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Speaker 1: The talk station sixty one. If if you've got KRCD

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Speaker 1: talk station the Friday this time of week appointment listening

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Speaker 1: Tech Friday's Dave Hatter brought to you by intrust It.

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Speaker 1: That's Dave's company, which business Curier says is the best

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Speaker 1: in the greater Cincinnati area in the tri State for

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Speaker 1: helping you with your manage and deal with your computer

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Speaker 1: needs for businesses. So businesses rely on interest It, you'd

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Speaker 1: be in great hands with Dave had Ter. Dave had

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Speaker 1: to welcome back to the morning show. Understand you're not

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Speaker 1: feeling real good today, Dave.

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Speaker 2: A little bit of a cold. I'm all right. I

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Speaker 2: just sounded a little crazy this morning.

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Speaker 1: All right, Well, we'll wish you the best and then

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Speaker 1: we'll find out in the next segment whether you'll trust

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Speaker 1: an AI bot to figure out what the hell's wrong

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Speaker 1: with you. But before that, I was reminded Dave on

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Speaker 1: a on a comical level, and I asked Joe Streker

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Speaker 1: if he knew what the joke was about Rurou. And

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Speaker 1: of course my dad had told him that joke, and

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Speaker 1: that dad told me that joke too. Remember death by

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Speaker 1: Ruru also death by Unga Bunga. We have not RUU

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Speaker 1: but review. So you can either acknowledge your understanding of

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Speaker 1: that joke or we can just die into the subject matter.

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Speaker 2: Dave Hatter, Yeah, that is funny. And also there's a

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Speaker 2: take off of that on if you ever watch Futurama

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Speaker 2: Death by Snoozenoode.

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Speaker 1: There you go. Okay, we're all on the same page.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, so this is an interesting story headline. Wi Fi

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Speaker 2: signals reveal human activities through walls by mapping body key points,

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Speaker 2: and this is the review you're talking about. Is an

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Speaker 2: open source AI system and basically just using ordinary Wi Fi.

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Speaker 2: Keep in mind, your Wi Fi router is throwing out

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Speaker 2: a wireless signal that allows the devices within range to

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Speaker 2: connect to it. Your computer, your phone, your smart TV,

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Speaker 2: whatever other devices you have that can pick up a

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Speaker 2: Wi Fi signal. And I'm sure many of your listeners

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Speaker 2: out there have fought in the past with well, the

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Speaker 2: signals not strong enough in this room, or sometimes it

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Speaker 2: drops off at this time of day or whatever. But

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Speaker 2: my point is you're throwing out a radio frequency right

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Speaker 2: typically in the three hundred and sixty degree arc or

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Speaker 2: circle that all these devices are trying to connect to

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Speaker 2: and this is This is not new exactly. Researchers have

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Speaker 2: shown in the past you could do this, but now

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Speaker 2: with this new system, it basically shows you how as

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Speaker 2: the radio signals are either bouncing off of things or

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Speaker 2: absorbed by things. Think the way radar works. Basically without

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Speaker 2: any kind of cameras or anything. Someone that has the

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Speaker 2: right equipment and this in the right system can pick

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Speaker 2: up that Wi Fi and see where people are in

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Speaker 2: a room through the walls with no windows, no cameras

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Speaker 2: or anything like that. It's it's pretty wild, really, it

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Speaker 2: says in the article turning ordinary Wi Fi infrastructure into

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Speaker 2: a through the wall human sensing platform detecting body pos,

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Speaker 2: vital signs, and movement patterns without a single camera, raising

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Speaker 2: security and raising urgent security and surveillance concerns. Yeah, I'd

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Speaker 2: say yeah, and they say. Researchers and developers have long

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Speaker 2: theorized that ambient radio signals could be weaponized for passive surveillance,

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Speaker 2: and this review, built by developer RUBN Cohen and available

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Speaker 2: on GitHub, implements Wi Fi dns POS, a sensing technique

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Speaker 2: originally pioneered by Carnegie Mellon University, is a practical, low

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Speaker 2: cost edge system that reconstructs full body human poses through

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Speaker 2: walls using only standard Wi Fi signals. Wow, so yeah,

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Speaker 2: it's it just goes to show you again, all of

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Speaker 2: this technology can be used in ways that are often

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Speaker 2: unintended and potentially negative.

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Speaker 1: This sounds like something or American military would have developed

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Speaker 1: in order to do like breaches of you know, rooms,

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Speaker 1: whether so they know exactly where people are before they

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Speaker 1: kick a door in.

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Speaker 2: But well and maybe they did have Brian and you

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Speaker 2: just haven't heard about their version of it. You know. Again,

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Speaker 2: this idea of using Wi Fi signals to be able

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Speaker 2: to like map an area and so forth isn't new,

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Speaker 2: but this, this review application is fairly new. It's it

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Speaker 2: goes on to say, when a human body moves within

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Speaker 2: a wireless environment, it distorted signal paths across dozens of

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Speaker 2: o FDM subcarriers. This is a signal process. This software

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Speaker 2: is a signal processing pipeline. It captures these disturbances and

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Speaker 2: extracts the amplitude and phase variation, feeds them through a

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Speaker 2: modified process and essentially will show you again where a

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Speaker 2: person is, how they're positioned, and so forth, simply because

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Speaker 2: their body is block interfering with.

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Speaker 1: The signals frightening. It doesn't extract me that the technology

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Speaker 1: exists that can do that, but that the technology exists

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Speaker 1: that they can do that is just in and of

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Speaker 1: itself kind of frightening. So it's the death of privacy

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Speaker 1: by review.

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Speaker 2: Certainly one more step towards it. And it goes on

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Speaker 2: to say, unlike cameras which are regulating under GDPR and CCPA,

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Speaker 2: you know privacy laws which again vary all around the world,

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Speaker 2: and there isn't a single single privacy on the US

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Speaker 2: cameras which are regulating GDPR and CCPA and physical installation laws.

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Speaker 2: Passive Wi Fi sensing is invisible and requires no physical

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Speaker 2: access to the target environment. Legal analysis is noted. Quote,

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Speaker 2: it's quite difficult to ask pedestrians for permission and advance unquote,

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Speaker 2: and can send frameworks collap entirely when the sensing is passive.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, let's face it. Even if there's a law

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Speaker 1: on the book outright prohibiting it and subjecting you to

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Speaker 1: criminal penalty if you do it, nefarious actors don't follow

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Speaker 1: the law, Dave. So I don't think one of for

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Speaker 1: want of a regulation, this is going to go anywhere.

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Speaker 1: All right, Well, keep that in mind. If you have

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Speaker 1: Wi Fi, someone could hack in and use this as

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Speaker 1: basically what it boils down to.

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Speaker 2: Yes, that is what it boils down to.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, right, get those Internet of Things devices to make

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Speaker 1: it really easy for people to break into your Wi

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Speaker 1: Fi system.

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Speaker 2: More on that, dude.

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Speaker 1: Maybe AI can figure out what's wrong with Dave this morning,

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Speaker 1: We're going to find that out. Coming up next first,

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Speaker 1: Kate of Heaven talk Station six, is that you love

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Speaker 1: KC the talk station. This is my theme song Sunday

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Speaker 1: Money and Tuesday Joe and of course Dave Hatter Feeling

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Speaker 1: slightly under the weather this morning in trust it dot

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Speaker 1: Com sponsoring the Tech Friday segment here with Dave Hatter.

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Speaker 1: Of course, they're the ones that rely on for all

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Speaker 1: your business computer needs. Feel a little under the weather?

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Speaker 1: Are you have you consulted AI bought Dave Hatter?

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Speaker 2: Now, Brian, I'm gonna have you guests. Do you think no,

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Speaker 2: that I would that I would a put any sensitive

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Speaker 2: information into any sort of AI bot? No partless? Yeah,

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Speaker 2: and then b take its advice as uh as gospel,

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Speaker 2: because you know, we have an ever increasing number of

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Speaker 2: cases showing that these things will literally just make things

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Speaker 2: up and then try to convince you there correct.

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Speaker 1: Or to kill yourself because you have a head colts.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, da wow, Yeah you might not.

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Speaker 1: You're dying. You're dying. You may as well just fast

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Speaker 1: forward and get it over with. It's the right thing

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Speaker 1: to do.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, some sort of nasal cancer, You better go off yourself.

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Speaker 2: It's no, there's there's Folks have to have to understand.

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Speaker 2: And this is something you and I have talked about

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Speaker 2: off and on, not on this specific topic, but the

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Speaker 2: idea that the more information you put out there about yourself, right,

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Speaker 2: the more that information will get corelated, sold, et cetera.

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Speaker 2: And is it possible that at some point you won't

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Speaker 2: get a job, or your insurance premium will go up,

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Speaker 2: or something like that, you won't be able to rent

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Speaker 2: an apartment because there's data out there about you which

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Speaker 2: might be incorrect. I mean, for example, you may enter

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Speaker 2: your symptoms about something and that data gets sold and

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Speaker 2: then you know someone some AI some person draws a

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Speaker 2: wrong conclusion or it gets mixed in with other data

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Speaker 2: and they draw wrong conclusion, and some AI algorithm somewhere

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Speaker 2: that someone has sold to some company that helps them

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Speaker 2: supposedly determine whether you're a good renter or a good employee,

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Speaker 2: or a good insurable or whatever it is, is making

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Speaker 2: wrong decisions based on that information which is not correct

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Speaker 2: to begin with. Yeah, that's a real threat. And I'll

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Speaker 2: just tell you right now. It's you know, it's one thing.

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Speaker 2: If you have a standalone AI set up like Ohama

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Speaker 2: or something, you know, I still wouldn't really put my

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Speaker 2: information in there. I would not take its advice. Might

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Speaker 2: I ask it a question and see what it says

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Speaker 2: and then compare that to other resources? Yes, maybe I

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Speaker 2: probably wouldn't, just because that's the way I am. However,

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Speaker 2: if you're using these free online tools, you need to

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Speaker 2: understand first off, unless you've read and understood the privacy

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Speaker 2: policy and or the terms of service, which is probably

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Speaker 2: going to be at minimum and eighty page confuse ofully

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Speaker 2: of mumbo jumbo that you can't understand. You don't know

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Speaker 2: where your data is going to go, you don't know

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Speaker 2: who they might sell it to, you don't know how

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Speaker 2: that could be used in ways that you would not

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Speaker 2: appreciate or approve of if you understood. So yeah, I'm

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Speaker 2: just I'm telling you all straight up now, there is

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Speaker 2: absolutely no chance I would use any sort of free

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Speaker 2: online AI tool Chat, GPT, Perplexity, Claude, groc fill in

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Speaker 2: the blank. I would not use any of them by

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Speaker 2: you know, to as a platform where I'm going to

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Speaker 2: enter sensitive information about myself or my family, especially health

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Speaker 2: related information, well knowing that there's no control over that

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Speaker 2: once I hit the.

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Speaker 1: Button, okay, and I get all that. And you know,

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Speaker 1: you often find out after crimes have been committed, they

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Speaker 1: go back and do look at your Internet search and

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Speaker 1: see if you've looked up like how to dispose of

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Speaker 1: a body or whatever that's obviously incriminating relative to the

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Speaker 1: crime scene. So but I have you know, I haven't

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Speaker 1: used the AI platforms like chat, GPT, but I have

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Speaker 1: looked up certain diseases. Like a friend is diagnosed with something,

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Speaker 1: I'm like, what the hell is that, I'll go in

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Speaker 1: and look it up. That doesn't mean it applies to me,

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Speaker 1: it's just I'm curious about it. It was a Mayo

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Speaker 1: clinic website. It's got all kinds of information, for example,

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Speaker 1: So that could be presumed by the folks out there

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Speaker 1: collecting information about my IP address that I'm the one

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Speaker 1: struggling with that, and I'm the one suffering for whatever

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Speaker 1: disease has been looked up?

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Speaker 2: Yes, how do they know that you're not the person

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Speaker 2: that has the potential disease that you're looking at?

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Speaker 1: How do they know that I don't have it and

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Speaker 1: I'm just looking it up out of curiosity.

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Speaker 2: Well, they don't. But my point is, once that data

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Speaker 2: gets sold somewhere down the line, can someone infer that

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Speaker 2: maybe Brian Thomas has fill in the blank because he

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Speaker 2: looked it up twice? Wow? You know so?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I think I'd like a hearing on that, a

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Speaker 1: little due process before people reach irroneous conclusions, perhaps without

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Speaker 1: my knowledge.

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Speaker 2: That is.

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Speaker 1: That's that's scary, Dave, It really is.

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Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, I'm just telling you that at the end

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Speaker 2: of the day, when you use anything that's online, you're

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Speaker 2: being tracked constantly. May you know a lot of these

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Speaker 2: medical sites are some of the worst offenders of trackers

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Speaker 2: and fingerprinting and all that sort of thing. We've talked

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Speaker 2: about that before, and people can go research that for themselves,

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Speaker 2: but again they don't. Yes, you may have some just

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Speaker 2: random curiosity. You saw an ad on TV and what

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Speaker 2: does this drug do? What is this disease? Right? Because

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Speaker 2: they're constantly trying to tell you this stuff. But yes,

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Speaker 2: understand when you go look that up, if it's traceable

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Speaker 2: directly to you and through things like browser fingerprinting, it's

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Speaker 2: increasingly difficult to stop that. You know, if you have

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Speaker 2: the right tools and you know what you're doing, and

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Speaker 2: you use a VPN and all that, you can make

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Speaker 2: it much more difficult to attribute that to you specifically.

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Speaker 1: Okay, that's what my question was going to be. Using

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Speaker 1: a VPN that masks my personal IP address, then it

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Speaker 1: gives me one of the ones that's generically used by

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Speaker 1: anybody else with a VPN. So you got Nord VPN.

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Speaker 1: They think you're in Chicago or Poughkeepsie or in you know,

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Speaker 1: Venezuela or wherever the servers are. They can't trace that

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Speaker 1: directly to you individually. It's the VPN that they're they're

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Speaker 1: they're connecting it with.

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Speaker 2: Well they can, Yes, the endpoint is not going to

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Speaker 2: be able to trace that back to you. They'll just

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Speaker 2: see whatever VPN endpoint you came out of. So to

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Speaker 2: your point, you know, I could sign into my Proton

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Speaker 2: VPN today and come out of let's say Austria or

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Speaker 2: you know wherever I want, so it's going to appear

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Speaker 2: that I'm there. But here's the thing that most people

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Speaker 2: still don't really understand. Your web browser, in conjunction with

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Speaker 2: your operating system on your device, can be fingerprinted in

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Speaker 2: a way that is, if not unique, very very close

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Speaker 2: to unique. And here's what I mean by that. The

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Speaker 2: exact way your computer, your phone, whatever is configured is

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Speaker 2: unlikely to be exactly the same as mine, even if

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Speaker 2: we both have Windows eleven, for example. And all of

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Speaker 2: this information is not all of it. Much of it

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Speaker 2: is sent to every web request, and these apps that

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Speaker 2: people are using can collect even more information than a

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Speaker 2: web browser can. So even if you're using a VPN,

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Speaker 2: I can potentially capture a unique fingerprint or something that

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Speaker 2: is very likely to be unique to you, right, like

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Speaker 2: maybe you're one in one hundred people in the whole world.

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Speaker 2: And even with things like blocking cookies, even with things

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Speaker 2: like a VPN, it is possible to more or less

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Speaker 2: uniquely identify someone. So I'm just just warning jokes out

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Speaker 2: there if you think that you can have anonymity simply

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Speaker 2: because you're using a VPN, and you can go online

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Speaker 2: and look up things that you don't want other people

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Speaker 2: to know about, whether it's born or diseases, or whatever

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Speaker 2: purient interest you might have. It is possible that you

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Speaker 2: will be uniquely identified. And again you've got to understand, Brian,

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Speaker 2: most of these companies that are providing all these so

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Speaker 2: called free services to you, free medical advice, whatever it is, right,

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Speaker 2: they're making money off collecting your data. They're making money

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Speaker 2: off serving up ads to you. They're potentially making money

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Speaker 2: off selling your data so that other people can sell

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Speaker 2: ads to you or know that or think you have

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Speaker 2: disease X, so they can now send you the latest

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Speaker 2: medical information, latest pharmaceutical data, or whatever it is. You know.

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Speaker 2: They are heavily incentivized to want to uniquely identify you

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Speaker 2: and track you across the internet because there's power in

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Speaker 2: that data, right, there's power in the profiling of you

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Speaker 2: and me and Joe and everyone else is out there.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, to figure out how you.

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Speaker 2: Think, what you do, what you're interested in, and sell

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Speaker 2: you more stuff. That's the fundamental reason for it. Now

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Speaker 2: there are these others downstream consequences.

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Speaker 1: All right, fair enough, Yeah, yeah, don't.

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Speaker 2: Don't enter your health information in a chat pot. Don't

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Speaker 2: do it.

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Speaker 1: And Tom, let's say don't fhote Democrats six forty nine

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Speaker 1: fifty five KRC detox station odor exit gets rid of

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Speaker 1: the smells that're regularly surrounding you. At six fifty two

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Speaker 1: fift about car Ce detalks station tech part of Dave

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Speaker 1: had to brought to you by intrust it. Okay, So

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Speaker 1: they're deliberately degrading consoles through software upgrades. This it's like

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Speaker 1: the products these days are have like an internal self

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Speaker 1: destruct mechanism. Nothing lasts as long as it used to.

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Speaker 2: Days.

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Speaker 1: You got to go out and buy a new one.

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Speaker 1: Is this done? I guess the same thing via software.

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Speaker 2: Well, apparently that is the case. So Tom's Hardware has

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Speaker 2: this article. Uh am I allowed to say this word, Bran.

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Speaker 1: No, Joe said, I don't even know what word you

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Speaker 1: talking about. Yes, okay, so are we ns wortification? We

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Speaker 1: can call it that, yes, which.

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Speaker 2: I love this word, by the way, because I think

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Speaker 2: it is a perfect description. And Corey Doctor wrote a

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Speaker 2: whole book about this, the idea that these so called

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Speaker 2: smart products are increasingly making the world less good. Now

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Speaker 2: you know, I've been on this for a long time, Brian,

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Speaker 2: really primarily because of the privacy and security aspects of

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Speaker 2: these devices. But I'm just going to quote directly from

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Speaker 2: this article. Okay, so the headline again, I'll skip the

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Speaker 2: word in Norwegen Government watch dog calls out quote in

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Speaker 2: essification of video games, connected devices and others names hardware

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Speaker 2: deliberately degraded after purchase, and they say this direct quote

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Speaker 2: from the article, Well, companies can degrade the functionality of

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Speaker 2: your car or effectively destroy your connected washing machine with

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Speaker 2: the software updates. Does the report going on call out

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Speaker 2: printer in cartridges, smart home devices that lose features or

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Speaker 2: require subscriptions post purchase, and connected devices where functionality is

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Speaker 2: gated or removed over time, such as a Tesla's self

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Speaker 2: driving feature, which is switched to a subscription only service

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Speaker 2: as of February fourteenth. The report also Yeah. The report

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Speaker 2: also describes how freemium games use forced to add breaks

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Speaker 2: and in game virtual currencies to convert what we're one

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Speaker 2: single game purchase titles into recurring revenue streams. You know,

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Speaker 2: the idea that I bought a new car, and if

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Speaker 2: I want to use the heated seats, because it's all

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Speaker 2: software based, right, It's all software based, so I can

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Speaker 2: turn off your seats until you want to pay the

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Speaker 2: subscription fee or any other feature. But the bigger concern

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Speaker 2: I have about this, you know I and this goes

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Speaker 2: back to, you know, lawsuits against John Deere, where they've said, oh,

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Speaker 2: you can't fix your own equipment because we own the

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Speaker 2: intellectual property of the software and this sort of thing.

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Speaker 2: And it's not unique to John Deere. I'm not trying

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Speaker 2: to single them out. I'm just saying that, in general,

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Speaker 2: there have been lawsuits against companies in the past because

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Speaker 2: of the right to repair. That's sort of the idea

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Speaker 2: that I bought something, it's mine now, and if I

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Speaker 2: want to repair it myself, I should be able to.

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Speaker 2: But as we get into this increasingly digital world of

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Speaker 2: Internet of things so called smart devices, well, do you

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Speaker 2: really own it if it has software in it that

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Speaker 2: can control it and you know one or more features

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Speaker 2: can be shut off? And let me give you an

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Speaker 2: example of why I despise this stuff, Brian, and I

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Speaker 2: keep trying to explain to people. I'm not inherently against it.

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Speaker 2: I'm against the fact that we are now in a

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Speaker 2: world where everything has software in it. People don't understand

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Speaker 2: the risks, they don't know how to configure it correctly.

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Speaker 2: They don't know how to update it, and in fact,

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Speaker 2: in many cases the companies that make it will not

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Speaker 2: provide updates after a certain period of time. They can

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Speaker 2: turn things off, but it can be hacked. Here's an example,

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Speaker 2: headline cyber attack leaves main drivers with breathalyzer test systems

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Speaker 2: unable to start vehicles. A cyber attacks shut down a

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Speaker 2: national breathalyzer test system found in vehicles of OUI offenders,

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Speaker 2: impacting thousands of drivers in forty five other states. Then

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Speaker 2: I'm reading from the article. Once the device is installed,

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Speaker 2: drivers have to pass the breathalyzer test where they can

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Speaker 2: start their vehicle. It won't start if your alcohol blood

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Speaker 2: alcohol is point to or higher. But since the cyber

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Speaker 2: breach shut its entire system down on Saturday, anyone with

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Speaker 2: one of the devices cannot start their car. So you

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Speaker 2: may end up losing your job because your car won't

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Speaker 2: start due to some sort of Internet connected device. Or

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Speaker 2: better yet, Brian, now that your car is a rolling computer,

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Speaker 2: what happens when an adversarial nation just turns your car

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Speaker 2: off for you, or when you violate some you know,

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Speaker 2: theoretical law or whatever, and now you can't use your

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Speaker 2: car because the system has decided that you can't you

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Speaker 2: can't use the car. This is where the in word

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Speaker 2: comes in that we've been describing the essification right. We're

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Speaker 2: headed into a crazy place if people do not get

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Speaker 2: wise to the fact that all of these Internet of

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Speaker 2: things devices where we're at today are not good. They're hackable.

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Speaker 2: Here's yet another example. I keep trying to point these

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Speaker 2: out real quick, and yeah, the less of these we

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Speaker 2: have the better.

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Speaker 1: Thus, with ease, we have the better. Continuing theme with

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Speaker 1: tech Friday's Dave at or interest it dot com. Get

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Speaker 1: in touch with Dave. You're in the best hands with

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Speaker 1: business computer needs. Dave, thank you very much every week

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Speaker 1: for the segment. We'll talk again next Friday. I hope

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Speaker 1: you have a wonderful weekend.

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Speaker 2: Brother, Always my pleasure.

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Speaker 1: Thanks six to fifty six. Coming up in seven fifty

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Speaker 1: five KRCD Talk Stations Signal ninety nine full hour