S1: If we live our lives just pursuing health, we're going
S1: to end up disappointed because the question is like, well,
S1: what is health for? Then we end up finding that
S1: what we're ultimately longing for is, in some ways, something
S1: that can't be satisfied by any particular thing, because we
S1: have in ourselves this kind of natural desire for God
S1: that only God can fill.
S2: Welcome to the habit podcast conversations with writers about writing
S2: I'm Jonathan Rogers, your host. Doctor Warren Kinghorn, is a
S2: psychiatrist and theologian at Duke University, where he holds joint
S2: appointments at Duke Divinity School and the Duke University Medical Center.
S2: Warren's work focuses on the intersection of theology, mental health
S2: and human flourishing, and he brings an integrated, humane perspective
S2: to questions that too often get reduced to biology or technique.
S2: His new book is wayfaring A Christian Approach to Mental
S2: Health Care. In this episode, Warren Kinghorn and I discuss
S2: how the metaphor of the human being as machine has
S2: shaped mental health care and what's gained by reclaiming the
S2: older metaphor of the human as wayfarer. We talk about
S2: the ways that Thomas Aquinas theological vision of human behavior
S2: opens up a richer account of freedom, agency, and virtue.
S2: And we talk about the possibility that the meaning of
S2: life is an active participation in blessing. Warren Kinghorn, I'm
S2: so happy to have you on The Habit podcast. I'm
S2: so excited about your book, wayfaring Subtitle A Christian Approach
S2: to Mental Health.
S1: A Christian Approach to Mental Health Care. And I'm so
S1: glad to be here. Thank you.
S2: Yeah. This is this is so fun. As I was
S2: telling you before we started recording, I just love this book. Um,
S2: maybe we'll just start with, well know. First, give me
S2: the 92nd version. When people say, what's your book about?
S2: What do you tell them?
S1: Well, I'm a psychiatrist. I love being a psychiatrist. I
S1: see things in the modern field of psychiatry that I
S1: think extend to the broader field of mental health care,
S1: where people can feel like they're being treated like machines
S1: that need to be fixed, and they can be felt
S1: like they're being carried along on a kind of assembly line.
S1: And I want to resist that. And I think that
S1: Christians have all the resources that we need to resist that.
S1: So in place of the image of the human being
S1: as a machine, especially the human body or mind as
S1: a machine, I draw in Saint Thomas Aquinas, the 13th
S1: century philosopher and theologian, to argue for a different image
S1: of the human as a wayfarer or pilgrim, and his
S1: human life as a journey. And and the practices of
S1: mental health care is being able to accompany each other
S1: on a journey. Hmm.
S2: Love it. Let's talk about that image of the machine.
S2: The machine metaphor. Um, yeah. What? What are the dangers?
S2: What are the ramifications of of thinking of of people
S2: as machines? I mean, in one sense, it's been pretty
S2: helpful to. Yeah. I mean, it has been to think
S2: of the human body as a machine, I think has
S2: been certainly has, has had its advantages.
S1: That's right. I think I think there are ways in
S1: which picturing the human body as a machine can help
S1: us to be able to see things and to. I've
S1: been a physician now for over 20 years. I think
S1: I benefit in some ways from machine thinking in, in, in,
S1: in healthcare as a whole and medicine specifically. I think
S1: there's limits, though, and I think it's important to name
S1: that we live in a culture where we're surrounded all
S1: the time by machines. So you and I are talking
S1: in different cities. We're depending on machines to, you know,
S1: allow us to have our conversation. Um, and, and this
S1: permeates our ways of thinking, not only about the world
S1: around us, but also about ourselves. Um, and there's a
S1: particular philosophical history to this that we may talk about.
S1: So especially, uh, René Descartes in the, you know, early 1600s, uh,
S1: is known as the father of modern philosophy. We think
S1: of him because he, he, uh, came up with this.
S1: He articulated this idea of substance dualism, that the mind
S1: is a separate substance from the body. And we think
S1: about Descartes often as being the champion of the idea
S1: of the mind as as completely disembodied, as immaterial, which
S1: which Descartes did affirm. But just as important to Descartes
S1: work was his affirmation that the body is a machine,
S1: and in fact that all bodies, animal and human bodies
S1: are machines and and all of the natural world is,
S1: is a matter of space and extension. So Descartes encouraged
S1: us to think of nature as a machine. It didn't
S1: take long before subsequent thinkers began to apply that way
S1: of thinking of a machine to the human mind also,
S1: which Descartes would have resisted, but which others would go
S1: along with. By the time we had the rise of
S1: modern psychology and psychiatry, this this idea that the human
S1: mind operated like a machine or as a machine was
S1: just kind of in the water, so to speak. It's
S1: something that Freud picked up on. It's something that a
S1: lot of early psychologists picked up on, and therefore it
S1: shows up in our modern medical and mental health practices. Um,
S1: I think apart from the history of it, though, I
S1: think it's just we even the language that we use
S1: for ourselves often tracks with the idea of machines. So
S1: in in my field of medicine, We talk a lot
S1: about burnout of physicians and nurses. You know, pastors and
S1: talk about this as well. But burnout is a mechanical image. Like,
S1: what else burns out? You know, I mean, rockets burn out,
S1: engines burn out, candles burn out. You know, we talk about, uh,
S1: you know, going on vacation to recharge. We talk about,
S1: you know, I have my, you know, my water and
S1: my coffee in front of me to refuel. You know,
S1: if I get hungry. These are all, like mechanistic images.
S1: We talk about resilience, which is a physical image of,
S1: you know, an immaterial object that bends but doesn't break.
S1: And all these, I think are, are, are mechanical images
S1: that we use to apply to ourselves. And I've learned
S1: from Wendell Berry in this as well as others. But if,
S1: if we if we insist on a on using mechanical
S1: images for ourselves, we're eventually going to find ourselves treating
S1: ourselves like machines. And so I think one, one just
S1: practical thing for us all to think of is how
S1: to resist mechanical, industrial images for human beings to replace
S1: those with creaturely images. So we're not, um, you know,
S1: we're not we're not machines that burn out and need
S1: to be refueled and recharged. We're we're we're bodies. We're
S1: living creatures who need to be fed and nourished and
S1: tended and cared for and held. The this is this
S1: is befitting our nature as embodied creatures of God, not
S1: just artifacts or machines. Um, I can say more about
S1: the mental health care system and how I think that
S1: embodies this, but you may want to go a different direction. Uh, Jonathan.
S2: Well, one thing that I've been thinking, as you've been
S2: talking about the machine image, is that the reason the
S2: machine machinery image is helpful is because it simplifies like
S2: it takes an impossibly complex thing, like the human body
S2: and simplifies, you know, I can think about, you know,
S2: the knee, for instance, in it does have some, some
S2: significant overlap with, with how machinery works, the knee does
S2: and the shoulder and, you know, all kinds of processes.
S2: But I think we can forget the fact that it's
S2: helpful because it, it it, um, what's the word I'm
S2: looking for? It excludes it excludes so much reality to
S2: simplify something that we can get our brains around. And
S2: then then we think, aha, now I've got my brain
S2: around this thing. Right. And when we apply that to
S2: the mind, right. The soul, the all our processes. Sure.
S2: I mean, I think it's really helpful to know it's
S2: helpful because it is a gross oversimplification. Yeah. And then
S2: we and so that's not to say it's not helpful
S2: to say it helps by excluding most of reality.
S1: That's right.
S2: And and yet we still live with the rest of
S2: reality too.
S1: That's right. I mean, there are ways in which these
S1: mechanical images are very helpful because you're right. So my
S1: my mother has had two knee replacements. I'm really grateful
S1: for the surgeons who figured out how to do that
S1: and to to get that done. The the the knee is, um,
S1: is a hinge. Uh, but it's not just a hinge.
S1: It's not. It's not a hinge. It's like the hinge
S1: is on the the hinges of my front door. Ah,
S1: it's it's a knee. It's, it's much more complex than
S1: simply calling it a hinge. The heart is a pump,
S1: but it's not. It's not the same as the pump
S1: that pumps, you know, water into our water towers, you know,
S1: to come into our houses. It's it's a hard it's a,
S1: it's an organic thing. So we, we tend to fix
S1: on mechanical images to help us to understand the body.
S1: And the danger is when those images come to subsume
S1: our understanding of the body or, frankly, any part of
S1: the body itself, because the body is almost always more
S1: complex than any of these mechanical images. And that especially
S1: applies to the brain, and it applies to the body
S1: that relates the body as a whole as it relates
S1: to our knowing and thinking and and acting. So I mean,
S1: there's been lots of images of like, how, how what
S1: might we draw in from the language of mechanism to
S1: describe the brain? Is it is it a computer? Is
S1: it a neural network? Um, what is it? And I
S1: think all of these images have some benefit, but they
S1: always fall short because the brain and and and the
S1: body and and and the mind as like the as our,
S1: our our our ability to extend not only to our
S1: own bodies, but also to the bodies of others always
S1: eludes the mechanistic images that we might apply to them.
S1: So my my complaint in the book, and I make
S1: clear that in I kind of use the machine metaphor,
S1: is something that I want to in many ways oppose.
S1: But I do think that there are times when mechanistic
S1: thinking can be helpful and the medical model can be
S1: very helpful, uh, which I have to describe more in detail.
S1: But but I think it's the danger is when we
S1: reduce everything to mechanistic thinking or reduce everything to the
S1: idea that we can understand mental health problems, for example,
S1: only by recourse to more and better elucidation of what's
S1: happening in the brain, I think. I think our language
S1: always comes to an end, and we're left with some
S1: mystery that exceeds our ability to to name it. Yeah.
S2: Well, you and you're you're coming from a long tradition, um, here.
S2: But you talk about the idea that what it is
S2: to be human is connected very much to, um. The
S2: the reaching toward. Right. It's it's. Well, you're talking about wayfaring.
S2: That's the name of your book is wayfaring. We we
S2: are on a journey. We're moving toward something. Um, you
S2: say that that living beings always act toward ends, that
S2: we discern to be good for us. Yeah, this we are.
S2: We are always, uh, a hammer. Uh, doesn't The user
S2: of the hammer may have a purpose for it, but
S2: the hammer doesn't have a purpose. It doesn't. It doesn't
S2: seek out. Yeah. No machine seeks out its own purpose.
S2: It has to come from outside. And yet, what it
S2: means to be a human being is we are pursuing
S2: what we think is going to be good for us. Unfortunately,
S2: we're not very good at knowing what's good for us. Yeah. Um, yeah.
S2: And that can be a that can be framed as sin.
S2: It could be framed as bad mental health. I mean,
S2: those are I shouldn't say framed. I mean, some ways
S2: that we are bad at knowing what's good for us
S2: manifests in what's traditionally been called sin. And some of
S2: our pursuit of what's bad for us is falls into
S2: the category of mental ill mental health. Is that is
S2: that fair to say?
S1: Yeah. Well, those are obviously complex terms that we could
S1: we could unpack a lot more. I think in general,
S1: you're right that, uh, the one of the distinction between
S1: living creatures and inanimate objects is that or. The central
S1: distinction is that living creatures have within them on aquinas's
S1: terms have within themselves the the principle of their own movement.
S1: And so Aquinas talked about living creatures, having within them
S1: the capacity for nutrition and for growth and reproduction, as
S1: these internal principles that are given in creation. So plants can,
S1: can seek the sun and can absorb nutrients and can
S1: find ways to, to reproduce and, and animals also, and
S1: human beings also, and human beings. For Aquinas, unique among
S1: all creatures are those that can not only, uh, do
S1: the the kinds of creaturely tasks of, of growing and, uh,
S1: feeding and procreating and, and other things, but also can
S1: order our lives by, uh, according to God's ordering of
S1: the world. And so and so for Aquinas, humans have
S1: this God given capacity that he referred to as the intellectual, um,
S1: faculty of the soul, to, uh, to know God and
S1: to be able to know, uh, God's ordering of the
S1: world so as to be able to regulate and to
S1: order our lives accordingly. And of course, uh, we always
S1: do that imperfectly. We do that imperfectly, in part because
S1: we're finite creatures like we are embodied. And and the
S1: fact that we're embodied means that we always are dealing
S1: with a kind of creaturely limitation, but also we're wounded
S1: by sin. And so we find ourselves distracted in various
S1: ways and unable to unable to see the truth of
S1: God and unable to order our lives according to the
S1: things of God. And of course, for Aquinas, as a Christian,
S1: you know the answer to that begins with God's grace,
S1: that God in grace, specifically in the grace that comes
S1: to us in in Jesus Christ, it enables us to
S1: be able to, uh, to, to, to have within ourselves
S1: the capacity to once again find, um, connection with union,
S1: with knowledge of God and God's ordering of the world
S1: so as to be able then to to progress into
S1: the life of God. And of course, Aquinas understood all
S1: of human life, ultimately, as as God's good creatures. We're
S1: from God as as our creator and as the one
S1: who has loved us into existence. We find ourselves now
S1: on a journey from God to God, and at the
S1: end of our lives is in the life of God. Um, in, uh,
S1: the the beatific vision and, uh, union and praise of
S1: God that we, we find ultimately and perfectly only in
S1: the life to come, but we find in part in
S1: this life and even just a glimpse of that, uh,
S1: in this life is, um, is is an incredible blessing
S1: for us.
S2: Yeah. Um, you along those lines, You say that? Um,
S2: and again, you're following Aquinas here. We really can't understand
S2: a thing unless we understand the end toward which it
S2: is directed. Mhm. Um, and then you say the question
S2: of whether a person is moving toward ends or goals
S2: that are life giving is not a neurochemical question, but
S2: a moral question.
S1: Mhm.
S2: Can you how are you using the word moral question there.
S1: Yeah. Well the part of the book where I talk
S1: about this is when we talk about Aquinas understanding of
S1: the four causes, which he draws from Aristotle. And very briefly,
S1: without going into too much technical detail, Aquinas would would
S1: have said with Aristotle that you really can't understand what
S1: a thing is. And especially he's he's thinking here about
S1: what we would consider like natural things like trees and
S1: frogs and human beings. Um, without understanding four dimensions of
S1: his existence, um, one would be the material dimension or
S1: material cause, which is basically the matter of which we're composed.
S1: It basically means that, like, I'm sitting right here at
S1: this desk and no one, no other creature can sit
S1: exactly where I am because I'm here. They'd have to
S1: push me aside to be able to do so. Um,
S1: another would be the formal dimension or formal cause. And
S1: and by that it means how is the matter configured? Like,
S1: what's the shape and form that matter takes. So in
S1: this case, uh, the form of the matter of my
S1: body is not just the it's not just a human body,
S1: but it's specifically me. We're in Kinghorn. This, you know,
S1: as all of us are a kind of unrepeatable, unique, uh, person. And, uh,
S1: he also understood the efficient, efficient cause is like those
S1: things that have enabled us to grow into the kind
S1: of creatures that we are. So that obviously begins, you know,
S1: with the first moment of our conception and development. But
S1: it continues and there's a lot of different ways to
S1: understand that. And then finally, he said, you can't understand
S1: what a thing is without considering what he considered Or
S1: final cause, or the ends and goals toward which something
S1: is directed. Um, this is clear. Like, let's say that you're, like,
S1: in a museum or going through an old, you know,
S1: drawer in a house that's been neglected for a long time.
S1: And you find you find something that clearly at some
S1: point had a function, but you don't know what it was.
S1: And you're like, I can see this thing in front
S1: of me, but I don't know what it is. What
S1: do we mean when we say we don't know what
S1: it is? Like, we can see it's maybe, maybe a
S1: a piece of metal that looks kind of sharp, but
S1: not a knife. And like, we can describe that. But
S1: until somebody says, oh, that's a letter opener, you know,
S1: then you don't actually know what it is like. And that, that,
S1: that applied to an artifact, something that humans have made
S1: is an example of how sometimes to know to know
S1: what something is, you have to know what it's for.
S1: And Aquinas would have said the same thing about creatures
S1: is that, you know, we know in some ways what
S1: something is based on what it's for and specifically the
S1: the purposes and goals that, that constitute the life of
S1: that creature. And so and so we we know what
S1: a what a snake is, or what a frog is,
S1: or what a tree is, in part by what those
S1: creatures do. And and we know what a human being is,
S1: in part because human beings are those that live a
S1: human life that humans characteristically live, and a life of
S1: excellence and, and that, uh, in, in some ways, to
S1: know somebody, to know, to know a person is not
S1: just to know, like what's in what matter they're composed of,
S1: or even what their body looks like, or how it's
S1: configured or what brought that body into being. But it's
S1: to know something about about them, like what kind of
S1: life are they pursuing? And that, I argue, is you
S1: can't reduce that to chemistry like you have to then
S1: to engage in story and narrative and, and and that's
S1: what I mean by these are moral questions. You can't
S1: ever get into a neurobiology lab or a, you know,
S1: physical chemistry lab and say, oh, now I understand Jonathan Rogers,
S1: because I can see every way, every cell of his
S1: body is put together because, frankly, you could see all
S1: of that. But unless. Unless they knew of you as
S1: a as an artist, you know, as a teacher. Um,
S1: as as someone who has had a long career in
S1: literature and, and understand what that matters to you, they're
S1: not going to know you, nor any of us in
S1: those ways.
S2: Um, you can tell me if I'm overstating the case, um,
S2: because you've thought a lot more about this than I have, but, um,
S2: is it is it in any way fair to say
S2: that science, as it has been defined for the last
S2: several centuries, is trying to do, um, the first three
S2: kinds of causes that you're talking about and skip the,
S2: the final cause. Is that is that fair to say?
S2: Is that an overstatement?
S1: I think it's mostly fair to say that that modern
S1: science focuses almost exclusively on efficient causation. How does something,
S1: how to to, uh, to physical causes in the world,
S1: Old cause changes that result in the phenomena that we see. Indirectly,
S1: we also scientists would also care about the matter of
S1: which something's made and the the form that that takes.
S1: But that's almost always brought into the language of, of, uh,
S1: efficient causation. That said, I think there are and I'm
S1: not a philosopher of science. I'm not certainly not a
S1: philosopher of biology. But there are those within the field
S1: of biology who argue that as much as, as, uh,
S1: some might want to strip like purposes and, and, uh,
S1: and final causes away that, that actually especially when you
S1: get into the, the, into living things, um, you actually
S1: can't do so and still make sense of the field.
S1: So I think there is some diversity of thought.
S2: Uh, okay. I'm glad to hear that there's diversity of
S2: thought in that. Yeah. Because I think of, um, and this,
S2: you know, probably just from surface level reading that, that, um,
S2: contemporary science is sort of trying to, get out of
S2: the teleology business, you know? Yeah.
S1: I think I think there's, there's internal debate about that,
S1: especially in philosophy of biology and certainly within psychology as well.
S1: You know, there's ways in which the early behaviorists wanted
S1: to actually take really, in some ways all subjectivity away from, uh,
S1: study of behavior. And, and in fact, we found that
S1: you just can't do that and make sense of the phenomena.
S1: So now modern psychology is actually a pretty diverse field
S1: where you have, uh, the people don't frame it in
S1: this way, but but they, they're often thinking of the
S1: irreducibility of, of story and narrative and, and purposes and
S1: goals as, as part of understanding, like what it means to,
S1: to view a human being. So again, that's a way
S1: of saying you just you just can't get rid of
S1: teleology or the idea of like to understand something, you
S1: have to understand what it's heading toward or what it's for.
S2: Yeah, yeah. Um, okay. So help me bridge this idea
S2: of of final cause Teleology. You know what a thing
S2: is for? Um. With the idea of human agency and virtue.
S2: You write about human agency. You write about virtue. That
S2: one of our, you know, one of these, the signs
S2: of mental health is, um, or maybe the very basis
S2: of mental health is I have the agency to to
S2: behave in ways that that are. Well, I'll let you
S2: define agency. Right.
S1: Yeah, yeah. You've used you just used the word agency.
S1: That's really important to me as a psychiatrist and also
S1: as a Christian. You know, in medicine, we tend to
S1: focus on this idea of autonomy, which often has this
S1: Kantian ring to it. As someone who is in some
S1: ways a like a ruler of their own actions, who
S1: sets their own law. And often the language of autonomy
S1: leads us to this idea of a kind of self-contained,
S1: self choosing, self-governing Individual.
S2: Oh, yeah.
S1: And and that's different from, from from what Aquinas meant
S1: by by free will and by freedom. And I think
S1: the word agency captures it better. Um, let me back
S1: up and say there was a a French Dominican thinker
S1: who drew on Aquinas, named Servaes Pinckaers, who wrote a
S1: book about 30 years ago called The Sources of Christian Ethics.
S1: And at the center of that book was a distinction
S1: between two conceptions of freedom that I think a lot
S1: of Christians will resonate with. One is he called when
S1: he called freedom of indifference. So this idea would be
S1: that this this would be the kind of idea of
S1: freedom as just the capacity to do anything that we
S1: want to have, like perfect ability to choose our own path, um,
S1: without any other constraints. And he said, that's, that's a
S1: kind of a kind of freedom that's that's treasured in
S1: our modern world. But it's not the Christian, the best
S1: Christian understanding of freedom. Opposed to that is what he
S1: called freedom for excellence. That actually does involve constraint and
S1: it involves law and it involves disciplines. It involves actually
S1: submitting ourselves in some ways to, uh, to certain kinds
S1: of authority. And and yet the freedom that emerges in
S1: freedom for excellence is, is is not the freedom to be,
S1: to be, um, free of any other kind of constraint.
S1: But it's the freedom to live a life that's consistent
S1: with what's good and and that in living a life
S1: consistent with what's good, aiming toward what's true and what's
S1: good and what's beautiful, we actually find a kind of
S1: growth of interior freedom to be able to, to, to
S1: pursue those things, um, with joy and with relative ease
S1: and in a way that actually we find the growth
S1: of freedom in that freedom for excellence. So when, when
S1: Aquinas talks about, uh, agency or when I use the
S1: word agency to describe Aquinas view, it's agency is not
S1: just like freedom from any kind of constraint, but it's
S1: specifically the growth of the ability to act for purposes
S1: and goals in the world that in some ways we
S1: are the seat. Or he would have, said the principium,
S1: the originator of our actions. So how when I pursue
S1: a relationship or a new academic opportunity in my role
S1: as a professor, or a new clinical opportunity in my
S1: role as a physician, or, um, you know, do something
S1: different with my church or something like that. How am
S1: I doing so in a way that I am choosing
S1: to do so based on reasons that are good. I'm
S1: not I'm not constrained or coerced by others, or especially
S1: by my own internal dynamics. But but to be able
S1: to do so, to freely choose to pursue a path
S1: that's consistent with, um, with what's good and, uh, and
S1: we grow in our ability to do that. And so
S1: and so someone who is, um, who is, uh, for example,
S1: you know, in the, in the vice grip of um,
S1: of addiction or, or a kind of substance use disorder
S1: finds their agency constrained. They can actually choose to do things,
S1: but they can't choose freely. They find themselves like the
S1: range of action, the capacity to be that agent who's
S1: able to freely act for purposes and goals is constrained.
S1: When somebody is in a situation of significant social deprivation,
S1: you know, they're incarcerated or they're in a really untenable
S1: financial situation or unstable housing. Also, their agency is constrained
S1: because of these external things that happen. So so the
S1: growth of agency is in part related to external factors,
S1: but it's also related to like how we are, how
S1: we orient ourselves toward what's good. And for for Aquinas. Uh,
S1: I mean, this podcast is called habit. And for Aquinas,
S1: habits are are grooves of our of our thinking and
S1: acting that, uh, that that enable us to then be
S1: able to think and act in particular ways with ease
S1: and pleasure and, uh, and habits that are consistent with
S1: what's good. Are called virtues. Habits that distract us and
S1: that enclose us are called vices. And so for Aquinas,
S1: the moral life is about the cultivation of habits that
S1: enable us to act toward what's good and true and beautiful,
S1: and ultimately toward God and toward the life of God.
S1: And to be able to do so with with ease
S1: and pleasure. And that's that's why I think the language
S1: of virtue can often seem kind of kind of patronizing
S1: and moralizing. But I think the language of virtue is
S1: really important for thinking about mental health, but also about,
S1: you know, the work of, of art because it because
S1: it involves what does it mean to be able to,
S1: to act in a way that's free and open and
S1: and open to the world as it is?
S2: Yeah. That language of ease and pleasure is, um, I think,
S2: can be surprising to somebody who's used to thinking of virtue, as,
S2: you know, buckle down, do the hard thing, you know,
S2: I mean, even the language of do hard things is,
S2: is a, um, kind of a catch catchphrase for what
S2: it means to to live a good life.
S1: Um, yeah.
S2: Yeah. And I certainly don't think that a life of
S2: virtue precludes doing hard things. But. But the doing of
S2: hard things, the fact that it's hard is not the
S2: clue that it's virtuous, I guess I would say.
S1: Yeah. That's right. And I think that's that's right. And
S1: I think that that, I mean, pursuing a life of
S1: virtue doesn't, does entail finding things hard, especially when we're
S1: first starting out. But, uh, but you're right that that
S1: the cultivation of virtue often allows things that previously were
S1: really hard to be to be easier, frankly, not always,
S1: but sometimes. And to give a couple of concrete examples
S1: of how we our modern ways of thinking about virtue,
S1: I think, doesn't actually convey what Aquinas means. Uh, two,
S1: two virtues. One would be the virtue of prudence. Like
S1: when we talk, we think about prudence. One is it's
S1: a very kind of Victorian archaic term, but also it
S1: it tends to convey like to be prudent is to
S1: be cautious, to be constantly, like almost afraid to act
S1: because we're wanting to be prudent. But for Aquinas, the
S1: virtue of prudence or prudence. Prudentia. Um, was he understood
S1: it as a cardinal virtue? And it basically is the capacity.
S1: In complex situations, to be able to step into difficult
S1: situations and to just have. A kind of ability to
S1: sense what the right thing is to do. So think
S1: of somebody who. You know, is just good at what
S1: they do. They can step into a room where there's
S1: tension and they just know what to say and what
S1: to do. They can step into a difficult relationship and
S1: be like, I think, I, I think I have some
S1: sense of what needs to happen here. That's what prudence
S1: is for Aquinas, and it's what we all want for ourselves.
S1: And when you see it in somebody else, it's really beautiful.
S2: I had a tow truck driver show up after a
S2: fender bender. Yeah. And he was amazing. He was just,
S2: you know, his whole all day, every day he was
S2: coming to, you know, somebody's worst day they'd had all month.
S2: And he was just there to sort of sort just
S2: to help. And it's such a great example of prudence.
S1: That's right. It's a specific example. Like he's had experience.
S1: He kind of knows how to step into a hard
S1: situation and be like, hey, it's going to be all right.
S1: We're going to get this taken care of. Same way.
S1: Virtue of self-control. I mean, we in our culture, we
S1: think of self-control or or temperance as like always just
S1: restraining ourselves and like, you know, it's so hard to
S1: be controlled about what you're eating or whatever it is, but, um,
S1: and that is part of what self-control is. But for Aquinas,
S1: self-control fundamentally has to do first with like, what does
S1: it mean to care well for ourselves, to give our
S1: bodies what they what our bodies actually need instead of
S1: what we what we think we need? That actually makes
S1: it harder for us in the long run. And so,
S1: so a different understanding. Self-control is like, how can I
S1: actually learn to care for my body in a way
S1: that actually is sustainable and good and healthy, you know?
S1: And so those are the different ways in which, like
S1: reframing virtus away from just like things that seem, um,
S1: you know, You know, patronizing and moralizing toward things that
S1: seem life giving and freeing, I think is really important
S1: for us.
S2: Yeah. And, you know, along the same lines, the way
S2: Aquinas talks about courage is it leads to cheerfulness, right?
S1: Absolutely. Yeah.
S2: That's right. There is a there is the connection between
S2: cheerfulness and and courage I think is fascinating. And, you know,
S2: you didn't use the phrase just then, but you could
S2: have said, you know, self-control leads to ease and pleasure and.
S1: Yeah. That's right. That's right. Yeah. Yeah. That's right.
S2: But also, you mentioned prudence as being able to step
S2: into a situation and know what to do. I think
S2: it's worth pointing out. I mean, it's going to lead
S2: to kind of the next thing I want to talk about.
S2: The way Aquinas talked about prudence was being open to
S2: to reality, you know, to, to, to instead of defining
S2: my own reality, which, by the way, can make for
S2: a really a lot of misery for a lot of people.
S2: That's right. Um, as I align myself with, with reality
S2: and resist the temptation to believe that reality is, you
S2: know what I want it to be, or reality is, um, or,
S2: you know, the desire to bend reality to to my
S2: own purposes. Yeah. Um, which I think maybe in some ways, uh, well,
S2: I guess that's guile. Um, yeah. That that tendency to
S2: to bend, to attempt to bend reality to my own purposes. Um.
S2: That's right. But the idea that there is a reality
S2: that's outside us and I didn't invent and I can,
S2: as I conform to that, I'm prudent. And I know,
S2: you know, I can be the best tow truck driver
S2: in the world because I, um, am aligned with reality.
S2: And I'm. And I've stepped into a situation where people
S2: feel unmoored. I mean, there's a car accident makes you
S2: feel unmoored from reality. And this tow truck driver comes
S2: in and says, you know, I yeah, he's he's more Yeah. Maud,
S2: I guess, is the word I'm looking for.
S1: Right. I mean, when acquaintance talks about prudence in the
S1: Summa Theologiae, he has a list of, of in a
S1: kind of technical term. He calls them quasi integral parts
S1: of prudence. But they're basically like, what are the kind
S1: of building blocks of the development of prudence? And I
S1: can't list all of them from, from memory. But he
S1: they include things like, um, circumspection, like the ability to
S1: just notice what's around you. They include a kind of
S1: awareness of the past, an ability to look toward the future.
S1: Does include some amount of caution, like not acting too rashly,
S1: but it also involves a kind of freedom to be
S1: able to act. It involves, uh, teachable ness, you know,
S1: said docility or docility, the ability to learn. So again,
S1: like when we think about, like, now that we're having
S1: all these debates in our culture about higher education, for example,
S1: you know, and like, what is the point of education?
S1: I think some of what Aquinas writes about, like these
S1: integral parts of prudence as like things that we want
S1: students to cultivate, you know, awareness and reflection and teachable
S1: ness and, you know, and caution. And I think there's
S1: some there's a lot of wisdom there for for teachers,
S1: I think as well.
S2: Yeah. Love it. Well, you point out something I found
S2: so interesting and that's that for Plato. An idea was
S2: something that was outside, that existed out in the in
S2: the universe somewhere. And I have access to it by
S2: way of the mind. Yeah, but the idea is not
S2: internal to my mind. And post Descartes, we tend to
S2: think of an idea as something that's happening in inside
S2: my in my mind. And maybe after Descartes, an idea,
S2: something that's actually inside my cranium, you know, in the
S2: in the neural networks inside my head.
S1: Um, eventually maybe. Yeah, yeah. Mhm.
S2: Um, and that's, um. Yeah, you quote Charles Taylor, the
S2: order of ideas seems to be something that we find
S2: and something it becomes, something we build.
S1: Yeah, yeah, yeah. That that to me is something that
S1: is was really helpful to think about. And I'm not
S1: a not primarily an intellectual historian. I've learned a lot
S1: from folks like Charles Taylor. And the book I quote
S1: from in that particular section is his older book, sources
S1: of the self, where he talks about how did we
S1: how did we come to have our modern sense of self.
S1: And he he has a set of chapters on, on
S1: different thinkers. But in a chapter on René Descartes, who
S1: I mentioned earlier, um, he makes the point that, uh,
S1: that for Plato the ideas were like existing in the
S1: world of ultimate reality. And so knowledge was in some
S1: ways the confirmation of the mind or participation of, of in,
S1: in the mind of that that involves participation in the
S1: world of ideas. Um, Christian thinkers like Augustine and especially Aquinas,
S1: had a slightly different understanding of ideas as is those
S1: things that that were like in some ways, um, part
S1: of God's mind. And so it kind of talks about
S1: the divine ideas as, um, as ideas that in some
S1: ways were part of were cognized by God, but also
S1: the ideas became, some have argued ideas are like exemplar
S1: causes in the world. And so and so, God, there's
S1: a divine idea that is something like an idea of
S1: a particular creature, and that the creation of particular creatures, like,
S1: flows from those divine ideas. Creation Aquinas always understood creation
S1: as different from the. The creator is different from the creation.
S1: There's always that distinction. But yet, uh, creatures can form
S1: in some ways to exemplar ideas in the mind of God.
S1: And when Aquinas talked about like reason, like he often
S1: would talk about God's reason, God's ratio, which is in
S1: some ways God's providential ordering of the world that participates
S1: in God's mind. So in in all of those eras
S1: of human history in the early early church. In the, uh,
S1: in in the medieval era, to, um, to have ideas
S1: was in some ways to participate in something real outside
S1: of yourself and ultimately to find yourself in some ways,
S1: maybe even united in some way, you know, to the
S1: mind of God. Uh, so, so ideas are something that you,
S1: that you discover in the sense of, like I discovered
S1: a mountain that I didn't realize was near me. You know,
S1: there are things outside of you that, oh, I'm so
S1: happy to have, like, come into contact with this thing
S1: outside of myself. Whereas for Descartes, um, Descartes rejected that
S1: as a, as a any any idea that, um, that
S1: the meaning of things or the purposes of things are
S1: known within the things themselves that direct us to guide
S1: Descartes uh, substituted that with a representational approach to knowledge where,
S1: where ideas were things that not only we formed within
S1: ourselves by our own, like mental activity, but that we
S1: could then gain certainty of, as in some ways representing
S1: the world or the reality that's outside of us, which
S1: he understood as a world of space and extension. So
S1: Taylor argues that since Descartes, we've tended to see ideas as,
S1: as like things that are ours. Like, I had an idea.
S1: This is my idea. Um, it's it's inside me. I
S1: can patent my idea. I can write about and copyright
S1: my idea because it's mine. And, uh, and he says
S1: that's just not the way that, uh, human beings would
S1: have thought before the enlightenment. And that's that's Taylor's argument. Uh,
S1: and I find that very interesting.
S2: So it seems to me there's a connection here between
S2: the idea of autonomy for Descartes, maybe, and the anybody
S2: who believes that, that ideas and our sense of reality
S2: comes from inside the goal will be autonomy. Um, and
S2: the way you defined agency before as the ability to
S2: make choices that lead to excellence. Um, yeah. From the
S2: perspective of mental mental health, what difference does it make
S2: whether my ideas are come from inside me or whether
S2: ideas are are something else?
S1: Yeah. Well, it's a great question. How do we think
S1: about mental health? I think one thing to notice is
S1: that we very rarely talk in our mental health culture
S1: about what mental health itself is. We talk a lot
S1: about mental illness. We talk about mental health problems, but
S1: we don't actually talk about mental health. And I think
S1: there's reasons for that because frankly, it's hard to do.
S1: And when people do it, you begin to get into
S1: questions of like, what's what does it mean to live
S1: a well-lived human life? And that's something that we don't
S1: often want to talk about. In psychiatry.
S2: You talk about neurochemical question. That a moral question, isn't it?
S1: Yeah. Yeah. That's right, I do. That's exactly right. I
S1: did in the book talk about, uh, ways that when
S1: mental health is talked about constructively, like what are some
S1: of the attributes of mental health that are framed and
S1: I list seven, I call them natural goods of mental health. um,
S1: and their personal and bodily security, positive regard for oneself
S1: and one's life, the capacity for a full range of emotion,
S1: the capacity for finding meaning, um, personal, purposeful and engaging activity,
S1: the capacity for intimate and fulfilling interpersonal relationships, and the
S1: ability to respond flexibly and creatively to challenges. And those
S1: are those are, you know, that's not meant to be
S1: an absolute comprehensive list. There may be others that people
S1: would add, but that kind of gets to the core
S1: of what I think modern psychologists, psychiatrists, theorists, when they
S1: talk about mental health, what they're getting to, um, and
S1: it's a good list. I think Christians can affirm that
S1: all of those are things that we'd want for ourselves,
S1: we'd want for our children, we'd want for our students
S1: and our, you know, and our colleagues and our friends,
S1: our neighbours. Um, I think the problem with with that, though,
S1: is that is that if if any of those one
S1: things is pursued for its own sake, if I live
S1: my whole life just pursuing personal security. Then I become
S1: that becomes the goal of my life, and I end
S1: up making decisions that might surprise my security, but at
S1: the cost of my relationships, or at the cost of
S1: others who are made more, less secure by my security.
S1: If we if we spend our lives pursuing intimate and
S1: fulfilling interpersonal relationships, then great. Like, we can pursue those.
S1: But if the point is just if we're always asking like,
S1: is this relationship intimate and fulfilling enough? Like, am I?
S1: Have I arrived yet? Then we end up. We end
S1: up pursuing things. We value things too highly and and
S1: they end up kind of imploding in front of us sometimes.
S1: And that can be the case with any of those
S1: goods as good as they are, you know, pursuing, you know,
S1: meaning like, you can you can live your life pursuing meaning.
S1: But then what happens when you, like all of a
S1: sudden get tired of pursuing meaning? So I think this
S1: is where Aquinas would say, all these are goods, but
S1: they're they're goods that always point us toward some other
S1: good that is that we're always left desiring. And and
S1: he famously says, like, you know, wealth is good, but
S1: it's not good as an end in itself, you know.
S1: Honours are good, but it's not good as an end itself.
S1: Health is good. But if we if we live our
S1: lives just pursuing health, we're going to end up disappointed
S1: because the question is like, well, what is health for?
S1: And when we're and when we're we kind of keep
S1: pursuing this question of like, what is what is wealth for?
S1: What are honors for what is health for what is
S1: mental health for? You know, what is what is excellence for?
S1: Then we end up finding that what we're ultimately longing
S1: for is, in some ways, something that can't be satisfied
S1: by any particular thing, because we have in ourselves this
S1: kind of natural desire for God that only God can fill.
S1: And so, so Aquinas would say, as a Christian, and
S1: I think, you know, Christians can broadly affirm this, that
S1: our our ultimate fulfillment as human beings is found in
S1: pursuing and ultimately in being united with the life of God.
S1: That as before, we only find in, in, in full
S1: in the life to come. But we can find it
S1: in part in this life. And so, so that's that's,
S1: I think, a way to frame what Christians are aiming
S1: for when we think about, um, the goal of human life, um,
S1: as in some ways, if God is like perfect in
S1: God's self, if God is supremely happy, um, then in
S1: some ways we're invited to participate in, in God's life. Uh,
S1: so if God is if God is truly blessed, then
S1: we can find in this life the kind of participation
S1: in the blessedness that God is and God's blessing. So
S1: that's why when I when I try to think about
S1: how to translate aquinas's Latin term beatitude, which would be
S1: a kind of his interpretation of Aristotle's term eudaimonia, which
S1: is often translated happiness or flourishing. I think both of
S1: those are good, but they're not sufficient. So I render
S1: that term as participation in blessing. We live our lives, um,
S1: pursuing in some ways, God, we, we, we find by participation,
S1: like a glimpse of the life of God. That's participation
S1: in blessing. And that's that's the end and goal of
S1: our of our lives as human beings. Christians would say,
S1: and the goods of mental health are goods that we
S1: can find along the way. You know, I think I
S1: would say, yeah, I love that our life is not mental.
S2: Health and blessing and and the assumption that the blessings
S2: are there and we participate. We don't create the blessings. No.
S2: We put ourselves in the way of the blessings. We
S2: put ourselves in a position to to receive.
S1: And true blessedness. It is in the very life of God.
S1: And so like we, we just like get to participate
S1: in it just a little bit, you know, like a
S1: time when you like, you have a sense of, wow,
S1: something happened there. I felt myself opening. In some ways,
S1: it's something that doesn't feel like it just came from me,
S1: that I'm somehow participating in something broader than me. And
S1: that's when we begin to feel that and experience that
S1: in this life.
S2: Yeah, I know you're a peeper reader, and and, uh,
S2: I love peepers formulation that to love a thing is
S2: to agree with God that it that it's good. The
S2: God who who made this thing and said this is good,
S2: it's to agree that that feels like a kind of
S2: participation and blessing to be able to agree with God
S2: that that, that, that the good things God made are
S2: indeed good.
S1: Yes. And Pieper's affirmation that I've said almost every time
S1: I talk to a group that, you know, when he
S1: meditates on Genesis 131, uh, and he asks like, what
S1: does it mean for God to see all that God
S1: has made and hold? It's very good. And he says
S1: it's something like approval, not not approval for every state
S1: of affairs or for everything that happens. But, but, but
S1: God's approval for the basic existence of the creature that
S1: for God to look at the creation and say it's
S1: good is to say it's good that you exist. Yeah,
S1: it's good that you're in this world. And man, that's
S1: just something we need to be able to say to
S1: each other as God says it to us.
S2: Yeah, Lord, I'm so glad that your book exists. Um,
S2: I hope a lot of people read it and get
S2: as much good out of it as I did. And, uh. Well,
S2: I'm glad you exist, too. Thanks for being.
S1: Glad that you exist. Jonathan, thank you so much. I
S1: really enjoyed speaking with you. Thank you.
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S2: Visit COVID-19. Special thanks as well to Taylor Leonard for
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