WEBVTT - 11-27-25 America's Truckin' Network 0:00:11.080 --> 0:00:13.920 This is America's truck and Network with Kevin Gordon. 0:00:15.720 --> 0:00:20.880 Welcome aboard, Thanks for tuning in. Happy Thanksgiving. First of all, 0:00:20.960 --> 0:00:22.799 I want to give a shout out to all you 0:00:22.920 --> 0:00:26.439 truckers that are still out on the road, the first responders, 0:00:26.760 --> 0:00:32.360 hospital staff, anybody that is working through the holidays, especially Thanksgiving, 0:00:32.680 --> 0:00:35.520 so that the rest of us can enjoy and celebrate 0:00:35.560 --> 0:00:38.479 with our families. Now, as far as the trucking industry 0:00:38.600 --> 0:00:40.360 is concerned, any of people that are out on the 0:00:40.400 --> 0:00:43.279 road and you see these trucks out there, mind you, 0:00:43.440 --> 0:00:45.840 these are the people that have brought the food to 0:00:45.920 --> 0:00:49.200 the stores so that you can enjoy that on Thanksgiving. 0:00:49.600 --> 0:00:50.720 They are the ones. 0:00:50.520 --> 0:00:52.879 That are out there bringing the goods to the stores 0:00:52.920 --> 0:00:56.160 so that you can shop on Black Friday. Also the 0:00:56.240 --> 0:01:00.480 people that are stocking the individual warehouses and stuff so 0:01:00.560 --> 0:01:03.760 that Cyber Monday can be successful as well. So when 0:01:03.800 --> 0:01:06.600 you see these truckers out on the road, realize that 0:01:06.680 --> 0:01:09.959 they're working while you're having fun, and show them a. 0:01:09.880 --> 0:01:11.640 Little bit of courtesy along the way. 0:01:12.240 --> 0:01:14.200 Now, this is a busy time of the year round 0:01:14.319 --> 0:01:17.480 Christmas and so on, and a lot of freight is moving. 0:01:17.640 --> 0:01:21.319 A lot of people are online they're going to different 0:01:21.360 --> 0:01:27.520 websites buying things online, which is a perfect storm, if 0:01:27.600 --> 0:01:31.800 you will, for those thieves out there, people that want 0:01:31.840 --> 0:01:35.520 to steal your identity, and people that want to basically 0:01:35.600 --> 0:01:38.720 drain your bank account. Coming up in the next segment, 0:01:38.720 --> 0:01:41.399 we're going to be talking to a cyber security expert, 0:01:41.560 --> 0:01:45.679 Dave Hatter, about this very topic and as it relates 0:01:45.720 --> 0:01:48.760 to the trucking industry, the thieves are busy out there. 0:01:48.800 --> 0:01:51.560 They're always trying to separate you from your money and 0:01:51.800 --> 0:01:54.200 as well as what we're seeing as far as the 0:01:54.240 --> 0:02:00.080 trucking industry is concerned as well, American Transportation Research Institute 0:02:00.200 --> 0:02:04.800 back in October issue a report talking about the cost 0:02:04.960 --> 0:02:08.840 of cargo theft and what's going on in the trucking 0:02:08.840 --> 0:02:13.280 industry over well, and it's getting worse as we go on, 0:02:13.560 --> 0:02:17.440 because thieves are getting better, they're getting smarter, they're getting 0:02:17.480 --> 0:02:21.720 more slick, if you will, and they're getting very good 0:02:21.720 --> 0:02:25.680 at being able to figure out different ways of stealing 0:02:25.720 --> 0:02:30.480 your money and your cargo. According to and again the 0:02:30.560 --> 0:02:33.920 American Transportation Research Institute, I get this. These are some 0:02:33.960 --> 0:02:37.320 frightening numbers cargo theft costs the US trucking industry about 0:02:37.360 --> 0:02:43.480 six point six billion dollars annually or eighteen million dollars daily. 0:02:44.160 --> 0:02:50.360 Eighteen million dollars daily. That is just absolutely astounding. 0:02:50.639 --> 0:02:53.400 Study found that seventy four percent of stolen goods are 0:02:53.600 --> 0:02:58.240 never recovered, with thefts concentrated near major logistic hubs and 0:02:58.280 --> 0:03:04.400 states such as California, Texas, Illinois, and Tennessee. So those 0:03:04.560 --> 0:03:08.600 areas there are ripe for where the thieves are intending 0:03:08.639 --> 0:03:12.120 to steal as much cargo as they can. Annual theft 0:03:12.160 --> 0:03:14.679 costs let me see an average of five hundred and 0:03:14.760 --> 0:03:19.799 twenty thousand dollars per motor carrier and about one point 0:03:19.840 --> 0:03:24.640 eight million dollars per logistics service providers, So these are 0:03:25.000 --> 0:03:27.400 This is not jump change. This is something that really 0:03:27.480 --> 0:03:31.880 needs to be paid attention to and some security measures 0:03:32.280 --> 0:03:35.240 need to be in place. Cargo is more likely to 0:03:35.240 --> 0:03:38.800 be stolen as mentioned before, near major freight and logistics 0:03:38.880 --> 0:03:42.240 hubs in large cities where significant goods are moving on 0:03:42.320 --> 0:03:48.120 interstate corridors while law enforcement capabilities are strained. Let's see 0:03:48.120 --> 0:03:53.200 prevention strategies include protecting and monitoring facilities, trucks and trailers. 0:03:53.440 --> 0:03:54.960 I mean that is one of. 0:03:54.920 --> 0:03:58.720 The I guess probably the first line of defense, if 0:03:58.760 --> 0:04:02.240 you will, making sure that you're you know, locks on 0:04:02.320 --> 0:04:06.320 the gate, controlling the access into your facility, making sure 0:04:06.360 --> 0:04:09.720 that anybody that shows up has the proper paperwork. And 0:04:09.760 --> 0:04:12.160 we'll get into that here shortly as to what is 0:04:12.280 --> 0:04:16.440 proper paperwork and so on, but you know, putting locks 0:04:16.520 --> 0:04:19.680 on the trailers, putting making sure that they're parked and 0:04:19.720 --> 0:04:21.840 well lit places. If you know, if you're off the 0:04:21.920 --> 0:04:25.279 road and you're by a you know, getting a bite 0:04:25.320 --> 0:04:27.520 to eat or something like that, try to make sure 0:04:27.520 --> 0:04:29.720 that your truck is in visioned so that people are 0:04:29.720 --> 0:04:31.640 not out there, you know, in the dark, you know, 0:04:32.279 --> 0:04:33.839 being able to steal merchandise. 0:04:34.080 --> 0:04:36.440 It's still the low level type. 0:04:36.240 --> 0:04:39.080 Of thing that is happening out there, but then again 0:04:39.120 --> 0:04:41.799 you get in some of the sophisticated measures as well. 0:04:42.120 --> 0:04:45.640 For motor carriers, there are terminals where twenty four percent 0:04:45.680 --> 0:04:48.719 of the thefts occurred, so at the terminal level itself, 0:04:48.960 --> 0:04:52.680 stuff being pilfered from there. Logistics services providers, on the 0:04:52.680 --> 0:04:55.760 other hand, have experienced fifty one percent of the theft 0:04:55.800 --> 0:05:01.840 as customer pick up locations through strategic schemes. And speaking 0:05:01.880 --> 0:05:04.040 of which, there were a couple if there have been 0:05:04.040 --> 0:05:07.120 a couple of high profile schemes so to speak, that 0:05:07.160 --> 0:05:13.480 have been in the news recently, and one getting into 0:05:13.640 --> 0:05:15.920 how this is done and so on. 0:05:15.920 --> 0:05:17.000 One of the things. 0:05:16.720 --> 0:05:21.360 That a sophisticated cargo thieves steel Craft whiskey worth one 0:05:21.640 --> 0:05:27.760 million dollars and Guy Fieri from Food Network tequila was 0:05:27.760 --> 0:05:30.520 stolen in a double brokering scheme. So these are two 0:05:30.720 --> 0:05:33.719 very high profile stories that have been in the news. 0:05:34.320 --> 0:05:38.520 The one involved single malt. Distillers had worked more than 0:05:38.560 --> 0:05:41.960 a decade to make thieves stole Let me see, thieves 0:05:42.040 --> 0:05:44.680 who made off with twelve thousand bottles of a craft 0:05:44.680 --> 0:05:47.839 whiskey and a rare US liquor heightst this summer did 0:05:47.880 --> 0:05:50.520 more than just snag one million dollars worth of product. 0:05:50.680 --> 0:05:53.719 They also spirit away nearly half the stock of the 0:05:53.760 --> 0:05:57.839 single malt that took them a decade to gather. I'm 0:05:57.880 --> 0:06:00.440 wondering on this one if it was not something of 0:06:00.480 --> 0:06:03.760 an inside job informing people of where this was going on, 0:06:04.240 --> 0:06:08.839 and had this happen now in Guy Fieri's situation, the 0:06:08.880 --> 0:06:12.520 tequila that was stolen, Now, this is the methods that 0:06:12.560 --> 0:06:16.800 are used. First, thieves will steal a business identity, then 0:06:16.839 --> 0:06:21.040 they trick shippers into handing over entire container loads. Criminals 0:06:21.080 --> 0:06:25.000 will go out and create fake online profiles of trucking companies, 0:06:25.320 --> 0:06:28.839 bid on those jobs they suspect might be valuable, and 0:06:28.960 --> 0:06:32.720 hire unsuspecting drivers to go ahead and pick those up 0:06:32.920 --> 0:06:35.800 and then give them a location to send those two 0:06:36.720 --> 0:06:41.600 In Guy Fieri's situation, the way this particular thing worked, 0:06:42.120 --> 0:06:46.960 let's see here, two truckloads of tequila were stolen by 0:06:47.200 --> 0:06:51.839 a company owned by Guy Fieri and Sammy Hagar known 0:06:51.880 --> 0:06:54.240 as Freight Industry as double brokering. 0:06:54.520 --> 0:06:57.640 So here's what happened. The company's logistic. 0:06:57.279 --> 0:07:01.600 Partner hired a carrier that pre broker the job to 0:07:01.640 --> 0:07:04.720 another firm, which turned out to be fictitious. 0:07:05.080 --> 0:07:07.280 The imposter carrier used. 0:07:07.200 --> 0:07:12.160 Forged documents, phony emails accounts, and fake phone numbers to 0:07:12.240 --> 0:07:17.640 appear legitimate. Thieves sent video to supposed breakdown and routine 0:07:17.640 --> 0:07:19.360 delays update. 0:07:19.040 --> 0:07:21.480 To mask the frauds. So as they. 0:07:21.320 --> 0:07:25.200 Were busy moving this freight from where it was from 0:07:25.240 --> 0:07:27.640 when they picked it up from the location and were 0:07:27.680 --> 0:07:32.120 moving it to a different location in a different direction, 0:07:32.560 --> 0:07:35.360 they had to have some sort of diversion in order 0:07:35.400 --> 0:07:41.040 to delay that shipment that was supposedly going to as 0:07:41.120 --> 0:07:44.360 in this case Pennsylvania, So if they could delay that 0:07:44.480 --> 0:07:46.840 by a few days, it would give them a head 0:07:46.880 --> 0:07:50.520 start of getting this truckloads, these two truckloads to Los 0:07:50.520 --> 0:07:55.280 Angeles where it was actually dropped off. And so by 0:07:55.320 --> 0:07:59.720 delaying this with showing fake breakdowns and fake information in 0:07:59.760 --> 0:08:04.880 terms of how this traffic is being delayed, it you know, 0:08:05.000 --> 0:08:09.320 people are unsuspecting. They're thinking, okay, we've ordered this merchandise 0:08:09.440 --> 0:08:12.000 and it's supposed to arrive on a date certain But 0:08:12.160 --> 0:08:15.120 if you've ever tracked a package coming to your house, 0:08:15.200 --> 0:08:18.160 or if you've ever bought anything online, you'll see as 0:08:18.160 --> 0:08:20.520 you're doing these tracking where it will go to a 0:08:20.560 --> 0:08:23.960 particular location, it'll stay there, you know'll get there in 0:08:23.960 --> 0:08:25.920 the morning, and you think, okay, well, you know that's 0:08:25.960 --> 0:08:28.280 one hundred miles away from here. It'll be here by 0:08:28.280 --> 0:08:31.840 the afternoon or tomorrow at least. But somehow somewhere along 0:08:31.880 --> 0:08:34.880 the line in the tracking, it gets delayed and then 0:08:34.920 --> 0:08:37.840 it doesn't get to you when it's supposed to get there, 0:08:38.160 --> 0:08:42.360 So you're left waiting for this merchandise. In this instance, 0:08:42.480 --> 0:08:46.080 they kept informing them that okay, the truck broke down 0:08:46.160 --> 0:08:50.319 here this is what's going on. You know, don't worry. 0:08:50.400 --> 0:08:52.400 The truckload's going to be there. And then as it 0:08:52.440 --> 0:08:56.520 turned out, that truckload was actually never sent in that direction, 0:08:56.679 --> 0:09:00.160 it was diverted to a different direction. And again this 0:09:00.280 --> 0:09:05.560 has to do with sophistication, cloning these creating fake websites, 0:09:05.760 --> 0:09:08.320 And what we'll see coming up and talking with Dave 0:09:08.360 --> 0:09:12.000 Hatter is that how thieves are getting very clever at 0:09:12.320 --> 0:09:17.679 just changing certain things, making something look legitimate, making a 0:09:17.720 --> 0:09:22.240 website look legitimate, making phone numbers look legitimate, making emails 0:09:22.280 --> 0:09:28.320 look legitimate. Sometimes it's necessary to trust and trust, but verify, 0:09:28.880 --> 0:09:32.160 maybe making a couple of extra calls, making sure that 0:09:32.240 --> 0:09:34.680 the person picking this up is actually the person that's 0:09:34.720 --> 0:09:37.680 supposed to pick this up, and tracking this along the line. 0:09:37.760 --> 0:09:39.840 So coming up, we're gonna be talking with Dave Hatter, 0:09:39.960 --> 0:09:41.920 and if you miss any if you can't hang around 0:09:41.920 --> 0:09:46.760 for that interview, just hit up that iHeartRadio app later on, 0:09:47.040 --> 0:09:49.080 brought to you by our friends at Rush Truck Centers. 0:09:49.200 --> 0:09:54.480 I'm Kevin Gordon, America's truck and Network seven hundred Wlwantastic. 0:09:54.920 --> 0:09:57.600 I've been wanting to have Dave Hatter on this show 0:09:57.600 --> 0:10:00.840 for months we got tired of winning for his people 0:10:00.880 --> 0:10:03.000 and my people to get together, so we just decided 0:10:03.040 --> 0:10:07.200 to do ourselves. Dave Hatter is Cincinnati's top cybersecurity pro. 0:10:07.360 --> 0:10:10.240 I would say the region's top security pro. But who 0:10:10.240 --> 0:10:13.720 am I to argue. An enthusiastic tech evangelist, he has 0:10:13.800 --> 0:10:16.440 more certifications that you can shake a stick at. 0:10:16.920 --> 0:10:18.400 He's regularly featured. 0:10:18.040 --> 0:10:20.439 On Tech Friday, or as I call it, Scare the 0:10:20.520 --> 0:10:23.080 Hell out of Your Friday, which airs each week at 0:10:23.160 --> 0:10:26.880 six thirty am on our sister station fifty five KRS 0:10:26.880 --> 0:10:30.400 in Cincinnati. Dave Hatter, Welcome to America's truck and Network. 0:10:30.480 --> 0:10:31.640 Appreciate your time. 0:10:31.600 --> 0:10:33.640 Heany, Kevin, thanks for having me on. I'm looking forward 0:10:33.720 --> 0:10:35.280 to hopefully doing's good out here. 0:10:35.400 --> 0:10:36.400 Yeah. Absolutely. 0:10:36.480 --> 0:10:40.679 Now, you know, we're going into this Black Friday and 0:10:40.720 --> 0:10:43.720 then of course Cyber Monday and a lot of the 0:10:43.720 --> 0:10:46.080 stuff that people need to do in terms of protecting 0:10:46.080 --> 0:10:48.199 themselves so they don't get scammed and all this sort 0:10:48.240 --> 0:10:48.640 of stuff. 0:10:48.679 --> 0:10:49.760 All these things are good. 0:10:50.000 --> 0:10:51.560 But one of the reasons I wanted to have you 0:10:51.679 --> 0:10:54.160 on is that there's been a lot of stuff going 0:10:54.160 --> 0:10:57.120 on in the trucking industry here recently where there's been 0:10:57.160 --> 0:11:00.360 a lot of cargo theft, and this this is aded 0:11:00.400 --> 0:11:03.000 from you know, the old school of what you just 0:11:03.120 --> 0:11:06.240 hijack a truck, or you wait for a truck to 0:11:06.320 --> 0:11:08.680 park and you, you know, unload it while they're eating 0:11:08.760 --> 0:11:11.640 or something like that. This has gotten more sophisticated to 0:11:11.679 --> 0:11:16.000 where they're actually stealing these loads through all kinds of 0:11:16.040 --> 0:11:19.959 different methods in terms of identity theft and so on. 0:11:20.080 --> 0:11:23.320 So I guess basically the same thing that would happen 0:11:23.760 --> 0:11:27.439 in terms of an individual's identity theft would apply here 0:11:27.480 --> 0:11:27.960 as well. 0:11:28.440 --> 0:11:30.880 Yeah, to a large extent, that's true, Kevin. I mean 0:11:30.920 --> 0:11:33.600 it's a combination of the fact that and I'm sure 0:11:33.600 --> 0:11:36.200 all your listeners have seen many examples of these gigantic 0:11:36.240 --> 0:11:38.360 data breaches, you know, time and time again. You see 0:11:38.360 --> 0:11:41.080 where this company has had a data breach. Millions of 0:11:41.080 --> 0:11:44.320 records lost, millions of records lost. A perfect example of 0:11:44.320 --> 0:11:47.200 this would be the National Public Data Data breaks. National 0:11:47.200 --> 0:11:50.600 Public Data is a background check company. For any listener 0:11:50.920 --> 0:11:53.160 who's gone through a background check. Think of the very 0:11:53.200 --> 0:11:56.360 sensitive information you give up in a background check. Places 0:11:56.400 --> 0:11:59.080 you've lived, places you've worked, your family members, all kinds 0:11:59.120 --> 0:12:02.960 of very sensitive information. So that if someone wanted to 0:12:03.000 --> 0:12:06.240 either impersonate you using the information, they would need to 0:12:06.280 --> 0:12:09.120 convince someone else their you they have it. 0:12:09.160 --> 0:12:11.079 Or vice versa. 0:12:11.240 --> 0:12:14.040 If I'm trying to convince you that I'm a legitimate 0:12:14.600 --> 0:12:17.120 entity because I know information about you. 0:12:17.040 --> 0:12:18.720 That only that legitimate entity would know. 0:12:19.360 --> 0:12:22.200 These data breaches cut both ways, and they're a powerful 0:12:22.240 --> 0:12:25.080 tool for criminals and con artists. And I would mention 0:12:25.520 --> 0:12:28.640 so many of these cyber criminals are really just really good. 0:12:28.600 --> 0:12:30.480 Con artists that know how to use technology. 0:12:30.840 --> 0:12:33.040 But once you put all this information into the hands 0:12:33.080 --> 0:12:35.440 of the bad guys, it makes it very easy for 0:12:35.520 --> 0:12:39.520 them to then leverage technical tools like spoofing. So spoofing 0:12:39.600 --> 0:12:42.240 is basically a term. You can think of it as impersonation. 0:12:42.840 --> 0:12:45.320 I can spoof a website. I copy a website, I 0:12:45.360 --> 0:12:47.520 set it up on another server with a very slightly 0:12:47.559 --> 0:12:50.559 different domain. Maybe I replace an S with a number 0:12:50.559 --> 0:12:53.440 five or something in it. I can easily spoof an email. 0:12:53.520 --> 0:12:55.720 I can spoof a phone number, so whether it's a 0:12:55.720 --> 0:12:57.720 text message to you or a phone call to you, 0:12:58.120 --> 0:13:00.360 I can make a call or send it to text 0:13:00.400 --> 0:13:02.200 and make it appear to come from any number I want, 0:13:02.320 --> 0:13:04.360 Just like I can send an email and make it 0:13:04.360 --> 0:13:07.280 appear to come from any email address. So that's my 0:13:07.360 --> 0:13:10.360 long winded way of saying, the criminals have the information 0:13:10.440 --> 0:13:14.840 they need to set up fake websites to create the 0:13:15.160 --> 0:13:18.880 false sense of authority that they need to then, using 0:13:18.920 --> 0:13:22.400 spoofing and social engineering, convince people to do things like, hey, 0:13:22.400 --> 0:13:24.480 I'm here to pick up this shipment. Well, how did 0:13:24.520 --> 0:13:26.439 you know about the shipment? Well, I hacked your system, 0:13:27.000 --> 0:13:29.520 or I convinced one of your employees to tell me 0:13:29.559 --> 0:13:33.199 some information because I impersonated your IT person or whatever, 0:13:33.480 --> 0:13:35.760 and then they drive off with the shipment. So yeah, 0:13:36.000 --> 0:13:37.920 I'm not at all surprised you're seeing this. 0:13:37.880 --> 0:13:40.000 Yeah, Dave hat Or, I don't think people are going 0:13:40.120 --> 0:13:43.160 up to the where they pick up the load and saying, hey, 0:13:43.200 --> 0:13:45.520 I am personated this company. I'm here to steal this 0:13:45.800 --> 0:13:47.680 from you. 0:13:47.720 --> 0:13:50.360 But I mean, if I show up with the bill 0:13:50.640 --> 0:13:53.160 with all the proper paperwork, how would. 0:13:52.920 --> 0:13:54.120 You know exactly? 0:13:54.480 --> 0:13:54.960 Exactly? 0:13:55.040 --> 0:13:57.400 Yeah, I was just teasing there, because the way you 0:13:57.480 --> 0:13:59.440 phrased it was that, yeah, I'm here to steal your 0:13:59.480 --> 0:14:03.840 merchandise and all this ors and here's the bill of lady. 0:14:03.920 --> 0:14:06.120 They're probably not saying that they're showing the bill of lady. 0:14:06.240 --> 0:14:08.800 But you're you're right, I mean, because it is so 0:14:08.840 --> 0:14:11.240 easy and you know you and I, I mean, I 0:14:11.280 --> 0:14:13.400 called you a few months ago. I got this thing 0:14:13.440 --> 0:14:16.480 on my computer that it seemed like my my bank 0:14:16.640 --> 0:14:19.480 was telling you that there's been some fraudulent charges and 0:14:20.080 --> 0:14:22.320 do this, that and the other thing, and it looked 0:14:22.440 --> 0:14:25.080 legitimate as hell. And I thought, well, maybe I'll call 0:14:25.160 --> 0:14:27.920 the company. And I couldn't get through or I don't 0:14:27.960 --> 0:14:29.760 know what I was thinking, and I thought, do I 0:14:29.840 --> 0:14:31.440 click on this or not? And I called you and 0:14:31.440 --> 0:14:33.320 I said, you know what, I'm thinking that this is 0:14:33.360 --> 0:14:37.320 probably probably not a good thing to do, and so 0:14:37.840 --> 0:14:40.160 we talked about it. You said, well, you know, reboot 0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:42.760 or do this and do that and see if if 0:14:42.760 --> 0:14:45.720 it's still there before you call your your bank. And 0:14:46.560 --> 0:14:49.480 sure enough, I mean, I who you know from listening 0:14:49.480 --> 0:14:51.400 to you over the years and what and going to 0:14:51.440 --> 0:14:54.080 back up here again when I say what I call 0:14:54.200 --> 0:14:57.040 it scare the hell out of your fridays on KRNC. 0:14:57.760 --> 0:15:01.240 Is that because you always have this in that's available 0:15:01.280 --> 0:15:05.720 how people can protect themselves. But you also give the 0:15:05.800 --> 0:15:08.520 stories about how these companies, as you said, these big 0:15:08.640 --> 0:15:11.840 data breaches where they can come in steal your identity 0:15:11.840 --> 0:15:13.880 and how easy it is for them to get into 0:15:13.880 --> 0:15:17.160 your system because you click on something that you are unsuspecting, 0:15:17.520 --> 0:15:20.040 or you answer a question you shouldn't answer, answer a 0:15:20.080 --> 0:15:22.840 phone call you shouldn't answer, or something along those lines. 0:15:22.840 --> 0:15:24.520 And you know, when I say scare the hell out 0:15:24.560 --> 0:15:27.120 of it, well, maybe people need to bed the hell 0:15:27.200 --> 0:15:30.400 scared out of them sometime on this stuff. But again, 0:15:30.760 --> 0:15:33.240 these are the kinds of things that you know, the 0:15:33.600 --> 0:15:38.600 people are getting very sophisticated with this process of faking 0:15:38.640 --> 0:15:41.600 an id facing and as we saw on some of 0:15:41.600 --> 0:15:47.200 these stories that we talked about, that they actually identify 0:15:47.280 --> 0:15:50.800 themselves or steal the identity of a legitimate trucking company 0:15:51.080 --> 0:15:54.640 or a logistics company. And so how do people protect 0:15:54.680 --> 0:15:57.560 themselves from this? Is there certain things that you should 0:15:57.560 --> 0:16:00.920 look for? Is there certain things that that are not 0:16:00.960 --> 0:16:01.880 being done? 0:16:02.880 --> 0:16:03.120 Well? 0:16:03.160 --> 0:16:04.800 I think you know, a big part of it, just 0:16:04.840 --> 0:16:07.560 in general is awareness. So one of the reasons why 0:16:07.600 --> 0:16:09.520 I appreciate you giving me a chance to come talk 0:16:09.560 --> 0:16:09.920 about this. 0:16:10.080 --> 0:16:12.360 You know, you don't have to take my word for this. 0:16:12.560 --> 0:16:15.360 You can go out and find copious examples of this 0:16:15.720 --> 0:16:17.920 and reported in the media of all different kinds of 0:16:17.960 --> 0:16:21.640 you know, identity theft and these sorts of hacks and 0:16:21.680 --> 0:16:24.800 account takeovers and so forth. You can also go to 0:16:24.840 --> 0:16:28.360 sites like the FTC, FTC dot gov, FBI dot gov, 0:16:28.880 --> 0:16:32.680 the FBIS, Internet Crime Complaint Center IC three dot gov, Indigo, 0:16:32.760 --> 0:16:36.160 Charlie number three dot gov. You know, they're replete with 0:16:36.280 --> 0:16:39.680 examples of what to look out for, how to protect 0:16:39.720 --> 0:16:40.880 yourself against this stuff. 0:16:40.920 --> 0:16:42.760 But you know the first step is awareness. 0:16:43.120 --> 0:16:46.080 Awareness that just because something looks legit doesn't mean that 0:16:46.160 --> 0:16:49.040 it is. Awareness that it's easy for bad guys to 0:16:49.080 --> 0:16:52.840 spoof things, right, to create complete goppelganger websites, to go 0:16:52.880 --> 0:16:56.360 to like seven hundred wlw's website, copy the whole thing, 0:16:56.880 --> 0:17:00.680 set it up on another server and maybe change the 0:17:00.800 --> 0:17:03.840 zeros and seven hundred to the upper case letter O. 0:17:04.400 --> 0:17:08.800 Is the average person going to notice that? Probably not so. 0:17:09.000 --> 0:17:11.040 You know, once you have some awareness, then it's having. 0:17:10.840 --> 0:17:12.240 A healthy dose of skepticism. 0:17:12.800 --> 0:17:16.159 If you're suddenly asked to do something unusual, especially if 0:17:16.200 --> 0:17:19.480 it's of a financial nature, you should stop, take a 0:17:19.520 --> 0:17:21.760 breath and do what we nerds like to call go 0:17:21.880 --> 0:17:24.000 out of band to verify it. You know, if it's 0:17:24.000 --> 0:17:26.719 your bank, for example, like you mentioned the bank example before. 0:17:27.200 --> 0:17:29.240 If you get I'll tell you a quick story. 0:17:29.000 --> 0:17:30.439 And you'll see how this ties. And I'm sitting on 0:17:30.440 --> 0:17:33.560 the couch with my wife. She gets a text claiming 0:17:33.640 --> 0:17:37.520 from USAA, that's our bank, that there's fraud on our account. So, 0:17:37.760 --> 0:17:39.560 you know, she looks at it. There's a number there 0:17:39.560 --> 0:17:42.160 for her to call. She calls the number. I can 0:17:42.200 --> 0:17:44.879 guarantee that call went to like a boiler room in 0:17:44.960 --> 0:17:47.280 some third world country where they have a room full 0:17:47.320 --> 0:17:50.600 of people con artists waiting to take that call. Okay, 0:17:51.160 --> 0:17:53.679 she calls, all this fraud on your account, I'm going 0:17:53.720 --> 0:17:54.560 to need this, that and the other. 0:17:54.560 --> 0:17:56.080 And I'm listening to this, I'm like, this is a 0:17:56.160 --> 0:17:58.520 scam hanger, you know. 0:17:58.720 --> 0:18:01.080 So in a scenario like that, you know, we went, 0:18:01.200 --> 0:18:04.920 we logged into our USA account using our normal procedure, 0:18:05.240 --> 0:18:07.720 and of course there was no fraud. So it's it's 0:18:07.840 --> 0:18:11.000 being skeptical. Your bank does not need your password, Your 0:18:11.040 --> 0:18:14.000 bank does not need your bank account information. They already 0:18:14.040 --> 0:18:17.080 know all that. They can reset your password. So when 0:18:17.119 --> 0:18:19.920 you're being asked to do something unusual, when you're being 0:18:19.960 --> 0:18:21.960 pressured at something like, oh, there's fraud on your account, 0:18:22.080 --> 0:18:24.640 we need to transfer your money to a safe account, 0:18:24.880 --> 0:18:27.560 you know, anything like that ninety nine point. 0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:30.040 Repeating scam. 0:18:30.520 --> 0:18:34.000 Stop hang up, and you then go log into your 0:18:34.000 --> 0:18:36.720 bank using your app or your with the normal website 0:18:36.800 --> 0:18:39.440 that you use, get out your bank statement, get out 0:18:39.480 --> 0:18:42.520 your credit card. Call the number that's published on there. 0:18:43.040 --> 0:18:43.960 Any number can be. 0:18:43.960 --> 0:18:46.439 Spoofed, you know when you when you. 0:18:46.359 --> 0:18:48.639 Call, you're going to get a human being on that 0:18:48.760 --> 0:18:50.520 phone who is there to con you. 0:18:50.640 --> 0:18:52.199 They will tell you any lie. 0:18:52.680 --> 0:18:55.240 They may have information about you stolen from one of 0:18:55.280 --> 0:18:58.160 these data breaches to make it seem more realistic, right, 0:18:58.280 --> 0:19:01.080 so they'll know certain things that will give them a 0:19:01.160 --> 0:19:04.080 sense of legitimacy and create a feeling that, you know, 0:19:04.119 --> 0:19:06.360 they are an authority and you should do what they say. 0:19:06.880 --> 0:19:07.040 You know. 0:19:07.160 --> 0:19:09.800 Lookal law enforcement has reported on this sort of thing extensively. 0:19:09.800 --> 0:19:11.560 Where you get a call from like the Hamlin County 0:19:11.560 --> 0:19:14.000 Sheriff's office telling you to do X, Y or Z. 0:19:14.680 --> 0:19:17.280 They've gone to the Hamlin County Sheriff's website, They've looked 0:19:17.359 --> 0:19:20.200 up Deputy such and such as name. They'll say, i'm 0:19:20.240 --> 0:19:23.760 this person again. These are not people sitting in their 0:19:23.760 --> 0:19:27.000 mom's basement eating pizza and drinking mountain dew. You know 0:19:27.080 --> 0:19:31.000 these are criminal con artists who will steal your money 0:19:31.040 --> 0:19:33.439 if you make it easy for him. So again, it's stop, 0:19:33.600 --> 0:19:36.640 take a breath, hang up. If it's important and it's real, 0:19:36.680 --> 0:19:39.000 they'll call you back and go out of band and 0:19:39.119 --> 0:19:42.960 verify on your own any especially if it's financial. 0:19:43.160 --> 0:19:44.000 Yeah, exactly. 0:19:44.560 --> 0:19:48.600 My guest is Dave Hatter, Dave Cincinnati's top cybersecurity pro. 0:19:48.680 --> 0:19:51.400 I would say, in the region's top side, the security 0:19:51.840 --> 0:19:53.199 pro will pick this up. 0:19:53.240 --> 0:19:53.720 Coming up. 0:19:53.840 --> 0:20:05.399 I'm Kevin Gordon, America struck in Network seven hundred WLW. 0:20:06.400 --> 0:20:08.800 Here's your trucking forecast for the Try State and the 0:20:08.800 --> 0:20:10.720 rest of the country and the Tri Sate. Over night, 0:20:10.800 --> 0:20:13.520 cloudy sky is gradually becoming partly cloudy. Be low down 0:20:13.560 --> 0:20:16.479 to twenty seven, mostly claudy early for your Thanksgiving Day, 0:20:16.520 --> 0:20:19.520 then gradually becoming sunny. A high of thirty eight sunny Friday, 0:20:19.600 --> 0:20:22.200 highs in the mid thirties, mostly claudy. Saturday, with the 0:20:22.240 --> 0:20:24.800 chants of afternoon snow a high of thirty nine, chants 0:20:24.840 --> 0:20:28.120 of early rained Sunday, otherwise cloudy a high of forty one. 0:20:28.400 --> 0:20:31.440 Nationally heavy like effects snow expected downwind to the Great 0:20:31.480 --> 0:20:33.440 Lakes region through the rest of the week and through 0:20:33.480 --> 0:20:36.760 Thanksgiving Day. Blizzard like conditions seen along the south shore 0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:39.600 of Lake Superior. Cold weather scene across the central and 0:20:39.640 --> 0:20:43.320 eastern US. Meanwhile, in the Pacific Northwest, day storm system 0:20:43.359 --> 0:20:46.520 bringing locally heavy rainfalls to the coastal ranges of western 0:20:46.640 --> 0:20:49.560 Washington State and Oregon, with locally heavy snow fall across 0:20:49.600 --> 0:20:52.320 the Cascades in Washington State and eventually moving into the 0:20:52.359 --> 0:20:56.879 Northern Rockies and Northern High Plains through Friday. 0:21:01.160 --> 0:21:05.240 I'm Kevin Gordon, America's truck in Network seven hundred WLW 0:21:05.400 --> 0:21:09.879 continue our conversation with Dave Hatter, Cincinnati's top cybersecurity pro 0:21:09.960 --> 0:21:12.959 and again, I think I keep emphasizing. I think he's 0:21:13.280 --> 0:21:15.199 actually he's probably one of the best in the country. 0:21:15.240 --> 0:21:17.920