1 00:00:00,520 --> 00:00:04,800 Speaker 1: It's Night Side with Dan Ray. I'm tell Youbsy Costing's 2 00:00:04,880 --> 00:00:05,840 Speaker 1: news radio. 3 00:00:06,320 --> 00:00:09,840 Speaker 2: Brady J for Dan to night on nights Side. The 4 00:00:09,880 --> 00:00:13,400 Speaker 2: phrase algorithmic pricing may not strike fear into your heart yet, 5 00:00:13,920 --> 00:00:16,120 Speaker 2: but only because you might not know what it is, 6 00:00:16,400 --> 00:00:18,919 Speaker 2: and actually you might think it's a good thing. I 7 00:00:18,960 --> 00:00:21,040 Speaker 2: think it might depend on who you are, how much 8 00:00:21,079 --> 00:00:24,200 Speaker 2: money you have, how much you value your privacy, et cetera, 9 00:00:25,400 --> 00:00:28,680 Speaker 2: or how much you value that notion that long since 10 00:00:28,840 --> 00:00:33,400 Speaker 2: gone notion of privacy that's there is no real privacy anymore. 11 00:00:33,920 --> 00:00:36,479 Speaker 2: But we're gonna find out about algorithmic pricing. Did you 12 00:00:36,560 --> 00:00:41,600 Speaker 2: know you may likely be charged a different amount for 13 00:00:41,640 --> 00:00:47,199 Speaker 2: the same goods depending on who you are. The machine 14 00:00:47,760 --> 00:00:51,239 Speaker 2: that sells you your computer is gonna know all about you. 15 00:00:51,280 --> 00:00:56,960 Speaker 2: And figure hm, that's Dot from Boston. I think she'll 16 00:00:57,040 --> 00:01:00,880 Speaker 2: pay two hundred and ninety five dollars for the whereas 17 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:04,360 Speaker 2: somebody else on a different computer with different information. Oh, 18 00:01:04,440 --> 00:01:05,760 Speaker 2: I bet they'd pay five hundred. 19 00:01:06,600 --> 00:01:10,520 Speaker 3: Is that fair? Do you think it's coming? Well, we'll 20 00:01:10,560 --> 00:01:16,360 Speaker 3: find out algorithmic pricing. Our guest is Noah G and Sarahcusa. 21 00:01:16,920 --> 00:01:21,320 Speaker 3: And if I'm not mistaken, that U means John of Syracuse, 22 00:01:21,520 --> 00:01:27,240 Speaker 3: Syracusa in Sicily, home of the great inventor Archimedes? Is that? 23 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:28,440 Speaker 3: Am I on track? There? 24 00:01:28,680 --> 00:01:31,720 Speaker 4: You are spot on that. It's absoulley correct. I'm impressed 25 00:01:31,720 --> 00:01:32,680 Speaker 4: you did your homework there. 26 00:01:33,480 --> 00:01:36,760 Speaker 2: I like words, and I knew Syracusa had to be that, 27 00:01:36,920 --> 00:01:40,040 Speaker 2: and then of course the GM has got to be John. 28 00:01:40,160 --> 00:01:40,759 Speaker 3: So there you go. 29 00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:44,040 Speaker 4: Most people just think of Syracuse, New York, but you 30 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:45,000 Speaker 4: know that's close enough. 31 00:01:45,840 --> 00:01:48,800 Speaker 2: Tell us about you before we get into this algorithmic pricing. 32 00:01:49,960 --> 00:01:52,720 Speaker 4: So I'm a math professor at Bentley and Waltham, and 33 00:01:53,840 --> 00:01:56,240 Speaker 4: I try to keep up with the news for my 34 00:01:56,280 --> 00:01:58,440 Speaker 4: teaching because I want to help my students know what's 35 00:01:58,480 --> 00:02:00,000 Speaker 4: going on in a lot of the world right now 36 00:02:00,080 --> 00:02:03,520 Speaker 4: as AI and algorithms, And something that's been coming up 37 00:02:03,560 --> 00:02:06,480 Speaker 4: in the news lately is this algorithmic pricing. It goes 38 00:02:06,520 --> 00:02:09,320 Speaker 4: by feet different names. If you've heard of it, you 39 00:02:09,400 --> 00:02:12,200 Speaker 4: might have heard of it as personalized pricing or dynamic pricing. 40 00:02:12,880 --> 00:02:15,880 Speaker 4: And it's the basic idea what you said, that you 41 00:02:15,960 --> 00:02:18,480 Speaker 4: might get a different price, like if you, let's say, 42 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:21,400 Speaker 4: door dash your dinner, you might potentially get a different 43 00:02:21,400 --> 00:02:24,440 Speaker 4: price as even someone in your own house, just on 44 00:02:24,520 --> 00:02:27,760 Speaker 4: a different phone, different computer, different data goes into it. 45 00:02:28,240 --> 00:02:29,919 Speaker 4: So we can get into why that happens and why 46 00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:32,600 Speaker 4: it's scary. But that's what it is, just different people 47 00:02:32,600 --> 00:02:33,639 Speaker 4: getting different prices. 48 00:02:33,720 --> 00:02:38,480 Speaker 2: So first it seems as though if big business decides 49 00:02:38,520 --> 00:02:40,920 Speaker 2: that's the way I want to go, there's nothing we 50 00:02:40,960 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 2: can there's nothing we can do as as consumers about it. 51 00:02:44,840 --> 00:02:46,480 Speaker 3: Or is there if we did not like it? 52 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:50,400 Speaker 4: You know? Good question. So literally just today, I'm not 53 00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:52,320 Speaker 4: making this up. I had lunch. I'm actually in DC 54 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:53,919 Speaker 4: at the time. That's why I'm calling on the phone 55 00:02:53,919 --> 00:02:56,360 Speaker 4: and said, have in your studio. I had lunch with 56 00:02:56,440 --> 00:02:59,560 Speaker 4: the lawyer from former lawyer from the FTC. He's moved 57 00:02:59,600 --> 00:03:02,200 Speaker 4: on last year or so, and I was asking him 58 00:03:02,200 --> 00:03:04,960 Speaker 4: this very question. I said, is this even illegal? You know, 59 00:03:05,200 --> 00:03:07,280 Speaker 4: we might want to try to stop it, but is 60 00:03:07,280 --> 00:03:09,720 Speaker 4: is it illegal? And he said I didn't know this 61 00:03:09,800 --> 00:03:12,960 Speaker 4: when the FTC, So the Federal Trade Commission was founded. 62 00:03:13,800 --> 00:03:16,680 Speaker 4: They sort of have a charter that introduced the FTC. 63 00:03:17,240 --> 00:03:19,520 Speaker 4: And one of the things, you know, I forget the number, 64 00:03:19,560 --> 00:03:21,880 Speaker 4: paragraph five or section five or something like that. It's 65 00:03:21,880 --> 00:03:25,760 Speaker 4: on legal term says, I forget the exact name the 66 00:03:26,160 --> 00:03:29,080 Speaker 4: wording that he used, but it was something like unfair 67 00:03:29,440 --> 00:03:34,800 Speaker 4: and misleading practices are illegal as far as FTC is concerned. 68 00:03:35,680 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 4: So how you exactly interpret that? You know, that goes 69 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:41,040 Speaker 4: to courts and judges and juries. So there's a lot 70 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:44,120 Speaker 4: that goes into that. But there is some central idea 71 00:03:44,160 --> 00:03:49,080 Speaker 4: that goes across the whole country that unfair practices in 72 00:03:49,160 --> 00:03:52,400 Speaker 4: retail are illegal. We don't need a specific law that 73 00:03:52,520 --> 00:03:55,520 Speaker 4: bans this kind of pricing. That it's just you can't 74 00:03:55,520 --> 00:03:58,360 Speaker 4: do unfair things. So he said that there is a 75 00:03:58,440 --> 00:04:02,480 Speaker 4: reasonable argument that the whole idea, you know, tech companies 76 00:04:02,520 --> 00:04:04,920 Speaker 4: want to do this, that it should be illegal, but 77 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:07,880 Speaker 4: it's not obviously breaking a law, like it's something that's 78 00:04:07,880 --> 00:04:09,720 Speaker 4: going to have to go to corporates. 79 00:04:09,760 --> 00:04:13,440 Speaker 3: Two things first, if it's unfair, how is it unfair? 80 00:04:14,760 --> 00:04:17,640 Speaker 4: Okay? So that great question. So part of it was 81 00:04:18,120 --> 00:04:20,520 Speaker 4: this idea, I forget again the exact wording that he used, 82 00:04:20,520 --> 00:04:23,240 Speaker 4: but it's something like misleading or a deceptive that was 83 00:04:23,240 --> 00:04:26,640 Speaker 4: a deceptive practices, And he said it's it's not exactly 84 00:04:26,680 --> 00:04:29,520 Speaker 4: clear what the argument would be, but there is some 85 00:04:29,680 --> 00:04:33,279 Speaker 4: idea that imagine again like you know, i'm i'm i 86 00:04:33,320 --> 00:04:36,520 Speaker 4: live in actin with my wife, and if I order 87 00:04:36,600 --> 00:04:39,280 Speaker 4: something and she orders something and it costs her a 88 00:04:39,279 --> 00:04:42,960 Speaker 4: different amount than me, there's some fundamental feeling that that's 89 00:04:43,000 --> 00:04:45,120 Speaker 4: not fair. You know, why is she getting a different price. 90 00:04:45,200 --> 00:04:48,560 Speaker 4: It's not because she is in some loyalty program or 91 00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:51,880 Speaker 4: she you know. The only thing that might be different 92 00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:55,120 Speaker 4: is our data. So what does data mean? Well, let 93 00:04:55,120 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 4: me let me give you a little backstory. So the 94 00:04:58,160 --> 00:05:02,520 Speaker 4: Internet for the last twenty years has developed around the 95 00:05:02,560 --> 00:05:05,279 Speaker 4: idea that things should be free online. But we see 96 00:05:05,279 --> 00:05:07,440 Speaker 4: a lot of ads. So you don't pay to do 97 00:05:07,520 --> 00:05:10,240 Speaker 4: Google searches, you don't pay to watch videos on TikTok, 98 00:05:10,279 --> 00:05:12,719 Speaker 4: you don't pay to watch videos on YouTube. All those 99 00:05:12,720 --> 00:05:15,160 Speaker 4: things are free because they're funded by ads a lot 100 00:05:15,200 --> 00:05:19,400 Speaker 4: like radio and TV mostly is. But what's different between 101 00:05:19,480 --> 00:05:21,480 Speaker 4: radio and TV and the Internet is on the Internet, 102 00:05:21,680 --> 00:05:25,560 Speaker 4: there are fancy algorithms that target these ads. So when 103 00:05:25,600 --> 00:05:28,760 Speaker 4: you browse through, when you watch TikTok videos, the algorithms 104 00:05:28,800 --> 00:05:31,400 Speaker 4: are paying attention to what you're watching, what you're commenting, 105 00:05:31,480 --> 00:05:34,239 Speaker 4: what you're doing, and it uses all of that data, 106 00:05:34,520 --> 00:05:37,680 Speaker 4: the trail of your actions to find exactly the ads 107 00:05:37,720 --> 00:05:40,560 Speaker 4: that they find products that they think you're interested in 108 00:05:41,040 --> 00:05:43,080 Speaker 4: if you watch a lot of sports videos, maybe start 109 00:05:43,080 --> 00:05:46,159 Speaker 4: seeing ads for sports equipment. So they have this whole 110 00:05:46,200 --> 00:05:49,280 Speaker 4: infrastructure built up on learning as much as they can 111 00:05:49,320 --> 00:05:52,080 Speaker 4: about you and then using these algorithms to target with ads. 112 00:05:52,560 --> 00:05:54,560 Speaker 4: And now we're in the situation where they can use 113 00:05:54,760 --> 00:05:58,159 Speaker 4: very similar algorithms to instead of figure out what you 114 00:05:58,240 --> 00:06:00,600 Speaker 4: might buy, figure out how much you might buy it for. 115 00:06:01,560 --> 00:06:04,320 Speaker 4: And so your data like what you search and google, 116 00:06:04,360 --> 00:06:07,200 Speaker 4: what you watch on YouTube. Potentially, I don't think it's 117 00:06:07,200 --> 00:06:10,680 Speaker 4: happening yet, but in theory, could the conversations you have 118 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:14,960 Speaker 4: with your AI chatbots could go into some algorithm and 119 00:06:15,400 --> 00:06:18,040 Speaker 4: end up determining how much things cost online. So it's 120 00:06:18,279 --> 00:06:19,240 Speaker 4: scary to be honest. 121 00:06:19,960 --> 00:06:21,520 Speaker 3: So you're you're. 122 00:06:21,360 --> 00:06:24,120 Speaker 2: Saying unfair, and I need a better word than that, 123 00:06:24,160 --> 00:06:25,240 Speaker 2: and I think it might have it. 124 00:06:25,360 --> 00:06:26,880 Speaker 3: I mean unfairnair. 125 00:06:27,839 --> 00:06:32,280 Speaker 2: I feel like if I were the attorney who was 126 00:06:32,360 --> 00:06:39,159 Speaker 2: suing one of the Googles, say sorry, Jeff, I would 127 00:06:39,360 --> 00:06:40,159 Speaker 2: say it's. 128 00:06:40,040 --> 00:06:41,440 Speaker 3: Just a form of discrimination. 129 00:06:43,120 --> 00:06:43,360 Speaker 4: Yep. 130 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:45,640 Speaker 3: So here if I go to a bar. 131 00:06:45,800 --> 00:06:47,279 Speaker 2: If I go to a bar and order a white 132 00:06:47,320 --> 00:06:51,839 Speaker 2: Russian and it's nine bucks for me and twelve bucks 133 00:06:51,880 --> 00:06:52,839 Speaker 2: for the person beside me. 134 00:06:52,920 --> 00:06:53,880 Speaker 3: That's discrimination. 135 00:06:54,000 --> 00:06:58,680 Speaker 2: And I guess the discrimination would be based on how 136 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:01,120 Speaker 2: much money they think I have. And why should I 137 00:07:01,160 --> 00:07:04,279 Speaker 2: be discriminated against because I. 138 00:07:03,880 --> 00:07:05,760 Speaker 3: Work hard or got lucky. I don't know. 139 00:07:05,880 --> 00:07:08,960 Speaker 2: I don't think so now they could as a market system, 140 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:11,880 Speaker 2: we can charge anything we want. Yes, that you have 141 00:07:11,960 --> 00:07:16,680 Speaker 2: to charge it uniformly, like Uber currently does. If it's 142 00:07:16,680 --> 00:07:19,760 Speaker 2: surge pricing, it's surge pricing for everybody. I think there 143 00:07:19,840 --> 00:07:22,880 Speaker 2: should be anyway. But this is different because you're getting 144 00:07:23,160 --> 00:07:29,239 Speaker 2: picked out because of your income and that there. 145 00:07:29,080 --> 00:07:32,360 Speaker 4: You go, oh yeah, so let's let's untack. You said 146 00:07:32,360 --> 00:07:34,320 Speaker 4: a lot of great things. Let's untack those. So first 147 00:07:34,360 --> 00:07:37,240 Speaker 4: of all, I, personally, you know this is made just 148 00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:39,160 Speaker 4: as a human being. Agree with what you're saying, like 149 00:07:39,640 --> 00:07:43,520 Speaker 4: that sounds what you describe sounds unfair and discriminatory. But 150 00:07:43,600 --> 00:07:46,440 Speaker 4: let's step back. Is it actually illegal to discriminate in 151 00:07:46,480 --> 00:07:49,440 Speaker 4: that manner? So I didn't know this until fairly recently, 152 00:07:49,480 --> 00:07:52,880 Speaker 4: But it turns out only in certain categories. So there's 153 00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:57,480 Speaker 4: the Federal Civil Rights Act from the nineteen sixties that 154 00:07:57,640 --> 00:08:02,160 Speaker 4: makes it illegal to discriminate in certain but they're restricted. 155 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:07,440 Speaker 4: I think it's three housing finance and medicine. I think. So, like, 156 00:08:07,800 --> 00:08:10,040 Speaker 4: you know, if you're trying to buy a house or 157 00:08:10,040 --> 00:08:13,520 Speaker 4: rent a house, you can't charge different people different rents 158 00:08:13,560 --> 00:08:15,560 Speaker 4: based on the race or gender and things like that. 159 00:08:16,120 --> 00:08:18,600 Speaker 4: But there isn't actually a law in the US that 160 00:08:18,680 --> 00:08:23,280 Speaker 4: says discrimination price discrimination just across the board is illegal. 161 00:08:23,320 --> 00:08:27,960 Speaker 4: It's only in these settings. So if you're selling laptops, 162 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:31,480 Speaker 4: you can discriminate, this doesn't break the law. So it 163 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 4: gets kind of subtle with you know what we're talking about, 164 00:08:33,600 --> 00:08:37,320 Speaker 4: this online discrimination. It depends what we're talking about buying, 165 00:08:37,520 --> 00:08:40,199 Speaker 4: and it depends what kind of discrimination, what kind of 166 00:08:40,280 --> 00:08:43,160 Speaker 4: data goes into this. So in other words, it's it's 167 00:08:43,160 --> 00:08:46,000 Speaker 4: more subtle than I realized. And I was asking this 168 00:08:46,200 --> 00:08:49,920 Speaker 4: FTC lawyer and I said, oh, you know, if the 169 00:08:49,960 --> 00:08:55,040 Speaker 4: FDC says it's illegal to have the unfair price algorithms happening, 170 00:08:55,880 --> 00:08:58,360 Speaker 4: I said, well, these seem pretty unfair to me. And he's, 171 00:08:59,000 --> 00:09:01,640 Speaker 4: you know, I'm not a lawyer, I'm a math, technical guy. 172 00:09:02,120 --> 00:09:05,360 Speaker 4: He gave this long sentence that was describing how they 173 00:09:05,400 --> 00:09:07,640 Speaker 4: tend to interpret the word unfair, and I don't remember 174 00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:11,280 Speaker 4: the details, but it was it's you know, complicated, so 175 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:14,920 Speaker 4: lawyers don't have a very clear simple definition of what 176 00:09:15,040 --> 00:09:18,760 Speaker 4: unfair is. It doesn't mean discrimination, but it certainly that's 177 00:09:18,760 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 4: one of the things that comes up in it. 178 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:25,280 Speaker 3: All right, So according to your legal friend, it is uh, 179 00:09:26,080 --> 00:09:27,160 Speaker 3: not illegal. 180 00:09:28,600 --> 00:09:31,720 Speaker 4: Well so that's not what he said. He said, it's 181 00:09:31,840 --> 00:09:37,920 Speaker 4: it's not obviously unfair, but he kind of thought probably 182 00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:40,520 Speaker 4: if these things do go to court, there'll be an 183 00:09:40,640 --> 00:09:43,920 Speaker 4: argument that they're deceptive, and if the judge doesn't buy that, 184 00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:49,200 Speaker 4: then there'll be an argument that they're unfair, you know, 185 00:09:49,280 --> 00:09:52,680 Speaker 4: sort of misleading people that if I go on Amazon 186 00:09:52,760 --> 00:09:54,720 Speaker 4: and I try to buy diapers for my baby and 187 00:09:54,760 --> 00:09:57,800 Speaker 4: it says this particular diapers ten dollars for a package, 188 00:09:58,679 --> 00:10:02,000 Speaker 4: and someone else goes and they see that it's five dollars, 189 00:10:02,840 --> 00:10:03,800 Speaker 4: there's an argument, you. 190 00:10:03,720 --> 00:10:05,800 Speaker 3: Know, you don't have to believe that there's a price 191 00:10:05,960 --> 00:10:06,480 Speaker 3: is X. 192 00:10:06,960 --> 00:10:08,560 Speaker 4: Yeah, it's not X. 193 00:10:08,880 --> 00:10:12,440 Speaker 3: The price is actually for you. So the price is 194 00:10:12,480 --> 00:10:13,120 Speaker 3: not X. 195 00:10:13,080 --> 00:10:17,040 Speaker 2: Really in all cases, So that's the deception, okay, exactly. 196 00:10:17,080 --> 00:10:19,920 Speaker 4: And imagine, you know, I physically walk into a store 197 00:10:20,120 --> 00:10:23,320 Speaker 4: and I go to buy something and the shopkeeper looks 198 00:10:23,320 --> 00:10:25,560 Speaker 4: at me, kind of sizes me up and says this, 199 00:10:25,679 --> 00:10:28,480 Speaker 4: you know, this whatever piece of clothing is twenty bucks. 200 00:10:28,679 --> 00:10:30,560 Speaker 4: Then he looks at the customers to me and he says, 201 00:10:30,600 --> 00:10:33,720 Speaker 4: for you ten dollars. Yeah, that's that's what we're talking about, 202 00:10:33,840 --> 00:10:35,720 Speaker 4: just happening in a computer instead of in person. So 203 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:37,960 Speaker 4: we don't know how the lock's going to play out. 204 00:10:38,040 --> 00:10:40,520 Speaker 4: That's that's the truth. We don't know, but these are 205 00:10:40,559 --> 00:10:42,480 Speaker 4: the ideas and the arguments that might go into it. 206 00:10:42,559 --> 00:10:44,120 Speaker 2: Yeah, we'll get into a little more of the tech. 207 00:10:44,160 --> 00:10:46,200 Speaker 2: And I love to hear if you think that's fair. 208 00:10:46,240 --> 00:10:49,719 Speaker 2: And you may think it is fair because if you 209 00:10:49,760 --> 00:10:52,000 Speaker 2: don't have a lot of money, you may be able 210 00:10:52,040 --> 00:10:53,560 Speaker 2: to pay less. 211 00:10:53,840 --> 00:10:54,760 Speaker 3: Now I don't know. 212 00:10:55,000 --> 00:10:58,760 Speaker 2: I don't know if the bar will go down for 213 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:01,720 Speaker 2: someone with less money, or does it only go up 214 00:11:01,960 --> 00:11:05,600 Speaker 2: for some of them more money that that wouldn't help 215 00:11:05,640 --> 00:11:06,920 Speaker 2: anybody really. 216 00:11:07,000 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 3: But we'll discus. 217 00:11:08,679 --> 00:11:11,479 Speaker 2: I want to take a break now and we'll continue 218 00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:13,920 Speaker 2: in just a moment on WBZ. 219 00:11:14,880 --> 00:11:20,000 Speaker 1: Night Side with Dan Ray on WBZ Boston's News Radio. 220 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:27,439 Speaker 2: Algorithmic or dynamic pricing, it's kind of I feel it's 221 00:11:27,480 --> 00:11:30,280 Speaker 2: kind of ugly. And the longer we go here, the 222 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:32,800 Speaker 2: more details I'll give you about why. And we have 223 00:11:32,880 --> 00:11:35,960 Speaker 2: a real great guest with us talking about this. Noah's 224 00:11:36,000 --> 00:11:40,559 Speaker 2: young Sarah Cusa, Sarah Cusa and Noah. We have Dan 225 00:11:40,640 --> 00:11:42,680 Speaker 2: and Boston who's been waiting to talk with us and 226 00:11:42,960 --> 00:11:46,320 Speaker 2: weigh in on this. So Dan, welcome to Night Side. 227 00:11:48,160 --> 00:11:49,000 Speaker 4: Thank you, Bradley. 228 00:11:49,520 --> 00:11:52,000 Speaker 5: Uh well, this has kind of already been going on 229 00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:56,240 Speaker 5: a little bit. I feel like a lot of supermarkets 230 00:11:56,240 --> 00:11:59,520 Speaker 5: will do this type of thing. I'll pay a different 231 00:11:59,559 --> 00:12:03,720 Speaker 5: price for a gallon of milk depending it's not my 232 00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:07,040 Speaker 5: digital footprint, but on the zip code of the town 233 00:12:07,160 --> 00:12:08,240 Speaker 5: I buy that milk in. 234 00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:14,400 Speaker 3: It's more expensive at that store all the time, though. 235 00:12:16,040 --> 00:12:20,360 Speaker 5: Yeah, so just because it's a town of median average 236 00:12:20,360 --> 00:12:24,160 Speaker 5: income maybe more or or so, it's gonna be a 237 00:12:24,200 --> 00:12:27,120 Speaker 5: little bit more expensive for the same gallon at a 238 00:12:27,320 --> 00:12:31,679 Speaker 5: certain supermarket as it would be the same supermarket a 239 00:12:31,840 --> 00:12:36,120 Speaker 5: town over. If they're average, you know, gross incomes are 240 00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:39,640 Speaker 5: a little less, so they're kind of already gauging it 241 00:12:40,160 --> 00:12:40,640 Speaker 5: in a way. 242 00:12:40,720 --> 00:12:41,160 Speaker 3: That's right. 243 00:12:41,360 --> 00:12:47,440 Speaker 2: That's a very broad brushed, ham fisted early version of it, 244 00:12:47,480 --> 00:12:50,840 Speaker 2: I guess. But not only it's even worse when you're 245 00:12:50,880 --> 00:12:53,400 Speaker 2: in the store and the person behind you has to 246 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:56,960 Speaker 2: pay less, and who are they to decide that I 247 00:12:56,960 --> 00:13:00,280 Speaker 2: should pay more. Who is my priorities? The money I 248 00:13:00,320 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 2: spend on other things is my business. If I want 249 00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:05,600 Speaker 2: to go on fancy trip or have a fancy car, 250 00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:09,559 Speaker 2: and should I have to pay more for my food 251 00:13:09,600 --> 00:13:10,360 Speaker 2: too because of that? 252 00:13:10,440 --> 00:13:12,440 Speaker 3: No, I shouldn't if I have to pay more. I 253 00:13:12,480 --> 00:13:15,040 Speaker 3: agree that if I have to pay more for my food, 254 00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:17,240 Speaker 3: then I can't afford the fancy trip and the fancy car. 255 00:13:18,280 --> 00:13:22,280 Speaker 5: Yeah, that's big brother creeping in on us. And it's 256 00:13:22,400 --> 00:13:27,079 Speaker 5: unfair that people pay different prices for the same services rendered. 257 00:13:27,480 --> 00:13:30,439 Speaker 3: I appreciate that, Dan, Thank you nobody. 258 00:13:30,640 --> 00:13:33,560 Speaker 4: And I think kind of the point, you know, dance 259 00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:35,640 Speaker 4: raising and you're you're, you know, falling up Bradley, is 260 00:13:36,600 --> 00:13:40,040 Speaker 4: we're gonna have to decide as a society what we're 261 00:13:40,080 --> 00:13:43,440 Speaker 4: okay with and what we're not. And it's not a 262 00:13:43,480 --> 00:13:45,800 Speaker 4: simple matter of just saying all of this is illegal 263 00:13:45,920 --> 00:13:47,800 Speaker 4: or all of this is not. All this is okay, 264 00:13:47,840 --> 00:13:49,280 Speaker 4: and all of it we're gonna have to go through 265 00:13:49,280 --> 00:13:52,840 Speaker 4: and say some price discriminations okay, and some is not. So. 266 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:58,240 Speaker 4: I think dance Point is using zip codes, Okay, I 267 00:13:58,240 --> 00:14:00,640 Speaker 4: don't know. Maybe some people think it is. Maybe isn't 268 00:14:01,120 --> 00:14:04,080 Speaker 4: but knowing it's happening is a key, and that's what's 269 00:14:04,160 --> 00:14:08,040 Speaker 4: really frustrating with the algorithmic stuff. It's really hard to 270 00:14:08,240 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 4: know when it's happening. So when I go on Amazon, 271 00:14:11,800 --> 00:14:14,280 Speaker 4: when I go on buy my plane tickets on Delta 272 00:14:14,360 --> 00:14:16,640 Speaker 4: or wherever it is, I don't know if they're doing 273 00:14:16,679 --> 00:14:20,040 Speaker 4: this algorithm pricing, personalized pricing or not. I just see 274 00:14:20,040 --> 00:14:23,040 Speaker 4: the price that I see. At least in the grocery store. 275 00:14:23,040 --> 00:14:25,120 Speaker 4: I can drive around and say, hey, you know, milk's 276 00:14:25,120 --> 00:14:26,800 Speaker 4: a little cheaper at this one store than the other. 277 00:14:27,320 --> 00:14:29,840 Speaker 4: So part of it is a transparency issue. We don't 278 00:14:29,840 --> 00:14:31,480 Speaker 4: if we don't know what's happening, we just feel like 279 00:14:32,720 --> 00:14:36,200 Speaker 4: we're being more manipulated. And it's creepier when we are 280 00:14:36,400 --> 00:14:38,280 Speaker 4: left out of the equation, so to speak. 281 00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:42,440 Speaker 2: I myself feel like it's okay for it for one 282 00:14:42,520 --> 00:14:45,480 Speaker 2: town too, for any institution to charge what they want 283 00:14:45,880 --> 00:14:48,320 Speaker 2: if they think that their clientele will pay more. It's 284 00:14:48,320 --> 00:14:50,400 Speaker 2: the market system as long as it's for everyone that 285 00:14:50,480 --> 00:14:54,840 Speaker 2: comes in the door and that they're not changing it and. 286 00:14:54,800 --> 00:14:57,000 Speaker 4: It's sort of open right. You walk in, you see 287 00:14:57,000 --> 00:14:58,880 Speaker 4: what the price is, and as you said, everyone else 288 00:14:58,880 --> 00:15:02,160 Speaker 4: sees the same price. That's fine, But it's it's the 289 00:15:02,160 --> 00:15:05,080 Speaker 4: more that it gets secret and kind of behind closed 290 00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:07,400 Speaker 4: doors that we run into issues. 291 00:15:07,520 --> 00:15:10,160 Speaker 2: Okay, there's a logistic question, and I see how he's 292 00:15:10,200 --> 00:15:13,320 Speaker 2: easily done when you do it online because they have email, 293 00:15:13,320 --> 00:15:16,640 Speaker 2: addressent poof, they know everything about you. But when you 294 00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:19,120 Speaker 2: go to and it's brick and mortar store. So you 295 00:15:19,160 --> 00:15:21,680 Speaker 2: want to buy a tempopeeding mattress and it's you know, 296 00:15:21,880 --> 00:15:28,360 Speaker 2: five grand. That's not me, but somebody might. They don't 297 00:15:28,400 --> 00:15:30,440 Speaker 2: know who you are. They have to put the price 298 00:15:30,480 --> 00:15:32,080 Speaker 2: out there before they know who you are. So I 299 00:15:32,080 --> 00:15:35,520 Speaker 2: don't know if they can do algorithmic algorithmic pricing with 300 00:15:35,600 --> 00:15:36,680 Speaker 2: a brick and mortar store. 301 00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:37,120 Speaker 3: Can they? 302 00:15:38,080 --> 00:15:41,280 Speaker 4: Yeah? Great question. So it is more of an online thing, 303 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:44,200 Speaker 4: but guess what, More and more of our shopping is online. 304 00:15:44,680 --> 00:15:47,240 Speaker 4: But we actually did see earlier versions that are kind 305 00:15:47,240 --> 00:15:50,320 Speaker 4: of related to Dan's calling question. When you have a 306 00:15:50,320 --> 00:15:53,200 Speaker 4: loyalty card at a grocery store, why do we all 307 00:15:53,240 --> 00:15:55,360 Speaker 4: have to get those stupid cards and scan them every 308 00:15:55,360 --> 00:15:58,560 Speaker 4: time we shop and buy stuff to get hate that? 309 00:15:59,040 --> 00:16:01,280 Speaker 3: Well, they wasn't want your infant, Why do they want 310 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:01,880 Speaker 3: us to do that? 311 00:16:02,680 --> 00:16:03,320 Speaker 4: Want our data? 312 00:16:03,720 --> 00:16:05,520 Speaker 3: So they can use it or sell it. 313 00:16:06,760 --> 00:16:09,440 Speaker 4: Exactly, They want to know who is buying what, how 314 00:16:09,520 --> 00:16:12,520 Speaker 4: much when they want as much data as possible, and 315 00:16:12,560 --> 00:16:14,280 Speaker 4: that's how they collect and save the data to as 316 00:16:14,280 --> 00:16:17,120 Speaker 4: he's exactly said, to use or to sell the data. 317 00:16:17,520 --> 00:16:20,960 Speaker 4: Why do we agree to that because we get price discrimination, 318 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:24,560 Speaker 4: we get discounts, you know, price discrimination in the good way. 319 00:16:24,760 --> 00:16:28,240 Speaker 4: We get lower prices if we participate in that system. 320 00:16:28,600 --> 00:16:31,000 Speaker 4: So you brought up a really good point I want 321 00:16:31,040 --> 00:16:33,000 Speaker 4: to touch on right before the break. He said, well, 322 00:16:33,040 --> 00:16:36,000 Speaker 4: hold on, price discrimination sounds bad when I'm paying higher prices, 323 00:16:36,040 --> 00:16:38,680 Speaker 4: but what about when I get lower prices? And yeah, 324 00:16:38,880 --> 00:16:41,120 Speaker 4: we may all be annoyed at these loyalty cards, but 325 00:16:41,160 --> 00:16:43,600 Speaker 4: we all do it to get a discount. So let 326 00:16:43,600 --> 00:16:46,160 Speaker 4: me give your listeners. I think, to me, what was 327 00:16:46,200 --> 00:16:48,880 Speaker 4: like a really eye opening case about this. If I 328 00:16:49,000 --> 00:16:52,760 Speaker 4: told you I'm going to start discriminating price based on 329 00:16:52,800 --> 00:16:56,520 Speaker 4: people's age, are you okay with that? You might think, 330 00:16:56,560 --> 00:16:59,200 Speaker 4: Oh no, that's gross, right, that's that sounds creepy. What 331 00:16:59,320 --> 00:17:01,440 Speaker 4: I said, Oh no, What I meant is I'm going 332 00:17:01,520 --> 00:17:05,960 Speaker 4: to give senior citizens discounts to use public transits. Well, 333 00:17:05,960 --> 00:17:09,919 Speaker 4: that sounds great. That is price discrimination based on a 334 00:17:09,960 --> 00:17:12,760 Speaker 4: personal data point based on people's age. 335 00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:17,200 Speaker 3: Oh, it's semantics. Just shows semantic's subtle and it is semantic. 336 00:17:17,280 --> 00:17:22,520 Speaker 2: And surge pricing dynamic pricing is they're they're thinking about 337 00:17:22,560 --> 00:17:24,880 Speaker 2: it for the tolling to come on roads that come 338 00:17:24,880 --> 00:17:28,480 Speaker 2: into Massachusetts. And it can be phrased different ways. It 339 00:17:28,480 --> 00:17:33,720 Speaker 2: can be phrased you're going to pay more for example 340 00:17:33,760 --> 00:17:36,080 Speaker 2: if you come or in peak hours, or they can 341 00:17:36,080 --> 00:17:38,040 Speaker 2: phrase it, hey, you want to get a break on 342 00:17:38,080 --> 00:17:43,160 Speaker 2: the price, come in off hours and you'll and you'll 343 00:17:43,160 --> 00:17:45,240 Speaker 2: get a break. But the only real way they can 344 00:17:45,240 --> 00:17:47,959 Speaker 2: do that is if if they give you a break 345 00:17:48,280 --> 00:17:50,960 Speaker 2: off peak hours, they have to raise it. I think 346 00:17:51,000 --> 00:17:53,520 Speaker 2: if they're going to keep continuing the same amount of revenue, 347 00:17:54,080 --> 00:17:58,120 Speaker 2: if revenue is happens to be the goal, they can't 348 00:17:58,119 --> 00:18:02,640 Speaker 2: really just give you a break for coming in out peak. 349 00:18:02,680 --> 00:18:06,520 Speaker 2: They're going to have to raise it during peak. 350 00:18:07,119 --> 00:18:09,480 Speaker 4: So yeah, yeah, I mean if they want to keep 351 00:18:09,480 --> 00:18:12,280 Speaker 4: their budget the same. But you know, if one goes up, 352 00:18:12,320 --> 00:18:15,560 Speaker 4: the others go down. That's right. Yeah, that's the thing 353 00:18:15,560 --> 00:18:18,720 Speaker 4: is a discount sounds great until you realize there's no 354 00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:21,520 Speaker 4: real such thing as a you know, if one price 355 00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:24,159 Speaker 4: is down, the others are going up. If everything is 356 00:18:24,200 --> 00:18:25,760 Speaker 4: going to balance out to the way they were. 357 00:18:25,960 --> 00:18:30,560 Speaker 2: Can you give us some idea of the points, the 358 00:18:30,600 --> 00:18:34,800 Speaker 2: info points, the details that an algorithm gathers on us 359 00:18:34,840 --> 00:18:37,760 Speaker 2: to Really, no, it's probably going to be a little 360 00:18:37,760 --> 00:18:39,560 Speaker 2: bit shocking when we realize. 361 00:18:39,720 --> 00:18:43,800 Speaker 4: Yeah, okay, you you earlier said, you know, it's easy 362 00:18:43,800 --> 00:18:45,600 Speaker 4: to imagine. Once they have the email, they have all 363 00:18:45,640 --> 00:18:47,879 Speaker 4: our information. But let me just spell out, and you 364 00:18:47,880 --> 00:18:50,000 Speaker 4: know I can't resist to my mask, professor. Let me 365 00:18:50,080 --> 00:18:53,000 Speaker 4: just go a little bit technical, but I promise all 366 00:18:53,040 --> 00:18:55,120 Speaker 4: your listeners will be included. This is you know, won't 367 00:18:55,160 --> 00:19:00,359 Speaker 4: be too bad. Here's the basic idea. Imagine I show 368 00:19:00,359 --> 00:19:03,119 Speaker 4: you some product, you know, let's say diapers, just to 369 00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:07,120 Speaker 4: be concrete, and I charge twenty bucks. Let's pretend I'm 370 00:19:07,160 --> 00:19:09,200 Speaker 4: on Amazon or something, and you see it and you 371 00:19:09,520 --> 00:19:11,479 Speaker 4: just scroll buy, you don't buy them, and then you 372 00:19:11,520 --> 00:19:14,520 Speaker 4: scroll by again, but now they're for fifteen dollars. Now 373 00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:16,760 Speaker 4: you scroll by again and they're ten dollars, and finally 374 00:19:16,760 --> 00:19:20,159 Speaker 4: you buy it. If I'm a smart algorithm, I'm going 375 00:19:20,240 --> 00:19:23,119 Speaker 4: to learn Okay, that's your your pain point, that's the 376 00:19:23,160 --> 00:19:25,960 Speaker 4: price that you finally are willing to buy these. I 377 00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:30,080 Speaker 4: can't do that for every single shopper online, but this 378 00:19:30,200 --> 00:19:32,880 Speaker 4: is where the data science comes in. I can look 379 00:19:32,920 --> 00:19:35,760 Speaker 4: for other shoppers that have very similar data as you. 380 00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:39,720 Speaker 4: So in the kind of traditional old school that might 381 00:19:39,760 --> 00:19:43,720 Speaker 4: have meant similar gender, age, zip code, that kind of thing, 382 00:19:44,119 --> 00:19:46,440 Speaker 4: but nowadays it could mean anything. It could mean you've 383 00:19:46,480 --> 00:19:49,120 Speaker 4: watched similar videos on TikTok, you've typed similar things into 384 00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:52,840 Speaker 4: Google or chatbots, you have similar web browsing histories, so 385 00:19:52,880 --> 00:19:55,600 Speaker 4: whatever it means. They look for people with similar data 386 00:19:55,640 --> 00:19:59,120 Speaker 4: as you, and they figure, hey, if Bradley starts buying 387 00:19:59,160 --> 00:20:02,120 Speaker 4: diapers at ten dollars, than people who look like Bradley 388 00:20:02,200 --> 00:20:04,680 Speaker 4: in a data sense are probably also going to start 389 00:20:04,680 --> 00:20:07,080 Speaker 4: buying them at ten dollars. And that's how this price 390 00:20:07,160 --> 00:20:10,320 Speaker 4: discrimination works. They look for they kind of test it 391 00:20:10,359 --> 00:20:12,760 Speaker 4: on some people, and they extrapolate it to others. 392 00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:17,399 Speaker 2: Do you think it's possible that prices get raised if 393 00:20:17,480 --> 00:20:21,920 Speaker 2: you check something online an online place more than once, 394 00:20:22,359 --> 00:20:25,560 Speaker 2: The algorithm says, ooh, this person's kind of interested in this. 395 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:28,840 Speaker 3: Do you think they would jump it up? Or maybe 396 00:20:28,880 --> 00:20:30,159 Speaker 3: if you've checked. 397 00:20:30,040 --> 00:20:32,720 Speaker 2: Maybe if you've checked an airline price twice, as they 398 00:20:32,800 --> 00:20:36,240 Speaker 2: might say, this person really wants to go there, they're 399 00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:36,920 Speaker 2: checking it out. 400 00:20:37,000 --> 00:20:38,439 Speaker 3: You think they would jump it out or maybe they 401 00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:39,600 Speaker 3: would reduce it. I don't know. 402 00:20:40,560 --> 00:20:43,359 Speaker 4: That's here. Yeah, So you hit the nail on the 403 00:20:43,359 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 4: head with the very last comment there that I don't know. Here, 404 00:20:46,440 --> 00:20:49,719 Speaker 4: there's two very similar but very different questions. You're kind 405 00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:54,160 Speaker 4: of asking could they do this? One? Yes, do they 406 00:20:54,160 --> 00:20:57,800 Speaker 4: do this? We have no idea, and that's the problem. 407 00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:01,399 Speaker 4: We don't know, even the the FTC. So remember I 408 00:21:01,440 --> 00:21:03,960 Speaker 4: was meeting up this lawyer from the FTC Federal Trade Commission. 409 00:21:04,160 --> 00:21:06,200 Speaker 4: They're the ones that kind of are trying to monitor 410 00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:10,560 Speaker 4: this and sort of police it. They don't know when 411 00:21:10,640 --> 00:21:14,560 Speaker 4: companies are doing this kind of price games, algorithmic discrimination stuff. 412 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:16,840 Speaker 4: They don't know. The best they can do is try 413 00:21:16,880 --> 00:21:18,520 Speaker 4: to read the news. I asked this lawyer, I said, 414 00:21:18,520 --> 00:21:20,720 Speaker 4: how do you know when when companies are doing this 415 00:21:20,800 --> 00:21:24,000 Speaker 4: and maybe violating this law? He said, we read the news, 416 00:21:24,440 --> 00:21:27,160 Speaker 4: we have customers file reports, we listen to the radio, 417 00:21:27,240 --> 00:21:30,000 Speaker 4: and hear what people are saying. They don't really know. 418 00:21:30,320 --> 00:21:34,199 Speaker 4: So to go back to answer your question again, absolutely, 419 00:21:34,400 --> 00:21:38,160 Speaker 4: from a technological perspective, what you described could happen. People 420 00:21:38,160 --> 00:21:40,280 Speaker 4: could come up with all kinds of strategies where if 421 00:21:40,280 --> 00:21:42,560 Speaker 4: you're you know, you keep returning to the same flight, 422 00:21:43,440 --> 00:21:46,000 Speaker 4: they say, oh, this person's really interested, but you know 423 00:21:46,000 --> 00:21:48,960 Speaker 4: they're returning, so they're they're not quite ready to pull 424 00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:51,000 Speaker 4: the trigger. Let's lower the price of it. Or maybe 425 00:21:51,040 --> 00:21:53,119 Speaker 4: the opposite, as he said, maybe like, oh they're interested, 426 00:21:53,160 --> 00:21:54,840 Speaker 4: let's raise the price because we know they're going to 427 00:21:55,040 --> 00:21:57,560 Speaker 4: take debate. Eventually, they can do all this stuff if 428 00:21:57,600 --> 00:22:00,359 Speaker 4: they want. We just don't know if and when. We 429 00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:03,159 Speaker 4: don't know who is doing this, so that's the big issue. 430 00:22:03,160 --> 00:22:07,280 Speaker 4: It's just there's so little information. There's no transparency, so 431 00:22:07,400 --> 00:22:09,640 Speaker 4: a lot of our conversation is kind of hypothetical because 432 00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:10,520 Speaker 4: we don't know what's happening. 433 00:22:11,040 --> 00:22:12,840 Speaker 2: Folks, what do you think maybe you'll get a deal 434 00:22:12,920 --> 00:22:17,520 Speaker 2: with this dynamic price if you're poor, maybe you will 435 00:22:17,520 --> 00:22:20,480 Speaker 2: get a lower price for goods if the algorithm knows this. 436 00:22:21,520 --> 00:22:23,960 Speaker 2: Bob and Medford doesn't have a whole lot of money, 437 00:22:24,280 --> 00:22:29,280 Speaker 2: we think he'll pay X minus twenty. I mean, would 438 00:22:29,320 --> 00:22:31,080 Speaker 2: you be willing to put up with the big brother 439 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:34,800 Speaker 2: factor for perhaps a chance at a lower price, or 440 00:22:34,800 --> 00:22:37,280 Speaker 2: do you think there would be any lower pricing it 441 00:22:37,280 --> 00:22:42,520 Speaker 2: would simply be more for people who they perceive through 442 00:22:42,560 --> 00:22:45,520 Speaker 2: their algorithm to be rich and able to pay. We'll 443 00:22:45,520 --> 00:22:48,600 Speaker 2: continue with her no our guests in a moment on WBZ. 444 00:22:51,480 --> 00:22:54,919 Speaker 1: If you're on Night Side with Dan Ray on WBZ 445 00:22:55,320 --> 00:22:56,880 Speaker 1: Boston's news radio. 446 00:22:56,800 --> 00:22:59,960 Speaker 2: We continue talking about dynamic pricing and all the ramification 447 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:02,919 Speaker 2: as we can think of that you may not have 448 00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:09,199 Speaker 2: thought of yet. So Noah, excuse me, Noah gy and 449 00:23:09,560 --> 00:23:15,120 Speaker 2: Syracusa who is a mathema mathematician and factually associated Harvard 450 00:23:15,200 --> 00:23:20,160 Speaker 2: and teaches the Bentley Professor at Bentley. I just during 451 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:25,040 Speaker 2: the break was kind of thunderstruck by this thought that 452 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:32,960 Speaker 2: dynamic pricing could hurt productivity in a town, state, or 453 00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:37,080 Speaker 2: even a nation. If I know that I'm going to 454 00:23:37,160 --> 00:23:40,520 Speaker 2: have to pay more for stuff, if I have more money, 455 00:23:41,760 --> 00:23:44,159 Speaker 2: that's incentive for me not to work as much or 456 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,960 Speaker 2: not to work as hard. What's the point I bust 457 00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:52,920 Speaker 2: in my self to work extra hours If the algorithm 458 00:23:52,960 --> 00:23:54,520 Speaker 2: is going to see it and charge me more stuff, 459 00:23:54,680 --> 00:23:57,440 Speaker 2: I'm going to end up being able to with the 460 00:23:57,480 --> 00:24:00,720 Speaker 2: same purchasing power even though I worked harder. So why 461 00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:04,600 Speaker 2: not just quit my job and get stuff cheaper? And 462 00:24:04,640 --> 00:24:06,760 Speaker 2: that in some ways doesn't make a lot of sense, 463 00:24:06,800 --> 00:24:09,040 Speaker 2: but a lot of people are on the edge of 464 00:24:09,440 --> 00:24:10,439 Speaker 2: kind of quitting anyway. 465 00:24:10,520 --> 00:24:12,760 Speaker 3: And if you realize that. 466 00:24:13,119 --> 00:24:14,919 Speaker 2: Extra hard work is going to be seen by the 467 00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:16,960 Speaker 2: algorithm and going to charge you more, not just for 468 00:24:17,040 --> 00:24:24,840 Speaker 2: some things, but for everything, for food, drink, cars, computers, everything, 469 00:24:26,440 --> 00:24:31,280 Speaker 2: then why work twenty percent harder? If the algorithm's going 470 00:24:31,320 --> 00:24:33,720 Speaker 2: to charge you twenty percent more for everything you're you're 471 00:24:34,200 --> 00:24:36,919 Speaker 2: purchasing power would remain the same even though you worked harder. 472 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:37,680 Speaker 3: Thoughts. 473 00:24:39,080 --> 00:24:42,119 Speaker 4: Yeah, so first of all, it's a practical advice for 474 00:24:42,200 --> 00:24:42,960 Speaker 4: your listeners. 475 00:24:43,280 --> 00:24:43,800 Speaker 5: Don't do it. 476 00:24:43,840 --> 00:24:47,400 Speaker 4: Don't quit your job, because I don't think this personalized 477 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:49,320 Speaker 4: pricing is widespread yet. I don't. 478 00:24:49,520 --> 00:24:51,359 Speaker 3: I mean no, you know, when it happens. 479 00:24:52,080 --> 00:24:54,000 Speaker 4: We're not telling people to go ahead and do this. 480 00:24:54,119 --> 00:24:57,040 Speaker 4: But you're absolutely right hypothetically, if it were widespread and 481 00:24:57,080 --> 00:24:59,560 Speaker 4: this is how all of our retail shopping is. I 482 00:24:59,560 --> 00:25:06,480 Speaker 4: think you're actually right, you know it, just I think 483 00:25:06,480 --> 00:25:08,159 Speaker 4: you're right. I think you're hitting in a really important 484 00:25:08,200 --> 00:25:11,720 Speaker 4: point that if having more money means you're gonna have 485 00:25:11,720 --> 00:25:14,280 Speaker 4: to pay more prices for everything, not that oh, now 486 00:25:14,280 --> 00:25:17,080 Speaker 4: I can afford some luxury goods that have an inflated price, 487 00:25:17,359 --> 00:25:20,960 Speaker 4: but everything I was buying before, I'm gonna lose those 488 00:25:21,000 --> 00:25:23,880 Speaker 4: extra earnings because the price went up. That doesn't feel 489 00:25:23,920 --> 00:25:27,120 Speaker 4: like a win for anyone. So, you know, going tying 490 00:25:27,160 --> 00:25:29,879 Speaker 4: back to the our earlier part of a conversation, is 491 00:25:29,880 --> 00:25:33,640 Speaker 4: this actually illegal? One of the criteria is this unfairness. 492 00:25:33,680 --> 00:25:36,679 Speaker 4: And I think what you're hitting on is is an 493 00:25:36,800 --> 00:25:39,840 Speaker 4: argument for why maybe a court should consider this unfair, 494 00:25:40,440 --> 00:25:43,320 Speaker 4: as if it's hurting the whole economy, if this is 495 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:46,960 Speaker 4: not really benefiting the nation, you could argue this is unfair. 496 00:25:46,960 --> 00:25:49,600 Speaker 4: It's it's making people not want to work, right, and 497 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:51,600 Speaker 4: you go the other way. Talk what you're saying, and. 498 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:53,240 Speaker 2: You go the other way. They're gonna cap it out. 499 00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:56,200 Speaker 2: If they're gonna do that, then maybe I'd be a 500 00:25:56,240 --> 00:26:02,160 Speaker 2: little better with it. If they would charge Jeff Bezos 501 00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:05,080 Speaker 2: one hundred dollars for a can of tuna because he's 502 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:07,600 Speaker 2: got so much money. 503 00:26:07,640 --> 00:26:09,720 Speaker 4: Yeah, you know, and you're right right. You could go 504 00:26:09,800 --> 00:26:12,040 Speaker 4: the discount way, like, oh, I look at some product, 505 00:26:12,080 --> 00:26:13,720 Speaker 4: but I can't afford it. Oh, and then they lower 506 00:26:13,800 --> 00:26:15,520 Speaker 4: the price because I don't have as much money, So 507 00:26:15,560 --> 00:26:19,040 Speaker 4: that's great. So it does go both ways. But I 508 00:26:19,119 --> 00:26:21,359 Speaker 4: just want to step back and remind people, this is 509 00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:23,520 Speaker 4: what you're talking about, is you know, income or net 510 00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:25,560 Speaker 4: worth or whatever you want to call it. That's just 511 00:26:25,640 --> 00:26:30,120 Speaker 4: one of the potential factors. There's many other factors. 512 00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:30,119 Speaker 3: They can do. 513 00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:33,080 Speaker 2: You want to get exactly what I want to go 514 00:26:33,119 --> 00:26:35,119 Speaker 2: in next? What are the factors that we just haven't 515 00:26:35,119 --> 00:26:36,520 Speaker 2: thought of that you may have thought of? 516 00:26:37,400 --> 00:26:39,680 Speaker 4: All? Right? So one that came up. I didn't think 517 00:26:39,680 --> 00:26:41,560 Speaker 4: of this, but I read about it. It's so close enough, 518 00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:45,320 Speaker 4: is uh. There's some evidence. It's not proven, but there's 519 00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:48,359 Speaker 4: some pretty compelling evidence that some of the ride sharees. 520 00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:50,399 Speaker 4: So we don't know if it's uber Lyft or one 521 00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:54,000 Speaker 4: of their competitors, but something like that actually seem to 522 00:26:54,080 --> 00:26:55,879 Speaker 4: have used. I don't know if they still do or 523 00:26:55,920 --> 00:26:59,000 Speaker 4: if they this in the past, but some evidence that 524 00:26:59,040 --> 00:27:02,680 Speaker 4: they use batter the battery life left on your phone 525 00:27:03,160 --> 00:27:06,919 Speaker 4: for a factor. What does that mean? Imagine you're standing 526 00:27:06,920 --> 00:27:09,320 Speaker 4: on a street corner, you want to get home, it's late, 527 00:27:09,600 --> 00:27:13,040 Speaker 4: and your batteries down to five percent. You're kind of desperate, right, 528 00:27:13,520 --> 00:27:15,760 Speaker 4: you want to get home before that battery runs out. 529 00:27:15,880 --> 00:27:18,359 Speaker 4: They can see your batteries at five percent, and they 530 00:27:18,359 --> 00:27:20,960 Speaker 4: can charge you more. And it looks the data that 531 00:27:21,080 --> 00:27:24,239 Speaker 4: some researchers glected looks like that's what happens. That the 532 00:27:24,240 --> 00:27:26,760 Speaker 4: lower your battery, the more desperate you are, and the 533 00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:28,760 Speaker 4: higher prices you're going to get on your right share. 534 00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:30,919 Speaker 4: So that has nothing to do with net worth or 535 00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:33,639 Speaker 4: how much money you have. That's just taking advantage of 536 00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:34,200 Speaker 4: your phone. 537 00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:36,800 Speaker 3: That's yeah, it's. 538 00:27:36,640 --> 00:27:39,720 Speaker 4: A desperation factor. So I don't see any ethical justification 539 00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:42,119 Speaker 4: for that that it seems creepy. 540 00:27:42,840 --> 00:27:46,160 Speaker 2: Then if they would do that for a ride share, 541 00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:51,080 Speaker 2: what if they did that with medical equipment and medicine. 542 00:27:51,119 --> 00:27:54,040 Speaker 2: What if they yes, saw that you're desperate and you 543 00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:57,320 Speaker 2: have kidney disease and it's advanced. 544 00:27:57,560 --> 00:28:00,600 Speaker 4: And yeah, so we you know, how could they know that. 545 00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:03,560 Speaker 2: Advance your kidney disease is the more different desperate you are, 546 00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:04,640 Speaker 2: the more they charge you for. 547 00:28:04,600 --> 00:28:06,560 Speaker 3: The for the medication. 548 00:28:08,080 --> 00:28:10,440 Speaker 2: If you could justify the other, I suppose you could 549 00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:11,080 Speaker 2: justify that. 550 00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:14,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, so you're absolutely right, And you know, I'll be 551 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:16,760 Speaker 4: a little speculative here. So this is kind of you know, 552 00:28:16,880 --> 00:28:19,520 Speaker 4: border on SI fi, but it's not much. So cell 553 00:28:19,560 --> 00:28:22,000 Speaker 4: phone battery life is easy, like they can get that data, 554 00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:24,359 Speaker 4: but the kinds of things you're mentioning with, you know, 555 00:28:24,440 --> 00:28:26,480 Speaker 4: medical stuff, all right, how are they going to really 556 00:28:26,480 --> 00:28:28,479 Speaker 4: get that data? Well, let me just try to make 557 00:28:28,520 --> 00:28:32,240 Speaker 4: a concrete Imagine someone's talking to their favorite AI chatbot, 558 00:28:32,320 --> 00:28:35,040 Speaker 4: you know, chat GPT or one of the others. Think 559 00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:38,120 Speaker 4: a lot of people are describing their medical symptoms and 560 00:28:38,160 --> 00:28:41,920 Speaker 4: ailments to their their chatbots. That's data. So if you're 561 00:28:42,000 --> 00:28:46,720 Speaker 4: open AI, for instance, who runs chat GPT. I'm not 562 00:28:46,720 --> 00:28:49,440 Speaker 4: saying they're using this data, but they certainly have access 563 00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:51,840 Speaker 4: to a lot of data of what people are confiding 564 00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:54,080 Speaker 4: in their chatbots. So if you say, like, oh, you know, 565 00:28:54,160 --> 00:28:56,720 Speaker 4: I have one of these kidney problems, that's it. That 566 00:28:56,840 --> 00:28:59,760 Speaker 4: data's out there if they wanted. There's no laws preventing 567 00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:02,440 Speaker 4: them from selling that data to other companies that might 568 00:29:02,480 --> 00:29:04,960 Speaker 4: want to use it. So absolutely, what you're saying that 569 00:29:05,040 --> 00:29:07,920 Speaker 4: the desperation factor that could be used in many ways. 570 00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:11,200 Speaker 4: So you know that AI is taking over, like there's 571 00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:12,800 Speaker 4: you know, the sky's the limit. They can use it 572 00:29:12,840 --> 00:29:14,239 Speaker 4: for all kinds of things if they want it. 573 00:29:14,400 --> 00:29:17,720 Speaker 2: Do you know that for a fact that rideshare companies 574 00:29:18,040 --> 00:29:21,000 Speaker 2: can see your battery life? 575 00:29:21,240 --> 00:29:23,600 Speaker 4: I think it's pretty safe to say for a fact 576 00:29:23,640 --> 00:29:26,760 Speaker 4: that they can see it. Do we know for a 577 00:29:26,800 --> 00:29:30,400 Speaker 4: fact that they're using it in their pricing that we don't. 578 00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:33,920 Speaker 4: We can't say definitively. So there's been some evidence that 579 00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:37,320 Speaker 4: strongly suggests it, but you know, to give a little 580 00:29:37,520 --> 00:29:39,360 Speaker 4: legal wiggle room, we can't say for sure. 581 00:29:39,880 --> 00:29:42,560 Speaker 2: And every if they can see the battery life, they 582 00:29:42,600 --> 00:29:43,840 Speaker 2: can see everything on your phone. 583 00:29:45,240 --> 00:29:47,880 Speaker 4: I mean, I wouldn't go I wouldn't make that extrapolation, right, 584 00:29:47,920 --> 00:29:50,920 Speaker 4: you know, battery life might be one thing that So 585 00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:54,120 Speaker 4: this comes down to the app designers. You know, when 586 00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:55,680 Speaker 4: you're using an app, it says, oh, do you grant 587 00:29:55,720 --> 00:29:58,719 Speaker 4: permission to like, I don't know, let WhatsApp see your 588 00:29:58,760 --> 00:30:02,160 Speaker 4: photo album. There's different permissions and levels when you're on 589 00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:04,600 Speaker 4: your phone. It doesn't just share everything, but I share 590 00:30:04,680 --> 00:30:08,480 Speaker 4: some things, and sometimes you're given the choice of allowing 591 00:30:08,520 --> 00:30:12,080 Speaker 4: certain permissions. I just click accepted, okay. You know, I'm 592 00:30:12,280 --> 00:30:14,280 Speaker 4: I study the stuff, and I still just clicked up 593 00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:17,240 Speaker 4: accepting okay. Because I want my apps to run. I 594 00:30:17,240 --> 00:30:20,160 Speaker 4: don't really pay attention to what data it is giving, okay, 595 00:30:20,160 --> 00:30:22,200 Speaker 4: But I have to admit that's dangerous, right, I'm giving 596 00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:24,720 Speaker 4: all the way all that data giving access, So I 597 00:30:24,720 --> 00:30:26,760 Speaker 4: don't know how long it lasts. What if I click 598 00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:30,280 Speaker 4: accept and then one year later it turns out that 599 00:30:30,320 --> 00:30:32,560 Speaker 4: what I accepted is is feeding a bunch of data 600 00:30:32,600 --> 00:30:35,400 Speaker 4: to some price discrimination algorithm. You know, it's impossible to 601 00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:36,240 Speaker 4: keep track of the stuff. 602 00:30:36,240 --> 00:30:39,640 Speaker 2: Well, I'm sure that if you accept it that it's 603 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:43,240 Speaker 2: will well stay accepted until you get rid of the app. 604 00:30:43,280 --> 00:30:45,680 Speaker 2: And who knows, maybe even after you get rid of 605 00:30:45,680 --> 00:30:47,720 Speaker 2: the app, maybe they stick something in your phone even 606 00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:48,320 Speaker 2: if you get rid. 607 00:30:48,280 --> 00:30:48,760 Speaker 3: Of the app. 608 00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:50,080 Speaker 4: Yeah, we don't know. 609 00:30:50,280 --> 00:30:51,920 Speaker 3: Okay, one quick question. I don't know if you know 610 00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:55,320 Speaker 3: the answer to this. It can. 611 00:30:56,320 --> 00:31:00,000 Speaker 2: Actors see what's on your desktops? You have all kinds 612 00:30:59,960 --> 00:31:04,400 Speaker 2: of documents. Maybe you pay your taxes, Uh, most people 613 00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:07,680 Speaker 2: pay their taxes online now and maybe you keep the 614 00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:09,240 Speaker 2: receipt and a folder and your documents. 615 00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:11,680 Speaker 3: Can they see all that that? 616 00:31:11,880 --> 00:31:14,080 Speaker 4: So I'm just gonna speculate here because you're right, I 617 00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:16,240 Speaker 4: don't know for sure, but I would say I doubt 618 00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:19,720 Speaker 4: you know anyone that you're interacting with has access and 619 00:31:19,720 --> 00:31:23,040 Speaker 4: can see that. But I would suspect, you know, let's 620 00:31:23,040 --> 00:31:26,680 Speaker 4: say I'm on a Windows computer, which is by Microsoft. 621 00:31:27,520 --> 00:31:29,840 Speaker 4: Everything nowadays is in the cloud. I would suspect that 622 00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:33,320 Speaker 4: Microsoft would have access to that data. But if I 623 00:31:33,360 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 4: go to buy some things on Amazon, I would suspect 624 00:31:35,720 --> 00:31:37,800 Speaker 4: that Amazon does not have that kind of data. So 625 00:31:38,000 --> 00:31:39,240 Speaker 4: it depends unless. 626 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:40,480 Speaker 3: They bought it from Microsoft. 627 00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:43,000 Speaker 4: Yeah, and then then we don't know, you know, whose 628 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:45,040 Speaker 4: data is sold ware and where it travels. 629 00:31:45,120 --> 00:31:50,760 Speaker 2: That's right, So on the dark web, you can buy data. 630 00:31:50,800 --> 00:31:53,040 Speaker 2: Companies can buy your data on the dark Web. 631 00:31:53,320 --> 00:31:55,400 Speaker 4: I wouldn't know. I've never been there, but I know 632 00:31:55,480 --> 00:31:56,080 Speaker 4: that from fact. 633 00:31:56,760 --> 00:32:00,880 Speaker 2: That's where That's where nefarious actors go. That's where hackers go. 634 00:32:01,200 --> 00:32:03,720 Speaker 2: They want to get your you know, your money out 635 00:32:03,760 --> 00:32:06,400 Speaker 2: of your bank account. They can go there and buy 636 00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:10,800 Speaker 2: big swaths of information. How did that get there, Well, 637 00:32:11,120 --> 00:32:13,800 Speaker 2: somebody's probably sold it to somebody who put. 638 00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:14,120 Speaker 3: It up there. 639 00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:16,240 Speaker 4: A little bit of a don't ask, don't tell. 640 00:32:16,840 --> 00:32:18,680 Speaker 2: Just a few more minutes to go in this hour 641 00:32:18,760 --> 00:32:22,320 Speaker 2: with our guests Noah talking about dynamic pricing and the 642 00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:27,720 Speaker 2: various extrapolations ramifications of that here on WBZ. 643 00:32:28,760 --> 00:32:33,400 Speaker 1: It's Night Side with Dan Ray on wb Boston's News Radio. 644 00:32:34,320 --> 00:32:37,560 Speaker 2: We return with Noah gn Siracusa and talk a little 645 00:32:37,560 --> 00:32:44,160 Speaker 2: bit more about algorithm pricing, So algorithms, let me back up, 646 00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:52,920 Speaker 2: it's illegal to conspire to price fix m I believe. However, 647 00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:59,520 Speaker 2: I believe it's possible for algorithms to do that without 648 00:32:59,560 --> 00:33:03,560 Speaker 2: actually any contact. They can they can be programmed to 649 00:33:03,600 --> 00:33:06,320 Speaker 2: do that on their own. Does that make sense? And 650 00:33:06,400 --> 00:33:10,640 Speaker 2: that would be a problem with dynamic pricing. You couldn't 651 00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:12,520 Speaker 2: program the algorithm. 652 00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:12,920 Speaker 3: To do that. 653 00:33:14,480 --> 00:33:17,040 Speaker 4: Look, yeah, let's let's go through that slowly because there's 654 00:33:17,040 --> 00:33:20,560 Speaker 4: a lot to digest there. So if let's say we're 655 00:33:20,600 --> 00:33:22,880 Speaker 4: in some market where there's a handful of companies like 656 00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:28,120 Speaker 4: airlines and Delta Continental, few other if all the leading airlines, 657 00:33:28,280 --> 00:33:30,600 Speaker 4: the CEO sit in the room and they said, what 658 00:33:30,640 --> 00:33:33,880 Speaker 4: if we all raise our price ten percent, where no 659 00:33:33,880 --> 00:33:36,080 Speaker 4: one's going to win or lose any customers, but we're 660 00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:38,920 Speaker 4: all going to make more money. Let's do a twenty percent. 661 00:33:39,360 --> 00:33:42,920 Speaker 4: There's nothing you know, they would all win there, they're 662 00:33:42,920 --> 00:33:45,560 Speaker 4: not undercutting each other. They would all just make more 663 00:33:45,560 --> 00:33:48,200 Speaker 4: money and all of us customers would lose. So that 664 00:33:48,360 --> 00:33:51,960 Speaker 4: is called collusion, and that is illegal. So you can't 665 00:33:52,240 --> 00:33:54,800 Speaker 4: just get in a backroom and negotiate with your competitors 666 00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:58,760 Speaker 4: to all raise your prices. But exactly if you're saying, 667 00:33:58,800 --> 00:34:01,360 Speaker 4: what if I's an algorithm that just says, look at 668 00:34:01,360 --> 00:34:04,760 Speaker 4: my peers and let me just match the price, but 669 00:34:04,840 --> 00:34:07,320 Speaker 4: raise it by a few dollars. What if they run 670 00:34:07,320 --> 00:34:10,440 Speaker 4: the same algorithm. Now, my competitor is going to look 671 00:34:10,440 --> 00:34:12,160 Speaker 4: at my prices and raise it by few dollars, and 672 00:34:12,200 --> 00:34:14,200 Speaker 4: my algorithms gonn look at their prices and raise it 673 00:34:14,200 --> 00:34:16,680 Speaker 4: by few dollars. We could all end up just raising 674 00:34:16,680 --> 00:34:20,120 Speaker 4: our prices and raising our prices. So the algorithms might 675 00:34:20,320 --> 00:34:23,839 Speaker 4: intentionally collude, or they might even just accidentally collude. They're 676 00:34:23,840 --> 00:34:27,200 Speaker 4: just running some math formulas, so the collusion could happen 677 00:34:27,719 --> 00:34:31,360 Speaker 4: just baked into the algorithm. And it's not entirely clear 678 00:34:31,960 --> 00:34:36,120 Speaker 4: if that's the same illegality as the humans in the 679 00:34:36,160 --> 00:34:40,879 Speaker 4: back room smoking the cigars, shaking hands. So I've asked 680 00:34:40,920 --> 00:34:43,000 Speaker 4: someone about this, and the answer I got it was 681 00:34:43,800 --> 00:34:47,640 Speaker 4: it's probably illegal as algorithms do it, but intent really 682 00:34:47,640 --> 00:34:51,560 Speaker 4: matters in the law, and computers don't have intent. 683 00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:53,319 Speaker 3: Right the programmers program it. 684 00:34:54,480 --> 00:34:56,840 Speaker 4: Programmers may not have the intent. They might just be 685 00:34:56,960 --> 00:35:01,000 Speaker 4: programming an algorithm to do something. They might not intending 686 00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:06,040 Speaker 4: to collude, but what they program may result in collusion. Okay, 687 00:35:06,040 --> 00:35:08,080 Speaker 4: So that's where it gets tricky. So there was a 688 00:35:08,120 --> 00:35:11,640 Speaker 4: proposed law recently I forget which state or which office 689 00:35:11,920 --> 00:35:15,480 Speaker 4: that was basically not saying that algorithmic collusion is legal, 690 00:35:15,680 --> 00:35:18,040 Speaker 4: but saying, let's just go ahead and make a loss, 691 00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:22,200 Speaker 4: spelling out explicitly that if algorithms collude in any capacity, 692 00:35:22,239 --> 00:35:24,919 Speaker 4: that's illegal. So that we don't have that law yet. 693 00:35:24,960 --> 00:35:28,239 Speaker 4: But this is just showing there is some interest in 694 00:35:28,280 --> 00:35:31,839 Speaker 4: Congress in making sure collusion does not happen. But right 695 00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:35,360 Speaker 4: now it's not clear exactly what's legal, and it's not 696 00:35:35,480 --> 00:35:37,360 Speaker 4: when computers do it versus humans. 697 00:35:37,480 --> 00:35:41,480 Speaker 2: Okay, So if you cannot program them to collude, or 698 00:35:41,520 --> 00:35:45,240 Speaker 2: you can't that means you cannot not program them to collude, 699 00:35:45,320 --> 00:35:48,560 Speaker 2: so you can't prevent that from happening, then maybe it 700 00:35:48,680 --> 00:35:52,360 Speaker 2: just should be all illegal if it's going to potentially 701 00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:56,560 Speaker 2: result in collusion. Another thing is price gouging depending on 702 00:35:56,640 --> 00:36:01,920 Speaker 2: an event, And I mean at a say, a grocery store. 703 00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:06,400 Speaker 2: You know how when snowstorm comes, people flock to the 704 00:36:06,440 --> 00:36:07,200 Speaker 2: grocery store. 705 00:36:07,560 --> 00:36:10,680 Speaker 3: Now in you have paper. 706 00:36:11,920 --> 00:36:15,520 Speaker 2: Labels, paper price tags on everything, the staff can't go 707 00:36:15,640 --> 00:36:16,839 Speaker 2: around and reprice everything. 708 00:36:16,880 --> 00:36:18,320 Speaker 3: It would take a month. 709 00:36:19,160 --> 00:36:26,000 Speaker 2: But with this dynamic pricing or or just digital, this 710 00:36:26,080 --> 00:36:29,600 Speaker 2: isn't really this isn't really the same exact algorithmically operated thing. 711 00:36:29,719 --> 00:36:33,640 Speaker 2: But if your your market goes to digital pricing, they 712 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,560 Speaker 2: jump everything up by ten with the push of a button. 713 00:36:38,000 --> 00:36:42,719 Speaker 4: And yeah, you're absolutely right. There are a lot of 714 00:36:42,719 --> 00:36:45,400 Speaker 4: price a lot of grocery stores now that are moving 715 00:36:45,400 --> 00:36:48,240 Speaker 4: in or experienting with as exactly as you said, digital label. 716 00:36:48,320 --> 00:36:50,000 Speaker 4: So what that means, it's just a match in a 717 00:36:50,000 --> 00:36:54,640 Speaker 4: little display that's you know, like a calculator kind of display, 718 00:36:54,719 --> 00:36:56,680 Speaker 4: so it shows the numbers and they can just click 719 00:36:56,719 --> 00:36:59,920 Speaker 4: a button or type in centrally to update the numbers 720 00:37:00,160 --> 00:37:03,719 Speaker 4: the prices. And what grocery stores are saying is this 721 00:37:03,840 --> 00:37:06,520 Speaker 4: is just an efficiency thing. If we want to, you know, 722 00:37:06,560 --> 00:37:09,759 Speaker 4: lower the cost of bananas instead of having to have 723 00:37:09,800 --> 00:37:12,080 Speaker 4: a work or go and change all the prices manually, 724 00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:13,960 Speaker 4: it's just easier, you know. It's just a little bit 725 00:37:13,960 --> 00:37:16,719 Speaker 4: of automation. So that's how they present it. It's just 726 00:37:16,719 --> 00:37:18,319 Speaker 4: we're going to save time, we're going to make it 727 00:37:18,360 --> 00:37:21,400 Speaker 4: more efficient. Yeah, but you're pointing out. 728 00:37:21,360 --> 00:37:24,440 Speaker 2: They'll say that they're going to pass the savings onto us. 729 00:37:24,280 --> 00:37:27,880 Speaker 4: That's great, that's what they'll say. But exactly as you said, 730 00:37:28,200 --> 00:37:30,440 Speaker 4: it also makes it very easy for them to just 731 00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:33,040 Speaker 4: change the prices in a split second in whatever way 732 00:37:33,040 --> 00:37:36,560 Speaker 4: they want. So suddenly, you know the bananas are almost out. 733 00:37:36,640 --> 00:37:39,480 Speaker 4: They could raise the prices of banana and people might say, hey, 734 00:37:39,600 --> 00:37:42,000 Speaker 4: I want bananas. There's only a few left. I'm willing 735 00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:43,960 Speaker 4: to pay more to get that left banana. And if 736 00:37:44,000 --> 00:37:46,680 Speaker 4: there's a snowstorm, they raise the price on the salt. 737 00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:49,279 Speaker 4: You know, they can do these things and there's nothing 738 00:37:49,360 --> 00:37:49,960 Speaker 4: stopping them. 739 00:37:50,040 --> 00:37:53,600 Speaker 2: Since they have automated inventory, they could set it to 740 00:37:53,840 --> 00:37:57,520 Speaker 2: automatically raise the price the fewer bananas they have. Well, 741 00:37:57,600 --> 00:38:00,560 Speaker 2: we got one less banana, we raise. The price goes 742 00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:03,800 Speaker 2: up incrementally with each item sold. 743 00:38:03,960 --> 00:38:05,520 Speaker 3: One quick thing. We don't have what. We don't have 744 00:38:05,600 --> 00:38:06,000 Speaker 3: much time. 745 00:38:06,000 --> 00:38:11,120 Speaker 2: But you gotta wonder why this is not an industry 746 00:38:11,600 --> 00:38:14,880 Speaker 2: to help beat the system. Get like to have an 747 00:38:14,920 --> 00:38:19,600 Speaker 2: alternative identity or to mask what you do. It would 748 00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:21,960 Speaker 2: be great if I go and buy something with a 749 00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:23,640 Speaker 2: completely different identity. 750 00:38:23,880 --> 00:38:27,640 Speaker 3: I would I wouldn't be able to use it at 751 00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:31,560 Speaker 3: the for legal stuff. But it's got to be a 752 00:38:31,600 --> 00:38:34,480 Speaker 3: way for me to mask who I am. Like a scramble. 753 00:38:37,239 --> 00:38:42,120 Speaker 4: I think you're I think you're predicting. I think you're 754 00:38:42,120 --> 00:38:44,480 Speaker 4: predicting the future. I think we don't have that industry 755 00:38:44,520 --> 00:38:48,680 Speaker 4: because this algorithm pricing stuff is not as widespread yet. 756 00:38:49,520 --> 00:38:51,719 Speaker 4: But I think as as it gets to be more widespread, 757 00:38:51,760 --> 00:38:54,000 Speaker 4: if we do allow it, and it does, I think 758 00:38:54,120 --> 00:38:58,120 Speaker 4: the industry you're predicting is gonna arise. Probably just you 759 00:38:58,160 --> 00:39:01,000 Speaker 4: download an app that will try to, you know, mess 760 00:39:01,080 --> 00:39:03,600 Speaker 4: around with your data until it finds some configuration that 761 00:39:03,640 --> 00:39:08,160 Speaker 4: gives you the lower prices. I wonder if fire, why not. 762 00:39:08,360 --> 00:39:10,560 Speaker 2: If you have a VPN, you could take one factor 763 00:39:10,600 --> 00:39:12,520 Speaker 2: out of there and they won't know that you're from 764 00:39:12,520 --> 00:39:15,320 Speaker 2: a rich community. If you have a virtual person on network, 765 00:39:16,120 --> 00:39:19,279 Speaker 2: you could even choose. You could choose a server in 766 00:39:19,320 --> 00:39:22,640 Speaker 2: a poor community or a poor country. Even you can 767 00:39:22,719 --> 00:39:26,239 Speaker 2: say that you choose a server in Romania. But then, 768 00:39:26,239 --> 00:39:28,000 Speaker 2: of course, if you're gonna get it delivered, you gotta 769 00:39:28,040 --> 00:39:30,040 Speaker 2: have the you gotta give them your actual address. 770 00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:33,640 Speaker 3: At times, you know, I wish we had more. We'll 771 00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:34,680 Speaker 3: have to talk again soon. 772 00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:37,239 Speaker 4: Thanks for having me, of. 773 00:39:37,280 --> 00:39:41,120 Speaker 2: Course, No and Sarah, who's a really fun and excellent guest. 774 00:39:41,360 --> 00:39:44,480 Speaker 2: Thanks for coming and hanging around with us on WBZ 775 00:39:45,480 --> 00:39:49,480 Speaker 2: Take care open lines. Now we're gonna take a break. 776 00:39:49,560 --> 00:39:53,840 Speaker 2: I'm gonna get a I don't know, ginger ale. Maybe 777 00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:57,680 Speaker 2: maybe I'll go hardcore and go Coca Cola some water. 778 00:39:58,080 --> 00:39:59,879 Speaker 2: You could do the same, or you could just hang 779 00:40:00,560 --> 00:40:03,160 Speaker 2: and we'll have some fun with the open lines. I'll 780 00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:05,680 Speaker 2: have some questions for you, but really it's a great 781 00:40:05,680 --> 00:40:06,680 Speaker 2: time to just chat. 782 00:40:07,320 --> 00:40:09,480 Speaker 3: The pressure of the holidays. 783 00:40:08,960 --> 00:40:14,480 Speaker 2: Is over, New Year upon us, and it's fun to 784 00:40:14,680 --> 00:40:20,440 Speaker 2: just exercise, hang with the community, the w BSY community, 785 00:40:20,480 --> 00:40:24,200 Speaker 2: the number six one, seven, two, five, four, ten thirty 786 00:40:24,400 --> 00:40:26,680 Speaker 2: and look forward to your call and chatting with you. 787 00:40:26,680 --> 00:40:29,160 Speaker 3: You can refer to anything we've talked about. 788 00:40:29,000 --> 00:40:34,040 Speaker 2: Including the US action in Venezuela or anything else we've 789 00:40:34,040 --> 00:40:34,600 Speaker 2: talked about. 790 00:40:34,760 --> 00:40:36,120 Speaker 3: Ever, it's WBZ