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Speaker 1: Fifty five KRC the talk station.

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Speaker 2: Six thirty Friday. It is a time intrust dot com

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Speaker 2: for the best in the business and the greater Cincinnati area.

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Speaker 2: You want to get rely on interest I for all

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Speaker 2: your business computer needs, especially if your entire system gets

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Speaker 2: wiped out by a malware attack. Welcome back, Dave, had

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Speaker 2: it from interest I, T well. Thank you. Start by

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Speaker 2: appreciating your company interest I for sponsoring this segment, valuable

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Speaker 2: it is and scaring the living crap out of us regularly,

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Speaker 2: which is a good thing, most notably on the heels

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Speaker 2: of this Striker attack. What the heck, Dave, this.

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Speaker 1: Is so bad, Brian, as always, thanks for having me

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Speaker 1: on and the pleasure. I hate to always be the

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Speaker 1: guy with the bad news, but if you look at

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Speaker 1: what happened with Striker, and I'm a little surprised this

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Speaker 1: has not gotten more news coverage or or or because

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Speaker 1: of the connection to the action in Iran. So but

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Speaker 1: this is the kind of thing, Brian, you and I

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Speaker 1: have talked about for years. I've warned about it for years.

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Speaker 1: So Striker is a large company, apparently based on a

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Speaker 1: Michigan I really wasn't very familiar with them up to

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Speaker 1: this incident, although I'll tell you a connection I have

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Speaker 1: to it which is really interesting and even more concerning.

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Speaker 1: They make medical devices that are used in hospitals, doctors' offices, ambulances,

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Speaker 1: that sort of thing. So I'm just going to quote

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Speaker 1: from an article here Fortune five hundred company reported global

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Speaker 1: sales of twenty two point six billion and twenty twenty

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Speaker 1: four fifty three thousand employees. Yeah, so we're we're not

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Speaker 1: talking about some mom and pop shop that doesn't have money,

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Speaker 1: doesn't have resources, and frankly is a technology company. They're

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Speaker 1: making you know again quoting this article leading medical technology company.

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Speaker 1: So they were hit apparently as a result of the

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Speaker 1: hostilities in Iran. Now, can't say it wouldn't have happened anyway,

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Speaker 1: I know, but the organization that was behind this attack

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Speaker 1: claims to be affiliated with Iran. You can see what

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Speaker 1: they had to say in them. They put out, you know,

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Speaker 1: Zionist rooted Corporation Striker, one of the key arms of

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Speaker 1: the globalist Zionist lobby New Central Ring in the New

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Speaker 1: Epstein Chain. I'm reading to you from a statement from Hondala.

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Speaker 2: Is big Foot, are big Foot and Chupacabra mentioned in

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Speaker 2: there as well as the other conspiracy theories that they're fabricating.

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Speaker 1: They are not. They are just So here's what they say, Brian. Again,

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Speaker 1: the organization that claims to have done this, Striker's offices

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Speaker 1: in seventy nine countries have been forced to shut down.

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Speaker 1: All the acquired data is now in the hands of

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Speaker 1: the three people of the world, ready to be used

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Speaker 1: for the true lancement of humanity and the exposure of

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Speaker 1: injustice and corruption. They say. In this operation, over two

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Speaker 1: hundred thousand systems, servers, and mobile devices have been wiped

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Speaker 1: and fifty terabytes of critical data have been extracted. So again,

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Speaker 1: this is a company that makes medical equipment.

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Speaker 2: I was just trying to ask you, are the terrorist

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Speaker 2: hackers behind the Iranians? Are they going to start making

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Speaker 2: surgical and neurotechnology the equipment that the Striker can no

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Speaker 2: longer manufacture? Are they going to bring this harmony to

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Speaker 2: the globe and taking over the operation?

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Speaker 1: Dave Quest, Yes, I understand, I doubt it. But what

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Speaker 1: they could potentially do is start to then hack the

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Speaker 1: equipment with the information that they have. But here here's

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Speaker 1: my real concern about this, Brian. So a wiper attack

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Speaker 1: is essentially a type of malware similar to ransomware. The

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Speaker 1: difference is, you know, if I hit you with ransomware,

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Speaker 1: I want you to pay a ransom to decrypt your data. Right,

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Speaker 1: I encrypt your data, scrambles it up, renders the devices

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Speaker 1: where that data exists unusable, and you pay me a ransom.

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Speaker 1: I theoretically decrypt the data. Everything goes back to normal.

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Speaker 1: And then if I say, as the victim of it,

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Speaker 1: I said well, I'm not going to pay, then they say, well,

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Speaker 1: let's fine. Typically they have also exfiltrated stolen your data,

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Speaker 1: and you know they'll use that as leverage, say well,

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Speaker 1: we'll start to expose this so called fifty terabytes of

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Speaker 1: data they claim they've stolen to the world unless you

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Speaker 1: pay us. A wiper is different. Though a wiper is

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Speaker 1: not designed to get a ransom. A wiper is not

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Speaker 1: designed to be able to recover from its diffictly designed

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Speaker 1: to just destroy the data on whatever devices it hits,

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Speaker 1: so that they're down and you can't use them. This

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Speaker 1: has happened before, you may recall, I think it was

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Speaker 1: twenty fifteen. A Ukrainian company that made software was hit

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Speaker 1: with something like this, which then went out to their

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Speaker 1: customers and knocked hundreds of thousands of devices from huge

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Speaker 1: companies like MAYERSK offline. So this isn't the first time

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Speaker 1: something like this has happened, but it's the first time

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Speaker 1: I can tell you I'm aware of anything of this

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Speaker 1: significance in the US, not only because now think about this, Brian,

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Speaker 1: think about this, if they really knocked out two hundred

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Speaker 1: thousand devices. And Striker has commented on this, but it's

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Speaker 1: been kind of vague. Even if I had systems in place,

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Speaker 1: so I had resiliency and business continuity and could recover

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Speaker 1: these two hundred thousand devices quickly, even if it took

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Speaker 1: ten minutes per device. What's ten minutes times two hundred

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Speaker 1: thousand Think at the downtime.

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Speaker 2: Here, Holy cow when you put it in them in terms.

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Speaker 1: Yes, well, this is the thing that people are often

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Speaker 1: not thinking about. So you know, part of cybersecurity is

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Speaker 1: how do I harden my systems and reduce the likelihood

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Speaker 1: that something like this will happen? Right? And then secondarily,

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Speaker 1: if something happens, doesn't have to be a cyber attack,

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Speaker 1: could be natural disaster, could be equipment failure. How do

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Speaker 1: I have an environment and systems in it that are

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Speaker 1: resilient and can recover quickly with minimal downtime. You know, again,

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Speaker 1: I only know what I've read about this, Brian. But

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Speaker 1: think about this again. Ten minutes at two hundred thousand,

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Speaker 1: and I can tell you it. We'll take more than

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Speaker 1: ten minutes. I'm just speculating here. I don't know if

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Speaker 1: this company can survive. I know, you know there and

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Speaker 1: that fifty three thousand jobs, twenty two billion dollar company.

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Speaker 1: But here's the really scary part. That's all terrible, absolutely terrible.

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Speaker 1: But these medical devices are everywhere. I can tell you

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Speaker 1: when I put my mayor's hat on, we have a

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Speaker 1: bunch of their equipment in our fire department and our ambulances.

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Speaker 2: My wife works one of the largest hospital systems in

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Speaker 2: the country, and she knew about this right away, and

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Speaker 2: she even mentioned it to me the other day that

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Speaker 2: this had happened. Then it impacted. I mean, they have

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Speaker 2: relationships established with all these hospital systems, and so there

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Speaker 2: may be a ripple effect there.

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Speaker 1: Yes, I mean, okay, if they don't survive when those

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Speaker 1: devices start to go bad, what happens? Could the devices

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Speaker 1: could summer All of the devices they make that are

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Speaker 1: Internet connected be hacked as a result of this information

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Speaker 1: they now have who knows. I mean, this is where

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Speaker 1: people do not think about the downstream consequences of not

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Speaker 1: having the right security in place, and frankly of equal

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Speaker 1: maybe more importance when you see these kind of things

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Speaker 1: with having systems in place for resiliency and a quick recovery.

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Speaker 2: Interest I dot Com a plug right there for that

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Speaker 2: one pause will bring him back and talk about more issues.

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Speaker 2: Foreign exchange, your premier European and Asian imported automotive specialists.

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Speaker 1: You talk station.

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Speaker 2: Sixty one if you have carec the talk station Brian

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Speaker 2: Thomas with Interest i T dot COM's Dave had Or

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Speaker 2: business curer says interest I T is the best in

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Speaker 2: the business when it comes to things like we were talking

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Speaker 2: about the last hour. Try to avoid your you avoid

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Speaker 2: the risk of being hacked. Dave pivoting over local person.

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Speaker 2: Talk about imposter scams. You got one every week? What

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Speaker 2: happened here?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, these scams are super prevalent, Brian. I know people

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Speaker 1: that have been victims of them personally, and as you

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Speaker 1: and I have discussed so many times, and I think

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Speaker 1: you might have mentioned this yesterday you had another breach

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Speaker 1: of a billion records. Your data is everywhere now, everywhere, everywhere,

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Speaker 1: And I would bet you there's not a single person

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Speaker 1: listening to us ever that hasn't gotten at least one

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Speaker 1: notice of some sort of data breach.

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Speaker 2: Even if they're a loud ate. That's because public information,

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Speaker 2: like auditor records, public information. It's out there for all

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Speaker 2: to see. So even if you're hiding in a closet,

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Speaker 2: you're still going to have your information hacked. You have

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Speaker 2: an address, yes.

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Speaker 1: I mean, you're exactly right, Brian. I mean, the more

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Speaker 1: apps you use, the more Internet of Things devices you have,

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Speaker 1: the more your data is going to be out there.

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Speaker 1: But even if you don't do any of that stuff,

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Speaker 1: I mean you're using credit cards, people are buying and

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Speaker 1: selling your data. And the reason why that's important is

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Speaker 1: all of that data gets in the hands of bad guys.

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Speaker 1: They buy it off the dark web and such. Again,

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Speaker 1: we see stories regularly about oh, here's someone found a

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Speaker 1: database with a being and social security numbers or whatever.

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Speaker 1: All that data in the hands of these bad guys

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Speaker 1: helps them refine their scams, It helps them target you,

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Speaker 1: It helps them figure out what to say to you

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Speaker 1: if and when they talk to you. On the phone.

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Speaker 1: It helps them guide those conversations so they seem like

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Speaker 1: the legitimate agency that claims you have some kind of problem, right,

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Speaker 1: So they'll fish you via text, via email, sometimes they'll

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Speaker 1: call you, sometimes a combination of all these things. They're

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Speaker 1: using this information to create messages that are much more

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Speaker 1: realistic than the standard. Hey, I'm in Nigerian Prince. I

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Speaker 1: want to transfer eight million dollars to your bank account.

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Speaker 1: And that's what you see here in this story price

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Speaker 1: woman rather loses five thousand dollars in bank imposter scam.

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Speaker 1: And I think it's I have so much respect for

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Speaker 1: people who come forward and tell these stories. Yes, because

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Speaker 1: I know it's embarrassing. I know it's hurtful to them.

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Speaker 1: You know, who has a spare five grand they want

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Speaker 1: to lose. But rather than listen to someone like me

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Speaker 1: speculate on this, orn't about this, when these real people

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Speaker 1: come forward and tell these stories, at least I believe

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Speaker 1: it puts a fine point on it. This stuff is real.

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Speaker 1: It's not just even they've had her making stuff up.

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Speaker 1: This is happening every day.

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Speaker 2: Well, and even more so, she works in banking and

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Speaker 2: she knows how financial systems work. That's what the reporting shows.

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Speaker 2: So this isn't some novice out there. This is someone

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Speaker 2: who has at least some understanding of the banking system.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I agree. And so she lost five thousand dollars.

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Speaker 1: She claims that, you know, she got a call. They

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Speaker 1: said there was some kind of fraud on her account.

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Speaker 1: The number appeared to come from her bank, and they said.

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Speaker 1: There's one part again, I only know what the reporting says.

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Speaker 1: One part that says that the callers, the hackers, the

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Speaker 1: bad actors, were prepared. They knew her recent transactions. They

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Speaker 1: knew she had just ordered a new debit card. They

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Speaker 1: had a deep tell personal account information that made them

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Speaker 1: sound completely legitimate.

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Speaker 2: That's scary.

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Speaker 1: Exactly exactly how they would know her recent transactions, that

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Speaker 1: she just ordered a debit card, I don't know. But

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Speaker 1: the detailed personal account information, again, that stuff is everywhere

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Speaker 1: out there now. So just because you get a call,

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Speaker 1: it's easy to spoof a phone number. Anyone right now

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Speaker 1: can go do a search and find a website that

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Speaker 1: will let them send a text or make a phone

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Speaker 1: call from any number they want. It is trivially easy.

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Speaker 1: You cannot look at a phone number on your phone

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Speaker 1: and know whether it's a legitimate number again, be a

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Speaker 1: text or phone. So you know, they call her, so

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Speaker 1: they got guts, they call her. They're con artists. They're

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Speaker 1: going to talk to her on the phone. They have

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Speaker 1: this information that makes them seem legitimate. Then they claim

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Speaker 1: frauds and activity in Dallas. She needs to open up

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Speaker 1: a new account and transfer her money over now again, Brian,

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Speaker 1: the bank can just turn your account right, No? Right?

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Speaker 1: I mean you should not transfer your money should You

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Speaker 1: should not go buy Venmo or put it in ven

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Speaker 1: By gift cards, put it in an ATM and another bank.

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Speaker 1: I know someone that had something similar to this happened.

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Speaker 1: But unfortunately she did it, and you know, this article says, okay,

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Speaker 1: didn't even know what happens. She took every you know,

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Speaker 1: call their real customer service line, by a police repport,

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Speaker 1: contact a better business view, freeze your credit, you know,

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Speaker 1: escalate with the bank, contact the FBI. Now, let's be real,

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Speaker 1: the FBI is not going to have the resources to

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Speaker 1: get engaged with a five thousand dollars individual theft. But

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Speaker 1: it's not a bad idea to report that, at least

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Speaker 1: to the Internet Crime Complaints Center IC three dot gov.

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Speaker 1: Which the the FBI runs. But I mean, here's the

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Speaker 1: here's the bottom line, and they say it in the article.

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Speaker 1: If you get something like this, hang up immediately. Do

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Speaker 1: not talk to these people. They're con artists. They'll tell

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Speaker 1: you whatever lies they need to hang up. Get out

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Speaker 1: your debit card or credit card, call that number, use

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Speaker 1: the app you normally use. You know, you need to

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Speaker 1: verify this. Go to a local bank branch if there is.

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Speaker 1: Don't click the links, don't don't use any of the

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Speaker 1: information they gave you. Hang up and use information that

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Speaker 1: you already have, and you know, reach out to your

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Speaker 1: bank and say, hey, I got this call.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, don't engage in a knee jerk reaction. Stop hanging up,

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Speaker 2: give it some thought, thinking maybe this is a scam.

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Speaker 2: It's not going to unring the bell of whatever they

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Speaker 2: claim to be warning you about. So you do have

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Speaker 2: some time. The damage has already been done, according to them,

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Speaker 2: so go to the bank and find out for sure.

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Speaker 2: Dave yes at a time. In the segment, let's bring

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Speaker 2: you back and we'll talk about Meta getting sued over

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Speaker 2: the wonderfully gorgeous looking privacy. Intrust dot Com sponsors the

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Speaker 2: Tech Friday with Dave Hatter segment Dave Hatter, it's his

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Speaker 2: company and the best in the business. So get yourself

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Speaker 2: out of a jam, or prevent jams by calling them up.

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Speaker 2: And then we pivot over Dave Hatter. Metas getting sued

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Speaker 2: over the new AI smart glasses and I'm looking at

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Speaker 2: a photograph of them, and honestly, you can tell when

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Speaker 2: someone has them on based upon the awesome fashion statement

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Speaker 2: they present. But I would not feel comfortable talking with

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Speaker 2: anyone with these things on.

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Speaker 1: Well, I'm sure it doesn't come as a shock to you.

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Speaker 1: I'm in the same boat as you. You know, I'm

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Speaker 1: not a big fan of the Internet of Things aka

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Speaker 1: smart devices, and as we see miniaturization of this technology

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Speaker 1: and the ability to add cameras and microphones to everything,

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Speaker 1: you know, you see things like the Meta smart classes here. Now,

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Speaker 1: as a reminder, this is not new. A few years ago,

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Speaker 1: Google tried this. They had something called Google Glass, which

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Speaker 1: coined the awesome term for people wearing these things glassholes

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Speaker 1: quote unquote. They didn't really catch on. Yeah, they didn't

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Speaker 1: really catch on. So now Meta's back. They're apparently in

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Speaker 1: partnership with Luxotica for their ray band brand, and yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's plenty of pictures out there of Mark Zuckerberg wearing

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Speaker 1: these things. You can see there's a little light on

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Speaker 1: that shows you what it's active in recording. But from

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Speaker 1: what I have read.

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Speaker 2: You can disable the light go on there and.

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Speaker 1: You know so. Here's an article from tech Crunch metasuit

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Speaker 1: over AI smart classes privacy concerns after workers reviewed nudity,

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Speaker 1: sex and other footage now again allegedly in this lawsuit.

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Speaker 1: This is what this article says. You know. It goes

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Speaker 1: on to say in the article Meta is facing a

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Speaker 1: new class action lawsuit or it's our smart classes and

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Speaker 1: their lack of privacy after an investigation by Swedish newspapers

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Speaker 1: find them that workers at a Kenya based subcontractor are

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Speaker 1: reviewing footage from customers classes which included sensitive content like nudity,

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Speaker 1: people having sex and using the toilet.

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Speaker 2: Medically don't have with someone wearing smart classes.

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Speaker 1: Yes, Or don't go to the toilet while your smart

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Speaker 1: classes are on, or maybe perhaps just don't have smart

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Speaker 1: classes or be around people with smart classes, and then

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Speaker 1: at least you will have one less orwelly and spy

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Speaker 1: mechanism tracking your every move, listening to your conversations, et cetera.

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Speaker 1: Now it goes on to say in here, the complaint

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Speaker 1: alleges that meta AI smart classes are advertising using promises

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Speaker 1: like quote designed for privacy, controlled by you unquote and

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Speaker 1: quote built for your privacy unquote, which might not lead

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Speaker 1: the might not lead customers to assume their glasses footage,

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Speaker 1: including innimate moments, was being watched by workers overseas. You know,

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Speaker 1: they claim that this is being done for quality purposes.

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Speaker 1: Same thing all these companies say about the data that

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Speaker 1: they collect and upload, and you know, again, in many cases,

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Speaker 1: I'm assuming some of this more sensitive footage isn't because

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Speaker 1: someone is purposely violating someone else's privacy. It's because they

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Speaker 1: don't really understand how these things work. They don't understand

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Speaker 1: when they're on, they forget that they're on, they set

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Speaker 1: them down in an inconvenient spot. But ultimately that data

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Speaker 1: gets uploaded to servers where someone you know is theoretically

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Speaker 1: reviewing this for quality purposes.

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Speaker 2: It's like it's like the room go back with the

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Speaker 2: camera in it. This is the same thing, except Lord Almighty,

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Speaker 2: the implications are far broader. With the glasses, they go

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Speaker 2: with the ever wherever you have them on, unlike a room,

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Speaker 2: but which is at least going to be you know,

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Speaker 2: stuck in your living room or.

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Speaker 1: Your house exactly. And so also reading from the article here,

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Speaker 1: and twenty twenty five seven million people bought Meta smart glasses.

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Speaker 1: The footage from those glasses is fed into a data

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Speaker 1: pipeline for a review, and users can't opt out. So

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Speaker 1: and I know we'll we're out of time, but yeah,

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Speaker 1: the room at least is confined to your house. You

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Speaker 1: could be sitting in a restaurant next to someone that's

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Speaker 1: essentially recording your conversation without your knowledge. And I just

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Speaker 1: want to point out, let's go back to the nest

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Speaker 1: thing in the Guthrie situation. She didn't have a subscription,

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Speaker 1: They said we can't retrieve this data, and then magically,

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Speaker 1: ten days later the data shows up. So if you

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Speaker 1: think this stuff is going into their servers and is

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Speaker 1: somehow eventually being deleted, or isn't potentially being sold to

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Speaker 1: someone else who knows, So, yeah, there is literally no

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Speaker 1: chance I would use these things. There is no chance

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Speaker 1: I would be around someone that has these on. This

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Speaker 1: is just more of it, just illustrates once again how

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Speaker 1: as we make everything smart. Quote unquote put software in everything.

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Speaker 1: There are all these unintended consequences to everyday people that

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Speaker 1: they typically don't understand. So again, all of this is alleged.

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Speaker 1: That's in a lawsuit. Go out, read these articles, see

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Speaker 1: the pictures. But yeah, I'm not a fan, and I

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Speaker 1: would encourage people not to buy this stuff and to

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Speaker 1: try to avoid being around it as much as possible. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: the Internet of Things. Not a fan. Yes, that's a

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Speaker 1: good stopping point.

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Speaker 2: Take a pass on Internet of Things devices,