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Speaker 1: Joining us.

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Speaker 2: In the WIBC studios, we have former FBI special agent

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Speaker 2: Corey Grass. He spent twenty years in counterintelligence and counter terrorism.

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Speaker 2: It's Casey and Jim you're listening to on ninety three WIBC,

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Speaker 2: So Corey. Yesterday, Jim and I discussed this article spyware,

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Speaker 2: once used by governments, is now spreading to cyber criminals,

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Speaker 2: and I thought, well, we've got we've.

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Speaker 3: Got a guy.

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Speaker 4: Love it when we got a guy.

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Speaker 3: We got a guy, and here you are.

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Speaker 2: So how big of a problem is it when government

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Speaker 2: grade spyware tools leak into the hands of cyber criminals

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Speaker 2: or just regular criminals.

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Speaker 5: Well, first, I might say, thanks for having me. I'm

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Speaker 5: glad you think of criminals you think of me. I'm

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Speaker 5: not sure what that says about me, but I appreciate it.

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Speaker 5: That type of technology is so prevalent these days. It's crazy.

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Speaker 5: Like you said, it was a high level use previously

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Speaker 5: by higher powers that had access to it, and now

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Speaker 5: that it's worked this way down, I think it's kind

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Speaker 5: of foolish for any of us in the United States.

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Speaker 5: I think our stuff is safe in any capacity because

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Speaker 5: there's so many people in so many ways trying to

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Speaker 5: steal your information multi ways.

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Speaker 3: Let's talk about some of the ways.

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Speaker 2: Okay, some of the things that you're skeptical of or

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Speaker 2: you've seen or people need to be aware of.

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Speaker 5: I'll mention you guys previously, but QR codes are a

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Speaker 5: great way for people to steal your information as simple

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Speaker 5: as City of Indianapolis parking signs downtown. You go to

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Speaker 5: pay your parking meter. Now everything's automated, then which you

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Speaker 5: to click on the QR code send your money that way?

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Speaker 5: Will it cost me a dollar apiece for a sticker

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Speaker 5: to put on those signs? And then I have you

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Speaker 5: send you to my website or my corrupt way of

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Speaker 5: doing business, and now I have all your personal information

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Speaker 5: as simple as that a simple sticker.

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Speaker 4: Okay.

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Speaker 1: So what you're saying is, and you're right, those QR

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Speaker 1: codes are everywhere, especially with city parking.

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Speaker 4: So you go there and you park, and then you've

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Speaker 4: got to go to the little shi phone and you.

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Speaker 1: Got to scan it with your phone and then you

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Speaker 1: give them all your credit card information and your license

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Speaker 1: plate and that's how they charge you for your parking.

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Speaker 1: And what you're saying is somebody could easily just print

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Speaker 1: out a sticker of their own QR code that's the

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Speaker 1: same size as the QR code on the sign, and

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Speaker 1: just slap that sticker on there.

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Speaker 4: And then so that when they.

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Speaker 1: Scan my QR code, the criminal that I've put on there,

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Speaker 1: it's going to take them to this website that's going

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Speaker 1: to download some malicious software onto their phone or whatever else.

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Speaker 5: Correct, and particularly if you're good enough, wow, to have

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Speaker 5: a website that it goes to me? How many times

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Speaker 5: do you click on a code, a link in your emails,

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Speaker 5: a text you get, you click on it and it

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Speaker 5: goes and says file not available. You know, some sort

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Speaker 5: of tech issue. But if you do it right and

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Speaker 5: you create a site that will collect that information even better,

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Speaker 5: would you notice the difference if it was a different

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Speaker 5: parking company name, if it then seaving Annapolis? Or It's

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Speaker 5: funny we discussed last couple of days, all of us

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Speaker 5: did what we're going to talk about today. Yesterday in

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Speaker 5: the mail, I got a letter from a unnamed company

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Speaker 5: from there, let's it called let me see their secure

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Speaker 5: processing center. Set of my information got stolen from an

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Speaker 5: unnamed vendor. It possibly included all of or some of

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Speaker 5: my first name, last name, address, email address, so security

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Speaker 5: number dat to birth. They sent me an email this

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Speaker 5: company who lost my information, a secure processing company lost

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Speaker 5: my information potentially. They sent me an email address and

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Speaker 5: a secret code to put in an access code, and

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Speaker 5: they want me to click out another link and submit

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Speaker 5: that information. I don't trust that company. They've already lost

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Speaker 5: my stuff and they're asked me to send it to

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Speaker 5: them again.

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Speaker 2: So do you think that it's a scammer actually wanting

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Speaker 2: you to enter reial information?

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Speaker 5: Probably legitimate, but this legitimate company has filt.

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Speaker 3: They can't do it.

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Speaker 5: They could secure it the first time, so they want

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Speaker 5: me to send my information to them again. I'm just

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Speaker 5: very skeptical.

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Speaker 1: Well, and they're asking you to do the types of things.

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Speaker 1: Let's assume this company is legitimate. What they're asking you

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Speaker 1: to do are the exact type of things that a

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Speaker 1: scammer would ask you to do.

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Speaker 4: Go to this website.

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Speaker 1: That you don't know from a hole in the wall

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Speaker 1: and put in this special secure code, and if it

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Speaker 1: turned out that it was not legitimate, then all of

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Speaker 1: a sudden, they could have access.

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Speaker 4: Part of what we talked about too, is that you.

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Speaker 1: Know, now it used to be that if you had

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Speaker 1: an iPhone that was you know, scam free and malware

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Speaker 1: free and virus and trojan horse and all of those

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Speaker 1: sorts of problems. But in these specific situations that we're

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Speaker 1: talking about, a lot of these things you would do

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Speaker 1: with your iPhone, like scanning a QR code at a

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Speaker 1: public parking garage and doing that that could you know,

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Speaker 1: the days of the iPhone being completely secure or long gone?

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Speaker 5: I thought of two things there. Yeah, technology use has

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Speaker 5: changed so much, and anything that's being used for business

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Speaker 5: in a very positive way to grow business, you know,

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Speaker 5: to continue transacting business, the criminals will find a way

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Speaker 5: exploit that. And that's kind of always been the game

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Speaker 5: of law enforce when you were trying to play catch

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Speaker 5: up with what the bad guys have gotten ahead of you.

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Speaker 5: On you mentioned iPhones being secure, I think it was

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Speaker 5: still during my time as an FBI agen. But there

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Speaker 5: was a terrorist attack in Ky San Berdano, California. There

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Speaker 5: were two phones recovered that the FBI could not get into,

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Speaker 5: and Apple refused to help. They said they could not help,

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Speaker 5: they didn't have the technology. They wanted their consumers to

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Speaker 5: know their phones were so secure. Your informational say they

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Speaker 5: couldn't help you. And then I recall somehow, some way,

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Speaker 5: the FBI was able to access those phones, and they

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Speaker 5: called the director back in the test fight in front

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Speaker 5: of Congress, and then Apple one was demanding to know

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Speaker 5: how we got into those phones, and the director had

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Speaker 5: some kolay funny comments about another private company had developed

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Speaker 5: the software and would not divulge a price, but it

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Speaker 5: was I believe he mentioned something along the lines with

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Speaker 5: ten times his salary, that a company had done that

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Speaker 5: for us.

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Speaker 2: But you just mentioned a private company developed that software

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Speaker 2: to break into the iPhone, and if a private company

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Speaker 2: can do it, then a criminal can do it.

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Speaker 5: And again, I'm no expert in technology, and I'm not

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Speaker 5: an expert in all things FBI. But to bring the

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Speaker 5: whole picture into focus, it was pretty widely accepted as

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Speaker 5: a foreign company as well that had developed that software.

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Speaker 3: Corey Grass is joining us.

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Speaker 2: He's a former FBI special agent, spent twenty years in

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Speaker 2: counterintelligence and counter terrorism. You had mentioned We've been talking

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Speaker 2: a lot about airports, a lot of people waiting in

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Speaker 2: long lines at airports, and there's something that you said

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Speaker 2: you will never do when you're at an airport, And I'm.

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Speaker 5: Not sure if I'm just paranoid and skeptical, but i'd

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Speaker 5: read previously. I heard stories that if you plug your

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Speaker 5: phone into a USB charger, which these days be different,

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Speaker 5: I guess a little different, that it could access your

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Speaker 5: information that as well. So I don't recall ever plugging

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Speaker 5: my phone into an unknown charging base that I don't

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Speaker 5: have control over or no who owns or has access to.

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Speaker 1: And see, that's something I wouldn't think of because when

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Speaker 1: we talked about this before, when we were off the

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Speaker 1: air I thought about the traditional credit card skimmers, and

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Speaker 1: you've heard those stories for a long time, either at

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Speaker 1: the ATM or at the gas station and the criminals

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Speaker 1: put some sort of device and it looks just like

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Speaker 1: it's the you know, the gas pump, but you put

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Speaker 1: your credit card in they're stealing your information. But now

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Speaker 1: that could potentially apply to just USB charging ports at

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Speaker 1: public location, So this is not only at the airport,

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Speaker 1: it's any place that you might go to charge your phone.

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Speaker 1: It could be very It could be something similar to

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Speaker 1: what we've seen with these credit card skimmers, where they

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Speaker 1: just install something in front of it or it looks

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Speaker 1: like an attachment, but to the average consumer, it wouldn't

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Speaker 1: raise alarm bells at all. And then you plug in

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Speaker 1: your USB phone, your USB port into your phone, and

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Speaker 1: all of a sudden, they've had access to your information.

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Speaker 5: It's a new way of doing business for criminals. It's

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Speaker 5: it's more subtle. Again, even in naked, I can sometimes

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Speaker 5: see those skimmers look weird on a gas pump. Something

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Speaker 5: will catch your attention falling off that don't look right,

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Speaker 5: something's abnormal. Technology use doesn't Isn't that that clear to

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Speaker 5: the plane eye to see? And it's on a whole

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Speaker 5: new level now they're way to get access. It used

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Speaker 5: to be you had to as a victim, You had

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Speaker 5: to take a proactive step to fall for their trick.

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Speaker 5: They was in a link, you know, some sort of

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Speaker 5: something that was proactive.

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Speaker 4: You had to do it.

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Speaker 5: Sure seems to be now that they can access your

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Speaker 5: information without you doing something to help them, they can

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Speaker 5: just do it themselves. The article we talked about yesterday

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Speaker 5: a love real fast. They seem to think of this

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Speaker 5: MSN article that these bad guys or other entities can

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Speaker 5: access your information while you clicking on a series of

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Speaker 5: web different websites they could direct you to and things.

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Speaker 5: So again it seems very normal a victim to just

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Speaker 5: click a different websites you're being led to, especially if

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Speaker 5: they entice you to go certain ways with certain topics,

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Speaker 5: and then once you do that combination, then they've got

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Speaker 5: your stuff.

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Speaker 2: How how does a tool like that that was once

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Speaker 2: used by state or intelligence services end up in the

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Speaker 2: hands of criminals? Is it internal leaks, is it black

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Speaker 2: market sales or is it just like reverse engineering?

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Speaker 5: Probably a little bit of everything. But the weakest link

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Speaker 5: is always going to be human beings. When I did investigation,

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Speaker 5: you always start with that who worked the company, who

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Speaker 5: left under bad terms, who suddenly had affluence that didn't

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Speaker 5: have it before. Again, espionage case, it's very similar to that.

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Speaker 5: So usually it's going to be the human being being

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Speaker 5: the weak link, either selling it or giving away out

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Speaker 5: of anger or spite or whatever, but also just accidentally

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Speaker 5: not knowing that they didn't protect it through their coding

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Speaker 5: or whatever it was. That's going to be the biggest

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Speaker 5: issue probably.

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Speaker 4: You know, I think that's really interesting what you talk

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Speaker 4: about about.

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Speaker 1: The human being being the week weakest link, because we

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Speaker 1: saw these stories where you know, big corporations spent billions

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Speaker 1: and billions of dollars building up this incredible IT infrastructure

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Speaker 1: and IT security associated with it. And now what is

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Speaker 1: becoming one of the most successful ways to break into

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Speaker 1: a company's IT structure is a phishing scam. Okay, great,

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Speaker 1: you've got all this wonderful IT security keeping all the

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Speaker 1: bad guys out.

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Speaker 4: But if I can just send an employee an email

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Speaker 4: that has a.

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Speaker 1: Link on it that they click on, then all of

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Speaker 1: a sudden, I've got the same access to that internal

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Speaker 1: IT system that employee you had.

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Speaker 5: And there's so many ways to gain your information and

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Speaker 5: the way you can secure it. I mean, as you

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Speaker 5: took me back to the FBI training this now, this

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Speaker 5: is some of the most basic online training we take

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Speaker 5: as reminders every year. Is wearing your name badge when

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Speaker 5: I work in the State House up here. I always

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Speaker 5: took my name badge when I left because it's not

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Speaker 5: important for people on the street to know who I am,

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Speaker 5: where I work my name. And again, same thing with

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Speaker 5: big corporation up at Indianapolis. You know, Lily, it comings

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Speaker 5: these people. We don't want foreign companies or foreign agencies

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Speaker 5: to know be able to target you based on where

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Speaker 5: you work. All it takes is again it's a very

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Speaker 5: simple scam. A lot of times they see you come out,

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Speaker 5: pick up your patterns, pick up if you're married or not,

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Speaker 5: do you have kids? Are you a drinker? Do you

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Speaker 5: live in downtown Indy? Do you live somewhere else? They

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Speaker 5: follow you, they pick up those patterns, and then they

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Speaker 5: find a way to social engineer it that they will

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Speaker 5: connect with you and get what they want.

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Speaker 3: How is it?

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Speaker 2: What's a realistic way that can you tell if can

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Speaker 2: you tell if your computer or your phone has been compromised?

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Speaker 3: Like, can you tell if somebody's spying on you? Is

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Speaker 3: there a way to pick that up?

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Speaker 5: I believe there's no. In my experience, I don't think there's.

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Speaker 3: Anything with without taking I'll be happening to you and

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Speaker 3: you don't even know.

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Speaker 5: I would get that occasionally when I was still in

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Speaker 5: the FBI, people would call me and say they think

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Speaker 5: their phones were tapped because they could hear the clicking

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Speaker 5: or hear whatever.

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Speaker 4: It doesn't work that way.

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Speaker 5: I would always tell them if even if your phone

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Speaker 5: was being listened to by an agency, there's no there's

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Speaker 5: no signs that gives off any of emissions or anything.

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Speaker 3: So there's no way to defend it like you don't know.

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Speaker 5: I mean, I think probably the first sign as you

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Speaker 5: realize either your credit or something is wrong, your just

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Speaker 5: thing is maybe your computer is slowing down more or

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Speaker 5: things like that, your cell phone's not working right. Possibly,

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Speaker 5: but again that happens so often anyway. Software updates and

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Speaker 5: things like that.

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Speaker 2: Well, and I have to imagine that like the spy

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Speaker 2: where on computers has gotten so much more advanced over

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Speaker 2: the years.

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Speaker 3: It's just gotten better and better.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, again, it's it's a race waray who can get

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Speaker 5: farther ahead. They developed something to get your information. Law

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Speaker 5: enforcement'll catch up to it eventually. Another country will develop

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Speaker 5: a program they want to target a certain thing. We

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Speaker 5: hear about or figure it out eventually and react to that.

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Speaker 5: It's always reacting. It's hard to get ahead of that.

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Speaker 1: We talked again off the air about a story that

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Speaker 1: I want you to tell again too, because I used

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Speaker 1: to do with my job. Used to go to a

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Speaker 1: lot of trade shows, used to fly all over the country,

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Speaker 1: go to life of trade shows. You meet a lot

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Speaker 1: of strangers that give you their business card. Talk to

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Speaker 1: me about trade shows and business cards and how there's weaknesses.

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Speaker 5: There they know Again, that they need you to click

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Speaker 5: on something or access their information to get what they

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Speaker 5: want out of yours. So QR codes on a business

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Speaker 5: card again, I work in real estate now I'm a

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Speaker 5: realtra full time. QR codes my open house flyers. There's

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Speaker 5: QR codes on your links on your website for people

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Speaker 5: to click on. There's QR cards in your business card.

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Speaker 5: I have a QR code on my phone. That's one's

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Speaker 5: my business card reales that I can show my phone,

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Speaker 5: they take a picture of them. Goes other thing. A

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Speaker 5: legitimate business or even a foreign agency conducting business under

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Speaker 5: the cover of darkness can use those same tricks to

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Speaker 5: get you to click on their site either no business name,

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Speaker 5: a confusing business name, or something a logo, and you

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Speaker 5: go back to your office wherever that might be, whether

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Speaker 5: it's the government or a private industry, and you click

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Speaker 5: on that QR code trying to go to their site

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Speaker 5: to see if they can help you with your technology

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Speaker 5: for your company, and then they infiltrate that with your

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Speaker 5: private stuff right to the company.

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Speaker 2: We only have a couple of minutes left here with

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Speaker 2: Corey Grass, former FBI special agent, couple last questions, how

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Speaker 2: big of a risk or a trend. Do these cyber

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Speaker 2: criminals posed to not only personal security but United States

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Speaker 2: national security?

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Speaker 4: It's huge.

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Speaker 5: I mean it's a constant barrage. I work counter intelligence

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Speaker 5: for many years and there's multiple countries that it is

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Speaker 5: constant their ability to try. They will try and steal anything.

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Speaker 5: And I would deal with universities and sometimes have different

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Speaker 5: backgrounds of political opinions on how it works.

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Speaker 4: I lived it one way.

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Speaker 5: They lived a different way with different perspectives, but it

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Speaker 5: is relentless in their pursuit of I mean, the FBI

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Speaker 5: and Indiana had a seed corn in case years ago

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Speaker 5: when I was here, and I forget that the value was.

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Speaker 4: It started with a b.

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Speaker 5: Billions or billion billion dollar loss a seed core coming in.

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Speaker 5: Any that developed a product that a Chinese national had

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Speaker 5: stolen is sent back to their country. And the implications

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Speaker 5: from that are insane because not only did this company

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Speaker 5: spend R and D money for years to develop this

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Speaker 5: product to help feed Americans, but also sell to other

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Speaker 5: countries when they stole that technology. Not only did we

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Speaker 5: not our farmers lost out on selling that product, list

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Speaker 5: all that research time and money, and then that country

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Speaker 5: can then sell the product to other people and steal

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Speaker 5: our profits.

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Speaker 3: That way, they took it back to seed corn.

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Speaker 5: People think seed corn is it's seed corn. Yeah, it's

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Speaker 5: seed corn, unless unless it build up another country's military

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Speaker 5: with that money, unless ithearts our tax base and our military.

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Speaker 5: It's far reaching, and that seedcorn is one little example.

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Speaker 5: It's everything. There's a lot of examples to an under

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Speaker 5: counterintelligence where they noticed a trend of like this certain

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Speaker 5: company buying up I'm going to make an example like

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Speaker 5: a rubber band factory. It sounds like rubber bands are,

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Speaker 5: but what they do is they buy up the entire

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Speaker 5: market and then jack the prices up on it and

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Speaker 5: then take take over everything they want, and that way

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Speaker 5: they shut down. That way they can elevate the whole

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Speaker 5: market to what they want and then shut it down.

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Speaker 5: They just have the one provider within that product.

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Speaker 3: I wanted to ask you before you go.

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Speaker 2: You served in the FBI during the time of Robert

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Speaker 2: Mueller and he had just passed away at the age

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Speaker 2: of eighty one, and the director changed while you were there,

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Speaker 2: So it was partly Mueller and partly Ray.

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Speaker 3: Did you notice a did you ever meet mule Reeler?

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Speaker 5: I did not. It was early in my career now, but.

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Speaker 3: You met Ray often.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, did you notice a difference in the administration or

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Speaker 2: the way things were run in the FBI under the

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Speaker 2: different leadership.

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Speaker 5: I was always a special agent, that was my goal

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Speaker 5: all along. I never put in to be promoted or

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Speaker 5: I did some specialty things. I was a host negotiator.

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Speaker 5: I was the Agent Association RED for Indiana for many

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Speaker 5: years and on the national board for several years at

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Speaker 5: the end. So you didn't really notice. As the street

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Speaker 5: level cop I call it. You know, when you get

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Speaker 5: a new chief, it doesn't affect morale maybe a little bit,

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Speaker 5: but it doesn't really check affect the day to day activities.

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Speaker 5: They'll they'll change the priorities and say we're going to

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Speaker 5: be more focus on whatever it is, counter terrors and

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Speaker 5: counter intelligence, go back to violent crime if there's a

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Speaker 5: surge in that. But typically once you get down to

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Speaker 5: the street level where people are working in the cases,

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Speaker 5: it doesn't affect your world all that much.

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Speaker 3: You just going in and doing this.

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Speaker 5: I do remember people talking to him, obviously the respect

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Speaker 5: that he people had for him based on his military

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Speaker 5: service prior, but also I got hired just after nine

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Speaker 5: to eleven. He got hired before I did, but he

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Speaker 5: took over to that weird transition time where pe we're

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Speaker 5: trying to split the FBI and half for an I

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Speaker 5: five I six type model, and he was able to

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Speaker 5: keep it together as one intelligence and criminal organization same time.

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Speaker 5: That was kind of that was my memory of what

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Speaker 5: he did during our time.

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Speaker 3: Well, we appreciate you coming in. You're going to be

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Speaker 3: here next week.

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Speaker 5: April fool Day.

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Speaker 2: Wouldn' miss it, Corey Grass, former FBI special agent.

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Speaker 3: We appreciate you and everything that you've done. Before we

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Speaker 3: let you go.

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Speaker 2: We have to tell everybody where they can find you

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Speaker 2: more information about you.

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Speaker 5: The easiest way to find is on Facebook. I'm just

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Speaker 5: Corey Grass. Co Ry Grass, like you moo or. I

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Speaker 5: do have a partnership with the company I work with

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Speaker 5: that does a consulting for active shooter and a lot

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Speaker 5: of security issues. It's APEX Defend dot.

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Speaker 2: Com, Apex Defend dot Com. Corey Grass, all right, thank you.

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Speaker 2: You're listening to ninety three WIBC