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Speaker 1: Joining us.

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Speaker 2: In the WIBC studios, we have former FBI special agent

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Speaker 2: Corey Grass. He spent twenty years in counterintelligence and counter terrorism.

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Speaker 2: It's Casey and Jim you're listening to on ninety three WIBC.

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Speaker 1: So Corey.

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Speaker 2: Yesterday, Jim and I discussed this article spyware, once used

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Speaker 2: by governments, is now spreading to cyber criminals, and I thought, well,

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Speaker 2: we've got we've got a guy.

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Speaker 3: Love it when we got a guy.

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Speaker 1: We got a guy, and here you are.

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Speaker 2: So how big of a problem is it when government

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Speaker 2: grade spyware tools leak into the hands of cyber criminals

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Speaker 2: or just regular criminals.

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Speaker 4: Well, first, I might say, thanks for having me. I'm

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Speaker 4: glad you think of criminals you think of me. I'm

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Speaker 4: not sure what that says about me, but I appreciate it.

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Speaker 4: That type of technology is so prevalent these days. It's crazy.

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Speaker 4: Like you said, it was a high level use previously

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Speaker 4: by higher powers that had access to it, and now

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Speaker 4: that it's worked this way down, I think it's kind

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Speaker 4: of foolish for any of us in the United States.

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Speaker 4: I think our stuff is safe in any capacity because

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Speaker 4: there's so many people in so many ways trying to

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Speaker 4: steal your information multi ways.

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Speaker 2: Let's talk about some of the ways. Okay, some of

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Speaker 2: the things that you're skeptical of or you've seen or

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Speaker 2: people need to be aware of.

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Speaker 4: I'll mention you guys previously, but QR codes are a

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Speaker 4: great way for people to steal your information as simple

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Speaker 4: as City of Indianapolis parking signs downtown. You go to

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Speaker 4: pay your parking meter. Now everything's automated, then which you

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Speaker 4: to click on the QR code send your money that way?

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Speaker 4: Will it cost me a dollar apiece for a sticker

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Speaker 4: to put on those signs? And then I have you

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Speaker 4: send you to my website or my corrupt way of

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Speaker 4: doing business, and now I have all your personal information

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Speaker 4: as simple as that a simple sticker.

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Speaker 3: Okay. So what you're saying is, and you're right, those

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Speaker 3: QR codes are everywhere, especially with city parking. So you

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Speaker 3: go there and you park, and then you've got to

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Speaker 3: go to the little shi phone and you got to

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Speaker 3: scan it with your phone and then you give them

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Speaker 3: all your credit card information and your license plate and

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Speaker 3: that's how they charge you for your parking. And what

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Speaker 3: you're saying is somebody could easily just print out a

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Speaker 3: sticker of their own QR code that's the same size

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Speaker 3: as the QR code on the sign, and just slap

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Speaker 3: that sticker on there. And then so that when they

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Speaker 3: scan my QR code, the criminal that I've put on there,

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Speaker 3: it's going to take them to this website that's going

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Speaker 3: to download some malicious software onto their phone or whatever else.

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Speaker 4: Correct, and particularly if you're good enough, wow, to have

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Speaker 4: a website that it goes to me? How many times

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Speaker 4: do you click on a code, a link in your emails,

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Speaker 4: a text you get, you click on it and it

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Speaker 4: goes and says file not available. You know, some sort

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Speaker 4: of tech issue. But if you do it right and

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Speaker 4: you create a site that will collect that information even better,

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Speaker 4: would you notice the difference if it was a different

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Speaker 4: parking company name, if it then seaving Annapolis? Or It's

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Speaker 4: funny we discussed last couple of days, all of us

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Speaker 4: did what we're going to talk about today. Yesterday in

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Speaker 4: the mail, I got a letter from a unnamed company

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Speaker 4: from there, let's it called let me see their secure

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Speaker 4: processing center. Set of my information got stolen from an

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Speaker 4: unnamed vendor. It possibly included all of or some of

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Speaker 4: my first name, last name, address, email address, so security

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Speaker 4: number dat to birth. They sent me an email this

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Speaker 4: company who lost my information, a secure processing company lost

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Speaker 4: my information potentially. They sent me an email address and

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Speaker 4: a secret code to put in an access code, and

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Speaker 4: they want me to click out another link and submit

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Speaker 4: that information. I don't trust that company. They've already lost

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Speaker 4: my stuff and they're asked me to send it to

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Speaker 4: them again.

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Speaker 2: So do you think that it's a scammer actually wanting

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Speaker 2: you to enter reial information?

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Speaker 4: Probably legitimate, but this legitimate company has filt.

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Speaker 1: They can't do it.

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Speaker 4: They could secure it the first time, so they want

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Speaker 4: me to send my information to them again. I'm just

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Speaker 4: very skeptical.

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Speaker 3: Well, and they're asking you to do the types of things.

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Speaker 3: Let's assume this company is legitimate. What they're asking you

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Speaker 3: to do are the exact type of things that a

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Speaker 3: scammer would ask you to do. Go to this website

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Speaker 3: that you don't know from a hole in the wall

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Speaker 3: and put in this special secure code, and if it

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Speaker 3: turned out that it was not legitimate, then all of

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Speaker 3: a sudden, they could have access. Part of what we

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Speaker 3: talked about too, is that you know, now it used

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Speaker 3: to be that if you had an iPhone that was

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Speaker 3: you know, scam free and malware free and virus and

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Speaker 3: trojan horse and all of those sorts of problems. But

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Speaker 3: in these specific situations that we're talking about, a lot

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Speaker 3: of these things you would do with your iPhone, like

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Speaker 3: scanning a QR code at a public parking garage and

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Speaker 3: doing that that could you know, the days of the

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Speaker 3: iPhone being completely secure or long gone?

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Speaker 4: I thought of two things there. Yeah, technology use has

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Speaker 4: changed so much, and anything that's being used for business

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Speaker 4: in a very positive way to grow business, you know,

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Speaker 4: to continue transacting business, the criminals will find a way

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Speaker 4: exploit that. And that's kind of always been the game

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Speaker 4: of law enforce when you were trying to play catch

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Speaker 4: up with what the bad guys have gotten ahead of you.

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Speaker 4: On you mentioned iPhones being secure, I think it was

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Speaker 4: still during my time as an FBI agen. But there

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Speaker 4: was a terrorist attack in Ky San Berdano, California. There

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Speaker 4: were two phones recovered that the FBI could not get into,

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Speaker 4: and Apple refused to help. They said they could not help,

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Speaker 4: they didn't have the technology. They wanted their consumers to

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Speaker 4: know their phones were so secure. Your informational say they

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Speaker 4: couldn't help you. And then I recall somehow, some way,

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Speaker 4: the FBI was able to access those phones, and they

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Speaker 4: called the director back in the test fight in front

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Speaker 4: of Congress, and then Apple one was demanding to know

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Speaker 4: how we got into those phones, and the director had

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Speaker 4: some kolay funny comments about another private company had developed

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Speaker 4: the software and would not divulge a price, but it

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Speaker 4: was I believe he mentioned something along the lines with

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Speaker 4: ten times his salary, that a company had done that

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Speaker 4: for us.

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Speaker 2: But you just mentioned a private company developed that software

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Speaker 2: to break into the iPhone, and if a private company

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Speaker 2: can do it, then a criminal can do it.

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Speaker 4: And again, I'm no expert in technology, and I'm not

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Speaker 4: an expert in all things FBI. But to bring the

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Speaker 4: whole picture into focus, it was pretty widely accepted as

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Speaker 4: a foreign company as well that had developed that software.

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Speaker 1: Corey Grass is joining us.

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Speaker 2: He's a former FBI special agent, spent twenty years in

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Speaker 2: counterintelligence and counter terrorism. You had mentioned We've been talking

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Speaker 2: a lot about airports, a lot of people waiting in

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Speaker 2: long lines at airports, and there's something that you said

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Speaker 2: you will never do when you're at an airport, And I'm.

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Speaker 4: Not sure if I'm just paranoid and skeptical, but i'd

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Speaker 4: read previously. I heard stories that if you plug your

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Speaker 4: phone into a USB charger, which these days be different,

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Speaker 4: I guess a little different, that it could access your

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Speaker 4: information that as well. So I don't recall ever plugging

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Speaker 4: my phone into an unknown charging base that I don't

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Speaker 4: have control over or no who owns or has access to.

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Speaker 3: And see, that's something I wouldn't think of because when

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Speaker 3: we talked about this before, when we were off the

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Speaker 3: air I thought about the traditional credit card skimmers, and

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Speaker 3: you've heard those stories for a long time, either at

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Speaker 3: the ATM or at the gas station and the criminals

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Speaker 3: put some sort of device and it looks just like

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Speaker 3: it's the you know, the gas pump, but you put

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Speaker 3: your credit card in they're stealing your information. But now

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Speaker 3: that could potentially apply to just USB charging ports at

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Speaker 3: public location, So this is not only at the airport,

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Speaker 3: it's any place that you might go to charge your phone.

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Speaker 3: It could be very It could be something similar to

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Speaker 3: what we've seen with these credit card skimmers, where they

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Speaker 3: just install something in front of it or it looks

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Speaker 3: like an attachment, but to the average consumer, it wouldn't

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Speaker 3: raise alarm bells at all. And then you plug in

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Speaker 3: your USB phone, your USB port into your phone, and

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Speaker 3: all of a sudden, they've had access to your information.

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Speaker 4: It's a new way of doing business for criminals. It's

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Speaker 4: it's more subtle. Again, even in naked, I can sometimes

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Speaker 4: see those skimmers look weird on a gas pump. Something

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Speaker 4: will catch your attention falling off that don't look right,

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Speaker 4: something's abnormal. Technology use doesn't Isn't that that clear to

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Speaker 4: the plane eye to see? And it's on a whole

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Speaker 4: new level now they're way to get access. It used

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Speaker 4: to be you had to as a victim, You had

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Speaker 4: to take a proactive step to fall for their trick.

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Speaker 4: They was in a link, you know, some sort of

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Speaker 4: something that was proactive.

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Speaker 3: You had to do it.

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Speaker 4: Sure seems to be now that they can access your

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Speaker 4: information without you doing something to help them, they can

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Speaker 4: just do it themselves. The article we talked about yesterday

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Speaker 4: a love real fast. They seem to think of this

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Speaker 4: MSN article that these bad guys or other entities can

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Speaker 4: access your information while you clicking on a series of

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Speaker 4: web different websites they could direct you to and things.

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Speaker 4: So again it seems very normal a victim to just

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Speaker 4: click a different websites you're being led to, especially if

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Speaker 4: they entice you to go certain ways with certain topics,

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Speaker 4: and then once you do that combination, then they've got

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Speaker 4: your stuff.

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Speaker 2: How how does a tool like that that was once

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Speaker 2: used by state or intelligence services end up in the

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Speaker 2: hands of criminals? Is it internal leaks, is it black

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Speaker 2: market sales or is it just like reverse engineering?

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Speaker 4: Probably a little bit of everything. But the weakest link

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Speaker 4: is always going to be human beings. When I did investigation,

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Speaker 4: you always start with that who worked the company, who

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Speaker 4: left under bad terms, who suddenly had affluence that didn't

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Speaker 4: have it before. Again, espionage case, it's very similar to that.

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Speaker 4: So usually it's going to be the human being being

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Speaker 4: the weak link, either selling it or giving away out

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Speaker 4: of anger or spite or whatever, but also just accidentally

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Speaker 4: not knowing that they didn't protect it through their coding

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Speaker 4: or whatever it was. That's going to be the biggest

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Speaker 4: issue probably.

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Speaker 3: You know, I think that's really interesting what you talk

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Speaker 3: about about the human being being the week weakest link,

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Speaker 3: because we saw these stories where you know, big corporations

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Speaker 3: spent billions and billions of dollars building up this incredible

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Speaker 3: IT infrastructure and IT security associated with it. And now

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Speaker 3: what is becoming one of the most successful ways to

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Speaker 3: break into a company's IT structure is a phishing scam. Okay, great,

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Speaker 3: you've got all this wonderful IT security keeping all the

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Speaker 3: bad guys out. But if I can just send an

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Speaker 3: employee an email that has a link on it that

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Speaker 3: they click on, then all of a sudden, I've got

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Speaker 3: the same access to that internal IT system that employee

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Speaker 3: you had.

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Speaker 4: And there's so many ways to gain your information and

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Speaker 4: the way you can secure it. I mean, as you

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Speaker 4: took me back to the FBI training this now, this

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Speaker 4: is some of the most basic online training we take

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Speaker 4: as reminders every year. Is wearing your name badge when

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Speaker 4: I work in the State House up here. I always

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Speaker 4: took my name badge when I left because it's not

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Speaker 4: important for people on the street to know who I am,

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Speaker 4: where I work my name. And again, same thing with

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Speaker 4: big corporation up at Indianapolis. You know, Lily, it comings

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Speaker 4: these people. We don't want foreign companies or foreign agencies

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Speaker 4: to know be able to target you based on where

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Speaker 4: you work. All it takes is again it's a very

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Speaker 4: simple scam. A lot of times they see you come out,

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Speaker 4: pick up your patterns, pick up if you're married or not,

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Speaker 4: do you have kids? Are you a drinker? Do you

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Speaker 4: live in downtown Indy? Do you live somewhere else? They

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Speaker 4: follow you, they pick up those patterns, and then they

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Speaker 4: find a way to social engineer it that they will

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Speaker 4: connect with you and get what they want.

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Speaker 1: How is it?

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Speaker 2: What's a realistic way that can you tell if can

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Speaker 2: you tell if your computer or your phone has been compromised? Like,

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Speaker 2: can you tell if somebody's spying on you? Is there

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Speaker 2: a way to pick that up?

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Speaker 4: I believe there's no. In my experience, I don't think there's.

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Speaker 2: Anything with without taking I'll be happening to you and

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Speaker 2: you don't even know.

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Speaker 4: I would get that occasionally when I was still in

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Speaker 4: the FBI, people would call me and say they think

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Speaker 4: their phones were tapped because they could hear the clicking

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Speaker 4: or hear whatever.

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Speaker 3: It doesn't work that way.

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Speaker 4: I would always tell them if even if your phone

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Speaker 4: was being listened to by an agency, there's no there's

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Speaker 4: no signs that gives off any of emissions or anything.

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Speaker 2: So there's no way to defend it like you don't know.

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Speaker 4: I mean, I think probably the first sign as you

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Speaker 4: realize either your credit or something is wrong, your just

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Speaker 4: thing is maybe your computer is slowing down more or

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Speaker 4: things like that, your cell phone's not working right. Possibly,

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Speaker 4: but again that happens so often anyway. Software updates and

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Speaker 4: things like that.

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Speaker 2: Well, and I have to imagine that like the spy

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Speaker 2: where on computers has gotten so much more advanced over

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Speaker 2: the years. It's just gotten better and better.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, again, it's it's a race waray who can get

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Speaker 4: farther ahead. They developed something to get your information. Law

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Speaker 4: enforcement'll catch up to it eventually. Another country will develop

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Speaker 4: a program they want to target a certain thing. We

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Speaker 4: hear about or figure it out eventually and react to that.

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Speaker 4: It's always reacting. It's hard to get ahead of that.

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Speaker 3: We talked again off the air about a story that

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Speaker 3: I want you to tell again too, because I used

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Speaker 3: to do with my job. Used to go to a

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Speaker 3: lot of trade shows, used to fly all over the country,

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Speaker 3: go to life of trade shows. You meet a lot

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Speaker 3: of strangers that give you their business card. Talk to

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Speaker 3: me about trade shows and business cards and how there's weaknesses.

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Speaker 4: There they know Again, that they need you to click

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Speaker 4: on something or access their information to get what they

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Speaker 4: want out of yours. So QR codes on a business

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Speaker 4: card again, I work in real estate now I'm a

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Speaker 4: realtra full time. QR codes my open house flyers. There's

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Speaker 4: QR codes on your links on your website for people

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Speaker 4: to click on. There's QR cards in your business card.

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Speaker 4: I have a QR code on my phone. That's one's

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Speaker 4: my business card reales that I can show my phone,

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Speaker 4: they take a picture of them. Goes other thing. A

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Speaker 4: legitimate business or even a foreign agency conducting business under

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Speaker 4: the cover of darkness can use those same tricks to

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Speaker 4: get you to click on their site either no business name,

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Speaker 4: a confusing business name, or something a logo, and you

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Speaker 4: go back to your office wherever that might be, whether

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Speaker 4: it's the government or a private industry, and you click

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Speaker 4: on that QR code trying to go to their site

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Speaker 4: to see if they can help you with your technology

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Speaker 4: for your company, and then they infiltrate that with your

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Speaker 4: private stuff right to the company.

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Speaker 2: We only have a couple of minutes left here with

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Speaker 2: Corey Grass, former FBI special agent, couple last questions, how

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Speaker 2: big of a risk or a trend. Do these cyber

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Speaker 2: criminals posed to not only personal security but United States

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Speaker 2: national security?

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Speaker 3: It's huge.

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Speaker 4: I mean it's a constant barrage. I work counter intelligence

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Speaker 4: for many years and there's multiple countries that it is

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Speaker 4: constant their ability to try. They will try and steal anything.

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Speaker 4: And I would deal with universities and sometimes have different

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Speaker 4: backgrounds of political opinions on how it works. I lived

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Speaker 4: it one way. They lived a different way with different perspectives,

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Speaker 4: but it is relentless in their pursuit of I mean,

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Speaker 4: the FBI and Indiana had a seed corn in case

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Speaker 4: years ago when I was here, and I forget that

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Speaker 4: the value was.

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Speaker 3: It started with a b.

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Speaker 4: Billions or billion billion dollar loss a seed core coming in.

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Speaker 4: Any that developed a product that a Chinese national had

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Speaker 4: stolen is sent back to their country. And the implications

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Speaker 4: from that are insane because not only did this company

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Speaker 4: spend R and D money for years to develop this

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Speaker 4: product to help feed Americans, but also sell to other

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Speaker 4: countries when they stole that technology. Not only did we

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Speaker 4: not our farmers lost out on selling that product, list

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Speaker 4: all that research time and money, and then that country

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Speaker 4: can then sell the product to other people and steal

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Speaker 4: our profits.

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Speaker 2: That way, they took it back to seed corn.

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Speaker 4: People think seed corn is it's seed corn. Yeah, it's

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Speaker 4: seed corn, unless unless it build up another country's military

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Speaker 4: with that money, unless ithearts our tax base and our military.

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Speaker 4: It's far reaching, and that seedcorn is one little example.

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Speaker 4: It's everything. There's a lot of examples to an under

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Speaker 4: counterintelligence where they noticed a trend of like this certain

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Speaker 4: company buying up I'm going to make an example like

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Speaker 4: a rubber band factory. It sounds like rubber bands are,

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Speaker 4: but what they do is they buy up the entire

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Speaker 4: market and then jack the prices up on it and

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Speaker 4: then take take over everything they want, and that way

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Speaker 4: they shut down. That way they can elevate the whole

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Speaker 4: market to what they want and then shut it down.

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Speaker 4: They just have the one provider within that product.

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Speaker 1: I wanted to ask you before you go.

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Speaker 2: You served in the FBI during the time of Robert

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Speaker 2: Mueller and he had just passed away at the age

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Speaker 2: of eighty one, and the director changed while you were there,

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Speaker 2: So it was partly Mueller and partly Ray. Did you

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Speaker 2: notice a did you ever meet mule Reeler?

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Speaker 4: I did not. It was early in my career now, but.

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Speaker 2: You met Ray often. Yeah, did you notice a difference

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Speaker 2: in the administration or the way things were run in

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Speaker 2: the FBI under the different leadership.

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Speaker 4: I was always a special agent, that was my goal

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Speaker 4: all along. I never put in to be promoted or

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Speaker 4: I did some specialty things. I was a host negotiator.

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Speaker 4: I was the Agent Association RED for Indiana for many

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Speaker 4: years and on the national board for several years at

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Speaker 4: the end. So you didn't really notice. As the street

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Speaker 4: level cop I call it. You know, when you get

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Speaker 4: a new chief, it doesn't affect morale maybe a little bit,

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Speaker 4: but it doesn't really check affect the day to day activities.

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Speaker 4: They'll they'll change the priorities and say we're going to

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Speaker 4: be more focus on whatever it is, counter terrors and

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Speaker 4: counter intelligence, go back to violent crime if there's a

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Speaker 4: surge in that. But typically once you get down to

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Speaker 4: the street level where people are working in the cases,

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Speaker 4: it doesn't affect your world all that much.

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Speaker 2: You just going in and doing this.

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Speaker 4: I do remember people talking to him, obviously the respect

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Speaker 4: that he people had for him based on his military

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Speaker 4: service prior, but also I got hired just after nine

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Speaker 4: to eleven. He got hired before I did, but he

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Speaker 4: took over to that weird transition time where pe we're

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Speaker 4: trying to split the FBI and half for an I

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Speaker 4: five I six type model, and he was able to

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Speaker 4: keep it together as one intelligence and criminal organization same time.

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Speaker 4: That was kind of that was my memory of what

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Speaker 4: he did during our time.

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Speaker 2: Well, we appreciate you coming in. You're gonna be here next.

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Speaker 4: Week April fool Day.

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Speaker 2: Wouldn' miss it, Corey Grass, former FBI special agent.

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Speaker 1: We appreciate you.

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Speaker 2: And everything that you've done.

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Speaker 1: Before we let you go.

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Speaker 2: We have to tell everybody where they can find you

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Speaker 2: more information about you.

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Speaker 4: The easiest way to find is on Facebook. I'm just

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Speaker 4: Corey Grass. Co Ry Grass, like you moo or. I

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Speaker 4: do have a partnership with the company I work with

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Speaker 4: that does a consulting for active shooter and a lot

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Speaker 4: of security issues. It's APEX Defend dot.

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Speaker 2: Com, Apex Defend dot Com. Corey Grass, all right, thank you.

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Speaker 2: You're listening to ninety three WIBC.

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Speaker 3: What is your problem? I got a lot of problems

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Speaker 3: with your people. We have a problem.

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Speaker 4: What's your problem?

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Speaker 3: I've got ninety nine problems On ninety three double YBC.

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Speaker 2: All right, here we go some group therapy and today, Jim,

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Speaker 2: what's your problem.

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Speaker 3: Here's the problem. Major League Baseball is expanding their replay

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Speaker 3: system in the form of what they are calling automatic

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Speaker 3: Ball Strike Challenge System or the ABS Challenge systems. Robottompires, robottompiers.

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Speaker 3: That's exactly right. And look, I don't have a problem

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Speaker 3: with technology and sports, and especially a sport that is

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Speaker 3: where tradition is such an integral part of the sport

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Speaker 3: like it is with Major League Baseball. Here's the problem

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Speaker 3: I have with it. I've seen this work in person.

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Speaker 3: I went to an Indianapolis Indians game last year the

402
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Speaker 3: minor league baseball team here in town, and Minor league

403
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Speaker 3: Baseball's had this for a few years, and you can

404
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Speaker 3: challenge balls and strikes, and the problem with it is

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Speaker 3: it slows the game down. Because recently, the big change

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Speaker 3: in Major League Baseball has been the pitch clock, and

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Speaker 3: a lot of people were against this, but man, the

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Speaker 3: pitch clock has improved the pace of a baseball game

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Speaker 3: dramatically and it's just made the game so much more

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Speaker 3: enjoyable to watch it. By the way, baseball ratings have

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Speaker 3: been through the roof since they put the pitch clock

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Speaker 3: in there, and a lot of people were against it,

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Speaker 3: and it's been proven to be very popular, very successful,

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Speaker 3: because now we've got this quick pace of game. Pitchers

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Speaker 3: can't sit on the pitching mound forever and you know,

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Speaker 3: take their time like they used to. They got to

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Speaker 3: move it forward. Well, now we've got an additional replay

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Speaker 3: option on balls and strikes that is going to counteract

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Speaker 3: what Major League Baseball just did a couple of years

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Speaker 3: ago with the pitch clock. So we sped up the game,

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Speaker 3: and now we're going to slow it down with more replays.

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Speaker 2: So you've got batters, pitchers, and catchers who can immediately

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Speaker 2: challenge a call by tapping their helmet or cap within

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Speaker 2: a few seconds.

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Speaker 1: The experts are.

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Speaker 2: Saying that purists are gonna hate it for about two weeks,

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Speaker 2: but then they'll notice that a bad call could cost

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Speaker 2: someone a perfect game. And if you have the robot

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Speaker 2: umpires checking everything with their high speed cameras much like

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Speaker 2: the Hawkeye, then they're going to change their mind because

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Speaker 2: their team may end up winning the game.

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Speaker 3: I understand, and this has always been the challenge with replay,

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Speaker 3: whether it's in the NBA or the NFL or Major

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Speaker 3: League Baseball or whatever, is that it just can dramatically

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Speaker 3: slow down the pace of the game. And that was

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Speaker 3: a big problem with baseball, and Baseball fixes the problem

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00:18:18,920 --> 00:18:20,960
Speaker 3: by putting in the pitch clock, and now we're just

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Speaker 3: going to throw all of those games away by putting

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00:18:23,800 --> 00:18:26,720
Speaker 3: in this ABS system where you can challenge balls and strikes.

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Speaker 3: My biggest problem is that, Look, I'm a technology guy

441
00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:32,240
Speaker 3: and I'm not a big sentimentalist, kind of traditionalist kind

442
00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:33,960
Speaker 3: of guy where I'm like, oh, they should never change

443
00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:35,760
Speaker 3: the game. I'm fine if you want to make changes

444
00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:37,600
Speaker 3: to the game, but you just sped the game up,

445
00:18:37,760 --> 00:18:39,119
Speaker 3: and now you're going to go back and slow the

446
00:18:39,400 --> 00:18:40,200
Speaker 3: game back down again.

447
00:18:40,240 --> 00:18:42,080
Speaker 2: But the goal is to cut down on the blown calls,

448
00:18:42,480 --> 00:18:45,800
Speaker 2: especially on some really close pitches in key moments of games.

449
00:18:46,119 --> 00:18:50,800
Speaker 3: Understand that, But look, sports and referees and umpires and officials,

450
00:18:50,960 --> 00:18:54,800
Speaker 3: it's always going to have a certain level of subjectivity

451
00:18:54,840 --> 00:18:57,840
Speaker 3: to it. There's always going to be officials that make

452
00:18:57,880 --> 00:19:00,320
Speaker 3: the wrong call. That's just part of the game. Game.

453
00:19:00,600 --> 00:19:02,840
Speaker 3: The fact that it's slowing it down after we just

454
00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:04,879
Speaker 3: sped it up, we just got here.

455
00:19:04,720 --> 00:19:07,120
Speaker 2: You're not upset about the fact that now you can't

456
00:19:07,119 --> 00:19:08,160
Speaker 2: blame it on an umpire.

457
00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:11,359
Speaker 3: I've always hated that. Look, if your team loses and

458
00:19:11,359 --> 00:19:13,119
Speaker 3: you spend the whole next day talking about how the

459
00:19:13,119 --> 00:19:16,439
Speaker 3: ref suck, you know what, that's a terrible argument.

460
00:19:16,560 --> 00:19:17,320
Speaker 1: Find your way to win.

461
00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:19,760
Speaker 3: Yeah, exactly, figure out a way to win. Every team's

462
00:19:19,760 --> 00:19:22,680
Speaker 3: got challenges and have to overcome obstacles. Sometimes you got

463
00:19:22,680 --> 00:19:25,840
Speaker 3: to overcome the obstacle. And that's the ref you're listening to.

464
00:19:25,920 --> 00:19:37,840
Speaker 2: Ninety three WYBC, Good Morning. Americans can smell when something

465
00:19:37,880 --> 00:19:41,320
Speaker 2: doesn't have a source. There's a new poll out, a

466
00:19:41,400 --> 00:19:43,960
Speaker 2: new national poll, and it said that very few Americans

467
00:19:44,080 --> 00:19:49,520
Speaker 2: use AI chatbots as their first choice for breaking news. Well,

468
00:19:49,560 --> 00:19:54,520
Speaker 2: no kidding, this shouldn't surprise anybody. AI summarizes, it doesn't report,

469
00:19:54,760 --> 00:19:57,120
Speaker 2: and until a robot can actually knock on a door

470
00:19:57,160 --> 00:19:59,879
Speaker 2: and get hung up on, treat it like a tool,

471
00:20:00,359 --> 00:20:05,840
Speaker 2: not a journalist. AI is not journalism, AI summarizes, And

472
00:20:05,880 --> 00:20:10,000
Speaker 2: people who go to AI chatbots as their first choice

473
00:20:10,000 --> 00:20:13,400
Speaker 2: for breaking news are pretty slim in numbers.

474
00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:15,440
Speaker 3: Yeah, and this was done by a very reputable pole

475
00:20:15,520 --> 00:20:18,320
Speaker 3: in research. FE Research did these did this bowl and

476
00:20:18,440 --> 00:20:21,800
Speaker 3: only one percent of adults say they use AI chatbots

477
00:20:21,800 --> 00:20:24,880
Speaker 3: first for breaking news. I'm surprised, And so who are

478
00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:27,520
Speaker 3: those one percent wackos out there that go to AI

479
00:20:27,640 --> 00:20:30,320
Speaker 3: chatbots for breaking news first? I mean, just look what

480
00:20:30,359 --> 00:20:33,480
Speaker 3: we've witnessed since the Iran War started. When when when

481
00:20:33,800 --> 00:20:37,160
Speaker 3: the you know, military operation first started, all you had

482
00:20:37,160 --> 00:20:39,600
Speaker 3: to do was go to Twitter and it was nothing

483
00:20:39,680 --> 00:20:45,160
Speaker 3: but fake AI generated video that trying to depict itself

484
00:20:45,359 --> 00:20:49,040
Speaker 3: as real life events when it was clearly fake. I

485
00:20:49,160 --> 00:20:51,560
Speaker 3: just don't see how they Yeah, I mean, look, we're

486
00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:54,480
Speaker 3: just getting started down the road in this whole AI thing.

487
00:20:54,800 --> 00:20:57,840
Speaker 3: The idea that there's any trust associated with it is

488
00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:01,040
Speaker 3: something I didn't need a poll, but I'm glad to

489
00:21:01,080 --> 00:21:03,040
Speaker 3: see that only one percent of the public goes to

490
00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:03,480
Speaker 3: it first.

491
00:21:03,720 --> 00:21:05,440
Speaker 1: But where do people go for their news?

492
00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:09,479
Speaker 2: Thirty six percent choose their preferred news organization like a

493
00:21:09,520 --> 00:21:13,040
Speaker 2: specific TV or newspaper. Twenty eight percent go to search

494
00:21:13,119 --> 00:21:17,520
Speaker 2: engines like Google or Bing. You have nineteen percent using

495
00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:20,800
Speaker 2: social media to get breaking news. That's the number that

496
00:21:20,880 --> 00:21:24,439
Speaker 2: surprises me the most because I always feel like X

497
00:21:24,600 --> 00:21:27,800
Speaker 2: or Twitter are so much quicker on breaking news than

498
00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:31,920
Speaker 2: any other news source, especially you know, your local news

499
00:21:31,960 --> 00:21:33,560
Speaker 2: or even national news. For that matter.

500
00:21:33,760 --> 00:21:38,320
Speaker 3: Absolutely. Twitter has always been essentially a real time news feed,

501
00:21:39,200 --> 00:21:42,159
Speaker 3: and it's and and when breaking news happens, like the

502
00:21:42,240 --> 00:21:45,040
Speaker 3: when the war and Iran started, I mean Twitter usage

503
00:21:45,080 --> 00:21:47,720
Speaker 3: went through the roof because that's where everybody goes. I

504
00:21:47,760 --> 00:21:51,280
Speaker 3: think where people may be confusing this is and the

505
00:21:51,280 --> 00:21:54,240
Speaker 3: problem here is there's so much misinformation on social media and.

506
00:21:54,280 --> 00:21:54,880
Speaker 2: That's so bad.

507
00:21:54,880 --> 00:21:58,520
Speaker 3: There's so much phony AI videos and photos, and people

508
00:21:58,600 --> 00:22:02,679
Speaker 3: just post stuff that they know is intentionally false because

509
00:22:02,680 --> 00:22:05,840
Speaker 3: it generates them engagement. And because Twitter, for certain people

510
00:22:05,880 --> 00:22:08,520
Speaker 3: can pay you for your engagement, they can actually make

511
00:22:08,600 --> 00:22:11,680
Speaker 3: money off of posting obvious fake information. So I think

512
00:22:11,840 --> 00:22:14,320
Speaker 3: that's the problem with social media. If you're smart enough

513
00:22:14,720 --> 00:22:18,000
Speaker 3: and kind of have the wherewithal to be able to

514
00:22:18,119 --> 00:22:22,119
Speaker 3: recognize the misinformation and the fake news from the real news,

515
00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:24,840
Speaker 3: then yeah, Twitter and social media is the perfect place

516
00:22:24,840 --> 00:22:25,600
Speaker 3: for breaking news.

517
00:22:25,640 --> 00:22:27,879
Speaker 2: I had no idea that this was even a job,

518
00:22:27,960 --> 00:22:29,400
Speaker 2: but apparently it is.

519
00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:30,360
Speaker 1: Did you know that the.

520
00:22:30,400 --> 00:22:33,720
Speaker 2: United States has a brand ambassador.

521
00:22:33,960 --> 00:22:35,040
Speaker 3: I think it's new, isn't it.

522
00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:38,280
Speaker 2: Well, the Biden administration had one. Oh well, then Biden

523
00:22:38,320 --> 00:22:43,320
Speaker 2: Administration's brand ambassador liked Hunter Biden's artwork. The New Guy

524
00:22:43,640 --> 00:22:48,280
Speaker 2: under Donald Trump. He's a conservative influencer and author, and

525
00:22:48,520 --> 00:22:53,240
Speaker 2: apparently he likes Hooters. Yes, I'm talking about the restaurantaurant.

526
00:22:53,280 --> 00:22:57,320
Speaker 2: They're calling him an alpha male, so he's a Dude's dude.

527
00:22:57,880 --> 00:23:02,800
Speaker 2: He likes hot wings over Biden's art. He's his name

528
00:23:02,880 --> 00:23:07,240
Speaker 2: is Nick Adams, and he's an Australian American who is naturalized.

529
00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:10,439
Speaker 2: In twenty one and he became known as a Trump

530
00:23:10,520 --> 00:23:15,359
Speaker 2: aligned conservative commentator and writer. He was previously nominated to

531
00:23:15,359 --> 00:23:20,440
Speaker 2: be US Ambassador to Malaysia. Nomination fell apart, but now

532
00:23:20,480 --> 00:23:25,120
Speaker 2: he's in this new position as America's brand Ambassador. He's

533
00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:30,720
Speaker 2: in charge of getting people excited about American tourism, exceptionalism,

534
00:23:31,160 --> 00:23:34,919
Speaker 2: and also US values. He's, I guess, going to be

535
00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:40,159
Speaker 2: playing a key role part of the Special Presidential Envoy

536
00:23:40,240 --> 00:23:43,680
Speaker 2: for the World Cup events and also the two hundred

537
00:23:43,680 --> 00:23:45,600
Speaker 2: and fiftieth anniversary.

538
00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:48,040
Speaker 3: Well, what is so ironic about what you just said

539
00:23:48,080 --> 00:23:51,280
Speaker 3: is that this guy, Nick Adams, he was nominated to

540
00:23:51,359 --> 00:23:55,720
Speaker 3: be the actual US ambassador to Malaysia. That didn't work out,

541
00:23:55,880 --> 00:23:58,160
Speaker 3: so now he's going to move to be the brand

542
00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:01,720
Speaker 3: ambassador of the United State TIS. This follows a trend

543
00:24:01,760 --> 00:24:04,360
Speaker 3: of what you see major brands and major corporations doing

544
00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:07,040
Speaker 3: is they do hire these brand ambassadors, and what that

545
00:24:07,359 --> 00:24:10,760
Speaker 3: essentially means, you're a spokesperson. You're a spokesperson, and mostly

546
00:24:10,840 --> 00:24:14,760
Speaker 3: what you're doing is cheerleading for that corporate entity or

547
00:24:14,760 --> 00:24:17,840
Speaker 3: that brand, or in this specific instance, the United States

548
00:24:17,880 --> 00:24:20,520
Speaker 3: of America. You're cheerleading for the United States of America,

549
00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:22,960
Speaker 3: mostly on social media and just talking about how great

550
00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:25,800
Speaker 3: they are and how awesome they are. And it's it's

551
00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:29,679
Speaker 3: as opposed to putting together a commercial, which corporations and

552
00:24:29,720 --> 00:24:32,480
Speaker 3: brands in the United States does as well. This is

553
00:24:32,560 --> 00:24:35,040
Speaker 3: kind of like putting a face to all of that,

554
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:36,920
Speaker 3: and they essentially are just a cheerleader.

555
00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:40,720
Speaker 2: Okay, So from Hooters to something a little bit more

556
00:24:40,760 --> 00:24:46,840
Speaker 2: pricey Ruth's Chris the steakhouse chain has implemented a new

557
00:24:46,960 --> 00:24:50,240
Speaker 2: dress code and they're saying that they will ban hats

558
00:24:50,400 --> 00:24:54,560
Speaker 2: and gymware. Chili's restaurant fired back, saying that their only

559
00:24:54,640 --> 00:24:57,720
Speaker 2: dress code is that you have to be dressed.

560
00:24:59,119 --> 00:25:00,720
Speaker 5: I'm not finding any I want if they wear their

561
00:25:00,720 --> 00:25:03,200
Speaker 5: pajamas on the airplane, right, that's not what we're doing.

562
00:25:03,240 --> 00:25:07,000
Speaker 1: I'm just we're asking people to maybe dress a little better.

563
00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:11,680
Speaker 2: So that was the Transportation Secretary Sean Tuffey reminding people

564
00:25:11,720 --> 00:25:14,960
Speaker 2: not to wear jammies when they fly. But we have

565
00:25:15,040 --> 00:25:18,639
Speaker 2: to ask, okay, Ruth, Chris, you're paying a lot of

566
00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:22,440
Speaker 2: money to go there and get a really delicious, delicious steak.

567
00:25:22,480 --> 00:25:23,920
Speaker 3: Fantastic, absolutely good.

568
00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:27,160
Speaker 2: But they're saying, hey, no hats, no gym ware. They

569
00:25:27,160 --> 00:25:30,359
Speaker 2: can implement any dress code they want, But it's the

570
00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:32,359
Speaker 2: public who's really going to decide at the end of

571
00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:32,760
Speaker 2: the day.

572
00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:35,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, this is a business decision for Ruth Chris, and

573
00:25:35,560 --> 00:25:38,040
Speaker 3: I think what And we've seen this through our culture

574
00:25:38,080 --> 00:25:42,040
Speaker 3: that people are more casual in their dress than they

575
00:25:42,080 --> 00:25:44,679
Speaker 3: ever have been before. And we see this too. You know,

576
00:25:44,960 --> 00:25:46,119
Speaker 3: it used to be when I was a kid and

577
00:25:46,119 --> 00:25:48,239
Speaker 3: you would go to church, that you would dress up

578
00:25:48,280 --> 00:25:50,080
Speaker 3: and you would wear you know what, your quote, your

579
00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:52,760
Speaker 3: Sunday best. You can go into plenty of churches now

580
00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:55,120
Speaker 3: and there's a lot of people that are far from

581
00:25:55,280 --> 00:25:58,040
Speaker 3: dressed in their Sunday best. And this happens everywhere we go.

582
00:25:58,240 --> 00:25:59,960
Speaker 3: We always talk about this. You see people, you know,

583
00:26:00,320 --> 00:26:02,600
Speaker 3: shopping at the grocery store and their jammy pants and

584
00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:06,119
Speaker 3: their slippers and and okay, everybody's free to do that,

585
00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:09,120
Speaker 3: but Ruth Chris, as its own private company, is free

586
00:26:09,160 --> 00:26:12,439
Speaker 3: to restrict that. And Ruth Chris is, let's be honest,

587
00:26:12,560 --> 00:26:14,800
Speaker 3: it's an expensive rents for a restaurant. It's a fancy,

588
00:26:15,119 --> 00:26:18,760
Speaker 3: expensive restaurant. And I say so, I think from their perspective,

589
00:26:19,119 --> 00:26:21,520
Speaker 3: they want to make sure that the client tele coming

590
00:26:21,560 --> 00:26:26,760
Speaker 3: into their restaurant reflects that brand image of more expensive,

591
00:26:27,040 --> 00:26:30,800
Speaker 3: upper class, put together, special occasion sort of thing.

592
00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:33,160
Speaker 2: So a lot of people are saying that they should

593
00:26:33,160 --> 00:26:35,920
Speaker 2: be spending more time on picking a name that's easier

594
00:26:35,960 --> 00:26:39,480
Speaker 2: to pronounce than what people wear they come into the restaurant.

595
00:26:39,760 --> 00:26:43,080
Speaker 2: But you're right, it's a private business. It's their rules.

596
00:26:43,359 --> 00:26:47,800
Speaker 2: End of story. Move along. But Chili's coming back trying

597
00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:52,080
Speaker 2: to inject themselves into the conversation saying that as long

598
00:26:52,160 --> 00:26:56,280
Speaker 2: as you're dressed, we're okay with it. Chili's and Ruth's

599
00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:58,440
Speaker 2: Chris not on the same level.

600
00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:01,040
Speaker 3: No, it's smart of Chili's to to piggyback off of this,

601
00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:04,280
Speaker 3: And because the Ruth's Chris dress code story got a

602
00:27:04,280 --> 00:27:06,359
Speaker 3: lot of traction in the media, and so Chili's, you know,

603
00:27:06,560 --> 00:27:09,400
Speaker 3: piggybacked off of that to get some engagement of themselves.

604
00:27:09,560 --> 00:27:12,800
Speaker 3: I don't think anybody's confusing Chili's for Ruth Chris. Nobody's,

605
00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:15,840
Speaker 3: you know, confusing the three for ten ninety nine deal

606
00:27:16,280 --> 00:27:19,639
Speaker 3: at Chili's for a you know, a porter House steak

607
00:27:19,720 --> 00:27:21,320
Speaker 3: at Ruth Chris, which is going to cost you a

608
00:27:21,320 --> 00:27:23,160
Speaker 3: whole lot of money. It will be interesting to see

609
00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:24,600
Speaker 3: how this goes, because this is either going to go

610
00:27:24,640 --> 00:27:27,159
Speaker 3: really well for Ruth Chris or it's going to go

611
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:29,960
Speaker 3: really poorly for Ruth Chris. And they may lose a

612
00:27:29,960 --> 00:27:32,240
Speaker 3: lot of customers because of this, and it'll be interesting

613
00:27:32,280 --> 00:27:35,000
Speaker 3: to see how long they keep this dress code in place.

614
00:27:35,280 --> 00:27:38,440
Speaker 2: NASA has unveiled a new plan to build a permanent

615
00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:43,000
Speaker 2: lunar base near the Moon's South Pole. Project is part

616
00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:45,879
Speaker 2: of the update to the Artemis program. We were just

617
00:27:46,000 --> 00:27:50,199
Speaker 2: talking about how we were planning on putting somebody on

618
00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:52,639
Speaker 2: the Moon, how in April they were going to go

619
00:27:52,720 --> 00:27:56,000
Speaker 2: up and they were gonna satellite around, and that was

620
00:27:56,040 --> 00:27:58,159
Speaker 2: part of a broader plan to put people on the

621
00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:02,600
Speaker 2: Moon within the next two years. Now they changed the

622
00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:06,600
Speaker 2: plan just this week and they're wanting to build a

623
00:28:06,640 --> 00:28:09,879
Speaker 2: permanent lunar base on the Moon and the plan is

624
00:28:10,080 --> 00:28:13,760
Speaker 2: expected to cost about twenty billion dollars and take around

625
00:28:13,880 --> 00:28:17,600
Speaker 2: seven years to build. It's meant to be a lasting

626
00:28:17,640 --> 00:28:20,960
Speaker 2: outpost on the Moon's surface. To what end? What is

627
00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:21,960
Speaker 2: the purpose of that?

628
00:28:21,960 --> 00:28:24,200
Speaker 3: That was my big question in all of this, because

629
00:28:24,359 --> 00:28:26,280
Speaker 3: I came across the story and it was reported in

630
00:28:26,320 --> 00:28:28,560
Speaker 3: a ton of news outlets, and I was like, Okay, okay,

631
00:28:28,760 --> 00:28:29,800
Speaker 3: why are we doing?

632
00:28:29,840 --> 00:28:32,560
Speaker 2: What do they know that we don't know? Because we're

633
00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:34,800
Speaker 2: going to be spending billions on a moon base while

634
00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:38,960
Speaker 2: everyday infrastructure here at home needs work. It's like Washington's

635
00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:41,280
Speaker 2: priorities are upside down. Like if you want to talk

636
00:28:41,280 --> 00:28:45,200
Speaker 2: about moon craters, drive anywhere in Indianapolis and you'll get

637
00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:46,600
Speaker 2: the exact same feeling.

638
00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:49,120
Speaker 3: Yeah, with our roads and the current conditions that they're in.

639
00:28:49,160 --> 00:28:51,920
Speaker 3: And look, we knew, you know, the first space race

640
00:28:52,160 --> 00:28:55,200
Speaker 3: John Kennedy in the sixties and the Russians. We knew

641
00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:57,000
Speaker 3: what the goal was for that. We had to beat

642
00:28:57,040 --> 00:28:59,440
Speaker 3: the Russians to the Moon. Not only was it to

643
00:28:59,520 --> 00:29:03,840
Speaker 3: advance technologically to keep them from you know, getting there first,

644
00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:06,680
Speaker 3: but also we had this national pride and we were

645
00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:08,560
Speaker 3: in the Cold War with the Soviets. I get all

646
00:29:08,560 --> 00:29:10,600
Speaker 3: of that, and we spent billions of dollars doing that.

647
00:29:10,960 --> 00:29:14,040
Speaker 3: And after that in the seventies, NASA realized pretty quickly,

648
00:29:14,120 --> 00:29:17,520
Speaker 3: hey man, these Moon missions that we're doing, they're pretty

649
00:29:17,560 --> 00:29:20,480
Speaker 3: darn expensive and we're really not getting much out of it.

650
00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:22,640
Speaker 3: So now here we are fifty years later, and we

651
00:29:22,680 --> 00:29:25,200
Speaker 3: want to build a base on the Moon, and NASA

652
00:29:25,280 --> 00:29:27,960
Speaker 3: really didn't do a great job of explaining why we

653
00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:30,480
Speaker 3: need to spend thirty billion dollars to do this. Look,

654
00:29:30,520 --> 00:29:33,160
Speaker 3: and there may be really good reasons. Maybe we mine

655
00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:35,360
Speaker 3: Moon rocks and send them back to the US. Maybe

656
00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:38,840
Speaker 3: there's rare earth metals there. Maybe this is preparation for

657
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:41,400
Speaker 3: us to build you know, we start with the Moon

658
00:29:41,760 --> 00:29:43,760
Speaker 3: and then maybe the next one is we build a

659
00:29:43,800 --> 00:29:47,440
Speaker 3: base on Mars or some other planet. Okay, fine, but NASA,

660
00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:49,720
Speaker 3: come on, man, you can't just tell me you're spending

661
00:29:49,760 --> 00:29:52,040
Speaker 3: thirty billion dollars to build a Moon base and not

662
00:29:52,120 --> 00:29:54,640
Speaker 3: give me a what's in it for me? What's in

663
00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:55,080
Speaker 3: it for me?

664
00:29:55,240 --> 00:29:59,400
Speaker 2: NASA official say the base would support more frequent astronaut missions,

665
00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:04,240
Speaker 2: research and scientific work, and also infrastructure for long term

666
00:30:04,400 --> 00:30:07,320
Speaker 2: lunar presence. And they're going to the South Pole that

667
00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:11,160
Speaker 2: was chosen because it likely has water, ice and better

668
00:30:11,320 --> 00:30:14,840
Speaker 2: sunlight for power. So maybe this is all part of

669
00:30:15,400 --> 00:30:19,520
Speaker 2: Elon Musk's push to put data centers in space. I

670
00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:20,480
Speaker 2: got to start.

671
00:30:20,240 --> 00:30:22,840
Speaker 1: Somewhere, so perhaps we're starting on the Moon.

672
00:30:22,920 --> 00:30:26,040
Speaker 2: And I've also heard that China is interested in getting

673
00:30:26,040 --> 00:30:28,680
Speaker 2: to the Moon, so now it's a race. It used

674
00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:31,280
Speaker 2: to be the Russians, now once again it's China.

675
00:30:31,440 --> 00:30:35,040
Speaker 3: India wants to also put a banned Moon mission as

676
00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:37,480
Speaker 3: part of their space program as well. But you're exactly right, Hey,

677
00:30:37,480 --> 00:30:40,480
Speaker 3: if this is part of you know, data centers in space,

678
00:30:40,600 --> 00:30:43,040
Speaker 3: and that's going to help us figure that out, wonderful. Look,

679
00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:45,360
Speaker 3: I'd rather have the data centers in space than in

680
00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:48,280
Speaker 3: my backyard, so I'm all for that. But that's something nasty.

681
00:30:48,280 --> 00:30:49,880
Speaker 3: You got to give me something that's in it for

682
00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:50,720
Speaker 3: me on this mat.

683
00:30:50,680 --> 00:30:52,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, and it also could be part of a whole

684
00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:57,600
Speaker 2: branding situation where it is seen that US is maintaining

685
00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:01,480
Speaker 2: leadership in space exploration, and since we have not been

686
00:31:01,520 --> 00:31:05,000
Speaker 2: to the Moon in many moons, it is possibly time

687
00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:05,520
Speaker 2: to go back.

688
00:31:05,600 --> 00:31:05,800
Speaker 1: Now.

689
00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:07,760
Speaker 2: I'm embarrassed to say it. Just the other day we

690
00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:10,000
Speaker 2: were talking about favorite sports teams and I said that

691
00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:15,480
Speaker 2: Baltimore Ravens were my favorite NFL team, and that is

692
00:31:15,560 --> 00:31:18,560
Speaker 2: strictly an emotional bias, because you know, our daughter lives

693
00:31:18,560 --> 00:31:20,360
Speaker 2: in Baltimore, so I'm just trying to make.

694
00:31:20,240 --> 00:31:21,160
Speaker 1: The connection there.

695
00:31:21,760 --> 00:31:26,000
Speaker 2: But now after hearing that this, I might have to

696
00:31:26,080 --> 00:31:27,560
Speaker 2: rescind my statement.

697
00:31:28,120 --> 00:31:33,160
Speaker 5: Menstrual hygiene products means appropriately sized tampons. What are appropriately

698
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:37,760
Speaker 5: sized tampons? I've never heard of such a thing. What

699
00:31:37,920 --> 00:31:39,360
Speaker 5: do you consider appropriate?

700
00:31:43,040 --> 00:31:45,400
Speaker 3: It just means that tampons are offered.

701
00:31:45,680 --> 00:31:47,320
Speaker 4: They're no specific side.

702
00:31:48,400 --> 00:31:51,600
Speaker 5: Well, apparently there's four different sizes. So which one would

703
00:31:51,600 --> 00:31:52,480
Speaker 5: you like them to use?

704
00:31:54,560 --> 00:31:57,040
Speaker 4: Just a regular sized tampon in the bathroom?

705
00:31:57,640 --> 00:32:00,680
Speaker 5: Okay, maybe it should say that and not a apropriately

706
00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:04,840
Speaker 5: sized tampon. Now, is this going in all bathrooms men

707
00:32:05,080 --> 00:32:05,800
Speaker 5: and women's?

708
00:32:05,920 --> 00:32:06,240
Speaker 3: Yes?

709
00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:11,520
Speaker 5: How about the Ravens Stadium.

710
00:32:11,600 --> 00:32:18,160
Speaker 4: If it is a state owned building, then yes, it

711
00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:20,880
Speaker 4: would go in it's a public building.

712
00:32:21,200 --> 00:32:22,880
Speaker 5: Oriole Park.

713
00:32:24,440 --> 00:32:26,760
Speaker 4: Well, if it applies to the Ravens Stadium, it would

714
00:32:26,760 --> 00:32:28,160
Speaker 4: also apply to Orioles Park.

715
00:32:28,240 --> 00:32:32,520
Speaker 2: I guess Pamlico, So Maryland is seriously debating putting tampons

716
00:32:32,560 --> 00:32:36,600
Speaker 2: in the men's bathroom at Baltimore Ravens and the Oriel stadiums.

717
00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:41,000
Speaker 2: And you've got this Democrat delegate insisting that the tampons

718
00:32:41,080 --> 00:32:46,560
Speaker 2: must be appropriately sized. There is no appropriate size for

719
00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:51,560
Speaker 2: tampons and men's bathrooms at any NFL stadium or anywhere.

720
00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:54,720
Speaker 2: I can't even believe that that guy said that out loud.

721
00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:59,360
Speaker 2: You know, Ravens fans, especially the dudes, they just want

722
00:32:59,360 --> 00:33:00,120
Speaker 2: to watch foot.

723
00:33:00,080 --> 00:33:01,760
Speaker 1: All right, why are you doing that?

724
00:33:01,960 --> 00:33:04,240
Speaker 3: When did Tim Walls become the governor of Maryland?

725
00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:07,320
Speaker 2: They didn't know what have No, it's the whole thing

726
00:33:07,400 --> 00:33:11,120
Speaker 2: is ridiculous. And so now I'm rethinking about announcing that

727
00:33:11,160 --> 00:33:14,240
Speaker 2: the Baltimore Ravens was my favorite NFL team.

728
00:33:14,320 --> 00:33:17,280
Speaker 3: Okay, so this is part of a state of Maryland plan.

729
00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:19,360
Speaker 3: Like I'm not trying to justify it here. This doesn't

730
00:33:19,360 --> 00:33:22,240
Speaker 3: make it any better. But it's more than just Camden

731
00:33:22,320 --> 00:33:25,920
Speaker 3: Yards and the Ravens Stadium that would be getting tampons

732
00:33:26,000 --> 00:33:27,000
Speaker 3: in men's rooms either.

733
00:33:27,000 --> 00:33:29,320
Speaker 2: They're saying, it's all public buildings across the state.

734
00:33:29,440 --> 00:33:32,640
Speaker 3: It's all public buildings across the save in the rest area.

735
00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:35,920
Speaker 3: So so anywhere that you go and there's a public restroom,

736
00:33:36,040 --> 00:33:39,000
Speaker 3: and this is being debated, it's not law yet correct

737
00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:43,320
Speaker 3: correct in the state of Maryland that they would require tampons.

738
00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:45,920
Speaker 2: In men So the next time we do another cross

739
00:33:45,960 --> 00:33:48,600
Speaker 2: country trek to go see our daughter in Baltimore and

740
00:33:48,640 --> 00:33:51,560
Speaker 2: we have to stop at a rest area along the way,

741
00:33:52,400 --> 00:33:54,800
Speaker 2: I want to report from you. Let me know if

742
00:33:54,840 --> 00:33:56,920
Speaker 2: there's tampons in the men's restaurant.

743
00:33:57,000 --> 00:33:59,280
Speaker 3: Do you think we could like you know, most of

744
00:33:59,320 --> 00:34:02,840
Speaker 3: these state governments now have special hotlines to report waste

745
00:34:02,880 --> 00:34:05,520
Speaker 3: frauden abuse. I think that would probably be my first

746
00:34:05,560 --> 00:34:09,040
Speaker 3: phone call. I'd like to report some waste fraud abuse. Yes, sir,

747
00:34:09,320 --> 00:34:11,399
Speaker 3: where are you seeing this waste broaden abuse? Yea, I'm

748
00:34:11,400 --> 00:34:13,720
Speaker 3: at the rest area on I seventy and you've got

749
00:34:13,760 --> 00:34:18,000
Speaker 3: tampons in the men's room. That waste waste. That is

750
00:34:18,040 --> 00:34:19,520
Speaker 3: the epitome of waste.

751
00:34:19,680 --> 00:34:26,600
Speaker 1: You're listening to ninety three WIBC. We have been spending

752
00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:27,120
Speaker 1: a lot.

753
00:34:26,920 --> 00:34:30,000
Speaker 2: Of time over the past few days talking about TSA.

754
00:34:30,320 --> 00:34:33,760
Speaker 2: This is a TSA story, but it's a little different.

755
00:34:33,880 --> 00:34:39,440
Speaker 2: It's the most shocking confiscated items that TSA has found

756
00:34:39,640 --> 00:34:44,000
Speaker 2: over the past year, the bizarre things that people try

757
00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:50,360
Speaker 2: to get through TSA, and they range from wildlife to weapons,

758
00:34:51,200 --> 00:34:53,560
Speaker 2: and if you're trying to get a weapon through TSA,

759
00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:57,640
Speaker 2: clearly you can't read because the signs are posted everywhere.

760
00:34:57,680 --> 00:35:00,200
Speaker 2: You can't even take more than four ounces of You

761
00:35:00,280 --> 00:35:04,000
Speaker 2: can't even take water through TSA or four ounces of shampoo,

762
00:35:04,040 --> 00:35:05,799
Speaker 2: and you're going to try and get a weapon. Thrill. Yeah.

763
00:35:06,080 --> 00:35:08,160
Speaker 3: I think this has a lot more to do with

764
00:35:08,400 --> 00:35:12,400
Speaker 3: just laziness and forgetfulness than it does malice. Probably. I

765
00:35:12,440 --> 00:35:15,240
Speaker 3: think everybody knows. You know, you can't take a knife

766
00:35:15,239 --> 00:35:17,560
Speaker 3: over a certain size. You certainly can't take a gun through.

767
00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:20,040
Speaker 3: You know, your carry on baggage and other weapons through

768
00:35:20,440 --> 00:35:22,520
Speaker 3: you know, most of your carry on stuff that you

769
00:35:22,560 --> 00:35:25,200
Speaker 3: take and get checked in through TSA. And my guess

770
00:35:25,320 --> 00:35:28,200
Speaker 3: is the vast majority of people that just forget that

771
00:35:28,239 --> 00:35:28,960
Speaker 3: they had it there.

772
00:35:29,080 --> 00:35:29,799
Speaker 1: No, they're not.

773
00:35:29,960 --> 00:35:33,279
Speaker 2: They're people that were up to nefarious activity because some

774
00:35:33,320 --> 00:35:37,520
Speaker 2: of the weapons were concealed in ordinary objects, for example,

775
00:35:38,000 --> 00:35:42,600
Speaker 2: knives hidden in knee braces or in a children's car seat.

776
00:35:43,040 --> 00:35:47,480
Speaker 2: You also had bullets that were packed inside containers like

777
00:35:47,520 --> 00:35:51,600
Speaker 2: a drink or like a ness quick box, like a

778
00:35:51,680 --> 00:35:56,320
Speaker 2: juice box. They were intentionally put there and intentionally hidden there.

779
00:35:56,719 --> 00:36:01,040
Speaker 2: Some other items that TSA has found hidden in luggage,

780
00:36:01,640 --> 00:36:08,000
Speaker 2: fake pipe bombs, also a turtle hidden in someone's pants.

781
00:36:09,400 --> 00:36:10,960
Speaker 2: You're trying to smuggle a turtle.

782
00:36:11,080 --> 00:36:12,839
Speaker 3: I can see how that would be an accident. You're

783
00:36:12,880 --> 00:36:15,880
Speaker 3: telling me that he intentionally tried to smuggle a turtle

784
00:36:16,040 --> 00:36:18,279
Speaker 3: who hasn't walked out the door of their house and

785
00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:22,319
Speaker 3: forgot about their turtle in their pants. But I mean

786
00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:24,239
Speaker 3: for some of the and I guess maybe I'm too

787
00:36:24,280 --> 00:36:28,080
Speaker 3: trusting because I tend to go through well, I'm always

788
00:36:28,080 --> 00:36:30,160
Speaker 3: worried and making sure, Okay, do I have all of

789
00:36:30,200 --> 00:36:32,920
Speaker 3: my you know, toilet trees in a one ounce clear

790
00:36:33,080 --> 00:36:36,240
Speaker 3: quart bag and they all less than three point four ounces?

791
00:36:36,239 --> 00:36:38,680
Speaker 3: And I'm always is my laptop out in a separate pack?

792
00:36:38,719 --> 00:36:40,000
Speaker 3: What do I do with my jacket? Do I wear

793
00:36:40,080 --> 00:36:41,440
Speaker 3: my jacket? Do I put it in the bin? And

794
00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:43,919
Speaker 3: so I'm always worried about the rules and regulations that

795
00:36:43,920 --> 00:36:45,759
Speaker 3: that's when I forget. Oh, I forgot I had that

796
00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:48,560
Speaker 3: bottle of water in my backpack and that goes through

797
00:36:48,680 --> 00:36:51,280
Speaker 3: and then my bag gets pulled out for special screening

798
00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:54,000
Speaker 3: and I get the dirty look from the TSA guy like,

799
00:36:54,040 --> 00:36:56,239
Speaker 3: come on, dude, you didn't know that you couldn't take water?

800
00:36:56,320 --> 00:36:58,080
Speaker 3: Through the screen to read.

801
00:36:58,120 --> 00:37:01,400
Speaker 2: I want to read this quote from the article. In

802
00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:08,960
Speaker 2: multiple cases, TSA found turtles. In multiple, multiple cases, TSA

803
00:37:09,120 --> 00:37:13,080
Speaker 2: found turtles hidden in people's pants or bras, which is

804
00:37:13,280 --> 00:37:17,799
Speaker 2: unsafe and violates rules for transporting animals.

805
00:37:17,920 --> 00:37:21,520
Speaker 3: It just violates human decency. Quit putting your pet turtle

806
00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:24,279
Speaker 3: down your pants, dude. Think of the Think of the

807
00:37:24,400 --> 00:37:27,880
Speaker 3: poor turtle. Okay, he's got to walk through security in

808
00:37:27,920 --> 00:37:28,560
Speaker 3: your pants.

809
00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:32,200
Speaker 1: I forgot I've got a turtle in my pants. Uh huh.

810
00:37:32,200 --> 00:37:34,440
Speaker 3: But you do see, I do love every now and

811
00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:37,160
Speaker 3: then you will see like the big bin of things

812
00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:39,320
Speaker 3: that they confiscate. Now most of the time it's like

813
00:37:39,440 --> 00:37:42,120
Speaker 3: big shampoo bottles and a bottle of water. But can

814
00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:44,080
Speaker 3: you imagine going through that and looking off to the

815
00:37:44,120 --> 00:37:46,239
Speaker 3: side and see the turtle sitting on top of a

816
00:37:46,280 --> 00:37:48,960
Speaker 3: shampoo bottle as part of the confiscated items.

817
00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:51,040
Speaker 2: I tried to go through airport security ones and I

818
00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:53,520
Speaker 2: forgot that I had pepper spray in my purse.

819
00:37:53,560 --> 00:37:56,080
Speaker 3: See there's a great example that would be when I walked.

820
00:37:55,840 --> 00:37:58,080
Speaker 2: Right up to the line and I was like, I

821
00:37:58,360 --> 00:38:00,600
Speaker 2: think I was reaching for my ID or something, and

822
00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:03,399
Speaker 2: I saw and I was like, oh, I can't do this.

823
00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:06,319
Speaker 2: And I looked up at the TSA officer and I said,

824
00:38:06,680 --> 00:38:08,920
Speaker 2: I can't take pepper spray through, can I? And he

825
00:38:09,080 --> 00:38:11,640
Speaker 2: was like, no, but you can throw it away right here.

826
00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:14,640
Speaker 2: And at that time, the hour, you know, the wait

827
00:38:14,719 --> 00:38:16,920
Speaker 2: time was not four or five hours long. So I

828
00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:19,200
Speaker 2: walked it all the way back out to my car

829
00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:21,840
Speaker 2: and then came back in because that was expensive and

830
00:38:21,880 --> 00:38:23,360
Speaker 2: I didn't want to just throw it away.

831
00:38:23,600 --> 00:38:27,120
Speaker 3: Yeah, and see that would be to me. That's what

832
00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:31,040
Speaker 3: ninety nine percent of these is. But obviously a turtle

833
00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:34,520
Speaker 3: in your pants and concealing knives and knee braces and

834
00:38:34,960 --> 00:38:37,600
Speaker 3: bullets and part of it, you know, juice boxes. I

835
00:38:37,640 --> 00:38:39,680
Speaker 3: guess there's a lot more people trying to sneak stuff

836
00:38:39,719 --> 00:38:40,520
Speaker 3: through than I thought.

837
00:38:41,080 --> 00:38:43,320
Speaker 1: Someone trying to smuggle a live animal.

838
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:46,400
Speaker 2: True airport security, and we're worried about ice speed.

839
00:38:46,600 --> 00:38:50,400
Speaker 3: Everybody. Everybody knows. You put your turtle in your shoe,

840
00:38:50,640 --> 00:38:52,359
Speaker 3: that's how you get it through. You don't put them

841
00:38:52,360 --> 00:38:55,120
Speaker 3: in your pants. That's how you get a turtle through TSA.

842
00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:58,240
Speaker 2: Huh, Thank you, Jim, thank you, Kevin, thank you for listening.

843
00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:00,440
Speaker 2: This is ninety three YBC