1 00:00:00,360 --> 00:00:02,800 Speaker 1: I'm out doing my kennels right now, and my dogs 2 00:00:02,800 --> 00:00:05,080 Speaker 1: say hello because they do not want to hear a 3 00:00:05,160 --> 00:00:07,600 Speaker 1: Kamela catle have a great day. 4 00:00:08,560 --> 00:00:12,880 Speaker 2: Wow, you don't know how close you were. That talkback 5 00:00:13,039 --> 00:00:14,760 Speaker 2: was just left a few minutes. 6 00:00:15,200 --> 00:00:17,799 Speaker 3: Really, maybe we should remind this audience that if we 7 00:00:17,840 --> 00:00:21,520 Speaker 3: don't get talkbacks at the beginning of an hour, that 8 00:00:21,960 --> 00:00:24,200 Speaker 3: there will be the Kamala cackle. 9 00:00:24,280 --> 00:00:26,360 Speaker 2: There is punishment, Yes, there is punishment. 10 00:00:26,440 --> 00:00:29,800 Speaker 3: So we we're a little dictators, is what we are. 11 00:00:29,920 --> 00:00:31,680 Speaker 3: We hold up our end of the bargain. You just 12 00:00:31,680 --> 00:00:35,200 Speaker 3: have that's right, but I do. I did enjoy the dogs. 13 00:00:35,280 --> 00:00:37,320 Speaker 3: How many dogs do you think there were? There? Weren't 14 00:00:37,320 --> 00:00:40,040 Speaker 3: that kennel right there? There had to be that. I'm 15 00:00:40,040 --> 00:00:41,600 Speaker 3: guessing eight to ten dogs. 16 00:00:41,640 --> 00:00:44,120 Speaker 2: I think I heard three, so I don't know how 17 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:47,640 Speaker 2: many more there were, but you know, yeah, yeah. 18 00:00:47,159 --> 00:00:48,919 Speaker 3: And I wonder if those were all her dogs? Does 19 00:00:48,960 --> 00:00:51,360 Speaker 3: she mean, like, does she have a kennel runs a 20 00:00:51,440 --> 00:00:55,120 Speaker 3: kennel right? Or were those all her dogs? You know? 21 00:00:55,160 --> 00:00:58,320 Speaker 3: One time I had we had three Saint Renards. 22 00:00:58,680 --> 00:01:00,840 Speaker 2: What's the proper number of dogs? How many dogs? Are 23 00:01:00,880 --> 00:01:01,720 Speaker 2: too many dogs? 24 00:01:02,040 --> 00:01:05,840 Speaker 3: Three Saint Bernards are too many dogs? Yeah? Two two's okay. 25 00:01:06,160 --> 00:01:10,800 Speaker 3: Two Liamburger's were okay. Three Saint Bernard's was over the top. Yeah, 26 00:01:10,840 --> 00:01:13,319 Speaker 3: it was a little difficult. Now, don't get me wrong. 27 00:01:13,360 --> 00:01:17,400 Speaker 3: If they were fine and they attracted a lot of attention, 28 00:01:17,680 --> 00:01:18,440 Speaker 3: but it was. 29 00:01:18,480 --> 00:01:22,640 Speaker 2: Like, uh, textas three textas Mike or Michael at three 30 00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:27,240 Speaker 2: three one o three see one zero very good, very good. 31 00:01:27,360 --> 00:01:29,560 Speaker 2: It just doesn't sound right, it doesn't feel right. Three 32 00:01:29,640 --> 00:01:32,160 Speaker 2: three one oh three Mike or Michael? And let us 33 00:01:32,200 --> 00:01:33,800 Speaker 2: know how many dogs are? Too many dogs? 34 00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:35,880 Speaker 3: What's the area code where we're sitting right now? What 35 00:01:35,880 --> 00:01:40,760 Speaker 3: what's the area code for? You know, an area code? 36 00:01:40,840 --> 00:01:41,040 Speaker 1: What? 37 00:01:41,040 --> 00:01:42,400 Speaker 3: What's the area code for? 38 00:01:42,640 --> 00:01:42,680 Speaker 1: What? 39 00:01:42,880 --> 00:01:47,680 Speaker 3: What? What's the primary first area code for Colorado? Three three? Nope, 40 00:01:47,800 --> 00:01:50,919 Speaker 3: it's three zero three seven two oh three zero three 41 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:53,920 Speaker 3: seven two zero seven seven? What you got that one? Right? 42 00:01:55,040 --> 00:01:58,280 Speaker 3: Got that one right? K zero is as I recall, 43 00:01:58,640 --> 00:02:00,080 Speaker 3: you're a lousy speller, right. 44 00:02:00,240 --> 00:02:00,600 Speaker 2: Very much? 45 00:02:00,680 --> 00:02:06,680 Speaker 3: So, uh spell the word uh specific? 46 00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:10,760 Speaker 2: Oh goodness specific s P E C I F I 47 00:02:11,040 --> 00:02:12,360 Speaker 2: C very good. 48 00:02:12,560 --> 00:02:18,480 Speaker 3: Really yeah, that's absolutely correct. But let's say this would 49 00:02:18,480 --> 00:02:22,320 Speaker 3: be easier for people to picture speedial the word federal. 50 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:26,840 Speaker 2: H uh F E D E R A L yeah, yeah, 51 00:02:26,960 --> 00:02:27,480 Speaker 2: two for two. 52 00:02:27,560 --> 00:02:30,959 Speaker 3: But you could have spelled f E D E r 53 00:02:31,240 --> 00:02:34,840 Speaker 3: l E federal, or you could have in place of 54 00:02:34,960 --> 00:02:38,560 Speaker 3: the A, you could have put a little tendall or something, 55 00:02:39,240 --> 00:02:42,440 Speaker 3: a symbol, a dollar sign something, or maybe instead of 56 00:02:42,440 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 3: an A, you could have put the at sign. Sure. 57 00:02:44,840 --> 00:02:46,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, as the kids do these days. 58 00:02:46,960 --> 00:02:49,880 Speaker 3: Yeah, as all the kids do, and also as federal 59 00:02:49,919 --> 00:02:54,600 Speaker 3: bureaucrats do. Wait, but yes, yes. When I first went 60 00:02:54,639 --> 00:02:58,440 Speaker 3: to d C as the general counsel at FEMA, I yeah, 61 00:02:58,440 --> 00:03:00,280 Speaker 3: I sat down with all the lawyers and and we 62 00:03:00,400 --> 00:03:03,040 Speaker 3: had you know, it's like a giant law firm. Every 63 00:03:03,040 --> 00:03:06,080 Speaker 3: agency and department has like a giant law firm. And 64 00:03:06,160 --> 00:03:10,720 Speaker 3: there are lawyers that deal with program issues. There are 65 00:03:10,800 --> 00:03:13,480 Speaker 3: lawyers that deal with legislative issues. There are lawyers that 66 00:03:13,520 --> 00:03:16,560 Speaker 3: deal with the cod to federal regulations, you know, and 67 00:03:16,560 --> 00:03:19,639 Speaker 3: all the regulations and policies and rules. There. There are 68 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:23,399 Speaker 3: lawyers that deal with nothing but Freedom of Information Act requests. 69 00:03:23,760 --> 00:03:26,120 Speaker 3: So you have, oh, then you have civil cases, you 70 00:03:26,120 --> 00:03:28,560 Speaker 3: have criminal cases. You have lawyers that deal with these 71 00:03:28,680 --> 00:03:31,720 Speaker 3: inspector general So it's like a giant law firm and 72 00:03:31,760 --> 00:03:35,160 Speaker 3: you have all these different specialties in it. And one 73 00:03:35,160 --> 00:03:37,320 Speaker 3: of the ones that caught my attention at the very 74 00:03:37,360 --> 00:03:40,720 Speaker 3: beginning as I sat down. You know, because when you 75 00:03:40,760 --> 00:03:43,760 Speaker 3: first go, as I've explained earlier, when you first show up, 76 00:03:44,160 --> 00:03:48,400 Speaker 3: it's you're there as a consultant until your nomination. You know, 77 00:03:48,640 --> 00:03:51,520 Speaker 3: depending on whether you're going through a Senate confirmation or 78 00:03:51,600 --> 00:03:54,400 Speaker 3: just a presidential appointment, you really get hired as a 79 00:03:54,400 --> 00:03:56,880 Speaker 3: consultant initially, so you can at least dig in and 80 00:03:56,920 --> 00:03:59,320 Speaker 3: start trying to figure out what's going on. So my 81 00:03:59,400 --> 00:04:02,720 Speaker 3: first meeting with this, with this batchel of lawyers, and 82 00:04:02,760 --> 00:04:04,400 Speaker 3: by the way, I'm not really quite sure what you 83 00:04:04,400 --> 00:04:07,960 Speaker 3: would call a batch of lawyers, a herd of lawyers, 84 00:04:08,680 --> 00:04:11,160 Speaker 3: a gaggle of lawyers. I'm not sure you know, pain 85 00:04:11,920 --> 00:04:15,560 Speaker 3: of lawyer. Careful, careful, what pain in the of lawyers 86 00:04:16,839 --> 00:04:20,839 Speaker 3: could be? Could be? Yeah, but you know, hemorrhoids of lawyers. 87 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:23,719 Speaker 3: You can there, you go, that's it, Yes, a hemorrhoid 88 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:26,240 Speaker 3: of lawyers. That's what. That's what you call a gaggle 89 00:04:26,440 --> 00:04:29,320 Speaker 3: of lawyers. And I'm going through in there, each explaining 90 00:04:29,360 --> 00:04:32,400 Speaker 3: to me, you know, like well, one person for each 91 00:04:32,400 --> 00:04:34,560 Speaker 3: of the divisions would explained to me what they were doing. 92 00:04:34,960 --> 00:04:38,599 Speaker 3: And I get to the Freedom of Information Division, and 93 00:04:39,040 --> 00:04:41,800 Speaker 3: they're talking to me about, you know, their procedures, what 94 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:44,920 Speaker 3: they do. And I ask a very simple question, what's 95 00:04:44,960 --> 00:04:49,839 Speaker 3: the backlog? What the backlog? I'm responding to requests for 96 00:04:50,000 --> 00:04:53,719 Speaker 3: information from? No, because remember DHS did not exist at 97 00:04:53,760 --> 00:04:56,560 Speaker 3: the time, it was only FEMA. So what what what 98 00:04:56,760 --> 00:05:01,120 Speaker 3: are what is the backlog? What is the backlaw? And 99 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:04,200 Speaker 3: I don't remember the number, but it was astonishing. I 100 00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:08,400 Speaker 3: don't know, say a thousand, So out of out of 101 00:05:09,160 --> 00:05:13,640 Speaker 3: two thousand requests, you're a thousand behind. What's the oldest, 102 00:05:13,640 --> 00:05:17,240 Speaker 3: Well maybe maybe nine months, Maybe might be a year 103 00:05:17,279 --> 00:05:19,560 Speaker 3: that there, there might be one in there a year. Well, 104 00:05:20,320 --> 00:05:24,599 Speaker 3: don't you know. Can't you explain to me what number 105 00:05:24,680 --> 00:05:27,479 Speaker 3: the number is and what the backlog? No, we'd have 106 00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:30,839 Speaker 3: to go look at that. Well don't you think you 107 00:05:30,839 --> 00:05:34,400 Speaker 3: would have wanted to explain to the General Council exactly? 108 00:05:34,640 --> 00:05:38,000 Speaker 3: You know? How many you know? Give me some stats, 109 00:05:38,360 --> 00:05:40,880 Speaker 3: Give me some stats about how many do you get? 110 00:05:40,920 --> 00:05:43,159 Speaker 3: How long does it take you to respond? What's your average? 111 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:47,039 Speaker 3: What's the longest, what's the shortest? What is the greatest 112 00:05:47,120 --> 00:05:49,960 Speaker 3: number that come from say Congress, or come from citizens, 113 00:05:50,040 --> 00:05:52,560 Speaker 3: or come from another department or just some from N 114 00:05:52,640 --> 00:05:55,080 Speaker 3: G O or whatever. They couldn't They couldn't tell me 115 00:05:55,080 --> 00:05:58,520 Speaker 3: squat about it. Why do I talk about the spelling 116 00:05:59,279 --> 00:06:04,760 Speaker 3: because a single letter s E d E r at 117 00:06:04,800 --> 00:06:09,840 Speaker 3: sign l amber sign or you can put an amber 118 00:06:09,920 --> 00:06:12,360 Speaker 3: sand in there too. But the app the apt symbol 119 00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:17,640 Speaker 3: that can hide a scandal. For example, take Eco health. 120 00:06:18,520 --> 00:06:20,800 Speaker 3: You remember Eco Health, the ones that were doing the 121 00:06:20,800 --> 00:06:24,359 Speaker 3: game of function study over in Muhan. Change that to 122 00:06:25,040 --> 00:06:31,360 Speaker 3: ec tendall health tendle this most wiggly lined sometimes used 123 00:06:31,400 --> 00:06:36,560 Speaker 3: for approximate, or change the word anderson a N D 124 00:06:36,720 --> 00:06:41,839 Speaker 3: E R s E N to ender s dollar sign in. 125 00:06:42,800 --> 00:06:47,240 Speaker 3: And then you know what happens the email or the 126 00:06:47,279 --> 00:06:51,240 Speaker 3: document that should surface in response to a Freedom of 127 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:58,600 Speaker 3: Information act that quietly disappears from the search results because 128 00:06:58,640 --> 00:07:01,760 Speaker 3: you're doing a word search. You're looking for the word 129 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:06,159 Speaker 3: federal fe d e r a L. But someone decided 130 00:07:06,200 --> 00:07:08,720 Speaker 3: to be really clever and in their email put fb 131 00:07:09,400 --> 00:07:16,360 Speaker 3: r at sign L. There's a name for that. It 132 00:07:16,480 --> 00:07:21,640 Speaker 3: is the protective reduction technique. It is the practice of 133 00:07:21,760 --> 00:07:26,400 Speaker 3: using pseudonyms or a deliberate misspelling, or some sort of 134 00:07:26,440 --> 00:07:30,680 Speaker 3: creative abbreviation so that you and I are kept in 135 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:37,000 Speaker 3: the dark about public business technically public but practically invisible. Yeah, 136 00:07:37,040 --> 00:07:39,600 Speaker 3: this is what they really do. This is what bureaucrats. 137 00:07:40,200 --> 00:07:43,720 Speaker 3: This is why I say that they're technically or generally overpaid, 138 00:07:44,120 --> 00:07:45,920 Speaker 3: and we could do without a lot of them. And 139 00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:48,320 Speaker 3: the ones that are there are you generally doing things 140 00:07:48,320 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 3: that are meant to design to keep you in the 141 00:07:50,640 --> 00:07:54,360 Speaker 3: dark about what's really happening. At the federal level, Congress 142 00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:58,040 Speaker 3: needs to outlaw that practice. They need to make it illegal. 143 00:07:58,360 --> 00:07:59,880 Speaker 3: In fact, I would go so far as to make 144 00:07:59,920 --> 00:08:03,920 Speaker 3: it a crime subject to removal from your position if 145 00:08:03,920 --> 00:08:07,280 Speaker 3: you engage in that activity. Now, I know that a 146 00:08:07,320 --> 00:08:09,880 Speaker 3: guy like Dryden would last about a week because he 147 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:12,200 Speaker 3: would say, you know, when he sends me emails, I 148 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:14,400 Speaker 3: have to I have a person at home that actually 149 00:08:14,640 --> 00:08:17,360 Speaker 3: use I have a I have a Google machine or 150 00:08:17,360 --> 00:08:19,960 Speaker 3: an AI machine or something that I use to interpret 151 00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:24,880 Speaker 3: Dragon's emails for me because he can't spell worth But this. 152 00:08:24,840 --> 00:08:27,520 Speaker 2: Is even worse than just bad spelling. If they're putting 153 00:08:27,560 --> 00:08:30,080 Speaker 2: the AT symbol or dollar signs in, or you know, 154 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:34,000 Speaker 2: the hashtag pound symbol, that that's even worse. Yeah, I 155 00:08:34,040 --> 00:08:35,760 Speaker 2: agree with you. That should be punished. If I'm just 156 00:08:35,800 --> 00:08:39,720 Speaker 2: a bad speller. May you yell at me first, but 157 00:08:40,160 --> 00:08:42,400 Speaker 2: these other guys and think about on the. 158 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:45,680 Speaker 3: End of the person who's making the follier request. So 159 00:08:45,840 --> 00:08:48,640 Speaker 3: I'm looking for these keywords. So again, let's go back 160 00:08:48,679 --> 00:08:50,800 Speaker 3: to federal. So you have you'd have to put in 161 00:08:50,920 --> 00:08:53,560 Speaker 3: every possible iteration you can think of with the word 162 00:08:53,640 --> 00:08:55,760 Speaker 3: federal in order to do it, which most people are 163 00:08:55,800 --> 00:08:58,199 Speaker 3: not going to do because you who would think that, 164 00:08:58,600 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 3: who would ever think that the federal government might be 165 00:09:02,360 --> 00:09:05,640 Speaker 3: trying to hide something from you? I know that, I 166 00:09:05,720 --> 00:09:08,520 Speaker 3: know that most people out there listening in radio land 167 00:09:08,600 --> 00:09:11,920 Speaker 3: right now, I know that the is that the you 168 00:09:11,960 --> 00:09:14,160 Speaker 3: ever so symbol for the shockface? Got it all right? 169 00:09:15,640 --> 00:09:15,800 Speaker 2: Now? 170 00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:18,199 Speaker 3: I want you to imagine the problem. So an ordinary 171 00:09:18,240 --> 00:09:22,520 Speaker 3: citizen you suspects that some powerful government official has intervened 172 00:09:22,559 --> 00:09:26,120 Speaker 3: in a case. They've intervened in some sort of case. 173 00:09:26,120 --> 00:09:28,960 Speaker 3: So you file a four your request for all emails 174 00:09:29,000 --> 00:09:34,040 Speaker 3: that mention Jonathan M. Roberts. So the agency, you know, 175 00:09:34,440 --> 00:09:38,680 Speaker 3: very carefully and dutifully searches its servers for that string 176 00:09:38,720 --> 00:09:44,360 Speaker 3: of characters that spells Jonathan M. Initial M period Roberts. 177 00:09:44,840 --> 00:09:46,880 Speaker 3: You might leave out the period sometimes too, you might 178 00:09:46,960 --> 00:09:49,840 Speaker 3: just and you might just look for Jonathan Roberts. You 179 00:09:49,920 --> 00:09:53,520 Speaker 3: might look for Jonathan capital M no period Roberts or 180 00:09:53,640 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 3: Jonathan capital M period Roberts, no records, no records. In reality, 181 00:10:00,120 --> 00:10:03,920 Speaker 3: key emails refer to Jonathan spelled with an E N 182 00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:08,160 Speaker 3: M Roberts. Now you and I might infer that this 183 00:10:08,240 --> 00:10:11,640 Speaker 3: is the same man if you're looking at it, but 184 00:10:11,720 --> 00:10:15,920 Speaker 3: a search engine doesn't do that. By simply changing two letters, 185 00:10:16,040 --> 00:10:20,280 Speaker 3: the agency has created the appearance of transparency. Oh, we looked, 186 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:22,360 Speaker 3: we sarched, and here's what we got back. We didn't 187 00:10:22,400 --> 00:10:26,120 Speaker 3: get anything, while preserving secrecy. Where it matters the most, 188 00:10:26,440 --> 00:10:30,320 Speaker 3: the record does exist. But for all practical purposes, the 189 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:35,440 Speaker 3: record does not exist. Protective redaction is not traditional redaction, 190 00:10:35,840 --> 00:10:39,480 Speaker 3: you know when an agency. You've seen these documents online 191 00:10:39,520 --> 00:10:43,720 Speaker 3: somewhere where an agency might block out someone's full name, 192 00:10:44,080 --> 00:10:47,400 Speaker 3: or they might block out their social Security number, or 193 00:10:47,400 --> 00:10:52,040 Speaker 3: they black out their the domain for their email address 194 00:10:52,160 --> 00:10:56,200 Speaker 3: or something that's personal that is not subject to a 195 00:10:56,280 --> 00:11:01,199 Speaker 3: Freedom of Information Act request. But this practice of protective 196 00:11:01,240 --> 00:11:04,400 Speaker 3: redaction keeps the name visible to any reader who already 197 00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:07,280 Speaker 3: knows what to look for, yet invisible to an algorithm 198 00:11:07,600 --> 00:11:11,280 Speaker 3: that powers for your searches, or that powers court e 199 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:16,280 Speaker 3: discovery tools, and for that matter, even the endussing systems 200 00:11:16,679 --> 00:11:21,720 Speaker 3: of the National Archives. So instead of withholding the official 201 00:11:21,840 --> 00:11:28,400 Speaker 3: just misspells, instead of redacting the official abbreviates, you might 202 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:31,840 Speaker 3: as well just shred the file. The result is the 203 00:11:31,880 --> 00:11:34,920 Speaker 3: same as a shredded file, only it's actually harder to 204 00:11:35,000 --> 00:11:40,680 Speaker 3: prove what brings all this up recent investigations of the 205 00:11:40,760 --> 00:11:43,840 Speaker 3: National Institutes of Health. Remember the good old NIH and 206 00:11:43,880 --> 00:11:46,160 Speaker 3: COVID and the shutdowns. I know you'd like to forget 207 00:11:46,160 --> 00:11:48,800 Speaker 3: about it, but I'm here. I'm here to irritate you 208 00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:51,000 Speaker 3: and to continue to remind you of things that you 209 00:11:51,080 --> 00:11:53,679 Speaker 3: want to forget about, like the shutdowns and how and 210 00:11:53,720 --> 00:11:56,160 Speaker 3: how we all, like a bunch of sheep, just said, ooh, 211 00:11:56,240 --> 00:11:58,719 Speaker 3: we're scared of this virus. Oh my gosh, we better 212 00:11:58,800 --> 00:12:01,240 Speaker 3: sit down and you know, go to the restaurant. You 213 00:12:01,280 --> 00:12:04,320 Speaker 3: go walk through the restaurant because the viruses you know 214 00:12:04,559 --> 00:12:06,839 Speaker 3: up there, So wear a mask as you walk through 215 00:12:06,840 --> 00:12:09,560 Speaker 3: the restaurant. But the virus doesn't know when you sit down. 216 00:12:09,920 --> 00:12:11,679 Speaker 3: So when you sit down to Edith's okay to take 217 00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:15,080 Speaker 3: your mask off. Jimney Chris I remember watching people in 218 00:12:15,120 --> 00:12:19,600 Speaker 3: restaurants who would keep their mask on and look, I'm nosy. 219 00:12:19,640 --> 00:12:22,200 Speaker 3: I know I'm nosy, but I couldn't stop watching them. 220 00:12:22,760 --> 00:12:24,680 Speaker 3: They lift their mask up and put a bite of 221 00:12:24,679 --> 00:12:26,640 Speaker 3: food in their mouth with the mask back down and 222 00:12:26,640 --> 00:12:29,679 Speaker 3: show it, and I thought, Wow, you're really some kind 223 00:12:29,679 --> 00:12:32,480 Speaker 3: of stupid, You're really some kind of paranoid, and you're 224 00:12:32,559 --> 00:12:35,360 Speaker 3: also some kind of person that you're precisely the kind 225 00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:39,280 Speaker 3: of citizen that an all powerful, trannical government would love 226 00:12:39,320 --> 00:12:42,000 Speaker 3: to have. Just do whatever we tell you to do. 227 00:12:43,360 --> 00:12:47,240 Speaker 3: Emails at the National Institutes of Health from David Morin's, 228 00:12:47,240 --> 00:12:51,800 Speaker 3: who's a longtime advisor, took Grandthony Fuci shows him brigging 229 00:12:51,880 --> 00:12:53,960 Speaker 3: that he had learned from their fo you lady here 230 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:57,160 Speaker 3: how to make emails disappear after I'm follied, but before 231 00:12:57,160 --> 00:13:00,480 Speaker 3: the search starts. He did that, describing how he deleted 232 00:13:00,480 --> 00:13:04,120 Speaker 3: messages and then rather than sensitive discussions to personal accounts. 233 00:13:04,880 --> 00:13:09,320 Speaker 3: There's a house oversight memo and subsequent reporting reveals that 234 00:13:09,559 --> 00:13:13,080 Speaker 3: Greg Fucker's Falci's former chief of staff at the National 235 00:13:13,080 --> 00:13:20,920 Speaker 3: Institutes of Allergies Infectious Diseases, the NIAID repeatedly wrote ec 236 00:13:21,640 --> 00:13:26,720 Speaker 3: tendal health instead of egal health, that alter the spelling 237 00:13:26,760 --> 00:13:30,880 Speaker 3: of key scientists' names, such as Christian Andersen and not 238 00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:33,480 Speaker 3: Christian like with the C, but Christian with a K, 239 00:13:34,559 --> 00:13:41,000 Speaker 3: in ways that would predictably and purposely defeat keyword searches. Now, 240 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:44,440 Speaker 3: the experts in open government describe that pattern that they've 241 00:13:44,480 --> 00:13:49,240 Speaker 3: discovered now as shocking disregard for your right of access 242 00:13:49,720 --> 00:13:53,760 Speaker 3: and quite frankly, a pattern and practice of avoiding Freedom 243 00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:59,000 Speaker 3: of Information Act requests. HM, and we're supposed to be 244 00:13:59,040 --> 00:14:02,120 Speaker 3: shocked by this. Now, I want you to understand. These 245 00:14:02,120 --> 00:14:08,000 Speaker 3: are not isolated lapses in spelling. These are adversarial misspellings 246 00:14:08,040 --> 00:14:10,839 Speaker 3: to borrow a term from the machine learning literature, from 247 00:14:10,880 --> 00:14:18,080 Speaker 3: the artificial intelligence literature. These are adversarial misspellings designed to 248 00:14:18,160 --> 00:14:23,160 Speaker 3: exploit the brittle way that computers match text. They literally 249 00:14:23,200 --> 00:14:28,720 Speaker 3: look for a literal match. Now, legal technologists have warned 250 00:14:28,760 --> 00:14:32,200 Speaker 3: that technology assisted to review and discovery. For example, for lawyers, 251 00:14:32,440 --> 00:14:37,240 Speaker 3: when they're doing discovery, that by discovery, I mean they're 252 00:14:37,240 --> 00:14:40,360 Speaker 3: doing there. You know there's they get they get a 253 00:14:40,720 --> 00:14:44,800 Speaker 3: they get a batch of documents, and the documents come 254 00:14:44,800 --> 00:14:47,440 Speaker 3: in two forms. They come in a box, so that 255 00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:49,840 Speaker 3: you know, some poor little paralegal can dict through the 256 00:14:49,840 --> 00:14:53,000 Speaker 3: boxes and see what's in there. They also come as 257 00:14:53,200 --> 00:14:57,280 Speaker 3: electronic files, and so as a lawyer's searching for the evidence, 258 00:14:57,320 --> 00:15:00,720 Speaker 3: searching through evidence, the same thing happens in law firms. 259 00:15:02,000 --> 00:15:05,040 Speaker 3: So the legal technologists are also warning us now that 260 00:15:05,160 --> 00:15:09,640 Speaker 3: technology assisted review in discovery as you're doing the research, 261 00:15:10,120 --> 00:15:13,840 Speaker 3: can also be gained by carefully introducing typos or code 262 00:15:13,880 --> 00:15:17,960 Speaker 3: words that cause the algorithms to misclassify documents or to 263 00:15:17,960 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 3: miss them entirely. Computer scientists to study. Think about this, 264 00:15:23,400 --> 00:15:27,880 Speaker 3: your computer scientists, and this is your specialty, studying adversarial 265 00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:33,640 Speaker 3: text permutations. They have found that very small semantics preserving 266 00:15:33,720 --> 00:15:38,600 Speaker 3: changes in spelling can actually degrade the performance of text classifiers, 267 00:15:38,920 --> 00:15:41,440 Speaker 3: which is exactly what full you search tools and document 268 00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:46,560 Speaker 3: review platforms are designed to do. So, bureaucrats who adopt 269 00:15:46,800 --> 00:15:51,600 Speaker 3: protective reduction, they are not innocent victims of those vulnerabilities. 270 00:15:52,280 --> 00:15:56,280 Speaker 3: They are indeed the adversaries. My point being the government 271 00:15:56,360 --> 00:16:01,960 Speaker 3: is your adversary. Now, the practice has another form, probably 272 00:16:01,960 --> 00:16:07,440 Speaker 3: more familiar, the use of full blown pseudonyms by senior 273 00:16:07,480 --> 00:16:13,320 Speaker 3: officials undertaking public business. James Comy eventually admitted that the 274 00:16:15,160 --> 00:16:21,640 Speaker 3: dot at former bu that's an account on X. It 275 00:16:21,840 --> 00:16:28,560 Speaker 3: used the display name Ryan hold Neber was actually James Comy, 276 00:16:29,600 --> 00:16:34,480 Speaker 3: and it was his habit to use that pseudonym to 277 00:16:34,840 --> 00:16:38,840 Speaker 3: post on X so people would know that it was him. 278 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:41,840 Speaker 3: It makes me. Let me just stop hearing that parenthetical. 279 00:16:43,400 --> 00:16:45,760 Speaker 3: You know, my wife's gotten into a habit of and 280 00:16:46,200 --> 00:16:49,880 Speaker 3: I don't blame her, but it drives me crazy sometimes. 281 00:16:50,440 --> 00:16:52,160 Speaker 3: Did you see this video of such and such and 282 00:16:52,200 --> 00:16:56,560 Speaker 3: sochial on Facebook or X or whatever? Like, No, why 283 00:16:56,760 --> 00:16:58,320 Speaker 3: do you think it's real? They'll show it to me. 284 00:16:58,600 --> 00:17:01,200 Speaker 3: Let me look at it. Now, that's not And so 285 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:04,959 Speaker 3: you have to start. You know, for those of you 286 00:17:05,000 --> 00:17:10,120 Speaker 3: that are new to me, but my other audience knows 287 00:17:10,160 --> 00:17:11,440 Speaker 3: that I talk about how you have to be a 288 00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:14,560 Speaker 3: discerning consumer of news. Well, now not only do you 289 00:17:14,560 --> 00:17:17,000 Speaker 3: have to be a discerning consumer of news, you have 290 00:17:17,040 --> 00:17:21,840 Speaker 3: to be a discerning consumer of info, whatever you might 291 00:17:21,920 --> 00:17:26,000 Speaker 3: see on any of these platforms. So now let's talk 292 00:17:26,000 --> 00:17:28,480 Speaker 3: about James Comy and what he was doing. 293 00:17:28,720 --> 00:17:32,159 Speaker 1: Hey, Michael, I'm just wondering what the current gooper count is. 294 00:17:33,080 --> 00:17:36,119 Speaker 1: Did you lose any goopers that couldn't find you? On 295 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:40,679 Speaker 1: the new K zero A and were you able to 296 00:17:40,720 --> 00:17:45,240 Speaker 1: gain any goobers from the old K zero A group 297 00:17:45,320 --> 00:17:48,800 Speaker 1: that found your new show. Anyway, I just want to 298 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:53,760 Speaker 1: let everybody know it's a okay on K zero A. 299 00:17:54,080 --> 00:17:56,640 Speaker 3: Yeah. In fact, we found so many new ones that 300 00:17:56,680 --> 00:17:59,600 Speaker 3: were now like a clown car and we're all just 301 00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:02,080 Speaker 3: pad ten there because we only had twelve plus the 302 00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:05,160 Speaker 3: alternate and now it's it's like up to thirty four 303 00:18:05,520 --> 00:18:08,520 Speaker 3: at an alternate. So it's really kind of Crampton here. 304 00:18:08,560 --> 00:18:10,679 Speaker 3: But you know what, I just wish some of you 305 00:18:10,680 --> 00:18:13,560 Speaker 3: would bathe because the car really kind of stinks. 306 00:18:15,040 --> 00:18:17,359 Speaker 2: You need to lay off the onions and eggs, yes, please. 307 00:18:18,040 --> 00:18:22,000 Speaker 3: And then goober number nine one sixty nine caught me. 308 00:18:22,480 --> 00:18:27,200 Speaker 3: You caught me, yep. I kept saying tendall, not till 309 00:18:27,760 --> 00:18:32,520 Speaker 3: till tilled. Yes, that's the little squiggly symbol you were 310 00:18:32,520 --> 00:18:36,679 Speaker 3: thinking of tender Actually, you know what, I don't know 311 00:18:36,680 --> 00:18:39,439 Speaker 3: what I was thinking, but when I when I read it, 312 00:18:39,520 --> 00:18:41,720 Speaker 3: the first thing I thought of was I used to 313 00:18:41,760 --> 00:18:46,320 Speaker 3: represent a state trooper whose last name was Tendall. Oh okay, yes, 314 00:18:46,680 --> 00:18:49,080 Speaker 3: represent him in a federal court case. So I don't 315 00:18:49,080 --> 00:18:52,919 Speaker 3: know what was good. Look, I've only had about a 316 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:56,240 Speaker 3: third of my diet coke this morning. So just back off. 317 00:18:56,280 --> 00:18:57,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, we're not awake yet, that's right. 318 00:18:57,800 --> 00:19:01,960 Speaker 3: Just back off. Back to the story about now, about 319 00:19:02,040 --> 00:19:10,600 Speaker 3: James Coomy, when you in internal communications, Commie would slip 320 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:17,560 Speaker 3: in deliberate misspellings of politically sensitive names, using Weener into Wiser, 321 00:19:17,640 --> 00:19:23,480 Speaker 3: or Clinton into Clinton, and Abidin as an Abdin into Abdeen. 322 00:19:24,440 --> 00:19:27,760 Speaker 3: That's a pattern that mirrored the logic of what I'm 323 00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:31,840 Speaker 3: referring to as protective redaction. That was his way of 324 00:19:31,920 --> 00:19:36,840 Speaker 3: keeping tea key terms from being easily discovered through a 325 00:19:36,880 --> 00:19:40,120 Speaker 3: full year request or an open records request or even 326 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:43,680 Speaker 3: legal discovery in a lawsuit. Now, I don't think there's 327 00:19:43,680 --> 00:19:48,800 Speaker 3: anything inherently wrong with an FBI director lurking online if 328 00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:52,879 Speaker 3: you want to use a fake account because you want to. 329 00:19:53,000 --> 00:19:57,879 Speaker 3: In fact, some people might actually have a fake account 330 00:19:58,400 --> 00:20:02,160 Speaker 3: for the very purpose of lurking online. I don't want 331 00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:05,560 Speaker 3: maybe people to know that I'm online, but when I do, 332 00:20:05,600 --> 00:20:09,760 Speaker 3: I use my real at Michael Brown USA on X which, 333 00:20:09,800 --> 00:20:11,560 Speaker 3: by the way, you should be following me on X 334 00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:15,719 Speaker 3: at Michael Brown USA. So I don't think it's inherently wrong. 335 00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:19,880 Speaker 3: For example, I was always given the opportunity that if 336 00:20:19,920 --> 00:20:23,600 Speaker 3: I wanted to have a private email address, it would 337 00:20:23,640 --> 00:20:26,679 Speaker 3: it would still be a dot gov address, but instead 338 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:30,399 Speaker 3: of you know, Michael Brown at DHS dot gov, it 339 00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:34,560 Speaker 3: might be Boso at DHS dot gov, which obviously be 340 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:37,800 Speaker 3: very appropriate. But I chose not to do that simply 341 00:20:37,840 --> 00:20:41,359 Speaker 3: because those would still be subject to foil you, and 342 00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:44,639 Speaker 3: I didn't want to get into a laxadaisical attitude about, 343 00:20:44,680 --> 00:20:48,240 Speaker 3: oh I'm emailing on a government server, I still need 344 00:20:48,280 --> 00:20:49,920 Speaker 3: to pay attention to what I'm saying, So I just 345 00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 3: didn't do it. Although lots of lots of For example, 346 00:20:53,119 --> 00:20:59,440 Speaker 3: it's fairly typical of a Cabinet secretary to have let's say, 347 00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:04,639 Speaker 3: Deliza dot Rice at white House dot gov. But also 348 00:21:04,800 --> 00:21:08,800 Speaker 3: she might have something that would be like a football 349 00:21:08,920 --> 00:21:13,000 Speaker 3: fan at white House dot gov, so that she could 350 00:21:13,119 --> 00:21:15,280 Speaker 3: email back and forth if she just didn't want to, 351 00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:17,479 Speaker 3: you know, she wanted to. She just wanted it not 352 00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:22,000 Speaker 3: to be uh in in that official capacity, even though 353 00:21:22,040 --> 00:21:26,440 Speaker 3: it's still discoverable under FOYA. So don't get me wrong, 354 00:21:26,480 --> 00:21:28,720 Speaker 3: I'm not I'm not bitching about the fact that that 355 00:21:28,840 --> 00:21:33,879 Speaker 3: James Comy is using a pseudonym to work online. But 356 00:21:34,040 --> 00:21:37,360 Speaker 3: I am if he's using that to avoid a foy 357 00:21:37,400 --> 00:21:42,440 Speaker 3: your request, because the public cannot foil you a pseudonym, 358 00:21:43,080 --> 00:21:46,280 Speaker 3: and if you subpoena a fake name in a civil suit, 359 00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:49,640 Speaker 3: well that would be an absurdity. Yet that is exactly 360 00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:52,560 Speaker 3: how James Comy chose to speak into the public square. 361 00:21:53,920 --> 00:21:56,720 Speaker 3: Joe Biden's use of aliases when he was vice president 362 00:21:57,160 --> 00:21:59,560 Speaker 3: is more troubling because he appears to have done it 363 00:21:59,840 --> 00:22:03,560 Speaker 3: and spilled directly into the realm of official communications. The 364 00:22:03,640 --> 00:22:07,960 Speaker 3: National Archives has told us that Biden, while serving as 365 00:22:08,080 --> 00:22:11,920 Speaker 3: vice president, used accounts tied to the names Robin Ware, 366 00:22:12,359 --> 00:22:19,400 Speaker 3: Robert L. Peters, Jrbware, including a PCI dot gov email 367 00:22:19,400 --> 00:22:24,679 Speaker 3: address under the Peters identity van House. Republicans and Public 368 00:22:24,720 --> 00:22:28,240 Speaker 3: Interests litigants had pointed out that some of the emails 369 00:22:28,280 --> 00:22:32,160 Speaker 3: to or from those accounts actually involved foreign policy calls, 370 00:22:32,520 --> 00:22:35,680 Speaker 3: briefings for President Obama at the time, or topics where 371 00:22:35,680 --> 00:22:40,160 Speaker 3: Biden's family business interests overlapped with his official duties, obviously Ukraine. 372 00:22:41,480 --> 00:22:45,280 Speaker 3: Whatever you think about those allegations, a basic point should 373 00:22:45,320 --> 00:22:49,679 Speaker 3: be uncontroversial. When the vice president of the United States 374 00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:53,159 Speaker 3: corresponds about public business, the emails should be under his 375 00:22:53,280 --> 00:22:56,760 Speaker 3: own legal name and accounts that are easily traceable to 376 00:22:56,840 --> 00:23:00,760 Speaker 3: that office. Nor is this purely the crid a vice 377 00:23:02,119 --> 00:23:08,320 Speaker 3: Mitt Romney now perhaps most famous as Pierre Delecto. That 378 00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:13,200 Speaker 3: was his It was his fake name, Pierre Delecto, probably 379 00:23:13,280 --> 00:23:17,080 Speaker 3: more famous as Pierre Delecto than as the twenty twelve nominee. 380 00:23:17,320 --> 00:23:20,159 Speaker 3: He admitted that he maintained a secret ex account with 381 00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:22,919 Speaker 3: that alias for years, and he used it to monitor 382 00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:27,600 Speaker 3: and sometimes respond to political commentary. Now, defenders of Romney 383 00:23:27,640 --> 00:23:29,960 Speaker 3: would say that he used it mostly to work, not 384 00:23:30,040 --> 00:23:32,959 Speaker 3: to conduct government business. And I don't know that may 385 00:23:33,040 --> 00:23:35,359 Speaker 3: or may I'll be true. I just don't know. But 386 00:23:35,480 --> 00:23:40,560 Speaker 3: the bipartisan nature of alias culture is precisely my point, 387 00:23:40,800 --> 00:23:45,400 Speaker 3: because when that is left unchecked and nobody is watching 388 00:23:45,480 --> 00:23:49,320 Speaker 3: that both parties will continue to normalize the idea that 389 00:23:49,400 --> 00:23:55,040 Speaker 3: elect officials can live a second, unaccountable life online, a 390 00:23:55,160 --> 00:23:59,240 Speaker 3: step away from a subpoena, a step removed from a 391 00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:03,720 Speaker 3: foyer request, and ordinary schmucks like you and me and 392 00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:07,160 Speaker 3: our ability to see what they're or our representatives are 393 00:24:07,200 --> 00:24:15,879 Speaker 3: saying and doing becomes pretty much worthless. H don't forget 394 00:24:16,080 --> 00:24:21,679 Speaker 3: that what you see or what you're told does not exist, 395 00:24:22,480 --> 00:24:23,840 Speaker 3: may indeed not be the truth. 396 00:24:24,160 --> 00:24:25,280 Speaker 1: It speaks volumes. 397 00:24:25,320 --> 00:24:28,920 Speaker 3: When they have to manipulate spellings of names to avoid 398 00:24:29,040 --> 00:24:35,639 Speaker 3: a FOIA requests definitely means they're hiding something. And I 399 00:24:35,680 --> 00:24:39,560 Speaker 3: want to make certain that people that all you goobers 400 00:24:39,640 --> 00:24:44,159 Speaker 3: understand that if and I use Condolleza Rice as an example, 401 00:24:44,160 --> 00:24:45,879 Speaker 3: and I don't know whether Condoleeza had Rice had a 402 00:24:45,920 --> 00:24:50,359 Speaker 3: separate alias or not, but sometimes that's a good way 403 00:24:50,400 --> 00:24:54,720 Speaker 3: to keep your inbox clean of spam, because if you 404 00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:59,800 Speaker 3: understand the naming protocol for government websites or government email 405 00:24:59,840 --> 00:25:03,600 Speaker 3: edge dresses, it's pretty easy to start spamming, say the 406 00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:07,160 Speaker 3: Secretary of Agriculture. So if the Secretary of Agriculture wants 407 00:25:07,160 --> 00:25:10,840 Speaker 3: to use an alias but conduct official business using the 408 00:25:10,920 --> 00:25:15,399 Speaker 3: alias among their federal employees or the White House or someone, 409 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,679 Speaker 3: I don't have a problem with that as long as 410 00:25:19,160 --> 00:25:23,160 Speaker 3: they stick to government business. And if there's a fuller request, 411 00:25:23,480 --> 00:25:26,400 Speaker 3: the foiler lawyers know that they should also look for 412 00:25:27,080 --> 00:25:32,280 Speaker 3: you know, Cornfield at you know dot gov, at agg 413 00:25:32,359 --> 00:25:37,240 Speaker 3: dot gov, whatever whatever the alias is. But Congress can 414 00:25:37,840 --> 00:25:42,880 Speaker 3: and Congress should close this stupid productive reduction loophole by 415 00:25:42,920 --> 00:25:50,600 Speaker 3: defining protection protective reduction as a distinct form of personnel misconduct. 416 00:25:51,359 --> 00:25:55,280 Speaker 3: You could draft a statute very very concisely, very precisely, 417 00:25:55,960 --> 00:25:58,760 Speaker 3: it would make it unlawful for anybody that's covered by 418 00:25:58,880 --> 00:26:03,879 Speaker 3: FOYA to conduc public business under an undisclosed pseudonym or 419 00:26:03,880 --> 00:26:06,840 Speaker 3: in a least account, whether that's email, a message app, 420 00:26:06,960 --> 00:26:10,840 Speaker 3: or social media. And there could be some narrow enumerated 421 00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:16,639 Speaker 3: exceptions for say, undercover or obviously classified operations. And second, 422 00:26:17,640 --> 00:26:22,879 Speaker 3: they should prohibit deliberate distortion of identifying information such as 423 00:26:23,000 --> 00:26:27,160 Speaker 3: names of persons, entities, or key organizations in any record 424 00:26:27,440 --> 00:26:30,320 Speaker 3: that is reasonably likely to be subject to fool you 425 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:34,159 Speaker 3: state open records laws or for that matter, legal discovery. 426 00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:38,680 Speaker 3: Where the purpose of a misspelling you know, the accident 427 00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:41,920 Speaker 3: you know again. I use Dragons as an example as 428 00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:45,280 Speaker 3: a lousy speller. He's if he were working for the government, 429 00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:52,280 Speaker 3: I can absolutely see him misspelling a word, although truthfully, well, 430 00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:56,199 Speaker 3: for example, pseudonym no, ain't gonna even come close to 431 00:26:56,240 --> 00:26:59,600 Speaker 3: spelling that one. But if you if you need to 432 00:26:59,600 --> 00:27:01,200 Speaker 3: start a try no. 433 00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:02,639 Speaker 2: It says with a P, not an s like it 434 00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:04,720 Speaker 2: sounds okay, that's about it, And. 435 00:27:05,440 --> 00:27:07,440 Speaker 3: Could you get the first three letters. Do you think 436 00:27:08,840 --> 00:27:12,159 Speaker 3: a ps PS is beyond that? 437 00:27:12,200 --> 00:27:17,200 Speaker 2: You don't whether it's or anything UD actually the e oh, 438 00:27:17,359 --> 00:27:18,159 Speaker 2: we see, there you go. 439 00:27:18,400 --> 00:27:20,480 Speaker 3: But my point, my point was going to be this, 440 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:22,320 Speaker 3: I think a lot of common words that that's a 441 00:27:22,640 --> 00:27:25,760 Speaker 3: very good one to use as an example of contrary 442 00:27:25,760 --> 00:27:28,040 Speaker 3: to what I'm about to say, and that is that 443 00:27:28,680 --> 00:27:35,159 Speaker 3: most of these platforms and software programs we use do 444 00:27:35,240 --> 00:27:39,160 Speaker 3: autocorrect and we'll even start to spell out the word 445 00:27:39,400 --> 00:27:42,000 Speaker 3: like it drives me nuts on text messages where you 446 00:27:42,040 --> 00:27:44,560 Speaker 3: start to type something and automatically sources to fill in. No, 447 00:27:44,720 --> 00:27:48,640 Speaker 3: that's not what I wanted to say, but there there 448 00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:51,760 Speaker 3: can be exceptions where people honestly make a mistake. 449 00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:54,240 Speaker 2: When I try and do text message, even autocorrect goes 450 00:27:54,240 --> 00:27:54,800 Speaker 2: and I don't. 451 00:27:54,600 --> 00:27:58,520 Speaker 3: Know what what you're saying, but just deliberate distortion of 452 00:27:58,560 --> 00:28:02,600 Speaker 3: information has got to stop, and there should be real 453 00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:08,320 Speaker 3: consequences for it. There's including say an evidentiary presumption against 454 00:28:08,320 --> 00:28:12,679 Speaker 3: an agency that engages in protective reduction, and then maybe 455 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:19,040 Speaker 3: personal sanctions for officials who systematically use protective reduction. And 456 00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:23,960 Speaker 3: if you take my approach that I think respects the 457 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:27,880 Speaker 3: technological reality that we live in and the constitutional limits. 458 00:28:28,240 --> 00:28:32,239 Speaker 3: I'm not trying to micromanage search algorithms and mandate that 459 00:28:32,320 --> 00:28:35,720 Speaker 3: every PDF or or that every email or anything else 460 00:28:35,840 --> 00:28:42,920 Speaker 3: be perfectly you know, optical character recognition OCR indexed. It 461 00:28:42,960 --> 00:28:49,680 Speaker 3: wouldn't criminalize honest typos or translation errors. Intent and pattern matter, 462 00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:54,280 Speaker 3: and the examples I've given you here of Comy and 463 00:28:54,360 --> 00:29:01,200 Speaker 3: Fauci and his minions was a pattern of intentional misdirection, 464 00:29:01,920 --> 00:29:07,160 Speaker 3: of intentional hiding of what's in the emails. Now, if 465 00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:10,120 Speaker 3: I'd ever discovered when I was the General counsel, or 466 00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:12,000 Speaker 3: for that matter, even when I was the under Secretary, 467 00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:15,920 Speaker 3: that people had engaged in that kind of behavior, I 468 00:29:15,920 --> 00:29:18,320 Speaker 3: would have filed complaints against them. I would have taken 469 00:29:18,600 --> 00:29:21,680 Speaker 3: personnel action against them for doing so, because I had 470 00:29:21,720 --> 00:29:24,880 Speaker 3: a real bugaboom about Foya. Not only did going back 471 00:29:24,920 --> 00:29:27,200 Speaker 3: to the very beginning of the program, not only did 472 00:29:27,200 --> 00:29:30,120 Speaker 3: I demand that the Officer General Counsel catch up on 473 00:29:30,240 --> 00:29:34,360 Speaker 3: those by bringing in some contractors to speed up the 474 00:29:34,440 --> 00:29:37,200 Speaker 3: process and get the backlog cleared out, but then I 475 00:29:37,280 --> 00:29:39,400 Speaker 3: put in our requirement. I forget what it was, but 476 00:29:39,520 --> 00:29:42,440 Speaker 3: you had ninety days to respond. And if you couldn't 477 00:29:42,480 --> 00:29:44,680 Speaker 3: respond to ninety days, you had to give the request 478 00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:47,680 Speaker 3: or a very specific reason why I was taking longer 479 00:29:47,720 --> 00:29:50,240 Speaker 3: than ninety days to respond to a folly yer request. 480 00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:53,080 Speaker 3: And you think about that was twenty years ago. Action 481 00:29:53,240 --> 00:29:55,360 Speaker 3: was more than twenty years ago because it was two 482 00:29:55,440 --> 00:30:00,320 Speaker 3: thousand and one when we officially took office. So today 483 00:30:00,720 --> 00:30:05,800 Speaker 3: there's no excuse for it. And this purposely misspelling to 484 00:30:05,960 --> 00:30:09,960 Speaker 3: hide things, and there's precedent for this kind of legislation. 485 00:30:10,920 --> 00:30:15,120 Speaker 3: Foyer itself has been amended repeatedly, often in response to 486 00:30:15,680 --> 00:30:20,840 Speaker 3: creative evasions that the agencies end up bureaucracy engages in 487 00:30:21,480 --> 00:30:24,920 Speaker 3: to clarify that electronic records are covered, that delays and 488 00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:28,000 Speaker 3: fee games are unacceptable, that court should review claims of 489 00:30:28,040 --> 00:30:31,120 Speaker 3: exemptionis de novo meaning for the first time on their own, 490 00:30:31,160 --> 00:30:35,160 Speaker 3: they can review these. And we have FOYA advisory councils, 491 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:37,160 Speaker 3: they have all sorts of things going on state. But 492 00:30:37,280 --> 00:30:44,160 Speaker 3: the deeper principle here is public access, and public access 493 00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:46,120 Speaker 3: should mean exactly that