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Speaker 1: Well way new warning.

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Speaker 2: Iran and its proxies are very likely planning attacks on

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Speaker 2: the United States, not hardcore terrorist attacks as we saw

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Speaker 2: in nine to eleven. I mean that's all possibility. Look

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Speaker 2: what happened in Austin, Texas, which was more like a

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Speaker 2: lone wolf, crazy dude, but still again that's terrorism. I'm

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Speaker 2: talking about cyber attacks. Are you prepared, as Willie would say,

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Speaker 2: for attacks on American soil? Found the killing of Kamene?

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Speaker 2: So what does that look like for you? We hear

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Speaker 2: about these large scale tax all the time. Maybe I

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Speaker 2: don't know, you can't shop on Amazon, maybe your Twitter

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Speaker 2: feed goes down for a little bit. What actually would

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Speaker 2: happen and what might happen? Chris naiheis of Vigilant Cybersecurity

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Speaker 2: in Cincinnati. He's the CEO again to talk about it,

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Speaker 2: and this is probably the main concern, which would be

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Speaker 2: cyber So are you at.

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Speaker 1: Def con one right now? How deep? How high a

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Speaker 1: level of deaf con are you right now? Chris?

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Speaker 3: Like a Con two too, you know, but you gotta

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Speaker 3: have awareness, you know, ultimately you want to ever operate in

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Speaker 3: dufton one even in your regular everyday lives because your

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Speaker 3: brain just gets tired to that and you just degrade

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Speaker 3: over time. So sure, you want to be in heightened

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Speaker 3: state awareness. And that's where we are right now, just watching,

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Speaker 3: watching everything. You know, you're always watching intently anyway, just

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Speaker 3: because you never know when someone's going to try to

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Speaker 3: creatively do something here in the United States, But you

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Speaker 3: know now it's it's just being aware that you know,

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Speaker 3: more likely there's an imminent threat that's happening.

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Speaker 2: We've often talked about a cyber nine to eleven coming

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Speaker 2: we saw now with AI and other other sentence means

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Speaker 2: is that we have faced crisises before, but we always

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Speaker 2: talk about like the big one, whether it's an earthquake,

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Speaker 2: whether it's a terrorist a physical terroist attack.

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Speaker 1: This would be more digital one.

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Speaker 2: Is that more likely now with this or less likely

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Speaker 2: because well we're on guard more on guard?

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Speaker 3: I guess yeah, So I think I think with this one,

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Speaker 3: when you look at you know, the big one, right

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Speaker 3: that would be coming from more of like a nation

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Speaker 3: state like China or Russia. They're not really going to

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Speaker 3: do those things unless they just decide day to just

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Speaker 3: make a consorted effort to just take out the United

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Speaker 3: the entire United States, because it would.

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Speaker 4: Be a direct active war and it's very coordinated.

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Speaker 3: It would take multi nations to do it in this case,

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Speaker 3: at least right now anyway, because it's all about time

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Speaker 3: and positioning. You know, I don't the the adversaries from

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Speaker 3: like you know that you know, Iran et cetera. They

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Speaker 3: do have the uh you know, when you look at

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Speaker 3: Iran or Hamas or or the Taliban, et cetera, they

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Speaker 3: have the technological ability to do these same types of attacks.

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Speaker 3: It doesn't take long to do it. You can learn

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Speaker 3: on YouTube. But on top of that, Iran was funding

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Speaker 3: the development of very intense, very good tools in Iran

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Speaker 3: use those. What they were doing though, is giving those

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Speaker 3: the terrorist organizations and training them up. And so whereas Russia,

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Speaker 3: where China has had a lot hunger to position themselves

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Speaker 3: in our water systems and things like that just like

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Speaker 3: beauty to them, uh and and.

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Speaker 4: Put hooks in there. Uh.

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Speaker 3: These you know, Ran and these terrorist organizations haven't had

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Speaker 3: that same length of time, but they but guaranteed from me,

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Speaker 3: you know, quote unquote cyber sleeper self standpoint, they've embedded

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Speaker 3: themselves in certain places that are considered them strategic and

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Speaker 3: you know we're we're at war, and I think in

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Speaker 3: the United States a lot we think the war's over there,

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Speaker 3: and generally that does happen, but cyber enables the war

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Speaker 3: to come here really quickly.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it makes sense.

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Speaker 2: So Iranian process, give me a sense of things that

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Speaker 2: may have happened in a layman's terms, that Iran or

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Speaker 2: their proxies have done to us in the past.

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Speaker 1: What type of cyber attacks have we seen.

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Speaker 4: That we know? Well?

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Speaker 3: So the and that's the that's the hard part, right,

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Speaker 3: is attribution. Knowing that they're the ones that have actually

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Speaker 3: done this. We've had more military type approaches or hats

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Speaker 3: in to get data, uh, defense defense type approach where

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Speaker 3: they've passed into defense organizations. There's not there has not

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Speaker 3: been a attributed you know, critical infrastructure takedown in the

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Speaker 3: United States by Iran, and I think that was intentional

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Speaker 3: because they knew if we attributed that back to them,

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Speaker 3: we would just have destroyed them.

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Speaker 4: But see, the thing that's happened.

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Speaker 3: Now is you know, just like you know President Trump

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Speaker 3: said yesterday, if he's assassinated, he has instructions for us

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Speaker 3: to annihilate, you know, ran the same thing happens there.

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Speaker 3: You know, if you know for them, you know, if

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Speaker 3: the Iopola was taken out, guaranteed there's instructions to sleep

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Speaker 3: or cells to do certain things, you know, after he's gone.

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Speaker 3: And so that's the part that you have to be

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Speaker 3: aware of now, is that there would be instructions already

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Speaker 3: in play, whereas it wouldn't have been there before because

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Speaker 3: they wouldn't wanted to do it because we weren't at war, right,

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Speaker 3: And that's the thing we just need to be aware.

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Speaker 2: We know Iran uses fake hacker groups as a front

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Speaker 2: so they can attack people that are officially taking credit.

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Speaker 2: Kind of mentioned that, but can't then Russia, China or

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Speaker 2: pretty much any other nation state do that to us

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Speaker 2: to try and make it look like it's Iran and

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Speaker 2: not them and use this as an opportunity.

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Speaker 1: Is that going to happen?

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Speaker 4: They absolutely can. And that's why I was going back

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Speaker 4: to attribution.

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Speaker 3: It's really easy to make you look like someone else, right,

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Speaker 3: I mean, anybody.

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Speaker 4: That's why we all have VPNs.

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Speaker 3: Right, we jump on a VPN, we can make it

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Speaker 3: look like we're coming from Arizona, or we can make

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Speaker 3: it look like we're coming from Poland, right, And so

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Speaker 3: you know, there's when you get into a very high

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Speaker 3: level advanced attackers. They're not just doing a VPN, they're

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Speaker 3: going through VPN dark web, a system they hacked in

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Speaker 3: another country back to another one, and they've got multiple

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Speaker 3: layers feet and so yeah, they absolutely can. Now, one

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Speaker 3: of the things that you find with tracking hackers is

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Speaker 3: at the end of the day, there's still the poining code,

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Speaker 3: and so a lot of times you can look into

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Speaker 3: that code and you can see the way that someone

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Speaker 3: writes or maybe they must spell something the same time

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Speaker 3: in the same way, or they write the scene uh

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Speaker 3: you know, uh, you know, the same type of code,

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Speaker 3: and when that happens, then you can say, okay, well

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Speaker 3: I know it's that person. But but still even if

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Speaker 3: they are, you can you know, Russia could say give

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Speaker 3: me an Iranian uh you know of malware and then

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Speaker 3: just duplicate it and make it look like you Ran.

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Speaker 3: So yeah, we have to be really careful in the response. Absolutely.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: So when we talk about Ran retelling a cybertext, what

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Speaker 2: does that actually mean for an ordinary American? Are we

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Speaker 2: talking about, you know, your phone and your network going dark,

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Speaker 2: your bank account getting drained, the light's going out, what happened.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I think all of those are on the table

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Speaker 3: when you look at again, just just deposing them against

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Speaker 3: a Russia or a China, they're going to be less

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Speaker 3: apt to do attacks against the United States, right, just

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Speaker 3: like where lesser thing to do it. So then when

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Speaker 3: you and and the reason for that is because we

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Speaker 3: operate under rules primarily. And one thing that you know

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Speaker 3: I talked about before, there's a book called Unrestricted Warfare

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Speaker 3: that came out of the PLA and a couple of

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Speaker 3: generals wrote it, and what they said was the only

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Speaker 3: way to take out the United States is to operate

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Speaker 3: on a different rules that than they do. And what

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Speaker 3: they realized is that the United States, in any real, big,

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Speaker 3: large nation has to operate off of some rules, and

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Speaker 3: those rules wrap around what you would do to people

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Speaker 3: or what you would do to infrastructure, because mass outages

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Speaker 3: can cause you know, significant widespread issues and even though

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Speaker 3: to people start and invest and things like that. So

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Speaker 3: when you look at Iran, where you look at a

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Speaker 3: terrorist organization, they don't have rules, right, and so it's

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Speaker 3: a very unrestricted warfare and we're really not playing on

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Speaker 3: the same level playing field. That's why you know, when

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Speaker 3: you look at why can navy fields do the things

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Speaker 3: navy fields do is because they operate differently than.

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Speaker 4: A larger you know a lot of larger army does.

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Speaker 3: Sure, Sure, and so the same thing here. They're they're

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Speaker 3: smaller groups, they're more targeted. They can get into into

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Speaker 3: into places that others can't. And and so when it

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Speaker 3: comes to what should we be worried about, I don't.

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Speaker 3: I wouldn't say be worried, but I would say be

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Speaker 3: prepared that you know, you could lose. They could take

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Speaker 3: out a water system for for two weeks, they could

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Speaker 3: take power down for four and and I would prepare

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Speaker 3: for this, not running to the stores and grabbing tons

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Speaker 3: of you all the bread off the shelves, but I

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Speaker 3: would over time as as just in your family, just

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Speaker 3: have some extra food that would last maybe a week

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Speaker 3: or two, has some extra water, because it's it's eminent

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Speaker 3: something's going to happen down the road that will take

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Speaker 3: out for services.

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Speaker 1: Here we we love in Cincinnati.

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Speaker 2: All they have to do is somehow is create the

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Speaker 2: illusion that we might get snowfall like a classic.

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Speaker 1: We'd be riding like hair is on fire.

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Speaker 2: He's the CEO of Cincinnati based vigil and cybersecurity Chris

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Speaker 2: and I Heights on the Scott Sloan Show seven hundred

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Speaker 2: WLW is Google and the government there at Google's top

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Speaker 2: cyber threat analyst said, Iran will absolutely respond with a

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Speaker 2: cyber attack. We talked about stuff they've done in the past.

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Speaker 2: You mentioned our infrastructure, Chris, I believe it was a

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Speaker 2: couple of years ago, three years ago maybe that Iran

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Speaker 2: and hackers got into water treatment plant computers in the US.

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Speaker 2: Could you take us back how that happened and what

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Speaker 2: does that tell us about how vulnerable our basic infrastructure is?

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Speaker 2: And are we better at protecting it now than we

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Speaker 2: were three years ago?

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Speaker 3: Actually, we're not better at protecting it now than we were.

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Speaker 3: We're actually worse than we were. I would you know,

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Speaker 3: I would say I was even that seven eight years

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Speaker 3: ago we were in a better position to protect than

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Speaker 3: we were than we are now. Right because a lot

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Speaker 3: of the cyber the cybersecurity industry has reduced effectiveness. Uh

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Speaker 3: and and and I would I would actually say because

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Speaker 3: of margin, right and so, and the other part of

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Speaker 3: it is that you know, is that companies have put

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Speaker 3: a lot of their things in the cloud, right, and

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Speaker 3: so because they've done that, they've removed a lot of

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Speaker 3: the security at their physical locations.

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Speaker 4: When we went to work from home.

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Speaker 3: In a lot of cases, now the attacks are more widespread,

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Speaker 3: so it's a lot harder to find. So are what

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Speaker 3: we would call in the industry an attack footprint.

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Speaker 4: It got way way big. Where it used to be.

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Speaker 3: Just at your office, now it's at everybody's home and

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Speaker 3: so it's a lot harder. Or it's in the cloud,

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Speaker 3: right so it's a lot harder to detect those things,

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Speaker 3: and a lot of organizations have made the decision to

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Speaker 3: remove the very security that could detect these things right now,

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Speaker 3: like even AI attacks, it's a lot easier to detect

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Speaker 3: AI attacks because we had a lot more data years ago,

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Speaker 3: but because companies have removed a lot of this security

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Speaker 3: local location because they said, hey, data is in the cloud,

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Speaker 3: well now it's up there. The other thing that's interesting

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Speaker 3: today is that now we have a lot of people

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Speaker 3: using the cloud as part of their everyday business operations.

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Speaker 3: And if you haven't noticed over the last which I'm

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Speaker 3: sure you have, or the last week, Claud has gone

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Speaker 3: out you know a few times, well, when you know

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Speaker 3: that Claud is being used by the US government to

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Speaker 3: do AI targeting and things like that. Now those technologies

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Speaker 3: become targets by the attackers, right, and so I look

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Speaker 3: look at where the missiles have been going for a rand.

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Speaker 3: They've been going to aws locations in Dubai, right, They've

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Speaker 3: been hitting radar systems. So if you build your entire

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Speaker 3: operations of your company around a specific technology, and that

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Speaker 3: technology is also used by the US government, it's going

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Speaker 3: to be attacked, right, and you're gonna have autes. No,

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Speaker 3: it makes sense, makes sense.

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Speaker 2: Experts are flag and energy, water, transpormission, banking, telecommunications as

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Speaker 2: you just did, as priority targets. If you had to

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Speaker 2: pick the single most vulnerable sector in the US right

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Speaker 2: now for a cyber attack from the Iranians or their proxies,

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Speaker 2: what it would be?

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Speaker 1: What would it be?

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Speaker 4: In one?

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Speaker 3: You know, I would uh, I would say, if I

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Speaker 3: were to be the attacker, I would go after water.

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Speaker 3: Electricity is one thing, but we're not in the winter

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Speaker 3: right now, and so you know, it's it's not like

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Speaker 3: it's going to take heat out. You know, no one's

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Speaker 3: gonna you know, uh, you know, freeze, freeze to death.

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Speaker 3: At this point, I would.

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Speaker 4: Go after water.

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Speaker 3: And so, and I would say both are electrical grid

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Speaker 3: and our water system are both you know at risk.

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Speaker 3: We we do know they were physical attacks. I mean

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Speaker 3: remember uh, you know, I think they attributed that back

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Speaker 3: to RAND when people were firing rifles at transformers out

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Speaker 3: you know. Now, I think water is the first thing

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Speaker 3: I think the I think water. I think electricity follows

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Speaker 3: water though, because if we're without electricity here in the

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Speaker 3: United States for you know, ninety days, we we have

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Speaker 3: a we're gonna have a really really bad problem.

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Speaker 2: Is that possible that they can shut down at least

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Speaker 2: you know, we have several grids here, but shut things

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Speaker 2: down and to make that big an impact, Oh for sure.

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Speaker 3: I mean if you look at if you look at

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Speaker 3: the electrical grid, I mean remember years ago, uh, that

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Speaker 3: circuar breaker pops in the northeast and it took out

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Speaker 3: you know. And I think, you know, somewhere like New Hampshire,

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Speaker 3: someone that pick out the right all the way to Canada.

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Speaker 3: So yes, I mean there are there are very if

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Speaker 3: you think about it, you know, a lot of a

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Speaker 3: lot of our grid is held together with you know,

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Speaker 3: the proverbial you know, surge protector with a bunch of

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Speaker 3: stuff plugged into it, and so you know, if you

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Speaker 3: take out one of those facilities, and yeah, it does

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Speaker 3: the other. The other risk to it too is that

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Speaker 3: a lot of actually almost all of our us you know,

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Speaker 3: big transformers that you see when you're driving around. Those

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Speaker 3: can't just be driven down the street. They have to

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Speaker 3: be flown in. And where they come from is China,

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Speaker 3: and China has like a two to three year you know,

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Speaker 3: backlog on this if they even decide they're going to

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Speaker 3: give us anymore. So you know, if those things get

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Speaker 3: taken out, it's not like you have two or three

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Speaker 3: of them. We have one, right you know, in certain areas,

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Speaker 3: So if that gets taken out, it could be a

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Speaker 3: significantly long time before this come back on. But I

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Speaker 3: would say from a cyber standpoint, I would say our

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Speaker 3: water is the most vulnerable, and we already know that.

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Speaker 3: You and I talked about that a few you know,

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Speaker 3: and I think what last month is about two hundred

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Speaker 3: and fifty of our water districts are known to have

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Speaker 3: attacks in it and right now and you know that

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Speaker 3: they can't get out. There's a big news article on that,

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Speaker 3: and you know, we just we have to.

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Speaker 1: Do so so when that's happens.

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Speaker 2: Not probably when Chris and I heis when a major

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Speaker 2: cyber attack hits critical in for church, let's say water

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Speaker 2: power good, whatever it is, What is the government's actual

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Speaker 2: response going to look like? And is it a credible

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Speaker 2: deterrent that makes around maybe think twice before paulling trigger.

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Speaker 4: That's that's the thing.

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Speaker 3: So one I think are there's an internal response, and

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Speaker 3: I think that's something FEMA keeps praty close because you

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Speaker 3: don't want to let you know your attackers know what

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Speaker 3: your responses are going to be.

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Speaker 4: And I think that's why.

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Speaker 3: I think, you know, as what the US is, you know,

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Speaker 3: you know, I would say, you know, kinetic or you know,

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Speaker 3: you know, direct attack action will be I think it

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Speaker 3: would be pretty swift. I mean, you know Donald Trump

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Speaker 3: is you know, he's he's big on making sure he

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Speaker 3: he fights back pretty hard.

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Speaker 4: You know, you can see that.

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Speaker 1: Our response will be good.

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Speaker 2: I just wonder how prepared right to get everything back

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Speaker 2: online here Stateside?

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Speaker 4: Really?

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Speaker 1: What what the operation looks like?

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Speaker 4: Yeah?

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Speaker 3: See, I think that's I think a good way to

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Speaker 3: look at that is, well, what happens when uh, you know,

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Speaker 3: snowstorm hits right, and I take down tons of things.

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Speaker 3: You can see what that response looks like. Think about

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Speaker 3: that response, but you know which is pretty good, right.

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Speaker 3: But those responses are because you know, if it's something

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Speaker 3: happens in Florida, they're bringing all the trucks from all

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Speaker 3: over the United States down to Florida. I don't think

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Speaker 3: we have the enough trucks and people to go fix

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Speaker 3: all of these things. And that's where I would say this.

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Speaker 3: If there's anything I would tell people in the United

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Speaker 3: States is you know, you said, how are we better

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Speaker 3: prepared now than we were before? You know, there's a

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Speaker 3: technological aspect of that, and then there's.

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Speaker 4: A people part of that.

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Speaker 3: And I would say it is something like this happened

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Speaker 3: in the fifties for the sixties. I think people were

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Speaker 3: a lot more self sufficient and they knew how to

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Speaker 3: take care of themselves, right, I think, and I'm not

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Speaker 3: saying that we don't as an as a society know

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Speaker 3: how to take care of ourselves. But we don't have

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Speaker 3: to do that in our everyday lives. You know, we

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Speaker 3: don't have to think about power, we don't have to

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Speaker 3: think about water.

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Speaker 4: I'll tell you this this story.

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Speaker 3: I was just reading this on Twitter this guy that

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Speaker 3: he posted this up and he said he had been

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Speaker 3: driving by this water main break for like four weeks

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Speaker 3: and like, I mean, water is showing the street. And

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Speaker 3: so he calls water department and he goes, hey, do

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Speaker 3: you guys know about this wire may break? And they

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Speaker 3: said no, we don't, and uh, and so what had happened?

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Speaker 3: You know, he thought about it later and he thought,

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Speaker 3: I bet all of these people, thousands of people drive

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Speaker 3: by us every day, including him for four weeks, just

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Speaker 3: thought somebody else was going to call. And and that's

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Speaker 3: where for us as Americans, you know, you know, one

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Speaker 3: thing that's always been a strength of ours is we

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Speaker 3: come together. And so if something were to happen, which

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Speaker 3: I believe it will eventually, whether it's small or big,

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Speaker 3: don't rely on the guys in the trucks to just

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Speaker 3: go fix things, right Like, we gotta we gotta start

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Speaker 3: getting back to where we we go help each other

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Speaker 3: and we we really come together as Americans and we

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Speaker 3: bring these things back online in whatever way we can together.

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Speaker 2: It sounds like Chris that that back in post nine

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Speaker 2: to eleven. If you see something, say something, we've we've

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Speaker 2: got to rebrand that imaging for today makes a lot

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Speaker 2: of sense.

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Speaker 4: Chris.

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Speaker 2: I Heist the CEO of Vigilant Cybersecurity here in Cincinnati.

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Speaker 2: You've been warned about what Iran is most likely to do.

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Speaker 2: Seem more cyber than it is physical terrorism hitting America's

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Speaker 2: homeland here, Chris, all the best. Thanks for jumping on

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Speaker 2: this morning. I appreciate it.

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Speaker 4: Thanks good Damen, take care.

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Speaker 2: We got to get a news update in and quickly

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Speaker 2: more to follow her. We got that's going to rain

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Speaker 2: for the next thirty years. Did I just blow the forecast?

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Speaker 2: I thought I did.

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Speaker 1: Anyway, I'll find up. I'm right here in seconds on

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Speaker 1: seven under WLW.

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