WEBVTT - Tech Friday w/ Dave Hatter - Sponsored by Intrust IT - 9/25/2026

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<v Speaker 1>The Talk Station. 630 at 55 KRC, The Talk Station. Friday,

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<v Speaker 1>that means Dave Hatter, IntrustIT.com. Dave Hatter's company, a business

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<v Speaker 1>owned by the employees for all of your computer needs.

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<v Speaker 1>You've got the business courier in their corner saying IntrustIT

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<v Speaker 1>is the best in the business. So business owners out there,

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<v Speaker 1>you've got computers, and Dave doesn't care how small you are,

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<v Speaker 1>you will be and are the subject of people trying

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<v Speaker 1>to steal your stuff and things and rip you off. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>Dave Hatter? Welcome back, my friend. It's always great having

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<v Speaker 1>you on the show.

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<v Speaker 2>Always good to be here. And sadly, Brian, you are correct.

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<v Speaker 1>InterestIT.com sponsors this segment, and God bless them for it.

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<v Speaker 1>All right. Mayor of Fort Wright, is that hat you

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<v Speaker 1>got on? You don't have flock cameras in your neighborhood,

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<v Speaker 1>do you, Dave? Because you don't like them. They're an

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<v Speaker 1>intrusion into privacy.

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<v Speaker 2>We do not. Okay.

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<v Speaker 1>How about the university?

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<v Speaker 2>We've not had them. Not going to have them.

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<v Speaker 1>Is the University of Kentucky installing artificial intelligence facial scanning

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<v Speaker 1>technology any different, really, just in a broader view than

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<v Speaker 1>flock cameras?

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<v Speaker 2>Not in my opinion, no. With the possible exception, Brian,

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<v Speaker 2>of if you go to UK or pick any college,

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<v Speaker 2>fill in the blank, you choose to go there.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the option.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. As a student, you're choosing to go there. As

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<v Speaker 2>an employee, you choose to work there, et cetera. So

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<v Speaker 2>in my mind, it's a little different. And also, depending

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<v Speaker 2>on how the technology works and who has access to

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<v Speaker 2>that data and so forth versus... You're just driving down

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<v Speaker 2>the street and you're getting sucked up by all these cameras.

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<v Speaker 2>So I think you could potentially make an argument that

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<v Speaker 2>it's not as invasive and intrusive as what has been

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<v Speaker 2>done with Flock. But yeah, I'm not a fan of

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<v Speaker 2>the idea in general. This stuff is abused. It's misused.

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<v Speaker 2>There are data and security problems with these things.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, and they try to address that. I saw the

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<v Speaker 1>WKYT article that you have over at LinkedIn.com as a

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<v Speaker 1>resource material. They pointed out a couple of things. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>much like you have a choice whether or not to

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<v Speaker 1>go to UK and face this technology, but they said

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<v Speaker 1>it's optional. You sign up for it and you agree

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<v Speaker 1>to have your face scanned so AI can let you

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<v Speaker 1>in or out of residence buildings. Now, a card, as

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<v Speaker 1>everyone knows, can get lost or stolen. Of course, it

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<v Speaker 1>can be duplicated and scanned. And that was kind of

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<v Speaker 1>the point they were making, why they were embracing this technology.

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<v Speaker 1>But you're not forced to use it. But also, and

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<v Speaker 1>I wanted you to address this because it sounds good,

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<v Speaker 1>but I don't know. In terms of who gets the

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<v Speaker 1>data and where it's stored and how it's stored, they

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<v Speaker 1>say they don't store it, but they only keep a

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<v Speaker 1>digital map of the face, which is ones and zeros.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a mathematical layout, so it's not actually a photograph.

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<v Speaker 1>In today's technological realities, Dave, is ones and zeros digital

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<v Speaker 1>mapping of someone's face really any different than a photograph?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, I'm not a mathematician, Brian, so I'm not sure

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<v Speaker 2>I can answer that with the same certainty that the

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<v Speaker 2>people who've built this stuff can. But in general, I

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<v Speaker 2>would put it this way. A, your photo's probably already

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<v Speaker 2>out there somewhere anyway, so I'm less concerned about that. But,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, in terms of this isn't just your biometric data,

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<v Speaker 2>it's your activity data. You know, if let's just say,

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<v Speaker 2>for example, someone wanted to stalk you or something and

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<v Speaker 2>they could access this data. And I know this sounds

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<v Speaker 2>far fetched to people sometimes. But if you look at

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<v Speaker 2>the security of some of these systems that have been

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<v Speaker 2>exposed in the recent past, it's terrible. Right. These things

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<v Speaker 2>are in general. My issue with so much of this

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<v Speaker 2>stuff is as a guy who was a software engineer

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<v Speaker 2>for 25 years, software. which is what powers all of

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<v Speaker 2>this stuff. Call it AI, call it whatever you want.

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<v Speaker 2>At the end of the day, it's still software. And

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<v Speaker 2>generally speaking, most software is not designed with privacy and

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<v Speaker 2>security in mind. It's designed with things like speed to market,

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<v Speaker 2>market share, ease of use, timelines, budgets, and collecting as

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<v Speaker 2>much data as possible. And we see how either terrible

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<v Speaker 2>security and or misconfiguration which is basically nerd speak for

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<v Speaker 2>there were options you could have turned on and did not,

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<v Speaker 2>which then led to some kind of security issue. Because

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<v Speaker 2>even if I build something that is like the Fortress

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<v Speaker 2>of Solitude, if it's not configured correctly, right, if you

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<v Speaker 2>leave the front door unlocked, well, what good is it? So,

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<v Speaker 2>It's not just the biometric data itself. It's all the

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<v Speaker 2>other data these things collect. Again, where does this data go?

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<v Speaker 2>Is it only accessible to UK? Is it accessible to

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<v Speaker 2>the company that built this stuff? What are they doing

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<v Speaker 2>with it? What are their terms of service say? We've

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<v Speaker 2>talked about this so many times, Brian. Most of the time,

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<v Speaker 2>terms of service is an 80-page confusopoly of mumbo-jumbo that

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<v Speaker 2>even if you're an attorney, you may not understand. So

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<v Speaker 2>I have those concerns above and beyond the biometrics. But

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<v Speaker 2>generally speaking, the way these things work, is yes, they

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<v Speaker 2>look at some aspect of your physical form, right? Iris, retina, fingerprint, gait, face,

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<v Speaker 2>something like that. And they reduce that down to some

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<v Speaker 2>sort of math, through a mathematical algorithm to just data, right?

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<v Speaker 2>Measures the distance between your eyes. It measures the height

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<v Speaker 2>of your nose. Again, I'm not truly an expert on

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<v Speaker 2>the inner workings of that stuff. But I will say this,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, depending on how that works, You know, you

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<v Speaker 2>can't get a new fingerprint. You can't get a new face.

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<v Speaker 2>I wish I could, but I can't. Right. Because I

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<v Speaker 2>could like Brad Pitt or something. But, you know, I can't.

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<v Speaker 2>I can't do that. So, yeah, I have a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of concerns about this. And frankly, I am not a

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<v Speaker 2>fan of the Orwellian surveillance state that we seem to

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<v Speaker 2>be headed towards. And I'm happy that the people are

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<v Speaker 2>starting to question these things. And I just want to

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<v Speaker 2>say one last thing because Flock has caught all the news.

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<v Speaker 1>Right.

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<v Speaker 2>Flock is not the only company that's making this. Flock

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<v Speaker 2>has sort of become the Kleenex or the Coke of

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<v Speaker 2>this space. But there are lots of companies that are

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<v Speaker 2>making this kind of technology. And just because someone doesn't

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<v Speaker 2>have Flock doesn't mean they don't have something else. So

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<v Speaker 2>I'm glad people are questioning this. I do not like

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<v Speaker 2>the overall direction. I can tell you that.

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<v Speaker 1>At least you still have some measure of control over

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<v Speaker 1>it in any jurisdiction. If you want them, you can

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<v Speaker 1>get them. If you don't want them, you know. Don't

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<v Speaker 1>get them. And if you want to go to UK,

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<v Speaker 1>go to UK. If not, you don't have to. 636

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<v Speaker 1>right now. Get rid of or actually disconnect your Deep

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<v Speaker 1>Talk Station. It's 640 at 55 KRC, Deep Talk Station

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<v Speaker 1>over at LinkedIn.com. Search for Dave Hatter. You will find him.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's where throughout the week he posts tech-related issues.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, he is InTrustIT's principal. InTrustIT.com for your computer

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<v Speaker 1>needs for businesses. This was, well, the headlines enough to be, whoa,

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<v Speaker 1>do I even, I don't have an LG television, thank God,

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<v Speaker 1>but disconnect your LG television from the internet now, reads

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<v Speaker 1>the headline from Apple Insider's Malcolm Owen. Dave, seriously?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, so now they've come out and disputed some of

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<v Speaker 2>the findings of this initial research. But I'll just say

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<v Speaker 2>this and then we'll talk specifically about this. As you know, Brian,

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<v Speaker 2>because we've been talking about this now for more than

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<v Speaker 2>10 years, I am not a fan of the Internet

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<v Speaker 2>of Things, a.k.a. smart devices, doorbells, thermostats, coffee makers, dryers, cars,

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<v Speaker 2>you name it. Everything is, and you can't see my

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<v Speaker 2>air quotes here, smart now, right? It's got software inside it.

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<v Speaker 2>It's connected to the Internet. In many cases, it has

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<v Speaker 2>a microphone and or camera. you know, ostensibly to make

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<v Speaker 2>your life better, right? Make things quicker, more convenient, easier

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<v Speaker 2>for you.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. It comes at a price. Yes.

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<v Speaker 2>As I've said to you many times, I understand both

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<v Speaker 2>the wow factor of some of this stuff for people

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<v Speaker 2>and the fact that in many cases, it does make

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<v Speaker 2>your life more convenient, but you have to understand the trade-offs.

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<v Speaker 2>And this particular story Nicely illustrates this because what I

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<v Speaker 2>often struggle with trying to explain to people why I

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<v Speaker 2>don't have any of this stuff, don't use any of

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<v Speaker 2>this stuff and don't intend to use any of it,

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<v Speaker 2>goes back to what I said in the last segment

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<v Speaker 2>that most software is not designed with privacy and security

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<v Speaker 2>in mind or to be, it's not favoring you, right?

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<v Speaker 2>It's favoring the people that built it. I would remind folks,

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<v Speaker 2>if you're buying something that is dirt cheap, that has

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<v Speaker 2>all of this capability or possibly free, the people building

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<v Speaker 2>this stuff have mortgages. They have to eat. They have cars, right?

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<v Speaker 1>You are paying a price. You just don't see it

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<v Speaker 1>in the form of dollars. That's the point.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, it's surveillance capitalism. I can't remember who coined that term,

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<v Speaker 2>but it nicely fits the entire model of the Internet now.

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<v Speaker 2>This stuff isn't free. It's being given to you at

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<v Speaker 2>no cost. You are paying for it with your data.

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<v Speaker 2>You are not the customer. You are the product. That's

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<v Speaker 2>the name surveillance capitalism. And increasingly, as the technology advances

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<v Speaker 2>and as the technology often, in terms of the hardware, again,

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<v Speaker 2>has microphones and cameras. And I'll just point out, you

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<v Speaker 2>mentioned LinkedIn. Yes, you can find me there. I share

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<v Speaker 2>all this stuff there. I set up a sub stack,

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<v Speaker 2>which is basically just like a web hosting platform where

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<v Speaker 2>people use it to publish articles and so forth. And

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<v Speaker 2>as these kinds of stories like this LG story, which

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<v Speaker 2>I'll get back to now, come out, I set up

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<v Speaker 2>a page basically explaining why the Internet of Things is

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<v Speaker 2>risky for you. If you're working from home, for example, right,

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<v Speaker 2>and you're connecting to your corporate environment, whatever that might

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<v Speaker 2>be from home. And you have these kind of devices.

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<v Speaker 2>They are potentially exposing your corporate devices and capturing sensitive

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<v Speaker 2>data that, you know, whether you own the business or

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<v Speaker 2>you're just an employee, may not be beneficial to that organization.

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<v Speaker 2>There's so much risk from this stuff because, let's be real, Brian,

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<v Speaker 2>much of it, if not most of it, is coming

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<v Speaker 2>from China. It's full of software. I just posted a

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<v Speaker 2>story the other day. I know we only have time

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<v Speaker 2>for today. Maybe we hit it next week. How these

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<v Speaker 2>consumer-grade Wi-Fi routers coming from China, they're finding actual software

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<v Speaker 2>backdoors in them that would allow a remote attacker to

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<v Speaker 2>take control of it.

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<v Speaker 1>Right. And those things are … ubiquitous. They are literally everywhere.

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<v Speaker 1>But pivoting over, so are LG televisions. What's the risk

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<v Speaker 1>here with LG? Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>So basically, you know, LG has claimed that it's not

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<v Speaker 2>doing a lot of the stuff this researcher said, which

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<v Speaker 2>basically it's listening to you. And even if you disconnected

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<v Speaker 2>from the Internet, it's storing transcripts and will upload them later.

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<v Speaker 2>They say, you know, automatic content recognition, all these new

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<v Speaker 2>TVs have this. And it's another reason why I don't

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<v Speaker 2>like the Internet of Things. In many cases, you have

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<v Speaker 2>to opt out. You have to know some feature that

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<v Speaker 2>is potentially not beneficial to you is turned on and

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<v Speaker 2>you have to go in and figure out how to

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<v Speaker 2>turn it out. Often they usually make that difficult. Automatic

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<v Speaker 2>content recognition basically is– and nearly every one of these

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<v Speaker 2>TVs does it. Well, yeah, that's the microphone capability.

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<v Speaker 1>Exactly.

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<v Speaker 2>It's taking a picture of everything you watch every so

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<v Speaker 2>often and sending it off somewhere. So bottom line to

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<v Speaker 2>save time is whether you have an LG TV or not,

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<v Speaker 2>whether you believe what they say versus these researchers– and

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<v Speaker 2>I encourage you, go look this up. If their TVs

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<v Speaker 2>are really doing what they said, I find it completely egregious.

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<v Speaker 2>I can tell you that at the city building, we

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<v Speaker 2>have eliminated all LG TVs because of this. But that said,

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<v Speaker 2>do your own research. Figure out how to turn these

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<v Speaker 2>features off on whatever TV you have. Turn off automatic

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<v Speaker 2>content recognition. Turn off voice recognition. Turn this stuff off. While, again,

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<v Speaker 2>it may be cool, it is not beneficial to you

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<v Speaker 2>unless and until we have a national privacy law or

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<v Speaker 2>until consumers finally say enough is enough of this. You're

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<v Speaker 2>going to continue to see these kinds of things and

0:11:33.280 --> 0:11:35.790
<v Speaker 2>these kind of problems. Frankly, the less of the stuff

0:11:35.830 --> 0:11:38.689
<v Speaker 2>you have, the better. Go see what LG said. Again,

0:11:38.710 --> 0:11:43.189
<v Speaker 2>I can only tell you what has been alleged. But yeah,

0:11:43.970 --> 0:11:45.430
<v Speaker 2>the less of this stuff you have, the better.

0:11:45.830 --> 0:11:48.650
<v Speaker 1>Well, it's alleged, but you know, because it's been well documented,

0:11:48.700 --> 0:11:51.240
<v Speaker 1>this kind of thing actually does happen. Whether or not

0:11:51.280 --> 0:11:53.960
<v Speaker 1>it happens all the time with LG, certainly the possibility

0:11:54.000 --> 0:11:57.920
<v Speaker 1>exists because the technology is built into it. Unplug it.

0:11:58.500 --> 0:12:01.090
<v Speaker 1>Good advice from Dave Hatter. Don't go away. Next, we're

0:12:01.110 --> 0:12:03.410
<v Speaker 1>going to find out exactly who is tracking you. Apparently,

0:12:03.429 --> 0:12:09.400
<v Speaker 1>there's a new service out there. The Talk Station. 650-55KRC,

0:12:09.420 --> 0:12:16.290
<v Speaker 1>The Talk Station. Businesses, remember, intrustit.com for your computer-related needs.

0:12:16.330 --> 0:12:17.850
<v Speaker 1>Dave Hatterton and the team will take care of you,

0:12:18.010 --> 0:12:20.370
<v Speaker 1>as they have been for years and years. Pivoting over,

0:12:20.530 --> 0:12:23.010
<v Speaker 1>who is tracking us, Dave, and how do we find out?

0:12:24.950 --> 0:12:27.700
<v Speaker 2>The better question probably, Brian, especially in light of the

0:12:27.740 --> 0:12:29.940
<v Speaker 2>last two segments, yes. Who isn't tracking you?

0:12:30.260 --> 0:12:32.740
<v Speaker 1>No, it's so sad.

0:12:32.860 --> 0:12:37.120
<v Speaker 2>Well, again, surveillance capitalism powers so much of what we

0:12:37.160 --> 0:12:39.900
<v Speaker 2>do today. This stuff that's free, these apps you download

0:12:39.950 --> 0:12:43.210
<v Speaker 2>to your phone or your computer for free, these Internet

0:12:43.230 --> 0:12:46.570
<v Speaker 2>of Things devices, they're not free, right? You're paying with

0:12:46.610 --> 0:12:49.230
<v Speaker 2>your data. As I've said to you so many times,

0:12:49.429 --> 0:12:52.359
<v Speaker 2>I'm not saying that is necessarily nefarious. But what I

0:12:52.460 --> 0:12:54.600
<v Speaker 2>am saying is that is the trade-off you're making to

0:12:54.780 --> 0:12:57.100
<v Speaker 2>use things at no cost to you. It's not free.

0:12:57.620 --> 0:13:01.840
<v Speaker 2>There's no financial cost to you today because they're collecting

0:13:01.900 --> 0:13:06.770
<v Speaker 2>all your data. Brian Krebs is a fairly well-known security expert.

0:13:06.890 --> 0:13:08.829
<v Speaker 2>He's been around for a while. He's got a website

0:13:08.870 --> 0:13:11.250
<v Speaker 2>called Krebs on Security where he delves into a lot

0:13:11.270 --> 0:13:12.830
<v Speaker 2>of the sort of stuff you and I talk about

0:13:12.910 --> 0:13:15.890
<v Speaker 2>on a regular basis. So he's a good source for

0:13:15.910 --> 0:13:18.859
<v Speaker 2>this sort of thing. So if you're Interested in the

0:13:18.900 --> 0:13:20.580
<v Speaker 2>sort of stuff you and I are talking about all

0:13:20.620 --> 0:13:23.120
<v Speaker 2>the time. That's a good site. Again, it's just Krebs

0:13:23.179 --> 0:13:26.260
<v Speaker 2>on security. He's easy to find. So he has this article,

0:13:26.470 --> 0:13:28.850
<v Speaker 2>who's tracking you use this new service to find out.

0:13:29.710 --> 0:13:32.510
<v Speaker 2>And I'll just read from his article, powerful and free

0:13:32.570 --> 0:13:36.189
<v Speaker 2>new service called decrypt ads, scrapes and correlates ad tech data.

0:13:36.230 --> 0:13:38.110
<v Speaker 2>It makes it simple to quickly learn a great deal

0:13:38.130 --> 0:13:41.510
<v Speaker 2>about the entities that are tracking you. So to give

0:13:41.530 --> 0:13:43.469
<v Speaker 2>you an idea, and he gets into this, but did

0:13:43.510 --> 0:13:47.100
<v Speaker 2>we talk about the, it was a wired article. where

0:13:47.120 --> 0:13:50.450
<v Speaker 2>the reporter did a story on he requested his data

0:13:50.710 --> 0:13:52.950
<v Speaker 2>from the McDonald's app. Did we talk about that at all?

0:13:53.570 --> 0:13:56.109
<v Speaker 1>Oh, I'm hard-pressed to remember, Dave Hatter. It sounds something

0:13:56.130 --> 0:13:58.990
<v Speaker 1>like we have talked about or that maybe I stumbled

0:13:59.050 --> 0:14:02.010
<v Speaker 1>upon elsewhere, but I can't remember specifically if the listeners

0:14:02.030 --> 0:14:02.330
<v Speaker 1>heard that.

0:14:03.320 --> 0:14:04.970
<v Speaker 2>I'll send it to you. Maybe we get to it

0:14:04.990 --> 0:14:07.690
<v Speaker 2>at some future point because it to me, it really

0:14:07.750 --> 0:14:09.950
<v Speaker 2>points out the sort of stuff we're talking about here.

0:14:10.390 --> 0:14:13.870
<v Speaker 2>But in really interesting and in my mind, disturbing details.

0:14:13.890 --> 0:14:17.110
<v Speaker 2>So this reporter has the McDonald's app. He goes to McDonald's.

0:14:17.130 --> 0:14:20.210
<v Speaker 2>He's a McDonald's fan. People have apps because, of course,

0:14:20.250 --> 0:14:23.820
<v Speaker 2>you get loyalty points and such. Right now, I get it.

0:14:24.270 --> 0:14:27.000
<v Speaker 2>And at least there's some direct financial benefit to you

0:14:27.280 --> 0:14:29.160
<v Speaker 2>of letting them track you at this level. But he

0:14:29.300 --> 0:14:36.830
<v Speaker 2>asked for his data directly. 515, 515, 515 pages of

0:14:36.890 --> 0:14:40.290
<v Speaker 2>data on this guy, Brian. Now think how often you'd

0:14:40.330 --> 0:14:43.430
<v Speaker 2>have to eat at McDonald's to generate 515 pages of

0:14:43.470 --> 0:14:46.270
<v Speaker 2>stuff unless they're collecting all kinds of insane stuff about

0:14:46.290 --> 0:14:48.750
<v Speaker 2>you that you probably did not realize.

0:14:48.880 --> 0:14:51.480
<v Speaker 1>Interesting since you mentioned that because, of course, that will

0:14:51.500 --> 0:14:53.400
<v Speaker 1>be an indicator maybe you should quit eating the processed

0:14:53.440 --> 0:14:55.620
<v Speaker 1>fast food at McDonald's given that George Brenneman's coming up

0:14:55.660 --> 0:14:57.340
<v Speaker 1>to talk about health in the next hour.

0:14:57.360 --> 0:14:59.000
<v Speaker 2>Warning sign.

0:14:59.120 --> 0:14:59.900
<v Speaker 1>Oh, my God.

0:15:00.690 --> 0:15:02.470
<v Speaker 2>Maybe you guys should dig into that. But my point

0:15:02.550 --> 0:15:05.510
<v Speaker 2>is they're collecting an enormous amount of data. That's where

0:15:05.530 --> 0:15:08.530
<v Speaker 2>a site like Decrypt Ads that he's talking about here

0:15:08.590 --> 0:15:11.190
<v Speaker 2>will give you some insight into this. Now, this is

0:15:11.230 --> 0:15:13.170
<v Speaker 2>a little bit different what they're shooting for here. They're

0:15:13.220 --> 0:15:16.120
<v Speaker 2>trying to get at when you visit a website, how

0:15:16.140 --> 0:15:18.720
<v Speaker 2>many trackers and so forth are built into it that

0:15:18.800 --> 0:15:22.080
<v Speaker 2>are collecting data from your device, your phone or your

0:15:22.140 --> 0:15:25.960
<v Speaker 2>computer when you hit that website through third party trackers

0:15:26.000 --> 0:15:28.510
<v Speaker 2>that are being sent elsewhere. So in this case, you

0:15:28.530 --> 0:15:32.520
<v Speaker 2>can see a screenshot, it's showing ESPN, okay? So the

0:15:32.620 --> 0:15:36.240
<v Speaker 2>idea is you've gone to ESPN because you care about sports, right?

0:15:37.360 --> 0:15:40.680
<v Speaker 2>But then it shows you all of the different tracking

0:15:40.730 --> 0:15:44.530
<v Speaker 2>and so forth that's happening behind the scenes while you're

0:15:44.550 --> 0:15:47.110
<v Speaker 2>reading a story about the Reds or the Bengals.

0:15:47.170 --> 0:15:48.770
<v Speaker 1>Is that cookies that they're looking at?

0:15:49.750 --> 0:15:53.380
<v Speaker 2>It's cookies, it's browser fingerprinting, you know, cookies, just as

0:15:53.400 --> 0:15:55.340
<v Speaker 2>a reminder for folks, a cookie is nothing more than

0:15:55.380 --> 0:15:58.160
<v Speaker 2>a text file. Like it's downloaded to your device So

0:15:58.180 --> 0:16:01.420
<v Speaker 2>they can track you. Now, that's usually not necessarily nefarious.

0:16:01.470 --> 0:16:03.390
<v Speaker 2>It may be that's the way you stay logged into

0:16:03.450 --> 0:16:05.690
<v Speaker 2>the site. You don't have to keep any username and password.

0:16:06.330 --> 0:16:08.990
<v Speaker 2>But as people have gotten wise to blocking cookies and

0:16:09.010 --> 0:16:12.490
<v Speaker 2>third party tracking cookies and so forth, they're using things

0:16:12.530 --> 0:16:15.650
<v Speaker 2>like browser fingerprinting, which are reading the settings off your computer.

0:16:15.690 --> 0:16:18.250
<v Speaker 2>So they don't even need cookies. But real quick for

0:16:18.270 --> 0:16:20.410
<v Speaker 2>a round of time, a search and decrypt ads for

0:16:20.470 --> 0:16:25.170
<v Speaker 2>hugely popular sports network ESPN reveals. Wait for it. 143

0:16:25.170 --> 0:16:30.500
<v Speaker 2>ad partners and 19 registered data broker domains listed within

0:16:30.960 --> 0:16:33.660
<v Speaker 2>the text files that this thing is reading. So there's,

0:16:34.420 --> 0:16:38.570
<v Speaker 2>as of when this article was published, 143 different companies

0:16:38.990 --> 0:16:43.450
<v Speaker 2>getting information about you because you went to ESPN. And

0:16:43.470 --> 0:16:47.270
<v Speaker 2>then reminder, data broker are companies, they're companies that do

0:16:47.310 --> 0:16:49.850
<v Speaker 2>nothing but buy and sell your data. They're usually behind

0:16:49.890 --> 0:16:51.790
<v Speaker 2>the scenes buying and selling this. This is how all

0:16:51.820 --> 0:16:54.820
<v Speaker 2>this data gets collected. So, you know, This company buys

0:16:54.880 --> 0:16:57.280
<v Speaker 2>data from that company, buys data from this company, puts

0:16:57.340 --> 0:17:00.920
<v Speaker 2>it all together, builds these incredibly granular dossiers about you,

0:17:00.940 --> 0:17:05.760
<v Speaker 2>like 515 pages of McDonald's data. So if McDonald's were

0:17:05.800 --> 0:17:07.940
<v Speaker 2>to sell that data to someone else, that just gets

0:17:07.980 --> 0:17:10.200
<v Speaker 2>put in the pool. And that's why there's so much

0:17:10.240 --> 0:17:14.050
<v Speaker 2>information out there about you now. Again, just ESPN, according

0:17:14.090 --> 0:17:17.550
<v Speaker 2>to this article, 143 partners, 19 data brokers. All right.

0:17:17.590 --> 0:17:19.550
<v Speaker 1>Well, let's say we delete all of our cookies. How

0:17:19.570 --> 0:17:21.429
<v Speaker 1>do we delete the other information they're stealing from us?

0:17:21.470 --> 0:17:21.869
<v Speaker 1>Can we?

0:17:23.240 --> 0:17:25.939
<v Speaker 2>Not really. There are things you can do. There are

0:17:25.980 --> 0:17:29.040
<v Speaker 2>things you can do. A, use a site like this

0:17:29.080 --> 0:17:31.200
<v Speaker 2>to figure out who's tracking you like this and stop

0:17:31.300 --> 0:17:35.629
<v Speaker 2>using their sites. You can use browser, web browsers that

0:17:35.670 --> 0:17:38.130
<v Speaker 2>are more privacy friendly than Google Chrome. You can use

0:17:38.150 --> 0:17:43.429
<v Speaker 2>things like Brave, Firefox, Safari. I use all three of

0:17:43.470 --> 0:17:45.130
<v Speaker 2>those to some extent.

0:17:45.270 --> 0:17:47.669
<v Speaker 1>Brave, at your recommendation, I've been using Brave for years.

0:17:49.210 --> 0:17:53.179
<v Speaker 2>There are browser plugins like EFF's Privacy Badger. A browser

0:17:53.200 --> 0:17:55.840
<v Speaker 2>plugin is just software you install in the browser to

0:17:56.220 --> 0:18:01.330
<v Speaker 2>add functionality to it. EFF is Electronic Frontier Foundation Privacy Badger.

0:18:01.350 --> 0:18:03.660
<v Speaker 2>And And by the way, Brian, going back to my Substack.

0:18:03.780 --> 0:18:06.639
<v Speaker 2>So I have a page on my Substack that is

0:18:06.840 --> 0:18:09.790
<v Speaker 2>every time I find these stories about egregious Internet of

0:18:09.830 --> 0:18:13.629
<v Speaker 2>Things issues, I put it on there. So I have

0:18:13.650 --> 0:18:15.889
<v Speaker 2>a long list showing you how crazy this stuff is

0:18:15.910 --> 0:18:18.330
<v Speaker 2>because I get that people get bits and pieces of it.

0:18:18.350 --> 0:18:23.129
<v Speaker 2>It's hard to put together. DaveHatter.Substack.com. Look for my IoT article.

0:18:23.609 --> 0:18:26.320
<v Speaker 2>And then I have an article out there. that lists

0:18:26.560 --> 0:18:29.459
<v Speaker 2>all of the privacy-friendly stuff I use personally in my

0:18:29.500 --> 0:18:30.740
<v Speaker 2>daily life as Dave Hatter.

0:18:30.920 --> 0:18:33.239
<v Speaker 1>Well, Joe Strecker, I just checked with Joe Strecker. It's

0:18:33.359 --> 0:18:36.510
<v Speaker 1>all there on 55KRC. com, your Substack link, and, of course,

0:18:36.550 --> 0:18:39.649
<v Speaker 1>all your other links. LinkedIn.com to find Dave, and Joe

0:18:39.670 --> 0:18:41.830
<v Speaker 1>will take care of the Substack to help those like

0:18:41.869 --> 0:18:44.130
<v Speaker 1>me who can be internet challenged from time to time.

0:18:44.170 --> 0:18:46.810
<v Speaker 1>Dave Hatter, thank you so much for Interest IT sponsoring

0:18:46.830 --> 0:18:49.130
<v Speaker 1>the segment and all that you do for your clients,

0:18:49.230 --> 0:18:52.450
<v Speaker 1>and congratulations on business success brought about by you doing

0:18:52.510 --> 0:18:55.210
<v Speaker 1>wonderful work and keeping us informed every Friday.