WEBVTT - Tech Friday w/ Dave Hatter - Sponsored by Intrust IT - 10/2/2026

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<v Speaker 1>The Talk Station. 631 on a Friday. It's that time

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<v Speaker 1>of week. IntrustIT.com sponsors Tech Friday with Dave Hatter. Dave's company,

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<v Speaker 1>although it's employee-owned, and they are there for your business

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<v Speaker 1>computer needs. Business Courier says they are the best in

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<v Speaker 1>the business, so get in trust with IntrustIT. IntrustIT.com to

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<v Speaker 1>do that. Find Dave Hatter on LinkedIn where you can

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<v Speaker 1>get all of his resource materials. And also throughout the week,

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<v Speaker 1>it's worth a LinkedIn check or search for Dave Hatter.

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<v Speaker 1>You'll find him. Dave Hatter, welcome, man. I appreciate what

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<v Speaker 1>you do each and every week here on The Morning Show.

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<v Speaker 2>Always my pleasure, Brian. Happy to be here.

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<v Speaker 1>Thank you. And you came to peddle iPhones today.

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<v Speaker 2>I guess. Well, not necessarily.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, to speak my curiosity, I don't have an iPhone,

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<v Speaker 1>but it makes me feel like I want one because

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<v Speaker 1>I guess you can, well, make a setting to stop spam.

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<v Speaker 2>You might be able to do this on an Android.

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<v Speaker 2>I haven't had an Android for a long time because

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<v Speaker 2>they come from Google. So I don't use them. And

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<v Speaker 2>generally speaking, Brian, Apple tends to be a lot more

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<v Speaker 2>privacy friendly than most of these other tech companies. But

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<v Speaker 2>all of that said, regardless of what type of phone

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<v Speaker 2>you have, there's really three things you can do. First off,

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<v Speaker 2>I suggest people add themselves to the Do Not Call registry. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>that's not going to stop Bad guys. No, it doesn't.

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<v Speaker 2>But it will stop legitimate companies, right? Go to the

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<v Speaker 2>FTC's Do Not Call Registry. Put your phone number on it.

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<v Speaker 2>That will stop legitimate sales calls, right? Legitimate companies will

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<v Speaker 2>adhere to that. Illegitimate companies will not. If you go

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<v Speaker 2>to the FTC's website, by the way, they've got a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of good resources out there on this. And they

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<v Speaker 2>focus in on three things to try to stop the

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<v Speaker 2>bad guys, the bad spam, the people that aren't going

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<v Speaker 2>to adhere to the Don't Call Registry. First thing you

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<v Speaker 2>can do is start with your cellular carrier. All the

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<v Speaker 2>big players all have various things you can do. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>they call them different things. They work a little differently.

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<v Speaker 2>Some are free. Some you might have to pay for. But,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, like I have an Apple phone on Verizon,

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<v Speaker 2>so I can go to Verizon and I can see

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<v Speaker 2>what options I have to try to get Verizon to

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<v Speaker 2>stop these kinds of spam calls and texts. And I'll

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<v Speaker 2>come back to why this is all happening, but start

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<v Speaker 2>with your carrier and then On your phone, see what

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<v Speaker 2>sort of options you might have on the phone itself

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<v Speaker 2>to try to stop this. So Apple does provide some

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<v Speaker 2>pretty good capabilities. I've been using this for a long time.

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<v Speaker 2>Is it foolproof? No. But it does, at least for me,

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<v Speaker 2>significantly reduce the amount of spammy stuff that I get.

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<v Speaker 2>On an Apple phone, go into the settings, go to apps,

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<v Speaker 2>go to phone, right? Settings, apps, phone. And then from there,

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<v Speaker 2>you hit the spam switch, turn that on, and then

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<v Speaker 2>you have some options about, well, what do you want

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<v Speaker 2>to do? And basically, you can say screen unknown callers,

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<v Speaker 2>and then there are three options. Don't ever screen unknown callers,

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<v Speaker 2>which is by generally the default setting, and you don't

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<v Speaker 2>want that. Ask for a reason for calling. So it

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<v Speaker 2>will literally tell your caller, hey, why are you calling

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<v Speaker 2>this person? They have to essentially leave a message. Or

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<v Speaker 2>just silence those calls, and they just go off into oblivion.

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<v Speaker 2>It'll show up in your recent calls list. Now, if

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<v Speaker 2>you turn on silence, and that's how I have mine,

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<v Speaker 2>you do have to check that occasionally because you'll get

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<v Speaker 2>legitimate calls from people that aren't in your contacts list,

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<v Speaker 2>and you'll never know if you don't check it. And

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<v Speaker 2>then the third thing you could do, Brian, is buy

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<v Speaker 2>an app. There are apps out there like RoboKiller. These

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<v Speaker 2>things cost money. So this is the typical defense in

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<v Speaker 2>depth I talk about with you all the time. One

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<v Speaker 2>layer is the carrier. One layer is whatever the phone

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<v Speaker 2>itself may or may not be capable of. And then

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<v Speaker 2>the third layer would be you buying an app at

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<v Speaker 2>your own expense, possibly a free app. But remember, if

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<v Speaker 2>it's free, you're paying with money, not data, that altogether

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<v Speaker 2>will try to reduce the amount of spam. And the

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<v Speaker 2>reason this happens is because the phone system is old.

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<v Speaker 2>And as a result, there's no way to authenticate a

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<v Speaker 2>phone number. It is trivially easy. Any one of your

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<v Speaker 2>listeners within 10 minutes can go find a website that

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<v Speaker 2>will allow them to type in a phone number and

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<v Speaker 2>make a call from that number or send a text

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<v Speaker 2>from that number. You cannot. You cannot look at the

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<v Speaker 2>phone number on your screen and know that it's legitimate.

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<v Speaker 2>And of course, the bad guys will make calls that

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<v Speaker 2>appear to be coming from local area codes. So my

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<v Speaker 2>general advice is never answer a call from anyone from

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<v Speaker 2>any number that you don't recognize.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>And if you have an Apple phone, turn these settings on.

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<v Speaker 2>Even if you don't have an Apple phone, see what

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<v Speaker 2>you can do on an Android, check with your carrier,

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<v Speaker 2>consider an app like RoboKiller, and you can significantly reduce

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<v Speaker 2>the amount of this garbage.

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<v Speaker 1>And you can reduce the amount of political ads in

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<v Speaker 1>your mailbox by just going out and voting, because once

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<v Speaker 1>you vote, they stop targeting you. So there's another fun

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<v Speaker 1>fact to get people to get out to vote beginning

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<v Speaker 1>next Tuesday. Dave Hatter, don't go away. We've got more

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about, including this huge drive station. It's 640-65-KRCD

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<v Speaker 1>Talk Station, intrustit.com. Dave Hatter and the crew help you

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<v Speaker 1>out with all your business needs and, of course, sponsoring

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<v Speaker 1>the segment, Dave Hatter does. And, you know, while you

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<v Speaker 1>were talking, the last thing I went over to the

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<v Speaker 1>Do Not Call Registry, I completed the whole process in

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<v Speaker 1>less than a minute, Dave. It's really simple to do.

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<v Speaker 1>I thought I had already put my phone on that registry,

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<v Speaker 1>so I don't know if it'll tell you you've already

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<v Speaker 1>registered if you try to do it again, but either

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<v Speaker 1>my recollection was failed or you can just go ahead

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<v Speaker 1>and try again if you think you're not on there.

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<v Speaker 2>It's easy to do. Exactly. It is easy to do.

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<v Speaker 2>It takes a few seconds, as you see. And again,

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<v Speaker 2>there are some good tips for this sort of thing

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<v Speaker 2>from the FTC at their website. Excellent.

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<v Speaker 1>Moving on, we heard about this before. I think you

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<v Speaker 1>brought up one of the prior interest IT segments here,

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<v Speaker 1>that huge driver's license data breach. All of the information

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<v Speaker 1>and high-res photographs were on this database, in spite of

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<v Speaker 1>the fact I don't think they were supposed to be,

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<v Speaker 1>but those were all stolen, 153 million of them. Dave,

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<v Speaker 1>what does this mean for us?

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, this is bad. So one of the reasons we

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<v Speaker 2>ran out of time in the last segment that you

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<v Speaker 2>get all these spam calls and you get all the

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<v Speaker 2>spam emails and the constant barrage of cybercrime is because

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<v Speaker 2>your data is everywhere now. Thanks to our extremely interconnected world,

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<v Speaker 2>these so-called smart devices that everyone has that's sucking up

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<v Speaker 2>all kinds of information, your data is everywhere, Brian. So

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<v Speaker 2>it makes it easy for bad guys to know how

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<v Speaker 2>to reach you, to send you these spam calls and

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<v Speaker 2>texts and emails and so forth. But this is much

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<v Speaker 2>worse than just the standard, oh, hey, you know, they've

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<v Speaker 2>got my email address. And this is one of the

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<v Speaker 2>reasons why you may recall, I'm pretty sure we talked

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<v Speaker 2>about this around two years ago. It came out that

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<v Speaker 2>various large chains were now wanting to scan your driver's

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<v Speaker 2>license to buy liquor, right?

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<v Speaker 1>Kroger was doing that. They quit doing it because people

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<v Speaker 1>were all pissed off about it, Dave.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, I told people at the time, there is no

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<v Speaker 2>way I'm going to let some store scan my driver's

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<v Speaker 2>license to buy a beer or something. I'll go to

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<v Speaker 2>a different place because I don't know what's happening with

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<v Speaker 2>that data once it goes through that scanner. First off,

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<v Speaker 2>anyone can look at my ID and look at me

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<v Speaker 2>and see that clearly I'm old enough to buy alcohol.

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<v Speaker 2>there's literally no legitimate reason, in my opinion, to need

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<v Speaker 2>to scan your driver's license. And your driver's license contains

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<v Speaker 2>very sensitive information. You can't just get a new driver's license.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, you can get a new driver's license, but

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<v Speaker 2>it's not like you just get one online. You've got

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<v Speaker 2>to go through a whole process. There's a number on there.

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<v Speaker 2>That number's tied to things. They get your height. They

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<v Speaker 2>get your weight. They get your eye color. They get

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<v Speaker 2>other sensitive information that can't just be easily replaced. Like,

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<v Speaker 2>I can't get a new height. You can't get a

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<v Speaker 2>new eye color.

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<v Speaker 1>I keep waiting. I keep waiting to grow an extra

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<v Speaker 1>couple inches so I can be six feet tall.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I can't I can't get a new face. I

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<v Speaker 2>wish I could. I'd order, you know, or Mel Gibson today. Right.

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<v Speaker 2>I can't I can't do that. So when when you're

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<v Speaker 2>handing over your driver's license willy nilly. Now, I get

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<v Speaker 2>there are some instances where you must you're legally required

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<v Speaker 2>to provide identity. I get that. OK, but for purchasing

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<v Speaker 2>something in a store, absolutely insane. This article points out,

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, this was originally broken by Krebs on Security,

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<v Speaker 2>which is a well-known website for this thing. He found

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<v Speaker 2>himself in this breach and believes that it was him

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<v Speaker 2>renting a car. I think he said Hertz. I don't

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<v Speaker 2>remember for sure. And it's not in this particular story

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<v Speaker 2>we're talking about today. And again, I'll post these links.

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<v Speaker 2>But we built a society where your data is being

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<v Speaker 2>collected at all the time, all the time. Your identity

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<v Speaker 2>is needed for things that, in my opinion, aren't really necessary.

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<v Speaker 2>And as a result, now it's becoming a vast and

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<v Speaker 2>valuable target for the bad guys. Because if I can

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<v Speaker 2>steal this information, I can use it to impersonate you

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<v Speaker 2>to conduct fraud in your name. Or maybe even worse,

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<v Speaker 2>I can use it to convince you that I am

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<v Speaker 2>some legitimate authority, some legitimate place you've done business with,

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<v Speaker 2>and fool you into allowing me to hack you, steal

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<v Speaker 2>your money or whatever. Because I have information it seems

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<v Speaker 2>that only the legitimate agency would have. So in this case,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, it's 153 million driver's licenses. I know the

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<v Speaker 2>FBI is looking into this. The finger so far has

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<v Speaker 2>been pointed at ID scan, a third party verification service.

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<v Speaker 2>So you run your driver's license through that scanner. The

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<v Speaker 2>data gets sent to them and they say, yeah, this

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<v Speaker 2>is that legitimate person. And again, going back to my

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<v Speaker 2>concern about letting someone just scan my driver's license, I

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<v Speaker 2>don't know. How long they store that, I don't know

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<v Speaker 2>where it goes. I don't know what they do with it.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't know what their terms of service say. So yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>right off the bat, I said, there is no way

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<v Speaker 2>I will do this. Again, if I'm required by law

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<v Speaker 2>to do it, so be it. But I'm not, and

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<v Speaker 2>I encourage every one of your listeners, do not give

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<v Speaker 2>your driver's license to just some random person to scan

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<v Speaker 2>or passport or anything like that. Because once it's out there,

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<v Speaker 2>and now 153 million are, they say roughly 63%. of

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<v Speaker 2>every single driver's license in the United States, it's out there.

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<v Speaker 2>It is. What are you going to do?

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<v Speaker 1>Dave, I, I, have a quick question for you. Got

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<v Speaker 1>to know this. Is there a database that we can

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<v Speaker 1>scan to find out whether ours is part of this breach?

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<v Speaker 2>As far as I know, I have not been able

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<v Speaker 2>to find one yet. I looked into that and so

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<v Speaker 2>far I have not seen that. That would be very helpful.

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<v Speaker 2>Kind of like the Have I Been Pwned service by

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<v Speaker 2>Troy Hunt, where you can see if you're Using your

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<v Speaker 2>email address, you can see if your information is on

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<v Speaker 2>the dark web. If and when I find this, I'll

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<v Speaker 2>definitely let you know. We can talk about it here

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<v Speaker 2>again because it would be helpful to know. The last

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<v Speaker 2>point for our time, Brian, because of this, and because

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<v Speaker 2>as far as I know, there currently is no way

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<v Speaker 2>to know if your driver's license is in there. Every

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<v Speaker 2>single one listening to us today should go, okay, I'm

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<v Speaker 2>not ever going to hand my driver's license out again

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<v Speaker 2>unless I'm required to by law. And then secondarily, up

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<v Speaker 2>your skepticism. Be aware that this sort of data is everywhere.

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<v Speaker 2>And if your driver's license is out there, you know,

0:10:53.260 --> 0:10:55.260
<v Speaker 2>you could get a call from someone claiming to be

0:10:55.280 --> 0:10:58.420
<v Speaker 2>the Hamilton County Sheriff or the Kenton County Sheriff or

0:10:58.490 --> 0:11:01.410
<v Speaker 2>whatever and claiming, you know, you've done something. They've got

0:11:01.450 --> 0:11:04.550
<v Speaker 2>this information. They're reading it off to you. They've gone

0:11:04.570 --> 0:11:07.470
<v Speaker 2>to the Hamilton County Sheriff's website and looked up Deputy

0:11:07.510 --> 0:11:10.130
<v Speaker 2>Doakes and they claim to be Deputy Doakes and they say,

0:11:10.150 --> 0:11:13.170
<v Speaker 2>go to this page. I'm this person. These people are

0:11:13.210 --> 0:11:16.030
<v Speaker 2>smart and devious, and the more information that's out there,

0:11:16.380 --> 0:11:18.600
<v Speaker 2>the easier it is for them to fool you. You

0:11:18.620 --> 0:11:21.780
<v Speaker 2>need to be skeptical. Trust nothing. Hang up on a

0:11:21.800 --> 0:11:24.000
<v Speaker 2>call like that. Oh, yeah. If you call the Hamilton

0:11:24.040 --> 0:11:29.740
<v Speaker 2>County Sheriff's Office directly, more skepticism, less Internet of Things devices,

0:11:29.960 --> 0:11:31.380
<v Speaker 2>less putting your data out there, Brian.

0:11:31.480 --> 0:11:34.030
<v Speaker 1>Or just ignore them outright and don't follow up because

0:11:34.050 --> 0:11:35.569
<v Speaker 1>they're not going to come to arrest you. And if

0:11:35.610 --> 0:11:37.689
<v Speaker 1>they do, that means they've got probable cause and a

0:11:37.690 --> 0:11:39.810
<v Speaker 1>reason to do so, and then you would probably know

0:11:39.870 --> 0:11:44.250
<v Speaker 1>it if you'd done something wrong. Anyway. Hawk Station. 651

0:11:44.960 --> 0:11:49.000
<v Speaker 1>at 55KRCD Talk Station. Dave Hatter, Tech Friday. Got one

0:11:49.020 --> 0:11:51.720
<v Speaker 1>more segment here. And, of course, interestit.com is where you

0:11:51.760 --> 0:11:53.730
<v Speaker 1>find Dave and the crew for your business needs. And

0:11:54.450 --> 0:11:57.490
<v Speaker 1>linkedin.com to find Dave Hatter and the resources he talks about,

0:11:57.510 --> 0:12:00.110
<v Speaker 1>like this one. We had a recent water utility attack,

0:12:00.130 --> 0:12:02.270
<v Speaker 1>but apparently they've learned something from it. Have I got

0:12:02.309 --> 0:12:02.990
<v Speaker 1>that right, Dave?

0:12:03.970 --> 0:12:07.619
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. The good news, Brian, is there are tons of

0:12:07.660 --> 0:12:12.439
<v Speaker 2>resources out there available for businesses, utilities, small local governments.

0:12:13.170 --> 0:12:16.710
<v Speaker 2>to harden their defenses and become more resilient. I'll come

0:12:16.770 --> 0:12:19.050
<v Speaker 2>back to that in a minute. You mentioned the water attack. So,

0:12:19.080 --> 0:12:21.480
<v Speaker 2>you know, we saw a few months ago and, you know,

0:12:21.500 --> 0:12:24.599
<v Speaker 2>I've been warning about this forever, Brian, critical infrastructure. Yeah.

0:12:24.940 --> 0:12:28.239
<v Speaker 2>Can't live long without water. Electricity makes water possible. The

0:12:28.300 --> 0:12:32.660
<v Speaker 2>telecom system, now it was interconnected, everything. You know, we

0:12:32.710 --> 0:12:35.490
<v Speaker 2>have got to focus and I share information about this

0:12:35.570 --> 0:12:37.910
<v Speaker 2>on all. Yeah. I've talked about this till I'm blue

0:12:37.929 --> 0:12:41.510
<v Speaker 2>in the face. It is extremely urgent that we focus

0:12:41.690 --> 0:12:44.860
<v Speaker 2>on addressing our critical infrastructure. And now we're seeing the

0:12:44.900 --> 0:12:48.800
<v Speaker 2>real world impacts. Over 100 water plants in 12 states

0:12:48.830 --> 0:12:51.350
<v Speaker 2>were recently attacked. It's been linked to the Iranians. Who

0:12:51.390 --> 0:12:53.910
<v Speaker 2>knows for sure, because if you're good, you're going to

0:12:53.929 --> 0:12:56.350
<v Speaker 2>make it look like someone else did it. But they

0:12:56.390 --> 0:12:58.290
<v Speaker 2>were able to get into many of these places. One

0:12:58.309 --> 0:13:00.069
<v Speaker 2>of them was shut down for a period of time.

0:13:00.929 --> 0:13:05.599
<v Speaker 2>It's super critical that across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors

0:13:05.640 --> 0:13:08.840
<v Speaker 2>that the FBI has identified that we focus on these things.

0:13:09.059 --> 0:13:13.280
<v Speaker 2>So the Center for Internet Security, you Think of it

0:13:13.320 --> 0:13:17.580
<v Speaker 2>like a chamber of commerce for cybersecurity nerds like me.

0:13:18.520 --> 0:13:20.660
<v Speaker 2>We pay to belong to this thing to be able

0:13:20.700 --> 0:13:25.130
<v Speaker 2>to use their resources commercially. They have incredible resources. The

0:13:25.150 --> 0:13:27.829
<v Speaker 2>state of Ohio last year, we talked about this, passed

0:13:27.910 --> 0:13:31.550
<v Speaker 2>a law. Again, kudos to Ohio for tending to lead

0:13:31.750 --> 0:13:35.929
<v Speaker 2>in this space. Ohio revised code 9.64 that amongst other

0:13:35.970 --> 0:13:40.630
<v Speaker 2>things requires any political subdivision, any taxing authority in Ohio

0:13:40.650 --> 0:13:44.460
<v Speaker 2>to have a cybersecurity program. And they actually reference the

0:13:44.500 --> 0:13:47.200
<v Speaker 2>Center for Internet Security Critical Controls, one of the things

0:13:47.280 --> 0:13:50.640
<v Speaker 2>CIS provides as a baseline, a framework for you to

0:13:50.679 --> 0:13:53.320
<v Speaker 2>build your cybersecurity program around. And other states have done

0:13:53.360 --> 0:13:56.240
<v Speaker 2>this as well. So my point is Center for Internet

0:13:56.260 --> 0:14:00.630
<v Speaker 2>Security is a well-known, well-respected organization. It's been around for decades.

0:14:01.350 --> 0:14:06.670
<v Speaker 2>And even states like Ohio recognize the quality of the

0:14:06.790 --> 0:14:09.130
<v Speaker 2>information they're putting out there, the tools and so forth.

0:14:09.170 --> 0:14:12.960
<v Speaker 2>So CIS recently put out this article. And one of

0:14:12.980 --> 0:14:15.199
<v Speaker 2>the things we do for businesses, Brian, is we can

0:14:15.240 --> 0:14:18.199
<v Speaker 2>come in and I usually lead these myself. We'll do

0:14:18.220 --> 0:14:21.480
<v Speaker 2>a security assessment of your organization based on the Center

0:14:21.500 --> 0:14:24.570
<v Speaker 2>for Internet Security Framework. So this isn't Dave Hatter's opinion.

0:14:24.610 --> 0:14:27.980
<v Speaker 2>This isn't InTrust's opinion. This isn't Microsoft's opinion. This is

0:14:28.010 --> 0:14:31.940
<v Speaker 2>a third-party organization with thousands of people like me involved

0:14:31.980 --> 0:14:34.660
<v Speaker 2>in it who have come up with these guidelines, frameworks,

0:14:34.740 --> 0:14:35.359
<v Speaker 2>and so forth.

0:14:35.380 --> 0:14:38.280
<v Speaker 1>It's like a medical standard of care.

0:14:39.140 --> 0:14:44.300
<v Speaker 2>Yes, or it's like a financial audit using– Like if

0:14:44.320 --> 0:14:48.060
<v Speaker 2>you're a city, you get audited, right? So again, this

0:14:48.120 --> 0:14:50.140
<v Speaker 2>is something we can do for businesses. There are plenty

0:14:50.180 --> 0:14:52.510
<v Speaker 2>of other people that can do this. But I encourage

0:14:52.750 --> 0:14:55.390
<v Speaker 2>anyone that owns a business, is an executive in a business,

0:14:55.950 --> 0:14:58.590
<v Speaker 2>you should be looking at some kind of security assessment

0:14:58.710 --> 0:15:02.050
<v Speaker 2>on a regular basis, especially because AI is accelerating the

0:15:02.070 --> 0:15:05.030
<v Speaker 2>attacks and making it easier for less sophisticated criminals to

0:15:05.070 --> 0:15:07.890
<v Speaker 2>pull these things off. And a framework like the Center

0:15:07.940 --> 0:15:10.580
<v Speaker 2>for Internet Security Critical Controls is the way to go.

0:15:10.640 --> 0:15:14.320
<v Speaker 2>I'm a big fan. So they came out and said, okay,

0:15:14.500 --> 0:15:18.480
<v Speaker 2>in light of these recent attacks, five things that utilities

0:15:18.560 --> 0:15:21.460
<v Speaker 2>in particular in the wastewater and water treatment space should

0:15:21.480 --> 0:15:24.480
<v Speaker 2>be doing. But this is good advice for any organization.

0:15:25.140 --> 0:15:28.880
<v Speaker 2>Any organization should be doing these five things. And CIS

0:15:28.900 --> 0:15:32.990
<v Speaker 2>has always focused on visibility. How can you protect something

0:15:33.020 --> 0:15:34.910
<v Speaker 2>if you don't know you have it? How can you

0:15:34.990 --> 0:15:37.190
<v Speaker 2>understand the risk something creates if you don't know you

0:15:37.210 --> 0:15:41.540
<v Speaker 2>have it? You've got to have an inventory, hardware, software, users, data.

0:15:42.180 --> 0:15:44.360
<v Speaker 2>You've got to have an inventory of this stuff. That's

0:15:44.420 --> 0:15:46.900
<v Speaker 2>the first point they make in here. And it's hammered

0:15:47.000 --> 0:15:51.500
<v Speaker 2>throughout this control framework I just mentioned. They mentioned connectivity

0:15:51.540 --> 0:15:54.660
<v Speaker 2>creates opportunity and risk. Yeah, it's great that now everything

0:15:54.720 --> 0:15:56.500
<v Speaker 2>is connected to the internet and you can get to

0:15:56.520 --> 0:15:58.390
<v Speaker 2>it remotely and work from home and all this stuff.

0:15:58.750 --> 0:16:00.310
<v Speaker 2>But if you can get to it from the internet,

0:16:00.430 --> 0:16:03.350
<v Speaker 2>so can the bad guys. 10 years ago, the controllers

0:16:03.390 --> 0:16:07.210
<v Speaker 2>that controlled the water, probably weren't accessible to the internet. Most,

0:16:07.350 --> 0:16:10.350
<v Speaker 2>like me, would argue they still shouldn't be. But anything

0:16:10.370 --> 0:16:13.050
<v Speaker 2>that is visible to the outside world is at risk

0:16:13.250 --> 0:16:17.540
<v Speaker 2>to your organization. They mentioned resilience. Yeah, you have to

0:16:17.580 --> 0:16:20.340
<v Speaker 2>defend against these kinds of attacks, and there are ways

0:16:20.400 --> 0:16:24.160
<v Speaker 2>to do it. But we've crossed the Rubicon where now

0:16:24.200 --> 0:16:27.440
<v Speaker 2>you can just assume if you have a firewall, you're good. Right.

0:16:27.600 --> 0:16:29.520
<v Speaker 2>They're coming at you in every angle. You've got to

0:16:29.570 --> 0:16:32.450
<v Speaker 2>focus on resilience. What happens when the system does go

0:16:32.490 --> 0:16:35.990
<v Speaker 2>down for whatever reason? Tornado, earthquake doesn't have to be

0:16:36.030 --> 0:16:38.850
<v Speaker 2>a cyber attack. These are critical systems that, you know,

0:16:39.110 --> 0:16:42.270
<v Speaker 2>we rely on and in some cases are, you know,

0:16:42.350 --> 0:16:46.030
<v Speaker 2>create an existential threat when they go down. They mentioned

0:16:46.190 --> 0:16:49.490
<v Speaker 2>third party risk. Everything's connected to the Internet now, connected

0:16:49.510 --> 0:16:52.490
<v Speaker 2>to the cloud, third party vendors. Third party risk is

0:16:52.530 --> 0:16:56.210
<v Speaker 2>a huge problem in cybersecurity now. And then their last point,

0:16:56.250 --> 0:16:58.130
<v Speaker 2>and then we'll be out of time. This is not

0:16:58.170 --> 0:17:02.250
<v Speaker 2>a business issue, especially in the critical infrastructure. It's a

0:17:02.290 --> 0:17:08.149
<v Speaker 2>public service issue. It's a safety issue. It's a societal issue.

0:17:09.350 --> 0:17:12.120
<v Speaker 2>When the water plant goes down and is out for days,

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:14.739
<v Speaker 2>then what? If the grid goes down and is out

0:17:14.800 --> 0:17:17.580
<v Speaker 2>for months, then what? We've got to get serious about this.

0:17:17.940 --> 0:17:21.930
<v Speaker 2>Organizations like CS have these great resources out there. Anyone

0:17:21.950 --> 0:17:24.409
<v Speaker 2>that's listening to me, you got questions, I'm happy to

0:17:24.470 --> 0:17:27.210
<v Speaker 2>talk about this, point you in the right direction. The

0:17:27.270 --> 0:17:30.389
<v Speaker 2>Center for Internet Security Critical Control is super, super valuable.

0:17:31.950 --> 0:17:34.080
<v Speaker 1>And this is something that you do for businesses in

0:17:34.119 --> 0:17:35.520
<v Speaker 1>the world performing this analysis.