1 00:00:00,560 --> 00:00:03,360 Speaker 1: Good morning. I'm Scott Sloan. This is seven hundred wudwity. 2 00:00:03,360 --> 00:00:05,280 Speaker 2: Thanks for checking out the show on air and of 3 00:00:05,320 --> 00:00:08,319 Speaker 2: course streaming anywhere you go. Reportable these days in the 4 00:00:08,360 --> 00:00:11,399 Speaker 2: iHeartRadio app and you can catch the show afterwards too. 5 00:00:11,480 --> 00:00:14,320 Speaker 2: It's podcast will may get easy for it, Easy Easy Easy. 6 00:00:14,520 --> 00:00:19,000 Speaker 2: Today is an historic day because this landmark moment, this 7 00:00:19,040 --> 00:00:23,920 Speaker 2: tragedy occurred forty years ago today go up. 8 00:00:26,000 --> 00:00:32,400 Speaker 3: It happened just over one minute inch of flight one 9 00:00:32,400 --> 00:00:33,479 Speaker 3: a minute fifteen. 10 00:00:33,159 --> 00:00:35,720 Speaker 4: Seconds flan City, twenty nine hundred feet per second, altitude 11 00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:38,240 Speaker 4: nine aautical mileth downrange, just in the seven nautical. 12 00:00:38,000 --> 00:00:41,879 Speaker 1: Miles from mission control. 13 00:00:42,159 --> 00:00:45,880 Speaker 3: Silence, Then the bland chilling report. 14 00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:48,680 Speaker 4: We have a report from the flight dynamics officer that 15 00:00:48,720 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 4: the vehicle has exploded. Flight Director confirms that we are 16 00:00:52,360 --> 00:00:56,040 Speaker 4: looking at checking with the recovery forces to see what 17 00:00:56,120 --> 00:00:57,120 Speaker 4: can be done at this point. 18 00:00:57,480 --> 00:01:00,320 Speaker 3: A search effort couldn't begin for some fifteen minutes after 19 00:01:00,360 --> 00:01:03,320 Speaker 3: this debris, they said, just kept raining from the sky. 20 00:01:03,800 --> 00:01:06,440 Speaker 3: The head of the Space Shuttle program had no explanations, 21 00:01:06,760 --> 00:01:07,960 Speaker 3: just sorrow at the tragedy. 22 00:01:08,800 --> 00:01:10,639 Speaker 1: I vividly remember when that happened. 23 00:01:10,680 --> 00:01:12,559 Speaker 2: For a lot of folks it might have been school kids, 24 00:01:12,640 --> 00:01:14,480 Speaker 2: and still even more folks don't remember it because they 25 00:01:14,480 --> 00:01:17,840 Speaker 2: happened outside their lifespan. But I'll remember that like I 26 00:01:17,880 --> 00:01:20,640 Speaker 2: remember nine to eleven. And how do we get to 27 00:01:20,640 --> 00:01:22,360 Speaker 2: this point? We've got this great space race going out 28 00:01:22,400 --> 00:01:25,720 Speaker 2: right now, of course privately speaking, but everything we know 29 00:01:25,760 --> 00:01:28,200 Speaker 2: about space and how to get to outer space and 30 00:01:28,240 --> 00:01:31,560 Speaker 2: travel is written in blood. Writing about it in the 31 00:01:31,640 --> 00:01:35,119 Speaker 2: Burning Blue is Kevin Cook, Kevin, welcome to the show. 32 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:36,160 Speaker 1: I'm doing fine. 33 00:01:36,160 --> 00:01:38,160 Speaker 2: Hopefully I set that up well enough for you too, 34 00:01:38,200 --> 00:01:39,920 Speaker 2: tying those things together. But I think there's something to 35 00:01:39,959 --> 00:01:41,959 Speaker 2: be said about that, right, is that we're in the 36 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:45,240 Speaker 2: new space race, but it's private space race between ultra 37 00:01:45,319 --> 00:01:48,760 Speaker 2: the ultra rich. Doesn't mean they're gonna cut corners, but man, 38 00:01:48,880 --> 00:01:52,200 Speaker 2: you know, when you're competitive like this, these are the 39 00:01:52,240 --> 00:01:52,560 Speaker 2: things that. 40 00:01:52,560 --> 00:01:53,120 Speaker 1: Happen, right. 41 00:01:54,080 --> 00:01:56,360 Speaker 5: I think you set it up just right, and it's 42 00:01:56,360 --> 00:02:01,080 Speaker 5: an exciting time in space exploration. These are eventually going 43 00:02:01,120 --> 00:02:04,840 Speaker 5: to be public private partnerships. I think we'll see SpaceX 44 00:02:04,840 --> 00:02:08,959 Speaker 5: and NASA working together, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic and NASA 45 00:02:09,080 --> 00:02:13,800 Speaker 5: working together. We're gonna have Moon missions again, and in 46 00:02:14,400 --> 00:02:19,400 Speaker 5: before too many decades past a Mars mission with human 47 00:02:19,480 --> 00:02:22,480 Speaker 5: crew on it, and there is going to be schedule 48 00:02:22,520 --> 00:02:26,560 Speaker 5: pressure again, there are going to be engineer's warning, well, 49 00:02:26,600 --> 00:02:29,919 Speaker 5: I have concerns about this or that aspect of the machinery, 50 00:02:30,080 --> 00:02:36,040 Speaker 5: and again these things are going to crop up. There 51 00:02:36,120 --> 00:02:38,800 Speaker 5: is a program at NASA now called the Lessons Learned 52 00:02:38,880 --> 00:02:46,440 Speaker 5: program that encourages listeners to remember things like disasters like 53 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:49,640 Speaker 5: the Challenger accident, so that we don't have such a 54 00:02:49,639 --> 00:02:50,400 Speaker 5: thing happen again. 55 00:02:50,880 --> 00:02:53,639 Speaker 2: Well, and the lesson here coming out of the Burning 56 00:02:53,680 --> 00:02:58,200 Speaker 2: Blue and the Challenger disaster, is that why Krista mcculloffe 57 00:02:58,200 --> 00:02:59,960 Speaker 2: was on that flight to begin with. 58 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:05,520 Speaker 5: That's true. It had aspects of a publicity effort on 59 00:03:05,639 --> 00:03:10,600 Speaker 5: NASA's part. After Sally VI made worldwide news in nineteen 60 00:03:10,639 --> 00:03:14,360 Speaker 5: eighty three as the first American woman in space, Shuttle 61 00:03:14,400 --> 00:03:17,000 Speaker 5: flights came to seem routine, and NASA was eager to 62 00:03:17,040 --> 00:03:20,919 Speaker 5: have the teacher in space, the first civilian to fly 63 00:03:21,080 --> 00:03:25,320 Speaker 5: on a Shuttle mission. And Christa mccaulliffe, to her great credit, 64 00:03:25,400 --> 00:03:29,080 Speaker 5: I think understood that she was wonderful on television. She 65 00:03:29,200 --> 00:03:33,160 Speaker 5: was sincere, she was herself, but she had a purpose 66 00:03:33,240 --> 00:03:35,600 Speaker 5: to a cause. She didn't want to get famous. She 67 00:03:35,680 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 5: wanted to promote the cause of school teachers. She was 68 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:42,880 Speaker 5: an active school teacher, a great one. She felt that 69 00:03:43,240 --> 00:03:47,840 Speaker 5: teachers were overworked and underpaid. I think that's true even 70 00:03:47,920 --> 00:03:52,000 Speaker 5: more so today. So she inspired an awful lot of 71 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:54,600 Speaker 5: people to become teachers. I think that's one of the 72 00:03:54,640 --> 00:03:57,560 Speaker 5: things that we could take from a story like the 73 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:00,800 Speaker 5: Challenger disaster in nineteen eighty six. There are a lot 74 00:04:00,800 --> 00:04:05,320 Speaker 5: of teachers, dedicated teachers who followed her example, who are 75 00:04:05,320 --> 00:04:06,200 Speaker 5: still teaching today. 76 00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, I remember that moment. I think we all did it. 77 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:10,920 Speaker 2: If you're old enough too, or if you just go back. 78 00:04:10,960 --> 00:04:13,520 Speaker 2: It was an excellent documentary on this. I think it 79 00:04:13,560 --> 00:04:16,520 Speaker 2: was on Netflix or maybe HBO, but Netflix. It was 80 00:04:16,560 --> 00:04:20,000 Speaker 2: great about that whole story too, because, man, you remember 81 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:22,680 Speaker 2: what it was like being a little kid, and you 82 00:04:22,720 --> 00:04:24,520 Speaker 2: know everyone was following, here's a teacher. 83 00:04:24,560 --> 00:04:26,040 Speaker 1: I've got a teacher. It's like my teacher. 84 00:04:26,080 --> 00:04:29,000 Speaker 2: Right, you could identify as a kid with Krista mccauliffe 85 00:04:29,440 --> 00:04:32,520 Speaker 2: and every kid in America at that moment. That morning, 86 00:04:33,200 --> 00:04:36,240 Speaker 2: that cold morning, he sat there and watched it on 87 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:38,560 Speaker 2: TV when they rolled a big old you know, CRT 88 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:41,320 Speaker 2: two TV in the classroom and everyone's watching the Challenger 89 00:04:41,360 --> 00:04:43,360 Speaker 2: and where everyone clapped and was so excited, and then 90 00:04:44,000 --> 00:04:46,720 Speaker 2: there was a catastrophe, And you want to talk about 91 00:04:46,720 --> 00:04:49,960 Speaker 2: traumatic moment in your childhood, that's it right there. 92 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:53,640 Speaker 5: That's true. I've encountered so many people who remember exactly 93 00:04:53,640 --> 00:04:56,239 Speaker 5: where they were as I do. When we should start 94 00:04:56,320 --> 00:05:00,159 Speaker 5: to see what had happened. The one thing that that 95 00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:04,160 Speaker 5: the television documentary did not address was the fact that 96 00:05:04,600 --> 00:05:07,520 Speaker 5: when that awful explosion happened and the pitchfork in the 97 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:10,120 Speaker 5: sky that we all saw on television, that was not 98 00:05:10,200 --> 00:05:12,919 Speaker 5: the end of the astronauts. They survived that moment that 99 00:05:13,040 --> 00:05:17,479 Speaker 5: was the explosion of the fuel tank. They survived for 100 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:22,200 Speaker 5: another probably two full minutes and forty five seconds, trying 101 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:25,840 Speaker 5: to regain control of the craft, which was impossible as 102 00:05:25,839 --> 00:05:28,520 Speaker 5: it turned out. I think they were heroic in any case, 103 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:33,039 Speaker 5: and trying to reconstruct what happened after the explosion, between 104 00:05:33,120 --> 00:05:36,760 Speaker 5: that and the moment that actually killed the Challenger astronauts, 105 00:05:36,800 --> 00:05:40,839 Speaker 5: which was when the falling of Shuttle struck the Atlantic 106 00:05:40,880 --> 00:05:44,520 Speaker 5: at two hundred and seven miles per hour. Reconstructing those 107 00:05:44,600 --> 00:05:48,719 Speaker 5: moments was one of the more grueling and also fascinating 108 00:05:49,000 --> 00:05:51,039 Speaker 5: aspects of working on the Burning. 109 00:05:50,760 --> 00:05:54,760 Speaker 2: Blue Yeah, and on that day in January nineteen eighty 110 00:05:54,760 --> 00:05:57,839 Speaker 2: six and watching that and so they were alive, didn't 111 00:05:57,880 --> 00:06:00,679 Speaker 2: die instantly. Were they aware that they're about the crash 112 00:06:00,800 --> 00:06:03,520 Speaker 2: into the ocean and at over two hundred miles an hour, 113 00:06:03,520 --> 00:06:04,720 Speaker 2: which is fatal. 114 00:06:05,680 --> 00:06:08,520 Speaker 5: It's likely that they were. That there was no escape, 115 00:06:08,520 --> 00:06:10,760 Speaker 5: That there were ejector seats in the very first Shuttle 116 00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:14,200 Speaker 5: missions that became impractical later that you can't have seven 117 00:06:14,240 --> 00:06:18,839 Speaker 5: people ejecting. There was no escape, there were no parachutes. 118 00:06:18,960 --> 00:06:24,479 Speaker 5: Those escape methods were built in after the Challenger disaster, 119 00:06:24,760 --> 00:06:27,120 Speaker 5: and they're going to need to be part of these 120 00:06:27,160 --> 00:06:30,440 Speaker 5: new efforts that we make, I think, to the near 121 00:06:30,560 --> 00:06:34,880 Speaker 5: future missions to the Moon and Mars, to learn the 122 00:06:35,000 --> 00:06:38,840 Speaker 5: lesson of the Challenger disaster and not repeat it. 123 00:06:39,160 --> 00:06:42,360 Speaker 2: What's scary is listening to that audio, the cockpit voice recorder, 124 00:06:42,520 --> 00:06:45,760 Speaker 2: and I think it was Michael Smith that saw that, 125 00:06:46,360 --> 00:06:50,320 Speaker 2: basically saw the catastrophic moment happen, and I think the 126 00:06:50,400 --> 00:06:54,120 Speaker 2: last words on that recording were something like oh no, or. 127 00:06:54,720 --> 00:06:58,040 Speaker 5: It was oh he said. And then for weeks after 128 00:06:58,080 --> 00:07:02,960 Speaker 5: the accident, it was believed that the last words from 129 00:07:03,200 --> 00:07:08,120 Speaker 5: the Challenger flight deck were Roger go and throttle up. 130 00:07:08,400 --> 00:07:12,160 Speaker 5: It was only later that was understood it was re 131 00:07:13,200 --> 00:07:19,720 Speaker 5: assembled the audio from the flight deck that Michael Smith 132 00:07:19,800 --> 00:07:23,080 Speaker 5: must have seen something just in the instance before all 133 00:07:23,160 --> 00:07:27,560 Speaker 5: of the electricity and the communications went out, and his 134 00:07:27,720 --> 00:07:31,560 Speaker 5: last words were, oh, that is the last thing that 135 00:07:32,880 --> 00:07:37,080 Speaker 5: was ever heard from the ASK Challenger astronauts Kevin. 136 00:07:36,760 --> 00:07:39,960 Speaker 2: Cook, the Burning Blue, the unstoried untold Sir of CHRISTA mcauliff, 137 00:07:40,000 --> 00:07:41,680 Speaker 2: and the NASA Challenger disaster. 138 00:07:41,800 --> 00:07:43,480 Speaker 1: But there's a lesson just a history. 139 00:07:43,520 --> 00:07:46,760 Speaker 2: It's also private base travel now with the Bezos and 140 00:07:46,800 --> 00:07:50,080 Speaker 2: the Branson's and the Musks of the world, and you 141 00:07:50,120 --> 00:07:53,440 Speaker 2: know that there's tremendous, tremendous pressure to perform here too. 142 00:07:53,880 --> 00:07:56,720 Speaker 2: That was the lesson from the NASA Challenger disaster is 143 00:07:57,000 --> 00:07:58,840 Speaker 2: there are a lot of warning signs ahead of this. 144 00:07:59,240 --> 00:08:01,080 Speaker 2: One of those is the act that as I recall 145 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:04,400 Speaker 2: that the launch itself was delayed many times because of 146 00:08:04,440 --> 00:08:05,400 Speaker 2: weather or other issues. 147 00:08:05,440 --> 00:08:08,680 Speaker 5: Correct, that's just right. And there was a debacle the 148 00:08:08,760 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 5: day before in which the launch was scrubbed because a 149 00:08:13,320 --> 00:08:17,120 Speaker 5: bolt malfunctioned in the hatch door, a bolt that you 150 00:08:17,120 --> 00:08:19,680 Speaker 5: could have replaced if you'd gone to the local hardware store. 151 00:08:20,560 --> 00:08:22,360 Speaker 5: Nobody could get to the local hardware store from the 152 00:08:22,400 --> 00:08:25,520 Speaker 5: launch pad that day. They had to wait until the 153 00:08:25,560 --> 00:08:29,560 Speaker 5: next day. The next day was far colder, dangerously cold, 154 00:08:29,800 --> 00:08:33,640 Speaker 5: And yet the decision is made to launch anyway because 155 00:08:33,679 --> 00:08:38,760 Speaker 5: of terrible schedule pressure, partly because of embarrassment to the agency, 156 00:08:39,080 --> 00:08:41,200 Speaker 5: because of what had happened in the scrubs that came 157 00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:46,520 Speaker 5: before this. These are all things that are going to 158 00:08:46,559 --> 00:08:48,679 Speaker 5: have to be born in mind by people who were 159 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:50,800 Speaker 5: making launch decisions in our near future. 160 00:08:51,440 --> 00:08:54,319 Speaker 2: If the weather were warmer that day in January. Now, 161 00:08:54,400 --> 00:08:57,400 Speaker 2: to keep in mind, what January twenty eighth, nineteen eighty six. 162 00:08:57,440 --> 00:09:01,520 Speaker 2: You're in Florida, but extremely cold by Florida standards. If 163 00:09:01,640 --> 00:09:03,520 Speaker 2: it would have been a few degrees warmer, would we 164 00:09:03,600 --> 00:09:04,680 Speaker 2: have not had this disaster. 165 00:09:05,520 --> 00:09:08,160 Speaker 5: I think it's likely, and there's certainly a great chance 166 00:09:08,200 --> 00:09:14,080 Speaker 5: that hadn't been normal weather for Florida that January. There 167 00:09:14,120 --> 00:09:19,480 Speaker 5: had been other missions that something similar happened with the 168 00:09:19,520 --> 00:09:22,400 Speaker 5: old Rings. There was what was called blow by, and 169 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:26,920 Speaker 5: certainly it might have happened had it been colder in 170 00:09:27,000 --> 00:09:30,280 Speaker 5: previous missions. I think it's one of the unknowables, but 171 00:09:30,840 --> 00:09:34,320 Speaker 5: there is a very good chance that they would have 172 00:09:34,360 --> 00:09:38,480 Speaker 5: been lucky again as as more than two dozen previous 173 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:44,520 Speaker 5: Shuttle missions. Two dozen previous missions had had had some trouble, 174 00:09:44,600 --> 00:09:46,880 Speaker 5: many of them, but they made it back. That's why 175 00:09:47,480 --> 00:09:51,560 Speaker 5: the Nobel Prize winning physicist Richard Fineman said that previous 176 00:09:51,559 --> 00:09:54,800 Speaker 5: missions had essentially been playing Russian Roulette with the astronauts. 177 00:09:55,040 --> 00:09:57,840 Speaker 2: Well, the issue then came down. I had a president 178 00:09:58,120 --> 00:10:01,880 Speaker 2: a presidential commission. I believe on the on the O ring, right, 179 00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:04,480 Speaker 2: and so the O ring you have the solid rocket 180 00:10:04,480 --> 00:10:07,200 Speaker 2: boosters and that is the that's what's powering you into 181 00:10:07,200 --> 00:10:09,280 Speaker 2: space at several hundred miles an hour. 182 00:10:09,679 --> 00:10:09,959 Speaker 1: Uh. 183 00:10:10,120 --> 00:10:11,680 Speaker 2: If you have a leak in one of these rubber 184 00:10:11,679 --> 00:10:14,400 Speaker 2: O rings, you got problems. And uh they uncovered a 185 00:10:14,400 --> 00:10:18,080 Speaker 2: momo from Morton Thia call the the engineers, the project 186 00:10:18,200 --> 00:10:21,040 Speaker 2: engineers on this thing. And if you saw the documentary 187 00:10:21,040 --> 00:10:24,440 Speaker 2: in the book, you detail this about engineers screaming for 188 00:10:24,520 --> 00:10:26,839 Speaker 2: help or please, like we're going to have a catastrophic falure. 189 00:10:26,840 --> 00:10:29,960 Speaker 2: People are going to die. Uh in that teme to fruition. 190 00:10:30,080 --> 00:10:31,000 Speaker 2: Take me through that part of it. 191 00:10:32,040 --> 00:10:34,480 Speaker 5: Well, there there was a teleconference the night before in 192 00:10:34,520 --> 00:10:38,280 Speaker 5: which the engineers that uh, that they had they had 193 00:10:38,320 --> 00:10:40,920 Speaker 5: great worries and they would not sign on to UH 194 00:10:41,000 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 5: to a launch. The next morning, their managers pressured them 195 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:50,040 Speaker 5: to UH, to change their minds, and eventually they did. 196 00:10:50,080 --> 00:10:52,200 Speaker 5: It's one of those things that one has to if 197 00:10:52,200 --> 00:10:55,040 Speaker 5: you put yourself in their shoes, you could say I've 198 00:10:55,080 --> 00:10:59,800 Speaker 5: got great concerns about this. Then then the managers may say, well, 199 00:10:59,800 --> 00:11:02,640 Speaker 5: what about the last dozen missions that tour went off 200 00:11:02,679 --> 00:11:05,600 Speaker 5: without a hitch. You were in a terrible position if 201 00:11:05,760 --> 00:11:09,440 Speaker 5: if you, if you UH say I'm against this, and 202 00:11:09,480 --> 00:11:12,640 Speaker 5: then they launched anyway and nothing bad happens. They were 203 00:11:12,679 --> 00:11:16,400 Speaker 5: certainly vindicated by circumstance. And that's why there's a program 204 00:11:16,440 --> 00:11:19,840 Speaker 5: called the Lessons Learned program in NASA now saying we've 205 00:11:19,840 --> 00:11:22,800 Speaker 5: got to support engineers, support people who are willing to 206 00:11:22,840 --> 00:11:26,319 Speaker 5: say this is too dangerous. Let's fix the problem. Before 207 00:11:26,360 --> 00:11:26,880 Speaker 5: we launched. 208 00:11:26,960 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 2: Well, there were signs with other missions right in tests 209 00:11:29,280 --> 00:11:31,080 Speaker 2: that that indicated the owerring was failing. 210 00:11:31,320 --> 00:11:36,200 Speaker 5: Correct, that's right. And the the idea that that one says, well, 211 00:11:37,440 --> 00:11:40,640 Speaker 5: they looked like they were failing, but nobody got killed 212 00:11:40,640 --> 00:11:44,880 Speaker 5: in the previous missions. That's the Russian roulette aspect. They 213 00:11:44,920 --> 00:11:48,280 Speaker 5: came back. There was a task Force studying the Old 214 00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:53,080 Speaker 5: Ring problem at more than DIACOL studying and studying, but 215 00:11:54,040 --> 00:11:57,280 Speaker 5: it wasn't seen as important enough to delay any launches 216 00:11:57,480 --> 00:12:00,120 Speaker 5: while the studying was done. 217 00:11:58,960 --> 00:12:02,720 Speaker 2: Explain how the rubber O Ring and the cold weather 218 00:12:02,760 --> 00:12:04,720 Speaker 2: go to go what caused the explosion. 219 00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:10,320 Speaker 5: It's stiffened, as Richard Feinman demonstrated so beautifully on television 220 00:12:10,360 --> 00:12:13,640 Speaker 5: during the Presidential Commission. He had a glass of ice water, 221 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:15,400 Speaker 5: he got a piece of rubber from the O Ring 222 00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:18,640 Speaker 5: difted in there. Showed how it's not as elastic when 223 00:12:18,640 --> 00:12:21,679 Speaker 5: it's cold, like like a lot of other things, it 224 00:12:21,720 --> 00:12:24,400 Speaker 5: gets denser and not flexible. 225 00:12:24,880 --> 00:12:25,080 Speaker 4: Uh. 226 00:12:25,120 --> 00:12:27,880 Speaker 5: So it was in the cold it was unable to 227 00:12:27,880 --> 00:12:31,360 Speaker 5: to uh to prevent the leak. The leak leads to 228 00:12:31,520 --> 00:12:33,839 Speaker 5: a plume of flame that then burns right through that 229 00:12:33,960 --> 00:12:38,679 Speaker 5: didn't hide and outer covering of the external tank, and 230 00:12:38,720 --> 00:12:40,960 Speaker 5: that causes the giant explosion we saw on TV. 231 00:12:41,720 --> 00:12:43,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, and we finally have some closure in that too. 232 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:45,520 Speaker 2: But I think the interesting part about it is is 233 00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:48,000 Speaker 2: really how little the families were awarded. 234 00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:53,200 Speaker 5: Yes, and I mean I think it's hard to sue 235 00:12:53,200 --> 00:12:57,480 Speaker 5: the government. Uh And and several of the crew members 236 00:12:57,480 --> 00:12:59,880 Speaker 5: were members of the armed forces. That that plays in 237 00:13:00,040 --> 00:13:02,520 Speaker 5: to it as well. There were settlements. They didn't make 238 00:13:02,559 --> 00:13:06,000 Speaker 5: news because there really wasn't much space program news in 239 00:13:06,000 --> 00:13:09,000 Speaker 5: the two and a half years after the Challenger disaster. 240 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:12,560 Speaker 5: That's when things will being put back together in a 241 00:13:12,600 --> 00:13:16,680 Speaker 5: safer way. Of course, before long, shuttle flights will seem 242 00:13:16,800 --> 00:13:21,199 Speaker 5: routine again, pressure will increase to launch and that leads 243 00:13:21,280 --> 00:13:25,400 Speaker 5: to similar problems and the Columbia disaster. 244 00:13:26,520 --> 00:13:29,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, the relationship there between the Columbia disaster and this 245 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:30,679 Speaker 1: is what. 246 00:13:32,120 --> 00:13:37,240 Speaker 5: Well, it's the fact that lessons learns need to be observed. 247 00:13:37,880 --> 00:13:42,080 Speaker 5: As Mike Tinellian, that's a wonderful person who runs the 248 00:13:42,160 --> 00:13:45,720 Speaker 5: Lessons Learned program down into Kennedy Space Center talks about 249 00:13:45,760 --> 00:13:48,720 Speaker 5: it's similar. We have a presidential commission. It's a little 250 00:13:48,760 --> 00:13:51,360 Speaker 5: bit like driving a past the wreck on the highway. 251 00:13:51,400 --> 00:13:54,080 Speaker 5: You see the smoke, you see the ambulances, and then 252 00:13:54,120 --> 00:13:56,839 Speaker 5: you're driving with your hands at ten and two for 253 00:13:56,880 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 5: a little while. But before long, as he said, you're 254 00:14:00,640 --> 00:14:02,440 Speaker 5: back to having your foot on the wheel and the 255 00:14:02,480 --> 00:14:04,880 Speaker 5: other foot out of the window. If you forget the 256 00:14:06,400 --> 00:14:10,720 Speaker 5: crucial importance of safety in the preparation for a launch, 257 00:14:11,960 --> 00:14:16,880 Speaker 5: that's what happened with Columbia after Challenger, and that's what 258 00:14:18,160 --> 00:14:22,040 Speaker 5: future planners are going to have to bear in mind 259 00:14:22,520 --> 00:14:27,560 Speaker 5: as we get to remarkably exciting and complicated missions to 260 00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:28,640 Speaker 5: the Moon and to Mars. 261 00:14:28,960 --> 00:14:30,240 Speaker 1: Somebody's going to die in the future. 262 00:14:30,240 --> 00:14:32,880 Speaker 2: It's bound to happen again, because yeah, we may learn 263 00:14:33,000 --> 00:14:36,280 Speaker 2: the lessons from history, but there's tremendous pressure. And look 264 00:14:36,280 --> 00:14:39,160 Speaker 2: what led to the death of the Challenger crew, right 265 00:14:39,680 --> 00:14:42,160 Speaker 2: had we got to put Krystal call on our teacher 266 00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:44,080 Speaker 2: because you know what, now all of a sudden, school 267 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:46,160 Speaker 2: kids are getting interested, we get them hooked, their parents 268 00:14:46,200 --> 00:14:49,320 Speaker 2: will be interested. Hey, great, we're putting someone on there 269 00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:52,240 Speaker 2: for the only reasons. It's a pr move. I don't 270 00:14:52,240 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 2: know what research a teacher can do in space, but 271 00:14:54,120 --> 00:14:56,720 Speaker 2: nonetheless there's an every man component to that. 272 00:14:56,760 --> 00:14:58,080 Speaker 1: It's marketing, is what this is. 273 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:00,880 Speaker 2: And then the pressure to launch the to launch because 274 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:03,920 Speaker 2: we want to see Krystal calf in space ended in 275 00:15:04,040 --> 00:15:06,120 Speaker 2: tragically in her death. We did the same thing with 276 00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:10,280 Speaker 2: Challenger to some degree as well. With private space missions 277 00:15:10,320 --> 00:15:12,640 Speaker 2: happening in the near future, at some point, people are 278 00:15:12,640 --> 00:15:13,760 Speaker 2: going to die again, aren't they. 279 00:15:14,680 --> 00:15:17,640 Speaker 5: Well. Elon Munk seems to think so it is a 280 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:22,280 Speaker 5: risky operation. It's a risky thing to do with space exploration. 281 00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:27,120 Speaker 5: I think the job of NASA, the agency as well 282 00:15:27,160 --> 00:15:30,280 Speaker 5: as it's private partners. I think these will be public 283 00:15:30,320 --> 00:15:34,320 Speaker 5: private partnerships the missions, especially when we're talking about Mars. 284 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:40,440 Speaker 5: I think one recognizes the risk and the likelihood that 285 00:15:40,520 --> 00:15:45,240 Speaker 5: people may die. But for those preparing for missions like that, 286 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:48,320 Speaker 5: your job is to do all you possibly can to 287 00:15:48,720 --> 00:15:51,600 Speaker 5: prevent that, to make them as safe as possible. That 288 00:15:51,760 --> 00:15:54,400 Speaker 5: lesson was forgotten afore challenger, and. 289 00:15:54,360 --> 00:15:56,200 Speaker 2: Even with the technology of the way it is because 290 00:15:56,240 --> 00:15:58,000 Speaker 2: you know, Elon must have said, well, we can't have 291 00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:00,440 Speaker 2: a it's not like you have an airline, let fly 292 00:16:00,920 --> 00:16:05,040 Speaker 2: fifty sixty missions. The human body can't withstand that. So 293 00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:09,200 Speaker 2: solving that is through autonomous meaning self driving aircraft, self 294 00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:12,760 Speaker 2: driving spacecraft. All right, that's all well and good, and 295 00:16:12,760 --> 00:16:15,320 Speaker 2: we have more technology and monitors and the things we did, 296 00:16:15,360 --> 00:16:17,800 Speaker 2: but you still can't get past the fact that that's 297 00:16:17,840 --> 00:16:22,320 Speaker 2: an incredibly traumatic procedure for any airframe to go through, 298 00:16:22,360 --> 00:16:26,120 Speaker 2: and that is launching, relaunching and making something a regularly 299 00:16:26,160 --> 00:16:26,800 Speaker 2: scheduled flight. 300 00:16:26,920 --> 00:16:28,160 Speaker 1: Ultimately, that's what they want to. 301 00:16:28,080 --> 00:16:32,120 Speaker 2: Do here Physically, is that possible for any aircraft? 302 00:16:33,400 --> 00:16:40,080 Speaker 5: It's sure difficult. And again, the spacecraft has so many parts. 303 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:44,480 Speaker 5: The space level was the most complicated machine ever built. Well, 304 00:16:44,480 --> 00:16:47,560 Speaker 5: when you have a lot of parts, Murphy's law stares 305 00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:53,400 Speaker 5: you in the face every day with every decision. That's 306 00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:57,800 Speaker 5: what the Elon musk, that's what visos, that's what Richard Branson, 307 00:16:57,920 --> 00:17:04,280 Speaker 5: that's what face looking forward. And the lesson is it's difficult, 308 00:17:04,320 --> 00:17:08,639 Speaker 5: it's complicated, it's dangerous, it's potentially lethal. These are things 309 00:17:08,359 --> 00:17:11,639 Speaker 5: that need to be born in mind just before the 310 00:17:11,680 --> 00:17:15,399 Speaker 5: word go it's given to send somebody into space. 311 00:17:15,560 --> 00:17:17,760 Speaker 2: Yeah, and I think it's gonna be interesting too. At 312 00:17:17,760 --> 00:17:19,720 Speaker 2: some point there's going to be a failure. Once again, 313 00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:21,840 Speaker 2: I don't think that means we stop trying. 314 00:17:22,359 --> 00:17:22,479 Speaker 4: Uh. 315 00:17:22,640 --> 00:17:24,560 Speaker 2: It means you learn from those lessons. But if the 316 00:17:24,640 --> 00:17:27,680 Speaker 2: lessons keep getting repeated, as it started with the Challenger, 317 00:17:28,600 --> 00:17:31,600 Speaker 2: then I guess that that's also human nature too. We 318 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:34,439 Speaker 2: have to accept a certain amount of casualties if this 319 00:17:34,600 --> 00:17:37,080 Speaker 2: is the price, if this is the goal. Kevin Cook, 320 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:39,639 Speaker 2: The Burning Blue, the Untolt Ster of Crystal Calf and 321 00:17:39,720 --> 00:17:41,600 Speaker 2: nashis NASA Challenger disaster. 322 00:17:41,680 --> 00:17:43,359 Speaker 1: Thanks again for the time, Good luck, with the book. 323 00:17:44,240 --> 00:17:45,879 Speaker 5: Thank you, Scott. I appreciate it and it's good to 324 00:17:45,920 --> 00:17:49,080 Speaker 5: be on w l W. I grew up listening to 325 00:17:49,080 --> 00:17:51,919 Speaker 5: to Al Michaels and then Marty Brenneman and Joe Dunsall 326 00:17:52,000 --> 00:17:52,920 Speaker 5: in Big Red Machine. 327 00:17:52,920 --> 00:17:56,040 Speaker 1: Wow, how about that. So you're India, We're in Indiana. 328 00:17:56,160 --> 00:17:56,920 Speaker 5: Indianapolis. 329 00:17:56,960 --> 00:17:59,640 Speaker 2: Oh, Indianapolis. Okay, very good. Yeah, So all the best 330 00:17:59,640 --> 00:18:02,439 Speaker 2: to you and thanks again for coming on, Kevin. Thanks 331 00:18:02,440 --> 00:18:06,760 Speaker 2: gotvingeh Kevin cookback on the show. It's the fortieth anniversary 332 00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:08,359 Speaker 2: of that challenge with Chet forty year Where were you 333 00:18:08,359 --> 00:18:09,080 Speaker 2: forty years ago? 334 00:18:09,119 --> 00:18:10,800 Speaker 1: Today? Most people said, well, I wasn't 335 00:18:10,800 --> 00:18:15,040 Speaker 2: Born yet, smart guy Douche Scott's loan show, Home of 336 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:16,520 Speaker 2: the Red seven hundred W weldom