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Speaker 1: If you've got KARC the talk station Friday. I love

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Speaker 1: this time of week Tech Friday with Dave Hatter. Such

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Speaker 1: an important segment on my program. He's doing a public

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Speaker 1: service and you know what interest it sponsors this segment

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Speaker 1: providing all this wonderful information and yeah, an ad campaign,

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Speaker 1: but it's working there. The best business courtier says, listen

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Speaker 1: for you businesses out there. Everybody's got computers. If you

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Speaker 1: need computer assistants, best practices get you out of a jam,

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Speaker 1: solving your problems in trust dot com. They're the best

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Speaker 1: game in the business. And God bless you Dave Hatter

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Speaker 1: for doing that and coming on the program and saving

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Speaker 1: us from ourselves. Welcome back, my friend, Happy Friday.

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Speaker 2: Thanks Brian.

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Speaker 3: Always good to be here, and as I always like

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Speaker 3: to say, hopefully we're doing some good out there.

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Speaker 1: You are. People can choose to disregard you, man, but

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Speaker 1: they do it at their own peril. Real quick here,

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Speaker 1: Dick Durbin, Dick got it was a victim of AI

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Speaker 1: making himself look like an idiot. He pulled up a

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Speaker 1: doctored AI doctored photo of the Alex preddy man who

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Speaker 1: got shot by Border patrol agents. Whoops, Oh yeah, there

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Speaker 1: is no head on that agent. It was an enhanced

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Speaker 1: image from a very greeny video footage that looks crystal

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Speaker 1: clear like I got taken with a high def camera,

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Speaker 1: and he thought it was wise to bring that one

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Speaker 1: out to show how bad the agent's acted. And of

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Speaker 1: course it was a source of much embarrassment. I'm sure

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Speaker 1: somebody lost their job over sending Dick out into the

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Speaker 1: world to that photo. But that's an example of artificial intelligence,

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Speaker 1: not that it has anything to do with the first

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Speaker 1: topic AI image geolocation. What is that and why is

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Speaker 1: it now easier than before?

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Speaker 3: Dave Hatter so Brian in the past talked about metadata

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Speaker 3: and in particular EXF data in photos. Most modern cameras,

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Speaker 3: probably every modern digital camera, I can't say for sure every,

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Speaker 3: but most have the capability to stamp data. Metadata data

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Speaker 3: you don't see into a picture. So behind the scenes

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Speaker 3: in your photos there's data that would tell you, like

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Speaker 3: the GPS coordinates where it was taken, and various other

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Speaker 3: data that describes the picture. When you hear nerd like

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Speaker 3: me say, metadata, metadata is essentially data that describes other data.

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Speaker 3: So if you've ever dug into like a word file

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Speaker 3: or an Excel document, there's metadata in there that will

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Speaker 3: tell you that it's an Excel file, when it was created,

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Speaker 3: who created it, that sort of thing, right, So a

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Speaker 3: lot of times people don't realize this metadata exists, and

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Speaker 3: they get themselves in trouble because they don't know what's

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Speaker 3: there and they think they're doing something that's untrackable or whatever.

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Speaker 3: There's a famous story of a hacker who was taunting

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Speaker 3: the FBI. He knew about metadata. He would post pictures

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Speaker 3: where the exif data was removed, and one time slipped

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Speaker 3: up posted a picture where he forgot to remove the

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Speaker 3: exif data, which included the location the geo coordinates of

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Speaker 3: where that picture was taken, and they eventually caught him

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Speaker 3: as a result. So this idea of being able to

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Speaker 3: take a photo and then use the metadata to figure

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Speaker 3: out where it came from as not new. However, this

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Speaker 3: article is basically pointing out that now AI can take

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Speaker 3: a photo even without the meta data. Okay, look at

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Speaker 3: the photo itself, and you know, using things like databases,

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Speaker 3: Google Earth, things like that, figure out where that photo

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Speaker 3: was taken.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 3: So again, even if you are savvy and you understand

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Speaker 3: things like metadata, stripping it out is not necessarily a

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Speaker 3: guarantee that these newer AI tools wouldn't be able to

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Speaker 3: identify where that photo was taken.

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Speaker 1: When they say it's just like facial recognition, there's enough

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Speaker 1: information photographs of the globe out there that they can

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Speaker 1: match whatever photograph you took, as long as it's sort

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Speaker 1: of like outdoors or something like that, or even indoors.

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Speaker 1: Multiple millions of photographs in the world, this AI program

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Speaker 1: is it can easily go through all that, scrape all

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Speaker 1: that and compare your photo with what exists in the

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Speaker 1: world and say, no, that was taken in downtown Cincinnati, right,

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Speaker 1: I mean that kind of thing.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, here's here's an example.

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Speaker 3: So there's a picture an anchor, a very large anchor,

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Speaker 3: probably from like a freighter or battleship or something, propped

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Speaker 3: up on a street and all you see really is

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Speaker 3: the anchor and a cobblestone street and a stone.

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Speaker 2: Building behind it.

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Speaker 3: I mean, there's no way I could look at this

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Speaker 3: and even begin to guess where this was taken. And

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Speaker 3: apparently it's from Helsinki, Finland, And they said in the

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Speaker 3: article tool the tool identified this, though it also might

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Speaker 3: be in other locations. Still this is amazingly impressive because

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Speaker 3: there's been a little go off. So you know, basically

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Speaker 3: they give you some tips here again, if you're going

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Speaker 3: to post photos online, turn off the location access on

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Speaker 3: your camera, strip actif data. Don't post pictures of your kids,

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Speaker 3: don't post pictures of your house or landscape. You know,

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Speaker 3: don't post things publicly. But remember this idea of privacy.

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Speaker 3: Once you post something, Right if you and I are friends, Brian,

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Speaker 3: and you post something it's only for your friends, Well,

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Speaker 3: once it's on my screen, I can take it, I

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Speaker 3: can potentially reshare it, I can take a screenshot of it.

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Speaker 3: You can't really stop me from doing whatever I want

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Speaker 3: with at that point. So that's not a great tip

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Speaker 3: in my mind. But the point they're making here is,

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Speaker 3: you know, and it's the point I'm trying to make

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Speaker 3: all the time. I'm not saying you should never post

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Speaker 3: anything online. I'm saying you should think about your digital footprint.

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Speaker 3: And as this technology progresses, you know, if someone were

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Speaker 3: stalking you, for example, now, even posting an image where

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Speaker 3: you know enough to strip out the exit data might

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Speaker 3: not be enough to prevent someone from using these kinds

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Speaker 3: of tools to figure out where that photo was taken

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Speaker 3: and eventually find you.

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Speaker 1: Makes sense for me to the consider Yeah, it's always

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Speaker 1: something to consider anything you post anything online anymore. Wow,

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Speaker 1: I don't view this as a good road we're going

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Speaker 1: on or going down. Dave, It really really it frightens

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Speaker 1: me more and more every day considering the forms of

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Speaker 1: abuse that AI is coming or the ability to abuse

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Speaker 1: of AI is coming up. With Dave hadd we're gonna

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Speaker 1: talk about his sixty one fib KCD talk station tech

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Speaker 1: part of the Dave Hatter introst it dot com and LinkedIn.

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Speaker 1: I guess in the next segment we're going to be

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Speaker 1: talking a little bit about LinkedIn day. That's your favorite

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Speaker 1: platform to put up information that you talk about here

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Speaker 1: in the morning show and throughout the week and just

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Speaker 1: search for Dave hat or on LinkedIn. But in the meantime,

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Speaker 1: check out the Northern Kentucky Tribune op ed piece by

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Speaker 1: the Man The Myths Legend Data January twenty first, Dave Hatter,

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Speaker 1: How Kentuckians can you use State Consumer Data Protection Act?

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Speaker 2: Dave?

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Speaker 1: What's this all about?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, Brian, So, Kentucky passd a Consumer Data Protection Act

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Speaker 3: that gives you some rights as a consumer to protect

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Speaker 3: your privacy from these data brokers and so forth that

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Speaker 3: are constantly buying and selling your data. And while it's

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Speaker 3: not a perfect law there, we're one of about twenty states.

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Speaker 2: That have a law.

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Speaker 3: Now, I don't think Ohio's gotten there yet, So for

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Speaker 3: all my friends in Ohio, you might want to reach

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Speaker 3: out to your legislators and tell them to take a

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Speaker 3: look at Kentucky's law. Again, they are about twenty states

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Speaker 3: that have done this, And as a reminder, there is

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Speaker 3: no FED privacy law at this point, So the best

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Speaker 3: you can hope for is some sort of state law

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Speaker 3: that would give you some protections as a consumer and

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Speaker 3: ideally incentivize businesses that are collecting your data to take

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Speaker 3: it seriously, protect it, that sort of thing. But this

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Speaker 3: law went into effect in January, and Kentucky, like I said,

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Speaker 3: it's not perfect.

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Speaker 2: It doesn't have a private right of action.

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Speaker 3: If you believe that you have been harmed under the

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Speaker 3: provisions of the law, you have to go to the

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Speaker 3: Kentucky Attorney General's office. They're the only ones that can

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Speaker 3: currently enforce this. But it does have some teeth. Businesses

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Speaker 3: can be penalized pretty substantially, depending on the type of business,

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Speaker 3: size of business, the amount of day to day collect

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Speaker 3: things like that. But what I was shooting for here,

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Speaker 3: because I did a different piece just trying to explain

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Speaker 3: the law so people would know about it. What I

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Speaker 3: tried to explain here is as a consumer in Kentucky,

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Speaker 3: and I'm going to try to put something together. So

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Speaker 3: business is doing business in Kentucky, understand how this will

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Speaker 3: apply to them, and hopefully start to take action to

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Speaker 3: not become someone who ends up in trouble because they

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Speaker 3: did not do the right things. But basically, this gives

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Speaker 3: you the opportunity to go to a company that you

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Speaker 3: believe is collected your data.

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Speaker 2: Now, this is not easy, Brian. This is one of

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Speaker 2: the tricks. Right.

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Speaker 3: You got to go to their website. You got to

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Speaker 3: find that their privacy policy or whatever, or how you

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Speaker 3: would contact them and say, you know, you have to

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Speaker 3: turn over your data to me. You know, you might

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Speaker 3: look for things like private privacy rights, data subject requests,

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Speaker 3: that sort of thing. Right, you got to submit a request.

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Speaker 3: You have to say, hey, I want you and I've

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Speaker 3: got some sample language in here. For example, please confirm

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Speaker 3: whether you are processing my personal data provide access to

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Speaker 3: all personal data associated with my account, including identifiers, browsing history,

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Speaker 3: location data in any inferences. Right, and then basically you

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Speaker 3: should get a report and you can look at that report,

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Speaker 3: and then you can do things like say, well this

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Speaker 3: is wrong, I want you to correct that. You can

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Speaker 3: request the LEAs of personal data collected directly from you.

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Speaker 3: And that's one of the things that makes this less ideal.

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Speaker 3: If they if they've bought it from someone else, well

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Speaker 3: that wasn't collected directly from you, so you can't they

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Speaker 3: won't have to delete that necessarily.

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Speaker 2: Right.

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Speaker 3: So again, there are some things where this could be better,

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Speaker 3: but even for people who've complained about it, my answer is, well,

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Speaker 3: it's way better than what we had before. The law

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Speaker 3: was passed in January twenty four and again went into

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Speaker 3: effect in January of this year. It was actually was

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Speaker 3: passed in twenty four, not January, went into effect this year.

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Speaker 2: It's way better than nothing.

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Speaker 3: It does give you, again, some rights as a consumer

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Speaker 3: to see what companies have to request, collect corrections, to

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Speaker 3: request deletions, to ask for the data so you could

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Speaker 3: take it somewhere else. And you know, I'm hoping that

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Speaker 3: this will just be a first step towards tightening this

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Speaker 3: up over time, you know, and giving businesses a chance

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Speaker 3: to understand this and start to implement practices to secure

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Speaker 3: your data, protect your data, store less data, and for

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Speaker 3: you as a consumer, that's all the wind. So again,

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Speaker 3: if you live in Kentucky, go read this op ed.

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Speaker 3: I've posted it several times in my social media LinkedIn acts,

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Speaker 3: et cetera. I'll post it again as part of the

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Speaker 3: notes for this and then you know, start to take

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Speaker 3: action to try.

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Speaker 2: To unwind some of the stuff.

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Speaker 3: I also talk about, like trying to do a personal

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Speaker 3: privacy audit. And you know, I've written some articles on

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Speaker 3: this kind of thing before, got some tips out there,

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Speaker 3: links to tools that I use, so you.

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Speaker 2: Know, ultimately this is it.

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Speaker 3: And also this week is Data Privacy Month, so this

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Speaker 3: is a great time to start thinking about your privacy,

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Speaker 3: clean up your digital footprint, and if you live in Kentucky,

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Speaker 3: start to use this law to unwind some of this stuff.

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Speaker 1: All right, Well, at the risk of going down some

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Speaker 1: rabbit hole, which I don't want to do. I'm just

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Speaker 1: I'm trying to process how complicated.

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Speaker 2: This is going to be. It's going to be complished.

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Speaker 1: Okay, let's say I interact with City Bank or something like,

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Speaker 1: I purposefully intend go to a website, right, I give

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Speaker 1: them my log in information, my name, they got my

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Speaker 1: credit card number, whatever. So I exchanged information with them.

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Speaker 1: I can say, hey, City Bank, what are you collecting

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Speaker 1: about me? What do you have internally related to me?

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Speaker 1: That makes sense, It's an easy ask. But lots of

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Speaker 1: businesses out there have people within the company that are

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Speaker 1: using other forms of let's say artificial apps.

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Speaker 2: Right.

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Speaker 1: Let's say within the working model of any given business,

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Speaker 1: they use information you provided them through some app created

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Speaker 1: by a third party. Now do they have to let

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Speaker 1: you know that what they're using involves a third party app?

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Speaker 1: Because that app, as you pointed out, may very well

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Speaker 1: be collecting your information, perhaps even unbeknownst to the company

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Speaker 1: that I'm asking for data from.

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Speaker 3: So the law has some exemptions for organizations and agencies

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Speaker 3: that would not be subject to this, for example, nonprofits,

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Speaker 3: higher education, state and local government agencies, businesses regulated under

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Speaker 3: federal laws like HIPPA and Graham leads Filey Act. So

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Speaker 3: not every business is subject this. But as I understand it,

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Speaker 3: I'm not an attorney. As I understand it, Yes, if

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Speaker 3: you don't fall into one of the exemptions. As someone

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Speaker 3: requests this information from you, you must turn it over.

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Speaker 1: Okay, if that's the answer, that's the answer, and I'm

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Speaker 1: comfortable with that. I'm just again a compliance with this

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Speaker 1: from the recip or by the recipient of the request.

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Speaker 1: That's you're gonna have to put a lot of faith

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Speaker 1: in them that they're actually looking for all of the

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Speaker 1: records that might apply to your request. This is something

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Speaker 1: a litigation attorneys have to deal with all the time.

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Speaker 1: Six forty seven, we're going to hear about well hackers

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Speaker 1: using day's favorite platform to the talk station. Six you

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Speaker 1: want if you buy KRCD talk station Byan Thomas with

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Speaker 1: Dave had Or doing Tech Friday intrust it dot com.

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Speaker 1: So your favorite platform has got a problem, Dave hat

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Speaker 1: Or what's the story here with pcgamer dot COM's Jane

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Speaker 1: Bentley bringing this to our attention.

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Speaker 3: Well, it isn't a LinkedIn problem, It's a file sharing

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Speaker 3: problem on any social media platform.

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Speaker 2: So the point she's.

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Speaker 3: Making here is hackers pretending to be a recruiter, as

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Speaker 3: one example, might go on LinkedIn and say hey, I

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Speaker 3: looked at your profile. You look like a great fit

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Speaker 3: for this job, fill out this application. Right, they're using

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Speaker 3: the messaging, so let me take a step back LinkedIn.

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Speaker 3: And for folks who haven't used LinkedIn, if you've used Facebook,

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Speaker 3: think of Facebook Messenger right now. I try to avoid

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Speaker 3: ever using Facebook Messenger. Don't send me messages on Facebook

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Speaker 3: Messenger because I probably won't see him for the next

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Speaker 3: six months.

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Speaker 2: I don't even look at it.

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Speaker 3: Okay, but Messenger is a way for you to send

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Speaker 3: a direct message to someone rather than make a post

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Speaker 3: that potentially everyone can see. It's a one to one

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Speaker 3: message or possibly a group message.

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Speaker 1: Right, every morning I get a whole bunch of them.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, same thing as a direct message on X Right,

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Speaker 3: it's a message between two people generally, so LinkedIn has

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Speaker 3: that same capability. You can go on LinkedIn and send

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Speaker 3: a message to someone. I use this all the time.

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Speaker 3: I get messages all the time, usually people trying to

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Speaker 3: sell me something. But again, someone can pretend to be

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Speaker 3: a recruiter and they send you a file. So in

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Speaker 3: addition to just typing a message in there, you can

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Speaker 3: send someone a link, but you can also attach a file,

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Speaker 3: so a word documented PDF, whatever. And they're pointing out

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Speaker 3: that you know people on LinkedIn are often looking for jobs,

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Speaker 3: looking for their next opportunity. It's not unusual to have

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Speaker 3: a legitimate recruiter reach out to you. But bad guys

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Speaker 3: understand this and are increasingly using LinkedIn, especially for people

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Speaker 3: looking for jobs, as a way to defraud them. And

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Speaker 3: what she's pointing out in this article, And again, I

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Speaker 3: want to be clear, Brian, this could happen to you

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Speaker 3: on anywhere. Someone can send you a file. Right in

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Speaker 3: the old days, this will primarily be email. I send

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Speaker 3: you an email, It's got an attachment. The attachment is

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Speaker 3: some kind of malware, virus, keystrokelog or whatever. Well, the

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Speaker 3: bad guys are smart. They go where people are. They

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Speaker 3: know that many folks don't really think. Well, wait a minute.

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Speaker 3: If someone can send me a file through Facebook, X, TikTok, Pinterest, LinkedIn, whatever,

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Speaker 3: that file could be malicious, just like it could if

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Speaker 3: I got it via email, or just like it could

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Speaker 3: if I went to a website and downloaded it. Right,

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Speaker 3: the file itself contains malicious content, a virus, if you will.

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Speaker 1: Well, this comes as no surprise to me given all

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Speaker 1: the times you've told us about other platforms. I mean,

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Speaker 1: that's why I don't open text messages that had links

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Speaker 1: to them. You know, I don't never open the link

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Speaker 1: because of your warnings. This sounds to me like no

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Speaker 1: different from that, So I'm asking this comes as a surprise.

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Speaker 3: It's no different at all. It's just that they're now

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Speaker 3: exploiting social media platforms and LinkedIn in particular, and they're

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Speaker 3: using social engineering, right the idea of it, Yes, here's

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Speaker 3: a job, here's a job. Click this form, open this

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Speaker 3: form and fill it out or something like that, which

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Speaker 3: then infects your computer with a virus potentially.

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Speaker 1: Well, I get all that.

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Speaker 2: I guess.

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Speaker 1: Part of me wants to say, how many true genuine

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Speaker 1: employers go out there and scan through LinkedIn profiles looking

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Speaker 1: for someone who fits the bill for the open spot

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Speaker 1: as opposed to posting a position open and having real

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Speaker 1: people respond.

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Speaker 3: I would say most they have recruiters, and their recruiters

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Speaker 3: are using LinkedIn to find people that fit their really

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Speaker 3: do it all the time?

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Speaker 1: Oh wow? Well, see, I'm not in business. What the

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Speaker 1: hell does Thomas know? So at least you answer my question,

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Speaker 1: So that does happen?

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Speaker 2: So?

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Speaker 3: So, yeah, if you're a recruiter, one of the best

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Speaker 3: ways to find people that would potentially fill an open

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Speaker 3: position is to use a tool like LinkedIn and say, well,

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Speaker 3: they have the right education, they have the right experience,

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Speaker 3: they have the right training. This is someone I want

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Speaker 3: to talk to and direct message. The message feature of

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Speaker 3: LinkedIn would be a way to get to them directly.

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Speaker 2: All right, Well, again, how does this?

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Speaker 1: How does one discern whether that is a real, genuine

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Speaker 1: tax with real genuine recruiter or somebody trying to rip

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Speaker 1: them off.

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Speaker 3: Well, that is an excellent question, and I would say

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Speaker 3: there is no one hundred percent guaranteed way to do it,

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Speaker 3: because the bad guys will go in and set up

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Speaker 3: a fake profile. They make it look realistic, they look

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Speaker 3: like they work at a real company. They you know,

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Speaker 3: they probably have. They've created activity make themselves look legitimate, right,

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Speaker 3: because it's easy to do.

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Speaker 2: So.

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Speaker 3: My advice to you would be if you have someone

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Speaker 3: reach out to you in an unsolicited way on any

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Speaker 3: of these platforms, but linked In particularly, and especially if

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Speaker 3: it's you're out of a job and you're looking for

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Speaker 3: a job. It's an offer, you know, all the stuff Brian,

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Speaker 3: too good to be true, whatever, you should be highly

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Speaker 3: skeptical of it, and you should do everything possible to

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Speaker 3: confirm that that is a real, real, legitimate thing before

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Speaker 3: you click that file. I'm not saying don't interact with

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Speaker 3: the person necessarily, but I'm saying, like, look at their profile,

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Speaker 3: try to confirm that they're real, Do they have other activity?

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Speaker 3: Can you confirm anything? But don't open the file until

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Speaker 3: you have a high, high level of certainty, and certainly

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Speaker 3: if you don't have any kind of antivirus, don't open it.

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Speaker 3: But even then, it's a risky proposition to open any

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Speaker 3: file someone sends you that you weren't expecting and did

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Speaker 3: not ask for.

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Speaker 1: Exclamation point. Dave atorinterest dot com. Appreciate what you do

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Speaker 1: every week on the program. I'll look forward to another

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Speaker 1: talk with you next Friday. In the meantime, you guys at Intrust,

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Speaker 1: I have a great week and thanks again. It's six

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Speaker 1: fifty seven and fifty five.

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Speaker 2: Care