1 00:00:00,600 --> 00:00:05,600 Speaker 1: It's Nice Eyes with Dan Ray ongoing Easy Boston's news radio. 2 00:00:06,519 --> 00:00:08,119 Speaker 1: I'm Breda Jay for Dan tonight. 3 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:11,879 Speaker 2: If I am, if I said, hey, we're going to 4 00:00:11,920 --> 00:00:17,560 Speaker 2: talk about cybersecurity, you would say, But if I phrased 5 00:00:17,560 --> 00:00:21,160 Speaker 2: it differently, if I told you tonight, I'm going to 6 00:00:21,360 --> 00:00:23,440 Speaker 2: tell you how to decrease your chances of having your 7 00:00:23,480 --> 00:00:27,040 Speaker 2: ID stolen, your credit ruined, your bank account wiped out, 8 00:00:27,120 --> 00:00:32,280 Speaker 2: and becoming a totally broken person, you'd pay attention. Well, 9 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:34,319 Speaker 2: then then go with the latter, because that's what we're 10 00:00:34,320 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 2: going to talk about, and we have a super duper 11 00:00:37,120 --> 00:00:40,879 Speaker 2: expert in here to give us well to let us 12 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:43,040 Speaker 2: know the dangers and to give us actionable stuff that 13 00:00:43,080 --> 00:00:45,600 Speaker 2: we can do to protect ourselves. I've already done a 14 00:00:45,640 --> 00:00:49,479 Speaker 2: bunch of them, and you really need you need to 15 00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:53,520 Speaker 2: know this stuff. So I'm very happy to introduce our guest, 16 00:00:53,600 --> 00:00:56,279 Speaker 2: Robert Ciciliano, a cybersecurity expert. Hi. 17 00:00:56,360 --> 00:00:58,320 Speaker 1: Robert, Hey buddy, you are iconic. 18 00:00:58,360 --> 00:01:01,000 Speaker 2: By the way, Well, thank you very much much. I 19 00:01:01,040 --> 00:01:03,200 Speaker 2: have spoken to you a number of times way back. 20 00:01:03,320 --> 00:01:07,760 Speaker 2: It almost seems, you know, when the Internet was first 21 00:01:07,800 --> 00:01:10,080 Speaker 2: starting out. It's not really that way, but things have 22 00:01:10,319 --> 00:01:12,440 Speaker 2: come a long way since we used to speak, so 23 00:01:12,440 --> 00:01:14,560 Speaker 2: I'm anxious to catch up. 24 00:01:14,800 --> 00:01:15,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, there's a lot to talk about. 25 00:01:16,280 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 2: You know. One thing I can do is start with 26 00:01:18,120 --> 00:01:22,319 Speaker 2: a story. I have a friend who was just living 27 00:01:22,400 --> 00:01:26,479 Speaker 2: her life, living in actually Florida at the time, and 28 00:01:26,520 --> 00:01:33,120 Speaker 2: put her iPhone and her scooter not you know, the 29 00:01:33,160 --> 00:01:35,400 Speaker 2: little pack on the back there, whatever you call it, 30 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:38,720 Speaker 2: and walked away and somebody, I don't know what she 31 00:01:38,840 --> 00:01:40,680 Speaker 2: was doing, but somebody went in there and stole it, 32 00:01:40,720 --> 00:01:45,200 Speaker 2: and somehow through that her life was ruined. Her apple 33 00:01:45,280 --> 00:01:49,080 Speaker 2: id her, she couldn't, you know, the access to her 34 00:01:49,080 --> 00:01:53,600 Speaker 2: stuff on the cloud was blocked, and on and on 35 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:56,240 Speaker 2: and on. Her life was living hell for months and 36 00:01:56,280 --> 00:02:00,040 Speaker 2: months and months. And this could happen to you. It 37 00:02:00,120 --> 00:02:03,960 Speaker 2: could happen to any one of you anytime, and so 38 00:02:04,160 --> 00:02:07,200 Speaker 2: we need to address that. First of all, Robert, tell 39 00:02:07,280 --> 00:02:11,359 Speaker 2: us about you, and tell us how people can contact 40 00:02:11,400 --> 00:02:15,840 Speaker 2: you if they should need more personal advice or have 41 00:02:15,960 --> 00:02:18,200 Speaker 2: further questions after you're gone. 42 00:02:18,320 --> 00:02:21,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, easy enough. So by trade, I provide a security 43 00:02:21,320 --> 00:02:25,200 Speaker 1: awareness training, which basically means I head into organizations, corporations 44 00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:28,239 Speaker 1: at their conferences and so forth, and get in front 45 00:02:28,240 --> 00:02:31,720 Speaker 1: of their people and provide awareness training, giving them what 46 00:02:31,760 --> 00:02:34,320 Speaker 1: they need to know in regards to who the bad 47 00:02:34,320 --> 00:02:36,640 Speaker 1: guys are, what the motivations are, and what you as 48 00:02:36,680 --> 00:02:39,840 Speaker 1: a consumer, as an employee, what systems need to put 49 00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:42,119 Speaker 1: in place to reduce that risk, to make sure that 50 00:02:42,440 --> 00:02:44,760 Speaker 1: when the bad guys send you an email, send you 51 00:02:44,800 --> 00:02:47,280 Speaker 1: a text message, call you, or show up to your 52 00:02:47,280 --> 00:02:50,200 Speaker 1: place of business, that you become a tougher target. I'm 53 00:02:50,240 --> 00:02:55,440 Speaker 1: available online at protect NOWLLC dot com. Again, protect NOWLLC 54 00:02:56,080 --> 00:02:56,640 Speaker 1: dot com. 55 00:02:56,720 --> 00:02:59,120 Speaker 2: Okay, you know we go through all this, I guess 56 00:02:59,120 --> 00:03:01,880 Speaker 2: for the sake of convenience, But look at all the 57 00:03:01,919 --> 00:03:05,400 Speaker 2: hoops we have to jump through for convenience. I wonder 58 00:03:05,639 --> 00:03:08,359 Speaker 2: if it is all worth it. I talk to people, 59 00:03:08,480 --> 00:03:11,560 Speaker 2: most Knights, who don't have computers and don't want computers 60 00:03:11,760 --> 00:03:13,799 Speaker 2: because they want no part of this risk that we're 61 00:03:13,840 --> 00:03:17,639 Speaker 2: talking about. It's fairly interesting. And speaking of you listening, 62 00:03:18,040 --> 00:03:20,800 Speaker 2: have you been acted? Have you had your identity stolen? 63 00:03:20,919 --> 00:03:25,920 Speaker 2: Have you been scammed? Do you wonder if you're being scammed? 64 00:03:25,960 --> 00:03:31,639 Speaker 2: Have you had you know? Questionable things happen? And in general, 65 00:03:31,639 --> 00:03:37,000 Speaker 2: does it bother you that strangers, some who many who 66 00:03:37,040 --> 00:03:40,119 Speaker 2: want to steal from you may already have your information. 67 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:42,280 Speaker 2: We'd like to hear from you at six point seven 68 00:03:42,320 --> 00:03:51,560 Speaker 2: two five ten thirty. Now, first let's talk about devices, phone, laptop. 69 00:03:51,960 --> 00:03:55,960 Speaker 2: What can we do to protect ourselves regarding these devices? 70 00:03:56,080 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 1: Well, first and foremost, your friend whose mobile was stolen 71 00:03:59,760 --> 00:04:03,520 Speaker 1: out for a scooter, there's a one hundred percent chance 72 00:04:03,520 --> 00:04:05,840 Speaker 1: that her life was ruined as a result of that, 73 00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:09,960 Speaker 1: that her mobile phone was not password protected. That's like 74 00:04:10,000 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: the first thing I thought. 75 00:04:12,160 --> 00:04:15,840 Speaker 2: That I would imagine that everyone would know to do that. 76 00:04:15,880 --> 00:04:17,680 Speaker 2: But is that you find that's not the case. 77 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:20,839 Speaker 1: You'd be surprised how many people do not password protect 78 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:23,640 Speaker 1: their mobile device. If your mobile device is lost or 79 00:04:24,000 --> 00:04:27,560 Speaker 1: or worse stolen and it's not password protected, you know, 80 00:04:27,640 --> 00:04:29,840 Speaker 1: the question is what do they have access to? And 81 00:04:29,880 --> 00:04:33,040 Speaker 1: the answer is always everything, right, And once they're on 82 00:04:33,160 --> 00:04:37,039 Speaker 1: your device, they not only have access to your Apple ID, 83 00:04:37,400 --> 00:04:41,360 Speaker 1: generally your whatever that email associated email addresses, they all 84 00:04:41,560 --> 00:04:43,679 Speaker 1: also have access to your email, right, so they're logged 85 00:04:43,680 --> 00:04:46,320 Speaker 1: into your Gmail once they are on your phone, and 86 00:04:46,800 --> 00:04:49,160 Speaker 1: if in fact you use email. But once they're in 87 00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:53,039 Speaker 1: your Gmail, from there, they can reset your Apple ID, 88 00:04:53,160 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 1: they can reset your Apple passcode. From there, they can 89 00:04:55,600 --> 00:04:58,640 Speaker 1: reset the passcode to your banking to your credit cards, 90 00:04:58,800 --> 00:05:02,040 Speaker 1: to pretty much everything. Guys say, if you own the 91 00:05:02,080 --> 00:05:07,520 Speaker 1: person's email, you own the person because that's where everything resides. 92 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:11,479 Speaker 1: That's where all the transactions begin and passwords are changed. 93 00:05:11,920 --> 00:05:16,760 Speaker 1: And so password protecting your devices, laptops, desktops, mobile phones, 94 00:05:17,200 --> 00:05:20,160 Speaker 1: in your house, and of course the portable devices is 95 00:05:20,240 --> 00:05:22,920 Speaker 1: absolutely necessary, and too many people don't do it. 96 00:05:23,320 --> 00:05:25,479 Speaker 2: So you're telling me that there are people currently with 97 00:05:26,320 --> 00:05:29,800 Speaker 2: where anyone can go into their phone if they get 98 00:05:29,839 --> 00:05:32,880 Speaker 2: the phone. Yeah, and it's not locked. So people, right 99 00:05:32,920 --> 00:05:37,119 Speaker 2: away you need to figure out how to password protect 100 00:05:37,120 --> 00:05:41,360 Speaker 2: your phone. If you don't know how, call If you 101 00:05:41,440 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 2: have an Apple device, you can call Apple tech Support. 102 00:05:44,040 --> 00:05:46,159 Speaker 2: I don't know how it works with other phones, but 103 00:05:46,839 --> 00:05:47,599 Speaker 2: figure it out. 104 00:05:47,760 --> 00:05:50,679 Speaker 1: Just google it. Just ask Google's Gemini how to password 105 00:05:50,760 --> 00:05:53,320 Speaker 1: protect my mobile device. It'll walk you through exactly how 106 00:05:53,360 --> 00:05:56,119 Speaker 1: to do that, whether it's Chatch ept, Google Gemini, step 107 00:05:56,120 --> 00:05:58,240 Speaker 1: by step. It's such a simple thing. And that's just 108 00:05:58,400 --> 00:06:01,720 Speaker 1: one thing. Password management, access control for all your devices 109 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:08,599 Speaker 1: is the most overlooked risk reduction strategy that too many 110 00:06:08,600 --> 00:06:09,560 Speaker 1: people don't engage in. 111 00:06:09,640 --> 00:06:12,880 Speaker 2: Oh yeah, and also, if you're a person like I 112 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:16,520 Speaker 2: am here, I'm a visual person. I love getting tutorials 113 00:06:16,560 --> 00:06:19,760 Speaker 2: on YouTube. That's that's how I get things done. That 114 00:06:19,839 --> 00:06:23,240 Speaker 2: works for me. Yeah, So use the technology in your 115 00:06:23,240 --> 00:06:27,760 Speaker 2: favor friends. So that goes for the phone and the laptop. 116 00:06:28,760 --> 00:06:31,920 Speaker 2: Now they're trying to circumvent password at least part of 117 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:36,480 Speaker 2: the time with your fingerprint on, Like my laptop, it 118 00:06:36,520 --> 00:06:38,320 Speaker 2: does shut down, but if I just touch it with 119 00:06:38,400 --> 00:06:41,240 Speaker 2: my fingerprint, it opens up. Is that okay? Or is 120 00:06:41,240 --> 00:06:44,440 Speaker 2: somebody going to cut my finger off to get into 121 00:06:44,440 --> 00:06:44,960 Speaker 2: my computer? 122 00:06:45,160 --> 00:06:51,280 Speaker 1: So I make sure to incorporate biometric technologies into all 123 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:54,280 Speaker 1: my hardware as a form of access control, whether it's 124 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:59,320 Speaker 1: my mobile device, my laptop. That's fine. You know, passwords, biometrics, fingerprint, 125 00:06:59,360 --> 00:07:01,960 Speaker 1: iris scan, facial recognition, all that stuff is really good 126 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 1: as long as it's locked down so that it's not 127 00:07:05,000 --> 00:07:06,960 Speaker 1: easy for somebody to get it if you lose it 128 00:07:07,080 --> 00:07:09,560 Speaker 1: or if they steal it. Generally you're going to be 129 00:07:09,600 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 1: in pretty good shape. 130 00:07:10,960 --> 00:07:13,840 Speaker 2: Okay, we're gonna break and then we're gonna get to 131 00:07:13,880 --> 00:07:17,840 Speaker 2: some other must do things to protect you from becoming 132 00:07:18,280 --> 00:07:21,720 Speaker 2: a cyber broken person. Coming up on WBZ. 133 00:07:22,800 --> 00:07:24,600 Speaker 1: It's Night Side with Dan Ray on. 134 00:07:26,200 --> 00:07:29,240 Speaker 2: Boston's news radio Bradley for Dan tonight. I'd love to 135 00:07:29,240 --> 00:07:31,920 Speaker 2: hear from you six one, seven, two, five, four, ten thirty. 136 00:07:32,240 --> 00:07:34,800 Speaker 2: Have you had any issues cybersecurity wise? Have you been hacked? 137 00:07:34,800 --> 00:07:37,320 Speaker 2: Have you been fooled? Have you had attempts? Have you 138 00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:41,000 Speaker 2: had do you have questions? Was was that legit? If 139 00:07:41,040 --> 00:07:44,920 Speaker 2: you have questions, it probably wasn't. Uh, And we have 140 00:07:44,960 --> 00:07:47,320 Speaker 2: a number of things, but definitely get to gonna get 141 00:07:47,320 --> 00:07:50,480 Speaker 2: to Robert Ciciliano. But one we're going to add on 142 00:07:51,040 --> 00:07:54,239 Speaker 2: is every email, every phone call, every text you get, 143 00:07:54,480 --> 00:07:57,040 Speaker 2: you got to take a look at what's going on here? 144 00:07:58,440 --> 00:07:58,920 Speaker 1: Who is that? 145 00:07:59,120 --> 00:07:59,760 Speaker 2: What are they doing? 146 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:02,800 Speaker 1: What's the motivation? Why are they contacting me that? Well, 147 00:08:02,800 --> 00:08:04,760 Speaker 1: what's the motivation? Why are they contacting me? Like? 148 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:04,960 Speaker 2: What? 149 00:08:04,960 --> 00:08:06,520 Speaker 1: What is what? What are they trying to get out 150 00:08:06,560 --> 00:08:08,480 Speaker 1: of me? You know? And and and be suspect. Don't 151 00:08:08,480 --> 00:08:12,960 Speaker 1: just automatically trust, you know, today, I don't know anybody 152 00:08:12,960 --> 00:08:15,680 Speaker 1: that does not get bombarded with the inbound communications that 153 00:08:15,680 --> 00:08:17,960 Speaker 1: are meant to you know, steale from us. And so 154 00:08:18,120 --> 00:08:21,560 Speaker 1: if you're cognizant of that, and you're not just by 155 00:08:21,640 --> 00:08:26,840 Speaker 1: default trusting every inbound communication, being suspect, especially when your 156 00:08:26,880 --> 00:08:28,560 Speaker 1: blood pressure goes up and there's some type of a 157 00:08:28,600 --> 00:08:31,280 Speaker 1: threat and there's any form of money that needs to 158 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:34,440 Speaker 1: be transacted. Oh god, no, you need to be suspect. 159 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:38,080 Speaker 1: You can't just automatically say, oh, my loved one is 160 00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:40,839 Speaker 1: in danger, therefore I must act. No, I mean, how 161 00:08:40,960 --> 00:08:43,120 Speaker 1: likely is it that that is actually happening? That's you love? 162 00:08:43,160 --> 00:08:45,160 Speaker 2: What is that that's a particular scam? We'll get to 163 00:08:45,240 --> 00:08:47,400 Speaker 2: there's so many, I am. We'll get to that in 164 00:08:47,440 --> 00:08:50,200 Speaker 2: the scam department. But I am so senative sensitive to 165 00:08:50,240 --> 00:08:54,800 Speaker 2: it that there I'm aware of these simple hey, how 166 00:08:54,800 --> 00:08:55,319 Speaker 2: are you doing? 167 00:08:56,240 --> 00:08:56,640 Speaker 1: Texts? 168 00:08:56,960 --> 00:09:00,440 Speaker 2: How do you that? That are not from any you know? 169 00:09:00,920 --> 00:09:05,400 Speaker 2: And the sender is hoping you'll, you know, say ah, good, 170 00:09:05,920 --> 00:09:09,160 Speaker 2: who's this? Or oh and they say, well, I'm sorry, 171 00:09:09,240 --> 00:09:11,320 Speaker 2: wrong thing, but how you doing anyway? And they try 172 00:09:11,320 --> 00:09:12,439 Speaker 2: to strike up a relationship. 173 00:09:12,480 --> 00:09:13,440 Speaker 1: It's the wrong number scam. 174 00:09:13,600 --> 00:09:15,480 Speaker 2: I guess we were into scams, so we might as 175 00:09:15,520 --> 00:09:20,960 Speaker 2: well do scams. How about how about the grand the grandmother, 176 00:09:20,960 --> 00:09:23,800 Speaker 2: little Timmy's in trouble, we need money right now? Scam? 177 00:09:24,240 --> 00:09:27,559 Speaker 2: And add into that mix in that type of scam 178 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:30,560 Speaker 2: AI and how much more effective these scams become. 179 00:09:30,800 --> 00:09:34,400 Speaker 1: Sure, So when we receive the wrong number of text messages. 180 00:09:34,480 --> 00:09:37,640 Speaker 1: Most of us, you know, delete it market. I spam. 181 00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:40,199 Speaker 1: I respond to all of them, right because I want 182 00:09:40,240 --> 00:09:42,080 Speaker 1: to know who's on the other end of line, and 183 00:09:42,120 --> 00:09:44,600 Speaker 1: I engage. I want and I scam bait them to 184 00:09:44,640 --> 00:09:47,240 Speaker 1: a certain degree, and I actually have dialogue with them. 185 00:09:47,480 --> 00:09:51,000 Speaker 1: And generally when I do this, within a week, they 186 00:09:51,000 --> 00:09:54,240 Speaker 1: want to get on WhatsApp video like, they want to 187 00:09:54,240 --> 00:09:57,040 Speaker 1: actually have do a video call with me, and they 188 00:09:57,040 --> 00:09:59,280 Speaker 1: want face to face. And when I do get face 189 00:09:59,320 --> 00:10:03,720 Speaker 1: to face with them, it's usually generally a female, a 190 00:10:03,760 --> 00:10:10,199 Speaker 1: Southeast Asian female. However, she has a generally like a 191 00:10:10,920 --> 00:10:15,600 Speaker 1: Russian woman's complexion that is generated via artificial intelligence. Okay, 192 00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:19,040 Speaker 1: so the woman that I'm actually speaking to is likely 193 00:10:19,080 --> 00:10:24,200 Speaker 1: a victim of human trafficking based in Southeast Asia. The 194 00:10:24,280 --> 00:10:27,040 Speaker 1: United Nations says this is probably about three hundred thousand 195 00:10:27,280 --> 00:10:31,960 Speaker 1: victims of human trafficking right now in the world, most 196 00:10:31,960 --> 00:10:35,480 Speaker 1: of them in Southeast Asia. That they are eighteen hours 197 00:10:35,480 --> 00:10:40,120 Speaker 1: a day scamming us because they're being forced to gun 198 00:10:40,160 --> 00:10:43,480 Speaker 1: to their head scamming us. And when I communicate with them, 199 00:10:43,520 --> 00:10:45,679 Speaker 1: I understand what they're going through. I'm not trying to 200 00:10:45,679 --> 00:10:47,880 Speaker 1: trip them up. I want to understand their scam, and 201 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:50,920 Speaker 1: generally within a week after the video, it's from there. 202 00:10:50,960 --> 00:10:53,880 Speaker 1: It's about trust, it's about building relationships. It's not so 203 00:10:53,960 --> 00:10:56,640 Speaker 1: much about romance, but it can be. And what they 204 00:10:56,679 --> 00:11:00,560 Speaker 1: want is primarily is for me to engage in cryptocurren right. 205 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:02,439 Speaker 1: They want me to download apps, they show me how 206 00:11:02,440 --> 00:11:05,080 Speaker 1: to do it right. They send me off screenshots of 207 00:11:05,120 --> 00:11:07,079 Speaker 1: all that, and I'll go back and forth with them, 208 00:11:07,120 --> 00:11:09,280 Speaker 1: showing them the screen shots. And then they want to 209 00:11:09,320 --> 00:11:12,280 Speaker 1: take over my accounts. And then they want me to invest, 210 00:11:12,320 --> 00:11:14,360 Speaker 1: you know, from my bank account, from my credit card, 211 00:11:14,440 --> 00:11:17,400 Speaker 1: and they'll show you, you know, like sixty eighty percent 212 00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:20,120 Speaker 1: you know, returns in your money in a week. And 213 00:11:20,160 --> 00:11:23,400 Speaker 1: it's exactly like a Ponzi scheme where you can actually 214 00:11:23,400 --> 00:11:25,640 Speaker 1: take the money out. But what they want is they 215 00:11:25,679 --> 00:11:28,720 Speaker 1: want you to invest and reinvest and invest and reinvest. 216 00:11:28,880 --> 00:11:31,600 Speaker 1: I met a couple down in Florida that lost six 217 00:11:31,720 --> 00:11:34,559 Speaker 1: hundred thousand dollars to the exact same scam. They thought 218 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:38,160 Speaker 1: they had made two point two million and they lost everything. 219 00:11:38,480 --> 00:11:41,839 Speaker 1: And that is so easy because AI makes it easy, 220 00:11:41,840 --> 00:11:44,720 Speaker 1: because it's scalable. They can change the voice, they can 221 00:11:44,800 --> 00:11:48,319 Speaker 1: change the face, and they are believable. And what they 222 00:11:48,320 --> 00:11:51,760 Speaker 1: really pray upon is our loneliness, because one out of 223 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:54,720 Speaker 1: four of us, twenty five percent, our default every day 224 00:11:55,160 --> 00:11:57,800 Speaker 1: is that we have a sense and feeling of loneliness. 225 00:11:57,840 --> 00:12:01,439 Speaker 1: And it's normal and it's natural, and it's unfortunate. And 226 00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:04,640 Speaker 1: that pain and ache of loneliness is no different than 227 00:12:04,720 --> 00:12:07,880 Speaker 1: hunger pains, you know, like we need to eat, therefore 228 00:12:07,880 --> 00:12:10,680 Speaker 1: we have hunger pains. We need to procreate, therefore we 229 00:12:10,720 --> 00:12:13,760 Speaker 1: have lonely Like that's evolutionary. And so as a result 230 00:12:13,840 --> 00:12:16,560 Speaker 1: of that, they prey upon those people who are lonely 231 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:17,560 Speaker 1: and they hook them. 232 00:12:17,679 --> 00:12:21,160 Speaker 2: Okay, Next, beware of anything that involves gift cards. 233 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:24,800 Speaker 1: Correct gift comment payment pay me in gift. 234 00:12:24,640 --> 00:12:27,120 Speaker 2: Cards is a huge giant red flag. 235 00:12:27,240 --> 00:12:31,439 Speaker 1: Yeah, anytime there's any type of a ruse where someone 236 00:12:31,600 --> 00:12:34,320 Speaker 1: emails you, text you say hey, go out and buy 237 00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:36,200 Speaker 1: me five gift cards or pay with gift cards, this 238 00:12:36,240 --> 00:12:39,240 Speaker 1: and that, that's always going to be a scam. Just don't. 239 00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:42,840 Speaker 2: Okay, other scams, well. 240 00:12:42,640 --> 00:12:45,000 Speaker 1: You know, I would say more than anything like the 241 00:12:45,000 --> 00:12:48,960 Speaker 1: grandparent scam. And look at Timmy, who you know, got 242 00:12:49,000 --> 00:12:52,040 Speaker 1: in a bar fight in New Orleans and needs his 243 00:12:52,080 --> 00:12:55,360 Speaker 1: grandparent to bail them out and just wire him two 244 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:58,360 Speaker 1: thousand dollars to pay for his lawyer. Like, that's just 245 00:12:58,400 --> 00:13:01,440 Speaker 1: not going to happen. I mean, the story might sound feasible. 246 00:13:01,600 --> 00:13:04,120 Speaker 1: Timmy might actually sound like Timmy, but they got Timmy's 247 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 1: voice off of Snapchat or you know, Facebook rails or 248 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:10,360 Speaker 1: he posted a video with him and his buddies and 249 00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:13,680 Speaker 1: they used artificial intelligence to clone his voice. But really, 250 00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:15,760 Speaker 1: what you need to do is call your son, call 251 00:13:15,840 --> 00:13:19,160 Speaker 1: your daughter, say hey, is Timmy? Okay? Or call Timmy directly. 252 00:13:19,440 --> 00:13:21,720 Speaker 1: Don't just wire the money. Because you wire the money, 253 00:13:22,160 --> 00:13:24,160 Speaker 1: you're just giving money to bad guys to support their 254 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:26,600 Speaker 1: drug habit. Okay. 255 00:13:27,520 --> 00:13:30,920 Speaker 2: Next up, Oh, let's talk about freezing credit. 256 00:13:31,720 --> 00:13:34,880 Speaker 1: So credit freeze has been around since two thousand and 257 00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:36,080 Speaker 1: eight as. 258 00:13:35,640 --> 00:13:39,320 Speaker 2: A way to protect yourself. Everyone should freeze your credit. 259 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:42,680 Speaker 1: Yeah, so, freezing your credit does not affect your credit rating, 260 00:13:43,000 --> 00:13:45,719 Speaker 1: It doesn't affect your credit score, it doesn't affect your 261 00:13:45,760 --> 00:13:49,280 Speaker 1: ability to get credit, it doesn't damage your credit. What 262 00:13:49,320 --> 00:13:51,160 Speaker 1: it does is, it's plain and simple. It's a lock 263 00:13:51,320 --> 00:13:56,880 Speaker 1: on your credit on your credit bureau. So experience TransUnion 264 00:13:56,920 --> 00:13:59,200 Speaker 1: Echo factor with the three major credit bureaus. When a 265 00:13:59,280 --> 00:14:02,400 Speaker 1: lender gets an application for credit, the first thing they're 266 00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:04,600 Speaker 1: gonna do is is contact the credit buros to check 267 00:14:04,600 --> 00:14:07,800 Speaker 1: your credit score and immediately if your credit's frozen, right, 268 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:10,400 Speaker 1: they're locked out. They can't They're not going to issue 269 00:14:10,480 --> 00:14:13,160 Speaker 1: a line of credit under your name. Therefore, you right 270 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:15,040 Speaker 1: now freezing your credit is the best thing that you 271 00:14:15,040 --> 00:14:17,120 Speaker 1: could do to reduce that risk. All you've got to 272 00:14:17,160 --> 00:14:21,080 Speaker 1: do is go to TransUnion experience echofax, search out eat 273 00:14:21,160 --> 00:14:23,920 Speaker 1: the three names of the credit bureaus the words credit freeze. 274 00:14:23,920 --> 00:14:26,800 Speaker 1: You'll find the page on each of the buros to 275 00:14:26,880 --> 00:14:28,160 Speaker 1: freeze your credit. 276 00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:32,200 Speaker 2: I guess before we go on and talk about things 277 00:14:32,200 --> 00:14:34,160 Speaker 2: you can do to protect yourself, let's spend a little 278 00:14:34,160 --> 00:14:37,800 Speaker 2: time talking about what you're protecting yourself from. How bad 279 00:14:37,880 --> 00:14:42,080 Speaker 2: could things get? What could you know? What could happen 280 00:14:42,120 --> 00:14:43,120 Speaker 2: to you? 281 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:45,840 Speaker 1: You know, if you are not doing the basic things, 282 00:14:46,040 --> 00:14:48,880 Speaker 1: like you know, freezing your credit, your Social Security number 283 00:14:48,920 --> 00:14:51,160 Speaker 1: ends up in the hands of a criminal. They're gonna 284 00:14:51,560 --> 00:14:54,120 Speaker 1: essentially open up as many possible lines of credit under 285 00:14:54,120 --> 00:14:56,760 Speaker 1: your name as quickly as they can, tens of thousands 286 00:14:56,800 --> 00:14:58,720 Speaker 1: of dollars. You don't even have to have good credit. 287 00:14:58,880 --> 00:15:00,920 Speaker 1: You just have to have decent cred And once they 288 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:02,880 Speaker 1: open up lines of credit under your name as much 289 00:15:02,880 --> 00:15:05,400 Speaker 1: as six figures, they're going to cash out, not pay 290 00:15:05,400 --> 00:15:09,920 Speaker 1: the bill. Now you're saddled with that debt until you 291 00:15:09,960 --> 00:15:13,200 Speaker 1: realize it, and then you can actually get the debt expunge. However, 292 00:15:13,320 --> 00:15:15,640 Speaker 1: your credit is still going to be bad and that 293 00:15:15,720 --> 00:15:19,200 Speaker 1: process can take years before your credit actually gets good again. 294 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:22,840 Speaker 1: So not freezing your credit today puts you at risk. 295 00:15:22,880 --> 00:15:26,120 Speaker 1: To freeze your credit now you eliminate that problem, right, 296 00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:28,160 Speaker 1: and a big one. I mean, do you have time 297 00:15:28,160 --> 00:15:28,720 Speaker 1: for this right now? 298 00:15:28,760 --> 00:15:33,400 Speaker 2: Password management actually more more dangerous I wanted to cover. 299 00:15:33,880 --> 00:15:36,280 Speaker 2: I ask you a question about what can happen regarding 300 00:15:36,320 --> 00:15:39,320 Speaker 2: your bank account? Can they clean out your bank account? 301 00:15:40,320 --> 00:15:43,880 Speaker 1: Generally, the cleaning out of a bank account occurs when 302 00:15:44,400 --> 00:15:48,080 Speaker 1: your hardware, your devices, your mobile, your laptop, your desktop 303 00:15:48,680 --> 00:15:53,840 Speaker 1: is older, outdated, not password protected, old browser, old operating system. 304 00:15:54,040 --> 00:15:58,320 Speaker 1: You're functioning in Windows seven, you're functioning in Windows eight. 305 00:15:58,640 --> 00:16:01,280 Speaker 1: You're not updating your critical security patches, you don't have 306 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:06,640 Speaker 1: anti virus, your devices are riddled with with with you know, vulnerabilities, right, 307 00:16:06,920 --> 00:16:10,720 Speaker 1: and so once the bad guy remotely gets on your machine, 308 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 1: they can get into your online banking like your like 309 00:16:14,520 --> 00:16:17,160 Speaker 1: like they're sitting in front of the computer from anywhere 310 00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:21,400 Speaker 1: in the world. Remote access technologies facilitate that process. So 311 00:16:21,480 --> 00:16:25,440 Speaker 1: if you're updating your hardware, updating your software, updating your passcodes, 312 00:16:25,800 --> 00:16:28,240 Speaker 1: generally you become a tougher target. It's harder for the 313 00:16:28,320 --> 00:16:30,000 Speaker 1: bad guy to get access to your bank account. 314 00:16:30,120 --> 00:16:32,680 Speaker 2: Okay, I guess we get to pass goes. 315 00:16:32,720 --> 00:16:32,880 Speaker 3: Now. 316 00:16:32,920 --> 00:16:34,880 Speaker 2: You mentioned having to update them. 317 00:16:35,480 --> 00:16:37,080 Speaker 1: I'm bad about that. I shouldn't. 318 00:16:37,080 --> 00:16:39,720 Speaker 2: I shouldn't tell the public that I'm bad about updating 319 00:16:39,760 --> 00:16:42,960 Speaker 2: my pass goes. I have really good ones. They're all different, 320 00:16:43,080 --> 00:16:45,440 Speaker 2: But why is it important to change them? What a pain? 321 00:16:45,920 --> 00:16:51,120 Speaker 1: So so I I don't necessarily change my passcodes. But 322 00:16:51,160 --> 00:16:54,080 Speaker 1: here's the thing. I don't have the same passcode on 323 00:16:54,200 --> 00:16:58,680 Speaker 1: any two accounts. I have hundreds of accounts and hundreds 324 00:16:58,680 --> 00:17:01,680 Speaker 1: of different passcodes. I don't know more than just a 325 00:17:01,680 --> 00:17:04,000 Speaker 1: couple of them. I know my Google password, I know 326 00:17:04,080 --> 00:17:06,520 Speaker 1: my Apple password. I know the password to my mobile 327 00:17:06,520 --> 00:17:07,359 Speaker 1: phone and my laptop. 328 00:17:07,480 --> 00:17:09,960 Speaker 2: If you know your password, it's probably a weak password. 329 00:17:10,040 --> 00:17:12,000 Speaker 2: Your password should be so strong enough you could never 330 00:17:12,080 --> 00:17:12,560 Speaker 2: remember it. 331 00:17:12,680 --> 00:17:16,439 Speaker 1: So uppercase lowercase phrases. All of that stuff is fine 332 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:19,760 Speaker 1: for the accounts that you want to or need to remember, right, 333 00:17:19,840 --> 00:17:23,680 Speaker 1: the critical accounts, but like for the majority of them 334 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:27,960 Speaker 1: that you don't necessarily need to remember your password manager. 335 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:29,080 Speaker 1: Do you have a password manager? 336 00:17:29,480 --> 00:17:29,720 Speaker 2: Yeah? 337 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:31,720 Speaker 1: So a password manager is one of the best tools 338 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:33,520 Speaker 1: that people can use in the first question that people 339 00:17:33,560 --> 00:17:35,800 Speaker 1: have is, well, what if the password manager gets hacked. 340 00:17:36,119 --> 00:17:38,800 Speaker 1: I'm not worried about that. The reality of it is, 341 00:17:38,840 --> 00:17:42,240 Speaker 1: this has been about fifteen billion passwords compromised in the 342 00:17:42,280 --> 00:17:46,280 Speaker 1: past fifteen twenty years. Fifteen billion. That means pretty much 343 00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:50,240 Speaker 1: all of our passwords at some point have been compromised. Okay, 344 00:17:50,480 --> 00:17:54,040 Speaker 1: now that in and of itself. The problem there is 345 00:17:54,080 --> 00:17:56,880 Speaker 1: that ninety six percent of those passes, actually ninety four 346 00:17:56,880 --> 00:17:59,560 Speaker 1: percent of those pass codes, people are pretty much using 347 00:17:59,560 --> 00:18:03,880 Speaker 1: the same passcode across multiple accounts. That's the danger because 348 00:18:03,880 --> 00:18:06,119 Speaker 1: if you're using the same passcode for Facebook as you 349 00:18:06,119 --> 00:18:09,560 Speaker 1: are for Email, and your Facebook account gets compromised, then 350 00:18:09,560 --> 00:18:11,399 Speaker 1: they can get into your email because you're using the 351 00:18:11,440 --> 00:18:15,399 Speaker 1: same credentials across multiple accounts. See how that works, And 352 00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:18,840 Speaker 1: so is if you're using a different passcode everywhere. Uppercase 353 00:18:18,920 --> 00:18:22,960 Speaker 1: lowercase numbers, characters, and the password manager generates the passcode. 354 00:18:23,359 --> 00:18:26,040 Speaker 1: You're not going to be able to remember that passcode 355 00:18:26,080 --> 00:18:31,560 Speaker 1: because it's essentially like six uppercase f ampersand exclamation. 356 00:18:31,640 --> 00:18:34,359 Speaker 2: You copy it, you can copy it, you don't need 357 00:18:34,400 --> 00:18:37,600 Speaker 2: to really remember it. You go to your manager reveal 358 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:40,000 Speaker 2: copy and you're paste. 359 00:18:39,680 --> 00:18:42,480 Speaker 1: It in or your password manager automatically plugs it in 360 00:18:42,560 --> 00:18:44,879 Speaker 1: for you. That's what this, that's what the that's what 361 00:18:44,920 --> 00:18:47,840 Speaker 1: a password managers generally want to do. So there's so 362 00:18:47,920 --> 00:18:50,520 Speaker 1: many out there. There's there's there's one password like the 363 00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:54,920 Speaker 1: number one password. Uh this uh this last pass. Last 364 00:18:54,920 --> 00:18:56,520 Speaker 1: pass got hacked a few years back, but they're in 365 00:18:56,560 --> 00:18:57,440 Speaker 1: pretty good shape now. 366 00:18:57,720 --> 00:19:01,360 Speaker 2: So we were just talking about how we should get one. 367 00:19:01,600 --> 00:19:05,720 Speaker 2: And you're not worried about them getting hacked, I'm. 368 00:19:04,760 --> 00:19:07,560 Speaker 1: Not at all. Well, but they're a security company. Their 369 00:19:07,720 --> 00:19:10,159 Speaker 1: servers were accessed, but the information that they had on 370 00:19:10,200 --> 00:19:14,080 Speaker 1: their files was not compromised because it was encrypted, right, 371 00:19:14,359 --> 00:19:15,800 Speaker 1: so they know what they're doing. It's like you have 372 00:19:15,880 --> 00:19:18,359 Speaker 1: your money in a bank. Banks get hacked, right, but 373 00:19:18,720 --> 00:19:20,800 Speaker 1: no banks have been hacked at the degree where you 374 00:19:20,840 --> 00:19:22,880 Speaker 1: know they no longer exist. 375 00:19:23,160 --> 00:19:23,320 Speaker 2: Right. 376 00:19:23,400 --> 00:19:26,120 Speaker 1: Let me, there's no such thing as one hundred percent security. 377 00:19:26,480 --> 00:19:29,320 Speaker 1: There's always going to be vulnerabilities. But you know, in 378 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:31,960 Speaker 1: order to engage in commerce at some level, you've got 379 00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:34,960 Speaker 1: a bank online to to a certain degree, you've got 380 00:19:34,960 --> 00:19:36,960 Speaker 1: to have a password manager, you know, with with a 381 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:40,240 Speaker 1: different passcode across multiple accounts. So one password is good, 382 00:19:40,400 --> 00:19:44,440 Speaker 1: last pass is good, roboform is good, Apple's password manager 383 00:19:44,480 --> 00:19:45,520 Speaker 1: is good. They're all pretty good. 384 00:19:45,640 --> 00:19:49,560 Speaker 2: Okay, more on password protection on this really important topic. 385 00:19:49,600 --> 00:19:52,119 Speaker 2: We're trying to keep you from having your life destroyed 386 00:19:52,119 --> 00:19:54,320 Speaker 2: by you by hackers. 387 00:19:54,520 --> 00:19:58,679 Speaker 1: On WBZ It's Night Side with Dan Ray on w 388 00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:01,639 Speaker 1: Austin's News Radio. Randy J. 389 00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:05,600 Speaker 2: Forb Dan WBZ guest Robert Ciciliano, he is a cybersecurity expert. 390 00:20:05,640 --> 00:20:07,399 Speaker 2: To break that down. Really, what we're trying to do 391 00:20:07,480 --> 00:20:11,119 Speaker 2: is save you from a horror story of being hacked 392 00:20:11,119 --> 00:20:14,680 Speaker 2: to death in the cyber world. And we're talking about 393 00:20:14,720 --> 00:20:20,400 Speaker 2: password protection now, and that's no small thing. And I'm 394 00:20:20,400 --> 00:20:23,520 Speaker 2: going to pick up on this, asking you the question, 395 00:20:24,280 --> 00:20:29,520 Speaker 2: what about folks who have mostly the same password for 396 00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:34,440 Speaker 2: everything only with a slight variation. For example, dog's name 397 00:20:35,320 --> 00:20:38,639 Speaker 2: thirty two, same dog's name forty seven. 398 00:20:39,119 --> 00:20:39,920 Speaker 1: Does that make it. 399 00:20:39,880 --> 00:20:43,520 Speaker 2: Easier for somebody with some sort of AI machine that's 400 00:20:43,880 --> 00:20:47,639 Speaker 2: or a computer to sift through a million numbers and 401 00:20:47,680 --> 00:20:52,439 Speaker 2: get your you get in or is that a fine 402 00:20:52,480 --> 00:20:53,480 Speaker 2: thing to do? Well? 403 00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:57,240 Speaker 1: See, I'm pretty confident that someone who's using like a 404 00:20:57,320 --> 00:21:02,280 Speaker 1: very similar password with slight variation, they're probably using like 405 00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:07,600 Speaker 1: a handful of passwords for multiple accounts, right, which means 406 00:21:07,640 --> 00:21:10,639 Speaker 1: that they're pretty much still kind of using same or 407 00:21:10,640 --> 00:21:15,760 Speaker 1: similar passcodes across multiple accounts, and that they're kind of 408 00:21:15,760 --> 00:21:17,879 Speaker 1: in the dark ages and no offense to anybody. I mean, 409 00:21:17,920 --> 00:21:20,040 Speaker 1: it's just you know, that's just the nature of it, right. 410 00:21:20,200 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 1: If you're not using that password manager like I suggested, 411 00:21:23,280 --> 00:21:26,920 Speaker 1: then if you then you don't either you either only 412 00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:30,000 Speaker 1: have like like a very small handful of accounts or 413 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:32,520 Speaker 1: you're just simply using the same passcode across multiple accounts 414 00:21:32,560 --> 00:21:34,879 Speaker 1: with billions and billions of passcodes being compromised. Look at 415 00:21:35,040 --> 00:21:36,720 Speaker 1: on my own laptop that's sitting in front of me 416 00:21:36,800 --> 00:21:39,639 Speaker 1: on the desk right now, I've got twenty million email 417 00:21:39,640 --> 00:21:42,560 Speaker 1: addresses along with their associated passcodes. And how did you 418 00:21:42,560 --> 00:21:44,720 Speaker 1: get the Dark Web? I just downloaded it from the 419 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:45,160 Speaker 1: Dark Web. 420 00:21:45,240 --> 00:21:47,000 Speaker 2: You did not pay for them, and you got them free. 421 00:21:47,160 --> 00:21:50,399 Speaker 1: Anybody can do the same exact thing. And with those credentials, 422 00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:53,760 Speaker 1: I can log into these people's accounts. Do you have 423 00:21:53,800 --> 00:21:56,280 Speaker 1: in there? Actually twenty one million you could. 424 00:21:56,119 --> 00:21:59,719 Speaker 2: Pick one and you have an email? You have them 425 00:22:00,680 --> 00:22:01,960 Speaker 2: and password? 426 00:22:02,119 --> 00:22:05,159 Speaker 1: Yeah, and that's all. Look at there are. 427 00:22:05,640 --> 00:22:07,520 Speaker 2: Have you ever done it? Just to look to peak. 428 00:22:08,560 --> 00:22:10,920 Speaker 2: I'll take that as a can't say. 429 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:13,920 Speaker 1: And I will neither confirm nor deny it. All right, 430 00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:16,360 Speaker 1: let's just say it's possible, all right, Okay, Look, there 431 00:22:16,359 --> 00:22:18,400 Speaker 1: have been as many as one hundred and seventy five 432 00:22:18,520 --> 00:22:22,840 Speaker 1: billion records of our records, our information, names, addresses, phone numbers, 433 00:22:22,840 --> 00:22:28,240 Speaker 1: email addresses, past codes, right bank account numbers, credit card numbers, everything, 434 00:22:28,840 --> 00:22:32,040 Speaker 1: one hundred and seventy five billion records compromised in the 435 00:22:32,040 --> 00:22:36,160 Speaker 1: past fifteen twenty years. That's like the world's population, multiple 436 00:22:36,240 --> 00:22:38,520 Speaker 1: multiple times. What's that mean? It means the bad guys 437 00:22:38,520 --> 00:22:40,960 Speaker 1: have access to almost everything. Does that mean you just 438 00:22:41,000 --> 00:22:41,400 Speaker 1: give up? 439 00:22:41,680 --> 00:22:41,720 Speaker 4: Know? 440 00:22:42,119 --> 00:22:44,240 Speaker 1: What it does mean is that you make the data 441 00:22:44,320 --> 00:22:47,760 Speaker 1: that the bad guys have about you useless to the thief. 442 00:22:48,040 --> 00:22:49,880 Speaker 1: So how do you make the data that the bad 443 00:22:49,920 --> 00:22:53,040 Speaker 1: guys have useless? Well, as far as passwords go, you 444 00:22:53,080 --> 00:22:55,560 Speaker 1: don't use the same passcode twice. You change up your 445 00:22:55,560 --> 00:22:57,840 Speaker 1: passcodes that you've been using for years and years and 446 00:22:57,880 --> 00:23:00,359 Speaker 1: years that are the same that are on the dark way. 447 00:23:00,440 --> 00:23:02,480 Speaker 1: So once you have the passwordvantage, you set that up 448 00:23:02,520 --> 00:23:07,120 Speaker 1: and then two factor authentication. Two factor authentication makes the 449 00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:10,600 Speaker 1: passwords that are out there useless to the thief. Explain 450 00:23:10,680 --> 00:23:13,200 Speaker 1: what that is for folks. Okay, so two factor authentication 451 00:23:13,320 --> 00:23:14,960 Speaker 1: is easy enough. You know, you have your mobile device 452 00:23:14,960 --> 00:23:17,520 Speaker 1: in your possession. You plug in your username, which might 453 00:23:17,520 --> 00:23:19,840 Speaker 1: be an email addressed, You plug in your passcode, and 454 00:23:19,880 --> 00:23:22,160 Speaker 1: then it sends you a text message for a one 455 00:23:22,240 --> 00:23:25,840 Speaker 1: time passcode usually like six to eight digits, and the 456 00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:29,280 Speaker 1: second factor is your mobile device. It's that second factor 457 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:32,000 Speaker 1: the bad guy would have to have your mobile device 458 00:23:32,160 --> 00:23:34,840 Speaker 1: in their possession in order to get into your account. 459 00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:38,439 Speaker 1: So two factor authentication isn't bulletproof, but it is one 460 00:23:38,480 --> 00:23:40,800 Speaker 1: of the best tools that we have right now to 461 00:23:40,840 --> 00:23:44,359 Speaker 1: prevent the bad guys from accessing your accounts with the 462 00:23:44,480 --> 00:23:46,680 Speaker 1: data that they have at their fingertips that they download 463 00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:47,480 Speaker 1: it from the dark web. 464 00:23:48,080 --> 00:23:50,760 Speaker 2: How is it not bulletproof if you have the phone 465 00:23:50,800 --> 00:23:51,879 Speaker 2: and there's nobody peaking. 466 00:23:52,280 --> 00:23:54,840 Speaker 1: So this is what's called a man in the middle attack. 467 00:23:55,119 --> 00:23:57,240 Speaker 1: A man in the middle attack could be somebody posing 468 00:23:57,320 --> 00:23:59,760 Speaker 1: as say your bank, and they say, hey, you know, 469 00:23:59,840 --> 00:24:02,080 Speaker 1: we at what we had a you know, our service 470 00:24:02,160 --> 00:24:05,440 Speaker 1: went down and we need to actually your account because 471 00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:07,440 Speaker 1: we think it might be compromised. We're going to send 472 00:24:07,440 --> 00:24:10,959 Speaker 1: you a text message with a one time passcode. So 473 00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:13,960 Speaker 1: they're socially engineering you. They're they're they're they're in the middle, 474 00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:16,359 Speaker 1: a man in the middle, and they're they're posing and 475 00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:20,720 Speaker 1: functioning as the bank, but convincing you to give up 476 00:24:20,760 --> 00:24:23,679 Speaker 1: that one time passcode via two factor authentication. 477 00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:25,840 Speaker 2: So yeah, you would never ever they would never ever 478 00:24:25,920 --> 00:24:27,320 Speaker 2: ever ask you to do this ever. 479 00:24:28,160 --> 00:24:32,040 Speaker 1: But look at that's we as human beings trust by default. 480 00:24:32,359 --> 00:24:35,919 Speaker 2: Oh that's your particular theory and that it hasn't it 481 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:39,919 Speaker 2: had an evolutionary evolutionary value. 482 00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:41,280 Speaker 1: Yeah, man, think about it. 483 00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:44,000 Speaker 2: Maybe that has become obsolete. Maybe maybe in order to 484 00:24:44,040 --> 00:24:46,399 Speaker 2: survive you kind of had to trust each other against 485 00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:48,800 Speaker 2: the other species that we're trying to eat us. Maybe 486 00:24:48,840 --> 00:24:51,080 Speaker 2: that is now an obsolete thing, that trust thing. 487 00:24:51,560 --> 00:24:53,840 Speaker 1: Look at when you come out of your mama, you 488 00:24:53,960 --> 00:24:58,040 Speaker 1: just trust and you go throughout life trusting pretty much 489 00:24:58,480 --> 00:25:01,160 Speaker 1: everybody you meet pretty much, which all the time. 490 00:25:01,280 --> 00:25:05,080 Speaker 2: That's that's another topic. But maybe that's now counterproductive. 491 00:25:05,359 --> 00:25:08,240 Speaker 1: Well it is. I think trust is overrated. We trust 492 00:25:08,280 --> 00:25:12,040 Speaker 1: too much. We give the benefit of the doubt all 493 00:25:12,320 --> 00:25:15,000 Speaker 1: the time every day. And some people say, I don't 494 00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:17,760 Speaker 1: trust anybody? What they do? You do? You do it? 495 00:25:17,800 --> 00:25:20,720 Speaker 1: You do? I mean we have to look at we 496 00:25:20,840 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: just want to. We need to. Without trust, we would 497 00:25:25,040 --> 00:25:28,800 Speaker 1: fail as a species, we wouldn't procreate, right, but we trust. 498 00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:31,400 Speaker 1: Look at ninety seven percent of all people are really 499 00:25:31,440 --> 00:25:33,040 Speaker 1: good about two How. 500 00:25:33,000 --> 00:25:34,880 Speaker 2: Do you would you arrive at that figure? By the way, 501 00:25:34,960 --> 00:25:35,920 Speaker 2: I think it's closer to. 502 00:25:37,600 --> 00:25:40,880 Speaker 1: Forty. I think it's about ninety seven percent of all 503 00:25:41,040 --> 00:25:45,440 Speaker 1: people a worthy of your trust. But that means two 504 00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:49,600 Speaker 1: to three percent are not. They are sociopaths, psychopaths, and 505 00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:52,320 Speaker 1: hard core narcissists by their nature, and they are not 506 00:25:52,520 --> 00:25:56,439 Speaker 1: worthy of our trust. They don't they don't possess empathy, sympathy, remorse, 507 00:25:56,520 --> 00:25:59,520 Speaker 1: or guilt. Those are the bad guys. Those are the hackers. 508 00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:02,560 Speaker 1: Those look they look at you and I as our 509 00:26:02,680 --> 00:26:06,560 Speaker 1: as their natural prey. Right all right, back to nuts 510 00:26:06,560 --> 00:26:06,960 Speaker 1: and bulls. 511 00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:09,399 Speaker 2: Sometimes you could ask, hey, do you want us to 512 00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:11,800 Speaker 2: generate a password for you, or do you want to 513 00:26:11,800 --> 00:26:13,520 Speaker 2: make up your own. I always make up my own 514 00:26:13,520 --> 00:26:17,080 Speaker 2: because I figure if they somebody made it up, then somebody, 515 00:26:17,160 --> 00:26:19,960 Speaker 2: some machine knows it and can't I can't trust that machine. 516 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:22,280 Speaker 1: Yeah, So I have access to tools. We all have 517 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:25,600 Speaker 1: access to tools that can search out compromise passcodes. So 518 00:26:25,640 --> 00:26:27,680 Speaker 1: like I, I like on my website protect now LLC 519 00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:29,800 Speaker 1: dot com. If you scroll down in the first page 520 00:26:29,840 --> 00:26:32,200 Speaker 1: of search, you could plug in email addresses, and you 521 00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:36,119 Speaker 1: could plug in passwords and search basically fifteen billion records 522 00:26:36,119 --> 00:26:38,680 Speaker 1: that you have access to on my website that let 523 00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:41,840 Speaker 1: you see if any passcodes or email addresses have been 524 00:26:41,840 --> 00:26:44,720 Speaker 1: part of any specific data breaches, right, And you could 525 00:26:44,720 --> 00:26:48,000 Speaker 1: take like the word password and plug that in. 526 00:26:48,080 --> 00:26:51,679 Speaker 2: Probably like one hundred one billion people, like one hundred. 527 00:26:51,400 --> 00:26:58,359 Speaker 1: And twenty million people using password as a password. You know, uh, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, 528 00:26:58,480 --> 00:27:01,160 Speaker 1: Like you know sixty six million people using one through 529 00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:03,320 Speaker 1: eight as a passcode and so on. But if you 530 00:27:03,400 --> 00:27:06,760 Speaker 1: take any passcode from a password manager that's generated from 531 00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:11,280 Speaker 1: a passport board manager, plug that into the tool. Ah zero, 532 00:27:11,600 --> 00:27:15,360 Speaker 1: I'm good to know zero, Okay, Yeah, because the password 533 00:27:15,359 --> 00:27:18,040 Speaker 1: managers they know what they're doing. It's like ten fifteen 534 00:27:18,320 --> 00:27:21,880 Speaker 1: upper case lower case numbers, characters. It's just it's undecipherable. 535 00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:25,000 Speaker 2: Okay, this doctor Rick and Bill Rica, thanks for calling 536 00:27:25,080 --> 00:27:26,920 Speaker 2: six months, seven, two, five, four, ten thirty. 537 00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:28,359 Speaker 1: Rick, you're on busy. 538 00:27:29,200 --> 00:27:32,159 Speaker 3: All right, Thanks guys, I really appreciate. I'm going to 539 00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:37,560 Speaker 3: try to organize my thoughts and say it quickly. Bradley, 540 00:27:37,240 --> 00:27:40,760 Speaker 3: Happy Thanksgiving. And Robert two and I heard you guys 541 00:27:40,880 --> 00:27:42,439 Speaker 3: driving and I said, my god, I got to tell 542 00:27:42,480 --> 00:27:44,240 Speaker 3: him most So I have this whole pallet us to 543 00:27:44,240 --> 00:27:47,040 Speaker 3: work with. He was my manager. He's retired now, he's 544 00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:51,159 Speaker 3: seventy five. And I recently saw him and he was 545 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:53,520 Speaker 3: telling me how he was making money in the stock 546 00:27:53,640 --> 00:27:57,240 Speaker 3: market through e trade and he shows me this beautiful 547 00:27:57,440 --> 00:28:00,440 Speaker 3: Singapore girl or something, and he goes, yes, she's she's 548 00:28:00,520 --> 00:28:03,080 Speaker 3: explaining and she's helping me to make a lot of 549 00:28:03,160 --> 00:28:07,200 Speaker 3: profit off it. And I said, all right, that's cool. 550 00:28:07,240 --> 00:28:13,200 Speaker 3: And so I recently called them to talk with them, 551 00:28:13,200 --> 00:28:17,760 Speaker 3: and he tells me I'm doing okay. You know. I 552 00:28:17,880 --> 00:28:22,439 Speaker 3: was just getting an update from him and well, actually 553 00:28:22,440 --> 00:28:25,800 Speaker 3: he said, yeah, I had a cancer scare and being 554 00:28:25,800 --> 00:28:28,480 Speaker 3: treated for it. But I made two hundred and forty 555 00:28:28,520 --> 00:28:32,800 Speaker 3: thousand dollars profit this summer. What do you think of that? 556 00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:36,719 Speaker 3: And I said, two hundred and forty thousand dollars? How 557 00:28:37,200 --> 00:28:39,080 Speaker 3: did you make that? He said, well, I make these 558 00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:44,920 Speaker 3: deposits to this girl who invests the money through E trade, 559 00:28:45,720 --> 00:28:48,880 Speaker 3: and I get the money and I can take it out. 560 00:28:48,880 --> 00:28:50,600 Speaker 3: And I said, well, you got to pay capital games. 561 00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:53,280 Speaker 3: He didn't even know what Capitol Games was, and I said, 562 00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:55,200 Speaker 3: you're going to have to pay taxes. But it was 563 00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:57,360 Speaker 3: good to know that it was E trade and not 564 00:28:57,720 --> 00:29:00,200 Speaker 3: I didn't know what it was, what country it was, 565 00:29:00,320 --> 00:29:02,880 Speaker 3: if it was a cyber so we said it was 566 00:29:02,880 --> 00:29:05,880 Speaker 3: E trade and so I was thinking of maybe doing 567 00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:10,360 Speaker 3: some of these deposits. Thatsader's two hundred. My friend I 568 00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:13,320 Speaker 3: won't say his name, but my friend put he like 569 00:29:13,320 --> 00:29:15,360 Speaker 3: invested one hundred thousand dollars to. 570 00:29:15,320 --> 00:29:19,200 Speaker 2: Make up let us know, you know, cut to the 571 00:29:19,280 --> 00:29:22,400 Speaker 2: chase and how did it turn out? Did you invest? 572 00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:24,480 Speaker 1: Anny? No? I did not. 573 00:29:25,840 --> 00:29:28,040 Speaker 3: I'm sorry, I'm beating around the bush, but but but 574 00:29:28,160 --> 00:29:31,640 Speaker 3: the chase is just is he being scammed? 575 00:29:32,280 --> 00:29:33,400 Speaker 1: All right, let's worry. 576 00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:35,040 Speaker 2: About I appreciate the call. 577 00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:35,840 Speaker 1: That was a great call. 578 00:29:36,120 --> 00:29:38,040 Speaker 3: Robert, I'm sorry, Yeah, Robert, this this to. 579 00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:41,360 Speaker 2: You, perfect call Rick, Okay, right up to the mic. 580 00:29:41,400 --> 00:29:44,360 Speaker 1: The likelihood of making two hundred and forty grand over 581 00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:46,160 Speaker 1: the course of a summer for some girl you met 582 00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:48,560 Speaker 1: on e trade is probably slim to none. 583 00:29:48,800 --> 00:29:50,720 Speaker 2: It's just somebody that said they're on the trade. 584 00:29:50,800 --> 00:29:53,760 Speaker 1: Yeah, And you can easily create an e trade looking 585 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:59,240 Speaker 1: website with a basic web management software web developing software, 586 00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:03,200 Speaker 1: you know, AI tools will create a live looking ticker 587 00:30:03,800 --> 00:30:06,240 Speaker 1: that looks like it's coming from e trade and like 588 00:30:06,400 --> 00:30:09,480 Speaker 1: everything is at the bad guy's fingertips to make the 589 00:30:09,560 --> 00:30:13,720 Speaker 1: scam as rare as possible. So the only people that 590 00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:16,720 Speaker 1: you should be engaging with in regards to any legit 591 00:30:16,840 --> 00:30:21,480 Speaker 1: trades are your financial service professionals, like real legit financial 592 00:30:21,520 --> 00:30:24,760 Speaker 1: service professionals. Yeah, because you either set up an e 593 00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:27,920 Speaker 1: trade account with e trade, you meet with e trade, 594 00:30:28,000 --> 00:30:30,160 Speaker 1: like you sit down with e trade. It's you know, 595 00:30:30,200 --> 00:30:32,560 Speaker 1: brick and mortar buildings that you're sitting down with like 596 00:30:32,680 --> 00:30:36,640 Speaker 1: legit people. That's the only investments that you should be making. 597 00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:39,200 Speaker 1: If you're not because some woman contacted you with the 598 00:30:39,200 --> 00:30:40,760 Speaker 1: wrong number of text message ever. 599 00:30:41,760 --> 00:30:46,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, Oh so, okay, many of us will say, that's obvious. 600 00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:50,560 Speaker 2: How many people you know in a hundred would make 601 00:30:50,600 --> 00:30:52,600 Speaker 2: the mistake of getting falling for that? 602 00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:57,520 Speaker 1: The problem is too many? How many? Park I would 603 00:30:57,600 --> 00:31:01,240 Speaker 1: say probably about ten percent? Okay, yeah, yeah, look at it, 604 00:31:01,880 --> 00:31:05,000 Speaker 1: because like you know, we we we're just gullible and vulnerable. 605 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,640 Speaker 1: But that doesn't make us dumb, It doesn't make us stupid. 606 00:31:07,680 --> 00:31:10,400 Speaker 1: It just makes us normal. Like we just want to 607 00:31:11,160 --> 00:31:12,160 Speaker 1: trust others. 608 00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:14,959 Speaker 2: Okay, we're gonna break. But when it comes to trust, 609 00:31:16,040 --> 00:31:19,480 Speaker 2: perhaps in person, maybe these days, in person trust and 610 00:31:19,560 --> 00:31:22,200 Speaker 2: maybe the default if you can't see their online, the 611 00:31:22,240 --> 00:31:23,760 Speaker 2: default might be don't trust. 612 00:31:24,440 --> 00:31:28,880 Speaker 1: Is WBZ you're on Night Side with Dan Ray. I'm 613 00:31:29,080 --> 00:31:31,240 Speaker 1: WBZ Boston's news Radio. 614 00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:34,800 Speaker 2: Bradley Jay Vidan tonight and we're with Robert Csile. I'm 615 00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:38,520 Speaker 2: trying to save you from having your identity stolen and 616 00:31:38,560 --> 00:31:41,200 Speaker 2: your money stolen. And we have quite a short time 617 00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:44,560 Speaker 2: to burn through a few important things. And Angelo and 618 00:31:44,600 --> 00:31:46,920 Speaker 2: Newton we're gonna get to you as well. But I 619 00:31:46,960 --> 00:31:51,960 Speaker 2: need to address this urgency. Always a red flag. Anything 620 00:31:52,240 --> 00:31:57,280 Speaker 2: anybody contacting you in any way trying to convince you 621 00:31:57,320 --> 00:32:01,000 Speaker 2: to do something quickly, must do now, is a red flag. 622 00:32:01,000 --> 00:32:06,360 Speaker 1: Correct especially when the voice is like your your loved ones, 623 00:32:06,720 --> 00:32:10,040 Speaker 1: often a female in the background screaming for help. Right 624 00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:12,560 Speaker 1: you hear her voice in the background screaming for help. 625 00:32:12,840 --> 00:32:16,120 Speaker 1: That happen actually happens, oh all the time. Yeah, even 626 00:32:16,160 --> 00:32:18,600 Speaker 1: if you don't hear that. Though, if somebody says contact 627 00:32:18,640 --> 00:32:22,400 Speaker 1: us immediately. For example, you were mentioning someone who uh 628 00:32:22,960 --> 00:32:27,640 Speaker 1: got an Apple message from Apple, contact us right away. 629 00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,480 Speaker 1: My dad gotta pop up on his computer that had 630 00:32:30,480 --> 00:32:33,400 Speaker 1: the Apple logo with the Apple phone with a phone number, 631 00:32:33,720 --> 00:32:36,280 Speaker 1: saying it's Apple. There's a problem the computer. Call us. 632 00:32:36,640 --> 00:32:40,040 Speaker 1: And he called the number, and and he's a smart guy. 633 00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:43,120 Speaker 2: You know, he's a you know what makes me worry 634 00:32:43,120 --> 00:32:45,480 Speaker 2: about me? I think I'm a smart guy. But well, 635 00:32:45,600 --> 00:32:48,520 Speaker 2: just people who think they're smart guys get get fooled. 636 00:32:48,640 --> 00:32:51,680 Speaker 1: It's because we trust by default. But what do we 637 00:32:51,720 --> 00:32:54,840 Speaker 1: trust have that going forward? We trust Apple, we trust 638 00:32:54,880 --> 00:32:57,120 Speaker 1: e Trade, we trust fidelity, we. 639 00:32:57,160 --> 00:33:01,160 Speaker 2: Trust familiar websites. Of course, we do whatever you do. 640 00:33:01,320 --> 00:33:04,000 Speaker 2: Just because a website looks familiar, Like if it looks 641 00:33:04,040 --> 00:33:07,400 Speaker 2: like your bank website, it doesn't mean it is. It 642 00:33:07,480 --> 00:33:08,200 Speaker 2: might not be. 643 00:33:08,280 --> 00:33:09,840 Speaker 1: I would say, the majority of the people that are 644 00:33:09,840 --> 00:33:14,960 Speaker 1: listening to the show. Grew up trusting the written word. First, Okay, 645 00:33:15,680 --> 00:33:19,120 Speaker 1: Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Time Magazine. You trusted 646 00:33:19,240 --> 00:33:21,840 Speaker 1: the written world, the written word, and then radio you 647 00:33:21,880 --> 00:33:24,440 Speaker 1: trust what you hear in the radio. Television you trust 648 00:33:24,440 --> 00:33:27,240 Speaker 1: what you see on television. So Internet, it's a form 649 00:33:27,280 --> 00:33:29,400 Speaker 1: of media. We trust what we see in the Internet 650 00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:33,560 Speaker 1: via email, text messages. We trust all these inbound communications, 651 00:33:33,560 --> 00:33:35,720 Speaker 1: and we have been doing it for all of our lives. 652 00:33:35,880 --> 00:33:38,479 Speaker 1: You can't just by default do that any longer. 653 00:33:38,560 --> 00:33:41,840 Speaker 2: Should you use a VP and a virtual private network, 654 00:33:41,880 --> 00:33:45,280 Speaker 2: you recommend it, explain what it is quickly and briefly, 655 00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:48,840 Speaker 2: I should say, not necessarily quickly. What's a VPN? When 656 00:33:48,840 --> 00:33:50,520 Speaker 2: would you use it? When would it be legit? 657 00:33:50,680 --> 00:33:53,520 Speaker 1: So just google VPN virtual Private network the software you're 658 00:33:53,520 --> 00:33:55,920 Speaker 1: downloading your mobile phone and or your laptop. So when 659 00:33:55,920 --> 00:33:58,400 Speaker 1: you're at the airport the hotel and you're on free 660 00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:02,200 Speaker 1: Wi Fi, the VPN encrypt your data on that open 661 00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:05,320 Speaker 1: free Wi Fi on a on an encrypted tunnel, preventing 662 00:34:05,360 --> 00:34:07,920 Speaker 1: bad guys from seeing your information on free open Wi Fi. 663 00:34:08,080 --> 00:34:10,200 Speaker 2: If you're a person who used has to use Wi 664 00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:13,080 Speaker 2: Fi at the airport, don't use the public Wi Fi, 665 00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:17,960 Speaker 2: especially for financial transactions. Look into virtual private network. A 666 00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:20,160 Speaker 2: lot of them have a monthly fee, and they can 667 00:34:20,239 --> 00:34:22,799 Speaker 2: slow your computer down. But unless you're streaming, you know 668 00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:25,480 Speaker 2: it will be as you explained to me earlier, it 669 00:34:25,520 --> 00:34:28,720 Speaker 2: will be faster than what's no, it will be faster 670 00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:31,279 Speaker 2: than your cell service at the airport because a lot 671 00:34:31,280 --> 00:34:34,560 Speaker 2: of times that slows down, but it will be safe. 672 00:34:34,560 --> 00:34:36,840 Speaker 2: It won't be maybe as fast as the airport, but 673 00:34:37,080 --> 00:34:40,640 Speaker 2: it will be safe VPN check it out. What about 674 00:34:40,880 --> 00:34:44,960 Speaker 2: speaking of the airport, I heard a rumor that it's 675 00:34:45,120 --> 00:34:49,840 Speaker 2: bad idea to plug in to their phone charges juicing. 676 00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:53,280 Speaker 1: What is that? That's called juice jashu jackie where the 677 00:34:53,320 --> 00:34:56,920 Speaker 1: actual outlet is compromised, and so once you plug ins, 678 00:34:57,160 --> 00:35:00,840 Speaker 1: it's it basically downloads your data off through the wire 679 00:35:01,200 --> 00:35:04,200 Speaker 1: from your device. Look At that's a that is a scam. 680 00:35:04,320 --> 00:35:06,320 Speaker 1: That is a that is out there. I'm not worried 681 00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:10,600 Speaker 1: about it. It's look at certain scams are probable and 682 00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:13,719 Speaker 1: possible and out there and discovered. But that doesn't mean 683 00:35:13,719 --> 00:35:15,360 Speaker 1: that you shouldn't plug in in judge. 684 00:35:15,239 --> 00:35:17,800 Speaker 2: Especially if you need your phone charts. I'm gonna whip 685 00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:19,680 Speaker 2: through this thing that happened to a friend of mine. 686 00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:22,759 Speaker 2: Just so you're aware that it can happen. And this 687 00:35:22,880 --> 00:35:24,920 Speaker 2: was an in person thing, it wasn't online. 688 00:35:25,680 --> 00:35:25,799 Speaker 1: Uh. 689 00:35:26,760 --> 00:35:29,080 Speaker 2: I know a person whose friend went to it an 690 00:35:29,120 --> 00:35:32,160 Speaker 2: ATM comes away from the ATM. Man comes up to 691 00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:34,799 Speaker 2: her says, oh, you forget ten bucks. You left ten 692 00:35:34,840 --> 00:35:38,040 Speaker 2: bucks at the ATM. And and by the way, your 693 00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:40,359 Speaker 2: your your window is still open, your kind still open. 694 00:35:40,400 --> 00:35:44,400 Speaker 2: You gotta go close it. So she goes over to it, 695 00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:47,960 Speaker 2: to the ATM machine and tries to like figure out 696 00:35:47,960 --> 00:35:50,399 Speaker 2: what he's talking about. And he goes, no, no, no, 697 00:35:50,480 --> 00:35:51,400 Speaker 2: just I'll do it for you. 698 00:35:52,520 --> 00:35:53,600 Speaker 1: And he took her card. 699 00:35:53,600 --> 00:35:56,960 Speaker 2: He does something he did a little slight of hand 700 00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:01,400 Speaker 2: did and gave her back different card that looked the 701 00:36:01,440 --> 00:36:05,440 Speaker 2: same in the same bank. Then took it to a 702 00:36:06,360 --> 00:36:11,879 Speaker 2: it took it in person two banks to withdraw three 703 00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:16,759 Speaker 2: different banks under a certain amount and cleaned out, you. 704 00:36:16,719 --> 00:36:19,040 Speaker 1: Know, double digit thousands of bucks. 705 00:36:19,160 --> 00:36:26,080 Speaker 2: Ye, So again default trust default, no trust. Now we 706 00:36:26,120 --> 00:36:29,359 Speaker 2: go to alec Angelo and Newton, perfect timing, Angela, what's 707 00:36:29,400 --> 00:36:32,719 Speaker 2: going on here on WBZ with Robert Ciciliano and. 708 00:36:32,719 --> 00:36:34,680 Speaker 4: I you doing, Bradley, thank you for taking my call, 709 00:36:34,760 --> 00:36:37,520 Speaker 4: and rob It I got a question to ask you. 710 00:36:38,200 --> 00:36:41,960 Speaker 4: I have been hacked nine times and I had a 711 00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:46,560 Speaker 4: person called me and was reading all my identification to 712 00:36:46,640 --> 00:36:50,600 Speaker 4: me in my credit cards that one that even activated. Ye, 713 00:36:50,719 --> 00:36:51,640 Speaker 4: how do they do that? 714 00:36:52,920 --> 00:36:56,760 Speaker 1: So chances are they've got access to various accounts because 715 00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:59,120 Speaker 1: you might be using the same pass quote across multiple accounts. 716 00:36:59,120 --> 00:37:01,520 Speaker 1: That's usually has to like that happens. And if they're 717 00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:04,359 Speaker 1: inside your email, they can see everything, right, So it's 718 00:37:04,360 --> 00:37:06,400 Speaker 1: important to change up your passcodes and set up two 719 00:37:06,440 --> 00:37:09,600 Speaker 1: factor authentication to lock them out, and make sure that 720 00:37:09,640 --> 00:37:12,480 Speaker 1: you have a credit freeze so that your socialist credit 721 00:37:12,600 --> 00:37:16,360 Speaker 1: number is also protected. The majority of the hacks that 722 00:37:16,400 --> 00:37:19,120 Speaker 1: I hear about our as a result of poor password 723 00:37:19,160 --> 00:37:23,240 Speaker 1: management and unprotected identities. And once you do these basic 724 00:37:23,320 --> 00:37:25,719 Speaker 1: things that you become a tougher target and the bad 725 00:37:25,760 --> 00:37:27,279 Speaker 1: guy is going to lay off you. They're going to 726 00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:28,080 Speaker 1: find somebody else. 727 00:37:29,120 --> 00:37:31,919 Speaker 2: That's a good That's a perfect place to stop because 728 00:37:31,920 --> 00:37:33,919 Speaker 2: I'm so we're so short a time, you know, after 729 00:37:34,040 --> 00:37:36,680 Speaker 2: thank you Angela, you know have to go in through 730 00:37:36,719 --> 00:37:39,640 Speaker 2: this hour. It almost seems like the folks that I 731 00:37:39,719 --> 00:37:42,520 Speaker 2: used to try to convince get a computer, you know, 732 00:37:42,560 --> 00:37:45,600 Speaker 2: the folks listening to me now without computers, I would 733 00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:46,439 Speaker 2: try to convince them. 734 00:37:46,360 --> 00:37:49,200 Speaker 1: You get a computer, you gotta get online. You're missing out. 735 00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:52,920 Speaker 2: I feel like, whoa, maybe they're right all along to 736 00:37:53,000 --> 00:37:55,960 Speaker 2: be you know, offline. I know there's certain things that 737 00:37:56,120 --> 00:37:58,439 Speaker 2: just can't do, and even there will be soon more 738 00:37:58,440 --> 00:38:01,840 Speaker 2: than you just can't do. But it's staying safe is 739 00:38:01,920 --> 00:38:02,719 Speaker 2: kind of exhausting. 740 00:38:03,120 --> 00:38:06,319 Speaker 1: OK a minute, Yeah it can be, but listen, it's 741 00:38:06,320 --> 00:38:09,400 Speaker 1: not about first of all, don't worry about any of 742 00:38:09,440 --> 00:38:11,719 Speaker 1: this stuff. Just do something about it. It's like anything else. 743 00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:14,560 Speaker 1: You know, you you you learn basic you know, risk 744 00:38:14,640 --> 00:38:17,960 Speaker 1: reduction strategies. You're gonna be online pretty much for the 745 00:38:17,960 --> 00:38:20,040 Speaker 1: rest of your life. So you do these basic things. 746 00:38:20,040 --> 00:38:20,920 Speaker 2: It's just gotta do it. 747 00:38:20,920 --> 00:38:23,200 Speaker 1: You become a tougher target. It's like anything else. It's 748 00:38:23,239 --> 00:38:25,640 Speaker 1: worth the effort. Right, you gotta go to the doctor. 749 00:38:25,680 --> 00:38:26,919 Speaker 1: You gotta do this stuff. Yeah. 750 00:38:27,320 --> 00:38:30,880 Speaker 2: Right, We had a wonderful hour everyone. You should probably 751 00:38:30,920 --> 00:38:34,040 Speaker 2: share this if you want to get this podcast. But 752 00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:37,160 Speaker 2: tomorrow go to night Side on demand and you can 753 00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:40,040 Speaker 2: get this podcast shareable link and everything and you can 754 00:38:40,040 --> 00:38:42,600 Speaker 2: do the same. Robert Ciciliano, thank you so much for coming. 755 00:38:42,640 --> 00:38:45,440 Speaker 2: And this is a great, great hour, Thank you, Yeah. 756 00:38:45,239 --> 00:38:48,520 Speaker 1: And see me online to protect now LLC dot com 757 00:38:48,520 --> 00:38:51,920 Speaker 1: perfect Now This on night Side on WBZ