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Speaker 1: Y I'm felling you Boston's News Radio.

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Speaker 2: All right, everyone, welcome on back as we start our

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Speaker 2: talk hours, the nine to ten and the eleven. I

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Speaker 2: want to welcome to the program a friend who I have

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Speaker 2: known for a long time. He happens to be the

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Speaker 2: chief legal officer of a company called Flock. Flock and

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Speaker 2: Flock is a company that has been subjected to a

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Speaker 2: couple of high profile stories in the last couple of months.

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Speaker 2: One of them dealt with some concerns people in Cambridge

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Speaker 2: had to the arrival of some public cameras on city

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Speaker 2: streets above city streets. And then the other story was

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Speaker 2: the way in which Flock cameras helped identify the individual

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Speaker 2: so called Brown shooter, who killed two students at Brown University,

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Speaker 2: then went to Brookline, Massachusetts, and killed a professor from

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Speaker 2: mi I T before he was found in a New

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Speaker 2: Hampshire warehouse dead of a gunshot wound. So there's lots

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Speaker 2: of positives and some people see some minuses, but I

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Speaker 2: want to talk about it with Dan Haley. Dan Haley,

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Speaker 2: welcome to Nightside.

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Speaker 3: Hi Dan, thanks for having me. It's great to talk

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Speaker 3: with you.

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Speaker 2: Well, I'll tell you this is an interesting story, because

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Speaker 2: we noticed this week, even as we speak, how much

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Speaker 2: of a reliance the police officials and public safety officials

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Speaker 2: who were searching for the mom of Savannah Guthrie and

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Speaker 2: Nancy Guthrie so far still without success. But they are

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Speaker 2: they really relying on cameras that really a part of

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Speaker 2: everyday spaces. Let's talk. Let's let's roll it back a

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Speaker 2: little bit and tell us a little bit about the

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Speaker 2: history of Flock. How did Flock as a business come

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Speaker 2: to be?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, well, very much as you just alluded to.

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Speaker 2: Dan.

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Speaker 3: The founder of the company, a guy named Garrett Langley,

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Speaker 3: experienced a crime wave in his own neighborhood and he

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Speaker 3: was somewhat shocked by the lack of actionable evidence that

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Speaker 3: the police had to try and figure out who was

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Speaker 3: breaking into homes on a regular basis. And he got

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Speaker 3: this idea that the police law enforcement ought to have

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Speaker 3: access to the most cutting edge technology available in terms

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Speaker 3: of cameras and AI. But also he recognized back then

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Speaker 3: in twenty seventeen, that this technology would be very powerful

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Speaker 3: and would become more powerful over time, and so needed

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Speaker 3: to be constrained and needed to be built in such

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Speaker 3: way is to provide for transparency in its use and

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Speaker 3: accountability in its use. And so that's what he did.

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Speaker 3: He created this this camera backed with AI enabled software

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Speaker 3: that at it simplest, the simplest way to describe it is,

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Speaker 3: as he said, these cameras sit above the roadway. They're

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Speaker 3: solar powered, and they take a photograph of every car

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Speaker 3: that passes by, and they capture the rear of the

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Speaker 3: car with the license plate that of course is you know,

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Speaker 3: that license plate is displayed by law for a very

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Speaker 3: specific reason, and that is to correlate that vehicle with

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Speaker 3: an owner. And these are photographs taken on public streets

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Speaker 3: of the car, not of the individual. The camera has

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Speaker 3: no idea who's driving the car, and those images are

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Speaker 3: then stored. Flock's default is thirty days, so the vast

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Speaker 3: majority of our images are stored for thirty day. Some

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Speaker 3: jurisdictions require shorter retention periods, a few jurisdictions require longer

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Speaker 3: retention periods, but in the main they're retained for thirty

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Speaker 3: days and then they're deleted forever they go away, and

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Speaker 3: far more well higher than ninety nine percent of those

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Speaker 3: images that are taken are never queried, are never viewed

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Speaker 3: by a human being. They exist in the ether and

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Speaker 3: then they disappear as though they've never existed. But while

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Speaker 3: they exist, if a law enforcement officer whose agency subscribes

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Speaker 3: to FLOCK has reason to believe that a vehicle has

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Speaker 3: been involved in a crime, they conduct a search and

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Speaker 3: the system will surface where that vehicle has passed a

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Speaker 3: flocked camera in the last thirty days, and they create

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Speaker 3: a hot list what's called a hot list, so that

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Speaker 3: if that vehicle that the police are searching for passes

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Speaker 3: another FLOCK camera, uh, that agency, that officer will get

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Speaker 3: an alert. And the system is really as simple as that,

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Speaker 3: but it's tremendously powerful. It it it creates this superpower

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Speaker 3: where police officers are given leads to solve crimes much

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Speaker 3: faster than they could in the past. And you know,

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Speaker 3: these these crimes. You mentioned the brown shooting and we

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Speaker 3: can talk about that one, but that was you know,

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Speaker 3: that was that was that was international news, but all

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Speaker 3: across the country.

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Speaker 2: Let me come back to the to the description. So

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Speaker 2: let's assume that I guess there's a there's a known vehicle,

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Speaker 2: so so the vehicle has to be identified. In other words,

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Speaker 2: you this this car was used in a bank robbery hypothetically,

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Speaker 2: and your cameras uh probably you know, assuming that that

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Speaker 2: the robber, the bank robber drove by in his or

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Speaker 2: a car before or after the robbery, you got some

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Speaker 2: a license plate number. Do the police then need a

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Speaker 2: judicial warrant and come to you and say, hey, look,

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Speaker 2: we got a warrant here for you to to tell

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Speaker 2: us if this car is seen in the vicinity, you know,

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Speaker 2: within the next thirty days. How does that work procedurely? Yeah?

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Speaker 3: No, Well, so, first of all, the data collected is

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Speaker 3: owned by the police agencies. It's not owned by flock.

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Speaker 3: And so when an agency queries the data, they are

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Speaker 3: querrying their own data, and they're querrying the data of

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Speaker 3: other agencies that have chosen to make their data available

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Speaker 3: outside of their own jurisdiction. So there is no there

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Speaker 3: is no warrant requirement. They're they're querrying images of vehicles

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Speaker 3: on public roadways. Your example of a bank robbery is

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Speaker 3: a really good use case. It's not just on TV.

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Speaker 1: That happens.

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Speaker 3: When someone's going to rob a bank or going to

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Speaker 3: rob a home, they case the area, they drive by

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Speaker 3: multiple times, and if there is a camera in the area,

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Speaker 3: that camera will pick up that car, and so when

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Speaker 3: there is a robbery, the police are able to querry

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Speaker 3: the system and identify vehicles that have engaged in that

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Speaker 3: behavior just prior to the robbery. And then that doesn't

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Speaker 3: give them cause to go arrest somebody. It gives them

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Speaker 3: a lead to go investigate somebody. And that's a very

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Speaker 3: different thing. All of the procedures and all of the

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Speaker 3: requirements to make an arrest still attach. It's just a

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Speaker 3: piece of information that is surfaced by the technology.

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Speaker 2: Okay, can we get back. I want to have you

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Speaker 2: address You've already addressed it in some respects, but address

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Speaker 2: some of the concerns that I know were raised in Cambridge. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: two or three months ago, and I forget how that

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Speaker 2: story ended up, but they were people who were upset

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Speaker 2: that the cameras were going up in Cambridge. And of

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Speaker 2: course then subsequent to that, we had this horrific crime

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Speaker 2: down in December in Providence, and I want to talk

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Speaker 2: about the success and the importance of flock cameras to

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Speaker 2: that crime, because there was a period of time when

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Speaker 2: it appeared as if this guy got Neway Scott free,

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Speaker 2: nobody knew who he was. He was this figure that

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Speaker 2: there was some pictures that were taken of him walking

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Speaker 2: up and down the street. We'll get to all of that.

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Speaker 2: My guest is Dan Haley. Dan is the chief legal

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Speaker 2: officer of Flock, and this is a company that I

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Speaker 2: just realized is less than ten years old and is

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Speaker 2: having quite an impact and a positive impact. In my position,

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Speaker 2: this is always the privacy versus security argument. And if

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Speaker 2: you feel strongly one way or the other and you

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Speaker 2: want to talk to Dan Haley, he'll be happy to

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Speaker 2: take your questions and give you his best answers. He's

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Speaker 2: a friend, and he's a reasonable guy, grew up locally

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Speaker 2: Harvard Law School of great training, and he's someone who

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Speaker 2: what he tells you you can believe him. And I

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Speaker 2: know that there are some of my audience who are

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Speaker 2: somewhat cynical. But with Dan Haley, he will tell you

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Speaker 2: the truth whatever question you asked, whether you're looking for

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Speaker 2: a specific answer or not, he will tell you what

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Speaker 2: the truth is. And I think that's why he was

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Speaker 2: going to be a very good guest. We'll take a

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Speaker 2: quick break here a night's side talking about public safety.

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Speaker 2: For those of you who do not know when you

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Speaker 2: are out in the public you do not have an

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Speaker 2: expectation of safety. And I've run into that over the

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Speaker 2: years when I worked in television. People would say to me,

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Speaker 2: if we were out taking pictures, just the generic pictures,

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Speaker 2: don't pick my picture. And I'd say, if you ask

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Speaker 2: us nicely, would we not take your picture, I'd be

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Speaker 2: happy to oblige. However, we have every right to take

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Speaker 2: pictures of people in public places. That's a big part

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Speaker 2: of the First Amendment that our founders didn't think about

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Speaker 2: TV reporters, But I think maybe in the back of

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Speaker 2: their mind they knew that there was going to be

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Speaker 2: something coming along one hundred or so one hundred and

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Speaker 2: fifty years later which would which would be very accommodating

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Speaker 2: to two television reporters called the First Amendment. Back on

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Speaker 2: Nights That with Dan Haley right after.

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Speaker 1: This Night Side with Dan Ray on Boston's news radio.

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Speaker 2: All right, before we get to some phone calls, Dan,

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Speaker 2: let's talk about the good, the bad, and the ugly.

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Speaker 2: We'll start with the ugly. You folks caught a lot

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Speaker 2: of grief. If I'm not mistaken for the flock cameras

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Speaker 2: and Cambridge, why don't you tell us what happened, and

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Speaker 2: what of the concerts coins for Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Sure, well, I mean, first of all, Dan, it's important

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Speaker 3: for me to say because this is true, No community

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Speaker 3: is obligated to have flot cameras, and every community has

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Speaker 3: the right to make the decision how they want to

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Speaker 3: balance safety and security and privacy and community concerns and

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Speaker 3: all those things. So we absolutely respect that. You know,

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Speaker 3: our north star is those debates ought to be had,

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Speaker 3: but they ought to be had based on facts and truths.

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Speaker 3: And what has happened in a number of communities, including Cambridge,

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Speaker 3: is that activists have gotten very focal and they've done

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Speaker 3: what activists tend to do. They show up at city

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Speaker 3: council meetings and they shout people down and they you know,

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Speaker 3: they make noise so that other people can't be heard,

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Speaker 3: and they put a lot of pressure on elected officials.

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Speaker 3: And in this particular moment in this country, uh, there's

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Speaker 3: a lot of understandable concern about government power, about government surveillance,

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Speaker 3: and so this is a this an environment in which

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Speaker 3: people can make a lot of noise and there's a

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Speaker 3: lot of emotion. So in Cambridge there was a lot

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Speaker 3: of concern voiced about whether ice had access to flock data.

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Speaker 3: They do not, But there were a lot of people

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Speaker 3: who made a lot of noise, you know, to the

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Speaker 3: to the contrary, asserting that they do or they could

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Speaker 3: or they might. A lot of concerns articulated about the

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Speaker 3: Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy, which you know

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Speaker 3: that does boil down to what you said. We're talking

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Speaker 3: about photographs of vehicles on public roadways and that question

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Speaker 3: of whether this technology violates the Fourth Amendment that's been

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Speaker 3: litigated more than thirty times in this country and we're

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Speaker 3: batting a thousand so far in those at all levels. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: that's you know, we've we've every single time, every quarters

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Speaker 3: looked at it has determined, as you said, there is

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Speaker 3: no expectation of privacy in the context of a public roadway.

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Speaker 3: And we can't and we don't track people. But the

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Speaker 3: activists will constantly tell elect officials that we're tracking people.

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Speaker 3: We aren't, We don't, we can't, we don't create a

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Speaker 3: national database. Our data is deleted, deleted. Well, their data

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Speaker 3: is deleted every thirty days and it's gone forever. But Cambridge,

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Speaker 3: you know that the the the privacy activist won the

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Speaker 3: day in Cambridge and Cambridge voted to deactivate their cameras. UH,

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Speaker 3: and then unfortunately, we did mess up at flock and

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Speaker 3: we messed up in the following way. UH. An installation

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Speaker 3: crew who was scheduled to put in two more cameras

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Speaker 3: the week after the cameras were deactivated didn't get the memo,

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Speaker 3: and they went out. You know, they got up and

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Speaker 3: they looked at their work orders, and they went out

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Speaker 3: and they installed those cameras, and people somewhat lost their minds,

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Speaker 3: you know, suggesting that we were secretly installing cameras. We

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Speaker 3: don't make any money on cameras that people don't want.

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Speaker 3: We have no incentive to do that. It was an

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Speaker 3: honest mistake. But you know, and ironically, as he said,

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Speaker 3: shortly thereafter, an MIT professor was murdered in Brookline. And

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Speaker 3: you know, Cambridge turned off their cameras on a day

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Speaker 3: when there was an active shooter at Harvard. So you know,

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Speaker 3: there are consequences.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, those are decision. Well, let's talk about the good

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Speaker 2: that is the Brown shooting, crazy, crazy story obviously, on

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Speaker 2: which I believe. It's a quiet Saturday afternoon as students

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Speaker 2: are getting ready to head home for the Christmas holidays.

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Speaker 2: And this guy, who had an incredibly complicated past, which

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Speaker 2: I think most of our audience know about, had lived

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Speaker 2: in this country for twenty years without really any problems,

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Speaker 2: just went to Brown University where he had started as

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Speaker 2: a student, and he out up a classroom, killed two students,

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Speaker 2: and literally walked away without anyone noticing him. So what

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Speaker 2: call did Flock play in getting him identified?

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Speaker 3: Well, I'll quote for you the chief of police and

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Speaker 3: Providence who said, and this is a director quote, the

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Speaker 3: only reason we got to this guy was because of Flock.

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Speaker 1: We didn't ask him to say that.

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Speaker 3: He said that in the press conference after they found

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Speaker 3: the guy. Yeah, yeah, there are Flock cameras in Providence.

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Speaker 3: And what happened was four days after the shooting, when

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Speaker 3: the tipster on Reddit posted that he had seen a

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Speaker 3: suspicious person getting into a gray blue Nissan with Florida plates.

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Speaker 3: We reached out to Providence and offered to activate for

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Speaker 3: them two features of our cameras that their premium features

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Speaker 3: they cost more, and Providence didn't have activated. That is

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Speaker 3: called we call that freeform search and cold plates, and

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Speaker 3: those features ended up being key to finding this guy.

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Speaker 3: Freeform search allows an officer to literally enter gray Nissan

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Speaker 3: Florida plates into the search engine, and the search engine

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Speaker 3: then goes and finds images of cars that fit that parameter,

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Speaker 3: and they were very quickly able to determine to identify

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Speaker 3: this particular shooter's car and to determine that per our

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Speaker 3: conversation earlier Dan, this car had been circling that area

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Speaker 3: for days. Then when he left Rhode Island and went

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Speaker 3: to Massachusetts, after he shot the and killed the MIT professor,

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Speaker 3: he swapped out the license plates. He put a set

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Speaker 3: of expired main license plates on that car before he

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Speaker 3: headed north to New Hampshire, and our system was able

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Speaker 3: to identify through the cold feature. It identified other features

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Speaker 3: of that car. So if you think about any automobile,

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Speaker 3: there are things, you know, a bumper, sticker, a rusty hub, cap,

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Speaker 3: roof rack, whatever, the system is able to determine, oh,

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Speaker 3: that's the same car, even though they've changed the plates.

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Speaker 3: Providence PD got that alert that those plates had been

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Speaker 3: changed and were able to track that vehicle to the

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Speaker 3: storage facility where the shooter had killed himself and hidden

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Speaker 3: his own body. The Providence Police have said they don't

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Speaker 3: think they would have found him without flock and we

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Speaker 3: would be in an alternate universe where everybody's wondering, is

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Speaker 3: that guy's still out there planning to kill someone else?

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Speaker 2: How much more time would have you needed this guy?

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Speaker 2: If I think the seek the time sequence was he

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Speaker 2: he kills the students at Prom University on Saturday afternoon,

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Speaker 2: and then obviously people are scrambling, and I don't know

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Speaker 2: when you folks were called in or when you offered

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Speaker 2: the more.

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Speaker 3: It was four days later, Dan, it was on the seventeenth, Okay.

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Speaker 2: So therefore, if somehow, some way your cameras had been

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Speaker 2: activated earlier, maybe the professor's life would have been saved.

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Speaker 2: That's what I'm trying to say, because he was shot.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, Yeah, that that is. You know, there has been

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Speaker 3: some controversy in bookline about slot cameras along the same

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Speaker 3: lines as Cambridge, you know, based on people, you know,

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Speaker 3: generating fears about a surveillance state that these cameras simply

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Speaker 3: aren't able, you know, aren't capable of creating, so you know,

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Speaker 3: would have could have u Yeah, I mean.

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Speaker 2: I know a little bit more about that story that

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Speaker 2: I'm allowed to say on the air. It is a

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Speaker 2: brutally horrible story. What, Yeah, visited upon that family that

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Speaker 2: night when that guy just knocked on the door. And

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Speaker 2: this was a guy that as I'm sure you know,

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Speaker 2: the professor who was killed and his killer had attended

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Speaker 2: the same school, yeah, in Lisbon, Portugal for five years. Uh.

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Speaker 2: And I don't know what sort of jealousy had had

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Speaker 2: developed in the mind of the killer, but obviously there

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Speaker 2: was something there. He held a grudge against this guy,

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Speaker 2: and he followed through on his grudge. So look, congratulations

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Speaker 2: on the work. When you think about it, that his

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Speaker 2: car could have been up there in New Hampshire, it

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Speaker 2: never would have been noticed in all probability, and in

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Speaker 2: the situation where it was. Let's uh, let's do this.

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Speaker 2: We got to take a break for news at the

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Speaker 2: botto of the hour and we'll we'll come back with

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Speaker 2: Dan Haley a Flock and that's the name of the company, Flock.

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Speaker 2: They do basically cameras. How when I come back, I'm

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Speaker 2: going to ask you again a young company, uh, to

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Speaker 2: to quantify the success of the company. I don't know

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Speaker 2: if you describe it as to as a region company

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Speaker 2: and national company. How many communities have decided to invite

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Speaker 2: Flock cameras into their community. I'd also love to know about.

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Speaker 2: They must be competitive companies out there. This can't be

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Speaker 2: the only company. But I'm just curious if this is

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Speaker 2: a peak into where we will be going forward. And

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Speaker 2: it's too bad that Flock cameras weren't in the Tucson neighborhood.

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Speaker 2: And I don't know that. Maybe they were going to

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Speaker 2: tell me they were. I don't know. But we'll get

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Speaker 2: all of those questions answered with the chief legal officer

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Speaker 2: of Flock, Dan Haley, right after this news break.

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Speaker 1: It's Night Side with Boston's News Radio.

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Speaker 2: Dan Haley is my guess. He is the chief legal

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Speaker 2: officer of a company called Flock. I have no idea

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Speaker 2: where the word flock, where the name flock came from,

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Speaker 2: but there must be a story behind it because normally

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Speaker 2: when you think of a flock, it's a flock of birds.

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Speaker 2: Is this a flock of security cameras?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, well it is. It is bird imagery, Dan, It's

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Speaker 3: it's it's the notion of you know, these these little

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Speaker 3: cameras sitting up in their in their artificial trees, being

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Speaker 3: being vigilant and watching, watching over us.

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Speaker 2: Okay, how many? How how far a field? Yeah? How far?

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Speaker 3: Does the Flock fly, Yeah, we're We're in more than

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Speaker 3: uh so, we're in We're based in Atlanta, we have

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Speaker 3: an office in Boston, and we are in more than

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Speaker 3: six thousand communities nationwide. So we are we are a

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Speaker 3: national company. We are a national network. And one of

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Speaker 3: the features we offer to the agencies, the police agencies

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Speaker 3: that use us is they can opt into what's called

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Speaker 3: National Search, and if they do that, their cameras are

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Speaker 3: available to be queried by anyone else in the nation,

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Speaker 3: any other agency in the nation that is also enrolled

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Speaker 3: in National Search. Now by the same token, every agency

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Speaker 3: controls access to its own cameras. So the choice that

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Speaker 3: an agency makes is literally they can share data with

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Speaker 3: every other Flock agency in the country. They can share

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Speaker 3: data only with agencies that they choose to share with,

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Speaker 3: or they can share data with nobody. They can lock

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Speaker 3: it down to their own community. That is entirely at

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Speaker 3: the control and discretion of the agency using the cameras.

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Speaker 2: Six thousand communities, how many states?

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Speaker 3: Almost all of them. I think we're not in Hawaii,

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Speaker 3: we're not in Alaska, but I think that's I wouldn't

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Speaker 3: take a live detector on that, but I think that's.

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Speaker 2: How much God, how many other direct competitors does Flock have.

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Speaker 1: So there are a.

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Speaker 3: Number of companies that sell some version of automated license

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Speaker 3: plate reader, but we are by far and away the

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Speaker 3: market leader in this.

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Speaker 2: Technology, privately held, publicly.

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Speaker 1: Traded, privately held.

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Speaker 2: Privately held. Okay, So I hope that we will hear

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Speaker 2: from some folks who want to raise questions and concerns,

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Speaker 2: or those who who want to basically say congratulations. I mean,

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Speaker 2: I just I don't know if you have a presence

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Speaker 2: in that neighborhood in Tucson, Arizona, but just the value

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Speaker 2: of cameras which could have read license plates. So it

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Speaker 2: just reads license plates, but it also images the cars.

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Speaker 2: Is the vehicles car.

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Speaker 3: That's right, Yes, it's it's we call it a we

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Speaker 3: call it a vehicle fingerprint. So it's the license plate

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Speaker 3: is one data point on the vehicle. But as we

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Speaker 3: saw in the Brown case, if a perpetrator changes that

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Speaker 3: license plate, the system can still tell it was that vehicle.

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Speaker 3: And we do have a significant presence in Arizona and

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Speaker 3: agencies who use block are actively engaged in that investigation.

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Speaker 2: Well, I'll tell you that would be a wonderful thing

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Speaker 2: if at some point that case can be broken. It's

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Speaker 2: gone on far too long as far as I am concerned. Now, look,

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Speaker 2: we have in this country at this point, a sharply

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Speaker 2: divided country, and an issue like this. You have I'm

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Speaker 2: sure in communities like Cambridge and maybe Brookline, people who

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Speaker 2: would be considered progressives, who are concerned about the privacy.

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Speaker 3: And I've got I don't want to interrupt you, but

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Speaker 3: I've got lawyers on my legal team, including my lawyers

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Speaker 3: who are in charge of our privacy policies, who are

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Speaker 3: progressives and consider themselves activists on the privacy. Sure, we absolutely,

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Speaker 3: That's as I said at the outset. Our system is designed.

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Speaker 3: I didn't really talk about that, but our system is

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Speaker 3: designed to provide transparency. Every time an officer conducts assertion flock,

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Speaker 3: there is an entry created in a log that is

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Speaker 3: a matter of public record, and it can't be erased,

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Speaker 3: it can't be altered, and they have to enter a

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Speaker 3: search reason. So you know, we give a lot of

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Speaker 3: equipment to law enforcement. I don't know of any piece

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Speaker 3: of equipment we give to law enforcement that has the

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Speaker 3: same transparency and accountability mechanisms that we've built into these cameras.

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Speaker 2: Okay, yeah, I wasn't trying to put it on progressives.

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Speaker 2: At the same time, on the other side, you have

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Speaker 2: a lot of libertarian conservatives who are very much opposed

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Speaker 2: to this. So yeah, you are, I'm sure in different

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Speaker 2: communities battling one or two constituencies, which which may have

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Speaker 2: a minority political minority point of view, but they may

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Speaker 2: come at you from different angles. I think that the

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Speaker 2: vast majority I believe in the bell curve of life, Dan,

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Speaker 2: I don't explain it to you with it that in everything,

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Speaker 2: you have three percent of the people who are fabulous athletes,

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Speaker 2: three percent of the people who are scholarly, three percent

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Speaker 2: of the people who are great at whatever, and then

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Speaker 2: on the other end you have three percent of the

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Speaker 2: people who you know are just helpless or hopeless. But

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Speaker 2: I do think that politically, you have three percent of

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Speaker 2: the people on the very far right. You have three

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Speaker 2: percent of the people on the very far left, and

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Speaker 2: this is an issue upon which they may actually find

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Speaker 2: some common ground against a larger group of the of

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Speaker 2: the middle. You have you noticed a difference in the

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Speaker 2: country in terms of are you getting more traction in

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Speaker 2: different geographic areas more so in in in city areas

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Speaker 2: where there's probably more crime. I think, for example, I'm

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Speaker 2: sure you've heard of this technology called shot spot where

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Speaker 2: where the gun is fired. Uh, And Boston has that

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Speaker 2: for example, and they triangulate so they can find out

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Speaker 2: where that where that gunshot came from. You know, I'm

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Speaker 2: just curious, what are you getting more success in suburbs

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Speaker 2: in you know, again, when I say politically, I mean

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Speaker 2: with a small with a small pe, not Republican Democrats

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Speaker 2: or anything. But is you know, urban areas becoming more

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Speaker 2: comfortable with this what what are you finding out six

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Speaker 2: thousand communities that that's quite a cross section.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, that's a that's a great question, Dan, I've I've

434
00:27:50,560 --> 00:27:53,479
Speaker 3: heard that articulates the horseshoet theory that as you get

435
00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:58,240
Speaker 3: to the extremes, the extremes actually meet and get consensus

436
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:05,960
Speaker 3: yes on an issue. You are absolutely correct. So we

437
00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:09,359
Speaker 3: do have a lot of traction in large cities, and

438
00:28:09,440 --> 00:28:12,760
Speaker 3: there's a lot of opposition in large cities. But what's

439
00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:16,000
Speaker 3: interesting is, so I'll use Oakland, California as an example.

440
00:28:16,680 --> 00:28:19,320
Speaker 3: That is a city that has had a lot of problems,

441
00:28:19,440 --> 00:28:22,280
Speaker 3: including a lot of problems with crime. There is a

442
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:26,520
Speaker 3: very vibrant activist community in Oakland, and there was a

443
00:28:26,880 --> 00:28:30,680
Speaker 3: very heated debate before the city Council on renewal of

444
00:28:30,760 --> 00:28:33,600
Speaker 3: the FLOCK contract a couple of months ago. Some of

445
00:28:33,680 --> 00:28:39,560
Speaker 3: the most vocal proponents of FLOCK were, for example, the

446
00:28:40,120 --> 00:28:44,800
Speaker 3: Oakland chapter of the NAACP, because these cameras have had

447
00:28:44,920 --> 00:28:49,760
Speaker 3: such a positive impact in minority communities that have had

448
00:28:49,840 --> 00:28:53,080
Speaker 3: significant problems with crime. And so you do see this

449
00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:56,920
Speaker 3: dynamic where, yes, we get as you said, we get

450
00:28:56,960 --> 00:28:59,640
Speaker 3: opposition from the left end, from the right from people

451
00:28:59,640 --> 00:29:03,160
Speaker 3: who have, as I said, they have legitimate concerns about

452
00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:07,960
Speaker 3: government overreach, about government authority, about a surveillance state. But

453
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:11,880
Speaker 3: you also get people who recognize, on both sides of

454
00:29:11,960 --> 00:29:16,479
Speaker 3: the at both ends of the political spectrum, the value,

455
00:29:17,680 --> 00:29:22,160
Speaker 3: the real the kind of core human value of safe

456
00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:27,600
Speaker 3: communities and the need to invest and enable law enforcement

457
00:29:27,640 --> 00:29:31,360
Speaker 3: to leverage technology that you know, this technology exists, it's

458
00:29:31,440 --> 00:29:33,560
Speaker 3: not going back in the bottle, and to say that

459
00:29:33,680 --> 00:29:37,480
Speaker 3: law enforcement can't use it seems like a bad idea.

460
00:29:38,080 --> 00:29:40,880
Speaker 3: To say that law enforcement can use it with accountability

461
00:29:41,000 --> 00:29:44,600
Speaker 3: and transparency, you know, that strikes us as a as

462
00:29:44,640 --> 00:29:47,080
Speaker 3: a winning argument and it won in Oakland, it won

463
00:29:47,160 --> 00:29:51,480
Speaker 3: recently in Denver, you know, San Diego cities, all of

464
00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:54,760
Speaker 3: the country where there's been significant opposition. But when people

465
00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:58,600
Speaker 3: sit down and have a debate and way those things,

466
00:29:58,880 --> 00:30:02,120
Speaker 3: they tend to come out in favor of safer communities.

467
00:30:02,480 --> 00:30:06,200
Speaker 2: Is there a point where if you if the sense

468
00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:10,000
Speaker 2: a flock is that there is whatever the tipping point

469
00:30:10,040 --> 00:30:15,440
Speaker 2: would be twenty percent of twenty five percent opposition that

470
00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:21,120
Speaker 2: you say, look the the atmospherics in this community as

471
00:30:21,200 --> 00:30:24,080
Speaker 2: such that we're going to waste our time going into

472
00:30:24,160 --> 00:30:27,760
Speaker 2: this community and we will choose, you know, not even

473
00:30:27,800 --> 00:30:31,560
Speaker 2: to pursue a contract or are you ready to deal

474
00:30:31,920 --> 00:30:34,680
Speaker 2: with whatever community wants wants help.

475
00:30:36,080 --> 00:30:38,880
Speaker 3: Dan, I love the way you introduced me and I

476
00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:42,000
Speaker 3: really appreciate it it and that is the that is

477
00:30:42,080 --> 00:30:44,880
Speaker 3: the perspective we take. We will always ask for a

478
00:30:45,000 --> 00:30:48,720
Speaker 3: conversation and an opportunity to be heard out. And then

479
00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:50,800
Speaker 3: if you know, at at the end of the day,

480
00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:55,440
Speaker 3: a community decides not to use us, we don't view

481
00:30:55,520 --> 00:30:57,360
Speaker 3: that as a loss for us. We view that as

482
00:30:57,440 --> 00:31:00,720
Speaker 3: unfortunate for the community. But so as long as we

483
00:31:00,840 --> 00:31:04,920
Speaker 3: have the opportunity to be heard out. The Democratic process

484
00:31:05,160 --> 00:31:09,280
Speaker 3: is an incredibly powerful thing, and we always walk away

485
00:31:09,400 --> 00:31:13,440
Speaker 3: thinking there's a pretty good chance that that community will

486
00:31:13,480 --> 00:31:15,920
Speaker 3: call back again sure down the road.

487
00:31:16,160 --> 00:31:20,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely, I think that's the perfect philosophy to follow.

488
00:31:20,520 --> 00:31:22,320
Speaker 2: We'll take a very quick break. I'd like to do

489
00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:26,360
Speaker 2: a quick sensus here, almost a little bit of a survey.

490
00:31:27,160 --> 00:31:32,479
Speaker 2: Would you welcome cameras as Dan Haley has described them

491
00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:36,160
Speaker 2: in your community. I certainly would welcome them and welcome

492
00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:40,280
Speaker 2: them in my community. I do not have any concern

493
00:31:40,840 --> 00:31:45,160
Speaker 2: with I'm speaking personally now, with the presence of cameras,

494
00:31:45,760 --> 00:31:50,480
Speaker 2: which I think, in addition to perhaps solving crimes, might

495
00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:55,520
Speaker 2: also contribute to some smarter criminals saying I don't want

496
00:31:55,520 --> 00:31:57,960
Speaker 2: to mess around in that community as long as there

497
00:31:58,000 --> 00:31:59,840
Speaker 2: are flock cameras there. I'd love to hear from you,

498
00:32:00,280 --> 00:32:02,800
Speaker 2: whatever your thought on it is. Let's do a quick

499
00:32:02,880 --> 00:32:06,800
Speaker 2: survey of night side listeners. I think Dan Haley's been

500
00:32:06,920 --> 00:32:10,640
Speaker 2: very convincing. It's a subject that I am inclined to say. Look,

501
00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:15,280
Speaker 2: privacy versus security. I think security is important. I think

502
00:32:15,400 --> 00:32:19,120
Speaker 2: privacy is important, But at the same time, we do

503
00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:24,240
Speaker 2: not have any anticipation of privacy when we choose to

504
00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:28,080
Speaker 2: leave our own homes. It's as simple as that. Walking

505
00:32:28,200 --> 00:32:32,720
Speaker 2: down the street, you have no expectation of privacy. Six

506
00:32:32,840 --> 00:32:35,720
Speaker 2: one seven, two five four to ten thirty six one

507
00:32:35,840 --> 00:32:38,720
Speaker 2: seven nine three one ten thirty. I like to go

508
00:32:38,840 --> 00:32:42,160
Speaker 2: to different topics, topics perhaps that you haven't thought of.

509
00:32:42,640 --> 00:32:45,960
Speaker 2: But I want to hear from each of you, if possible,

510
00:32:46,120 --> 00:32:50,160
Speaker 2: real quickly here, just quick, almost dumb, as we would

511
00:32:50,160 --> 00:32:54,040
Speaker 2: say in Latin syriatum, very quickly. Do you like this idea?

512
00:32:54,280 --> 00:32:57,320
Speaker 2: Do you not like this idea which is supporting your community?

513
00:32:57,480 --> 00:33:00,720
Speaker 2: Would you oppose it? Six one seven two thirty six

514
00:33:00,800 --> 00:33:04,720
Speaker 2: one seven nine give us a quick call. Coming back

515
00:33:04,760 --> 00:33:05,280
Speaker 2: on night Side.

516
00:33:06,360 --> 00:33:11,000
Speaker 1: It's night Side with Dan Ray on Boston's news radio.

517
00:33:11,920 --> 00:33:14,400
Speaker 2: My guess is Dan Haley is the chief legal officer

518
00:33:14,480 --> 00:33:16,880
Speaker 2: of Flock. And Dan we got several calls here. We're

519
00:33:16,880 --> 00:33:20,080
Speaker 2: going to get them as quickly as we can. We're

520
00:33:20,080 --> 00:33:22,040
Speaker 2: going to Metter fact. Two of them are from Cambridge

521
00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:25,320
Speaker 2: CG and Cambridge CG. Welcome back. How are you tonight

522
00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:26,520
Speaker 2: on you're on Nightside?

523
00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:27,520
Speaker 4: Right?

524
00:33:27,600 --> 00:33:30,640
Speaker 5: Thanks for Carling? Thank you, right, Carling? You bet the

525
00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:34,400
Speaker 5: gentleman from the general from Flock. I'd like it know

526
00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:37,840
Speaker 5: if is there a camera that the Savellian can buy

527
00:33:38,400 --> 00:33:41,800
Speaker 5: that will give them a good picture and they can

528
00:33:41,880 --> 00:33:45,040
Speaker 5: actually the police and actually take my camera and look

529
00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:49,360
Speaker 5: at it and read the license plate.

530
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:55,400
Speaker 3: So thank you for the question. A lot of neighborhood

531
00:33:55,440 --> 00:34:01,400
Speaker 3: associations and homeowners' associations do purchase flot cameras and then

532
00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:07,440
Speaker 3: they can elect to share those images with with local

533
00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:13,319
Speaker 3: law enforcement. I do believe that an individual can buy

534
00:34:13,400 --> 00:34:19,360
Speaker 3: a camera from us. That's I think that's that's relatively unusual,

535
00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:21,840
Speaker 3: but I do know that it happens. And then you know,

536
00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:26,120
Speaker 3: the same the same basic proposition would would attach you'd

537
00:34:26,320 --> 00:34:29,880
Speaker 3: you'd be able to share the information with whoever you

538
00:34:29,960 --> 00:34:30,640
Speaker 3: want to share it to.

539
00:34:31,320 --> 00:34:33,600
Speaker 2: Yeah, the other thing is what we'll do here CG

540
00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:39,040
Speaker 2: is before Dan leaves, we'll give the website a flock

541
00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:42,400
Speaker 2: and that if you keep listening, you'll have it and

542
00:34:42,520 --> 00:34:45,560
Speaker 2: you can contact them directly at some point, and particularly

543
00:34:45,600 --> 00:34:48,680
Speaker 2: if you're like a neighborhood association, somewhere you can mount

544
00:34:48,719 --> 00:34:51,759
Speaker 2: this camera. And if you've got problems with activities in

545
00:34:51,800 --> 00:34:55,240
Speaker 2: your in your parking lot, or or on the streets

546
00:34:55,320 --> 00:34:57,960
Speaker 2: near you, I'm sure a police would love to see

547
00:34:58,000 --> 00:34:59,680
Speaker 2: some of that video. If it would help them solve

548
00:34:59,760 --> 00:35:02,200
Speaker 2: some great question. Thanks eg.

549
00:35:02,440 --> 00:35:05,279
Speaker 5: No, they checked. They checked my camera after we had

550
00:35:05,320 --> 00:35:08,160
Speaker 5: some crime in our neighborhood. They could see the car

551
00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:11,160
Speaker 5: and they couldn't see the whole car, and of course

552
00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:14,000
Speaker 5: they couldn't see the license plate, so it wasn't any

553
00:35:14,080 --> 00:35:16,840
Speaker 5: helpful to them my camera.

554
00:35:17,320 --> 00:35:21,120
Speaker 2: Again. That's okay, we will we will give the flock

555
00:35:22,160 --> 00:35:25,320
Speaker 2: contact information at the end of the hour. So so

556
00:35:25,480 --> 00:35:27,360
Speaker 2: hang in there, get a piece of paper and a pencil.

557
00:35:27,440 --> 00:35:31,120
Speaker 5: Okay, thanks gg all, Sat, thank you, thank you much.

558
00:35:31,520 --> 00:35:33,480
Speaker 2: Let's go to John and Braintree. John, you were next

559
00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:36,920
Speaker 2: on night Side with Dan Haley, chief legal officer of FLOCK.

560
00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:40,920
Speaker 4: Hey, Dan, Captain Hindsight, thanks for taking my call.

561
00:35:41,239 --> 00:35:44,960
Speaker 2: Nice you've been a stranger. Captain high Sight, welcome, go

562
00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:45,560
Speaker 2: right ahead.

563
00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:49,680
Speaker 4: Thank you. Hey. I just have a simple question that

564
00:35:49,880 --> 00:35:53,160
Speaker 4: I would love to have some kind somebody respond to.

565
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:57,719
Speaker 4: But how would anybody not trust somebody who doesn't want cameras?

566
00:35:59,280 --> 00:36:00,680
Speaker 4: How can you try person?

567
00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:04,319
Speaker 2: Well, Captain Hindsight, I think that is a great rhetorical question.

568
00:36:04,400 --> 00:36:08,080
Speaker 2: I wish I had thought of it myself. We'll leave

569
00:36:08,120 --> 00:36:10,279
Speaker 2: it as a rhetorical question because they think it's more

570
00:36:10,360 --> 00:36:13,160
Speaker 2: powerful as a rhetorical question. It's a good one.

571
00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:15,239
Speaker 4: Thanks.

572
00:36:15,360 --> 00:36:18,239
Speaker 2: Thanks, Thanks Captain Hindsight, thank you very much. Let me

573
00:36:18,320 --> 00:36:20,560
Speaker 2: go back to Cambridge and we're going to talk with

574
00:36:20,719 --> 00:36:24,680
Speaker 2: Eileen and Cambridge. Eileen, good idea bad idea for Cambridge

575
00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:28,040
Speaker 2: to have these sort of cameras well.

576
00:36:28,840 --> 00:36:34,720
Speaker 3: After listening uh to Dan Haley Haley, Dan Haley, tonight,

577
00:36:34,960 --> 00:36:38,560
Speaker 3: I I am definitely in favor, yes.

578
00:36:39,239 --> 00:36:41,480
Speaker 2: And I think that today at one of our free

579
00:36:41,560 --> 00:36:46,200
Speaker 2: game shows, you expressed concern. If I'm not mistaken, I did.

580
00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:52,880
Speaker 3: Good maybe because of what I hear people saying around me,

581
00:36:53,120 --> 00:36:56,520
Speaker 3: but no, thank you very much.

582
00:36:56,640 --> 00:36:57,200
Speaker 1: I I.

583
00:36:58,880 --> 00:37:01,120
Speaker 5: Definitely see the advantage of this.

584
00:37:01,680 --> 00:37:04,560
Speaker 2: All right, Eileen, as always, thank you, Thank you so much.

585
00:37:04,640 --> 00:37:05,280
Speaker 2: Dan go ahead.

586
00:37:06,840 --> 00:37:08,680
Speaker 3: Oh, I just wanted to say thank you. That was

587
00:37:09,160 --> 00:37:11,800
Speaker 3: I that's the best thing in the world when someone

588
00:37:12,600 --> 00:37:15,719
Speaker 3: engages and changes their mind a little bit. So thank

589
00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:19,279
Speaker 3: you very much for that call. Will talk so well.

590
00:37:19,560 --> 00:37:23,640
Speaker 2: Thanks yep, thanks again, Thank you, Dan Haley. As as

591
00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:26,640
Speaker 2: I promise CG and perhaps others who are listening, how

592
00:37:26,719 --> 00:37:28,799
Speaker 2: can they get more information on flock.

593
00:37:30,480 --> 00:37:34,640
Speaker 3: Uh flocksafety dot com. That's all one word, f l

594
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:38,320
Speaker 3: O c K safety dot com and we've got a

595
00:37:38,440 --> 00:37:42,400
Speaker 3: ton of information there on the technology, on on the

596
00:37:42,719 --> 00:37:47,839
Speaker 3: privacy features and the accountability features, on how we treat

597
00:37:47,920 --> 00:37:50,400
Speaker 3: the data that we hold for our clients, all all

598
00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:53,280
Speaker 3: of it, and a lot of articles and blog posts

599
00:37:53,320 --> 00:37:57,800
Speaker 3: addressing the common concerns that people raise at about the

600
00:37:57,880 --> 00:37:58,960
Speaker 3: technology and the company.

601
00:37:59,600 --> 00:38:03,160
Speaker 2: Dan, hey, Bill, thank you very much. Important conversation, particularly

602
00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:07,040
Speaker 2: in the context of the resistance you met with in

603
00:38:07,160 --> 00:38:12,680
Speaker 2: Cambridge and the success that you contributed to the search

604
00:38:12,760 --> 00:38:17,319
Speaker 2: for the Brown University and Brookline doctor killer. Dan. Thanks

605
00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:18,680
Speaker 2: as always, You're the best.

606
00:38:18,960 --> 00:38:22,320
Speaker 3: Yes, thank you, Thank you so much. I really appreciate it.

607
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:24,600
Speaker 2: We'll talk so thanks, Dan, thanks so much. Have a

608
00:38:24,640 --> 00:38:26,680
Speaker 2: great one. All right, we get back. We're going to

609
00:38:26,760 --> 00:38:30,840
Speaker 2: talk about the effort to audit the Massachusetts state legislature.

610
00:38:31,600 --> 00:38:35,040
Speaker 2: The fight continues, the fight that is being carried by

611
00:38:35,120 --> 00:38:38,800
Speaker 2: the state Auditor Diana Desauglio. Coming back on Nightside