11,640 Speaker 1: provide these services. Also, dark webe enthusiast tend to gravitate 230 00:13:11,679 --> 00:13:15,760 Speaker 1: toward cryptocurrencies like bitcoin to pay those fees because of 231 00:13:15,800 --> 00:13:19,200 Speaker 1: that decentralized nature of cryptocurrency and also the fact that 232 00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:22,679 Speaker 1: if you're using it properly and you're not using it 233 00:13:22,720 --> 00:13:31,160 Speaker 1: too frequently, your transactions are largely untraceable. They don't link 234 00:13:31,200 --> 00:13:35,160 Speaker 1: back to your identity personally, so you have some safety 235 00:13:35,200 --> 00:13:40,120 Speaker 1: there by, making purchases through Bitcoin really secure. Vp ns 236 00:13:40,280 --> 00:13:43,679 Speaker 1: will frequently purge all their records so again, you want 237 00:13:43,679 --> 00:13:46,040 Speaker 1: to look into that if you are interested in using 238 00:13:46,040 --> 00:13:48,319 Speaker 1: a vp N. So some of you may be intrigued 239 00:13:48,320 --> 00:13:51,240 Speaker 1: by what I'm talking about so far and you want 240 00:13:51,280 --> 00:13:53,480 Speaker 1: to know more. We're gonna go further down the rabbit 241 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:58,679 Speaker 1: hole and really talk about onions in just a moment. 242 00:13:58,720 --> 00:14:01,880 Speaker 1: But first, let's sick quick break to thank our sponsor 243 00:14:09,520 --> 00:14:13,720 Speaker 1: I mentioned earlier, the Tour bundle, the tor browser or 244 00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:17,400 Speaker 1: Tour client. Tour grew out of the concept of onion routing. 245 00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:20,400 Speaker 1: In fact, that's you know, the onion routers what Tour 246 00:14:20,680 --> 00:14:25,320 Speaker 1: technically kind of stands for. And onion routing in itself 247 00:14:25,480 --> 00:14:29,640 Speaker 1: was a concept that emerged out of the early mid nineties. 248 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:33,360 Speaker 1: Uh and it was funded in part by organizations like 249 00:14:33,400 --> 00:14:37,120 Speaker 1: the Office of Naval Research and DARPA, so there's military 250 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:41,080 Speaker 1: money behind it. So what the heck is onion routing? Well, 251 00:14:41,080 --> 00:14:45,200 Speaker 1: it involves sending data wrapped inside a series of encrypted 252 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:49,560 Speaker 1: layers and passing through a series of relays before getting 253 00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:54,160 Speaker 1: to its intended destination. And those layers of encryption are 254 00:14:54,200 --> 00:14:56,320 Speaker 1: like the peel of an onion. You peel down one 255 00:14:56,360 --> 00:15:00,000 Speaker 1: layer of encryption and you have another layer of encryption. 256 00:15:00,320 --> 00:15:02,360 Speaker 1: You do that again you get another layer of encryption, 257 00:15:03,000 --> 00:15:05,800 Speaker 1: and finally, after you peel back that third layer, you 258 00:15:05,840 --> 00:15:08,480 Speaker 1: get to whatever the data is, which, by the way, 259 00:15:08,600 --> 00:15:11,280 Speaker 1: could still be in an encrypted format, it would just 260 00:15:11,440 --> 00:15:15,560 Speaker 1: no longer be related specifically to onion routing. So an 261 00:15:15,640 --> 00:15:19,840 Speaker 1: onion rolling network consists of thousands of computers run by volunteers. 262 00:15:19,880 --> 00:15:23,880 Speaker 1: By the way, you can actually volunteer to UH to 263 00:15:24,240 --> 00:15:29,000 Speaker 1: act as a tour relay UH. You are volunteering up 264 00:15:29,040 --> 00:15:33,400 Speaker 1: some of your bandwidth each month to that purpose UM, 265 00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:35,960 Speaker 1: and there are a lot of folks who advocate for 266 00:15:36,000 --> 00:15:39,440 Speaker 1: that sort of thing. When you're doing that, those those 267 00:15:39,480 --> 00:15:42,560 Speaker 1: computers that are part of this relay system, they're running 268 00:15:42,600 --> 00:15:46,880 Speaker 1: special software to act as relays. Traffic passing through an 269 00:15:46,880 --> 00:15:51,720 Speaker 1: onion network will go through three relays before reaching the 270 00:15:51,760 --> 00:15:56,760 Speaker 1: intended destination. So your computer is the client that you're 271 00:15:56,840 --> 00:16:00,920 Speaker 1: running a tour client technically, and when you ever you 272 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:03,520 Speaker 1: send a request out, it's going to pass through three 273 00:16:03,680 --> 00:16:07,040 Speaker 1: relays on the tour network before it gets to the 274 00:16:07,160 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 1: destination on the other side to retrieve whatever it is 275 00:16:11,240 --> 00:16:14,040 Speaker 1: you're looking for. You're hopping around. If you think about 276 00:16:14,040 --> 00:16:18,760 Speaker 1: spy movies, whenever people are tracing a call and they're like, oh, 277 00:16:18,880 --> 00:16:23,920 Speaker 1: we've got it. It's coming from you know, Los Angeles, California. Wait, no, no, 278 00:16:24,080 --> 00:16:27,200 Speaker 1: we're tracing it back. It's actually over in Tokyo. No wait, 279 00:16:27,280 --> 00:16:29,760 Speaker 1: we're tracing it back. The whole thing where that you're 280 00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:33,120 Speaker 1: seeing that the call is hopping through satellites over and 281 00:16:33,160 --> 00:16:34,720 Speaker 1: over and again, you're trying to trace it back to 282 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:37,440 Speaker 1: original source. That's kind of what Tour is doing. It 283 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:40,760 Speaker 1: does it in threes. So let's say I'm using the 284 00:16:40,800 --> 00:16:45,040 Speaker 1: Tour browser and I want to visit super secret site X. 285 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:49,840 Speaker 1: Here's what happens from a high level perspective. First, my 286 00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:54,840 Speaker 1: Tour browser, also known as the client, will encrypt my request, 287 00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:58,840 Speaker 1: and those three layers, the entity that holds the key 288 00:16:58,880 --> 00:17:03,480 Speaker 1: to my request exists on the relays of the Tour network. 289 00:17:04,080 --> 00:17:09,159 Speaker 1: The ultimate one, the closest layer of encryption to my data, 290 00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:12,960 Speaker 1: is held by what is called the exit relay. That's 291 00:17:13,000 --> 00:17:17,000 Speaker 1: the point where my request leaves the Tour network and 292 00:17:17,119 --> 00:17:22,240 Speaker 1: hits the destination. Uh. More on that in a second. So, 293 00:17:22,480 --> 00:17:25,439 Speaker 1: now my request will have layers of encryption around it. 294 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:29,560 Speaker 1: Uh the first layer being the one from the exit relay. 295 00:17:29,600 --> 00:17:33,040 Speaker 1: The second layer will be a layer of encryption around 296 00:17:33,040 --> 00:17:35,720 Speaker 1: the first That one can only be decoded by a 297 00:17:35,880 --> 00:17:39,040 Speaker 1: key that's one step back from the exit relay. That's 298 00:17:39,040 --> 00:17:42,440 Speaker 1: the middle relay. And then my client wraps one more 299 00:17:42,520 --> 00:17:46,600 Speaker 1: layer of encryption around that, and the holder of the 300 00:17:46,680 --> 00:17:50,800 Speaker 1: key to that outermost layer of encryption is the guard 301 00:17:51,040 --> 00:17:55,480 Speaker 1: relay or entrigue relay, the first relay my request will encounter. 302 00:17:56,080 --> 00:17:59,639 Speaker 1: So if you think of it as data in the center, 303 00:18:00,600 --> 00:18:04,760 Speaker 1: you have layer three around that, layer two around that, 304 00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:08,600 Speaker 1: and layer one on the outermost layer. I send my 305 00:18:08,680 --> 00:18:11,440 Speaker 1: request out, I say I want to see super secret 306 00:18:11,520 --> 00:18:14,680 Speaker 1: site X, and I'm I'm using my tour network browser. 307 00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:19,240 Speaker 1: The request then goes to that entry or guard relay, 308 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:22,400 Speaker 1: which has that first key to decrypt just the outer 309 00:18:22,560 --> 00:18:25,439 Speaker 1: layer of encryption. That's all it can do. So it 310 00:18:25,520 --> 00:18:31,200 Speaker 1: sees that it's got an incoming request from me. Uh, 311 00:18:31,359 --> 00:18:33,639 Speaker 1: it knows that I'm the one requesting it, but it 312 00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:37,000 Speaker 1: doesn't know what I'm requesting. All it knows is here's 313 00:18:37,000 --> 00:18:40,240 Speaker 1: a here's a big encrypted data package. It uses the 314 00:18:40,320 --> 00:18:43,480 Speaker 1: key to decrypt that outermost layer of protection around my request. 315 00:18:43,920 --> 00:18:47,000 Speaker 1: The only thing it sees is where it needs to 316 00:18:47,119 --> 00:18:50,760 Speaker 1: send that data packet two. Next, it doesn't know what's 317 00:18:50,880 --> 00:18:54,280 Speaker 1: inside the other layers of encryption. It just knows, oh, 318 00:18:54,320 --> 00:18:57,760 Speaker 1: I need to send this to this specific middle relay, 319 00:18:57,840 --> 00:19:01,360 Speaker 1: and so it does. The middle relay, all it knows 320 00:19:01,880 --> 00:19:06,040 Speaker 1: is that just received an encrypted package from relay number one, 321 00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:11,080 Speaker 1: the entry relay, and it uses it's key to decode 322 00:19:11,240 --> 00:19:16,080 Speaker 1: that particular layer mid layer two, and all it sees 323 00:19:16,440 --> 00:19:18,280 Speaker 1: is where it needs to send it to next, the 324 00:19:18,359 --> 00:19:22,840 Speaker 1: exit relay. So the middle relay doesn't know that that 325 00:19:23,080 --> 00:19:26,960 Speaker 1: initial request came from you at all. It just knows 326 00:19:27,040 --> 00:19:29,399 Speaker 1: that the entry relay was the one that sent it 327 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:31,399 Speaker 1: to it, and the exit relay is the one that 328 00:19:31,480 --> 00:19:37,720 Speaker 1: sends it to. So then the middle relay unwraps that 329 00:19:38,359 --> 00:19:42,639 Speaker 1: and then sends it on to the exit relay, which 330 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:46,679 Speaker 1: uses its key to finally unwrap the data. So the 331 00:19:46,720 --> 00:19:49,200 Speaker 1: exit relay actually gets to see the data you sent. 332 00:19:49,800 --> 00:19:52,640 Speaker 1: In fact, that's a very important thing to to stress. 333 00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:57,440 Speaker 1: The exit relay, the last relay in the Tor network 334 00:19:57,640 --> 00:20:01,840 Speaker 1: to send something out to the Destiny nation. It's sending 335 00:20:01,880 --> 00:20:05,320 Speaker 1: that information out as if it is your machine, so 336 00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:09,040 Speaker 1: it can see exactly what you are sending out, and 337 00:20:09,080 --> 00:20:12,560 Speaker 1: if you're sending out unencrypted information, it can see all 338 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:16,280 Speaker 1: of that. If it's in clear text, it can see 339 00:20:16,320 --> 00:20:19,800 Speaker 1: all that, including things like user names and passwords. So 340 00:20:20,320 --> 00:20:23,560 Speaker 1: with that in mind, you have to make sure that 341 00:20:24,119 --> 00:20:27,240 Speaker 1: you are pretty comfortable with the fact that there is 342 00:20:27,240 --> 00:20:31,720 Speaker 1: a machine out there that is getting access to all 343 00:20:31,720 --> 00:20:36,480 Speaker 1: of that stuff. If you're sending out unencrypted communications, if 344 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:38,560 Speaker 1: you've got another level of encryption on there, if you're 345 00:20:38,600 --> 00:20:43,119 Speaker 1: using something like HTTPS, then that's not as big a 346 00:20:43,119 --> 00:20:46,400 Speaker 1: concern because that information is still encrypted as it passes 347 00:20:46,520 --> 00:20:51,359 Speaker 1: through that exit relay. But if you're using clear text, 348 00:20:52,600 --> 00:20:56,440 Speaker 1: boy howdy, that could be a dangerous thing. If the 349 00:20:56,760 --> 00:21:02,040 Speaker 1: person who owns that exit relay is not ethical, they 350 00:21:02,160 --> 00:21:08,880 Speaker 1: might take advantage of that information. Uh So, guard relays, 351 00:21:08,920 --> 00:21:12,800 Speaker 1: those entry points to the Tour network are particularly vulnerable 352 00:21:12,840 --> 00:21:15,560 Speaker 1: if an oppressive government wants to cut off access to Tour. 353 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:19,159 Speaker 1: To connect to a guard relay, your client has to 354 00:21:19,240 --> 00:21:22,560 Speaker 1: know which machines it can communicate with, or which one 355 00:21:22,720 --> 00:21:26,960 Speaker 1: specific specifically it needs to communicate with, which means somewhere 356 00:21:27,720 --> 00:21:30,360 Speaker 1: there has to be a list of all the different 357 00:21:30,480 --> 00:21:34,439 Speaker 1: relays on the Tour network, because otherwise there's no way 358 00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:38,320 Speaker 1: to build these circuits of relays where it goes from 359 00:21:38,400 --> 00:21:42,080 Speaker 1: client to guard relay to middle relay to exit relay. 360 00:21:42,359 --> 00:21:44,480 Speaker 1: So you have to have a list somewhere. But lists 361 00:21:44,520 --> 00:21:47,360 Speaker 1: are dangerous, right, What if an oppressive government gets hold 362 00:21:47,359 --> 00:21:50,080 Speaker 1: of that list, then they just aim to shut down 363 00:21:50,080 --> 00:21:53,720 Speaker 1: those machines and no more Tour network, or they aim 364 00:21:53,800 --> 00:21:57,480 Speaker 1: to try and spy on those machines and try to 365 00:21:57,600 --> 00:22:01,919 Speaker 1: decrypt the information through some means or another. So you 366 00:22:02,920 --> 00:22:07,400 Speaker 1: to protect the guard relays from getting blacklisted. Tour actually 367 00:22:07,440 --> 00:22:11,840 Speaker 1: maintains a secret internal list of guard relays. They are 368 00:22:11,880 --> 00:22:16,000 Speaker 1: called bridges. These are a subset of entry relays, a 369 00:22:16,040 --> 00:22:21,280 Speaker 1: subset of those entry slash guard relays. Bridges are uh 370 00:22:21,400 --> 00:22:24,720 Speaker 1: The overall list is secret. So when you download and 371 00:22:24,800 --> 00:22:28,879 Speaker 1: launch a Tour client. When you do that, your client 372 00:22:29,000 --> 00:22:35,879 Speaker 1: requests from the Tour network a uh uh an entry 373 00:22:35,920 --> 00:22:38,960 Speaker 1: point where do I start? So I can start making 374 00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:44,119 Speaker 1: these encryption keys. And if it needs to be a bridge, 375 00:22:44,119 --> 00:22:47,200 Speaker 1: then the bridge one will send you a small selection 376 00:22:47,880 --> 00:22:51,080 Speaker 1: of potential bridges, but not the whole list. That way, 377 00:22:51,920 --> 00:22:56,960 Speaker 1: if that request is compromised in any way, the whole 378 00:22:57,000 --> 00:23:00,879 Speaker 1: list as it remains safe, right, or most of the 379 00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:03,520 Speaker 1: less remains safe, only the ones that were shared are 380 00:23:03,600 --> 00:23:10,480 Speaker 1: compromised the rest remain secret. There remains safe, so you 381 00:23:10,520 --> 00:23:16,240 Speaker 1: can always recruit more volunteers to run tour software. So 382 00:23:16,280 --> 00:23:19,480 Speaker 1: if you lose some, if if the government shut some down, 383 00:23:19,800 --> 00:23:22,760 Speaker 1: or if a government shuts some down because they're not 384 00:23:22,840 --> 00:23:26,720 Speaker 1: all located in the United States, then you can attempt 385 00:23:26,760 --> 00:23:31,439 Speaker 1: to replace them with new volunteers. The middle relay and 386 00:23:32,080 --> 00:23:36,440 Speaker 1: exit relay are are different. The exit relays are also 387 00:23:36,600 --> 00:23:40,120 Speaker 1: kind of a big target because if you shut down 388 00:23:40,119 --> 00:23:43,800 Speaker 1: the exit relays then information can't pass from the tour 389 00:23:43,920 --> 00:23:48,400 Speaker 1: network to their destinations. But that's also pretty tricky. They 390 00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:56,320 Speaker 1: tend to be restricted to very trustworthy volunteers. Entry and 391 00:23:56,440 --> 00:24:00,880 Speaker 1: middle points tend to be a little less of problem 392 00:24:00,920 --> 00:24:04,440 Speaker 1: from that perspective, mostly because you've got so many levels 393 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:09,320 Speaker 1: of encryption wrapping around that data. But exit relays, because 394 00:24:09,480 --> 00:24:12,880 Speaker 1: of the sensitivity to data and because they are tempting targets, 395 00:24:13,119 --> 00:24:18,440 Speaker 1: tend to be more trustworthy in general, and they're they're 396 00:24:18,440 --> 00:24:21,199 Speaker 1: frequent reviews to make sure that those exit points are 397 00:24:21,240 --> 00:24:26,479 Speaker 1: trustworthy and no one's being a jerk face, I guess. 398 00:24:27,359 --> 00:24:30,240 Speaker 1: So the important thing to remember is that the entry 399 00:24:30,280 --> 00:24:33,280 Speaker 1: and middle relays have no way of knowing what is 400 00:24:33,320 --> 00:24:37,440 Speaker 1: in that data. Request you're sending UM and the only 401 00:24:37,480 --> 00:24:39,320 Speaker 1: one that does know is the exit relay before it 402 00:24:39,320 --> 00:24:44,720 Speaker 1: sends it onto the to the destination AH. The maintenance 403 00:24:44,920 --> 00:24:49,879 Speaker 1: for this entire network falls to about ten pivotal tour 404 00:24:50,040 --> 00:24:55,800 Speaker 1: nodes called directory authorities. Nine of those contain lists of 405 00:24:55,840 --> 00:24:59,200 Speaker 1: the relays, the tenth contains a list of the bridges. 406 00:25:00,160 --> 00:25:05,679 Speaker 1: Those ten directory authorities are located mostly in Europe and 407 00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:09,320 Speaker 1: the United States. In fact, Central and Eastern Europe and 408 00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:14,399 Speaker 1: the United States mainly and UH. They are the backbone 409 00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:17,440 Speaker 1: of the Tour network. Using tour can help keep your 410 00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:20,320 Speaker 1: communications secret. If you were to send a request through 411 00:25:20,359 --> 00:25:23,760 Speaker 1: a browser, normally there'd be several points along the way 412 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:27,160 Speaker 1: where someone could potentially snoop on your traffic. So let's 413 00:25:27,160 --> 00:25:29,959 Speaker 1: say that you're connecting. Let's say you're in a coffee 414 00:25:29,960 --> 00:25:33,040 Speaker 1: shop and you're on a laptop and you want to 415 00:25:33,080 --> 00:25:36,159 Speaker 1: connect to the Internet and you're just using regular connections. 416 00:25:36,560 --> 00:25:39,160 Speaker 1: So if you connect through the coffee shops WiFi, there 417 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:43,280 Speaker 1: could be someone at that coffee shop who's sniffing WiFi 418 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:47,880 Speaker 1: packets and trying to spy on communications that are going 419 00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:52,240 Speaker 1: through the coffee shops WiFi network. And that's before it 420 00:25:52,280 --> 00:25:55,600 Speaker 1: ever gets to an Internet service provider or the Internet 421 00:25:55,600 --> 00:26:00,200 Speaker 1: at large. It's purely local. That's a problem no matter better, 422 00:26:00,520 --> 00:26:04,320 Speaker 1: whether you're using tour or a normal browser. You don't 423 00:26:04,400 --> 00:26:07,600 Speaker 1: want to try and do any sort of secure browsing 424 00:26:08,280 --> 00:26:12,800 Speaker 1: over an open WiFi network. That's that would be ridiculous. 425 00:26:13,560 --> 00:26:16,320 Speaker 1: It would be like putting all your money in a 426 00:26:16,560 --> 00:26:20,640 Speaker 1: super super duper high security vault and leaving the back 427 00:26:20,680 --> 00:26:23,320 Speaker 1: door of the vault open. It would be like putting 428 00:26:23,320 --> 00:26:24,879 Speaker 1: a back door in the vault in the first place. 429 00:26:24,960 --> 00:26:28,760 Speaker 1: It's not a good idea. So from that point, from 430 00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:31,159 Speaker 1: the WiFi point, the information gets into the I s P. 431 00:26:31,640 --> 00:26:34,479 Speaker 1: The I s P can see both where requests are 432 00:26:34,520 --> 00:26:38,239 Speaker 1: coming from as in your location, and what the request is, 433 00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:41,119 Speaker 1: so that the data itself, what you are doing, your 434 00:26:41,119 --> 00:26:44,439 Speaker 1: browsing activity, all of that can be recorded and is 435 00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:47,040 Speaker 1: recorded by your I s P. So if the I 436 00:26:47,200 --> 00:26:49,560 Speaker 1: s P were served with legal papers later on, or 437 00:26:49,600 --> 00:26:52,080 Speaker 1: if an organization like the n s A we're snooping 438 00:26:52,119 --> 00:26:54,440 Speaker 1: in on that I s P, your activities would be 439 00:26:54,840 --> 00:26:58,320 Speaker 1: known to them and that request would then pass from 440 00:26:58,320 --> 00:27:00,840 Speaker 1: your I s P through the inner at to the 441 00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:05,679 Speaker 1: I s P that handles whatever server that you're navigating to, 442 00:27:06,119 --> 00:27:09,240 Speaker 1: like whatever server holds the website that you are trying 443 00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:13,080 Speaker 1: to go to, and that um would mean that that 444 00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:17,360 Speaker 1: server would also know where you are and what you're 445 00:27:17,359 --> 00:27:20,879 Speaker 1: asking for obviously, and so anyone snooping on that server 446 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:23,879 Speaker 1: would be able to determine what you're what you're up to. 447 00:27:24,359 --> 00:27:26,320 Speaker 1: So there are a lot of points along the line 448 00:27:26,359 --> 00:27:30,280 Speaker 1: where you have an unsecured UH data connection where someone 449 00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:33,320 Speaker 1: could potentially know what's going on and spy on you 450 00:27:33,400 --> 00:27:37,360 Speaker 1: and maybe steal information. If you use HTTPS, that adds 451 00:27:37,400 --> 00:27:40,480 Speaker 1: a layer of encryption on top of communications. That means 452 00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:45,760 Speaker 1: anyone looking at points between you and the server you're contacting, 453 00:27:46,440 --> 00:27:49,040 Speaker 1: they can see that you're communicating in some way with 454 00:27:49,160 --> 00:27:52,520 Speaker 1: that server, right, They see that you're sending a request 455 00:27:52,800 --> 00:27:56,879 Speaker 1: to this target server, but they cannot see what the 456 00:27:56,920 --> 00:27:59,600 Speaker 1: communication is because it's encrypted, So they don't know what 457 00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:01,960 Speaker 1: you're saying. They just know you're talking to that server 458 00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:07,800 Speaker 1: and that the servers talking back to you. Uh. They do, however, 459 00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:11,160 Speaker 1: know where you are because you're not that that information 460 00:28:11,240 --> 00:28:14,200 Speaker 1: is not hidden, so they don't know what you're requesting, 461 00:28:14,359 --> 00:28:16,159 Speaker 1: but they know where you are, They know when you 462 00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:19,280 Speaker 1: requested it, and they know who you're talking to, and 463 00:28:19,400 --> 00:28:22,679 Speaker 1: that in itself can end up being a problem. If 464 00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:26,720 Speaker 1: you are working in a place that has an oppressive government, 465 00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:30,800 Speaker 1: that could be enough to get you into some hot water. 466 00:28:31,359 --> 00:28:34,120 Speaker 1: And it may be that you did nothing at all wrong, 467 00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:38,640 Speaker 1: but in the eyes of that oppressive regime, they're saying, well, 468 00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:42,840 Speaker 1: you were talking to this entity at this time from 469 00:28:42,880 --> 00:28:47,080 Speaker 1: this place, and that's all we need to come after you. 470 00:28:47,200 --> 00:28:51,840 Speaker 1: Using Tour eavesdroppers that are looking at you between you 471 00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:55,080 Speaker 1: and your I s P will know where you are, 472 00:28:55,880 --> 00:28:58,320 Speaker 1: and they'll know that you're sending communications to the Onion 473 00:28:58,400 --> 00:29:03,360 Speaker 1: router network, but they won't know what that information um 474 00:29:03,680 --> 00:29:06,920 Speaker 1: is and they don't know where the information is ultimately going, right, 475 00:29:07,280 --> 00:29:11,840 Speaker 1: They just see, okay, you're sending communications to Tour. Those 476 00:29:11,840 --> 00:29:16,200 Speaker 1: communications are already encrypted and three layers of encryption. And 477 00:29:16,280 --> 00:29:22,840 Speaker 1: because the outer layer only tells the data packet which 478 00:29:23,320 --> 00:29:26,800 Speaker 1: relay it needs to go to for the first entry relay, 479 00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:31,280 Speaker 1: for the entry relay into Tour, anyone snooping on your 480 00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:33,800 Speaker 1: data at that early stage. All they know is you're 481 00:29:33,800 --> 00:29:36,440 Speaker 1: sending information to the Tour network. But they wouldn't know 482 00:29:36,960 --> 00:29:40,000 Speaker 1: anything beyond that. They wouldn't know where the ultimate destination was, 483 00:29:40,680 --> 00:29:43,120 Speaker 1: and they wouldn't know what was actually in the information 484 00:29:43,240 --> 00:29:46,520 Speaker 1: once it hits the tour network. Now your location would 485 00:29:46,520 --> 00:29:49,959 Speaker 1: be secret because it would just look like the communication 486 00:29:50,040 --> 00:29:51,920 Speaker 1: is moving from one part of the tour network to 487 00:29:51,960 --> 00:29:55,440 Speaker 1: the next part of the tour network. So it would 488 00:29:55,480 --> 00:29:57,280 Speaker 1: be safe. If anyone were trying to snoop in on 489 00:29:57,320 --> 00:30:01,320 Speaker 1: the tour network, they would just see communications passing between 490 00:30:01,320 --> 00:30:06,240 Speaker 1: relays with no meaningful information to identify you. If there 491 00:30:06,280 --> 00:30:09,000 Speaker 1: were someone sniffing at an exit relay, they could get 492 00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:10,920 Speaker 1: all the information coming out of the relay with the 493 00:30:10,960 --> 00:30:15,640 Speaker 1: exception of your physical location, So they could get whatever 494 00:30:15,680 --> 00:30:17,880 Speaker 1: the data is because it would no longer be in 495 00:30:17,920 --> 00:30:21,080 Speaker 1: that those three layers of encryption, So if it's unencrypted data, 496 00:30:21,120 --> 00:30:23,920 Speaker 1: they could get that. Uh, they could essentially know who 497 00:30:24,000 --> 00:30:27,160 Speaker 1: you are, but and where you were going, what what 498 00:30:27,360 --> 00:30:30,719 Speaker 1: the ultimate site is that your destination is, But they 499 00:30:30,720 --> 00:30:34,200 Speaker 1: wouldn't know where you are because the location would still 500 00:30:34,240 --> 00:30:39,240 Speaker 1: be Tour network. But ultimately that might not be enough 501 00:30:39,320 --> 00:30:43,400 Speaker 1: protection for you. So if you combine tour and HTTPS, 502 00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:48,400 Speaker 1: that's best because then it really limits what information any 503 00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:52,640 Speaker 1: snooper can get when their eaves dropping on you. On 504 00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:54,920 Speaker 1: the front side of the tour network, So before your 505 00:30:54,960 --> 00:30:58,240 Speaker 1: information hits Tour, the snoop would only see that you're 506 00:30:58,280 --> 00:31:00,320 Speaker 1: sending communications to Tour, but they would and be able 507 00:31:00,360 --> 00:31:03,440 Speaker 1: to see what it was because you've encoded it in 508 00:31:03,760 --> 00:31:06,840 Speaker 1: uh in you've encrypted it. Rather on the back side 509 00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:11,480 Speaker 1: of the tour network, snoops would see that there's information 510 00:31:11,560 --> 00:31:14,000 Speaker 1: coming from Tour to a site, but there'd be no 511 00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:19,600 Speaker 1: data linking you to that request, to that communication, So 512 00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:22,640 Speaker 1: all they could say is somebody is using the tour 513 00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:25,360 Speaker 1: network to connect to this site, but we don't know 514 00:31:25,400 --> 00:31:28,960 Speaker 1: who it is because the communications inside are encrypted and 515 00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:32,640 Speaker 1: the location data is masked to the tour network. So 516 00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:36,760 Speaker 1: it's the safest of all the options. Now, I went 517 00:31:36,760 --> 00:31:39,680 Speaker 1: through great links to explain at a very very high 518 00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:45,080 Speaker 1: level was going on with tour networks, because these are 519 00:31:45,120 --> 00:31:48,680 Speaker 1: the sort of links that people who visit the dark 520 00:31:48,760 --> 00:31:54,320 Speaker 1: web will go to in order to maintain their privacy 521 00:31:54,440 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 1: and be able to do the things they do without 522 00:31:57,400 --> 00:32:02,320 Speaker 1: getting caught, sometimes the thing as they do being extremely 523 00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:07,480 Speaker 1: illegal or unethical or both. Uh sometimes illegal but not unethical. 524 00:32:07,680 --> 00:32:09,680 Speaker 1: I'll explain more in just a moment, but first let's 525 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:19,959 Speaker 1: take another quick break to thank our sponsor. All right, 526 00:32:20,040 --> 00:32:24,400 Speaker 1: so you've installed a tour bundle and you're using HTTPS connections, 527 00:32:24,440 --> 00:32:28,720 Speaker 1: you're using a VPN to add extra encryption, extra distance. 528 00:32:28,760 --> 00:32:32,280 Speaker 1: You're protecting yourself from eavesdroppers, whether they are hackers or 529 00:32:32,320 --> 00:32:37,440 Speaker 1: oppressive governmental organizations. What are you going to find when 530 00:32:37,440 --> 00:32:41,400 Speaker 1: you go to the dark Web. Well, it's actually a 531 00:32:41,440 --> 00:32:43,880 Speaker 1: little hard to navigate. You have to look around for 532 00:32:44,040 --> 00:32:48,280 Speaker 1: various resources to find where the the sites are because 533 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:53,640 Speaker 1: it's by its nature, it's not designed for you to 534 00:32:53,680 --> 00:32:55,960 Speaker 1: be able to have like a really effective search engine 535 00:32:56,560 --> 00:32:58,920 Speaker 1: for the dark Web. If you did, it would be 536 00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:02,960 Speaker 1: a lot easier for law enforcement to track down dark 537 00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:08,400 Speaker 1: web sites and and target them. So there are lots 538 00:33:08,400 --> 00:33:13,080 Speaker 1: of resources online that act as sort of a directory 539 00:33:13,200 --> 00:33:16,560 Speaker 1: for websites that are on the dark Web, and you 540 00:33:16,600 --> 00:33:21,120 Speaker 1: would find stuff that's of varying degrees of legality from 541 00:33:21,160 --> 00:33:23,840 Speaker 1: it's technically legal, but it's really difficult to get hold 542 00:33:23,880 --> 00:33:28,280 Speaker 1: of to this is totally illegal stuff. And it can 543 00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:32,840 Speaker 1: include things like controlled substances like drugs, like illegal drugs. 544 00:33:33,360 --> 00:33:36,480 Speaker 1: It can include sites that link you two hacker forums 545 00:33:36,560 --> 00:33:39,000 Speaker 1: where you can learn how to exploit systems. You can 546 00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,400 Speaker 1: take tutorials, you can talk with other hackers. You can 547 00:33:42,440 --> 00:33:45,680 Speaker 1: download malware that you could then use on other people 548 00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:50,440 Speaker 1: to exploit people or systems. You could hire hackers for 549 00:33:50,480 --> 00:33:53,760 Speaker 1: their services to do things of that nature. There are 550 00:33:54,040 --> 00:33:59,240 Speaker 1: marketplaces that sell weapons with no restrictions on them. On 551 00:33:59,280 --> 00:34:03,520 Speaker 1: this dark market. There are counterfeit goods that you could 552 00:34:03,520 --> 00:34:07,640 Speaker 1: buy super cheap that look like the real thing. Uh. 553 00:34:07,680 --> 00:34:12,080 Speaker 1: Then there's also tons and tons of data of information, 554 00:34:12,560 --> 00:34:16,239 Speaker 1: information that's been gathered through various means, often stolen through 555 00:34:16,280 --> 00:34:21,440 Speaker 1: security breaches or credit cards skimming or other methods. Now, personally, 556 00:34:22,440 --> 00:34:27,880 Speaker 1: I am mostly against purchasing anything off the dark web, 557 00:34:28,520 --> 00:34:32,960 Speaker 1: particularly dangerous stuff. I I personally find it distasteful. But 558 00:34:33,040 --> 00:34:36,320 Speaker 1: in some places you might find governments that could restrict 559 00:34:36,360 --> 00:34:41,200 Speaker 1: access to things that might be really helpful, and it's 560 00:34:41,239 --> 00:34:46,520 Speaker 1: because of the particular laws of that region. So, for example, 561 00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:50,440 Speaker 1: maybe there's an area where stuff like birth control is 562 00:34:50,560 --> 00:34:54,160 Speaker 1: really hard to get hold of, and you could argue, well, 563 00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:59,240 Speaker 1: that's unethical to deny people birth control so or or 564 00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:01,759 Speaker 1: you know, protect and from things like STDs, that kind 565 00:35:01,760 --> 00:35:05,600 Speaker 1: of stuff. So it's important to remember what is legal 566 00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:10,160 Speaker 1: and what is ethical doesn't always match up right just 567 00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:14,600 Speaker 1: because something might be illegal doesn't always mean it's unethical, 568 00:35:15,520 --> 00:35:19,040 Speaker 1: and just because something is ethical doesn't necessarily mean it's legal. 569 00:35:19,400 --> 00:35:23,320 Speaker 1: There's a lot of leeway there. Still, there's an awful 570 00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:27,440 Speaker 1: lot of dangerous and questionable stuff on these dark markets, 571 00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:32,480 Speaker 1: including stuff that could really seriously cause harm to yourself 572 00:35:32,680 --> 00:35:37,440 Speaker 1: or others, and some of it exploits innocent victims. So 573 00:35:37,520 --> 00:35:40,080 Speaker 1: I'm not for any of that. Like I I'd rather 574 00:35:40,160 --> 00:35:43,439 Speaker 1: not see anyone hurt themselves or hurt someone else, and 575 00:35:43,520 --> 00:35:48,120 Speaker 1: so for that reason, I am pretty negative toward these 576 00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:51,040 Speaker 1: dark markets. But there's a lot of money to be 577 00:35:51,120 --> 00:35:55,000 Speaker 1: made there, so obviously they're going to exist. Purchasing stuff 578 00:35:55,000 --> 00:35:57,560 Speaker 1: on the dark market obviously comes with its own risks. 579 00:35:57,920 --> 00:36:01,440 Speaker 1: Users tend to deal almost exclusively cryptocurrency, like I mentioned, 580 00:36:01,440 --> 00:36:05,000 Speaker 1: because you don't want those purchases to be traced back 581 00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:07,839 Speaker 1: to you. Using your own personal credit card to buy 582 00:36:07,960 --> 00:36:11,799 Speaker 1: illegal substances is a pretty dumb thing to do. But 583 00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:14,879 Speaker 1: it's not all black markets filled with illegal materials. There's 584 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:18,239 Speaker 1: also gambling sites where you can take a chance to 585 00:36:18,280 --> 00:36:21,680 Speaker 1: win money through various online casino games. Those may not 586 00:36:21,760 --> 00:36:24,680 Speaker 1: be legal in your area, but you can find them online. 587 00:36:25,239 --> 00:36:30,200 Speaker 1: Um I would seriously questioned the validity of those sites 588 00:36:30,239 --> 00:36:34,319 Speaker 1: before engaging in online games of chance. But if that's 589 00:36:34,360 --> 00:36:37,000 Speaker 1: your thing, those can be found on the deep web. 590 00:36:37,360 --> 00:36:40,840 Speaker 1: There are information exchanges dedicated to share as much information 591 00:36:40,880 --> 00:36:44,640 Speaker 1: as possible, essentially kind of the dark web version of 592 00:36:44,640 --> 00:36:47,919 Speaker 1: wiki leaks, sort of a whistleblower kind of approach. There's 593 00:36:47,920 --> 00:36:52,040 Speaker 1: obviously a lot of pornographic material on the dark web too, 594 00:36:52,560 --> 00:36:58,720 Speaker 1: things that again would not really fly in the surface web, 595 00:36:58,840 --> 00:37:02,880 Speaker 1: even uh uh, you know, stuff that's of definite questionable 596 00:37:02,960 --> 00:37:07,240 Speaker 1: legality or is straight out illegal and ethical. You can 597 00:37:07,440 --> 00:37:10,120 Speaker 1: find it much more easily on the dark web because 598 00:37:10,400 --> 00:37:13,600 Speaker 1: there's much less chance of the people who are dealing 599 00:37:13,600 --> 00:37:18,280 Speaker 1: in it of getting caught. It can get very upsetting, 600 00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:22,640 Speaker 1: very quickly. Actually, uh, these sites are not necessarily the 601 00:37:22,680 --> 00:37:24,920 Speaker 1: most reliable entities out there. You can look at a 602 00:37:24,960 --> 00:37:27,760 Speaker 1: directory and say, oh, I'm gonna go visit this particular 603 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:29,759 Speaker 1: side on the dark web, and then you try and 604 00:37:29,920 --> 00:37:32,560 Speaker 1: visit it. You type in the long and complicated u 605 00:37:32,640 --> 00:37:37,200 Speaker 1: r L that makes no seemingly seemingly makes no sense, 606 00:37:37,440 --> 00:37:39,680 Speaker 1: and then you get an error back after you wait 607 00:37:39,719 --> 00:37:42,879 Speaker 1: forever for the page to load. Uh. Or you might 608 00:37:42,920 --> 00:37:45,920 Speaker 1: find that the thing you purchased never gets to you, 609 00:37:45,920 --> 00:37:48,000 Speaker 1: you get scammed out of money, or you go to 610 00:37:48,040 --> 00:37:50,560 Speaker 1: a gambling site and you find out that not only 611 00:37:50,600 --> 00:37:53,360 Speaker 1: did you not win anything, but they took extra money 612 00:37:53,400 --> 00:37:59,040 Speaker 1: from you. Um. They're also are sites that are frequent 613 00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:03,239 Speaker 1: targets of various enforcement agencies for obvious reasons, so things 614 00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:06,040 Speaker 1: like markets like the Silk Road would get taken down. 615 00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:08,720 Speaker 1: And that means the connection points in the dark web 616 00:38:08,920 --> 00:38:12,680 Speaker 1: are constantly shifting as sites come online or go offline. 617 00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:15,880 Speaker 1: They are not as constant as most of the stuff 618 00:38:15,920 --> 00:38:19,399 Speaker 1: we see on the surface web, So navigating the dark 619 00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:22,000 Speaker 1: webs pretty slow due to all those jumps that you're 620 00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:25,040 Speaker 1: making in order for you to visit it safely, and 621 00:38:25,320 --> 00:38:27,680 Speaker 1: you might end up just getting an error message, which 622 00:38:27,719 --> 00:38:32,440 Speaker 1: can get really frustrating. Dark websites also have a special designation. 623 00:38:32,520 --> 00:38:34,839 Speaker 1: You don't get a dot com or a dot org 624 00:38:34,960 --> 00:38:39,399 Speaker 1: type top level domain. You see a dot onion designation. 625 00:38:39,880 --> 00:38:42,560 Speaker 1: Now that's not an official route in the domain name system, 626 00:38:42,680 --> 00:38:46,120 Speaker 1: but is a way of designating a site as being 627 00:38:46,320 --> 00:38:51,600 Speaker 1: a tour only accessible site. And I think there are 628 00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:54,680 Speaker 1: some very legitimate uses for the dark web. I don't 629 00:38:54,840 --> 00:38:57,920 Speaker 1: mean to suggest that it's only a place where criminals 630 00:38:57,960 --> 00:39:02,239 Speaker 1: go or illegal activity is the only thing that happens there. So, 631 00:39:02,320 --> 00:39:05,920 Speaker 1: for example, let's say you are an ambassador, and you're 632 00:39:05,920 --> 00:39:10,120 Speaker 1: an ambassador to a nation that has known antagonistic views 633 00:39:10,200 --> 00:39:14,279 Speaker 1: towards your home country, the country you are representing. So 634 00:39:14,360 --> 00:39:17,520 Speaker 1: you're an ambassador to some country that is hostile at 635 00:39:17,560 --> 00:39:20,880 Speaker 1: least in some degree towards your home, you would probably 636 00:39:20,920 --> 00:39:24,600 Speaker 1: want a secure means to communicate back to your home country. 637 00:39:24,719 --> 00:39:27,680 Speaker 1: When you're trying to send messages back home, whether whether 638 00:39:27,760 --> 00:39:32,560 Speaker 1: it's to your loved ones or to coworkers or your government, 639 00:39:32,640 --> 00:39:34,839 Speaker 1: or whatever it may be, you want to be able 640 00:39:34,840 --> 00:39:38,799 Speaker 1: to make sure those communications are secure, that the government 641 00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:42,040 Speaker 1: that is at least some level hostile towards your home 642 00:39:42,920 --> 00:39:46,920 Speaker 1: isn't snooping on what you have to say and either 643 00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:52,120 Speaker 1: making plans to do terrible things or to alter the 644 00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:54,680 Speaker 1: data in some way or prevent it from getting to 645 00:39:54,680 --> 00:39:57,280 Speaker 1: where it needs to go. Having a method to encrypt 646 00:39:57,280 --> 00:39:59,960 Speaker 1: the messages and hide your location would be really help 647 00:40:00,040 --> 00:40:02,719 Speaker 1: full when you're sending sensitive information back home, and some 648 00:40:02,800 --> 00:40:05,760 Speaker 1: of the sites on the dark Web are all about 649 00:40:06,320 --> 00:40:10,000 Speaker 1: encrypted communications so that you can have these kind of 650 00:40:10,040 --> 00:40:14,360 Speaker 1: communications between people and not worry about third parties snooping 651 00:40:14,360 --> 00:40:18,000 Speaker 1: in on it. So there are a lot of opportunities 652 00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:21,799 Speaker 1: for people like protesters or whistleblowers or people who are 653 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:24,360 Speaker 1: living under oppressive regimes to use the dark web to 654 00:40:24,440 --> 00:40:26,880 Speaker 1: send information and files back and forth. So it is 655 00:40:26,920 --> 00:40:29,480 Speaker 1: a valuable resource. It's just that when you have a 656 00:40:29,480 --> 00:40:31,880 Speaker 1: resource like this that's valuable the way you can say 657 00:40:31,920 --> 00:40:35,400 Speaker 1: there are legitimate uses where someone who is concerned about 658 00:40:35,640 --> 00:40:40,560 Speaker 1: government overreach wants to be able to communicate freely with others. 659 00:40:41,040 --> 00:40:44,920 Speaker 1: They're they're legitimate cases where that should be allowed. It 660 00:40:44,960 --> 00:40:48,799 Speaker 1: also opens up the opportunity for these dark markets. I 661 00:40:48,800 --> 00:40:51,480 Speaker 1: mean there's again, if there's money to be made, if 662 00:40:51,480 --> 00:40:56,120 Speaker 1: there's demand, the supply will follow. So that is an 663 00:40:56,160 --> 00:41:00,080 Speaker 1: overview of the dark web. I do not recommend and 664 00:41:00,760 --> 00:41:03,879 Speaker 1: just checking it out for fun zies. If you are 665 00:41:03,960 --> 00:41:06,120 Speaker 1: going to check it out, I do recommend you use 666 00:41:06,160 --> 00:41:09,200 Speaker 1: a VPN and that you use to our browser, and 667 00:41:09,280 --> 00:41:13,080 Speaker 1: that you enable all the security features. You don't have 668 00:41:13,120 --> 00:41:17,840 Speaker 1: stuff like JavaScript turned on, and you are super careful 669 00:41:18,040 --> 00:41:24,480 Speaker 1: because even if you're not doing anything illegal or unethical yourself, 670 00:41:25,200 --> 00:41:28,319 Speaker 1: there are a lot of a lot of entities on 671 00:41:28,360 --> 00:41:31,640 Speaker 1: the dark web that will jump at the chance of 672 00:41:31,680 --> 00:41:35,760 Speaker 1: taking advantage of people who are not covering their tracks properly, 673 00:41:36,200 --> 00:41:41,239 Speaker 1: so be careful out there. Well, that wraps up this discussion. 674 00:41:41,280 --> 00:41:43,560 Speaker 1: If you guys have any suggestions for future episodes of 675 00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:46,600 Speaker 1: tech Stuff, send me a message. My email address is 676 00:41:46,600 --> 00:41:48,680 Speaker 1: tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com, or drop 677 00:41:48,760 --> 00:41:50,799 Speaker 1: me a line on Facebook or Twitter to handle at 678 00:41:50,800 --> 00:41:53,920 Speaker 1: both of those is tech Stuff hs W. You can 679 00:41:53,960 --> 00:41:58,040 Speaker 1: go to our show merchandise page. That's what I wanted 680 00:41:58,040 --> 00:42:00,640 Speaker 1: to say. It's not a weird way of saying that anyway. 681 00:42:00,640 --> 00:42:03,799 Speaker 1: It's at t public dot com slash tech Stuff. You 682 00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:07,560 Speaker 1: can find t shirts, tote bags, phone cases, all sorts 683 00:42:07,600 --> 00:42:11,040 Speaker 1: of stuff with lots of different designs. Every purchase goes 684 00:42:11,160 --> 00:42:14,200 Speaker 1: to benefit the show and you get some cool merchandise 685 00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:16,480 Speaker 1: in return, So go check that out. Don't forget to 686 00:42:16,520 --> 00:42:19,400 Speaker 1: follow us on Instagram and I'll talk to you again 687 00:42:20,239 --> 00:42:28,640 Speaker 1: really soon for more on this and thousands of other topics. 688 00:42:28,640 --> 00:42:40,120 Speaker 1: Because it how stuff Works dot com.