WEBVTT - Tech Friday w/ Dave Hatter - Sponsored by Intrust IT - 10/30/2026

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<v Speaker 1>513-74.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, sorry. It's Tech Friday. Dave Hatter. Get ready to

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<v Speaker 2>give the phone number again. Default mode. InTrustIT.com is where

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<v Speaker 2>we find Dave Hatter and his crew. They are the

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<v Speaker 2>best in the business, court of business career for all

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<v Speaker 2>your business computer needs, keeping you out of trouble, engaging

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<v Speaker 2>in best practices, and unringing the bell of disaster when

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<v Speaker 2>it hits. Dave Hatter, welcome back to the show, man.

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<v Speaker 2>I certainly appreciate your company sponsoring this segment.

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<v Speaker 1>Always good to be here, Brian.

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<v Speaker 2>All right. Let's jump right into it. An issue that

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<v Speaker 2>comes up every election year is concerns about voting machines. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>I get a pretty good sense here in Ohio that

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<v Speaker 2>we don't have any hacking concerns. I've been advised that

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<v Speaker 2>they're not hooked up to the Internet and they can't

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<v Speaker 2>be tampered with from outside forces. I'll have to take

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<v Speaker 2>them at their word on this. But some states, well,

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<v Speaker 2>are at risk. That's what this article says. Anyway, Dave,

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<v Speaker 2>can you break it down?

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 3>So Security Week is a well-known, well-respected magazine in the

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<v Speaker 3>the cybersecurity, information security space. Timing of this article is

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<v Speaker 3>kind of unfortunate that they waited until a few days

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<v Speaker 3>before the election to publish it. But it's a pretty

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<v Speaker 3>deep dive into this, and I think it's really well done.

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<v Speaker 3>You know, my concerns with all of this are always, Brian,

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<v Speaker 3>and we see this sort of thing play out more

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<v Speaker 3>and more every day, right? I don't think you and

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<v Speaker 3>I have talked about the recent PHP vulnerability, but The

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<v Speaker 3>point I've been making for a long time now, and

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<v Speaker 3>one of the reasons why I got out of software

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<v Speaker 3>engineering as a professional and into cybersecurity is because anything

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<v Speaker 3>that has software in it is vulnerable. I've talked about

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<v Speaker 3>Mikko Hoponen's book before. He's a very well-known, much smarter

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<v Speaker 3>than me, cybersecurity professional, wrote a book called If It's Smart,

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<v Speaker 3>It's Vulnerable. I know I've mentioned Bruce Schneier's book, also

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<v Speaker 3>way smarter than me, internationally renowned cryptographer and cybersecurity guy,

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<v Speaker 3>wrote a book called Click Here to Kill Everyone. And

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<v Speaker 3>the whole idea is if it's got software in it,

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<v Speaker 3>it's vulnerable.

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<v Speaker 1>OK, period.

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<v Speaker 3>That's the bottom line point they're making. I believe that's

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<v Speaker 3>absolutely true. We've seen this PHP thing. We've talked about

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<v Speaker 3>refrigerators being hacked and so forth. So this article is

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<v Speaker 3>pretty long, but it goes into and here's the subhead.

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<v Speaker 3>Unpatched voting machines, unverifiable QR coded ballots and AI driven

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<v Speaker 3>influence campaigns leave U.S. elections short of secure. Now, that's

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<v Speaker 3>their words, not mine. You know, they they make some

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<v Speaker 3>very interesting points in here. There's some great quotes from

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<v Speaker 3>some pretty well-known cybersecurity experts. They talk about the vote

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<v Speaker 3>counting and the vote machines and how the machines are certified.

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<v Speaker 3>But at the end of the day, they have software

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<v Speaker 3>in them, Brian. And that's part of the problem. They

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<v Speaker 3>talk about foreign nations trying to influence the vote. But

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<v Speaker 3>the thing that I thought was the most interesting, again,

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<v Speaker 3>because there's a bunch of different headlines. There's a whole

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<v Speaker 3>section securing the integrity of the election, voting and counting. U.S.

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<v Speaker 3>election voting machines are certified by the EAC. This certificate

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<v Speaker 3>is designed to ensure their security and applies to both

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<v Speaker 3>the voting and the counting machines. Shari Bargel, co-founder and

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<v Speaker 3>CEO at Sequent, is doubtful. There is no direct correlation

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<v Speaker 3>of the certification process to the four-year election cycle, and

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<v Speaker 3>the certification can occur in any four years. Certification process

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<v Speaker 3>may take a year, but probably less than two years.

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<v Speaker 3>In a worst-case scenario, a voting machine whose certification began

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<v Speaker 3>in the first year of the electoral cycle will have

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<v Speaker 3>been sitting untouched for two years.

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<v Speaker 1>Quote, now this is this guy.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I saw that. Yeah, go ahead. This is the grill.

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<v Speaker 2>We're kicking out of the stadium here, right here.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 3>Quote, that's pretty ridiculous, unquote, Comet Sparkle. Quote, software needs

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<v Speaker 3>to be updated and patched pretty much continuously. In the

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<v Speaker 3>commercial world, we patch our systems every month, but for elections,

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<v Speaker 3>we're trusting the software. It hasn't been patched for two

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<v Speaker 3>years or more. And the final analysis, the EAC certification

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<v Speaker 3>is pretty much meaningless, unquote. Now, again, that's this guy.

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<v Speaker 3>They talk about air gapping, keeping machines offline. They talk

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<v Speaker 3>about voter village at DEF CON. You and I have

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<v Speaker 3>talked about that over the years where DEF CON is

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<v Speaker 3>a yearly cybersecurity conference. Thousands of people show up. They

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<v Speaker 3>have villages where they take things apart and attack stuff

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<v Speaker 3>and demonstrate stuff. And it says here, you know, machines

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<v Speaker 3>are often taken to Voting Village, a hands-on election security

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<v Speaker 3>lab run at DEF CON, gives researchers and election officials

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<v Speaker 3>and the public legal access to real voting equipment so

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<v Speaker 3>they can test the security. Some of these machines are

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<v Speaker 3>still in use in the current election cycle when they're

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<v Speaker 3>delivered to Voting Village. And the same guy, quote, basically,

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<v Speaker 3>this is Bargel, every voting machine that has been delivered

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<v Speaker 3>to Voting Village has been successfully hacked once the hackers

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<v Speaker 3>have hands-on access, unquote.

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<v Speaker 1>Hmm.

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<v Speaker 3>So, I mean, this goes on and on. I'll post

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<v Speaker 3>this in the notes. I've shared this with a bunch

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<v Speaker 3>of people. I strongly encourage people to go read it

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<v Speaker 3>for themselves. Again, they talk about election influence campaigns. They

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<v Speaker 3>talk about the idea that, you know, printing something with

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<v Speaker 3>a QR code where you can't read what it says

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<v Speaker 3>is basically useless. I try to make this point every day, Brian.

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<v Speaker 3>You can't look at a QR code and know what

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<v Speaker 3>it does.

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<v Speaker 1>True.

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<v Speaker 3>I never, ever, ever scan QR codes out in public.

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<v Speaker 3>I don't know what they do. I don't know how

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<v Speaker 3>they got there. I don't know that some bad guy

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<v Speaker 3>hasn't come along and put a new QR code over

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<v Speaker 3>top of a legitimate QR code like in a parking lot.

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<v Speaker 3>And this has happened, by the way. So, yeah, this

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<v Speaker 3>is a really interesting article. I am going to send

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<v Speaker 3>it to Secretary LaRose.

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<v Speaker 1>I know him. I've done some cybersecurity seminars.

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<v Speaker 3>For his team, which, by the way, is a huge

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<v Speaker 3>benefit to residents of Ohio that your secretary of state

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<v Speaker 3>is out there providing free cybersecurity seminars for small businesses.

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<v Speaker 3>I'm going to send it to the Kentucky secretary of state.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, again, sadly now we're just days out from

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<v Speaker 3>the election, but it's, it's a very interesting look at

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<v Speaker 3>this from a, this is, you know, this, and it's

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<v Speaker 3>not political in any way. It doesn't talk about, this

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<v Speaker 3>article doesn't talk about politics at all. So yeah, it's,

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<v Speaker 3>it's pretty useful in my mind.

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<v Speaker 2>Frightening stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>It would have been good to have it earlier. Yes.

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<v Speaker 2>LinkedIn.com. Find Dave Hatter and LinkedIn.com. That's where you'll find

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<v Speaker 2>the articles he speaks of here on the Morning show.

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<v Speaker 2>Don't go away. More to talk about, including the latest

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<v Speaker 2>MapQuest update. 55KRC, the talk station. 641-55KRC, the talk station.

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<v Speaker 2>IntrustIT.com is where you find Dave Hatter and his crew

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<v Speaker 2>for your business computer needs. Dave Hatter, I like this

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<v Speaker 2>new feature on MapQuest. At least I think I do.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, you know, Brian, I'm not a fan of flock cameras.

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<v Speaker 3>And I always like to remind people, flock has become

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<v Speaker 3>the coke of mass surveillance.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah. or the Kleenex, right?

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<v Speaker 3>They're not the only company that are building these sorts

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<v Speaker 3>of mass surveillance capable cameras. They're just the ones that

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<v Speaker 3>have gotten the most ire. They're the ones that are

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<v Speaker 3>the most well-known. Seems like in many cases, the public

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<v Speaker 3>is waking up to this whole mass surveillance thing.

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<v Speaker 1>And there's been a huge backlash against this.

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<v Speaker 3>I like to point out that Fort Wright does not

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<v Speaker 3>and has never had flock cameras.

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<v Speaker 1>Or anything like this and will not as long as

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<v Speaker 1>I'm involved in it. But that said, if you, uh, I,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not a, I don't use MapQuest. I have an

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<v Speaker 1>Apple phone. I use the maps on my Apple phone,

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<v Speaker 1>nothing against MapQuest. Um, but the, the native map app

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<v Speaker 1>on my Apple phone does what I want it to do.

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<v Speaker 3>And you know, Brian, I tell people all the time,

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<v Speaker 3>the less apps you have, the better. So again, I

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<v Speaker 3>have nothing against MapQuest. This is a useful feature though,

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<v Speaker 3>in my mind. And I think it just speaks to

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<v Speaker 3>the backlash. Although it's interesting to see one technology company essentially, um,

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<v Speaker 3>Let's just say cast aspersions, for lack of a better word,

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<v Speaker 3>for an FCC compliant way to say this on another

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<v Speaker 3>tech company. So MapQuest and their latest update will now

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<v Speaker 3>show you where the automated license plate reader cameras are.

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<v Speaker 1>Think Flock.

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<v Speaker 3>Again, other companies, Axon, there are other people doing this,

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<v Speaker 3>but Flock is the most well-known. So if you use

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<v Speaker 3>the MapQuest app, you can turn this on and it

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<v Speaker 3>will show you where the flock cameras are, wherever you are,

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<v Speaker 3>so that you can avoid them. So if you're someone

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<v Speaker 3>like me that does not want to be mass surveilled,

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<v Speaker 3>it's just out minding your own business, trying to live

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<v Speaker 3>your life, everyday, innocent, average citizen, and you don't want

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<v Speaker 3>to be surveilled, you don't want to be tracked like this,

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<v Speaker 3>this is a handy way to let you know how

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<v Speaker 3>to avoid these things. And it's really interesting because in

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<v Speaker 3>the screenshot they show in this one article, Now, again,

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<v Speaker 3>I don't know, Brian, that this particular screenshot is legit

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<v Speaker 3>or they just made it up for this news story.

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<v Speaker 3>But assuming that's a real screenshot of a real place,

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<v Speaker 3>there is an insane amount of flock cameras in that

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<v Speaker 3>given location.

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<v Speaker 2>And that was going to be my point. To your point,

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<v Speaker 2>even if I want to avoid flock cameras, it may

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<v Speaker 2>be impossible for me to get to point A to

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<v Speaker 2>point B without having to go past one or multiple

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<v Speaker 2>of them.

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<v Speaker 3>I mean, looking at this map, again, assuming it's legit,

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<v Speaker 3>it would be very difficult to avoid them. But at

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<v Speaker 3>the very least, you could minimize your exposure to them

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<v Speaker 3>if you had this.

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<v Speaker 2>Maybe this is less of a practical feature and more

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<v Speaker 2>of just the look at the size and scope of

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<v Speaker 2>the Big Brother reality we live in these days.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, it certainly is. points that out.

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<v Speaker 3>And they say in the article, by turning on the

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<v Speaker 3>surveillance layer in the map options, which I think is

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<v Speaker 3>a funny way to describe it, by turning on the

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<v Speaker 3>surveillance layer in the map options portion of the software,

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<v Speaker 3>the map will reveal each location.

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<v Speaker 1>And it does say in this article.

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<v Speaker 3>The feature allows users to view the reported locations of

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<v Speaker 3>license plate readers operated by providers, including Flock Safety, Motorola Solutions,

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<v Speaker 3>and Axon.

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<v Speaker 1>So I do.

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<v Speaker 3>Appreciate the fact that this MapQuest update feature, speaking of

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<v Speaker 3>software updates, like we talked about in the last Last segment, right?

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<v Speaker 3>Software updates don't just fix vulnerabilities and bugs.

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<v Speaker 1>They add capability. Or in our.

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<v Speaker 3>Increasingly digital world, potentially take away functionality. Oh, well, you

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<v Speaker 3>like that heated steering wheel in your car?

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<v Speaker 1>Not for you unless you want to pay the subscription fee.

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<v Speaker 1>Like those heated seats? Oh, your air conditioner? Yeah, that's

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<v Speaker 1>going to cost extra.

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<v Speaker 2>That's insane.

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<v Speaker 3>Because you're not paying the subscription fee. That's where we're

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<v Speaker 3>headed with all of this. But, you know, again, back

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<v Speaker 3>to the election machines and such, software updates are critical

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<v Speaker 3>because they fix vulnerabilities, flaws that could be exploited. They

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<v Speaker 3>fix bugs, things that make the software not function the

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<v Speaker 3>way it's supposed to, but they also, also give you

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<v Speaker 3>the capability to change the functionality. Today, I certified this, right?

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<v Speaker 3>And then a software update comes out. Well, unless I

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<v Speaker 3>recertify it, how can I know for sure there wasn't

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<v Speaker 3>a change in the software that changed the behavior, a la,

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<v Speaker 3>in this case, adding new functionality that shows you these

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<v Speaker 3>surveillance cameras? Hopefully what I'm saying is making sense to folks. Again,

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<v Speaker 3>In the old days when something was mechanical, right, and

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<v Speaker 3>you bought it, well, it couldn't just change itself overnight

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<v Speaker 3>with a software update. It couldn't be your smart refrigerator

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<v Speaker 3>that bricked itself and ruined the food or burned your

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<v Speaker 3>house down due to a software update that caused it

0:10:40.410 --> 0:10:43.590
<v Speaker 3>to overheat or something like things can now. And this

0:10:43.670 --> 0:10:46.650
<v Speaker 3>is my point that I keep trying to drive home

0:10:46.700 --> 0:10:49.300
<v Speaker 3>to folks as we make everything digital.

0:10:49.830 --> 0:10:50.980
<v Speaker 1>Everything has software in it.

0:10:51.450 --> 0:10:55.380
<v Speaker 3>Sometimes you get a benefit like, hey, I can see

0:10:55.420 --> 0:10:59.160
<v Speaker 3>these surveillance cameras in my MapQuest app now. Sometimes things

0:10:59.220 --> 0:11:04.160
<v Speaker 3>change and they might tell you, they might not tell you,

0:11:04.559 --> 0:11:06.900
<v Speaker 3>or it could be hackers that have broken into the

0:11:06.940 --> 0:11:09.179
<v Speaker 3>source code of that and changed it without even the

0:11:09.230 --> 0:11:09.950
<v Speaker 3>vendor's knowledge.

0:11:10.210 --> 0:11:15.469
<v Speaker 1>That has happened many times, all well-documented, Brian. So, yeah,

0:11:15.570 --> 0:11:16.170
<v Speaker 1>that's where we're at.

0:11:16.730 --> 0:11:21.860
<v Speaker 2>That's frightening stuff. Waymo. Robo-taxi operators. There's some new scrutiny

0:11:21.920 --> 0:11:28.189
<v Speaker 2>over station. 651-55-KRCD talk station. Dave Hatton, Interest IT, doing

0:11:28.230 --> 0:11:32.290
<v Speaker 2>the Tech Friday. And, well, confirming for me more that

0:11:32.590 --> 0:11:36.090
<v Speaker 2>I'm not going to do automated vehicles, Dave. I don't

0:11:36.110 --> 0:11:38.250
<v Speaker 2>think we're there yet. And apparently the federal government's going

0:11:38.270 --> 0:11:42.350
<v Speaker 2>to start getting involved because Waymo and other robo-taxi operators

0:11:42.470 --> 0:11:47.260
<v Speaker 2>can't manage, I guess, first responder emergency vehicle interactions. What's

0:11:47.280 --> 0:11:48.100
<v Speaker 2>going on with this one, Dave?

0:11:48.880 --> 0:11:50.870
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, there's all kinds of wild stuff, but I want

0:11:51.190 --> 0:11:53.750
<v Speaker 3>to take just one second to tell you two things, Brian.

0:11:53.790 --> 0:11:55.929
<v Speaker 3>First off, since I know you're into this sort of

0:11:55.950 --> 0:11:58.050
<v Speaker 3>thing personally, and I imagine a lot of your listeners are,

0:11:58.850 --> 0:12:00.989
<v Speaker 3>I belong to the Kenton Game and Fish Association.

0:12:01.190 --> 0:12:03.360
<v Speaker 1>Our annual fall turkey shoot is this Sunday.

0:12:03.440 --> 0:12:04.200
<v Speaker 2>Oh, cool. Love it.

0:12:04.400 --> 0:12:05.800
<v Speaker 3>If you or any of your listeners want to come

0:12:05.880 --> 0:12:08.220
<v Speaker 3>on down, it's open to the public. It begins at noon,

0:12:08.300 --> 0:12:10.280
<v Speaker 3>Kenton Game and Fish. It's on Locust Pike. You can

0:12:10.320 --> 0:12:13.100
<v Speaker 3>find it online, and I'll be sharing it in my

0:12:13.160 --> 0:12:17.740
<v Speaker 3>social media. And if you want to hear me talk

0:12:17.780 --> 0:12:19.900
<v Speaker 3>your ear off about more of this stuff, you can

0:12:19.980 --> 0:12:21.780
<v Speaker 3>meet me in person and I'll tell you the stuff

0:12:21.820 --> 0:12:22.820
<v Speaker 3>we can't talk about on the.

0:12:22.740 --> 0:12:25.900
<v Speaker 1>Radio, Brian. Then you'll really, really be sorry that you

0:12:25.940 --> 0:12:26.260
<v Speaker 1>know me.

0:12:26.480 --> 0:12:30.400
<v Speaker 2>No FCC oversight in offline communications. Anyway, let's get into this.

0:12:30.440 --> 0:12:33.860
<v Speaker 2>We've got about three minutes to boil down the robo-taxi operator.

0:12:33.880 --> 0:12:34.720
<v Speaker 1>All right.

0:12:34.760 --> 0:12:37.840
<v Speaker 3>And then real quick, last thing. Queen City Con Cybersecurity Conference,

0:12:37.950 --> 0:12:41.680
<v Speaker 3>November 13th through 15th. You all should come. That said, yeah,

0:12:41.740 --> 0:12:44.400
<v Speaker 3>so Brian, you know me pretty well now after all

0:12:44.420 --> 0:12:46.760
<v Speaker 3>the years we've been friends. I'm not riding in any

0:12:46.820 --> 0:12:49.400
<v Speaker 3>autonomous cars anytime soon.

0:12:49.900 --> 0:12:53.490
<v Speaker 1>Will these things eventually get to the point where they're trustworthy? Probably.

0:12:53.990 --> 0:12:56.189
<v Speaker 3>But you have a vehicle with a bunch of sensors

0:12:56.270 --> 0:12:59.270
<v Speaker 3>on it, right? Different types of sensors, cameras, LIDAR, all

0:12:59.309 --> 0:13:03.390
<v Speaker 3>kinds of different sensors. They've been trained in real-world driving simulations.

0:13:03.429 --> 0:13:09.640
<v Speaker 3>They've been trained in simulated driving situations. But you keep

0:13:09.679 --> 0:13:12.860
<v Speaker 3>seeing issues with these things. Now, again, I know the

0:13:12.960 --> 0:13:16.200
<v Speaker 3>experts and the people who are for this will tell me, oh, well,

0:13:16.260 --> 0:13:19.040
<v Speaker 3>if you look at the stats over time, they're much

0:13:19.080 --> 0:13:20.100
<v Speaker 3>better than human drivers.

0:13:20.320 --> 0:13:22.260
<v Speaker 1>OK, that may be the case.

0:13:22.440 --> 0:13:25.320
<v Speaker 3>All I know is we keep seeing examples where in

0:13:25.360 --> 0:13:29.660
<v Speaker 3>real world situations where a reasonable human driver would make

0:13:29.700 --> 0:13:33.000
<v Speaker 3>a different decision like, hey, let's not block the emergency vehicles. Hey,

0:13:33.020 --> 0:13:37.960
<v Speaker 3>let's not drive into a construction zone. If you look,

0:13:38.020 --> 0:13:40.060
<v Speaker 3>and I'll, again, post a bunch of these articles in

0:13:40.080 --> 0:13:43.640
<v Speaker 3>the show notes that show you this, there are continuous

0:13:43.720 --> 0:13:47.120
<v Speaker 3>problems with these kind of vehicles where they do things,

0:13:47.140 --> 0:13:50.459
<v Speaker 3>they get stuck. In one instance, they went into a

0:13:50.480 --> 0:13:53.260
<v Speaker 3>neighborhood and just jammed up the whole neighborhood. People run

0:13:53.320 --> 0:13:54.870
<v Speaker 3>up and put an orange cone on the hood, and

0:13:54.880 --> 0:13:58.890
<v Speaker 3>the thing doesn't know what to do. Again, you can

0:13:58.970 --> 0:14:00.910
<v Speaker 3>argue that in a perfect.

0:14:00.590 --> 0:14:04.210
<v Speaker 1>World, would a machine be better than a human driver? Maybe.

0:14:06.550 --> 0:14:08.790
<v Speaker 3>For all the reasons I've stated in the last two segments,

0:14:08.850 --> 0:14:12.050
<v Speaker 3>these things are full of software. They're connected to other systems.

0:14:12.190 --> 0:14:15.630
<v Speaker 3>What happens when those systems go down? What happens if

0:14:15.710 --> 0:14:16.840
<v Speaker 3>a sensor gets covered up?

0:14:17.840 --> 0:14:20.420
<v Speaker 1>Again, I'm not against this per se.

0:14:20.980 --> 0:14:23.520
<v Speaker 3>I think like so much of the technology that I

0:14:23.600 --> 0:14:25.700
<v Speaker 3>rail on all the time, and you know I'm not

0:14:25.740 --> 0:14:28.060
<v Speaker 3>an anti-technology guy, Brian. This is what I've done for

0:14:28.080 --> 0:14:31.290
<v Speaker 3>more than 30 years. This stuff is moving way too fast.

0:14:31.930 --> 0:14:35.340
<v Speaker 3>The incentives for you as a consumer are from a security,

0:14:35.500 --> 0:14:39.670
<v Speaker 3>both physical and cyber perspective, and your privacy are all

0:14:39.850 --> 0:14:43.170
<v Speaker 3>wrong for you as a consumer. And we just keep

0:14:43.230 --> 0:14:46.119
<v Speaker 3>putting more software in things. I've talked about some of

0:14:46.140 --> 0:14:47.880
<v Speaker 3>the problems. In fact, one of the things I'm gonna

0:14:47.920 --> 0:14:50.520
<v Speaker 3>talk about at that cybersecurity conference and have talked about

0:14:50.540 --> 0:14:53.790
<v Speaker 3>a lot recently the abysmal state of software security. As

0:14:53.870 --> 0:14:56.510
<v Speaker 3>a recovering software engineer that did it for 25 years,

0:14:56.950 --> 0:14:59.770
<v Speaker 3>there is literally no bad practice I have not personally

0:14:59.810 --> 0:15:02.320
<v Speaker 3>done because for most of my career, I was not

0:15:02.410 --> 0:15:04.080
<v Speaker 3>focused on security or privacy.

0:15:04.560 --> 0:15:07.239
<v Speaker 1>Those were not my objectives. I was not incentivized to

0:15:07.280 --> 0:15:10.030
<v Speaker 1>care about that. I hope this makes sense to you.

0:15:10.040 --> 0:15:11.860
<v Speaker 3>So when I tell you I don't have a smart

0:15:11.900 --> 0:15:14.680
<v Speaker 3>refrigerator or a smart coffee maker that can be hacked

0:15:14.840 --> 0:15:18.800
<v Speaker 3>online and used to burn my house down, these are

0:15:18.820 --> 0:15:22.920
<v Speaker 3>the reasons why. I know how this process works. Trust me,

0:15:23.420 --> 0:15:26.980
<v Speaker 3>they are not building this stuff with software in it

0:15:27.180 --> 0:15:31.370
<v Speaker 3>that is designed for your security and your privacy. And

0:15:31.710 --> 0:15:33.870
<v Speaker 3>that's why I'm not going to be writing any of

0:15:33.890 --> 0:15:35.630
<v Speaker 3>these kind of things soon. And I have a lot

0:15:35.670 --> 0:15:39.190
<v Speaker 3>of concerns about them because even though it doesn't get

0:15:39.210 --> 0:15:41.450
<v Speaker 3>a lot of press, it is documented out there. And

0:15:41.470 --> 0:15:44.750
<v Speaker 3>there are many examples where these things don't work right.

0:15:45.620 --> 0:15:47.359
<v Speaker 3>And yeah, it's not for me.

0:15:47.600 --> 0:15:49.770
<v Speaker 2>Appreciate the message. I've heard it loud and clear, and

0:15:49.930 --> 0:15:52.440
<v Speaker 2>I follow your directive, Dave, because I know you're right.