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Speaker 1: I brought to you by end trust It. Every business

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Speaker 1: has a computer, presumably unless they're a ludeite business not

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Speaker 1: making any money. Computers meeting potential problems. You need proper setup,

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Speaker 1: you need proper best practices, and you need to get

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Speaker 1: out of problems when you run into them. That's what

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Speaker 1: interest I t is all about. The best in the business,

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Speaker 1: according to the business courier and the man behind interest

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Speaker 1: I find him online at interest it dot com. Dave Hatter, Daddy.

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Speaker 1: Welcome man. The Verizon outage impacted quite a few people,

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Speaker 1: and it lasted a hell of a lot longer than

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Speaker 1: people realize. And it was at that point they all

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Speaker 1: realized how much we depend upon and our lives revolve

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Speaker 1: around our cell phone. Welcome back, my friend. It's always

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Speaker 1: great having you on.

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Speaker 2: Brian, always good to be here. Yeah. How many times

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Speaker 2: have you and I in the.

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Speaker 3: Last ten plus here has talked about are ever increasingly

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Speaker 3: digital society, how we depend on this technology more and

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Speaker 3: more all the time, and how fragile it is. The

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Speaker 3: point I try to make all the time. And here's

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Speaker 3: yet another example. You know, now, this is not unique

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Speaker 3: to Verizon. It's not the only time. It's happened to.

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Speaker 3: But the bottom line is, in general, I don't think

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Speaker 3: the average person really realizes how much network traffic goes

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Speaker 3: through these cellular carriers networks at this point. So it's

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Speaker 3: not just your cell phone doesn't work, it's other things

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Speaker 3: may not work as well, and especially if you could

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Speaker 3: knock out one of these carriers entire network. Because it

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Speaker 3: looks like this Verizon thing did not affect all users,

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Speaker 3: does not appear to be a cyber attack from everything

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Speaker 3: I've read, it looks like they had a problem with

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Speaker 3: a server. Now again, you know, this is still early

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Speaker 3: and sometimes when these incidents happen, as time wears on,

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Speaker 3: you get more detailed when you find out whatever was

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Speaker 3: originally reported wasn't right.

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Speaker 2: I'm not saying that's necessarily because they're lying about it.

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Speaker 3: I'm saying that, you know, you have to do some

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Speaker 3: forensics to get to the bottom of things to really

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Speaker 3: understand what went on. But apparently, for roughly ten hours,

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Speaker 3: a bunch of Verizon customers had issues with their phones.

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Speaker 3: I'm a Verizon customer. It did not impact me, for example.

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Speaker 3: But you know, kind of going back to the second

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Speaker 3: part of my point, which is not it's not just

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Speaker 3: cell phone traffic necessarily going through this stuff, but when

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Speaker 3: you see the sheer number of people that are potentially

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Speaker 3: suddenly unable to do the things they need to do

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Speaker 3: in their daily lives because they rely on these phones. Right,

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Speaker 3: whether it's making a doctor's appointment, whether it's trying to

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Speaker 3: get an uber or as an uber driver, whether it's

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Speaker 3: you know, trying.

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Speaker 1: To two factor authentication. You know, the days when I

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Speaker 1: when I when when I forgot my phone at home,

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Speaker 1: I can't I come in, I can't get into my email,

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Speaker 1: the of the iHeart system because of course, the the

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Speaker 1: good reason is I use two factor authentication. That's an

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Speaker 1: important safety tools. You've talked time and time again. Sorry

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Speaker 1: sucks to be you. You're not going to get your

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Speaker 1: six digit message saying that allow you access into your stuff.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, that's that's another interesting angle because even if your

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Speaker 3: computer is working because it's connected to a different network, right,

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Speaker 3: it's not using Verizons sell your network or at and

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Speaker 3: Tier whomever. Again we're specifically talking about Verizon in this case. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: you might not be able to get your MFA code.

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Speaker 2: Now.

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Speaker 3: You know, in some cases, Brian, if you have a

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Speaker 3: cell phone, I would just remind folks, you know, if

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Speaker 3: you have a cell phone.

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Speaker 2: All new ones that I'm aware of support Wi Fi.

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Speaker 3: If your cellular carrier is down, you could still theoretically

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Speaker 3: use some of the phone's functionality. You might not be

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Speaker 3: able to make phone calls, for example, text may or

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Speaker 3: may not work, but you might be able to at

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Speaker 3: least still do certain things because you're connected to the

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Speaker 3: Wi Fi. But the bigger point in my mind now Verizon,

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Speaker 3: you know, has apologized for this, and they said they're

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Speaker 3: going to issue credits and that sort of thing, which

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Speaker 3: I think is good and I think even more important

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Speaker 3: is from all initial reporting, this does not appear to

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Speaker 3: be a cyber attack of any kind. You know, I've

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Speaker 3: sent you all kinds of articles. We've talked about it

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Speaker 3: on here, I've shared many times in my social media

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Speaker 3: stories where you know, the FBI, DHS, etc. Is warning

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Speaker 3: about Chinese communists already infiltration in the telecom network, you know,

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Speaker 3: back doors and this stuff. The possibility that this stuff

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Speaker 3: could be knocked out on purpose again doesn't seem to

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Speaker 3: be anything like that, I'm happy to say. But the

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Speaker 3: bigger point in my mind, and I just keep telling

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Speaker 3: people this all the time, we must, we must, we must.

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Speaker 3: It's serious about protecting this infrastructure as we get You know,

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Speaker 3: it's thirty years ago. I don't know, maybe it's been

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Speaker 3: twenty five years. Whenever I first got a cell phone,

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Speaker 3: it was a convenience for me. It was a novelty

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Speaker 3: for me. It was not nearly as important to me

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Speaker 3: then as it is now and.

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Speaker 1: A half pounds plus weighed three and a half pounds.

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Speaker 3: Oh yeah, yeah, big old brick, right, But I mean

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Speaker 3: if it stopped working for a couple of hours, wasn't

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Speaker 3: that big of a deal. Landlines were everywhere, pay phones

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Speaker 3: were everywhere. Most people didn't have a cell phone. They

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Speaker 3: weren't trying to call my cell phone. It was mostly,

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Speaker 3: you know, a business rated thing and a convenience and

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Speaker 3: cool thing. Well now I don't even have a landline anymore,

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Speaker 3: Brian Dye.

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Speaker 1: I mentioned that earlier.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, many people don't. So you know, again, if now,

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Speaker 3: if my cell phone doesn't work, it's much more problematic

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Speaker 3: for me. And I don't exist out of my phone

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Speaker 3: like my kids do or like other people I know.

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Speaker 3: Do you know I would still get on the computer.

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Speaker 1: Now.

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Speaker 3: You mentioned MFA that may or may not work through

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Speaker 3: another connection. But the bigger point is we have we

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Speaker 3: have got to at every level of our society realize

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Speaker 3: how all this digital technology is impacting us, how fragile

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Speaker 3: it is, and how you know, We've got to get

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Speaker 3: this stuff fixed before some catastrophe happens. And my last point,

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Speaker 3: because I know will be out of time, is, as

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Speaker 3: you and I have discussed many times, one of the

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Speaker 3: many reasons why I'm completely and totally against any sort

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Speaker 3: of cashless society is, imagine all three carriers go down.

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Speaker 3: I imagine the telecom system is down entirely. How do

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Speaker 3: you bank, how do you get money? How do you

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Speaker 3: pay your bills?

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Speaker 1: At least stash of cash on hand in the end

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Speaker 1: of those contingencies, have something like a fire plan in

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Speaker 1: the event cell phone connectivity goes away for any period

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Speaker 1: of time. Pause. We'll bring Dave headerback to talk about

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Speaker 1: his op edpes the benefits of the Kentucky Consumer Data

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Speaker 1: protect Station tech part of the Dave Hatter and Opinion

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Speaker 1: Writer op ed opinion writer still keeping his interest it

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Speaker 1: dot com hat on. He's talking about the benefits of

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Speaker 1: Kentucky Consumer Data Protection Act. We can all read the

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Speaker 1: article in the Northern Kentucky Tribune Day. But tell us

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Speaker 1: about this. What is the Kentucky Consumer Data Protection Act?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, Brian, for the first time and probably my entire life,

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Speaker 3: Kentucky has actually beat Ohio to something useful in the

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Speaker 3: tech space. I'm happy to say. You know, Ohio honestly

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Speaker 3: is generally way ahead of Kentucky and anything related to tech.

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Speaker 3: I think we've talked on her show about Ohio House

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Speaker 3: Built ninety six, which requires local governments in Ohio to

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Speaker 3: take steps towards protecting your assets in the cybersecurity space

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Speaker 3: and some other stuff. So Ohio generally, in all honesty,

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Speaker 3: really has their act together, and I'm constantly trying to

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Speaker 3: get evince my friends here in Kentucky to follow suit.

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Speaker 3: But back in twenty four Kentucky passed the Kentucky Consumer

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Speaker 3: Data Protection Act, and it's not perfect, but it's a

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Speaker 3: great first step towards protecting you as a consumer. And

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Speaker 3: one of the reasons why I'm glad you wanted to

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Speaker 3: talk about this despite the fact that obviously you have

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Speaker 3: a large audience in Kentucky. I live in Kentucky. Is

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Speaker 3: I'm hoping Ohio will follow suits. So the International Association

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Speaker 3: of Privacy Professionals has a website I've linked to it

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Speaker 3: from this article that shows you which states have a

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Speaker 3: consumer data protection law. Currently there are nineteen. Kentucky is

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Speaker 3: one of the most recent. Indiana has one. Many states

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Speaker 3: surrounding Ohio either have one in place or are working

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Speaker 3: on one. From what I can tell, it looks like

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Speaker 3: Ohio's attempt at this sort of stalled out, and I

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Speaker 3: can't find any evidence that it's been reunited. So all

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Speaker 3: my Ohio friends, you might want to reach out to

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Speaker 3: your legislators. You can send them this article or there's

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Speaker 3: plenty of research on this went into law January first

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Speaker 3: of this year, and it's design. It has two prongs,

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Speaker 3: and I'm going to write another two articles on this,

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Speaker 3: one for Kentucky businesses what they need to know, because

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Speaker 3: I touch on it briefly in here, but I'm really

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Speaker 3: trying to focus on why you should care about this

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Speaker 3: as a consumer, and then another article about as a

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Speaker 3: consumer in Kentucky how to use this thing. But basically,

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Speaker 3: what it does is it says if you're a Kentucky

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Speaker 3: business and you collect consumer data, once you hit certain thresholds,

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Speaker 3: then there are penalties built into the bill.

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Speaker 2: If you don't protect people's data.

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Speaker 3: So there's a cybersecurity angle to this, right, It puts

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Speaker 3: teeth in the law so that businesses now are incentivized

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Speaker 3: to want to protect your data to stop all these

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Speaker 3: data breaches that we see. You know, I bet you, Brian,

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Speaker 3: everyone in your audience has gotten at least one, probably

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Speaker 3: many notices from some company somewhere, probably some they haven't

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Speaker 3: done business with that their data has been breached. Right, So,

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Speaker 3: if you're doing business in Kentucky and you have Kentucky

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Speaker 3: consumers data, there are exceptions. Again, there are thresholds, but

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Speaker 3: now as a consumer you potentially can get You're forcing

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Speaker 3: businesses to take this seriously. Essentially, the big knock on

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Speaker 3: this because it's not nearly as stringent as consumer or

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Speaker 3: California's law the California Consumer Day California Consumer Privacy Act

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Speaker 3: is by far the most stringent law in.

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Speaker 2: The United States.

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Speaker 3: It's kind of loosely based on the GDP. You are

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Speaker 3: out of the EU, it's much more rigorous, much bigger penalties.

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Speaker 3: But again, in my mind, this is a great first step.

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Speaker 3: It's something that got done, and the main things that

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Speaker 3: does fuse well. The main knock on it is. You

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Speaker 3: have no private right to action if you believe you

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Speaker 3: are a victim of if one of these things have

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Speaker 3: you know, been uh, I don't know. I can't talk

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Speaker 3: this morning, Brian. If a company runs a foul one

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Speaker 3: of these things and you believe you're a victim, you

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Speaker 3: can't sue them outright. You have to go through the

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Speaker 3: Kentucky Attorney General's Office. A lot of experts, you know,

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Speaker 3: have knocked it for that, But what it does do

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Speaker 3: is a whole lot of things. For example, you now

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Speaker 3: have a right to go to a company that has

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Speaker 3: your data data brokers, for example. Now this is not easy.

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Speaker 3: That's why I'm going to do another article to explain

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Speaker 3: how to work through this and say, I want to

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Speaker 3: see what data you have about me. I want to

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Speaker 3: is this data accurate. I want you to correct this

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Speaker 3: data in some cases potentially delete the data. I want

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Speaker 3: you to give me my data so I can take

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Speaker 3: it somewhere else. So without a law like this right

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Speaker 3: often you have no idea who has your data. You

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Speaker 3: have no way to know if that data is correct.

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Speaker 3: You and I've talked about this many times. It's one

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Speaker 3: of the reasons why I don't like the Internet of

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Speaker 3: Things and apps, all this data is being collected.

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Speaker 2: Is it even right.

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Speaker 1: You don't know you have no access to it. This

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Speaker 1: is basically creating a legal freedom of information act for

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Speaker 1: people to allow them to ask and demand the information

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Speaker 1: that is being collected about them. I love that. And

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Speaker 1: once you're around with that information, you can determine the

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Speaker 1: accuracy of it, and then maybe if Kentucky's you know,

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Speaker 1: is the norm, or or California's law becomes the norm

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Speaker 1: for America, then you'll have some right to legal recourse.

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Speaker 1: I think it's a step in the right direction. I

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Speaker 1: hate the idea that they're selling our information to third

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Speaker 1: parties all the time, and I guess the FTC recognized

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Speaker 1: that too. They have banned GM from disclosing all the

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Speaker 1: information it's been collecting about our driving habits for the

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Speaker 1: next five years, and I presume that that's going to

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Speaker 1: be an extension of in a broader application.

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Speaker 3: So, because keep in mind, right there is no national

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Speaker 3: privacy law, you've got nineteen states that have this patch

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Speaker 3: work built. Now again, is this law perfect, because I've

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Speaker 3: already gotten feedback that this is no good.

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Speaker 2: It's way better than what we had, which was nothing.

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Speaker 2: If you are business doing you don't have to be

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Speaker 2: a Kentucky business. If you're a business doing business in

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Speaker 2: Kentucky right now, you're a subject to this.

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Speaker 1: Law that makes it stretch all around the nation like

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Speaker 1: California cafe standards, forcing everybody to fall in line with California.

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Speaker 1: Pause will bring Dave haderback. He's going to tell us

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Speaker 1: us the worst products of the Consumer elect Products Show,

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Speaker 1: probably an endless list. One more with dation sixth if

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Speaker 1: you want to pick about kr CEDE talk station in

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Speaker 1: trust it dot com to find day you've had on

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Speaker 1: the crew for all your business computerity and sponsoring the

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Speaker 1: Tech Friday segment. Thank god for them doing it all.

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Speaker 1: Right now the fun and games begins. Can you narrow

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Speaker 1: down a list of the worst products of the CEO

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Speaker 1: Show that you can fit in the remaining four or

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Speaker 1: five minutes we've got?

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Speaker 3: Well, yeah, Brian, that's a that's a tall charge there,

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Speaker 3: I would be. You know, it's funny this so this

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Speaker 3: is an ap article. Worst in shows CES products include

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Speaker 3: AI refrigerators, AI companions, and AI doorbells. I'll post this

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Speaker 3: and all the other links to all the other stuff

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Speaker 3: we talked about this morning, so people can go see

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Speaker 3: these things for themselves.

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Speaker 2: But I love it the very first picture they start

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Speaker 2: out in the article.

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Speaker 3: Yes, Internet of Things coffee makers that conveniently not only

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Speaker 3: have a screen on them, but the Wi Fi symbol

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Speaker 3: telling you that you can plug this thing in and

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Speaker 3: you know, wreck your whole life, your business, et cetera,

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Speaker 3: because probably in two years or less, there'll be no

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Speaker 3: software updates coming for this thing.

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Speaker 2: That's how it works.

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Speaker 3: And as you and I have discussed so many times before,

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Speaker 3: you know, Internet of things aka smart devices, most of

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Speaker 3: which are really stupid, dumb dumpster fires for your privacy

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Speaker 3: and security. You know, the show was full of this stuff. Robots,

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Speaker 3: ai AI refrigerators. You know you've talked We've talked about

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Speaker 3: the Samsung refrigerator before with a screen that now serves

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Speaker 3: up ads.

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Speaker 2: Let me just add, let me just.

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Speaker 1: Sure to get advertising pumped into your own via your refrigerators.

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Speaker 3: You paid for a refrigerator that is going to send ads.

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Speaker 3: I mean, think of the drivel that's coming out of

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Speaker 3: your average gas pump now.

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Speaker 2: And now you can bring that into your kitchen. Is

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Speaker 2: that not? Are we not entertained? Brian?

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Speaker 3: This is aw so so they say here, now again,

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Speaker 3: these are a group of privacy experts from folks like

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Speaker 3: the Internet or Electronic Frontier Foundation and other groups. They

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Speaker 3: go to this thing and then you know, they collectively

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Speaker 3: vote on these things. Right, so it's it's ten four

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Speaker 3: hat people like me, but shouting at a bespoke AI

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Speaker 3: fridge that also hawks grocery products. This is from the

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Speaker 3: article Samsung's Bespoke AI Family Hub refrigerator received the overall

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Speaker 3: worst end show from the group of consumer privacy advocates.

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Speaker 3: And they basically go one to say for example, you know,

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Speaker 3: they talk about trying to talk to the thing it

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Speaker 3: was too loud. But that's not the thing that gets me.

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Speaker 3: It's the idea. Now again I'm reading from the article, right, Yeah,

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Speaker 3: that was just part of the complications and reliability concerned

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Speaker 3: Samsung added to an appliance that's supposed to have an

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Speaker 3: important job keeping food cold. Right, they talk about how

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Speaker 3: it could try to order food for you. Well, if

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Speaker 3: it could order food for you, it means it knows

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Speaker 3: what you're eating, it knows how much you're eating. It's

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Speaker 3: probably selling that to God knows who, like your insurance company.

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Speaker 3: You know, I've brought this up many times talking to you, Brian,

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Speaker 3: and I know in the past people like, well, that's crazy.

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Speaker 3: But think about this. If this can order your food,

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Speaker 3: then it could know that you eat. You know, let's

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Speaker 3: say eight pounds.

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Speaker 1: A bake in a week, how many twelve packs you

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Speaker 1: got in the fridge, that's all that's exactly right, on

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Speaker 1: and on and on. It is scary.

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Speaker 3: And while it might be convenient that it could order

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Speaker 3: that for you, unless, of course the Verizon network is down,

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Speaker 3: but it could order that for you, right and then

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Speaker 3: sell that to your insurance company, who might decide that

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Speaker 3: your premium should go up, or maybe they should cancel

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Speaker 3: you because you're eating in a way that is not

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Speaker 3: conducive to their insurance premiums and their payouts to your.

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Speaker 1: Desk, like Ford collecting your driving data, which they sell

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Speaker 1: to insurance companies who will cancel you or otherwise jack

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Speaker 1: your premium up. This is all a vicious circle leading

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Speaker 1: to a bad place for the consumer.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Again, the main I am not against the Internet of

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Speaker 3: things in principle. I'm against the Internet of things because,

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Speaker 3: as I've said so many times that anyone that will listen,

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Speaker 3: the incentives are wrong for you.

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Speaker 2: As a consumer.

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Speaker 3: One of the reasons why the Kentucky Consumer Data Protection

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Speaker 3: Act is helpful to you as a consumer. These things

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Speaker 3: are cheap garbage, usually coming from China, possibly full of backdoors.

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Speaker 3: They're designed for speed to market, ease of use, and

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Speaker 3: market share. They don't get software updates after a certain

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Speaker 3: peri of time. People do not know how to configure

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Speaker 3: them correctly, and they're sucking up all of your data

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Speaker 3: and selling it to God knows who, leaking it, breaching it,

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Speaker 3: et cetera. Right, so I know it will be out

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Speaker 3: of time. Amazon's doorbells once again ring privacy alarms. Right,

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Speaker 3: So again reading from the thing that includes facial recognition cone,

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Speaker 3: set of ring features, and includes mobile surveillance towers that

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Speaker 3: can be deployed at parking lots in other places, and

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Speaker 3: includes an app store that's going to let people develop

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Speaker 3: even sketch your apps for the doorbell than the ones

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Speaker 3: even Amazon provides. Now again, not my commentary. This coming

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Speaker 3: from Cindy Cone, executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation,

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Speaker 3: someone that knows about this stuff. So this article covers

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Speaker 3: a bunch of other things.

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Speaker 2: I'll post it.

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Speaker 3: Get folks, stop buying this stuff. Stop buying this stuff

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Speaker 3: at least until there are laws that force these companies

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Speaker 3: to get serious about protecting your privacy and security. Otherwise

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Speaker 3: you are setting yourself up for problems.

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Speaker 1: Underscore, amen bold and underline on that. Get to linked

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Speaker 1: in id or LinkedIn dot com, LinkedIn dot com. All

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Speaker 1: you need to do is type in Dave Hatter. You

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Speaker 1: will find Dave Hatter and the stories that he refers

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Speaker 1: to here on the fifty five KC Morning Show. Very

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Speaker 1: interesting article and it just I just shake my head

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Speaker 1: and wonder why anybody thinks they need any of this

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Speaker 1: stuff day. But then again, I've been thoroughly convinced by you,

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Speaker 1: and I know my life has been fine, swimmingly decent.

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Speaker 1: Uh without this stuff my entire life. I'm not going

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Speaker 1: to add it to my list of things that I want,

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Speaker 1: or then I will not buy it either. That's why

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Speaker 1: we've got you, Dave, get more people on the same ledger.

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Speaker 1: We'll do this again next Friday. Thanks again to your company,

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Speaker 1: interest it and online at interest it dot com for

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Speaker 1: sponsoring this valuable segment. Appreciate what you do. Have a

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Speaker 1: wonderful weekend, my friend.

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Speaker 3: Always my pleasure, Brian, Thanks to you and Joe and

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Speaker 3: I look forward to chatting with you next week.

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Speaker 1: Thanks brother from the Hudson