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Speaker 1: The talk station six twenty nine on a Friday. It

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Speaker 1: is that time appointment listening, necessary listening, that is, if

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Speaker 1: you want to stay out of trouble in your online antics.

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Speaker 1: Brought to you by intrust it dot com. It's tech Friday.

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Speaker 1: But Dave Hatter interest I dot COM's Dave's company. If

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Speaker 1: you outstanding work, if you're a business, I know you've

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Speaker 1: says are the best in the business. And who can

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Speaker 1: doubt what they say about a Dave Hatter. Thank you

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Speaker 1: for what you do each and every day for my

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Speaker 1: listeners and their companies. Welcome back for another important discussion.

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Speaker 1: It's time for tech Friday. Good here, Happy Friday Day.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Happy Friday to you, Brian and Joe and all

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Speaker 2: your listeners. Happy to be here, glad you are.

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Speaker 1: And this skimmer thing we've got I know you relied

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Speaker 1: on a local story about a convenience store card reader,

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Speaker 1: a skimmer thing. We can talk about that, but this

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Speaker 1: also goes along with the idea that they can capture

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Speaker 1: your card information by you know, digitally or through the waves, right,

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Speaker 1: I mean the elect tronically. They don't even need to

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Speaker 1: touch you or touch your card, that.

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Speaker 2: Is correct, Brian. I mean it depends on the type

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Speaker 2: of cards you have and the type of device they have.

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Speaker 2: But what you're describing really is just another form of skimming. Now.

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Speaker 2: You know, when you look at this, you hear different

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Speaker 2: terms skimming, shimming, that sort of thing. But basically, you know,

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Speaker 2: most credit cards still have a max right, some have

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Speaker 2: the chip. You know, you can use the near field

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Speaker 2: communication to pay, the tap to pay, you can wipe

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Speaker 2: your card. There's there's all these different ways that you know,

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Speaker 2: you can get the information off a credit card or

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Speaker 2: debit card. Now, this particular thing again, we've talked about

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Speaker 2: this before and it's showing up here once again in

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Speaker 2: the Tri State area. People using skimmers, which are basically devices.

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Speaker 2: Depending on the device, sometimes it's called a shimmer if

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Speaker 2: it goes inside, but essentially you either put a device

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Speaker 2: over the aperture of the credit card reader or inside

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Speaker 2: the credit card reader. Could be a gas pump, could

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Speaker 2: be an ATM, could be a point sales system sitting

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Speaker 2: on a counter somewhere. But you know, once you put

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Speaker 2: the card into it, it attempts to read the mag strip.

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Speaker 2: It attempts to read the chip again. Whatever it's designed

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Speaker 2: to do, or tap to pay, it can potentially, you know,

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Speaker 2: I could walk up to you with the right device

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Speaker 2: in my pocket, bump into you, and try to read

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Speaker 2: the cards in your wallet. So there's a variety of

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Speaker 2: different ways this works. We're just now seeing another real

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Speaker 2: world example where someone did.

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Speaker 1: It well, the old school way. The original way was

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Speaker 1: to put something over the top of the original card reader, correct.

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Speaker 1: I mean quite often you could tell that that had happened.

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Speaker 1: You could grab a hold of it and jiggle it.

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Speaker 1: It might pop off, and then it'd be revealed to

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Speaker 1: be in your hand. I mean, I at least there

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Speaker 1: was an opportunity for people to try or look for

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Speaker 1: something like that. How do they install these card skimming

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Speaker 1: devices inside that device?

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Speaker 2: Well, imagine just a small board, right, a small circuit board,

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Speaker 2: and you just drop it in the slot. I mean,

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Speaker 2: that's how small these things have gotten. Now, you know,

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Speaker 2: sometimes there's a second angle to this, because everything you

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Speaker 2: said is right about the older stuff. In many cases

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Speaker 2: it would literally fit over aperture for the credit card,

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Speaker 2: so you're sticking your card through their device. Sometimes I

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Speaker 2: might have a different color. It might be loose whatever

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Speaker 2: with this with these newer, smaller technologies, again, it could

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Speaker 2: be something if it's completely inside the slot, so you

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Speaker 2: wouldn't really see it. You wouldn't know what to look for.

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Speaker 2: Even if you looked inside. Right, Well, it looks like

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Speaker 2: a circuit board. This thing's electronic, it's probably okay. So yeah,

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Speaker 2: that's part of the issue with this, Brian, as if

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Speaker 2: they get more smaller and more sophisticated, they get more

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Speaker 2: difficult to detect. And in the old days too, and

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Speaker 2: many cases you'd have to come retrieve the thing is

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Speaker 2: the criminal to get the data out of it. But

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Speaker 2: now some of these things can support wireless protocols like

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Speaker 2: Bluetooth or Wi Fi or something like that, so once

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Speaker 2: I've deployed it, I don't necessarily need to ever touch

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Speaker 2: it again. As a criminal, I could just pull into

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Speaker 2: the lot and get the data off of it. So

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Speaker 2: they've gotten trickier. You know a couple other things you

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Speaker 2: should look for, and again this depends on the type

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Speaker 2: of skimmer they're using. Would be okay, if I have

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Speaker 2: a debit card, I got it. The criminal's got to

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Speaker 2: get my pen so sometimes they'll also deploy a tiny

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Speaker 2: camera or possibly an overlay over the keypad. So if

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Speaker 2: you wheel up on one of these devices and it

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Speaker 2: looks like it's been tampered with in any way, including

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Speaker 2: like the keypad looks funny. It looks like there's something

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Speaker 2: laid over the keypad where if you could potentially see

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Speaker 2: a camera. Now, I get this is a lot to

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Speaker 2: look for. You know, these guys want to place the

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Speaker 2: camera so they can see you type in your pin,

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Speaker 2: or they want to put an overlay over the keypad

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Speaker 2: so they can capture that pin. It gets tricky, and

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Speaker 2: you know, as they have to apply these other devices,

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Speaker 2: there's more likelihood to get caught. It sounds like, you know,

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Speaker 2: these guys got caught pretty quickly, but it's certainly something

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Speaker 2: to be on the lookout for. You know. A general

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Speaker 2: recommendation I would make to people is to try to

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Speaker 2: always use a device where it's in eye sight of

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Speaker 2: another human being. You know, pick the pump if it's

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Speaker 2: closest to the cashiers. Pick the pump where you know

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Speaker 2: there are security cameras. Again, it doesn't have to be

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Speaker 2: a gas pump though it could be an ATM. It

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Speaker 2: it could even in this case, it sounds like they

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Speaker 2: weren't tamping with the gas pumps, they were actually tampering

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Speaker 2: with the credit card readers inside the building. So it's

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Speaker 2: a tricky problem to solve, but if you know it's

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Speaker 2: a thing, at least you can be more cautious and

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Speaker 2: potentially use a credit card to avail yourself of the

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Speaker 2: Consumer protection City. Yes, credit cards versus debit cards.

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Speaker 1: I'm glad I was anticipating asking you about that. A

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Speaker 1: reminding listeners, uniform commercial code protects you. You're only liable

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Speaker 1: for fifty bucks if someone abuses your credit card, not

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Speaker 1: the case when you're using your pin and having the

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Speaker 1: money taken directly out of your bank account. That's danger

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Speaker 1: zone right there. That is a really really bad idea.

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Speaker 1: And I guess these card readers you said, someone needs

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Speaker 1: to maybe have a video camera to see your pin

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Speaker 1: or something. Can't they, you know, like record what numbers

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Speaker 1: you're typing in when you're putting your pin in with

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Speaker 1: these device readers.

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Speaker 2: Probably not with it, and I can't say for sure,

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Speaker 2: but with the reader itself, you know, typically it's just

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Speaker 2: electronic Okay, an electronic device is trying to read the

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Speaker 2: mag stripe you know, the keypad is separate, but in

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Speaker 2: many cases they'll put like a little overlay over it

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Speaker 2: so it looks, you know, it's it's another keypad sitting

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Speaker 2: over top of the real keypads, so when you punch

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Speaker 2: your number in, they're capturing it from that, or they're

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Speaker 2: placing a camera somewhere where they can see the keypad

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Speaker 2: so they can capture that pin.

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Speaker 1: Gotcha. And of course we can't end the segment without saying,

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Speaker 1: you know, with regard to the reading of your card

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Speaker 1: just by being near you Faraday wallet, right.

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Speaker 2: Yes, that's always a good thing, they said, blocking wallets.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, just type in Amazon. You just got I know

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Speaker 1: you people hate Amazon or love it either way. Just

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Speaker 1: type in RFID wallet or something. And maybe even I'm

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Speaker 1: presuming they make purses along the same way Faraday purses,

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Speaker 1: and you there you go. You'll be protected at least

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Speaker 1: from that type of shenanigans. We'll bring day back. We'll

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Speaker 1: talk about users apparently not liking or saying no to

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Speaker 1: the Windows eleven up, six thirty six. Right now, if

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Speaker 1: you five krcit talk talk station, it's six forty and

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Speaker 1: fifty five krsit the talk station doing that tech Friday

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Speaker 1: with Dave how It brought to you again by intrust

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Speaker 1: it online at interest dot com. I haven't been I

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Speaker 1: haven't used Windows, and I can't remember how long it's

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Speaker 1: been more than a decade. I went Apple and for

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Speaker 1: a different couple of reasons. But so I'm no longer

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Speaker 1: hip to the whole Windows upgrade thing. But why are

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Speaker 1: users saying no to the Windows eleven upgrade?

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Speaker 2: Dave hatter Well, Ron, I think it's a combination of things.

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Speaker 2: You know, first off, people get comfortable with the way

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Speaker 2: a particular operating system works and don't want to change. True.

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Speaker 2: I think people also don't really understand the risk of

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Speaker 2: having end of life systems, you know, whether it's Windows, Linux,

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Speaker 2: Mac Apple, iOS, Android, whatever, or a particular piece of

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Speaker 2: software like Chrome. For what it's worth, if you still

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Speaker 2: use Google Chrome, I suggest you dropped that. By the way,

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Speaker 2: it supposed to a privacy friendly browser like Brave, Firefox,

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Speaker 2: Tour or Safari. But if you still use Chrome, critical

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Speaker 2: updates came out the other day. My point being, when

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Speaker 2: you have end of life software or software that needs

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Speaker 2: to be updated, end of life means the manufacturer is

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Speaker 2: no longer putting out any updates, right, So it doesn't

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Speaker 2: really matter what the platform of software is. Once you

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Speaker 2: hit that point, then you are, over time increasing your

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Speaker 2: risk of some sort of attack against that vulnerability because

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Speaker 2: the bad guys will find them and the manufacturer's not

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Speaker 2: fixing them. Windows ten went end of life in October,

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Speaker 2: So whether it's people don't want to switch because they're

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Speaker 2: familiar with Windows ten, they don't want to spend the

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Speaker 2: money in some cases to upgrade from Windows ten to

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Speaker 2: Windows eleven you need to get a new computer because

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Speaker 2: the older hardware will not support Windows eleven, or it's

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Speaker 2: they don't understand the risk. I think those are probably

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Speaker 2: the four main reasons. Apparently from some recent reporting and

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Speaker 2: some information that came from Dell, obviously one of the

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Speaker 2: large PC manufacturers out there for the Windows operating system,

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Speaker 2: there are a huge number of people who so far,

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Speaker 2: despite Windows ten going into life in October, have not

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Speaker 2: made the leap to Windows eleven yet, and again as

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Speaker 2: time goes on, that's a bigger and bigger problem.

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Speaker 1: Well, I mean, I get all the points you're making,

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Speaker 1: but insofar as ten versus eleven, to your initial point,

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Speaker 1: people don't like the change or the look or whatever.

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Speaker 1: Are they that dramatically different.

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Speaker 2: In my opinion, No, Brian, But you know again, people

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Speaker 2: get used to something and then stuff gets moved around.

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Speaker 2: They don't like the way it looks, and you know it.

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Speaker 2: In my opinion, Now you know me, mister tin Floyd

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Speaker 2: hat guy here, I'm going to tell you that the

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Speaker 2: security risks to you, especially if you're not very technical

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Speaker 2: and you're not doing other things to mitigate those risks,

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Speaker 2: the security risks to you by not switching would well

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Speaker 2: outweigh the inconvenience you're going to experience for the first

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Speaker 2: several days while you get used to it. Now, you know,

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Speaker 2: people have other issues with Windows eleven. It's got a

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Speaker 2: lot more let's say, it's less privacy friendly than order versions. Again,

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Speaker 2: all of these big tech companies have their issues, but

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Speaker 2: just from a simple security perspective, not having an operating system,

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Speaker 2: since that's the fundamental part that drives everything else you

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Speaker 2: do on your device. And again this would be Apple, iOS, Android, Mac,

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Speaker 2: whatever you're using, if you hit a point where you

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Speaker 2: can't get updates anymore over time, you are going to

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Speaker 2: substantially put yourself at risk because there are bad guys

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Speaker 2: always looking for flaws these things have millions of lines

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Speaker 2: of code in them. There are flaws that are yet

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Speaker 2: to be discovered. I mean, Microsoft patch Tuesday once a

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Speaker 2: month usually is fixing dozens of things, not all security related.

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Speaker 2: You know, when you look at the Apple patches for

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Speaker 2: iOS for your phone, usually dozens of things are fixed.

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Speaker 2: As time wears on, and those don't get fixed, you're

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Speaker 2: putting yourself at risk. And now you may decide get

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Speaker 2: off Windows and go to Mac, use Linux, do so

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Speaker 2: something different. But if you're still running Windows ten or worse,

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Speaker 2: something like Windows eight or Windows seven, you are at

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Speaker 2: substantial risk with these older operating systems if you don't

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Speaker 2: upgrade them. I mean, just reading this Forbes article that

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Speaker 2: I sent to Joe about this, right, the headline is

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Speaker 2: security disaster, five hundred million Microsoft users saying no to

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Speaker 2: Windows eleven, and then you know it goes on to

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Speaker 2: say Microsoft's looming security disaster is worse than feared. Those

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Speaker 2: aren't my words, This is from Forbes. A staggering billion

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Speaker 2: Windows users are at risk is the sheer scale of

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Speaker 2: the task. You know, goes on YadA, YadA, YadA, But

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Speaker 2: they're just pointing out that you really need to get

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Speaker 2: off Windows ten and anything older than that. Absolutely you

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Speaker 2: need to get something different.

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Speaker 1: Well, that five hundred million figure serves to prove the

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Speaker 1: point you dis made. That's why the criminals are out

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Speaker 1: there looking for ways to exploit old, no longer serviced

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Speaker 1: operating systems. A lot of people have resisted so much

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Speaker 1: it makes them an easy target.

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Speaker 2: That's exactly right, Brian, And I want to point something

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Speaker 2: else out too. Now again, I'm I'm not here to

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Speaker 2: advocate for any particular platform at this point. I'm mostly

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Speaker 2: Windows based most of our customers and Windows based that's

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Speaker 2: how most business operates. But all of that said, there

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Speaker 2: are many choices at this point. Again, even something like

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Speaker 2: Chrome OS. Now, I'm not going to use products from

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Speaker 2: Google if I can help it. But you got Linux,

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Speaker 2: you got Mac. There's a lot of choices. But to

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Speaker 2: your point, you know, one of the reasons why Windows

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Speaker 2: is more attacked than others is because it has the

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Speaker 2: largest user base. Right, If I'm a criminal and I

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Speaker 2: want to steal your money or your data, or ideally both,

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Speaker 2: do I want to go after the smallest possible platform,

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Speaker 2: where you know I have less opportunities, or do I

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Speaker 2: want to go after the largest platform so again, I'm

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Speaker 2: not saying Windows doesn't have its issues. I'm just saying

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Speaker 2: one of the reasons why it's more attacked is because

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Speaker 2: it's a much larger user base. And as these systems

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Speaker 2: become obsolete, as you build up this technical debt, as

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Speaker 2: you have these systems that can't be patched, of course

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Speaker 2: they're going to go after those because it's easier for

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Speaker 2: them than the late and greatest version of whatever operating

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Speaker 2: system that's got all the latest and greatest security stuff.

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Speaker 2: And you're exactly right.

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Speaker 1: Well, i'll tell you what. We'll pause now and we'll

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Speaker 1: continue an attack on Google. Coming up next Dave's favorite

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Speaker 1: company six forty six right now for CD Talks Station.

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Speaker 1: I'm looking at him. He's in studio, Congressman Brad Well.

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Speaker 1: I'm sorry, Citizen Brad Winsor. I still want to call

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Speaker 1: him Congressman. Will be talking a full hour in the

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Speaker 1: next segment with him. In the meantime, Tech Friddy's Dave

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Speaker 1: hatters on yet another reason to hate Google. It's a

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Speaker 1: real grabbing headline. Google starts sharing all your text messages

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Speaker 1: with your employer. Well there's a red flag, Dave.

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Speaker 2: What, Well, Brian, you know the sort of typical of

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Speaker 2: clickbait headlines. Yeah, you know, for Forbes generally puts out

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Speaker 2: pretty good information in this space. You know, I read

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Speaker 2: a lot, and particularly this author, Zach Dorfmann. He's pretty

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Speaker 2: good in this privacy and security space. I understand what

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Speaker 2: he's saying. It's not quite as dire as it makes

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Speaker 2: this sound. And really it boils down to how text works. Right.

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Speaker 2: If you and I are both sending messages to each

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Speaker 2: other over Apple phones, they're into end encrypted because that's

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Speaker 2: the way Apple text works. Okay, But if you're on

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Speaker 2: an Android phone and I'm on an Apple phone, well

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Speaker 2: they work differently. So the end to end encryption potentially

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Speaker 2: goes away. And since the original version of text people

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Speaker 2: can think back to their flip phones and how limited

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Speaker 2: that was. Different protocols have been built to allow the

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Speaker 2: exchange of more rich information, right, things like pictures and

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Speaker 2: files and that sort of thing. Right, so that's come

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Speaker 2: on over time. Well, again, how Apple does it versus

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Speaker 2: how Android does it is different. One of the protocols

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Speaker 2: to make that work without getting too nerdy is something

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Speaker 2: called RCS Rich Communication Services, which basically allows you to

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Speaker 2: do things like see when the other person is typing again,

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Speaker 2: stuff that Apple's had for a long time. This works

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Speaker 2: back and forth even if you're not on an Apple phone,

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Speaker 2: voice messages, file sharing group chats, all this sort of stuff. Right,

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Speaker 2: So RCS in and of itself is a good thing

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Speaker 2: that allows you to be more compatible between different types

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Speaker 2: of texting systems. The problem, though, is is this article

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Speaker 2: points out if you know, most people are understand that

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Speaker 2: email is sort of inherently insecure unless it's encrypted, and

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Speaker 2: then it's easy to monitor. Most people sort of think, okay,

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Speaker 2: if I'm texting, my employer can't necessarily see that. And

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Speaker 2: what they point out here and again, why I say

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Speaker 2: it's a little bit clickbaity is because if you have

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Speaker 2: an employer supplied phone, right, they can turn on a

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Speaker 2: feature in the management of the phone that would allow

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Speaker 2: them to archive your text messages. Right, so they you

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Speaker 2: and I both have Android phones. Let's say we're texting

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Speaker 2: each other. Well, if that phone is supplied by the

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Speaker 2: company and they choose to turn on this feature, they

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Speaker 2: can archive my text messages. They're not really private. Now,

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Speaker 2: I would argue, and I think you probably would too, Brian.

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Speaker 2: If the employer supplies the phone, just like anything else

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Speaker 2: they supply, Well, they have the right to monitor it.

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Speaker 2: They're going to do what they want with it. I

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Speaker 2: think that the thing that this is trying to warn

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Speaker 2: about where this article is many people think that, you know,

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Speaker 2: they hear into end encryption. They talk about apps like

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Speaker 2: What's Happened Signaling this sort of thing, and they think

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Speaker 2: their texts are secure and if you have it, I

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Speaker 2: would argue, if you have an employer supplied device, the

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Speaker 2: employer can put tools on that device and ultimately read

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Speaker 2: anything they want. So I think this is just a

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Speaker 2: it's a good warning for folks. If you're on Android

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Speaker 2: and your phone is supplied by your employer, don't assume

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Speaker 2: that they can't access your text messages or you might

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Speaker 2: have some trouble on your hands depending on what you're doing.

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Speaker 2: But even better, Brian, I would just say this as

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Speaker 2: anything you do electronically can be can be accessed. Don't

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Speaker 2: assume anything you're doing in any electronic form is ultimately

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Speaker 2: private to you.

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Speaker 1: Well, I thought you were going to have a go

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Speaker 1: at Google, like Tom calls everyone and says, don't vote Democrat,

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Speaker 1: don't use Google.

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Speaker 2: Well, you know, if you're in a situation where that's

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Speaker 2: what your employer gives you. You may not have a choice,

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Speaker 2: so you know, you need to understand what could be

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Speaker 2: happening here. And you know this is I'm reading from

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Speaker 2: this Forbes article. Google says this is a quote dependable

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Speaker 2: Android supported solution for message archival, which is backwards compatible

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Speaker 2: with SMS and MMS message as well. Employees will see

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Speaker 2: a clear notification on their device when the archival feature

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Speaker 2: is active, So that's good news. You know, if you

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Speaker 2: have an employer's supply device and they turn this feature on,

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Speaker 2: it will tell you that. But I also get a

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Speaker 2: lot of people don't understand all this stuff, aren't paying attention.

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Speaker 2: And again I think the real heads up is if

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Speaker 2: you're an Android phone user and your device is supplied

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Speaker 2: by your employer, understand that any text messaging you're doing

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Speaker 2: on that device may be accessible by your employer.

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Speaker 1: Right, so don't act accordingly exactly. There is the underscoring

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Speaker 1: legitimately across the board, shenanigans and problems people might find

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Speaker 1: themselves in if they do text information in the world

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Speaker 1: that they don't want anybody else to read. I mean,

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Speaker 1: I find out people are so dumb when it comes

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Speaker 1: to that leaving, they're leaving a trail of evidence for

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Speaker 1: anybody down the road. So don't engage in untoward activities

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Speaker 1: whatever those might be, and documented on text. How's that?

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Speaker 2: Yes? And again you know, if you're worried about this,

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Speaker 2: get your own phone, use third party apps like Signal,

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Speaker 2: which I would recommend over What's happened because that's from

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Speaker 2: our friends at Meta. But also at the bottom line

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Speaker 2: is even if things are into and encrypted, even if

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Speaker 2: they're configured correctly, if you and I are messaging each

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Speaker 2: other to Signal Brian and we're doing something illegal, once

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Speaker 2: law enforcement has my device, if they can unlock the device,

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Speaker 2: well it unlocks the encryption and that's the content of

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Speaker 2: my Signal messages. So again, I think people watch TV

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Speaker 2: and they hear about in the end encryption and all

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Speaker 2: this security and privacy. But at the end of the day,

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Speaker 2: if I can unlock your device, will I unlock the

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Speaker 2: encryption that protects as messages I have them all? So again,

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Speaker 2: understand what this all really means, think about what privacy

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Speaker 2: is in today's world, and act accordingly. If you're doing

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Speaker 2: something illegal or something you don't want other people to know,

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Speaker 2: you can't assume that just because something is encrypted, that

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Speaker 2: it is protected, because if I can unlock your encryption,

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Speaker 2: I have it all.

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Speaker 1: Hey man interest dot Com that we find Dave and

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Speaker 1: the crew. Dave, thank you for you sponsoring this segment

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Speaker 1: that is so valuable and so informative and important. We'll

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Speaker 1: do it again next Friday. Have a great week between

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Speaker 1: now and then, and a wonderful weekend on top of it.

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Speaker 2: Always my pleasure, Brian. I look forward to chatting.

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Speaker 1: With you next week, Citizen Brad weinstrip in studio where

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Speaker 1: you're talking to him for a full hour. Plenty of

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Speaker 1: topics to talk about with Brad.

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Speaker 2: Be right back.

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Speaker 1: Today's top headlines coming on