1 00:00:00,480 --> 00:00:06,680 Speaker 1: It's nice, I'm telling you easy. Boston's News Radio. 2 00:00:06,800 --> 00:00:10,480 Speaker 2: All right, we were talking during the eight o'clock hour 3 00:00:11,119 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 2: about this ironically being National Consumer Protection Week, and that 4 00:00:17,440 --> 00:00:20,760 Speaker 2: segues pretty nicely into this conversation I'm about to have 5 00:00:20,840 --> 00:00:24,159 Speaker 2: with Cave Crockford. Cave, first of all, welcome back to 6 00:00:24,280 --> 00:00:25,840 Speaker 2: Night Side, Kate. How are you this evening? 7 00:00:26,880 --> 00:00:29,120 Speaker 3: Thanks Dan, great to be with you. I'm doing okay. 8 00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:29,560 Speaker 3: How are you? 9 00:00:29,880 --> 00:00:33,040 Speaker 2: I'm doing just great. Kate is the director of Technology 10 00:00:33,159 --> 00:00:38,320 Speaker 2: and Justice Programs at the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, 11 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:41,199 Speaker 2: and she's been doing this for a long time. I 12 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:43,920 Speaker 2: can remember more than a few years ago and we 13 00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:49,000 Speaker 2: had some conversations in our studio about the whole questions 14 00:00:49,080 --> 00:00:54,480 Speaker 2: of security versus privacy, and we can we can talk 15 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:57,600 Speaker 2: about that probably all night long. But Kate, it's only 16 00:00:57,640 --> 00:01:05,160 Speaker 2: gotten worse because as technology has improved, and we know 17 00:01:05,520 --> 00:01:09,720 Speaker 2: there were just so many things to talk about. Every 18 00:01:10,040 --> 00:01:13,560 Speaker 2: piece of information that we give up either to our 19 00:01:13,680 --> 00:01:18,920 Speaker 2: doctors or to our hospital, all of that somehow ends 20 00:01:19,040 --> 00:01:23,000 Speaker 2: up out there in the ether, and there were really 21 00:01:23,040 --> 00:01:26,160 Speaker 2: no controls here. So I think what we want to 22 00:01:26,160 --> 00:01:31,760 Speaker 2: talk about tonight is basically how we protect our privacy 23 00:01:33,080 --> 00:01:35,760 Speaker 2: in this I would call it the Brave New World. 24 00:01:35,760 --> 00:01:39,640 Speaker 2: It's sort of Eldus Huxley number two or number four 25 00:01:39,720 --> 00:01:43,640 Speaker 2: or five. This is something you deal with every day. 26 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:46,839 Speaker 2: Last week we had the big story about anthropic, which 27 00:01:46,880 --> 00:01:49,880 Speaker 2: I know just a little bit about. So let's start 28 00:01:49,920 --> 00:01:52,400 Speaker 2: off with the basics, because we have some time here, 29 00:01:52,440 --> 00:01:54,840 Speaker 2: and I want to give people an opportunity to ask 30 00:01:54,880 --> 00:01:59,680 Speaker 2: you questions. How bad is it out there these days 31 00:02:00,080 --> 00:02:04,680 Speaker 2: where our information is available in so many places, and 32 00:02:04,760 --> 00:02:09,280 Speaker 2: actually people are making money off the selling of our information. 33 00:02:11,360 --> 00:02:13,600 Speaker 3: Yeah, that's exactly right. I mean you said it in 34 00:02:13,639 --> 00:02:21,280 Speaker 3: your introduction. Technology has fast outpaced our legal protections in 35 00:02:21,360 --> 00:02:26,240 Speaker 3: terms of both consumer privacy law and then on the 36 00:02:26,280 --> 00:02:30,880 Speaker 3: other side also how the government can invade our privacy 37 00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:35,680 Speaker 3: using new technologies, and often those two issues are related. Actually, 38 00:02:36,560 --> 00:02:39,920 Speaker 3: but let's start with consumer protection. Yeah, I was just 39 00:02:39,919 --> 00:02:41,600 Speaker 3: going to say, if you want to, we can start 40 00:02:41,600 --> 00:02:44,560 Speaker 3: by talking about the consumer side. You know, folks are 41 00:02:44,600 --> 00:02:48,359 Speaker 3: obviously aware that for the past fifteen to twenty years, 42 00:02:48,360 --> 00:02:53,040 Speaker 3: we've been sold this story by Silicon Valley that essentially says, 43 00:02:53,680 --> 00:02:56,440 Speaker 3: you know, we will give you all of these services 44 00:02:56,440 --> 00:02:59,960 Speaker 3: and products in exchange for your personal information, and we 45 00:03:00,120 --> 00:03:04,359 Speaker 3: will use your personal information to make hundreds of billions, 46 00:03:04,400 --> 00:03:08,600 Speaker 3: if not trillions of dollars for private industry. And that 47 00:03:09,400 --> 00:03:13,000 Speaker 3: seemed to be a deal that people were comfortable with 48 00:03:13,040 --> 00:03:15,760 Speaker 3: for a few years in the beginning, until it became 49 00:03:16,480 --> 00:03:23,240 Speaker 3: clear that these tech companies amassing so much sensitive information 50 00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:27,320 Speaker 3: about everyone who uses cell phones in the Internet puts 51 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:31,400 Speaker 3: all of us at risk and allows those companies to 52 00:03:31,520 --> 00:03:36,200 Speaker 3: control us in ways that may maybe aren't immediately obvious. 53 00:03:36,800 --> 00:03:40,000 Speaker 3: So back in twenty seventeen, obviously there was the Camerage 54 00:03:40,000 --> 00:03:44,320 Speaker 3: Analyticas scandal. That was the first time that that involved 55 00:03:45,040 --> 00:03:49,040 Speaker 3: Facebook essentially working with this company called camerag Analytica and 56 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:55,440 Speaker 3: the Trump campaign in twenty sixteen to essentially turn Facebook's 57 00:03:55,480 --> 00:04:00,840 Speaker 3: digital marketing and consumer surveillance apparatus into a political tool 58 00:04:01,000 --> 00:04:04,800 Speaker 3: for the Trump campaign. They were using the data that 59 00:04:05,120 --> 00:04:09,680 Speaker 3: Facebook collects about people to target potential voters with very 60 00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:15,280 Speaker 3: specific messages tailored to those specific people, and that creeped 61 00:04:15,280 --> 00:04:17,440 Speaker 3: a lot of people out, I think for good reason, 62 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:21,560 Speaker 3: because it's one thing, if you know, Facebook wants to 63 00:04:21,600 --> 00:04:24,320 Speaker 3: sell you a pair of shoes, or a Google wants 64 00:04:24,360 --> 00:04:27,279 Speaker 3: to sell you a mattress or something like that, using 65 00:04:27,320 --> 00:04:30,440 Speaker 3: all of the data that they collect about you. It's 66 00:04:30,440 --> 00:04:33,440 Speaker 3: something else if they want to sell you a political 67 00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:37,000 Speaker 3: candidate and do it in a way that takes advantage 68 00:04:37,040 --> 00:04:39,320 Speaker 3: of all of the information that they have about you 69 00:04:39,360 --> 00:04:42,040 Speaker 3: and your interests and your family. You know, how much 70 00:04:42,080 --> 00:04:44,880 Speaker 3: money you make, where you live, what your religious practices 71 00:04:45,040 --> 00:04:47,800 Speaker 3: may be, et cetera. So that I think was the 72 00:04:47,839 --> 00:04:51,000 Speaker 3: first time that a lot of people in this country thought, WHOA, 73 00:04:51,560 --> 00:04:52,120 Speaker 3: you know, I don't know. 74 00:04:52,760 --> 00:04:54,640 Speaker 2: Let me just let me just slow let me just 75 00:04:54,680 --> 00:04:58,080 Speaker 2: slowly down there, because they want people to understand exactly 76 00:04:58,120 --> 00:05:01,880 Speaker 2: what you're talking about. So what that particular case. Again, 77 00:05:02,080 --> 00:05:04,479 Speaker 2: as I think I understand that, but as I think 78 00:05:04,480 --> 00:05:08,880 Speaker 2: you understand it better than me. The Trump campaign worked 79 00:05:09,960 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 2: a relationship with this company that had information about people. 80 00:05:14,440 --> 00:05:17,640 Speaker 2: So if hypothetically, and if I'm using a bad hypothetical, 81 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:21,479 Speaker 2: tell me, if they knew that someone was a gun 82 00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:24,000 Speaker 2: owner or a big gun advocate, and they thought that 83 00:05:24,120 --> 00:05:27,920 Speaker 2: people who held that point of view would be more 84 00:05:28,080 --> 00:05:31,359 Speaker 2: likely to vote for the Trump campaign, they were able 85 00:05:31,440 --> 00:05:39,120 Speaker 2: to glean their information sources and present names and ways 86 00:05:39,160 --> 00:05:44,320 Speaker 2: to contact people who might be consistent with the campaign 87 00:05:44,520 --> 00:05:49,960 Speaker 2: on let's say, guns or Second Amendment or on religious 88 00:05:50,920 --> 00:05:54,920 Speaker 2: attendance at church. Is that how granular it became? 89 00:05:55,920 --> 00:05:58,799 Speaker 3: Yeah, exactly. So here's another way of thinking about it. Look, 90 00:05:59,160 --> 00:06:02,800 Speaker 3: you know, if a political campaign wants to target voters 91 00:06:02,880 --> 00:06:07,080 Speaker 3: using Facebook's data, they can target and this gets true 92 00:06:07,080 --> 00:06:12,039 Speaker 3: for any political campaign. They could target people just as 93 00:06:12,080 --> 00:06:15,679 Speaker 3: you said, who maybe liked the NRA's page or something 94 00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:19,200 Speaker 3: like that on Facebook, ye with ads that talk about 95 00:06:19,240 --> 00:06:21,400 Speaker 3: how great that candidate is going to be for gun 96 00:06:21,480 --> 00:06:25,800 Speaker 3: rights right, And maybe that same person has liked pages 97 00:06:25,839 --> 00:06:28,240 Speaker 3: maybe they have sort of unorthodox politics, they're kind of 98 00:06:28,240 --> 00:06:31,960 Speaker 3: a libertarian. Maybe they've also liked pages that are supportive 99 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:34,919 Speaker 3: of a woman's right to choose right of abortion rights, 100 00:06:35,160 --> 00:06:38,560 Speaker 3: and so maybe they would not show that person ads 101 00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:43,159 Speaker 3: saying that the candidate is anti abortion right. So it's 102 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:47,080 Speaker 3: a way that you know, this is just one example, 103 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:49,359 Speaker 3: of course, of how this information can be used. But 104 00:06:49,400 --> 00:06:52,240 Speaker 3: the point is that you know, anybody who works with 105 00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:57,680 Speaker 3: information librarians, you know, intelligence specialists in the CIA, understand 106 00:06:57,720 --> 00:07:00,480 Speaker 3: that knowledge is power. Right, if you have a lot 107 00:07:00,520 --> 00:07:03,599 Speaker 3: of information about someone, you can control them, You can 108 00:07:03,600 --> 00:07:06,440 Speaker 3: manipulate them because you know what makes them tick, you 109 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:10,480 Speaker 3: know what vulnerabilities they have, and essentially what we've now 110 00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:15,000 Speaker 3: seen in Silicon Valley is the development of an entire 111 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:21,160 Speaker 3: industry that is focused on conducting surveillance of its users 112 00:07:21,680 --> 00:07:25,560 Speaker 3: so that they can sell people either products in the 113 00:07:25,600 --> 00:07:28,080 Speaker 3: case of you know, selling you shoes or a ski 114 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:31,480 Speaker 3: jacket or something like that, or you know, potentially sell 115 00:07:31,560 --> 00:07:35,160 Speaker 3: to political candidates the way to manipulate people to vote 116 00:07:35,200 --> 00:07:40,040 Speaker 3: for you. You also brought up the issue of data brokers. 117 00:07:40,080 --> 00:07:42,480 Speaker 3: That's a really important one that I want to highlight 118 00:07:42,480 --> 00:07:46,640 Speaker 3: for people because it's particularly creepy. One of the things 119 00:07:46,720 --> 00:07:53,400 Speaker 3: that this online surveillance you know economy has created is 120 00:07:53,760 --> 00:07:58,960 Speaker 3: a marketplace for the buying and selling of our personal data. 121 00:07:59,360 --> 00:08:02,160 Speaker 3: And there are there are many data brokers that are 122 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:05,920 Speaker 3: involved in this industry. The industry again initially came from 123 00:08:05,960 --> 00:08:10,600 Speaker 3: the online advertising industry, but has since expanded. And so 124 00:08:10,840 --> 00:08:17,200 Speaker 3: now right now, there are numerous location data brokers that 125 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:22,239 Speaker 3: sell information showing where essentially everyone with a cell phone 126 00:08:22,840 --> 00:08:27,200 Speaker 3: has been in the past, is presently and you know 127 00:08:27,280 --> 00:08:29,520 Speaker 3: where we're going to go in the future, and they 128 00:08:29,640 --> 00:08:32,560 Speaker 3: sell this data to anybody who can afford to pay 129 00:08:32,600 --> 00:08:36,319 Speaker 3: for it. So there have been stories in a variety 130 00:08:36,400 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 3: of newspapers about the dangers that this causes to national security. 131 00:08:44,000 --> 00:08:47,680 Speaker 3: You know, somebody take you know. Right now, the US 132 00:08:47,679 --> 00:08:51,360 Speaker 3: has now engaged in military hostilities against Iran. Things are 133 00:08:51,720 --> 00:08:54,880 Speaker 3: quite unstable in the Middle East at the moment. There 134 00:08:55,400 --> 00:09:02,040 Speaker 3: could be innumerable foreign actors currently buying access to cell 135 00:09:02,080 --> 00:09:07,760 Speaker 3: phone location data showing the present locations and the past 136 00:09:08,280 --> 00:09:12,360 Speaker 3: patterns of life and habits of key people who work 137 00:09:12,440 --> 00:09:15,800 Speaker 3: for Raytheon, or folks who work in the Trump administration 138 00:09:16,000 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 3: or the United States military political leaders. Yeah, let me 139 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:20,559 Speaker 3: let me. 140 00:09:20,840 --> 00:09:26,240 Speaker 2: Jump in here with a question. Okay, So let's assume someone, uh, 141 00:09:26,440 --> 00:09:29,360 Speaker 2: when they travel, and let's say it's somebody who's important, 142 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:33,960 Speaker 2: likes to go to a certain hotel chain. They like 143 00:09:34,040 --> 00:09:36,079 Speaker 2: to go wherever they're going to go that they want 144 00:09:36,120 --> 00:09:37,720 Speaker 2: to go to the Hilton, or they want to go 145 00:09:37,760 --> 00:09:40,960 Speaker 2: to the Four Seasons or whatever the hotel hotel chain is. 146 00:09:42,000 --> 00:09:48,000 Speaker 2: How is that data, person the broker, how does he 147 00:09:48,200 --> 00:09:53,320 Speaker 2: or she accumulate that data? Is it simply that the 148 00:09:53,520 --> 00:09:56,320 Speaker 2: cell phone that is assigned to you, that you that 149 00:09:56,760 --> 00:09:58,960 Speaker 2: you know, that has a specific number and that's assigned 150 00:09:58,960 --> 00:10:04,400 Speaker 2: to you shows up that you're at the Four Seasons hotel. 151 00:10:04,480 --> 00:10:07,720 Speaker 2: Here one day, and two days later you're another four 152 00:10:07,760 --> 00:10:11,040 Speaker 2: Seatson's Hotel, three thousand miles away. I'm just using the 153 00:10:11,040 --> 00:10:14,800 Speaker 2: four Seasons as an example. Or are they pulling the 154 00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:18,000 Speaker 2: data from your credit card when you use your credit 155 00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:20,720 Speaker 2: card to check out of you and they see, oh 156 00:10:20,800 --> 00:10:24,360 Speaker 2: this this person likes four seasons. Is the source the 157 00:10:24,440 --> 00:10:27,720 Speaker 2: credit card or is the source actually the ping on 158 00:10:27,800 --> 00:10:28,240 Speaker 2: the phone? 159 00:10:29,600 --> 00:10:33,200 Speaker 3: It's the phone. I mean, data workers also sell information 160 00:10:33,240 --> 00:10:36,640 Speaker 3: about what we buy with your credit cards. But taking 161 00:10:36,720 --> 00:10:40,640 Speaker 3: the example of location data, that's data that comes directly 162 00:10:40,679 --> 00:10:44,400 Speaker 3: from your cell phone. So you're probably you know, you've 163 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:47,880 Speaker 3: probably noticed that when you travel to a new place, 164 00:10:48,559 --> 00:10:52,360 Speaker 3: you get targeted advertisements on your phone that are specific 165 00:10:52,400 --> 00:10:54,640 Speaker 3: to the new location that you're in. You know, so 166 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:57,560 Speaker 3: if you go to Las Vegas on vacation, you get 167 00:10:57,559 --> 00:10:59,600 Speaker 3: off the plane, you open up your phone, you know 168 00:10:59,600 --> 00:11:04,000 Speaker 3: you're going to see advertisements on Instagram and other websites 169 00:11:04,040 --> 00:11:07,160 Speaker 3: and platforms that you use that are specific to businesses 170 00:11:07,200 --> 00:11:07,960 Speaker 3: in Las Vegas. 171 00:11:08,040 --> 00:11:10,680 Speaker 2: Right, I'll give you another exactly, because if you go 172 00:11:10,760 --> 00:11:17,000 Speaker 2: out of the country and you go to anywhere, it 173 00:11:17,040 --> 00:11:19,880 Speaker 2: will tell you that, you know, for a certain amounts 174 00:11:19,880 --> 00:11:22,599 Speaker 2: you can use your cell phone as if you're in 175 00:11:22,679 --> 00:11:26,079 Speaker 2: America for the next twenty four hours and you have 176 00:11:26,120 --> 00:11:28,679 Speaker 2: to sign up, but they know the moment that you 177 00:11:28,840 --> 00:11:29,839 Speaker 2: land somewhere else. 178 00:11:30,840 --> 00:11:35,160 Speaker 3: That's right, a cell phone company. Yeah, so your cell 179 00:11:35,160 --> 00:11:38,520 Speaker 3: phone company knows where you are. The apps on your 180 00:11:38,600 --> 00:11:43,480 Speaker 3: phone know where you are. And even if you don't 181 00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:49,760 Speaker 3: use apps that track your location, merely using web you know, 182 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:53,439 Speaker 3: we going to visit websites on the browser on your 183 00:11:53,520 --> 00:11:57,000 Speaker 3: phone can also trigger this location tracking. So it's essentially 184 00:11:57,040 --> 00:12:03,360 Speaker 3: impossible for consumers to use smartphones without being caught in 185 00:12:03,400 --> 00:12:08,200 Speaker 3: this location data drag net. And again, you know, what 186 00:12:08,559 --> 00:12:14,120 Speaker 3: was initially a marketplace that was created to facilitate digital 187 00:12:14,200 --> 00:12:19,800 Speaker 3: advertising has now morphed into something else or something additional 188 00:12:20,120 --> 00:12:23,560 Speaker 3: on top of that, which is that the government is 189 00:12:23,640 --> 00:12:27,200 Speaker 3: buying our cell phone location data from these location broke. 190 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:30,679 Speaker 2: Great use of my tax dollars, Kate, I got to 191 00:12:30,720 --> 00:12:32,480 Speaker 2: take a quick break here. I want to come back 192 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:36,120 Speaker 2: to thanks follow up on this. The information that you've 193 00:12:36,160 --> 00:12:40,880 Speaker 2: given us is so clear it should scare everyone, whatever 194 00:12:41,000 --> 00:12:47,720 Speaker 2: your political viewpoints. This is this is a transactional concern. 195 00:12:48,160 --> 00:12:52,640 Speaker 2: No matter where you live or work or travel anywhere 196 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:56,000 Speaker 2: in the world, there are people who are able to 197 00:12:56,040 --> 00:12:58,840 Speaker 2: track that based upon the things that we carry with 198 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 2: us voluntarily. This is pretty scary. And we're going to 199 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:05,920 Speaker 2: talk about the legislation that should be that I think 200 00:13:06,040 --> 00:13:09,640 Speaker 2: you're in favor of that that should be adopted nationally 201 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:12,280 Speaker 2: and also here in Massachusetts. Will take a break. My 202 00:13:12,400 --> 00:13:17,760 Speaker 2: guest UH is Cad Crockford. She is the director of 203 00:13:17,840 --> 00:13:21,439 Speaker 2: Technology and Justice Programs at the America Civil Liberties Union 204 00:13:21,480 --> 00:13:27,760 Speaker 2: of Massachusetts. And what I'm hearing from Caid tonight is 205 00:13:27,920 --> 00:13:33,760 Speaker 2: very troubling. I'm glad that that Stephanie from your office 206 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:36,480 Speaker 2: suggested that we do this interview because this is something 207 00:13:36,520 --> 00:13:41,439 Speaker 2: that is uh, it's beyond politics. It's it's absolutely beyond politics. 208 00:13:41,520 --> 00:13:44,400 Speaker 2: It's big Brother on steroids. We'll be back on Nightside 209 00:13:44,440 --> 00:13:46,200 Speaker 2: if you'd like to join the conversation or ask a 210 00:13:46,280 --> 00:13:49,400 Speaker 2: question six one, seven, two, five, four ten thirty, six 211 00:13:49,520 --> 00:13:51,800 Speaker 2: one seven, nine, three, one ten thirty. Coming right back 212 00:13:51,840 --> 00:13:53,720 Speaker 2: on Nightside with Caid Crockford. 213 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:57,839 Speaker 1: You're on night Side with Dan Ray. I'm w b 214 00:13:58,000 --> 00:13:59,920 Speaker 1: Z Boston's News Radio. 215 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:06,120 Speaker 2: With us is Cad Crockford. Cad is with the Civil 216 00:14:06,120 --> 00:14:10,400 Speaker 2: Liberties Union of Massachusetts, American Civil Liberties Union in Massachusetts. 217 00:14:10,440 --> 00:14:14,120 Speaker 2: She's the director of Technology and Justice Programs. So here's 218 00:14:14,120 --> 00:14:18,160 Speaker 2: a question, Kate. All this information that's being compiled on 219 00:14:18,280 --> 00:14:23,280 Speaker 2: us without our knowledge by private businesses, by the government, 220 00:14:23,880 --> 00:14:27,000 Speaker 2: how long does it stay relevant? Is this something that 221 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:33,200 Speaker 2: is you know, there forever, or you know is the 222 00:14:35,720 --> 00:14:39,080 Speaker 2: does it fall off the web at a certain point 223 00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:39,440 Speaker 2: in time. 224 00:14:41,360 --> 00:14:43,640 Speaker 3: Well, you know, one of the other issues we were 225 00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:46,480 Speaker 3: talking before about how one of the trends that we've 226 00:14:46,480 --> 00:14:49,400 Speaker 3: seen over the past twenty years is that technology has 227 00:14:49,520 --> 00:14:53,520 Speaker 3: far outpaced the law protecting our privacy and our civil liberties. 228 00:14:53,800 --> 00:14:57,520 Speaker 3: The other trend is that it's now basically cheaper to 229 00:14:57,640 --> 00:15:00,360 Speaker 3: keep information forever than it is to delete it. So 230 00:15:01,080 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 3: these companies have real, really no incentive to get rid 231 00:15:04,520 --> 00:15:08,240 Speaker 3: of this information if it's potentially valuable, which it is. So, 232 00:15:09,160 --> 00:15:12,080 Speaker 3: you know, location data again is one of the most 233 00:15:12,160 --> 00:15:17,120 Speaker 3: sensitive types of personal information that we're seeking to protect 234 00:15:17,320 --> 00:15:21,760 Speaker 3: in legislation that lawmakers in Massachusetts are working on right now. 235 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:27,040 Speaker 3: So in September, the Senate in Massachusetts past Comprehensive Data 236 00:15:27,040 --> 00:15:33,240 Speaker 3: Privacy legislation. That bill basically does two things. One, it 237 00:15:33,520 --> 00:15:38,760 Speaker 3: limits in the law how much and what kinds of 238 00:15:38,880 --> 00:15:43,320 Speaker 3: data companies can collect about you period. So it says essentially, 239 00:15:44,000 --> 00:15:47,480 Speaker 3: for ordinary types of information like your name, your email address, 240 00:15:47,520 --> 00:15:51,360 Speaker 3: things of that nature, companies can only collect that information 241 00:15:51,840 --> 00:15:55,880 Speaker 3: if it's reasonably necessary to provide you the consumer with 242 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:59,760 Speaker 3: the product that you've requested. And then for sensitive data 243 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:04,400 Speaker 3: that precise to your location data, biometric information, so that's like, 244 00:16:04,840 --> 00:16:08,120 Speaker 3: you know, information that is unique to each of us, 245 00:16:08,360 --> 00:16:10,840 Speaker 3: physical traits that are unique to us, or our face, 246 00:16:11,880 --> 00:16:14,640 Speaker 3: our voice is a biometric believe it or not, are 247 00:16:14,720 --> 00:16:18,960 Speaker 3: iris for those types of sensitive data as well as 248 00:16:19,200 --> 00:16:23,680 Speaker 3: information about children, information about your religious practices, you know, 249 00:16:23,720 --> 00:16:28,320 Speaker 3: your sexual practices, things that I think most people would agree, Yeah, 250 00:16:28,320 --> 00:16:31,960 Speaker 3: that's especially sensitive for those types of data. What the 251 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:36,960 Speaker 3: Senate did was say companies are limited to collecting sensitive 252 00:16:37,040 --> 00:16:41,080 Speaker 3: data to when it is strictly necessary to provide you, 253 00:16:41,200 --> 00:16:44,480 Speaker 3: the consumer, with the product that you've requested. So that 254 00:16:44,920 --> 00:16:49,000 Speaker 3: framework is called data minimization. And basically what we're trying 255 00:16:49,040 --> 00:16:51,880 Speaker 3: to do is sort of similar to what we have 256 00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:55,720 Speaker 3: in place with respect to safe food standards. Basically, the 257 00:16:56,040 --> 00:16:58,320 Speaker 3: idea is when you go to the grocery store, you 258 00:16:58,360 --> 00:17:01,040 Speaker 3: don't think, oh great, I have to figure out which 259 00:17:01,080 --> 00:17:03,320 Speaker 3: mil to get and take it home and test it 260 00:17:03,360 --> 00:17:05,879 Speaker 3: to see if there's a COLLI in it. You just 261 00:17:06,040 --> 00:17:11,399 Speaker 3: trust that our food safety system regulates businesses. Right. So 262 00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:14,480 Speaker 3: that's the same idea, is that not every consumer has 263 00:17:14,480 --> 00:17:16,760 Speaker 3: to be a data privacy expert, that you'd just be 264 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:19,400 Speaker 3: protected in the law that's created of minimization. 265 00:17:19,680 --> 00:17:23,560 Speaker 2: But so this passed the Senate, but past the Senate, 266 00:17:23,560 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 2: but not the House. 267 00:17:25,440 --> 00:17:27,880 Speaker 3: Not yet. So the second thing that that Senate bill 268 00:17:27,960 --> 00:17:32,280 Speaker 3: did was ban the sale of sensitive data entirely. And 269 00:17:32,320 --> 00:17:35,240 Speaker 3: so that's when we get into you know, the precise 270 00:17:35,320 --> 00:17:39,280 Speaker 3: deal location data again, the biometric information, information about children, 271 00:17:39,400 --> 00:17:42,560 Speaker 3: things of that nature. The Senate said you can't sell 272 00:17:42,600 --> 00:17:47,200 Speaker 3: that data period and that's extremely important. What we were 273 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:50,680 Speaker 3: hoping the Senate would do but they didn't was include 274 00:17:51,080 --> 00:17:54,560 Speaker 3: a private right of action to enforce that legislation. Meaning 275 00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:59,000 Speaker 3: just like with our consumer protection law, which says, you know, 276 00:17:59,080 --> 00:18:01,440 Speaker 3: you go to a car dealer, ship, the dealer can't 277 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:03,639 Speaker 3: lie to you about the car that he's selling you 278 00:18:04,320 --> 00:18:07,600 Speaker 3: because that is a violation of your rights under ninety 279 00:18:07,600 --> 00:18:11,159 Speaker 3: three A, the Consumer Protection Statute, and you can personally 280 00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:14,000 Speaker 3: sue that car dealer if you find out that he 281 00:18:14,119 --> 00:18:17,879 Speaker 3: lied to you. That's really crucial for trust in our society. 282 00:18:18,320 --> 00:18:22,399 Speaker 3: We believe that that same enforcement mechanism ought to apply 283 00:18:22,480 --> 00:18:26,000 Speaker 3: to data privacy legislation, and we didn't get that victory 284 00:18:26,000 --> 00:18:29,639 Speaker 3: in the Senate. The Senate has their legislation enforced only 285 00:18:29,680 --> 00:18:32,000 Speaker 3: by the Attorney General. So that's something that we hope 286 00:18:32,040 --> 00:18:34,600 Speaker 3: the House will address. And to your question, the House 287 00:18:34,760 --> 00:18:38,520 Speaker 3: is at work right now on very similar legislation that 288 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:42,199 Speaker 3: we hope to see enacted by the House within the 289 00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:45,680 Speaker 3: next month or so. So yes, those are the three 290 00:18:45,760 --> 00:18:48,800 Speaker 3: core elements that we are hoping that the House will 291 00:18:49,600 --> 00:18:51,840 Speaker 3: will apply in their data privacy legislation. 292 00:18:52,119 --> 00:18:55,000 Speaker 2: Well, we want to, we will work with you on this, 293 00:18:55,119 --> 00:18:58,480 Speaker 2: and again, I'm we're going to take a break here 294 00:18:58,520 --> 00:18:59,800 Speaker 2: for some news. I'm going to go to a phone 295 00:18:59,800 --> 00:19:02,920 Speaker 2: call after the break, but I want to just assure 296 00:19:02,960 --> 00:19:05,159 Speaker 2: you and assure the audience that this is not a 297 00:19:05,240 --> 00:19:07,439 Speaker 2: one and done as far as I'm concerned, this is 298 00:19:07,480 --> 00:19:10,320 Speaker 2: something we really have to stay on top of, and 299 00:19:10,359 --> 00:19:14,359 Speaker 2: whenever you know, I can work with the Massachusetts the 300 00:19:14,720 --> 00:19:18,359 Speaker 2: American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. Obviously there should be 301 00:19:18,359 --> 00:19:22,720 Speaker 2: a broad support of people. We might disagree on things 302 00:19:22,800 --> 00:19:25,959 Speaker 2: like public cameras and whether or not we're giving up 303 00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:29,080 Speaker 2: privacy in favor of security. And the old comment I 304 00:19:29,119 --> 00:19:32,800 Speaker 2: think was it Ben Franklin. The people who you know, 305 00:19:32,840 --> 00:19:37,160 Speaker 2: give up privacy for security of the end get neither. 306 00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:40,200 Speaker 2: I got to take a break, Kate. When I come back, 307 00:19:40,280 --> 00:19:43,240 Speaker 2: I'm going to ask you the question of you're trying 308 00:19:43,240 --> 00:19:45,359 Speaker 2: to get it done here in Massachusetts, but shouldn't this 309 00:19:45,440 --> 00:19:47,520 Speaker 2: really be done at a federal level. I'll give you 310 00:19:47,560 --> 00:19:50,400 Speaker 2: a chance to come back with your thoughts on that. 311 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:53,760 Speaker 2: My name is Dan Ray. We're talking with my guest, 312 00:19:54,040 --> 00:19:58,119 Speaker 2: who is Kad Crawford. She is the director of Technology 313 00:19:58,400 --> 00:20:03,959 Speaker 2: and Justice Programs for the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union. And uh, 314 00:20:04,560 --> 00:20:07,639 Speaker 2: this has opened up my eyes to a world that 315 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:11,520 Speaker 2: I should have known about, and I hope it's opening 316 00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:13,639 Speaker 2: up some of your eyes as well. Back on Nightside, 317 00:20:13,640 --> 00:20:15,800 Speaker 2: if you like to join the conversation, ask a question 318 00:20:16,160 --> 00:20:19,800 Speaker 2: six one, seven, two, five, four ten thirty six one seven, nine, three, 319 00:20:19,840 --> 00:20:21,320 Speaker 2: one ten thirty Back on Nightside. 320 00:20:21,359 --> 00:20:26,680 Speaker 1: Right after this Night Side though with Dan Ray, I'MBZ 321 00:20:27,160 --> 00:20:28,400 Speaker 1: Boston's News Radio. 322 00:20:29,119 --> 00:20:32,200 Speaker 2: Back with Kate Crockford, the director of Technology and Justice 323 00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:35,600 Speaker 2: Programs at the Massachusetts the American Civil Liberties Union of 324 00:20:35,600 --> 00:20:39,159 Speaker 2: Massachusetts Okay, So my question is, Okay, you guys are 325 00:20:39,200 --> 00:20:42,840 Speaker 2: doing great work cre in Massachusetts to try to protect 326 00:20:42,840 --> 00:20:47,400 Speaker 2: people in Massachusetts, but what good does that do us 327 00:20:48,000 --> 00:20:50,960 Speaker 2: if we don't have federal laws in place. And I'm 328 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:52,720 Speaker 2: not trying to reign on the parade here, I'm just 329 00:20:52,760 --> 00:20:56,960 Speaker 2: trying to say, it's obviously this is a great step 330 00:20:57,000 --> 00:20:59,879 Speaker 2: that you're undertaking, and people should support you on this, 331 00:21:01,080 --> 00:21:04,560 Speaker 2: but what are the chances that at the national level 332 00:21:04,600 --> 00:21:06,760 Speaker 2: we can get some form of federal protection. 333 00:21:08,560 --> 00:21:11,439 Speaker 3: It's a great question. And my colleagues at the National 334 00:21:11,440 --> 00:21:15,080 Speaker 3: ACLU and many other organizations that do work at the 335 00:21:15,080 --> 00:21:18,720 Speaker 3: federal level have been trying to get Congress to pass 336 00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:22,720 Speaker 3: strong consumer privacy legislation for many, many years now. 337 00:21:23,800 --> 00:21:28,880 Speaker 4: There was an effort in i believe two congresses ago 338 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:34,240 Speaker 4: where they came pretty close those you know that that 339 00:21:34,359 --> 00:21:38,120 Speaker 4: legislation got derailed at kind of the last minute, and 340 00:21:38,240 --> 00:21:43,480 Speaker 4: we haven't seen a serious effort since then in Congress 341 00:21:43,520 --> 00:21:46,520 Speaker 4: to pass strong consumer privacy legislation. 342 00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:49,879 Speaker 3: So the reality is, you know, it's sort of two things. 343 00:21:49,920 --> 00:21:53,040 Speaker 3: On the one hand, there are a lot of issues 344 00:21:53,080 --> 00:21:58,920 Speaker 3: that Massachusetts cannot you know, legislate, right, So for example, 345 00:21:59,040 --> 00:22:04,200 Speaker 3: you know, Massachusetts can't control ice. You know, the Massachusetts 346 00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:08,080 Speaker 3: state legislature can, of course pass laws to limit state 347 00:22:08,080 --> 00:22:11,880 Speaker 3: and local collaboration with ICE. But but Massachusetts lawmakers can't 348 00:22:11,880 --> 00:22:14,919 Speaker 3: tell the federal government what to do. But this is 349 00:22:15,200 --> 00:22:19,040 Speaker 3: an example of a scenario in which the Massachusetts legislature 350 00:22:19,080 --> 00:22:23,800 Speaker 3: actually does have tremendous power and authority. We've seen many 351 00:22:23,840 --> 00:22:28,800 Speaker 3: other states past consumer privacy laws California, Maryland there. You know, 352 00:22:28,880 --> 00:22:31,240 Speaker 3: there are many many other states that have done this, 353 00:22:31,400 --> 00:22:35,119 Speaker 3: some some bet are, some not so great. This is 354 00:22:35,119 --> 00:22:37,119 Speaker 3: an area where the state has a tremendous amount of 355 00:22:37,160 --> 00:22:39,840 Speaker 3: power and authority, and so we don't have to wait, 356 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:43,240 Speaker 3: fortunately for the federal government to step in, the State 357 00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:48,480 Speaker 3: of Massachusetts can protect Massachusetts consumers very well. You know 358 00:22:48,760 --> 00:22:50,720 Speaker 3: the devils in the details, of course, you know what 359 00:22:50,840 --> 00:22:54,280 Speaker 3: the legislation does, what it says, and again what the 360 00:22:54,400 --> 00:22:57,920 Speaker 3: enforcement mechanisms look like. Those are all really important questions. 361 00:22:57,920 --> 00:23:01,879 Speaker 3: But the basic question of can Massachusetts protect consumers in 362 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:03,879 Speaker 3: this area, the answer is clearly yes. 363 00:23:05,400 --> 00:23:09,959 Speaker 2: So when we talk about the difficulty that the National 364 00:23:10,160 --> 00:23:14,120 Speaker 2: American Civil Liberties Union has had in Washington, I'm assuming 365 00:23:14,160 --> 00:23:17,360 Speaker 2: that there are people of goodwill in both political parties. 366 00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:23,440 Speaker 2: I hope that this is a nonpartisan or a bipartisan issue, 367 00:23:24,200 --> 00:23:27,719 Speaker 2: that it doesn't break down on party lines. Seemingly everything 368 00:23:27,720 --> 00:23:30,320 Speaker 2: in this country has broken down over in the last 369 00:23:30,880 --> 00:23:32,800 Speaker 2: several years. Am I right or wrong on that? 370 00:23:32,880 --> 00:23:36,600 Speaker 4: Guess You're definitely right in terms of where voters are, 371 00:23:37,640 --> 00:23:43,320 Speaker 4: Voters across the political spectrum support strong consumer privacy legislation. 372 00:23:43,400 --> 00:23:46,600 Speaker 4: In fact, we did a poll here in Massachusetts a 373 00:23:46,680 --> 00:23:50,080 Speaker 4: few years ago when we launched this campaign, and we 374 00:23:50,240 --> 00:23:53,400 Speaker 4: asked voters left right and center, so that's people registered 375 00:23:53,440 --> 00:23:59,120 Speaker 4: as Republicans, Independence, and Democrats, would you support legislation that, 376 00:23:59,560 --> 00:24:05,040 Speaker 4: for exams sample, banned companies from selling your precise geolocation 377 00:24:05,160 --> 00:24:07,600 Speaker 4: data from your cell phone, showing you know where you travel, 378 00:24:07,640 --> 00:24:10,040 Speaker 4: where your children travel, where you live, where you work, 379 00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:15,080 Speaker 4: et cetera. Ninety two percent of Massachusetts likely voters said yes. 380 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:18,399 Speaker 3: This is not a close question when it comes to 381 00:24:18,440 --> 00:24:21,639 Speaker 3: where voters are. That's that's absolutely true. 382 00:24:21,760 --> 00:24:23,919 Speaker 2: I would love to know who that eight percent were on. 383 00:24:25,160 --> 00:24:26,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, they'll work for data brokers. 384 00:24:26,800 --> 00:24:31,840 Speaker 2: D Yes, well that's exactly it. Let's let's try to 385 00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:34,240 Speaker 2: get some phone calls six one, seven, two, five, four ten, 386 00:24:34,320 --> 00:24:39,960 Speaker 2: thirty six one seven nine, three thirty. This impacts everyone, everyone, 387 00:24:40,400 --> 00:24:43,280 Speaker 2: Joe and Belmont. Joe, you have a question for Cad Crawford, 388 00:24:43,280 --> 00:24:44,960 Speaker 2: I believe, go right ahead, Joe. 389 00:24:44,960 --> 00:24:50,119 Speaker 5: Yes, Uh, on this privacy question I have. I would 390 00:24:50,240 --> 00:24:53,479 Speaker 5: like some of your listeners to who are in the know, 391 00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:57,840 Speaker 5: to call in and common on it. My question is 392 00:24:57,880 --> 00:25:02,880 Speaker 5: the Massachusetts state license with the chip in it? Can 393 00:25:02,920 --> 00:25:06,439 Speaker 5: the government follow you in the state police and local 394 00:25:06,480 --> 00:25:09,119 Speaker 5: police follow you also with the chip. 395 00:25:13,080 --> 00:25:15,080 Speaker 3: I'm not sure what you mean by the chip. 396 00:25:15,240 --> 00:25:18,919 Speaker 2: I think what he might mean is that with the 397 00:25:18,960 --> 00:25:21,840 Speaker 2: new licenses, when you renew your license, you have to 398 00:25:21,840 --> 00:25:26,439 Speaker 2: get this, uh, this this federal type of license so 399 00:25:26,480 --> 00:25:31,040 Speaker 2: that you can get the reality. I think is that 400 00:25:31,080 --> 00:25:33,520 Speaker 2: what you're referring to, Joe, the reality. 401 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:37,240 Speaker 5: Just like you know, the chip when the Antichrist comes. 402 00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:39,440 Speaker 2: Well, I don't know. Let's Joe, let's not go off 403 00:25:39,480 --> 00:25:41,920 Speaker 2: and then never never land here. Let's just talk. If 404 00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:44,480 Speaker 2: you want to ask a question, let's stay on the question. 405 00:25:44,840 --> 00:25:50,680 Speaker 2: You're talking about the new federal licenses called the real ID, 406 00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:53,600 Speaker 2: which allow people okay as you know, to get into 407 00:25:53,600 --> 00:25:57,879 Speaker 2: federal buildings, state house, Uh, get get on airplanes without 408 00:25:58,000 --> 00:26:01,240 Speaker 2: that In theory, Uh, you have to bring a passport 409 00:26:01,320 --> 00:26:04,200 Speaker 2: or something. So is that chip something? I don't think 410 00:26:04,200 --> 00:26:07,280 Speaker 2: the police are following people around, but does the capacity 411 00:26:07,640 --> 00:26:09,360 Speaker 2: that capacity exist? 412 00:26:09,480 --> 00:26:14,480 Speaker 4: Gade, Well, the ACLU did a pose for many, many 413 00:26:14,600 --> 00:26:17,960 Speaker 4: long years, the rollout of real ID because we don't 414 00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:18,439 Speaker 4: think it's a. 415 00:26:18,440 --> 00:26:20,320 Speaker 3: Good idea to have a national. 416 00:26:19,960 --> 00:26:22,879 Speaker 4: ID system in the United States. And this is basically 417 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:25,960 Speaker 4: the closest thing that this country has ever had to 418 00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:26,960 Speaker 4: a national. 419 00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:28,040 Speaker 3: ID card is the real ID. 420 00:26:28,600 --> 00:26:31,320 Speaker 4: People ought to know though you do not have to 421 00:26:31,359 --> 00:26:34,639 Speaker 4: get a real ID. So for example, I do not 422 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:38,960 Speaker 4: have a real ID. I have a passport card which 423 00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:41,520 Speaker 4: you can get from the State Department if you don't 424 00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:43,840 Speaker 4: want to get a real ID, and that will get 425 00:26:43,880 --> 00:26:48,560 Speaker 4: you on domestic flights, that'll get you into federal courthouses 426 00:26:48,600 --> 00:26:52,200 Speaker 4: and places like that. You do not need an ID crucially. 427 00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:54,720 Speaker 3: To get into the state House. Just so your listeners know, 428 00:26:54,760 --> 00:26:56,359 Speaker 3: you don't have to show any form of IDA to 429 00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 3: get into the state House. But yes, you know, we 430 00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:01,960 Speaker 3: did a the real ID roll out. 431 00:27:02,040 --> 00:27:04,840 Speaker 4: That was a post nine to eleven creation of the 432 00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:05,720 Speaker 4: Bush administration. 433 00:27:05,920 --> 00:27:08,320 Speaker 3: Actually, yeah, I supposed. 434 00:27:07,920 --> 00:27:10,040 Speaker 2: To remember, remember KADD was supposed to go in to effect. 435 00:27:10,080 --> 00:27:13,359 Speaker 2: I think in October of twenty twenty uh and and 436 00:27:13,359 --> 00:27:15,800 Speaker 2: and then there was a real rush to get it, 437 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:18,760 Speaker 2: and then all of a sudden, COVID came along and 438 00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:21,160 Speaker 2: it got delayed, delayed, delayed, And I think it's only 439 00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:25,760 Speaker 2: late last year where it actually went into effect and 440 00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:29,840 Speaker 2: there was such a an anticipation of it and all 441 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:34,879 Speaker 2: of that. So, so Joe, that's I think. I'm not 442 00:27:34,920 --> 00:27:37,800 Speaker 2: sure if Kate, I don't think that they can like 443 00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:40,720 Speaker 2: walk into your license and follow you around. They could 444 00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:43,280 Speaker 2: probably follow you around by looking at your license plate 445 00:27:43,320 --> 00:27:47,280 Speaker 2: a lot easier than than going into your into your 446 00:27:47,320 --> 00:27:49,879 Speaker 2: real ideas, is that the I think that's the question 447 00:27:50,040 --> 00:27:50,679 Speaker 2: I was asking. 448 00:27:50,920 --> 00:27:52,320 Speaker 3: That's right, that's right. 449 00:27:52,440 --> 00:27:57,120 Speaker 4: And you know, if the caller is concerned about being tracked, 450 00:27:57,880 --> 00:28:00,240 Speaker 4: you know, the primary way that. 451 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:02,000 Speaker 3: You're being tracted through your cell phone. 452 00:28:02,160 --> 00:28:06,160 Speaker 4: And that's what this digital privacy consumer privacy legislation aims 453 00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:10,120 Speaker 4: to address. So you know, most of us don't even 454 00:28:10,160 --> 00:28:12,920 Speaker 4: travel to the bathroom without our phones these days, let 455 00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:15,240 Speaker 4: alone you know, going down to the store to pick 456 00:28:15,320 --> 00:28:16,520 Speaker 4: up some milk or something. 457 00:28:16,600 --> 00:28:20,440 Speaker 3: So it really does it does show everywhere you go, 458 00:28:20,680 --> 00:28:23,520 Speaker 3: you know, and therefore everything you do. And that's why 459 00:28:23,560 --> 00:28:27,720 Speaker 3: we think it's so crucial that the government prohibit companies 460 00:28:27,720 --> 00:28:30,240 Speaker 3: from buying and selling and trading this information. 461 00:28:30,320 --> 00:28:32,520 Speaker 2: So let me ask you this on most people drive cars, 462 00:28:32,520 --> 00:28:35,000 Speaker 2: and there were some people who don't drive cars in Massachusetts. 463 00:28:35,040 --> 00:28:39,040 Speaker 2: But when they get on the Massachusetts Trendpike, you know, 464 00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:44,320 Speaker 2: the transponders record what time you got on, what location 465 00:28:44,480 --> 00:28:46,880 Speaker 2: you got on at, how long it took you to 466 00:28:46,920 --> 00:28:49,440 Speaker 2: get to the next location. There's always been a lot 467 00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:52,400 Speaker 2: of conversation about that that they may be able to say, well, 468 00:28:52,640 --> 00:28:56,080 Speaker 2: they got from Brighton to Natick in six minutes, which 469 00:28:56,120 --> 00:28:58,240 Speaker 2: meant they had to be going over eighty five miles 470 00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:04,240 Speaker 2: an hour. Is that another concern that the Civil Liberties 471 00:29:04,320 --> 00:29:09,320 Speaker 2: Union of Massachusetts would have with the thing called transponders. Obviously, 472 00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:12,560 Speaker 2: the turnpike is not free if you want to drive 473 00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:12,760 Speaker 2: on the. 474 00:29:12,760 --> 00:29:19,080 Speaker 3: Turnpike, that's right. Yeah. When those when the announcement was 475 00:29:19,120 --> 00:29:22,560 Speaker 3: made that the state was moving towards automatic tolling on 476 00:29:22,640 --> 00:29:28,520 Speaker 3: the pike, we did contribute some thoughts. Wrote a letter 477 00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:32,840 Speaker 3: to state regulators, you know, advising them to strengthen the 478 00:29:32,880 --> 00:29:37,960 Speaker 3: privacy protections that apply to those data. They're okay, we 479 00:29:38,040 --> 00:29:41,400 Speaker 3: think they could be improved, and in fact, there is 480 00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:47,240 Speaker 3: legislation House Built thirty seven fifty five, sponsored by Representative 481 00:29:47,280 --> 00:29:51,719 Speaker 3: Steve Owens, called the Driver's Privacy Act that would apply 482 00:29:52,560 --> 00:29:56,320 Speaker 3: more stringent protections in the law to the data that's 483 00:29:56,360 --> 00:30:00,240 Speaker 3: collected by automatic tolling in the state of mass She. 484 00:30:00,240 --> 00:30:04,040 Speaker 5: Said, yeah, I disagree with your guests on the cell phone. 485 00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:06,560 Speaker 2: Okay, job, but I appreciate that, and we'll talk about 486 00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:08,440 Speaker 2: it again sometimes. Thanks very much. Sure, we've got to 487 00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:11,040 Speaker 2: take a quick break six one, two, five, four, ten, 488 00:30:11,160 --> 00:30:15,840 Speaker 2: thirty six, seven ninety. I think this is an extremely 489 00:30:15,880 --> 00:30:20,120 Speaker 2: important discussion issue. Uh, we have just scratching the surface 490 00:30:20,200 --> 00:30:22,480 Speaker 2: with it. I hope you'll feel free to join the 491 00:30:22,480 --> 00:30:25,640 Speaker 2: conversation if you have a question. Coming right back on night. 492 00:30:25,560 --> 00:30:32,280 Speaker 1: Side Night Side with Dan Ray. I'm BZY Boston's news Radio. 493 00:30:33,440 --> 00:30:38,240 Speaker 2: I am thoroughly enjoying my conversation with Jade Crockford. She 494 00:30:38,440 --> 00:30:42,840 Speaker 2: is with the American the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 495 00:30:42,920 --> 00:30:46,160 Speaker 2: It's a long title. Let's get at least one more 496 00:30:46,200 --> 00:30:49,720 Speaker 2: call in here and then, Uh, Jay Kate, I want 497 00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:52,840 Speaker 2: to make sure that we give away in which people 498 00:30:52,880 --> 00:30:55,480 Speaker 2: can get more information on this and how they can 499 00:30:55,800 --> 00:31:00,440 Speaker 2: get information on the the the American Service. Liberty is 500 00:31:00,480 --> 00:31:03,440 Speaker 2: union in Massachusetts. Gene and Everett's next. Gene, you're on 501 00:31:03,560 --> 00:31:06,280 Speaker 2: with k Crawford. Do you have a question or a comment? 502 00:31:06,480 --> 00:31:09,800 Speaker 6: Yes, yes, Hi, thank you very much. This is a 503 00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:13,280 Speaker 6: good topic. I I bought a few things at Best 504 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:17,240 Speaker 6: Buy and one of them was a phone, and they 505 00:31:17,360 --> 00:31:23,080 Speaker 6: asked me for my email and I said, well, I 506 00:31:23,120 --> 00:31:25,280 Speaker 6: don't really give it out and he said, well you 507 00:31:25,360 --> 00:31:29,120 Speaker 6: have to if you're buying the phone. So I again. 508 00:31:29,480 --> 00:31:33,480 Speaker 2: So your question, then, Gene, it seems to me is 509 00:31:33,480 --> 00:31:38,040 Speaker 2: is that legal that someone can compel you to give 510 00:31:38,080 --> 00:31:41,640 Speaker 2: an email while in order to purchase a cell phone? 511 00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:43,120 Speaker 2: I think what you're walling wanted. 512 00:31:43,880 --> 00:31:46,560 Speaker 6: They also wanted my phone number, and now I'm getting 513 00:31:46,560 --> 00:31:49,200 Speaker 6: a million a million emails. 514 00:31:49,360 --> 00:31:52,560 Speaker 2: Did you buy the did you buy the phone? Gene? 515 00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:54,600 Speaker 6: I did? Did you get up? 516 00:31:55,080 --> 00:31:57,080 Speaker 2: Gene? Jeane? Just stay with me now. I know this 517 00:31:57,160 --> 00:32:00,480 Speaker 2: is difficult, but I have some questions for clarific here, 518 00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:01,720 Speaker 2: So stay with me. 519 00:32:01,880 --> 00:32:03,760 Speaker 6: I wasn't finished. Go ahead, No, I know you. 520 00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:06,720 Speaker 2: Weren't, because but I only have about four minutes left here. 521 00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:09,440 Speaker 2: So my question is did you give them your phone number? 522 00:32:09,560 --> 00:32:12,800 Speaker 2: And did you give them all the information that they requested. 523 00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:16,040 Speaker 6: I did, and I'm getting emails from loads of companies. 524 00:32:16,560 --> 00:32:18,479 Speaker 2: Hold on, hold on, We're going to get to all 525 00:32:18,520 --> 00:32:21,400 Speaker 2: this Gene trust case. Okay, just stay right there. I'm 526 00:32:21,480 --> 00:32:27,160 Speaker 2: actually trying to help you, Gene. Kate was could have 527 00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:30,960 Speaker 2: Gene uh sue that company or said, you know, you 528 00:32:31,040 --> 00:32:34,480 Speaker 2: need to sell me your cell phone, but you can't 529 00:32:34,520 --> 00:32:38,040 Speaker 2: compel me as a as a condition preceeding of the 530 00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:41,040 Speaker 2: purchase to to give you for have me give you 531 00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:44,360 Speaker 2: your email and phone number. Are you familiar with that? 532 00:32:44,520 --> 00:32:46,280 Speaker 2: And go ahead? 533 00:32:46,560 --> 00:32:47,280 Speaker 3: Great questions. 534 00:32:47,960 --> 00:32:53,520 Speaker 4: So the phone number is necessary because otherwise they can't 535 00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:57,200 Speaker 4: connect the phone. So that's a good example of you. 536 00:32:57,080 --> 00:32:59,360 Speaker 3: Know what we're trying to accomplish here in mass Jesus 537 00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:00,920 Speaker 3: with the data privacy legislation. 538 00:33:01,600 --> 00:33:04,800 Speaker 4: The company would say, look, it's reasonably necessary that we 539 00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:07,520 Speaker 4: collect the phone number of the person who wants to 540 00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:09,240 Speaker 4: sign up for phone service. 541 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:11,000 Speaker 3: You know, so that we can phone service. 542 00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:13,280 Speaker 6: That's my home phone. 543 00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:16,320 Speaker 3: You're not talking about a cell phone. You're talking about 544 00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:19,360 Speaker 3: like a phone on the wall, like a landline. 545 00:33:19,760 --> 00:33:22,240 Speaker 6: No, I bought a cell phone, but they wanted my 546 00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:24,280 Speaker 6: home phone in That's that's. 547 00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:26,920 Speaker 2: What's called Gene. That's what's called the landline, the one 548 00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:30,000 Speaker 2: that the old phone that that you're one that's hanging 549 00:33:30,040 --> 00:33:32,320 Speaker 2: on the wall. So, so go ahead, Kate, I'm going 550 00:33:32,360 --> 00:33:33,800 Speaker 2: to interpret this. Go right ahead. 551 00:33:33,920 --> 00:33:34,479 Speaker 6: I'm sorry. 552 00:33:34,560 --> 00:33:37,440 Speaker 2: Hold on, hold on, Jean, Jeane, hold on for a second. 553 00:33:37,680 --> 00:33:41,280 Speaker 2: Let's just get through one question at a time, please, Kate, 554 00:33:42,000 --> 00:33:44,880 Speaker 2: could they could they compel her to give her home 555 00:33:44,960 --> 00:33:48,080 Speaker 2: phone number as opposed to the number that that the 556 00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:49,240 Speaker 2: phone would be registered in. 557 00:33:50,040 --> 00:33:53,280 Speaker 3: That does not sound reasonably necessary to me. So again, 558 00:33:53,440 --> 00:33:55,520 Speaker 3: you know, the goal of. 559 00:33:55,400 --> 00:34:00,600 Speaker 4: This privacy legislation is to limit in statute in the law, 560 00:34:01,320 --> 00:34:06,120 Speaker 4: the types and quantity of information that companies can collect 561 00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:09,719 Speaker 4: about us when we engage in you know, when we 562 00:34:09,840 --> 00:34:11,680 Speaker 4: use their products, or we engage. 563 00:34:11,320 --> 00:34:15,080 Speaker 3: In transactions like the one that you're describing. And I 564 00:34:15,120 --> 00:34:18,759 Speaker 3: would venture to say that it is not reasonably necessary 565 00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:23,160 Speaker 3: for a company like Best Buy to collect your landline 566 00:34:23,719 --> 00:34:26,000 Speaker 3: when you want to buy a cell phone from them. 567 00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:30,880 Speaker 3: So that is something that arguably would be prohibited. 568 00:34:30,719 --> 00:34:36,360 Speaker 4: By this new legislation that the Massachusetts legislature is currently debating. 569 00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:39,880 Speaker 4: It's not I don't believe that that would. 570 00:34:39,600 --> 00:34:43,560 Speaker 3: Be currently unlawful, although I have to be honest with you, 571 00:34:43,560 --> 00:34:47,360 Speaker 3: you know, I'm not an expert on every aspect of 572 00:34:48,640 --> 00:34:51,640 Speaker 3: the law. You know, there may be some federal law 573 00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:54,040 Speaker 3: that that gives you the right to buy a phone 574 00:34:54,040 --> 00:34:56,680 Speaker 3: without having to disclose information like that. I'm not aware 575 00:34:56,719 --> 00:34:58,160 Speaker 3: of any any statute like that. 576 00:34:58,800 --> 00:35:01,279 Speaker 2: I think I think that that you Jan has another question, Gene, 577 00:35:01,280 --> 00:35:02,760 Speaker 2: I know you have another question. Go ahead. 578 00:35:03,360 --> 00:35:07,440 Speaker 6: Well, they also required me to give them my home 579 00:35:08,360 --> 00:35:13,320 Speaker 6: computer email address, and I'm getting a ton of emails 580 00:35:13,320 --> 00:35:17,760 Speaker 6: from millions of companies every week. Now I can ask 581 00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:18,320 Speaker 6: them again. 582 00:35:18,600 --> 00:35:18,920 Speaker 3: I think. 583 00:35:19,480 --> 00:35:22,960 Speaker 4: I think that's another example of you know, I'm not 584 00:35:23,040 --> 00:35:23,960 Speaker 4: exactly sure. 585 00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:26,800 Speaker 3: Was it best Buy or was it Verizon that wanted 586 00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:31,359 Speaker 3: your email address? You know, stud I yeah, So I 587 00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:32,120 Speaker 3: don't think. 588 00:35:31,960 --> 00:35:35,880 Speaker 4: It's reasonably necessary for best Buy to say, you know, 589 00:35:36,280 --> 00:35:38,279 Speaker 4: we're only going to sell you a cell phone if 590 00:35:38,320 --> 00:35:39,880 Speaker 4: you give us your email address. 591 00:35:40,400 --> 00:35:43,320 Speaker 3: You know, I'm not I'm not familiar with any reason 592 00:35:43,400 --> 00:35:45,240 Speaker 3: why best Buy would need. 593 00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:48,000 Speaker 4: Your email address in order to complete that transaction. 594 00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:50,120 Speaker 3: So, you know, it's a good question. 595 00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:53,640 Speaker 4: Gene, because this is precisely what we're trying to address, 596 00:35:53,680 --> 00:35:55,200 Speaker 4: the kind of problem we're trying. 597 00:35:55,000 --> 00:35:58,759 Speaker 3: To address, and this privacy legislation, you know, companies. 598 00:35:58,320 --> 00:36:02,920 Speaker 4: Just hoovering up information about us, even when it has 599 00:36:03,000 --> 00:36:06,160 Speaker 4: nothing to do with the product or service that we're 600 00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:09,520 Speaker 4: requesting from that company. That's exactly what we're trying to 601 00:36:09,600 --> 00:36:10,320 Speaker 4: prevent with it. 602 00:36:10,719 --> 00:36:15,759 Speaker 2: I love the vacuum cleaner reference hoovering up. Jeane, is there? 603 00:36:16,680 --> 00:36:18,319 Speaker 2: I'm running out of time here. Do you have any 604 00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:19,239 Speaker 2: other question on this? 605 00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:25,239 Speaker 6: No, I'm just spending my life deleting emails. Well, I 606 00:36:25,719 --> 00:36:28,520 Speaker 6: have a company in the world now almost all the names. 607 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:32,279 Speaker 2: I will hire you full time and you can do 608 00:36:32,360 --> 00:36:34,520 Speaker 2: you know how many emails I get a day, not 609 00:36:34,560 --> 00:36:40,520 Speaker 2: only if, but no. So anyway, look, thank you for 610 00:36:41,200 --> 00:36:43,919 Speaker 2: going along and asking questions in a way in which 611 00:36:45,640 --> 00:36:47,799 Speaker 2: Cade was able to answer them one at a time. 612 00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:51,000 Speaker 6: Yeah. Sometimes, thank you. They told me it was requiet 613 00:36:51,040 --> 00:36:51,680 Speaker 6: at the time. 614 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:54,480 Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, one of the things. One of the things 615 00:36:54,480 --> 00:36:57,960 Speaker 2: that may have there's such things called burner phones that 616 00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:01,120 Speaker 2: people can buy, and sometimes people who are engaged in 617 00:37:01,120 --> 00:37:05,120 Speaker 2: criminal activity use phones that have no name associated with them. 618 00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:08,279 Speaker 2: They're called burner phones. You're familiar with those, I'm sure, kid. Yeah, 619 00:37:08,400 --> 00:37:11,959 Speaker 2: And it could be that that's what they were concerned about. 620 00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:13,480 Speaker 2: I don't know, Jane. Thank you, that was a very 621 00:37:13,520 --> 00:37:13,919 Speaker 2: good time. 622 00:37:13,960 --> 00:37:15,760 Speaker 6: All right, thanks so much, have a good. 623 00:37:15,680 --> 00:37:19,200 Speaker 2: Night, you two. Kate. How could folks either get in 624 00:37:19,480 --> 00:37:22,280 Speaker 2: more information, give us a website where we can direct 625 00:37:22,280 --> 00:37:24,279 Speaker 2: people to I think that there were a lot of 626 00:37:24,280 --> 00:37:26,720 Speaker 2: people who were listening to what we were talking about tonight. 627 00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:31,120 Speaker 4: Go right ahead, Yeah, folks should visit the ac LU 628 00:37:31,200 --> 00:37:34,840 Speaker 4: of Massachusetts website ac lum dot org. We have a 629 00:37:34,880 --> 00:37:37,920 Speaker 4: lot of information there about the data privacy legislation that 630 00:37:37,920 --> 00:37:38,600 Speaker 4: we're trying to. 631 00:37:38,560 --> 00:37:43,040 Speaker 3: Pass here in Massachusetts. And if you support strong data 632 00:37:43,040 --> 00:37:46,759 Speaker 3: privacy legislation, there's also a means on our website for 633 00:37:46,840 --> 00:37:50,760 Speaker 3: you to contact your state rep to express that support. 634 00:37:51,360 --> 00:37:54,440 Speaker 2: Kay, do me a favorite. I want to stay involved 635 00:37:54,440 --> 00:37:57,080 Speaker 2: in this with you. So we have a program that 636 00:37:57,120 --> 00:38:01,960 Speaker 2: reaches a lot of people. Feel free to get back 637 00:38:02,000 --> 00:38:04,120 Speaker 2: in touch with me. Have Stephanie getting back in touch 638 00:38:04,120 --> 00:38:06,880 Speaker 2: with me, and let's, uh, let's try to work together 639 00:38:06,960 --> 00:38:11,520 Speaker 2: on this because this is this is something that we 640 00:38:11,560 --> 00:38:15,279 Speaker 2: haven't even touched AI here at anthropric and all of 641 00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:19,040 Speaker 2: that stuff that went on last week, which is terrifying 642 00:38:19,080 --> 00:38:21,040 Speaker 2: as well. So there's a lot of stuff that we 643 00:38:21,160 --> 00:38:23,719 Speaker 2: gotta we gotta get out in the public. And I 644 00:38:23,719 --> 00:38:25,000 Speaker 2: hope you'll be willing to come back. 645 00:38:25,080 --> 00:38:28,960 Speaker 3: Okay, absolutely, that'll be fantastic. Thanks Dan, Thanks Kate. 646 00:38:29,040 --> 00:38:32,160 Speaker 2: Talk to and Kate Crawford the American Civil Liberties Union 647 00:38:32,200 --> 00:38:36,640 Speaker 2: of Massachusetts a c l U M dot org. Back 648 00:38:36,719 --> 00:38:39,799 Speaker 2: on Nightside, I'm going to talk about Iran with a 649 00:38:40,040 --> 00:38:43,239 Speaker 2: professor from Boston College who was born there and is 650 00:38:43,280 --> 00:38:46,520 Speaker 2: an expert in Iran. We've had him with us before. 651 00:38:46,800 --> 00:38:50,640 Speaker 2: Professor Ali Banawazizi will join us right after the ten 652 00:38:50,640 --> 00:38:51,360 Speaker 2: o'clock news