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Speaker 1: This is America's truck and Network with Kevin Gordon.

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Speaker 2: Welcome aboard, Thanks for tuning in. Happy Thanksgiving. First of all,

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Speaker 2: I want to give a shout out to all you

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Speaker 2: truckers that are still out on the road, the first responders,

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Speaker 2: hospital staff, anybody that is working through the holidays, especially Thanksgiving,

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Speaker 2: so that the rest of us can enjoy and celebrate

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Speaker 2: with our families. Now, as far as the trucking industry

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Speaker 2: is concerned, any of people that are out on the

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Speaker 2: road and you see these trucks out there, mind you,

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Speaker 2: these are the people that have brought the food to

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Speaker 2: the stores so that you can enjoy that on Thanksgiving.

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Speaker 1: They are the ones.

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Speaker 2: That are out there bringing the goods to the stores

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Speaker 2: so that you can shop on Black Friday. Also the

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Speaker 2: people that are stocking the individual warehouses and stuff so

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Speaker 2: that Cyber Monday can be successful as well. So when

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Speaker 2: you see these truckers out on the road, realize that

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Speaker 2: they're working while you're having fun, and show them a.

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Speaker 1: Little bit of courtesy along the way.

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Speaker 2: Now, this is a busy time of the year round

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Speaker 2: Christmas and so on, and a lot of freight is moving.

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Speaker 2: A lot of people are online they're going to different

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Speaker 2: websites buying things online, which is a perfect storm, if

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Speaker 2: you will, for those thieves out there, people that want

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Speaker 2: to steal your identity, and people that want to basically

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Speaker 2: drain your bank account. Coming up in the next segment,

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Speaker 2: we're going to be talking to a cyber security expert,

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Speaker 2: Dave Hatter, about this very topic and as it relates

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Speaker 2: to the trucking industry, the thieves are busy out there.

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Speaker 2: They're always trying to separate you from your money and

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Speaker 2: as well as what we're seeing as far as the

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Speaker 2: trucking industry is concerned as well, American Transportation Research Institute

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Speaker 2: back in October issue a report talking about the cost

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Speaker 2: of cargo theft and what's going on in the trucking

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Speaker 2: industry over well, and it's getting worse as we go on,

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Speaker 2: because thieves are getting better, they're getting smarter, they're getting

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Speaker 2: more slick, if you will, and they're getting very good

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Speaker 2: at being able to figure out different ways of stealing

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Speaker 2: your money and your cargo. According to and again the

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Speaker 2: American Transportation Research Institute, I get this. These are some

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Speaker 2: frightening numbers cargo theft costs the US trucking industry about

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Speaker 2: six point six billion dollars annually or eighteen million dollars daily.

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Speaker 1: Eighteen million dollars daily. That is just absolutely astounding.

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Speaker 2: Study found that seventy four percent of stolen goods are

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Speaker 2: never recovered, with thefts concentrated near major logistic hubs and

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Speaker 2: states such as California, Texas, Illinois, and Tennessee. So those

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Speaker 2: areas there are ripe for where the thieves are intending

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Speaker 2: to steal as much cargo as they can. Annual theft

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Speaker 2: costs let me see an average of five hundred and

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Speaker 2: twenty thousand dollars per motor carrier and about one point

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Speaker 2: eight million dollars per logistics service providers, So these are

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Speaker 2: This is not jump change. This is something that really

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Speaker 2: needs to be paid attention to and some security measures

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Speaker 2: need to be in place. Cargo is more likely to

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Speaker 2: be stolen as mentioned before, near major freight and logistics

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Speaker 2: hubs in large cities where significant goods are moving on

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Speaker 2: interstate corridors while law enforcement capabilities are strained. Let's see

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Speaker 2: prevention strategies include protecting and monitoring facilities, trucks and trailers.

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Speaker 1: I mean that is one of.

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Speaker 2: The I guess probably the first line of defense, if

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Speaker 2: you will, making sure that you're you know, locks on

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Speaker 2: the gate, controlling the access into your facility, making sure

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Speaker 2: that anybody that shows up has the proper paperwork. And

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Speaker 2: we'll get into that here shortly as to what is

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Speaker 2: proper paperwork and so on, but you know, putting locks

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Speaker 2: on the trailers, putting making sure that they're parked and

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Speaker 2: well lit places. If you know, if you're off the

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Speaker 2: road and you're by a you know, getting a bite

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Speaker 2: to eat or something like that, try to make sure

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Speaker 2: that your truck is in visioned so that people are

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Speaker 2: not out there, you know, in the dark, you know,

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Speaker 2: being able to steal merchandise.

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Speaker 1: It's still the low level type.

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Speaker 2: Of thing that is happening out there, but then again

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Speaker 2: you get in some of the sophisticated measures as well.

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Speaker 2: For motor carriers, there are terminals where twenty four percent

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Speaker 2: of the thefts occurred, so at the terminal level itself,

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Speaker 2: stuff being pilfered from there. Logistics services providers, on the

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Speaker 2: other hand, have experienced fifty one percent of the theft

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Speaker 2: as customer pick up locations through strategic schemes. And speaking

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Speaker 2: of which, there were a couple if there have been

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Speaker 2: a couple of high profile schemes so to speak, that

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Speaker 2: have been in the news recently, and one getting into

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Speaker 2: how this is done and so on.

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Speaker 1: One of the things.

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Speaker 2: That a sophisticated cargo thieves steel Craft whiskey worth one

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Speaker 2: million dollars and Guy Fieri from Food Network tequila was

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Speaker 2: stolen in a double brokering scheme. So these are two

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Speaker 2: very high profile stories that have been in the news.

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Speaker 2: The one involved single malt. Distillers had worked more than

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Speaker 2: a decade to make thieves stole Let me see, thieves

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Speaker 2: who made off with twelve thousand bottles of a craft

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Speaker 2: whiskey and a rare US liquor heightst this summer did

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Speaker 2: more than just snag one million dollars worth of product.

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Speaker 2: They also spirit away nearly half the stock of the

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Speaker 2: single malt that took them a decade to gather. I'm

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Speaker 2: wondering on this one if it was not something of

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Speaker 2: an inside job informing people of where this was going on,

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Speaker 2: and had this happen now in Guy Fieri's situation, the

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Speaker 2: tequila that was stolen, Now, this is the methods that

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Speaker 2: are used. First, thieves will steal a business identity, then

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Speaker 2: they trick shippers into handing over entire container loads. Criminals

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Speaker 2: will go out and create fake online profiles of trucking companies,

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Speaker 2: bid on those jobs they suspect might be valuable, and

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Speaker 2: hire unsuspecting drivers to go ahead and pick those up

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Speaker 2: and then give them a location to send those two

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Speaker 2: In Guy Fieri's situation, the way this particular thing worked,

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Speaker 2: let's see here, two truckloads of tequila were stolen by

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Speaker 2: a company owned by Guy Fieri and Sammy Hagar known

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Speaker 2: as Freight Industry as double brokering.

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Speaker 1: So here's what happened. The company's logistic.

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Speaker 2: Partner hired a carrier that pre broker the job to

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Speaker 2: another firm, which turned out to be fictitious.

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Speaker 1: The imposter carrier used.

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Speaker 2: Forged documents, phony emails accounts, and fake phone numbers to

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Speaker 2: appear legitimate. Thieves sent video to supposed breakdown and routine

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Speaker 2: delays update.

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Speaker 1: To mask the frauds. So as they.

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Speaker 2: Were busy moving this freight from where it was from

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Speaker 2: when they picked it up from the location and were

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Speaker 2: moving it to a different location in a different direction,

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Speaker 2: they had to have some sort of diversion in order

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Speaker 2: to delay that shipment that was supposedly going to as

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Speaker 2: in this case Pennsylvania, So if they could delay that

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Speaker 2: by a few days, it would give them a head

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Speaker 2: start of getting this truckloads, these two truckloads to Los

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Speaker 2: Angeles where it was actually dropped off. And so by

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Speaker 2: delaying this with showing fake breakdowns and fake information in

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Speaker 2: terms of how this traffic is being delayed, it you know,

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Speaker 2: people are unsuspecting. They're thinking, okay, we've ordered this merchandise

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Speaker 2: and it's supposed to arrive on a date certain But

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Speaker 2: if you've ever tracked a package coming to your house,

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Speaker 2: or if you've ever bought anything online, you'll see as

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Speaker 2: you're doing these tracking where it will go to a

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Speaker 2: particular location, it'll stay there, you know'll get there in

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Speaker 2: the morning, and you think, okay, well, you know that's

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Speaker 2: one hundred miles away from here. It'll be here by

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Speaker 2: the afternoon or tomorrow at least. But somehow somewhere along

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Speaker 2: the line in the tracking, it gets delayed and then

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Speaker 2: it doesn't get to you when it's supposed to get there,

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Speaker 2: So you're left waiting for this merchandise. In this instance,

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Speaker 2: they kept informing them that okay, the truck broke down

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Speaker 2: here this is what's going on. You know, don't worry.

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Speaker 2: The truckload's going to be there. And then as it

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Speaker 2: turned out, that truckload was actually never sent in that direction,

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Speaker 2: it was diverted to a different direction. And again this

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Speaker 2: has to do with sophistication, cloning these creating fake websites,

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Speaker 2: And what we'll see coming up and talking with Dave

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Speaker 2: Hatter is that how thieves are getting very clever at

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Speaker 2: just changing certain things, making something look legitimate, making a

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Speaker 2: website look legitimate, making phone numbers look legitimate, making emails

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Speaker 2: look legitimate. Sometimes it's necessary to trust and trust, but verify,

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Speaker 2: maybe making a couple of extra calls, making sure that

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Speaker 2: the person picking this up is actually the person that's

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Speaker 2: supposed to pick this up, and tracking this along the line.

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Speaker 2: So coming up, we're gonna be talking with Dave Hatter,

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Speaker 2: and if you miss any if you can't hang around

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Speaker 2: for that interview, just hit up that iHeartRadio app later on,

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Speaker 2: brought to you by our friends at Rush Truck Centers.

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Speaker 2: I'm Kevin Gordon, America's truck and Network seven hundred Wlwantastic.

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Speaker 2: I've been wanting to have Dave Hatter on this show

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Speaker 2: for months we got tired of winning for his people

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Speaker 2: and my people to get together, so we just decided

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Speaker 2: to do ourselves. Dave Hatter is Cincinnati's top cybersecurity pro.

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Speaker 2: I would say the region's top security pro. But who

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Speaker 2: am I to argue. An enthusiastic tech evangelist, he has

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Speaker 2: more certifications that you can shake a stick at.

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Speaker 1: He's regularly featured.

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Speaker 2: On Tech Friday, or as I call it, Scare the

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Speaker 2: Hell out of Your Friday, which airs each week at

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Speaker 2: six thirty am on our sister station fifty five KRS

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Speaker 2: in Cincinnati. Dave Hatter, Welcome to America's truck and Network.

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Speaker 2: Appreciate your time.

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Speaker 3: Heany, Kevin, thanks for having me on. I'm looking forward

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Speaker 3: to hopefully doing's good out here.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. Absolutely.

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Speaker 2: Now, you know, we're going into this Black Friday and

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Speaker 2: then of course Cyber Monday and a lot of the

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Speaker 2: stuff that people need to do in terms of protecting

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Speaker 2: themselves so they don't get scammed and all this sort

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Speaker 2: of stuff.

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Speaker 1: All these things are good.

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Speaker 2: But one of the reasons I wanted to have you

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Speaker 2: on is that there's been a lot of stuff going

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Speaker 2: on in the trucking industry here recently where there's been

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Speaker 2: a lot of cargo theft, and this this is aded

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Speaker 2: from you know, the old school of what you just

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Speaker 2: hijack a truck, or you wait for a truck to

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Speaker 2: park and you, you know, unload it while they're eating

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Speaker 2: or something like that. This has gotten more sophisticated to

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Speaker 2: where they're actually stealing these loads through all kinds of

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Speaker 2: different methods in terms of identity theft and so on.

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Speaker 2: So I guess basically the same thing that would happen

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Speaker 2: in terms of an individual's identity theft would apply here

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Speaker 2: as well.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, to a large extent, that's true, Kevin. I mean

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Speaker 4: it's a combination of the fact that and I'm sure

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Speaker 4: all your listeners have seen many examples of these gigantic

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Speaker 4: data breaches, you know, time and time again. You see

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Speaker 4: where this company has had a data breach. Millions of

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Speaker 4: records lost, millions of records lost. A perfect example of

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Speaker 4: this would be the National Public Data Data breaks. National

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Speaker 4: Public Data is a background check company. For any listener

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Speaker 4: who's gone through a background check. Think of the very

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Speaker 4: sensitive information you give up in a background check. Places

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Speaker 4: you've lived, places you've worked, your family members, all kinds

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Speaker 4: of very sensitive information. So that if someone wanted to

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Speaker 4: either impersonate you using the information, they would need to

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Speaker 4: convince someone else their you they have it.

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Speaker 3: Or vice versa.

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Speaker 4: If I'm trying to convince you that I'm a legitimate

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Speaker 4: entity because I know information about you.

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Speaker 3: That only that legitimate entity would know.

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Speaker 4: These data breaches cut both ways, and they're a powerful

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Speaker 4: tool for criminals and con artists. And I would mention

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Speaker 4: so many of these cyber criminals are really just really good.

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Speaker 3: Con artists that know how to use technology.

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Speaker 4: But once you put all this information into the hands

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Speaker 4: of the bad guys, it makes it very easy for

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Speaker 4: them to then leverage technical tools like spoofing. So spoofing

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Speaker 4: is basically a term. You can think of it as impersonation.

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Speaker 4: I can spoof a website. I copy a website, I

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Speaker 4: set it up on another server with a very slightly

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Speaker 4: different domain. Maybe I replace an S with a number

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Speaker 4: five or something in it. I can easily spoof an email.

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Speaker 4: I can spoof a phone number, so whether it's a

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Speaker 4: text message to you or a phone call to you,

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Speaker 4: I can make a call or send it to text

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Speaker 4: and make it appear to come from any number I want,

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Speaker 4: Just like I can send an email and make it

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Speaker 4: appear to come from any email address. So that's my

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Speaker 4: long winded way of saying, the criminals have the information

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Speaker 4: they need to set up fake websites to create the

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Speaker 4: false sense of authority that they need to then, using

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Speaker 4: spoofing and social engineering, convince people to do things like, hey,

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Speaker 4: I'm here to pick up this shipment. Well, how did

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Speaker 4: you know about the shipment? Well, I hacked your system,

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Speaker 4: or I convinced one of your employees to tell me

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Speaker 4: some information because I impersonated your IT person or whatever,

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Speaker 4: and then they drive off with the shipment. So yeah,

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Speaker 4: I'm not at all surprised you're seeing this.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Dave hat Or, I don't think people are going

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Speaker 2: up to the where they pick up the load and saying, hey,

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Speaker 2: I am personated this company. I'm here to steal this

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Speaker 2: from you.

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Speaker 4: But I mean, if I show up with the bill

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Speaker 4: with all the proper paperwork, how would.

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Speaker 3: You know exactly?

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Speaker 1: Exactly?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I was just teasing there, because the way you

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Speaker 2: phrased it was that, yeah, I'm here to steal your

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Speaker 2: merchandise and all this ors and here's the bill of lady.

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Speaker 2: They're probably not saying that they're showing the bill of lady.

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Speaker 2: But you're you're right, I mean, because it is so

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Speaker 2: easy and you know you and I, I mean, I

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Speaker 2: called you a few months ago. I got this thing

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Speaker 2: on my computer that it seemed like my my bank

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Speaker 2: was telling you that there's been some fraudulent charges and

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Speaker 2: do this, that and the other thing, and it looked

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Speaker 2: legitimate as hell. And I thought, well, maybe I'll call

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Speaker 2: the company. And I couldn't get through or I don't

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Speaker 2: know what I was thinking, and I thought, do I

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Speaker 2: click on this or not? And I called you and

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Speaker 2: I said, you know what, I'm thinking that this is

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Speaker 2: probably probably not a good thing to do, and so

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Speaker 2: we talked about it. You said, well, you know, reboot

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Speaker 2: or do this and do that and see if if

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Speaker 2: it's still there before you call your your bank. And

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Speaker 2: sure enough, I mean, I who you know from listening

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Speaker 2: to you over the years and what and going to

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Speaker 2: back up here again when I say what I call

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Speaker 2: it scare the hell out of your fridays on KRNC.

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Speaker 2: Is that because you always have this in that's available

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Speaker 2: how people can protect themselves. But you also give the

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Speaker 2: stories about how these companies, as you said, these big

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Speaker 2: data breaches where they can come in steal your identity

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Speaker 2: and how easy it is for them to get into

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Speaker 2: your system because you click on something that you are unsuspecting,

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Speaker 2: or you answer a question you shouldn't answer, answer a

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Speaker 2: phone call you shouldn't answer, or something along those lines.

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Speaker 2: And you know, when I say scare the hell out

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Speaker 2: of it, well, maybe people need to bed the hell

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Speaker 2: scared out of them sometime on this stuff. But again,

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Speaker 2: these are the kinds of things that you know, the

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Speaker 2: people are getting very sophisticated with this process of faking

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Speaker 2: an id facing and as we saw on some of

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Speaker 2: these stories that we talked about, that they actually identify

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Speaker 2: themselves or steal the identity of a legitimate trucking company

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Speaker 2: or a logistics company. And so how do people protect

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Speaker 2: themselves from this? Is there certain things that you should

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Speaker 2: look for? Is there certain things that that are not

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Speaker 2: being done?

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Speaker 3: Well?

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Speaker 4: I think you know, a big part of it, just

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Speaker 4: in general is awareness. So one of the reasons why

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Speaker 4: I appreciate you giving me a chance to come talk

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Speaker 4: about this.

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Speaker 3: You know, you don't have to take my word for this.

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Speaker 4: You can go out and find copious examples of this

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Speaker 4: and reported in the media of all different kinds of

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Speaker 4: you know, identity theft and these sorts of hacks and

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Speaker 4: account takeovers and so forth. You can also go to

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Speaker 4: sites like the FTC, FTC dot gov, FBI dot gov,

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Speaker 4: the FBIS, Internet Crime Complaint Center IC three dot gov, Indigo,

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Speaker 4: Charlie number three dot gov. You know, they're replete with

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Speaker 4: examples of what to look out for, how to protect

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Speaker 4: yourself against this stuff.

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Speaker 3: But you know the first step is awareness.

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Speaker 4: Awareness that just because something looks legit doesn't mean that

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Speaker 4: it is. Awareness that it's easy for bad guys to

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Speaker 4: spoof things, right, to create complete goppelganger websites, to go

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Speaker 4: to like seven hundred wlw's website, copy the whole thing,

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Speaker 4: set it up on another server and maybe change the

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Speaker 4: zeros and seven hundred to the upper case letter O.

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Speaker 4: Is the average person going to notice that? Probably not so.

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Speaker 4: You know, once you have some awareness, then it's having.

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Speaker 3: A healthy dose of skepticism.

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Speaker 4: If you're suddenly asked to do something unusual, especially if

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Speaker 4: it's of a financial nature, you should stop, take a

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Speaker 4: breath and do what we nerds like to call go

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Speaker 4: out of band to verify it. You know, if it's

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Speaker 4: your bank, for example, like you mentioned the bank example before.

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Speaker 3: If you get I'll tell you a quick story.

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Speaker 4: And you'll see how this ties. And I'm sitting on

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Speaker 4: the couch with my wife. She gets a text claiming

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Speaker 4: from USAA, that's our bank, that there's fraud on our account. So,

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Speaker 4: you know, she looks at it. There's a number there

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Speaker 4: for her to call. She calls the number. I can

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Speaker 4: guarantee that call went to like a boiler room in

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Speaker 4: some third world country where they have a room full

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Speaker 4: of people con artists waiting to take that call. Okay,

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Speaker 4: she calls, all this fraud on your account, I'm going

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Speaker 4: to need this, that and the other.

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Speaker 3: And I'm listening to this, I'm like, this is a

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Speaker 3: scam hanger, you know.

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Speaker 4: So in a scenario like that, you know, we went,

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Speaker 4: we logged into our USA account using our normal procedure,

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Speaker 4: and of course there was no fraud. So it's it's

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Speaker 4: being skeptical. Your bank does not need your password, Your

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Speaker 4: bank does not need your bank account information. They already

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Speaker 4: know all that. They can reset your password. So when

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Speaker 4: you're being asked to do something unusual, when you're being

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Speaker 4: pressured at something like, oh, there's fraud on your account,

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Speaker 4: we need to transfer your money to a safe account,

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Speaker 4: you know, anything like that ninety nine point.

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Speaker 3: Repeating scam.

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Speaker 4: Stop hang up, and you then go log into your

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Speaker 4: bank using your app or your with the normal website

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Speaker 4: that you use, get out your bank statement, get out

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Speaker 4: your credit card. Call the number that's published on there.

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Speaker 4: Any number can be.

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Speaker 3: Spoofed, you know when you when you.

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Speaker 4: Call, you're going to get a human being on that

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Speaker 4: phone who is there to con you.

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Speaker 3: They will tell you any lie.

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Speaker 4: They may have information about you stolen from one of

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Speaker 4: these data breaches to make it seem more realistic, right,

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Speaker 4: so they'll know certain things that will give them a

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Speaker 4: sense of legitimacy and create a feeling that, you know,

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Speaker 4: they are an authority and you should do what they say.

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Speaker 3: You know.

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Speaker 4: Lookal law enforcement has reported on this sort of thing extensively.

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Speaker 4: Where you get a call from like the Hamlin County

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Speaker 4: Sheriff's office telling you to do X, Y or Z.

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Speaker 4: They've gone to the Hamlin County Sheriff's website, They've looked

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Speaker 4: up Deputy such and such as name. They'll say, i'm

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Speaker 4: this person again. These are not people sitting in their

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Speaker 4: mom's basement eating pizza and drinking mountain dew. You know

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Speaker 4: these are criminal con artists who will steal your money

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Speaker 4: if you make it easy for him. So again, it's stop,

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Speaker 4: take a breath, hang up. If it's important and it's real,

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Speaker 4: they'll call you back and go out of band and

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Speaker 4: verify on your own any especially if it's financial.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly.

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Speaker 2: My guest is Dave Hatter, Dave Cincinnati's top cybersecurity pro.

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Speaker 2: I would say, in the region's top side, the security

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Speaker 2: pro will pick this up.

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Speaker 1: Coming up.

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Speaker 2: I'm Kevin Gordon, America struck in Network seven hundred WLW.

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Speaker 5: Here's your trucking forecast for the Try State and the

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Speaker 5: rest of the country and the Tri Sate. Over night,

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Speaker 5: cloudy sky is gradually becoming partly cloudy. Be low down

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Speaker 5: to twenty seven, mostly claudy early for your Thanksgiving Day,

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Speaker 5: then gradually becoming sunny. A high of thirty eight sunny Friday,

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00:20:19,600 --> 00:20:22,200
Speaker 5: highs in the mid thirties, mostly claudy. Saturday, with the

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Speaker 5: chants of afternoon snow a high of thirty nine, chants

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Speaker 5: of early rained Sunday, otherwise cloudy a high of forty one.

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Speaker 5: Nationally heavy like effects snow expected downwind to the Great

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Speaker 5: Lakes region through the rest of the week and through

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Speaker 5: Thanksgiving Day. Blizzard like conditions seen along the south shore

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Speaker 5: of Lake Superior. Cold weather scene across the central and

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Speaker 5: eastern US. Meanwhile, in the Pacific Northwest, day storm system

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Speaker 5: bringing locally heavy rainfalls to the coastal ranges of western

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Speaker 5: Washington State and Oregon, with locally heavy snow fall across

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Speaker 5: the Cascades in Washington State and eventually moving into the

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Speaker 5: Northern Rockies and Northern High Plains through Friday.

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Speaker 2: I'm Kevin Gordon, America's truck in Network seven hundred WLW

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00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:09,879
Speaker 2: continue our conversation with Dave Hatter, Cincinnati's top cybersecurity pro

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Speaker 2: and again, I think I keep emphasizing. I think he's

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Speaker 2: actually he's probably one of the best in the country.

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Speaker 2: I have not I've heard a lot of people talk

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Speaker 2: about these things, Dave in the past. I've heard them

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Speaker 2: on these national shows, and they don't have near the

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Speaker 2: amount of knowledge that you have. So again, thank you

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00:21:25,680 --> 00:21:27,440
Speaker 2: spending time with us certainly appreciated.

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Speaker 3: Well, it's my pleasure and I appreciate the compliment. Kevin.

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Speaker 3: Thank you.

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Speaker 2: We have been taking and it is so we can't

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Speaker 2: emphasize enough, how easy this is. I think one of

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Speaker 2: the stories that you had put out, because you are

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Speaker 2: putting out regular emails and stuff in terms of some

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Speaker 2: of these scams that are going on. And you had

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Speaker 2: a story from this new or post about a guy

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Speaker 2: who had gotten one of these phone calls and he

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Speaker 2: has to be switched and he started talking. It seemed

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Speaker 2: like he'd talked about four or five different people and

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Speaker 2: was tricked into giving them whatever information that they could drain.

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Speaker 1: His bank account.

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Speaker 2: And you know, the simple thing that I think you've

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Speaker 2: talked about before is that the simple thing you can

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Speaker 2: do is that if you get a phone call like this,

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Speaker 2: go to your page, go to your account, see if

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Speaker 2: there's been anything going on with that. And you've got

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Speaker 2: the phone number on the back of your card, your

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Speaker 2: credit card or whatever.

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Speaker 1: You can check it that way as well.

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Speaker 2: I mean, hang up the phone from the person and

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Speaker 2: then call the bank legitimately to find out if this

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Speaker 2: is a is a scam or not. And nine times

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Speaker 2: out of ten, as you said, ninety nine percent of

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Speaker 2: the time it is a scam. And those are very simple,

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Speaker 2: easy tips that people don't follow but are extremely important.

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Speaker 3: Yes they are.

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00:22:48,119 --> 00:22:51,040
Speaker 4: And again and just such a healthy dose of skepticism

435
00:22:51,240 --> 00:22:53,760
Speaker 4: will make you way ahead of the pack. And these

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00:22:53,840 --> 00:22:57,080
Speaker 4: says when you understand that, And again, Kevin, do you

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00:22:57,080 --> 00:22:58,720
Speaker 4: don't have to take my word for it. Go see

438
00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:01,440
Speaker 4: what the FBI says about Go see what DHS says

439
00:23:01,880 --> 00:23:06,480
Speaker 4: SIS of the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency, Microsoft Google, They'll

440
00:23:06,520 --> 00:23:08,800
Speaker 4: all basically tell you the same types of things you

441
00:23:08,840 --> 00:23:10,560
Speaker 4: know when you look at like the top five things

442
00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:13,320
Speaker 4: you can do to protect yourself. Education and awareness about

443
00:23:13,320 --> 00:23:15,600
Speaker 4: what's going on out there, which, by the way, there

444
00:23:15,600 --> 00:23:18,480
Speaker 4: are lots of free sites. Internet Crime Complaints Center from

445
00:23:18,480 --> 00:23:20,680
Speaker 4: the FBI, IC three dot gov is a good one,

446
00:23:21,160 --> 00:23:23,440
Speaker 4: as well as tips from Microsoft, Google.

447
00:23:23,119 --> 00:23:25,800
Speaker 3: And plenty of people out there who will give you.

448
00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:30,440
Speaker 4: Free advice on this education, awareness, skepticism. It's so easy

449
00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:32,400
Speaker 4: to create something that looks legitimate.

450
00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:35,440
Speaker 3: It's so trivially easy. And I get if you.

451
00:23:35,359 --> 00:23:37,520
Speaker 4: Don't work in tech, if you're not familiar with how

452
00:23:37,560 --> 00:23:41,240
Speaker 4: these things work, it seems probably far fetched that someone

453
00:23:41,240 --> 00:23:43,440
Speaker 4: could send an email that looks like it came from you.

454
00:23:43,920 --> 00:23:46,119
Speaker 4: But this is really really easy to do, or to

455
00:23:46,119 --> 00:23:47,879
Speaker 4: make a phone call that comes from any numbers. So

456
00:23:47,920 --> 00:23:52,680
Speaker 4: if you're aware how easy the spoofing angle is, then it's.

457
00:23:52,520 --> 00:23:54,600
Speaker 3: Easy to be more skeptical. You know, one piece of.

458
00:23:54,560 --> 00:23:56,920
Speaker 4: Advice I give to people all the time is if

459
00:23:56,920 --> 00:23:59,119
Speaker 4: you get call from a number you don't recognize, do

460
00:23:59,240 --> 00:24:02,560
Speaker 4: not answer the phone. If it's important, they'll leave a message,

461
00:24:02,680 --> 00:24:03,400
Speaker 4: or they'll call you.

462
00:24:03,359 --> 00:24:07,760
Speaker 3: Back right again, because it's easier, number.

463
00:24:08,040 --> 00:24:11,080
Speaker 2: Dave had or we are so geared to answering our

464
00:24:11,200 --> 00:24:15,000
Speaker 2: phone because generally, you know, and a lot of times

465
00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:17,600
Speaker 2: what this happens is is that if you have been

466
00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:19,760
Speaker 2: making a lot of phone calls like I do, to

467
00:24:19,800 --> 00:24:22,280
Speaker 2: try to get up guests or something along those lines,

468
00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:24,560
Speaker 2: or you're making these phone calls, and if you happen

469
00:24:24,600 --> 00:24:28,679
Speaker 2: to get a phone number from that area code that

470
00:24:28,720 --> 00:24:31,840
Speaker 2: you've been calling, that makes it even more difficult. But again,

471
00:24:31,920 --> 00:24:34,000
Speaker 2: if you don't recognize the phone number, it's a very

472
00:24:34,040 --> 00:24:37,000
Speaker 2: good idea not to answer the phone. And as you say,

473
00:24:37,080 --> 00:24:40,560
Speaker 2: if they do not, if it's important, they'll leave a message.

474
00:24:40,640 --> 00:24:42,520
Speaker 1: So that can't be emphasized enough.

475
00:24:43,040 --> 00:24:45,280
Speaker 4: And I just want to point out again, Kevin, you know, Stephen,

476
00:24:45,359 --> 00:24:48,240
Speaker 4: an area code, I could be in India or anywhere

477
00:24:48,240 --> 00:24:50,320
Speaker 4: in the world and make a phone call to your

478
00:24:50,359 --> 00:24:52,440
Speaker 4: phone that looks like it came from five hund three

479
00:24:52,480 --> 00:24:53,600
Speaker 4: area or anywhere I.

480
00:24:53,560 --> 00:24:53,960
Speaker 3: Wanted to do.

481
00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:58,000
Speaker 4: If I managed to find a data breach that has

482
00:24:58,160 --> 00:25:00,480
Speaker 4: information that tells me you bank with a certain bank,

483
00:25:00,960 --> 00:25:03,200
Speaker 4: I can go to their website, look up that phone

484
00:25:03,280 --> 00:25:06,240
Speaker 4: number off their website, and make a call or send

485
00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:08,000
Speaker 4: a text to you that appears.

486
00:25:07,640 --> 00:25:08,840
Speaker 3: To have come from that number.

487
00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:12,360
Speaker 4: So if it's if it's well done spoofing, that makes

488
00:25:12,400 --> 00:25:14,480
Speaker 4: it even more difficult, because I'm saying, don't answer a

489
00:25:14,480 --> 00:25:17,239
Speaker 4: call from whenever you don't recognize, but understand, even if

490
00:25:17,280 --> 00:25:20,000
Speaker 4: you recognize the number, that does not tell you that

491
00:25:20,080 --> 00:25:22,880
Speaker 4: it is coming from that legitimate number. Now there's there's

492
00:25:22,880 --> 00:25:25,320
Speaker 4: some steps in place to hopefully knock some of this

493
00:25:25,359 --> 00:25:28,280
Speaker 4: stuff down. But you know, this spoofing problem has been

494
00:25:28,280 --> 00:25:30,439
Speaker 4: a problem for a long time, and it's one of

495
00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:33,080
Speaker 4: the reasons why these bad guys, who are in many

496
00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:36,560
Speaker 4: cases professional con artists who are reaching you through technology,

497
00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:41,320
Speaker 4: social media, email, text, voice, etc. Are successful because the

498
00:25:41,359 --> 00:25:44,200
Speaker 4: average person doesn't realize how easy it is to spoof something.

499
00:25:44,240 --> 00:25:47,840
Speaker 4: And now, thanks to AI, you know to create perfect

500
00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:51,320
Speaker 4: English pros that doesn't have the bad grammar, bad spelling,

501
00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:53,960
Speaker 4: bad punctuation, all the weird things that in the old

502
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:56,680
Speaker 4: days would be flags. And I'll take it a step further, Kevin,

503
00:25:56,720 --> 00:25:59,200
Speaker 4: because this is something people really need to understand.

504
00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:03,640
Speaker 3: Fake voice cloning is a real thing. It is entirely possible,

505
00:26:03,640 --> 00:26:04,600
Speaker 3: and I have actually.

506
00:26:04,400 --> 00:26:08,520
Speaker 4: Demonstrated it in interviews on TV where you can close

507
00:26:08,560 --> 00:26:12,360
Speaker 4: someone's voice. Just recently did an interview with Steve Levine

508
00:26:12,359 --> 00:26:15,679
Speaker 4: from ABC six up in Columbus where we called his

509
00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:18,280
Speaker 4: phone because people sitting me, well, Kevin, I'm not a celebrity,

510
00:26:18,280 --> 00:26:20,119
Speaker 4: I'm not on the radio. How would you get my

511
00:26:20,200 --> 00:26:22,680
Speaker 4: voice if I call your phone? Do you have a

512
00:26:22,760 --> 00:26:25,639
Speaker 4: voicemail greeting? Because if you do, I can be you

513
00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:27,760
Speaker 4: in less than fifteen minutes using a free tool. And

514
00:26:27,760 --> 00:26:30,080
Speaker 4: Steve and I demonstrated that we called his voice, you

515
00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:33,760
Speaker 4: call his phone, got his voicemail, we recorded it, and

516
00:26:33,800 --> 00:26:36,639
Speaker 4: then we fed that into a deep fake voice cloning tool.

517
00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:39,600
Speaker 4: And you can watch in the interview me typing on

518
00:26:39,600 --> 00:26:41,960
Speaker 4: my keyboarding, hitting the button and Steve's voice coming out

519
00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:46,239
Speaker 4: of my speakers. So it's it's a real thing. And

520
00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:49,040
Speaker 4: so you know, as a family, it's a good idea

521
00:26:49,080 --> 00:26:50,560
Speaker 4: to have some sort of secret phrase.

522
00:26:50,600 --> 00:26:52,720
Speaker 3: So when you get a call three o'clock in the morning.

523
00:26:52,480 --> 00:26:55,960
Speaker 4: Telling you, hey, this is you know, this is little Jimmy, Dad,

524
00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:57,920
Speaker 4: I'm in jail. I need you to get gift cards

525
00:26:58,160 --> 00:27:00,840
Speaker 4: or whatever sort of scam they run on you. You know,

526
00:27:00,960 --> 00:27:03,560
Speaker 4: they got little Jimmy's voice out the social media or

527
00:27:03,560 --> 00:27:05,639
Speaker 4: office phone or wherever else.

528
00:27:06,200 --> 00:27:06,399
Speaker 3: You know.

529
00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:09,680
Speaker 4: A again, awareness that if you get a call like that,

530
00:27:09,800 --> 00:27:12,960
Speaker 4: and a strong red flag for voice cloning is there's

531
00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:16,520
Speaker 4: a long pause between what you say and a response,

532
00:27:16,880 --> 00:27:20,879
Speaker 4: and that's exactly typing what they want the computer to

533
00:27:20,880 --> 00:27:21,959
Speaker 4: say exactly so.

534
00:27:22,080 --> 00:27:22,680
Speaker 3: But it's real.

535
00:27:22,880 --> 00:27:27,160
Speaker 4: It's absolutely real, Kevin, and again, awareness skepticism, stop, take

536
00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:29,400
Speaker 4: a breath, and then go out of band. If I'm

537
00:27:29,400 --> 00:27:31,920
Speaker 4: going to kind of shriff calls and says, hey, little

538
00:27:32,000 --> 00:27:35,040
Speaker 4: Jimmy's in jail. Here's little Jimmy. You know, hang up

539
00:27:35,080 --> 00:27:37,520
Speaker 4: and call them back. Hang up and call them back

540
00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:39,000
Speaker 4: on the number that you can.

541
00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:41,160
Speaker 1: Verify, you know, exactly now.

542
00:27:41,800 --> 00:27:45,640
Speaker 2: And pointing this more towards the trucking industry again, it's

543
00:27:45,680 --> 00:27:49,199
Speaker 2: important because of the fact that these companies can clone.

544
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:53,280
Speaker 2: These companies pan clone an invoice and show up to pick.

545
00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:57,160
Speaker 1: Up a load. The verification process needs to be put

546
00:27:57,200 --> 00:27:57,639
Speaker 1: in place.

547
00:27:57,720 --> 00:28:00,680
Speaker 2: You know a little bit of human technology in terms

548
00:28:00,720 --> 00:28:03,480
Speaker 2: of even the cyber technology to find out that this

549
00:28:03,600 --> 00:28:07,119
Speaker 2: is being done. They talk about how the double brokering,

550
00:28:07,960 --> 00:28:12,240
Speaker 2: the fact that some of these companies are talking about

551
00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:15,680
Speaker 2: how first the thieves will steal a business identity, They

552
00:28:15,720 --> 00:28:20,159
Speaker 2: trick shippers into handing over entire container loads simply because

553
00:28:20,200 --> 00:28:22,919
Speaker 2: they can type up a manifest and come up and

554
00:28:22,920 --> 00:28:25,960
Speaker 2: pick that up. And then sometimes they will broker that

555
00:28:26,119 --> 00:28:29,760
Speaker 2: out to a legitimate company or a legitimate trucker that

556
00:28:29,920 --> 00:28:32,879
Speaker 2: is unaware that this is not a legitimate broker that

557
00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:35,439
Speaker 2: they're dealing with. They'll pick up the load and deliver it,

558
00:28:35,840 --> 00:28:38,240
Speaker 2: and then of course the money is stolen or the

559
00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:40,680
Speaker 2: load is stolen, they don't get paid for it. The

560
00:28:40,720 --> 00:28:44,760
Speaker 2: product has been stolen, which again it's necessary to verify

561
00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:48,000
Speaker 2: these things. Make sure that you're dealing with the proper company,

562
00:28:48,320 --> 00:28:51,640
Speaker 2: that it's a company you know you can verify, call

563
00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:55,120
Speaker 2: their phone number, and so on. And what's even more

564
00:28:55,160 --> 00:28:57,120
Speaker 2: amazing is that as I was reading through some of

565
00:28:57,160 --> 00:29:00,200
Speaker 2: these stories, they were talking about in terms of hey,

566
00:29:00,320 --> 00:29:04,120
Speaker 2: you know, put a lock on your truck, make sure

567
00:29:04,160 --> 00:29:07,120
Speaker 2: that you control the access in and out of your warehouse,

568
00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:09,520
Speaker 2: that somebody just can't have you know, people just can't

569
00:29:09,520 --> 00:29:12,080
Speaker 2: in walk in off the street. Make sure that there's

570
00:29:12,120 --> 00:29:14,640
Speaker 2: security codes on the building that people are picking up,

571
00:29:15,080 --> 00:29:18,240
Speaker 2: just minor types of things that would cut a lot

572
00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:20,760
Speaker 2: of this theft down completely.

573
00:29:21,000 --> 00:29:24,880
Speaker 1: Now. Is it too expensive now?

574
00:29:25,040 --> 00:29:28,480
Speaker 2: Or is it the technology getting better to where somebody

575
00:29:28,520 --> 00:29:31,280
Speaker 2: could actually because I don't know if you saw the

576
00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:35,120
Speaker 2: article about Guy Fieri. Guy Fieri has he had a

577
00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:38,200
Speaker 2: shipment of tequila that was stolen, about a million dollars

578
00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:40,880
Speaker 2: worth of that, and it was a kind of a

579
00:29:40,920 --> 00:29:44,680
Speaker 2: clever scam. They actually broke in the job to another firm,

580
00:29:44,720 --> 00:29:47,520
Speaker 2: which turned out to be fictitious. The imposter carrier carried

581
00:29:47,560 --> 00:29:51,280
Speaker 2: forged documents, phony email accounts, and fake phone numbers. But

582
00:29:51,400 --> 00:29:53,880
Speaker 2: then when the thieves took off, they were trying to

583
00:29:53,920 --> 00:29:56,480
Speaker 2: track this over the period and they were able to

584
00:29:56,480 --> 00:29:59,040
Speaker 2: fake the GPS and stuff. Is it getting to a

585
00:29:59,080 --> 00:30:02,000
Speaker 2: point now where you can actually put it like a

586
00:30:02,120 --> 00:30:05,760
Speaker 2: tracker on some of these the loads, so that you

587
00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:09,360
Speaker 2: know exactly where it is as opposed to just all right,

588
00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:12,120
Speaker 2: it's supposed to go to Phoenix, and yeah.

589
00:30:11,840 --> 00:30:13,880
Speaker 4: You could, you could, I mean think about something like

590
00:30:13,920 --> 00:30:16,480
Speaker 4: an Apple air tag, right, I mean, that's a relative

591
00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:20,120
Speaker 4: compared to a million dollar loss buying a bunch of

592
00:30:20,160 --> 00:30:22,920
Speaker 4: Apple air tags or other more industrial type devices that

593
00:30:22,960 --> 00:30:25,400
Speaker 4: you could affix to a palette or something to do

594
00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:26,440
Speaker 4: some additional tracking.

595
00:30:26,480 --> 00:30:27,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, that's.

596
00:30:27,360 --> 00:30:29,800
Speaker 4: All well within the realm of possibility. And my guess

597
00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:32,640
Speaker 4: is because of these sort of the fs, you'll see

598
00:30:32,920 --> 00:30:34,240
Speaker 4: more of that type of thing.

599
00:30:34,280 --> 00:30:35,680
Speaker 3: And I know with that the Guy.

600
00:30:35,520 --> 00:30:39,040
Speaker 4: Fierti tequila story, like this stuff, and then the whiskey

601
00:30:39,080 --> 00:30:41,080
Speaker 4: stories something like it's I think it'll be hard for

602
00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:43,720
Speaker 4: them to unload that because it's high profile.

603
00:30:44,320 --> 00:30:45,520
Speaker 3: But it just goes to show you.

604
00:30:45,520 --> 00:30:47,760
Speaker 4: You know, if you're a criminal and you could set

605
00:30:47,800 --> 00:30:50,600
Speaker 4: up a shell company and create a fake website and

606
00:30:50,640 --> 00:30:53,400
Speaker 4: fake email addresses and fake phone numbers, all of which

607
00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:57,280
Speaker 4: are very trivially easy to do, and you could steal

608
00:30:57,320 --> 00:30:58,120
Speaker 4: a million dollars.

609
00:30:58,440 --> 00:31:00,480
Speaker 3: And let's let's see it took you a way, Kevin.

610
00:31:00,560 --> 00:31:02,280
Speaker 4: Let's say he took a week of setting out the

611
00:31:02,320 --> 00:31:05,640
Speaker 4: stuff right and creating the fake emails and all that stuff.

612
00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:07,560
Speaker 4: And you know, if you could make a million dollars

613
00:31:07,600 --> 00:31:09,480
Speaker 4: a week in theft, you'd be doing pretty good, you know,

614
00:31:09,560 --> 00:31:13,040
Speaker 4: I'd I'd say so, Yeah, by my math, at three

615
00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:15,480
Speaker 4: hundred and sixty five or fifty two weeks a year,

616
00:31:15,520 --> 00:31:16,840
Speaker 4: that's fifty two million.

617
00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:18,320
Speaker 3: Dollars a year. You're you're doing pretty good.

618
00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:20,280
Speaker 1: Not a bad payday, Dave.

619
00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:22,680
Speaker 2: I think that's all I can say is I am

620
00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:24,640
Speaker 2: sure glad that you're on the right side of the

621
00:31:24,720 --> 00:31:26,800
Speaker 2: law and not the wrong side of the law, because

622
00:31:26,880 --> 00:31:29,240
Speaker 2: I think you could probably come up with a pretty

623
00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:32,080
Speaker 2: couple of pretty good schemes in order to scam some

624
00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:33,440
Speaker 2: people big time.

625
00:31:33,840 --> 00:31:37,880
Speaker 4: So well, I'm out here trying to help people prevent

626
00:31:37,920 --> 00:31:40,600
Speaker 4: these sort of things and protect themselves because it's become

627
00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:44,600
Speaker 4: as we become increasingly reliant on this digital technology, there

628
00:31:44,680 --> 00:31:47,640
Speaker 4: is just an ever increasing number of opportunities for the

629
00:31:47,680 --> 00:31:51,080
Speaker 4: bad guys to scam you, and you just youve got

630
00:31:51,080 --> 00:31:54,760
Speaker 4: to be skeptical and move cautiously exactly.

631
00:31:55,040 --> 00:31:56,880
Speaker 2: Well, Dave Hatter, it's been a pleasure we got to

632
00:31:56,880 --> 00:31:59,720
Speaker 2: have you on again, because this is there's always just

633
00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:02,280
Speaker 2: way too much information to get in a couple of

634
00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:04,880
Speaker 2: segments because of all the things going on out there.

635
00:32:04,920 --> 00:32:07,480
Speaker 2: I certainly appreciate your time. Hope you and your family

636
00:32:07,520 --> 00:32:09,680
Speaker 2: have a happy Thanksgiving and enjoyable time.

637
00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:12,600
Speaker 4: Well, thanks for having me on, Kevin, I'm happy to

638
00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:14,400
Speaker 4: come on anytime and they I hope you and your

639
00:32:14,440 --> 00:32:16,480
Speaker 4: family and all your listeners have a happy Thanksgiving too.

640
00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:22,000
Speaker 2: Absolutely, Kevin Gordon, my guest Dave Hadter, Cincinnati's top cybersecurity

641
00:32:22,040 --> 00:32:26,800
Speaker 2: pro I'm Kevin Gordon. America's struck a Network seven hundred WLW.

642
00:32:29,480 --> 00:32:33,719
Speaker 2: This is america'struck a Network seven one hundred WLW.

643
00:32:34,200 --> 00:32:35,200
Speaker 1: Doobless claims.

644
00:32:35,360 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 2: We've got some interesting economic data here actually yesterday, going

645
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:43,360
Speaker 2: into the holiday season. Usually some of these numbers aren't

646
00:32:43,360 --> 00:32:45,440
Speaker 2: supposed to come out until Thursday, but they came out

647
00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:49,960
Speaker 2: a day early because of the Thanksgiving holiday today, and

648
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:54,840
Speaker 2: so well they're just published early. Our jobless claims drop

649
00:32:55,160 --> 00:32:58,760
Speaker 2: to the lowest level since April. A US initial job

650
00:32:58,840 --> 00:33:01,360
Speaker 2: is claims fell by six one thousand to two hundred

651
00:33:01,400 --> 00:33:04,760
Speaker 2: and sixteen thousand for the week, and in November twenty second,

652
00:33:05,240 --> 00:33:09,840
Speaker 2: the lowest level since April. All this stuff that we

653
00:33:09,960 --> 00:33:13,719
Speaker 2: keep hearing about the economy that jobs are you know,

654
00:33:14,360 --> 00:33:17,160
Speaker 2: the job market is not as strong as it should

655
00:33:17,240 --> 00:33:20,120
Speaker 2: be the fact that there are very few companies or

656
00:33:20,240 --> 00:33:23,000
Speaker 2: very few layoffs is indicating in these jobs.

657
00:33:23,040 --> 00:33:26,800
Speaker 1: The lowest level of layoffs or.

658
00:33:26,880 --> 00:33:33,600
Speaker 2: Unemployment initial jobless claims since mid April. That is absolutely phenomenal.

659
00:33:33,800 --> 00:33:36,880
Speaker 2: At two hundred and sixteen thousand. The prediction had been

660
00:33:36,920 --> 00:33:38,600
Speaker 2: that there were going to be two hundred and twenty

661
00:33:38,640 --> 00:33:42,640
Speaker 2: five thousand jobless claims for that particular week, which meant

662
00:33:42,680 --> 00:33:45,280
Speaker 2: that the so called experts that predicted this were off

663
00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:48,120
Speaker 2: by four percent. Now four percent isn't a lot, but

664
00:33:48,200 --> 00:33:51,720
Speaker 2: it's still when you're talking about individual jobless claims as

665
00:33:51,720 --> 00:33:54,840
Speaker 2: far as where those numbers go. Now, we have talked

666
00:33:54,840 --> 00:33:57,680
Speaker 2: about on this program how these jobless claims have been

667
00:33:57,840 --> 00:33:59,920
Speaker 2: in that range and where people are saying it the

668
00:34:00,080 --> 00:34:02,480
Speaker 2: low end of that range around two hundred and ten

669
00:34:02,560 --> 00:34:06,680
Speaker 2: thousand up to two hundred and fifty thousand. But within

670
00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:09,799
Speaker 2: that range is where these job with claims have been

671
00:34:09,880 --> 00:34:12,880
Speaker 2: for a number of months and even I think almost

672
00:34:12,920 --> 00:34:17,520
Speaker 2: a year now. So nothing Again, we're back to what

673
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:21,320
Speaker 2: we've talked about numerous times on this program that companies

674
00:34:21,320 --> 00:34:25,120
Speaker 2: are in a no hire, no fire situation where they

675
00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:28,360
Speaker 2: want to hold on to their employees, thinking or hoping

676
00:34:28,760 --> 00:34:31,560
Speaker 2: that things will bounce back or things that are coming

677
00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:35,680
Speaker 2: will peak and things will grow. And I keep saying

678
00:34:35,880 --> 00:34:39,440
Speaker 2: that the thing that it's In my opinion, the thing

679
00:34:39,520 --> 00:34:43,240
Speaker 2: that's holding back our economy are the high interest rates.

680
00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:48,680
Speaker 2: People are reluctant to buy new equipment, expand their business,

681
00:34:49,040 --> 00:34:52,480
Speaker 2: buy a new piece of machinery or something along those lines,

682
00:34:52,800 --> 00:34:57,240
Speaker 2: because they're unsure as to well as far as interest

683
00:34:57,320 --> 00:34:59,359
Speaker 2: rates are concerned. They're looking at the cost of that

684
00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,360
Speaker 2: saying that my return on investment isn't going to be

685
00:35:02,400 --> 00:35:04,880
Speaker 2: what I think it's going to be, and so therefore

686
00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:07,879
Speaker 2: I'm going to hold off, hoping that the interest rates

687
00:35:07,920 --> 00:35:11,680
Speaker 2: come down, hope that things change, or if business picks

688
00:35:11,719 --> 00:35:15,520
Speaker 2: up tremendously more than what it's been doing, then maybe

689
00:35:15,520 --> 00:35:17,320
Speaker 2: I just got to bite the bullet and go ahead

690
00:35:17,520 --> 00:35:20,480
Speaker 2: and expand the business. But these are the kinds of

691
00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:23,600
Speaker 2: things that businesses are paying attention to and figuring out

692
00:35:23,600 --> 00:35:26,600
Speaker 2: whether or not what they should do. Now they're talking

693
00:35:26,640 --> 00:35:30,280
Speaker 2: about here in terms of again that the figures employers

694
00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:34,080
Speaker 2: are still largely retaining current employees. They pulled back on

695
00:35:34,200 --> 00:35:36,960
Speaker 2: bringing on new hires, though they have been increasing the

696
00:35:37,040 --> 00:35:40,279
Speaker 2: number of job cut announcements. By lord, we have seen

697
00:35:40,320 --> 00:35:44,120
Speaker 2: these job cut announcements. However, they haven't taken effect yet.

698
00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:48,640
Speaker 2: And you know, they can announce these job cuts like

699
00:35:48,800 --> 00:35:53,120
Speaker 2: Amazon have been making comments that they're going to be

700
00:35:53,200 --> 00:35:55,399
Speaker 2: laying off a lot of their workforce, which is kind

701
00:35:55,440 --> 00:35:58,160
Speaker 2: of interesting because all of the jobs that we have

702
00:35:58,239 --> 00:36:01,560
Speaker 2: been seeing, or they've been talking about tech jobs, well,

703
00:36:01,600 --> 00:36:05,319
Speaker 2: AI apparently is coming in and replacing some of the

704
00:36:05,320 --> 00:36:07,880
Speaker 2: people that are in these tech jobs, and they're looking

705
00:36:07,920 --> 00:36:09,680
Speaker 2: around and saying, well, gee whiz, I don't think we

706
00:36:09,719 --> 00:36:12,319
Speaker 2: need this many people, but it'll be interesting to see

707
00:36:12,360 --> 00:36:14,800
Speaker 2: because you know, I've been seeing a lot of stuff

708
00:36:14,840 --> 00:36:18,560
Speaker 2: as far as AI where people are starting to think

709
00:36:18,600 --> 00:36:22,319
Speaker 2: that this isn't the you know, this isn't quite as

710
00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:25,160
Speaker 2: ready for prime time as everybody would like to think.

711
00:36:25,360 --> 00:36:30,080
Speaker 2: There are still some hitches in that and not quite

712
00:36:30,360 --> 00:36:33,759
Speaker 2: completely trustworthy at this point, I guess, is what I'm

713
00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:37,440
Speaker 2: trying to say. Because again, it's a matter of somebody

714
00:36:37,560 --> 00:36:41,799
Speaker 2: is inputting these algorithms, somebody is developing these algorithms, and

715
00:36:41,960 --> 00:36:45,800
Speaker 2: if there's a miss, if there's something that's not done properly,

716
00:36:46,120 --> 00:36:49,000
Speaker 2: you're going to get a situation of garbage in, garbage out.

717
00:36:49,080 --> 00:36:53,480
Speaker 2: And so this rush to try to lower your number

718
00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:57,319
Speaker 2: of employees because of AI may wind up backfiring in

719
00:36:57,360 --> 00:37:00,279
Speaker 2: the end. So it's interesting that in the fact that

720
00:37:00,640 --> 00:37:04,000
Speaker 2: the headline, you know, one one headline said jobless claims

721
00:37:04,080 --> 00:37:08,080
Speaker 2: dropped to lowest level since April. Another jobless claims claims

722
00:37:08,120 --> 00:37:11,799
Speaker 2: that's seven month low, as layoffs remained low. Basically, it's

723
00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:14,960
Speaker 2: it's good news that they can't hide from they, you know,

724
00:37:15,080 --> 00:37:17,560
Speaker 2: when you're talking about a seven month low, that the

725
00:37:17,760 --> 00:37:22,839
Speaker 2: jobless the jobless claims unexpectedly fell last week. How many

726
00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:26,799
Speaker 2: times over the year have we heard unexpectedly to the

727
00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:32,760
Speaker 2: good side, retail sales unexpectedly high, home sales unexpectedly high,

728
00:37:33,239 --> 00:37:36,760
Speaker 2: unemployment unexpectedly low, all this sort of stuff.

729
00:37:37,040 --> 00:37:38,600
Speaker 1: It's just amazing that.

730
00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:40,960
Speaker 2: The so called experts are calling for certain things in

731
00:37:41,000 --> 00:37:44,520
Speaker 2: the economy that just aren't flat out happening. Another bit

732
00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:49,239
Speaker 2: of good news, capital goods have been reported. Although businesses

733
00:37:49,280 --> 00:37:54,120
Speaker 2: are reluctant to boost hiring, they are spending more on equipment,

734
00:37:54,560 --> 00:37:58,200
Speaker 2: underpinning the economy. A separate report from the Commerce Department

735
00:37:58,280 --> 00:38:05,040
Speaker 2: Census Bureau showed non defens capital goods orders excluding aircraft,

736
00:38:05,400 --> 00:38:10,200
Speaker 2: a closely watched proxy for business spending, jumped point nine

737
00:38:10,320 --> 00:38:14,840
Speaker 2: percent in September after an upwardly revised point nine percent

738
00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:16,440
Speaker 2: increase in August.

739
00:38:16,600 --> 00:38:17,800
Speaker 1: So back to back.

740
00:38:17,880 --> 00:38:21,920
Speaker 2: Months where usually we saw a point nine percent increase.

741
00:38:22,719 --> 00:38:25,680
Speaker 1: Now that may not seem like a nuts a lot.

742
00:38:25,760 --> 00:38:29,040
Speaker 2: But economists head forecast the so called core capital goods

743
00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:33,960
Speaker 2: orders rise point two percent. So they missed that by

744
00:38:35,360 --> 00:38:37,960
Speaker 2: what is that number? Probably I think something like, oh,

745
00:38:38,000 --> 00:38:41,839
Speaker 2: it's about three hundred, three hundred and fifty percent. They

746
00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:46,000
Speaker 2: blew that estimate. They expected a point two percent and

747
00:38:46,080 --> 00:38:52,120
Speaker 2: it came in at point nine percent unexpected again, unexpectedly high. Economists,

748
00:38:52,200 --> 00:38:55,040
Speaker 2: like I said, head forecast to these capital goods orders rising.

749
00:38:55,640 --> 00:38:59,480
Speaker 2: There were strong increases in orders for computers, electronic products,

750
00:38:59,640 --> 00:39:04,480
Speaker 2: electrical equipment, appliances and components, as well as transportation equipment

751
00:39:04,680 --> 00:39:09,800
Speaker 2: and primary metals, but orders for machinery barely rows. Again,

752
00:39:10,200 --> 00:39:15,640
Speaker 2: people that are in the manufacturing industry that as far

753
00:39:15,680 --> 00:39:20,000
Speaker 2: as machinery to build and to manufacture stuff, they are

754
00:39:20,040 --> 00:39:24,400
Speaker 2: again not investing or holding back hoping that interest rates

755
00:39:24,440 --> 00:39:28,960
Speaker 2: come down or that their amount of business justifies the

756
00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:32,800
Speaker 2: return on investment of having high interest rates, but biting

757
00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:35,920
Speaker 2: the bullet and buying that piece of equipment anyway, because

758
00:39:35,960 --> 00:39:40,440
Speaker 2: they have the necessary orders, the necessary products or orders

759
00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:43,840
Speaker 2: to fulfill in order to make that a make that

760
00:39:43,880 --> 00:39:47,920
Speaker 2: a worthwhile investment GDP. Now get this, okay, I'm going

761
00:39:48,000 --> 00:39:50,400
Speaker 2: to do a little bit of bragging here. You remember

762
00:39:50,480 --> 00:39:54,200
Speaker 2: back during the period of time, right during what they

763
00:39:54,239 --> 00:39:58,319
Speaker 2: called Liberation Day, back in April April the second, when

764
00:39:58,760 --> 00:40:01,439
Speaker 2: people were saying, oh, while the stock market went down

765
00:40:01,480 --> 00:40:04,600
Speaker 2: tremendously because the announcement of all these tariffs, people.

766
00:40:04,440 --> 00:40:05,959
Speaker 1: Were talking about the R word.

767
00:40:06,000 --> 00:40:09,200
Speaker 2: They were talking about a possibility of recession, talking about

768
00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:14,080
Speaker 2: negative growth, talking about the GDP going down, that there

769
00:40:14,160 --> 00:40:16,080
Speaker 2: wasn't going to be there were going to be, you know,

770
00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:18,719
Speaker 2: a lot of layoffs. There were going to be massive layoffs.

771
00:40:18,840 --> 00:40:21,719
Speaker 2: There was going to be rapidt inflation, and that was

772
00:40:21,719 --> 00:40:24,600
Speaker 2: going to push us into a recession. And they were

773
00:40:24,640 --> 00:40:27,200
Speaker 2: talking about, well, we don't expect by the end of

774
00:40:27,239 --> 00:40:30,719
Speaker 2: the year that GDP was going to be around. They

775
00:40:30,719 --> 00:40:33,280
Speaker 2: were predicting it to be about one point eight percent.

776
00:40:33,840 --> 00:40:36,799
Speaker 2: Back then, I was saying, by the end of the year,

777
00:40:37,280 --> 00:40:41,760
Speaker 2: I expected to see GDP somewhere between gross domestic product

778
00:40:42,000 --> 00:40:46,760
Speaker 2: somewhere between four point five percent and five percent by.

779
00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:47,359
Speaker 1: The end of the year.

780
00:40:47,640 --> 00:40:50,319
Speaker 2: And a lot of people around the office, around the

781
00:40:50,360 --> 00:40:53,480
Speaker 2: studio said, you know your little nuts there.

782
00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:54,120
Speaker 1: Well, the Atlanta.

783
00:40:54,920 --> 00:40:59,160
Speaker 2: Atlanta Federal Reserve is forecasting gross domestic product for the

784
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:04,239
Speaker 2: third quarter to increase at four percent annualized rate in

785
00:41:04,320 --> 00:41:07,920
Speaker 2: the July to September quarter. The delayed third quarter GDP

786
00:41:08,080 --> 00:41:11,120
Speaker 2: report will be released on December twenty third. The economy

787
00:41:11,120 --> 00:41:14,800
Speaker 2: grew at three point eight percent pace in the second quarter.

788
00:41:15,320 --> 00:41:18,799
Speaker 2: Orders for durable good items ranging from toasters to aircraft

789
00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:21,480
Speaker 2: meant that the three years or meant to last three

790
00:41:21,560 --> 00:41:26,000
Speaker 2: years and more rose point five percent. According to Christopher Roupki,

791
00:41:26,320 --> 00:41:30,520
Speaker 2: chief economists at Forward Bonds, one thing is certain and

792
00:41:30,600 --> 00:41:35,840
Speaker 2: that is is going to be a gigantic, gigantic quarter

793
00:41:36,160 --> 00:41:40,479
Speaker 2: for real GDP growth, although admittedly it's only a rear

794
00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:44,359
Speaker 2: view looking mirror looking back at the third quarter, which

795
00:41:44,480 --> 00:41:48,600
Speaker 2: was affected by the government shutdown. So if my prediction

796
00:41:48,840 --> 00:41:52,600
Speaker 2: doesn't come in at four point five percent or five

797
00:41:52,640 --> 00:41:56,240
Speaker 2: percent GDP growth somewhere between four point five, it's because

798
00:41:56,239 --> 00:41:59,600
Speaker 2: of the government shutdown. That was four was done by

799
00:41:59,640 --> 00:42:03,480
Speaker 2: the Democrats, the Shumer shut down. But again, very good news.

800
00:42:03,719 --> 00:42:06,680
Speaker 2: Four percent, right in line with what Kevin Gordon from

801
00:42:06,760 --> 00:42:10,560
Speaker 2: America's Truck and Network has been talking about. Well, folks,

802
00:42:11,040 --> 00:42:12,880
Speaker 2: enjoy the rest of the day. Enjoy the rest of

803
00:42:12,880 --> 00:42:16,319
Speaker 2: the weekend and and you know, just have a great time.

804
00:42:16,719 --> 00:42:19,080
Speaker 2: Don't eat well, I'm going to say don't eat too much,

805
00:42:19,120 --> 00:42:23,000
Speaker 2: but yeah, indulge. I'm Kevin Gordon, America's Truck and Network

806
00:42:23,080 --> 00:42:24,960
Speaker 2: seven hundred WLW