Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to the Votes and Verdicts podcast, hosted
Speaker 1: by the litigation and policy team at Bloomberg Intelligence, the
Speaker 1: investment research platform of Bloomberg LP. Just a quick word
Speaker 1: about Bloomberg Intelligence for those who don't know. We are
Speaker 1: the investment research platform on the Bloomberg terminal, with five
Speaker 1: hundred analysts and strategists working across the globe and focused
Speaker 1: on all major markets. Our coverage includes over two thousand
Speaker 1: equities and credits, and we have outlooks on more than
Speaker 1: ninety industries and one hundred market industries, currencies and commodities.
Speaker 1: This podcast series examines the intersection of business policy and law.
Speaker 1: I'm Elliott Stein and analysts with Bloomberg Intelligence covering financials litigation, and.
Speaker 2: My name is Nathan Dean. I mean, I'm an analyst
Speaker 2: with Bloomberg Intelligence covering financials policy.
Speaker 1: So we are delighted today to have not one, but
Speaker 1: two very esteemed guests. First, we have Dan Gallagher, Chief
Speaker 1: Legal Compliance and Corporate Affairs Officer of robin Hood Markets.
Speaker 1: Prior to joining Robinhood, Dan was a partner and deputy
Speaker 1: chair of the securities department at the law firm of
Speaker 1: Wilma Hale, and before that, he served as a Commissioner
Speaker 1: of the US Securities and Exchange Commission from twenty eleven
Speaker 1: to twenty fifteen and held several other positions on the
Speaker 1: SEC staff prior to being appointed commissioner. Dan's previous experience
Speaker 1: also includes serving as the chief legal officer at my Land,
Speaker 1: a leading global pharmaceutical company, and as a president of
Speaker 1: a financial services consulting firm. Our second guest today is
Speaker 1: not just a guest, but also a colleague of ours,
Speaker 1: Larry Tabb. Larry is head of Market Structure Research at
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Intelligence, and prior to BI, Larry was founder and
Speaker 1: rest search chairman of TAB Group, the research and strategic
Speaker 1: advisory firm focused exclusively on capital markets. Before founding TAB,
Speaker 1: Larry was vice president of Tower Groups Securities and Investments Practice,
Speaker 1: and prior to Tower Group, Larry managed business analysis for
Speaker 1: Lehman Brothers Trading Services division. Larry's markets experience also includes
Speaker 1: managing operations for the North American Investment Bank of City Bank.
Speaker 1: So with all that, Dan Gallagher and Larry tab welcome
Speaker 1: to the Votes and Verdicts podcasts.
Speaker 3: Great to be here, Happy to be here, Eli.
Speaker 1: Yeah, great to have you both, so, Dan, the first
Speaker 1: question is to you, and it's something that we ask
Speaker 1: all of our guests, and it's about their work history.
Speaker 1: You know, I read the highlights of your official bio
Speaker 1: and it's obviously very impressive, but we'd love to know
Speaker 1: how you got to where you are, what took you
Speaker 1: into government service, and more recently, what brought you to Robinhood.
Speaker 4: Again, thanks for having me long story. You know, if
Speaker 4: you look at my resume, there's a bunch of twists
Speaker 4: and turns, and as I tell young folks when I
Speaker 4: try to mentor them, if you know, I'd be lying
Speaker 4: if I claimed that I plotted this all out. One
Speaker 4: strange opportunity after another and led to another, led to another.
Speaker 4: So ultimately at robin Hood, I knew I was going
Speaker 4: to go to law school. I as an English major undergrad.
Speaker 4: Not too many other choices if you needed to make
Speaker 4: a buck, which I did. Got very interested in investing
Speaker 4: in the late eighties after the crash, and we started
Speaker 4: a stock market club in high school in Philadelphia where
Speaker 4: I grew up, and you know, always just had that
Speaker 4: little that passion for the markets, and so brought the
Speaker 4: law and the markets together. By you know, studying securities law,
Speaker 4: interning at the SEC when I was in law school,
Speaker 4: and then ultimately getting to Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, which
Speaker 4: is one of the predecessor firms to Wilmer Hale, which,
Speaker 4: as I think you know, was very steeped in SEC regulation.
Speaker 4: We had all the former directors of all the divisions
Speaker 4: of the SEC back then in the late nineties, and
Speaker 4: it was just an awesome place to grow. And as
Speaker 4: a young SEC lawyer so had some opportunities to go
Speaker 4: in house. I went in house real young to fight
Speaker 4: Serve Securities, which was a clearing firm up in Philly.
Speaker 4: So I took over a GC there and was there
Speaker 4: for about a year and a half and oversaw the
Speaker 4: sale to Fidelity of the firm, and then kind of
Speaker 4: came back to Wilmer ended up at the SEC working
Speaker 4: for Commissioner Paul Atkins back in two thousand and six,
Speaker 4: and that really opened my eyes. I interned there years before,
Speaker 4: but being up on the tenth floor working for a
Speaker 4: commissioner really opened my eyes to you know, all the
Speaker 4: inner workings, the sausage making of the SEC. So I got,
Speaker 4: you know, very excited about it, especially at the policy level,
Speaker 4: worked for Chris Cox, worked in the division of Trading Markets,
Speaker 4: and then when I was happily ensconced back in private practice,
Speaker 4: they lured me back to be a commissioner. You know.
Speaker 4: I took a ninety percent pay cut, you know, worked
Speaker 4: just as hard, if not harder, and lost a lot
Speaker 4: of votes, you know. And along the way though, I
Speaker 4: made a lot of good connections. One of them was
Speaker 4: a dear friend of mine, Joe Grunfest, another former SEC
Speaker 4: commissioner Stanford law professor, who was very close with the
Speaker 4: founders of Robinhood. And in early nineteen Joe was very
Speaker 4: adamant that I needed to meet the founders, that it
Speaker 4: would be a you know, a mutually beneficial relationship if
Speaker 4: I met them, and I did. I really liked them.
Speaker 4: I found them to be very different than how Robinhood
Speaker 4: and they were being portrayed in the media at the time,
Speaker 4: especially in Washington. They're just you know, intellectually curious, very smart,
Speaker 4: very earnest, and ethical. And we hit it off and
Speaker 4: they asked me to join the board in twenty nineteen,
Speaker 4: which I did. And then when the chief leagual officer
Speaker 4: left in twenty twenty, when COVID came on, it was
Speaker 4: a natural for me to join in this capacity. So
Speaker 4: it's been a little over four years. Been a hell
Speaker 4: of a ride, tons of fun. Love the firm, love
Speaker 4: what it does. It's mission, you know, for democratizing finance.
Speaker 4: It's never a dull moment. I can tell you that much.
Speaker 1: Yeah, we know that from from covering the company as
Speaker 1: well for the last several years. All right, Larry, same
Speaker 1: question for you. How did how did you get to
Speaker 1: become the you know what we like to call the
Speaker 1: market structure guru.
Speaker 3: Good question, last man standing. I don't know. I, like Dan,
Speaker 3: grew up in Philly or outside of Philly and also
Speaker 3: had a securit this route. I started in City working
Speaker 3: various operations, eventually wound up running their back office government dealer.
Speaker 3: From there, we had a pretty horrible systems implementation. I
Speaker 3: think we blew out, you know, we screwed up money
Speaker 3: supply and got calls by the Fed like what the
Speaker 3: hell are you guys doing over there? And that's when
Speaker 3: I kind of decided that technology was a lot more
Speaker 3: fun than operations, so I moved over to Lehman. Lehman
Speaker 3: was at that time owned by American Express and Shearson,
Speaker 3: and they were wanted to kind of have their own
Speaker 3: infrastructure in the acquisition. Shearson wanted them to use We
Speaker 3: were a fixed income shop, and they wanted us to
Speaker 3: use their equity infrastructure. And the time that really didn't
Speaker 3: suit us. So I was assigned to kind of look
Speaker 3: at different systems and then try to help them with
Speaker 3: some of the decisions. And we wound up actually building
Speaker 3: our own and come back office system. And after that
Speaker 3: I wound up running their business analysis business. Then during
Speaker 3: the meantime, got married, took a couple of years off,
Speaker 3: you know, out of the industry when my father in
Speaker 3: law took Ala, and I wound up at the garment center.
Speaker 3: When I realized that business, it was around the time
Speaker 3: and AFT I realized that business really didn't have any future.
Speaker 3: I figured out, I'll go back to Wall Street. But
Speaker 3: after working a small business, I found it really hard
Speaker 3: to go back and work in a big cube farm.
Speaker 3: So I decided I would go to become a consultant.
Speaker 3: What does anybody else do you know, they become a consultant.
Speaker 3: So I wound up actually finding a research firm in
Speaker 3: Massachusetts that was doing banking technology research. And they needed
Speaker 3: to move into capital markets, and I said, oh, I
Speaker 3: could do that. So I uppeer to Boston worked for
Speaker 3: those guys for seven years to build out the capital
Speaker 3: markets and securities investment research business, which was really writing
Speaker 3: about fintech before fintech was fintech, And so I started
Speaker 3: covering a lot of the ecns and the online BROKERASCA.
Speaker 3: This was kind of the mid nineties or early two
Speaker 3: thousands when all that was you know, building up. Those
Speaker 3: guys eventually got acquired by Reuters, who then sold it
Speaker 3: to my master Card who eventually now it's all part
Speaker 3: of Gartner Group. And I realized that I could do
Speaker 3: some of the stuff better myself. So I founded a
Speaker 3: TAB Group in two thousand and three that had a
Speaker 3: good seventeen year run, and eventually, you know, selling research,
Speaker 3: the business model was basically, go talk to the buy
Speaker 3: side and then sell that information to the cell side.
Speaker 3: But the sell side was getting harder and harder to
Speaker 3: you know, they had harder and harder to pay for research,
Speaker 3: and eventually, you know, TAB Group restructured.
Speaker 4: I sold and.
Speaker 3: Bloomberg picked me up, and it's been great. I think
Speaker 3: the way we write research and putting it on the
Speaker 3: terminal and distribution a second to none to put in
Speaker 3: a plug for, you know, be I at Bloomberg. So
Speaker 3: how I got into the market structure? You know, I
Speaker 3: was writing more on technology back at Towerburg, and when
Speaker 3: I started up TAB, all these new ecns and market
Speaker 3: structures now go trading. All the stuff was cropping up
Speaker 3: and nobody was really covering it, and nobody really understood it,
Speaker 3: and so it just became a niche and I've been
Speaker 3: running there for it ever since. It's been been a
Speaker 3: great you know, twenty five year you know, thirty year trip.
Speaker 2: Oh that's great. And you know, now that I realized
Speaker 2: that we have two Philadelphians on the call, I'm actually
Speaker 2: taking my son to his first Eagles game next month,
Speaker 2: So I am going to come back and hit you
Speaker 2: up on which are the best cheese steaks?
Speaker 4: But you got it?
Speaker 2: Yeah, But Dan, I want to ask you a question
Speaker 2: about the SEC, and specifically the rulemaking agenda that we're
Speaker 2: seeing at the SEC. There's been a lot of proposals
Speaker 2: out there over the last few years from Chairman Gensler.
Speaker 2: The Predictive Analytics Rule, which governs how financial advisors and
Speaker 2: brokers use AI you know, that's one of the first
Speaker 2: I think instances of AI coming into a rulemaking sounds
Speaker 2: like it's going to be reproposed. But also this idea
Speaker 2: of the SEC market structure proposals, I mean, Chairman Gensler
Speaker 2: comes out and essentially pursues a very aggressive agenda in
Speaker 2: terms of altering the US markets. And so what I'd
Speaker 2: love to understand is what are your views on just
Speaker 2: the general SEC rules and the proposals that you're seeing
Speaker 2: out there. Do you anticipate Chairman Gensler is going to
Speaker 2: finalize any before the election? And you know what improvements
Speaker 2: because I think I've read so many of robinhood comment letters.
Speaker 2: What improvements do you think the SEC can do going forward?
Speaker 4: It's a great question. Look, one thing to keep in
Speaker 4: mind as you talk about both the predictive analytics proposal
Speaker 4: as well as the market structure proposals, they both emanate
Speaker 4: from the same event, which was gme believe it or not? Right.
Speaker 4: So here comes the leading capital markets regulator in the
Speaker 4: US looks at a meme stock rally led on social
Speaker 4: media and says, my god, we need to reform equity
Speaker 4: market structure and eliminate what was really at the time
Speaker 4: called gamification. It's now being called AI. I think that's
Speaker 4: a marketing's been quite frankly between you and me. But
Speaker 4: everything is related to gm ME. That's the genesis. So
Speaker 4: I have a hard time with all of these rules
Speaker 4: because I deeply, having lived through gm ME in a
Speaker 4: very real and serious way, believe that the predicate for
Speaker 4: these rules is based on a false narrative, right that
Speaker 4: payment for orderflow, that gamification caused GME, and therefore these
Speaker 4: rules are going to fix what happened in January of
Speaker 4: twenty twenty one. That's garbage. What happened in twenty twenty one.
Speaker 4: A bunch of folks got together on social media agreed
Speaker 4: to do something directionally in the markets. They did it,
Speaker 4: and it had a major impact, right. It wiped out
Speaker 4: a hedge fund, It did all these other things. But
Speaker 4: it's as old as time, right since the first Yahoo
Speaker 4: chat room came out in the nineties. I actually worked
Speaker 4: on one of the first Internet enforcement cases when I
Speaker 4: was an intern at the SEC Systems of Excellence. Go
Speaker 4: look it up. It was being pumped on Yahoo Finance
Speaker 4: and I laughed thinking about that because we had one
Speaker 4: computer terminal in our whole floor at the SEC linked
Speaker 4: to the Internet, and I went to one of the
Speaker 4: supervisors and said, if I go on there, they're going
Speaker 4: to know the SEC's looking. He said, I don't know,
Speaker 4: give a shot, who cares. Yeah, that's where the SEC
Speaker 4: was then. But it was the same activity, right. It's
Speaker 4: a kind of classic pump and dump type activity. Get
Speaker 4: lots of people together trying to get them to do
Speaker 4: the same thing directionally, and then you make money off that.
Speaker 4: That's what happened. Those are hard cases to bring. So
Speaker 4: what did the agency do in debt? Instead? It went
Speaker 4: out and spent not enough time but a lot of
Speaker 4: resource proposing rules. So in December twenty two you had
Speaker 4: the four market structure proposals come out. Right now we
Speaker 4: have one implemented, the six oh five amendments. Those are
Speaker 4: largely fine. Larry will have more detailed commentary on that.
Speaker 4: I'm sure. We hear that tick size is coming here
Speaker 4: in the next couple months, as well as the best
Speaker 4: X rule, and we also hear that the the retail
Speaker 4: auction proposal, which was the most egregious of them all.
Speaker 4: They're all egregious in their own way. Again, given their
Speaker 4: pretext to them the retail auction proposal we hear is
Speaker 4: hitting the scrap heap, which is where it belongs. You know,
Speaker 4: the notion that Robinhood and other retail brokers would you
Speaker 4: have to send all retail orders to an exchange. I
Speaker 4: think you know it was pure folly to begin with.
Speaker 4: The comment file destroyed it in a in a very
Speaker 4: real way, exposed it as not a very unserious proposal.
Speaker 4: And so it's good that that's off to the side.
Speaker 4: But we are still waiting to see what tick size
Speaker 4: looks like and what the impacts are there. I mean,
Speaker 4: I lived through the tick size when I was an
Speaker 4: SEC commissioner. Even these little things that sound mundane and unimportant,
Speaker 4: they have huge consequences, right, I mean the issuer community.
Speaker 4: This is the one thing we never think about when
Speaker 4: we talk about equity market structures. These are companies trading
Speaker 4: on these exchanges, right, and if you impact the liquidity
Speaker 4: in their stock, you impact the trading in their stock.
Speaker 4: They go crazy, right. The CEOs of all these mid
Speaker 4: cap small cap companies that all of a sudden didn't
Speaker 4: have liquidity. If you don't have a secondary market, you
Speaker 4: can't do secondary offerings and things like that. It really
Speaker 4: impacts capital information. So we'll see the impact of that
Speaker 4: best execution. As I told Shair Gensler directly to his face,
Speaker 4: I thought was just ridiculous. FINRA has had a very
Speaker 4: well functioning best X rule in place for years. It
Speaker 4: has a ton of interpretations underneath it, which has helped
Speaker 4: the rule function for decades. Rights As markets changed, FINERRA
Speaker 4: has changed along with it and adopted and you know,
Speaker 4: new interpretations to allow the rule to work. And it's
Speaker 4: a rule with teeth. And I think the notion that
Speaker 4: you know, the SEC needs its own rule, that the
Speaker 4: official markets regulator, the government, the real governmental market regulator,
Speaker 4: the SEC needs one, and that finer is just a
Speaker 4: membership organization is just ridiculous. So we'll see where those
Speaker 4: market structure rules play out. I think if best X
Speaker 4: comes out even close to where it was proposed, I'm
Speaker 4: positive someone's suing them, and I'm nearly positive they're going
Speaker 4: to win. So I try not to lose sleep on
Speaker 4: that one. Predictive analytics, as you said, the chair has
Speaker 4: come out publicly now and said they're going to repropose.
Speaker 4: Good for him, you know, I applaud him and to
Speaker 4: have the humility to recognize how awful that proposal was.
Speaker 4: I mean, I gotta tell you I've read and written rules,
Speaker 4: you know, hundreds, if not thousands of them the SEC.
Speaker 4: It was the worst written rule I've ever seen. It
Speaker 4: was like a joke. It was like my seventeen year
Speaker 4: old did homework assignment and I was looking at it form.
Speaker 4: It was embarrassing to the agency. The definition of covered technology,
Speaker 4: which Commissionery way To pointed out in his dissent would
Speaker 4: include an abacus, was just completely silly. And by the way,
Speaker 4: the more macro point the point we drove home in
Speaker 4: our Robinhood comment letter. If you're at it, technology is
Speaker 4: the way that we're bringing people into the markets. And
Speaker 4: there is a national policy of wanting inclusive markets, right,
Speaker 4: we want retail in our capital markets. It distinguishes us
Speaker 4: from other countries where they're very wholesale markets and disintermediated.
Speaker 4: We want high retail participation. It's good as a national policy,
Speaker 4: and technology is the way to do that to bring
Speaker 4: in more people. It makes the provision of retail financial
Speaker 4: services cheaper. Robinhood was created, you know with that in mind.
Speaker 4: It's been successful. Right. We have all these customers now
Speaker 4: because the use of technology is allowed us to provide
Speaker 4: low price financial services to folks. And the idea that
Speaker 4: the SEC is going to say, well, we're worried that
Speaker 4: the folks being brought in are too stupid to understand
Speaker 4: what they're doing when they buy half a Tesla share, right,
Speaker 4: We're going to actually regulate them out of the markets
Speaker 4: because we're worried that they're too dumb. I find it offensive,
Speaker 4: I find it counter to national policy, and I'm again
Speaker 4: I applaud them for saying they got to repropose it.
Speaker 4: I don't think they should be doing anything in this space.
Speaker 4: And I think the fact that they've been calling it
Speaker 4: an AI rule is just a marketing scheme to make
Speaker 4: it sound more important after we had the AI takeoff,
Speaker 4: you know, in the last nine to twelve months. Because
Speaker 4: really this thing started as a so called gamification rule,
Speaker 4: and we all have to keep that in mind when
Speaker 4: and it helps explain why it's so such a bad idea.
Speaker 2: Yeah, when I cover this rule, I can I can
Speaker 2: remember my headlines originally going from gamification to you know,
Speaker 2: covery technologies AI, and it was just a very uh,
Speaker 2: you know, long path to get to that proposal.
Speaker 3: Let me let me let me put a little color
Speaker 3: around this, is that under the proposed rule that you
Speaker 3: could have a chart of a stock let's just call
Speaker 3: it an IBM or whatever. And that would be okay
Speaker 3: because that's kind of history because it shows you what happened.
Speaker 3: But if you put a trend line on it, you know,
Speaker 3: that becomes something that may prompt someone into action. Then
Speaker 3: that becomes you know, possibly conflicted technology. And and so
Speaker 3: I you know, list of top names that are trading,
Speaker 3: list of advanced declines, news items research. Virtually anything that
Speaker 3: that you know, robinhood puts on their website could possibly
Speaker 3: be conflicted. And unlike other things, you can't just disclose
Speaker 3: a way that we possibly be conflicted. That they must
Speaker 3: either be mitigated or or or eliminated. The whole thing
Speaker 3: basically would pretty much leave robin Hood as just a
Speaker 3: place to view your positions and a buy style ticket
Speaker 3: and that's basically all that robin could and maybe a quote.
Speaker 3: It would virtually shut down all all modern you know,
Speaker 3: brokerage technology, and you.
Speaker 1: Know, I mean, I think that goes to the point
Speaker 1: that this has been a very aggressive sec in terms
Speaker 1: of rule making, not just in terms of the number
Speaker 1: of rules that they've been promulgating, but in how they're
Speaker 1: interpreting the statutes, you know, uh, to sort of go
Speaker 1: far beyond you know what many what many think that
Speaker 1: the you know, Congress intended when when they passed these laws.
Speaker 1: I want to sort of ask you a question about that,
Speaker 1: because we spoke out the AI rule, we spoke about
Speaker 1: the market structure rules. You know, we've also seen rules
Speaker 1: from the SEC on climate change, on you know, the
Speaker 1: definition of a dealer on you know, the definition of
Speaker 1: an exchange, on private funds. And we're sort of in
Speaker 1: this you know, what we like to call a perfect
Speaker 1: storm where you have a very aggressive regulator sort of
Speaker 1: running smack into you know, a federal judiciary in particular
Speaker 1: that is very concerned with administrative overreach. You know, we
Speaker 1: recently saw the private funds rule get struck down in
Speaker 1: the Fifth Circuit. You've obviously been on the inside as
Speaker 1: an SEC commissioner. You're now on the industry side of things.
Speaker 1: You know, what do you think the SEC is getting
Speaker 1: wrong in its approach? What do you think it's getting
Speaker 1: right in its approach? And what do you think this
Speaker 1: all means for cher Gensler's legacy at the end of
Speaker 1: the day.
Speaker 4: Yeah. I mean, look, as the Fifth Circuit pointed out
Speaker 4: last week or the week before, and you know, the
Speaker 4: proxy you a rebuke to the SEC. They're getting a
Speaker 4: lot more wrong than they're getting right when it comes
Speaker 4: to these rulemakings. And I don't say that with joy.
Speaker 4: I'm a problem of the SEC. I believe in the knee,
Speaker 4: you know, for a strong and respected SEC. But you know,
Speaker 4: you got to call a spadeus bade, and they've gotten
Speaker 4: both the economic analysis critically wrong and they've gotten the
Speaker 4: legal analysis critically wrong in a way that's not, you know,
Speaker 4: typical of the agency. I mean, some of the best
Speaker 4: lawyers in the country have come out of that agency.
Speaker 4: It's not some sort of backwater regulatory agency where you
Speaker 4: go for a cushy job. It's where you get the
Speaker 4: brightest minds, and they're very intense. I mean I saw
Speaker 4: no drop off leaving Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering and going
Speaker 4: into the SEC. The level of intellect and attention was great,
Speaker 4: and I believe it still exists. But I believe some
Speaker 4: of the controls internally are being run over roughshot. I
Speaker 4: think things are being ignored on the cost benefit side.
Speaker 4: From the memo that Mary Shapiro when I was on
Speaker 4: the Commission, made public in twenty twelve demanding a rigorous
Speaker 4: you can analysis. None of these rules satisfy that memo.
Speaker 4: And on the legal analysis side, it's like, you know,
Speaker 4: clutching it straw some of the stuff Eliott you mentioned,
Speaker 4: you know, tenuous statutory authority. Look at the predictive analytics rule.
Speaker 4: What do they cite a statutory authority? A section in
Speaker 4: nine thirteen of Dodd Frank called other matters, Like literally,
Speaker 4: you have a whole section, pages and pages and pages
Speaker 4: that deal with the ability of the sec to promulgate
Speaker 4: a fiduciary duty rule for brokers. And then there's a
Speaker 4: little section called other matters, which is, by the way,
Speaker 4: like a drafting error from Congress. That section should have
Speaker 4: been eliminated. It was a legacy Kanjorski bill that had
Speaker 4: been sitting on the shelf and they just forgot to
Speaker 4: delete it. Like, yeah, legislation could be sloppy too, just
Speaker 4: as rules, and that they're going to cling on to
Speaker 4: that little provision called other matters and say, oh, we
Speaker 4: have the authority to ban any conflict. Well, that's garbage.
Speaker 4: It didn't work in the private fund rule, as the
Speaker 4: court pointed out, and you know, returning that rule, they
Speaker 4: cited the same source of authority there. But it's also
Speaker 4: kind of pathetic to me. It's pathetic that they're sitting
Speaker 4: around going, oh, gosh, here's a section called other matters. Aha,
Speaker 4: this is what we need to divine congressional intent, that
Speaker 4: we can do whatever the hell we want. You know,
Speaker 4: I find that pathetic. And guess what, the courts are
Speaker 4: going to rebuke them for doing things like that. So
Speaker 4: and I got to say, you know, you asked for
Speaker 4: Gary's legacy. These losses are no good for the agency.
Speaker 4: I came on board as a commissioner right after the
Speaker 4: d C Circuit loss on proxy access, and think about
Speaker 4: that one. I mean, that was a stinging rebuke of
Speaker 4: the agency back in twenty eleven. I think it was
Speaker 4: twenty eleven. It was months after, months after Dodd Frank,
Speaker 4: where the then chairman lobbied for authority to be inserted
Speaker 4: in Dodd Frank to write a proxy access rule. They
Speaker 4: got it in Dodd Frank. They used it and rushed
Speaker 4: out a rule that they already had in the can
Speaker 4: right because they so they kind of retrofitted legislation on
Speaker 4: it and then ces or get destroyed them. You know,
Speaker 4: it was like a torpedo on the broad side of
Speaker 4: the agency. No rules came out for months and months
Speaker 4: until we had to figure out a way how do
Speaker 4: we move forward? You know, how do we comply with
Speaker 4: the APA? How do we do cost benefit? That gave
Speaker 4: rise to the memo which ultimately became public, you know,
Speaker 4: because I think that was good government by Mary Shapiro.
Speaker 4: And now that now that's like, you know, a forgotten chapter.
Speaker 4: People are not paying attention to that at all. So
Speaker 4: I think I.
Speaker 3: Think this has a This is going to be really
Speaker 3: really difficult for the legacy of the SEC. It used
Speaker 3: to be that the folks really were not that comfortable
Speaker 3: suing their regulator. So you know, if you think about it,
Speaker 3: you know, I'm an entpity I'm regulated by X Y
Speaker 3: Z I. They they upset me, and I assume them,
Speaker 3: but but to a certain extent they regulate me. They
Speaker 3: have people who look at how I do the rules,
Speaker 3: and if you know, if I upset them enough, may
Speaker 3: people come and really big deeper than I would like
Speaker 3: them to dig. Now, you know, given what's going on.
Speaker 3: Folks out are coming out of the woodwork, not just brokers,
Speaker 3: not just exchanges nothing. The byside is getting together and
Speaker 3: suing the SEC. And so what does that mean. It
Speaker 3: means that these entities are no longer scared of the
Speaker 3: Regulator and and and anything that they even come near disliking.
Speaker 3: They don't have a qualm about, you know, suing them.
Speaker 3: And and then that you know, drive that further than
Speaker 3: what does that do to the agency? It makes them
Speaker 3: really leary about almost passing anything, which then means well,
Speaker 3: why even have the regulator begin with h And so
Speaker 3: I am you know, you know, the SEC over under
Speaker 3: this chairman has has really gone out on a limb,
Speaker 3: and I think has sawed itself off to a certain extent.
Speaker 3: It's going to be very difficult to regain, you know,
Speaker 3: the prominence or the or the capabilities of the organization.
Speaker 4: It's going to be really hard to get it, you know.
Speaker 3: Because in the fact they're gonna have to the only
Speaker 3: way to get it back is to come down with
Speaker 3: a huge stick and beat people up and make them
Speaker 3: afraid of him again.
Speaker 4: I think, uh, you know, anyone who knows Gary and
Speaker 4: I know him really well, and I've known him a
Speaker 4: really long time, knows he's intense, he's smart, he works
Speaker 4: harder than everybody else. It's all true. I mean, he's he's,
Speaker 4: you know, a machine. We saw it with the CFTC
Speaker 4: right when when he was chaired there, so anybody who
Speaker 4: thought it was gonna be any different, you know, was
Speaker 4: was delirious. The difference, though, the major difference for Gary
Speaker 4: was that when he was running the CFTC, he'd spend
Speaker 4: all this time literally on Capitol Hill, writing Title seven
Speaker 4: of of Dodd Frank It grant and a very prescriptive
Speaker 4: and sweeping authority to the CFTC for derivatives, and then
Speaker 4: he hopped over there and implemented it right, and he
Speaker 4: had a big piece of legislation on his back and
Speaker 4: mandates to do the rules, and he bent the industry
Speaker 4: to his will, you know, with that impromader from Congress here,
Speaker 4: he's come to the sec without Congressional mandates, and he's
Speaker 4: tried to, like I said, clutching at straws, grabbing existing
Speaker 4: and old and differentiated authorities all over the securities laws
Speaker 4: and trying to use them for things that are intensely aggressive,
Speaker 4: not necessarily the will of Congress or the people you know,
Speaker 4: but things that he and the majority of the commission
Speaker 4: want to do for whatever reasons. And this is the
Speaker 4: consequence of that.
Speaker 1: You guys, don't think that you know, once a new
Speaker 1: commissioner comes in, who's you know, a little more tempered
Speaker 1: in terms of rulemaking and maybe enforcement also that things
Speaker 1: normalize and go back to where they were before against
Speaker 1: the first.
Speaker 3: Of all, anybody knew who comes in needs to go
Speaker 3: revisit some of the stuff that went in and possibly
Speaker 3: pull it out, especially some of the more greageous stuff.
Speaker 3: And then I think they need to really find consensus
Speaker 3: to you know, what the industry believes to kind of
Speaker 3: you know, regain its footing. Either that or come out
Speaker 3: with a huge stick and beat everybody upside the head.
Speaker 3: I kind of prefer the former, you know, get consensus
Speaker 3: and make sure that they're moving in the right direction
Speaker 3: and try to do the right thing. And those are
Speaker 3: the right thing. Look, when I was at TAB everybody said, oh,
Speaker 3: you know, you know, you do business with you know,
Speaker 3: market makers, and you do business with why aren't you
Speaker 3: biased by market makers? Or you do business with buy it?
Speaker 3: You know, we did business with everybody, so so no
Speaker 3: matter what I wrote, people were pissed at me. So
Speaker 3: so it doesn't mean that I'm influenced by them. I
Speaker 3: just try to do the right thing and try to
Speaker 3: come to consensuss to what's important. I think the SEC
Speaker 3: is going to need to go back and do that,
Speaker 3: and by doing that doesn't mean that the industry walks
Speaker 3: all over investors. The investor sort of big portion of
Speaker 3: the business, and Dan Robinhood is going to stand up
Speaker 3: for their client base if they feel disadvantaged. Byside certainly
Speaker 3: is not going to be silent. So I think you
Speaker 3: need to go back and try to, you know, retriangulate
Speaker 3: what's the best thing, you know, for everything.
Speaker 4: I fully agree. I think this majority of the Commission,
Speaker 4: with what they've pushed through over the last three and
Speaker 4: a half years, has created this sort of yo yo
Speaker 4: effect where I think, you know, unless we get an
Speaker 4: eight year presidency of the single party right every four years,
Speaker 4: we're going to be regulating the capital markets differently. Right
Speaker 4: because because what happened back in twenty twenty one, what
Speaker 4: was one of the first things this majority did, They said,
Speaker 4: we're not going to enforce Jake Clayton's proxy advisor rules.
Speaker 4: They put basically a sweeping no action letter out, which
Speaker 4: was deemed by the way, by a federal judge to
Speaker 4: be actually illegal. That's the word that the judge used.
Speaker 4: But then they went and amended the rule, which of
Speaker 4: course was just overturned by the Fifth Circuit. So you
Speaker 4: can't rely on rules anymore. And you know, it's like,
Speaker 4: because you're getting every rule is three to two. To
Speaker 4: Larry's point, you're getting no consensus. You're not bringing in,
Speaker 4: you know, industries, and so every rule is subject to
Speaker 4: being overturned and not enforced every four years. And I
Speaker 4: have to say, I think on the Republican side they've
Speaker 4: had it right. The view is, oh my god. Every
Speaker 4: Democrat period of control, they marched the ball down to
Speaker 4: the ten yard line. And when Republicans take over, they
Speaker 4: might bring it back to the fifteen. But on the
Speaker 4: next drive, the Democrats are bringing it back to the five.
Speaker 4: There's just constant, you know, incremental increase in regulation. And
Speaker 4: so I predict, you know, whoever the new person is,
Speaker 4: if if Trump wins, I think they're going to come
Speaker 4: in to Larry's point and undo spend a lot of
Speaker 4: time undoing, which is not easy. You can't just go
Speaker 4: in and weave your one like they try to in
Speaker 4: twenty twenty one. You have to do rulemakings under the
Speaker 4: APA to undo things that have been done, and then
Speaker 4: you have to develop, to Larry's point, your own proactive,
Speaker 4: positive agenda with whatever time you have left. You know,
Speaker 4: from undoing the damage that's been done, you have to
Speaker 4: come up with things that actually help capital formation, that
Speaker 4: help investors. Right, let's have a very positive agenda and
Speaker 4: those types of things I think will be less susceptible
Speaker 4: to being overturned.
Speaker 3: Right, You'll have at the end of the day, we
Speaker 3: have to get back to what is our business. Our
Speaker 3: business isn't to fund the pockets of all these day
Speaker 3: traders and whatever. Our business you know, is really the
Speaker 3: fun companies to create jobs as well as the fund
Speaker 3: people's and retirements and their kids college education. It's about investing. Yeah,
Speaker 3: are there gamers around. There are opportunities to make a
Speaker 3: quick bob, absolutely, but that also goes in line with
Speaker 3: helping people retire and funding companies. We need to get
Speaker 3: back to the first principles as so, what the hell
Speaker 3: are we doing as an industry and we need to,
Speaker 3: you know, just refocus on on what's really coorn important
Speaker 3: to the health of the country, not not you know,
Speaker 3: some some guy buying a half of you know, you know,
Speaker 3: some guy buying selling a you know, game stock or whatever.
Speaker 1: Daniel, you mentioned the proxy advisory rules and how the
Speaker 1: you know how Againstli's sec rescinded the rules that were
Speaker 1: implemented by the previous chair, and you know, it made
Speaker 1: me think, you know, I wonder if demise of Chevron
Speaker 1: deference and with you know, the rise of the major
Speaker 1: questions doctrine will have sort of less whiplash from administration
Speaker 1: to administration on these rules. The question I have for
Speaker 1: you actually is, you know, it's obviously going to probably
Speaker 1: be harder to impose new rules and regulations, and you know,
Speaker 1: as a result, I wonder, you know, there has been
Speaker 1: talk amongst some analysts that they expect to see more
Speaker 1: enforcement actions because rule making is going to become harder.
Speaker 1: So I wonder if you have any thoughts on that.
Speaker 1: And also another question related to Chevron is if you know,
Speaker 1: if it becomes harder to pass new rules and new regulations,
Speaker 1: are companies that are sort of not regulated so heavily
Speaker 1: right now, like non banks or private credit well, they
Speaker 1: gain a competitive advantage because it's going to be harder
Speaker 1: to impose new rules and regulations on them.
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I've heard, you know on that the first
Speaker 4: point I've heard this idea of it. Oh gee, what
Speaker 4: a shame if agencies can't write rules, because then they'll
Speaker 4: just do rulemaking through enforcement. And I don't really follow
Speaker 4: that logic because I think everything's harder, and I think
Speaker 4: enforcement case Larry made the point earlier. People just aren't
Speaker 4: worried about litigating. And so if you're going to bring
Speaker 4: an enforcement case on me where you're trying to create policy,
Speaker 4: guess what. We're going to court and I'm going to
Speaker 4: make it very clear to the judge what you're trying
Speaker 4: to do and why your existing authority doesn't allow you
Speaker 4: to do it, and I'm going to win. So I
Speaker 4: think that's a you know, a straw man argument. I
Speaker 4: think what we are looking at is a much more
Speaker 4: constrained ability of agencies to write rules, much more important
Speaker 4: for Congress to actually legislate A and then B to
Speaker 4: legislate clearly right, so to spend more time to do
Speaker 4: what they're supposed to do and hand down legislation that
Speaker 4: doesn't require tons of interpretation. You know, I remember in
Speaker 4: the Jobs Act, right, how much time they spend on
Speaker 4: the Jobs Act, and you know for the reg d rulemakings.
Speaker 4: If you remember, there was a view at the SEC, oh,
Speaker 4: we need to define what an accredited investment is or
Speaker 4: how the verification process should work for accredited investors. That's
Speaker 4: something that had existed in the private market for decades.
Speaker 4: People knew how to get lists of accredited investors and
Speaker 4: it worked that way, like it just worked right, but
Speaker 4: to slow down the process right to put you know,
Speaker 4: sult in the gears. The SEC staff at the time said, oh,
Speaker 4: we need a whole big rulemaking on a process for
Speaker 4: determining who's an a credit investor. And that was I
Speaker 4: remember how frustrating it was because Congress was clear, uh,
Speaker 4: you know, in that role making with what they wanted
Speaker 4: done or in that legislation what they wanted done. And
Speaker 4: despite that, you know, we had the agency trying to
Speaker 4: come up the works and it did. It took a
Speaker 4: couple of years to get a full room making out,
Speaker 4: which turned into a principles based process that basically mirrored
Speaker 4: what happened in the private markets before that. Anyway, So
Speaker 4: I think.
Speaker 3: I also think that I also think that there are
Speaker 3: things that you know, they can get done if you
Speaker 3: look at our and we'll go back to market structure.
Speaker 3: You know, pretty much everybody agreed to Hey, look, we
Speaker 3: don't have any transparency on retail brokerich you know, best
Speaker 3: execution rules. It makes sense. Everybody thinks it makes sense. Okay,
Speaker 3: they passed the role for the right NMS stuff. You know,
Speaker 3: everybody thinking a lot if there's a fair amount of
Speaker 3: consensus that the spreads are too wide for the highly
Speaker 3: liquid stocks, is a tenth of a cent the right mark?
Speaker 3: And now probably not? Because a half cent? Yeah, probably.
Speaker 3: You know, there are incremental things that can be done
Speaker 3: to kind of make things better for people that I
Speaker 3: think that you could possibly get through without a whole
Speaker 3: lot of fighting and by doing them and staying away
Speaker 3: from Oh I want to remake the rules because I
Speaker 3: think the markets would work better. Like well, am, I'd
Speaker 3: say that, you know, let the industry speak up, let
Speaker 3: the investors speak up, you know, and then figure out
Speaker 3: a compromise the works and can be articulated, you know,
Speaker 3: throughout the industry. And I think that kind of stuff, Yeah,
Speaker 3: I think it's more likely to stand than all of
Speaker 3: a sudden, you know, me like coming down with King
Speaker 3: Solomon and just writing rules because I want to write rules.
Speaker 4: Let's not forget. I mean, the power of the anti
Speaker 4: fraud rules and the anti anti fraud statutory authority that
Speaker 4: the SEC has is pretty intense, right, So you know,
Speaker 4: Elliott's to your point, you know, neo banking or whatever
Speaker 4: other sort of you know here tofore unregulated corners of
Speaker 4: the market. I mean, and by the way, those corners
Speaker 4: are getting fewer and fewer. Last I looked, I don't
Speaker 4: know exactly what falls under shadow banking anymore. But you know,
Speaker 4: if only you have the authority to police those markets
Speaker 4: for anti fraud, you're doing pretty well, right. I mean,
Speaker 4: people always think you need these specialized rules, right look
Speaker 4: at again, go back to my favorite title seven. Oh
Speaker 4: my gosh, you have unregulated driven right now. You need
Speaker 4: to have rules that prescribe the qualifications of the CEO
Speaker 4: of a swap depository, like dear god, you know you don't.
Speaker 4: You really need to make sure there's not fraud in
Speaker 4: some basic transparency, right, So you know, not having these
Speaker 4: over elaborate regulatory schemes doesn't mean we have bad markets.
Speaker 4: You know, the markets tend to police themselves pretty well.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I tend to agree with that. And you know,
Speaker 1: I also am skeptical of the theory that we'll see
Speaker 1: more enforcement actions as a results, because it's not like,
Speaker 1: you know, the regulators have been shy about bringing enforcement actions,
Speaker 1: and it's not like they see wrongdoing and are like, oh,
Speaker 1: you know, maybe we'll wait and impose a rule making.
Speaker 4: Right, It's so true. I wish I mean, I'm you know,
Speaker 4: in crypto land right now. I wish they would wait
Speaker 4: and do a rule making, But no, they're leading, leading
Speaker 4: with enforcement.
Speaker 3: Well yeah, you know, it seems like almost an every
Speaker 3: market that they're overregulating something crypto where people are actually
Speaker 3: want it crazy right.
Speaker 2: Well, you know, so this is the Bloomberg Intelligence, Votes
Speaker 2: and Verdicts podcast, and Elliot and I have a lot
Speaker 2: of power, including I'm going to deem myself the President
Speaker 2: of the United States, and I'm needing nominating both of
Speaker 2: you to be my SEC chair, and I'm going to
Speaker 2: push the asset. I'm going to get the Senate to
Speaker 2: confirm each of you one hundred nothing.
Speaker 1: Co chairs for the first time.
Speaker 2: So you know, Dan and Larry, you're the new SEC chairman.
Speaker 4: What do you do?
Speaker 2: Let's go, Let's go Dan first.
Speaker 3: Well give it, give it. Given your name is on
Speaker 3: you know the room ORed, you can go first.
Speaker 4: You know, uh, don't don't wish that upon me. That's
Speaker 4: a you know, I know all about that job, and
Speaker 4: that's a thankless job, I can tell you. Look, I
Speaker 4: think it's kind of what I said before, Nathan you
Speaker 4: what would I do. I'd go in with a pretty
Speaker 4: healthy list of things that need to be undone, and
Speaker 4: I would undo them. And I would undo them legally,
Speaker 4: even though I know I'm going to get challenged, but
Speaker 4: I would actually, you know, undo in an APA compliant way.
Speaker 4: A lot of the very bad things that I think
Speaker 4: have been done, I would give. And this is going
Speaker 4: to sound very controversial, I would give serious thought to
Speaker 4: walking away from a lot of bad litigation that's going on.
Speaker 4: You know, I think I never have understood when I
Speaker 4: was on the commission. Also, I didn't understand this notion
Speaker 4: that if somebody pushes through a bad rule three two
Speaker 4: and you had two presidential appointees disagreeing with it, usually vehemently,
Speaker 4: for usually for very substantive reasons, why there's a presumption
Speaker 4: that the agency should proceed in litigation if there's been
Speaker 4: a change of administration, right when that those two become
Speaker 4: part of the majority. Why in the world would you
Speaker 4: defend a rule? But there is this presumption, and it's
Speaker 4: not written in any rule, but I can tell you
Speaker 4: I've encountered it up close and personal. Where this idea
Speaker 4: that you know, when you promulgate a rule comes with that,
Speaker 4: you know, a an authority from the Commission to also
Speaker 4: defend the rule, you know, down to the staff. And
Speaker 4: I don't believe that, And again I don't wish it
Speaker 4: on the agency, but I have to say that would
Speaker 4: be very disruptive, but I think it would be the
Speaker 4: right thing to do from a policy perspective.
Speaker 2: Do you think the SEC should jump in and do
Speaker 2: a crypto rulemaking or should they?
Speaker 4: Relyers absolutely should have done it in twenty twenty one,
Speaker 4: and I think after FTX blew up they were like,
Speaker 4: oh gosh, we can't do it now because we'd be
Speaker 4: admitting that we should have done it in twenty twenty one.
Speaker 4: And if we had done it in twenty twenty one,
Speaker 4: by the way, we might have caught FTX before it
Speaker 4: blew up. On so many people. Right, And here's how
Speaker 4: you do that, Nathan. Everyone says, oh, this existing authority.
Speaker 4: I actually agree with with Chair Gensler. The existing authority
Speaker 4: does work if you use Section thirty six exemptive authority
Speaker 4: and you go through all the requirements with a scalpel
Speaker 4: and you cut through it and you tailor make a
Speaker 4: package for crypto that said, come in and register on
Speaker 4: some form we create. Let us examine your books and records,
Speaker 4: your subject to anti fraud and there's some basic reporting.
Speaker 4: Is it the best perfect rulemaking?
Speaker 1: No?
Speaker 4: Would you rather have legislation from Congress to give you
Speaker 4: more authority, to give you, you know, more well rounded regulation. Absolutely,
Speaker 4: Plus you'd want to know what the will of the
Speaker 4: people is through Congress when you're doing it. But could
Speaker 4: you with exemptive authority? And people forget right, they forget
Speaker 4: about NISMIA back in ninety six giving the agency the
Speaker 4: authority exemptive authority to kind of slice and dice the
Speaker 4: securities laws. It's been used to great effects so many times.
Speaker 4: Think of all the late nineties clearing orders right exempting
Speaker 4: folks from seventeen cafe registration, you know, foreign platforms and others,
Speaker 4: right with conditions, right, with media conditions. That's what could
Speaker 4: have been done. I could do it over a weekend
Speaker 4: with a six pack of Year and a pizza, you know,
Speaker 4: Larry and I could sit there and I'd have a
Speaker 4: rule set ready for you.
Speaker 2: So it's a great way of me going to your
Speaker 2: co chairman, chairman TAB, Chairman, TAB, what would you do?
Speaker 1: I want to make sure we just get.
Speaker 3: I think dance, you know, right on. I can't argue
Speaker 3: or talk really much about you know, a lot of
Speaker 3: the laws. I'm not a lawyer, and I don't steep
Speaker 3: myself in a lot of the rules, uh to the
Speaker 3: extent that Dan does. But I would be looking at
Speaker 3: first of all, i'd scrap a lot of the market
Speaker 3: structure proposals. I would go back and rethink the NMS,
Speaker 3: the tech sizes for a constrained number of names. Access
Speaker 3: fees have been way too high. They need to come
Speaker 3: down in certain places, but not you know, yeah, not
Speaker 3: completely across the board, because they really turn into rebates
Speaker 3: which help the investors, you know, try to figure out
Speaker 3: how to get you know, we're seeing more and more
Speaker 3: float traded off exchange. Try to, you know, have folks
Speaker 3: improve some of the retail liquidity programs, try to coax
Speaker 3: not force more of Robin Hood's flow into exchanges, but
Speaker 3: coax them on there. Uh maybe you know, light up
Speaker 3: you know some of the you know, the subpenny retail quotes,
Speaker 3: so people can actually see that there's liquidity interspread things
Speaker 3: like that. The fixed income side, I think, even though
Speaker 3: the gov ATS or your rule was written so poorly,
Speaker 3: there is a pony there. There, There are there, there,
Speaker 3: there are you know, we need to create great try
Speaker 3: to create greater transparency with fixed income pricing, greater data dissemination,
Speaker 3: more you know, create a more fair regulatory platform for
Speaker 3: fixed income at SS in exchanges or ats is. Really
Speaker 3: so there are things to do, and I think that
Speaker 3: most of the you know, folks in the industry would
Speaker 3: agree their things to do. But I think, you know,
Speaker 3: I would go back, as I said, to to really
Speaker 3: try to find where you know, you know, go back
Speaker 3: to consensus, go back to talking with the industry, going
Speaker 3: back to understand like who's upset and why and how
Speaker 3: to make it better and not just you know, take
Speaker 3: the take the you know, the agency and the markets
Speaker 3: the way I want to go.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I forgot one point to Nathan. I you know,
Speaker 4: going back to to the co chairmanship with Larry here.
Speaker 4: You know, I lost sixteen votes on a three to
Speaker 4: two basis. I and I'm an Irish guy from Philadelphia
Speaker 4: with a long memory, so I might go back and
Speaker 4: revisit some of those rules too.
Speaker 1: All right, That was that was a good hypothetical role
Speaker 1: playing scenario. We have another hypothetical scenario for you, guys,
Speaker 1: and this is something we ask all of our guests
Speaker 1: at the end of the episode. It's a little lighter
Speaker 1: than the substance of conversation we've been having, but the
Speaker 1: question for each of you is this, and we'll start
Speaker 1: with you Dan. If you were stranded on a desert island,
Speaker 1: what are three pieces of music that you would want
Speaker 1: to take with you? And it can be, you know,
Speaker 1: the entire catalog of an artist, or it can be
Speaker 1: one album or a song or a soundtrack or whatever.
Speaker 4: Ah See, I heard you were gonna ask this, and
Speaker 4: I didn't know if it was like a whole catalog
Speaker 4: or not. But so that that you've made it easier,
Speaker 4: I think I would take the whole catalog of you two,
Speaker 4: Leonard Skinner and the Rolling Stones.
Speaker 1: That that's that's a good trio not bad. Huh, yeah,
Speaker 1: really good. I'd happily stay on that island with you.
Speaker 4: I guess.
Speaker 3: I'd be a little more diverse. Probably the Beatles, because
Speaker 3: Habby Road's got to be one of my favorite pieces
Speaker 3: of music, you know, of all time. Milestone US, you know,
Speaker 3: you know, kind of blue and a lot of the
Speaker 3: stuff he did his old stock is phenomenal, and probably
Speaker 3: like maybe Puccini operas or you know some you know
Speaker 3: something you know a little a little older and a
Speaker 3: little I don't know, you know, you listen to some
Speaker 3: of that else, you know, like Traviata La Whim and yeah,
Speaker 3: they're impressive pieces.
Speaker 2: We've had a bunch of guests suggest operas in the past.
Speaker 2: I think you and Labor former Labor Secretary Eugene Schulia
Speaker 2: are both really much into the opera.
Speaker 1: So you're on the same island, the opera island.
Speaker 4: I kind of look alike too.
Speaker 3: You know, I might have to move for messages, so
Speaker 3: I don't know.
Speaker 1: This is good stuff, all right. I think we're gonna
Speaker 1: have to leave it there and wrap up this episode
Speaker 1: of votes and verdicts. But we are so grateful to
Speaker 1: both of you, Dan Gallagher and Larry Tabb, thank you
Speaker 1: guys so much for coming on here and sharing your thoughts.
Speaker 1: As a reminder to all our listeners, you can read
Speaker 1: all of our Bloomberg intelligence research on the Bloomberg terminal
Speaker 1: at Big and with that we'll say, have a great day,