WEBVTT - 1-28-26 Sloan with Kevin Cook

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<v Speaker 1>Good morning. I'm Scott Sloan. This is seven hundred wudwity.

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<v Speaker 2>Thanks for checking out the show on air and of

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<v Speaker 2>course streaming anywhere you go. Reportable these days in the

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<v Speaker 2>iHeartRadio app and you can catch the show afterwards too.

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<v Speaker 2>It's podcast will may get easy for it, Easy Easy Easy.

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<v Speaker 2>Today is an historic day because this landmark moment, this

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<v Speaker 2>tragedy occurred forty years ago today go up.

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<v Speaker 3>It happened just over one minute inch of flight one

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<v Speaker 3>a minute fifteen.

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<v Speaker 4>Seconds flan City, twenty nine hundred feet per second, altitude

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<v Speaker 4>nine aautical mileth downrange, just in the seven nautical.

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<v Speaker 1>Miles from mission control.

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<v Speaker 3>Silence, Then the bland chilling report.

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<v Speaker 4>We have a report from the flight dynamics officer that

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<v Speaker 4>the vehicle has exploded. Flight Director confirms that we are

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<v Speaker 4>looking at checking with the recovery forces to see what

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<v Speaker 4>can be done at this point.

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<v Speaker 3>A search effort couldn't begin for some fifteen minutes after

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<v Speaker 3>this debris, they said, just kept raining from the sky.

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<v Speaker 3>The head of the Space Shuttle program had no explanations,

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<v Speaker 3>just sorrow at the tragedy.

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<v Speaker 1>I vividly remember when that happened.

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<v Speaker 2>For a lot of folks it might have been school kids,

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<v Speaker 2>and still even more folks don't remember it because they

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<v Speaker 2>happened outside their lifespan. But I'll remember that like I

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<v Speaker 2>remember nine to eleven. And how do we get to

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<v Speaker 2>this point? We've got this great space race going out

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<v Speaker 2>right now, of course privately speaking, but everything we know

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<v Speaker 2>about space and how to get to outer space and

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<v Speaker 2>travel is written in blood. Writing about it in the

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<v Speaker 2>Burning Blue is Kevin Cook, Kevin, welcome to the show.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm doing fine.

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<v Speaker 2>Hopefully I set that up well enough for you too,

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<v Speaker 2>tying those things together. But I think there's something to

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<v Speaker 2>be said about that, right, is that we're in the

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<v Speaker 2>new space race, but it's private space race between ultra

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<v Speaker 2>the ultra rich. Doesn't mean they're gonna cut corners, but man,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, when you're competitive like this, these are the

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<v Speaker 2>things that.

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<v Speaker 1>Happen, right.

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<v Speaker 5>I think you set it up just right, and it's

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<v Speaker 5>an exciting time in space exploration. These are eventually going

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<v Speaker 5>to be public private partnerships. I think we'll see SpaceX

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<v Speaker 5>and NASA working together, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic and NASA

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<v Speaker 5>working together. We're gonna have Moon missions again, and in

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<v Speaker 5>before too many decades past a Mars mission with human

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<v Speaker 5>crew on it, and there is going to be schedule

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<v Speaker 5>pressure again, there are going to be engineer's warning, well,

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<v Speaker 5>I have concerns about this or that aspect of the machinery,

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<v Speaker 5>and again these things are going to crop up. There

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<v Speaker 5>is a program at NASA now called the Lessons Learned

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<v Speaker 5>program that encourages listeners to remember things like disasters like

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<v Speaker 5>the Challenger accident, so that we don't have such a

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<v Speaker 5>thing happen again.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, and the lesson here coming out of the Burning

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<v Speaker 2>Blue and the Challenger disaster, is that why Krista mcculloffe

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<v Speaker 2>was on that flight to begin with.

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<v Speaker 5>That's true. It had aspects of a publicity effort on

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<v Speaker 5>NASA's part. After Sally VI made worldwide news in nineteen

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<v Speaker 5>eighty three as the first American woman in space, Shuttle

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<v Speaker 5>flights came to seem routine, and NASA was eager to

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<v Speaker 5>have the teacher in space, the first civilian to fly

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<v Speaker 5>on a Shuttle mission. And Christa mccaulliffe, to her great credit,

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<v Speaker 5>I think understood that she was wonderful on television. She

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<v Speaker 5>was sincere, she was herself, but she had a purpose

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<v Speaker 5>to a cause. She didn't want to get famous. She

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<v Speaker 5>wanted to promote the cause of school teachers. She was

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<v Speaker 5>an active school teacher, a great one. She felt that

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<v Speaker 5>teachers were overworked and underpaid. I think that's true even

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<v Speaker 5>more so today. So she inspired an awful lot of

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<v Speaker 5>people to become teachers. I think that's one of the

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<v Speaker 5>things that we could take from a story like the

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<v Speaker 5>Challenger disaster in nineteen eighty six. There are a lot

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<v Speaker 5>of teachers, dedicated teachers who followed her example, who are

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<v Speaker 5>still teaching today.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I remember that moment. I think we all did it.

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<v Speaker 2>If you're old enough too, or if you just go back.

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<v Speaker 2>It was an excellent documentary on this. I think it

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<v Speaker 2>was on Netflix or maybe HBO, but Netflix. It was

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<v Speaker 2>great about that whole story too, because, man, you remember

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<v Speaker 2>what it was like being a little kid, and you

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<v Speaker 2>know everyone was following, here's a teacher.

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<v Speaker 1>I've got a teacher. It's like my teacher.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, you could identify as a kid with Krista mccauliffe

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<v Speaker 2>and every kid in America at that moment. That morning,

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<v Speaker 2>that cold morning, he sat there and watched it on

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<v Speaker 2>TV when they rolled a big old you know, CRT

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<v Speaker 2>two TV in the classroom and everyone's watching the Challenger

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<v Speaker 2>and where everyone clapped and was so excited, and then

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<v Speaker 2>there was a catastrophe, And you want to talk about

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<v Speaker 2>traumatic moment in your childhood, that's it right there.

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<v Speaker 5>That's true. I've encountered so many people who remember exactly

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<v Speaker 5>where they were as I do. When we should start

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<v Speaker 5>to see what had happened. The one thing that that

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<v Speaker 5>the television documentary did not address was the fact that

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<v Speaker 5>when that awful explosion happened and the pitchfork in the

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<v Speaker 5>sky that we all saw on television, that was not

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<v Speaker 5>the end of the astronauts. They survived that moment that

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<v Speaker 5>was the explosion of the fuel tank. They survived for

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<v Speaker 5>another probably two full minutes and forty five seconds, trying

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<v Speaker 5>to regain control of the craft, which was impossible as

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<v Speaker 5>it turned out. I think they were heroic in any case,

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<v Speaker 5>and trying to reconstruct what happened after the explosion, between

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<v Speaker 5>that and the moment that actually killed the Challenger astronauts,

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<v Speaker 5>which was when the falling of Shuttle struck the Atlantic

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<v Speaker 5>at two hundred and seven miles per hour. Reconstructing those

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<v Speaker 5>moments was one of the more grueling and also fascinating

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<v Speaker 5>aspects of working on the Burning.

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<v Speaker 2>Blue Yeah, and on that day in January nineteen eighty

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<v Speaker 2>six and watching that and so they were alive, didn't

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<v Speaker 2>die instantly. Were they aware that they're about the crash

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<v Speaker 2>into the ocean and at over two hundred miles an hour,

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<v Speaker 2>which is fatal.

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<v Speaker 5>It's likely that they were. That there was no escape,

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<v Speaker 5>That there were ejector seats in the very first Shuttle

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<v Speaker 5>missions that became impractical later that you can't have seven

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<v Speaker 5>people ejecting. There was no escape, there were no parachutes.

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<v Speaker 5>Those escape methods were built in after the Challenger disaster,

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<v Speaker 5>and they're going to need to be part of these

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<v Speaker 5>new efforts that we make, I think, to the near

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<v Speaker 5>future missions to the Moon and Mars, to learn the

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<v Speaker 5>lesson of the Challenger disaster and not repeat it.

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<v Speaker 2>What's scary is listening to that audio, the cockpit voice recorder,

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<v Speaker 2>and I think it was Michael Smith that saw that,

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<v Speaker 2>basically saw the catastrophic moment happen, and I think the

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<v Speaker 2>last words on that recording were something like oh no, or.

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<v Speaker 5>It was oh he said. And then for weeks after

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<v Speaker 5>the accident, it was believed that the last words from

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<v Speaker 5>the Challenger flight deck were Roger go and throttle up.

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<v Speaker 5>It was only later that was understood it was re

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<v Speaker 5>assembled the audio from the flight deck that Michael Smith

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<v Speaker 5>must have seen something just in the instance before all

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<v Speaker 5>of the electricity and the communications went out, and his

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<v Speaker 5>last words were, oh, that is the last thing that

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<v Speaker 5>was ever heard from the ASK Challenger astronauts Kevin.

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<v Speaker 2>Cook, the Burning Blue, the unstoried untold Sir of CHRISTA mcauliff,

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<v Speaker 2>and the NASA Challenger disaster.

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<v Speaker 1>But there's a lesson just a history.

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<v Speaker 2>It's also private base travel now with the Bezos and

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<v Speaker 2>the Branson's and the Musks of the world, and you

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<v Speaker 2>know that there's tremendous, tremendous pressure to perform here too.

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<v Speaker 2>That was the lesson from the NASA Challenger disaster is

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<v Speaker 2>there are a lot of warning signs ahead of this.

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<v Speaker 2>One of those is the act that as I recall

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<v Speaker 2>that the launch itself was delayed many times because of

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<v Speaker 2>weather or other issues.

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<v Speaker 5>Correct, that's just right. And there was a debacle the

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<v Speaker 5>day before in which the launch was scrubbed because a

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<v Speaker 5>bolt malfunctioned in the hatch door, a bolt that you

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<v Speaker 5>could have replaced if you'd gone to the local hardware store.

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<v Speaker 5>Nobody could get to the local hardware store from the

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<v Speaker 5>launch pad that day. They had to wait until the

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<v Speaker 5>next day. The next day was far colder, dangerously cold,

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<v Speaker 5>And yet the decision is made to launch anyway because

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<v Speaker 5>of terrible schedule pressure, partly because of embarrassment to the agency,

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<v Speaker 5>because of what had happened in the scrubs that came

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<v Speaker 5>before this. These are all things that are going to

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<v Speaker 5>have to be born in mind by people who were

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<v Speaker 5>making launch decisions in our near future.

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<v Speaker 2>If the weather were warmer that day in January. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>to keep in mind, what January twenty eighth, nineteen eighty six.

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<v Speaker 2>You're in Florida, but extremely cold by Florida standards. If

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<v Speaker 2>it would have been a few degrees warmer, would we

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<v Speaker 2>have not had this disaster.

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<v Speaker 5>I think it's likely, and there's certainly a great chance

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<v Speaker 5>that hadn't been normal weather for Florida that January. There

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<v Speaker 5>had been other missions that something similar happened with the

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<v Speaker 5>old Rings. There was what was called blow by, and

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<v Speaker 5>certainly it might have happened had it been colder in

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<v Speaker 5>previous missions. I think it's one of the unknowables, but

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<v Speaker 5>there is a very good chance that they would have

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<v Speaker 5>been lucky again as as more than two dozen previous

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<v Speaker 5>Shuttle missions. Two dozen previous missions had had had some trouble,

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<v Speaker 5>many of them, but they made it back. That's why

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<v Speaker 5>the Nobel Prize winning physicist Richard Fineman said that previous

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<v Speaker 5>missions had essentially been playing Russian Roulette with the astronauts.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, the issue then came down. I had a president

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<v Speaker 2>a presidential commission. I believe on the on the O ring, right,

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<v Speaker 2>and so the O ring you have the solid rocket

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<v Speaker 2>boosters and that is the that's what's powering you into

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<v Speaker 2>space at several hundred miles an hour.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh.

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<v Speaker 2>If you have a leak in one of these rubber

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<v Speaker 2>O rings, you got problems. And uh they uncovered a

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<v Speaker 2>momo from Morton Thia call the the engineers, the project

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<v Speaker 2>engineers on this thing. And if you saw the documentary

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<v Speaker 2>in the book, you detail this about engineers screaming for

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<v Speaker 2>help or please, like we're going to have a catastrophic falure.

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<v Speaker 2>People are going to die. Uh in that teme to fruition.

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<v Speaker 2>Take me through that part of it.

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<v Speaker 5>Well, there there was a teleconference the night before in

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<v Speaker 5>which the engineers that uh, that they had they had

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<v Speaker 5>great worries and they would not sign on to UH

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<v Speaker 5>to a launch. The next morning, their managers pressured them

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<v Speaker 5>to UH, to change their minds, and eventually they did.

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<v Speaker 5>It's one of those things that one has to if

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<v Speaker 5>you put yourself in their shoes, you could say I've

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<v Speaker 5>got great concerns about this. Then then the managers may say, well,

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<v Speaker 5>what about the last dozen missions that tour went off

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<v Speaker 5>without a hitch. You were in a terrible position if

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<v Speaker 5>if you, if you UH say I'm against this, and

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<v Speaker 5>then they launched anyway and nothing bad happens. They were

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<v Speaker 5>certainly vindicated by circumstance. And that's why there's a program

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<v Speaker 5>called the Lessons Learned program in NASA now saying we've

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<v Speaker 5>got to support engineers, support people who are willing to

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<v Speaker 5>say this is too dangerous. Let's fix the problem. Before

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<v Speaker 5>we launched.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, there were signs with other missions right in tests

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<v Speaker 2>that that indicated the owerring was failing.

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<v Speaker 5>Correct, that's right. And the the idea that that one says, well,

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<v Speaker 5>they looked like they were failing, but nobody got killed

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<v Speaker 5>in the previous missions. That's the Russian roulette aspect. They

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<v Speaker 5>came back. There was a task Force studying the Old

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<v Speaker 5>Ring problem at more than DIACOL studying and studying, but

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<v Speaker 5>it wasn't seen as important enough to delay any launches

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<v Speaker 5>while the studying was done.

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<v Speaker 2>Explain how the rubber O Ring and the cold weather

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<v Speaker 2>go to go what caused the explosion.

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<v Speaker 5>It's stiffened, as Richard Feinman demonstrated so beautifully on television

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<v Speaker 5>during the Presidential Commission. He had a glass of ice water,

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<v Speaker 5>he got a piece of rubber from the O Ring

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<v Speaker 5>difted in there. Showed how it's not as elastic when

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<v Speaker 5>it's cold, like like a lot of other things, it

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<v Speaker 5>gets denser and not flexible.

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<v Speaker 4>Uh.

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<v Speaker 5>So it was in the cold it was unable to

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<v Speaker 5>to uh to prevent the leak. The leak leads to

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<v Speaker 5>a plume of flame that then burns right through that

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<v Speaker 5>didn't hide and outer covering of the external tank, and

0:12:38.720 --> 0:12:40.960
<v Speaker 5>that causes the giant explosion we saw on TV.

0:12:41.720 --> 0:12:43.640
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and we finally have some closure in that too.

0:12:43.640 --> 0:12:45.520
<v Speaker 2>But I think the interesting part about it is is

0:12:45.600 --> 0:12:48.000
<v Speaker 2>really how little the families were awarded.

0:12:49.760 --> 0:12:53.200
<v Speaker 5>Yes, and I mean I think it's hard to sue

0:12:53.200 --> 0:12:57.480
<v Speaker 5>the government. Uh And and several of the crew members

0:12:57.480 --> 0:12:59.880
<v Speaker 5>were members of the armed forces. That that plays in

0:13:00.040 --> 0:13:02.520
<v Speaker 5>to it as well. There were settlements. They didn't make

0:13:02.559 --> 0:13:06.000
<v Speaker 5>news because there really wasn't much space program news in

0:13:06.000 --> 0:13:09.000
<v Speaker 5>the two and a half years after the Challenger disaster.

0:13:09.840 --> 0:13:12.560
<v Speaker 5>That's when things will being put back together in a

0:13:12.600 --> 0:13:16.680
<v Speaker 5>safer way. Of course, before long, shuttle flights will seem

0:13:16.800 --> 0:13:21.199
<v Speaker 5>routine again, pressure will increase to launch and that leads

0:13:21.280 --> 0:13:25.400
<v Speaker 5>to similar problems and the Columbia disaster.

0:13:26.520 --> 0:13:29.720
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the relationship there between the Columbia disaster and this

0:13:29.920 --> 0:13:30.679
<v Speaker 1>is what.

0:13:32.120 --> 0:13:37.240
<v Speaker 5>Well, it's the fact that lessons learns need to be observed.

0:13:37.880 --> 0:13:42.080
<v Speaker 5>As Mike Tinellian, that's a wonderful person who runs the

0:13:42.160 --> 0:13:45.720
<v Speaker 5>Lessons Learned program down into Kennedy Space Center talks about

0:13:45.760 --> 0:13:48.720
<v Speaker 5>it's similar. We have a presidential commission. It's a little

0:13:48.760 --> 0:13:51.360
<v Speaker 5>bit like driving a past the wreck on the highway.

0:13:51.400 --> 0:13:54.080
<v Speaker 5>You see the smoke, you see the ambulances, and then

0:13:54.120 --> 0:13:56.839
<v Speaker 5>you're driving with your hands at ten and two for

0:13:56.880 --> 0:14:00.600
<v Speaker 5>a little while. But before long, as he said, you're

0:14:00.640 --> 0:14:02.440
<v Speaker 5>back to having your foot on the wheel and the

0:14:02.480 --> 0:14:04.880
<v Speaker 5>other foot out of the window. If you forget the

0:14:06.400 --> 0:14:10.720
<v Speaker 5>crucial importance of safety in the preparation for a launch,

0:14:11.960 --> 0:14:16.880
<v Speaker 5>that's what happened with Columbia after Challenger, and that's what

0:14:18.160 --> 0:14:22.040
<v Speaker 5>future planners are going to have to bear in mind

0:14:22.520 --> 0:14:27.560
<v Speaker 5>as we get to remarkably exciting and complicated missions to

0:14:27.760 --> 0:14:28.640
<v Speaker 5>the Moon and to Mars.

0:14:28.960 --> 0:14:30.240
<v Speaker 1>Somebody's going to die in the future.

0:14:30.240 --> 0:14:32.880
<v Speaker 2>It's bound to happen again, because yeah, we may learn

0:14:33.000 --> 0:14:36.280
<v Speaker 2>the lessons from history, but there's tremendous pressure. And look

0:14:36.280 --> 0:14:39.160
<v Speaker 2>what led to the death of the Challenger crew, right

0:14:39.680 --> 0:14:42.160
<v Speaker 2>had we got to put Krystal call on our teacher

0:14:42.240 --> 0:14:44.080
<v Speaker 2>because you know what, now all of a sudden, school

0:14:44.120 --> 0:14:46.160
<v Speaker 2>kids are getting interested, we get them hooked, their parents

0:14:46.200 --> 0:14:49.320
<v Speaker 2>will be interested. Hey, great, we're putting someone on there

0:14:49.600 --> 0:14:52.240
<v Speaker 2>for the only reasons. It's a pr move. I don't

0:14:52.240 --> 0:14:54.080
<v Speaker 2>know what research a teacher can do in space, but

0:14:54.120 --> 0:14:56.720
<v Speaker 2>nonetheless there's an every man component to that.

0:14:56.760 --> 0:14:58.080
<v Speaker 1>It's marketing, is what this is.

0:14:58.600 --> 0:15:00.880
<v Speaker 2>And then the pressure to launch the to launch because

0:15:00.920 --> 0:15:03.920
<v Speaker 2>we want to see Krystal calf in space ended in

0:15:04.040 --> 0:15:06.120
<v Speaker 2>tragically in her death. We did the same thing with

0:15:06.240 --> 0:15:10.280
<v Speaker 2>Challenger to some degree as well. With private space missions

0:15:10.320 --> 0:15:12.640
<v Speaker 2>happening in the near future, at some point, people are

0:15:12.640 --> 0:15:13.760
<v Speaker 2>going to die again, aren't they.

0:15:14.680 --> 0:15:17.640
<v Speaker 5>Well. Elon Munk seems to think so it is a

0:15:17.800 --> 0:15:22.280
<v Speaker 5>risky operation. It's a risky thing to do with space exploration.

0:15:23.000 --> 0:15:27.120
<v Speaker 5>I think the job of NASA, the agency as well

0:15:27.160 --> 0:15:30.280
<v Speaker 5>as it's private partners. I think these will be public

0:15:30.320 --> 0:15:34.320
<v Speaker 5>private partnerships the missions, especially when we're talking about Mars.

0:15:35.880 --> 0:15:40.440
<v Speaker 5>I think one recognizes the risk and the likelihood that

0:15:40.520 --> 0:15:45.240
<v Speaker 5>people may die. But for those preparing for missions like that,

0:15:45.480 --> 0:15:48.320
<v Speaker 5>your job is to do all you possibly can to

0:15:48.720 --> 0:15:51.600
<v Speaker 5>prevent that, to make them as safe as possible. That

0:15:51.760 --> 0:15:54.400
<v Speaker 5>lesson was forgotten afore challenger, and.

0:15:54.360 --> 0:15:56.200
<v Speaker 2>Even with the technology of the way it is because

0:15:56.240 --> 0:15:58.000
<v Speaker 2>you know, Elon must have said, well, we can't have

0:15:58.040 --> 0:16:00.440
<v Speaker 2>a it's not like you have an airline, let fly

0:16:00.920 --> 0:16:05.040
<v Speaker 2>fifty sixty missions. The human body can't withstand that. So

0:16:05.040 --> 0:16:09.200
<v Speaker 2>solving that is through autonomous meaning self driving aircraft, self

0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:12.760
<v Speaker 2>driving spacecraft. All right, that's all well and good, and

0:16:12.760 --> 0:16:15.320
<v Speaker 2>we have more technology and monitors and the things we did,

0:16:15.360 --> 0:16:17.800
<v Speaker 2>but you still can't get past the fact that that's

0:16:17.840 --> 0:16:22.320
<v Speaker 2>an incredibly traumatic procedure for any airframe to go through,

0:16:22.360 --> 0:16:26.120
<v Speaker 2>and that is launching, relaunching and making something a regularly

0:16:26.160 --> 0:16:26.800
<v Speaker 2>scheduled flight.

0:16:26.920 --> 0:16:28.160
<v Speaker 1>Ultimately, that's what they want to.

0:16:28.080 --> 0:16:32.120
<v Speaker 2>Do here Physically, is that possible for any aircraft?

0:16:33.400 --> 0:16:40.080
<v Speaker 5>It's sure difficult. And again, the spacecraft has so many parts.

0:16:40.400 --> 0:16:44.480
<v Speaker 5>The space level was the most complicated machine ever built. Well,

0:16:44.480 --> 0:16:47.560
<v Speaker 5>when you have a lot of parts, Murphy's law stares

0:16:47.600 --> 0:16:53.400
<v Speaker 5>you in the face every day with every decision. That's

0:16:53.480 --> 0:16:57.800
<v Speaker 5>what the Elon musk, that's what visos, that's what Richard Branson,

0:16:57.920 --> 0:17:04.280
<v Speaker 5>that's what face looking forward. And the lesson is it's difficult,

0:17:04.320 --> 0:17:08.639
<v Speaker 5>it's complicated, it's dangerous, it's potentially lethal. These are things

0:17:08.359 --> 0:17:11.639
<v Speaker 5>that need to be born in mind just before the

0:17:11.680 --> 0:17:15.399
<v Speaker 5>word go it's given to send somebody into space.

0:17:15.560 --> 0:17:17.760
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and I think it's gonna be interesting too. At

0:17:17.760 --> 0:17:19.720
<v Speaker 2>some point there's going to be a failure. Once again,

0:17:20.280 --> 0:17:21.840
<v Speaker 2>I don't think that means we stop trying.

0:17:22.359 --> 0:17:22.479
<v Speaker 4>Uh.

0:17:22.640 --> 0:17:24.560
<v Speaker 2>It means you learn from those lessons. But if the

0:17:24.640 --> 0:17:27.680
<v Speaker 2>lessons keep getting repeated, as it started with the Challenger,

0:17:28.600 --> 0:17:31.600
<v Speaker 2>then I guess that that's also human nature too. We

0:17:31.720 --> 0:17:34.439
<v Speaker 2>have to accept a certain amount of casualties if this

0:17:34.600 --> 0:17:37.080
<v Speaker 2>is the price, if this is the goal. Kevin Cook,

0:17:37.359 --> 0:17:39.639
<v Speaker 2>The Burning Blue, the Untolt Ster of Crystal Calf and

0:17:39.720 --> 0:17:41.600
<v Speaker 2>nashis NASA Challenger disaster.

0:17:41.680 --> 0:17:43.359
<v Speaker 1>Thanks again for the time, Good luck, with the book.

0:17:44.240 --> 0:17:45.879
<v Speaker 5>Thank you, Scott. I appreciate it and it's good to

0:17:45.920 --> 0:17:49.080
<v Speaker 5>be on w l W. I grew up listening to

0:17:49.080 --> 0:17:51.919
<v Speaker 5>to Al Michaels and then Marty Brenneman and Joe Dunsall

0:17:52.000 --> 0:17:52.920
<v Speaker 5>in Big Red Machine.

0:17:52.920 --> 0:17:56.040
<v Speaker 1>Wow, how about that. So you're India, We're in Indiana.

0:17:56.160 --> 0:17:56.920
<v Speaker 5>Indianapolis.

0:17:56.960 --> 0:17:59.640
<v Speaker 2>Oh, Indianapolis. Okay, very good. Yeah, So all the best

0:17:59.640 --> 0:18:02.439
<v Speaker 2>to you and thanks again for coming on, Kevin. Thanks

0:18:02.440 --> 0:18:06.760
<v Speaker 2>gotvingeh Kevin cookback on the show. It's the fortieth anniversary

0:18:06.760 --> 0:18:08.359
<v Speaker 2>of that challenge with Chet forty year Where were you

0:18:08.359 --> 0:18:09.080
<v Speaker 2>forty years ago?

0:18:09.119 --> 0:18:10.800
<v Speaker 1>Today? Most people said, well, I wasn't

0:18:10.800 --> 0:18:15.040
<v Speaker 2>Born yet, smart guy Douche Scott's loan show, Home of

0:18:15.080 --> 0:18:16.520
<v Speaker 2>the Red seven hundred W weldom