1 00:00:05,760 --> 00:00:08,240 Speaker 1: Good morning, thanks for being here. My name with Katy Daniels. 2 00:00:08,280 --> 00:00:10,640 Speaker 1: That is Jim and we have joining us in the 3 00:00:10,680 --> 00:00:11,440 Speaker 1: studio right now. 4 00:00:11,560 --> 00:00:15,880 Speaker 2: Former special FBI agent Corey Grass spent twenty years in 5 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:20,280 Speaker 2: counter terrorism, also counter intelligence, and we've had a lot 6 00:00:20,280 --> 00:00:23,360 Speaker 2: of questions and hopefully you have answers. I wanted to 7 00:00:23,400 --> 00:00:27,040 Speaker 2: start off with. This report came from ABC News. They 8 00:00:27,080 --> 00:00:31,800 Speaker 2: said that Iran maybe activating sleeper cells outside the country. 9 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:37,040 Speaker 2: Little alert, and then just yesterday Ted Cruz says that 10 00:00:37,200 --> 00:00:41,400 Speaker 2: the United States should prepare for terrorist attacks from Iranian 11 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:44,120 Speaker 2: sleeper cells located in the country. 12 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:44,960 Speaker 1: Here's Ted Cruz. 13 00:00:45,320 --> 00:00:47,040 Speaker 3: Now, are you concerned about sleeper cells? 14 00:00:47,040 --> 00:00:48,120 Speaker 1: There's been discussion of that. 15 00:00:48,479 --> 00:00:51,440 Speaker 4: Look, the risk of terrorism right now is quite high. 16 00:00:51,479 --> 00:00:56,680 Speaker 4: We tragically saw in Austin, Texas, just last weekend we 17 00:00:56,720 --> 00:01:00,160 Speaker 4: saw a terrorist attack. We also saw another terrorist attack 18 00:01:00,200 --> 00:01:03,160 Speaker 4: in New York City. There is a heightened danger of 19 00:01:03,240 --> 00:01:06,039 Speaker 4: terrorism right now, and I will say it is particularly 20 00:01:06,080 --> 00:01:09,720 Speaker 4: indefensible that Democrats have shut down the Department of Homeland 21 00:01:09,760 --> 00:01:13,720 Speaker 4: Security while we are facing an enhanced terrorist risk. The 22 00:01:13,760 --> 00:01:17,800 Speaker 4: Apartment of Homeland Security exist to guard against terrorist attacks. 23 00:01:18,200 --> 00:01:21,319 Speaker 4: The danger has never been higher than right now, particularly 24 00:01:21,319 --> 00:01:23,880 Speaker 4: after four years of open borders under Joe Biden. 25 00:01:24,440 --> 00:01:25,280 Speaker 5: We know that. 26 00:01:25,319 --> 00:01:29,400 Speaker 4: Radical Islamic terrorists entered this country and there's a vulnerability 27 00:01:29,440 --> 00:01:33,480 Speaker 4: all across this country. It is disgraceful and indefensible for 28 00:01:33,560 --> 00:01:36,320 Speaker 4: the Democrats to vote party line not to fund the 29 00:01:36,360 --> 00:01:38,039 Speaker 4: Apartment of Homeland Security right now. 30 00:01:38,080 --> 00:01:39,560 Speaker 3: We need to open it up and fully fund for. 31 00:01:39,640 --> 00:01:40,480 Speaker 1: Got it, thank you, sir. 32 00:01:40,720 --> 00:01:42,800 Speaker 2: Okay, So, Ted Cruz is saying that the risk of 33 00:01:42,920 --> 00:01:46,479 Speaker 2: terrorist attacks within the country is at an all time high. 34 00:01:46,560 --> 00:01:49,000 Speaker 1: So Corey Grass, former FBI. 35 00:01:48,840 --> 00:01:51,960 Speaker 2: Special agent, how does the FBI view the risk of 36 00:01:52,200 --> 00:01:54,000 Speaker 2: threats like sleeper cells? 37 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:57,360 Speaker 6: Well, good morning, and thanks for having me again. I've 38 00:01:57,360 --> 00:01:59,040 Speaker 6: been retired for three years, but I think I can 39 00:01:59,120 --> 00:02:01,680 Speaker 6: pretty confidently say that it's the same as it was 40 00:02:01,720 --> 00:02:02,240 Speaker 6: when I left it. 41 00:02:02,360 --> 00:02:03,320 Speaker 3: It is a high risk, you know. 42 00:02:03,320 --> 00:02:05,920 Speaker 6: The Senator Cruz there respond to her question almost before 43 00:02:05,920 --> 00:02:07,760 Speaker 6: she could finish her question. He was so emphatic in 44 00:02:07,800 --> 00:02:10,320 Speaker 6: his knowledge and his beliefs. So I'd be on the 45 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:13,040 Speaker 6: same page. I think there's a there's a high risk, 46 00:02:13,080 --> 00:02:15,000 Speaker 6: and I'm sure there's a lot of activity right now 47 00:02:15,160 --> 00:02:17,320 Speaker 6: that has been ramped up to respond to that that 48 00:02:17,400 --> 00:02:18,000 Speaker 6: risk as well. 49 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:21,040 Speaker 2: How do they how does the FBI coordinate with other 50 00:02:21,200 --> 00:02:23,840 Speaker 2: agencies when military actions like this are happening. 51 00:02:24,600 --> 00:02:26,200 Speaker 6: Well, one of the great things the FBI does is 52 00:02:26,240 --> 00:02:28,359 Speaker 6: they have these task forces that involve state locals and 53 00:02:28,400 --> 00:02:30,920 Speaker 6: also fed other federal agencies. I was a part of 54 00:02:30,919 --> 00:02:32,760 Speaker 6: task Force I Find that Crime Task Force in Miami, 55 00:02:32,800 --> 00:02:34,239 Speaker 6: Florida when I was down there, and then the Joint 56 00:02:34,320 --> 00:02:37,560 Speaker 6: Terrorism task Force here in Indiana. It's made up of 57 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:40,120 Speaker 6: a lot of FBI agents, but also other federal agencies 58 00:02:40,120 --> 00:02:43,080 Speaker 6: Homeland Security that we'll have Secret Service. So it depends 59 00:02:43,120 --> 00:02:44,600 Speaker 6: on the type of task force, but the Joint Terism 60 00:02:44,639 --> 00:02:47,040 Speaker 6: task Force has a lot of state and locals. For Indiana, 61 00:02:47,080 --> 00:02:49,440 Speaker 6: State Police is the biggest partner for the FBI in Indiana. 62 00:02:49,880 --> 00:02:51,880 Speaker 6: They have several members on the task force and also 63 00:02:51,919 --> 00:02:54,560 Speaker 6: you know Indianapolis. It depends on the part of the 64 00:02:54,600 --> 00:02:57,720 Speaker 6: state they're in, but there's also predominantly state and locals 65 00:02:57,720 --> 00:03:00,200 Speaker 6: make up those task forces to share information. Both they 66 00:03:00,320 --> 00:03:02,600 Speaker 6: learn from the field when their officers are not making stops, 67 00:03:02,600 --> 00:03:04,840 Speaker 6: doing interviews, making a risk and then also the FBI 68 00:03:04,840 --> 00:03:07,560 Speaker 6: can share information from a national level or international level 69 00:03:07,800 --> 00:03:10,040 Speaker 6: back to those same task force officers that have security 70 00:03:10,040 --> 00:03:10,800 Speaker 6: clearances as well. 71 00:03:10,919 --> 00:03:12,840 Speaker 5: Now, I think it's important to make a couple of 72 00:03:12,840 --> 00:03:17,120 Speaker 5: distinctions here between a sleeper cell and a lone wolf, 73 00:03:17,160 --> 00:03:18,920 Speaker 5: because I think what we've seen right now or a 74 00:03:18,919 --> 00:03:21,280 Speaker 5: couple of loan what typically called lone wolfs, that was 75 00:03:21,320 --> 00:03:24,160 Speaker 5: the issue in Austin, probably the issue of what happened 76 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:27,239 Speaker 5: in New York City. How does the FBI approach those two, 77 00:03:27,960 --> 00:03:30,840 Speaker 5: What is the difference between the two, and how does 78 00:03:30,880 --> 00:03:33,799 Speaker 5: the FBI differentiate in the way they approach each. 79 00:03:34,480 --> 00:03:37,280 Speaker 6: I think to oversimplify a little bit, a sleeper cell 80 00:03:37,400 --> 00:03:39,520 Speaker 6: has been prepared in advance to do some sort of 81 00:03:39,560 --> 00:03:40,240 Speaker 6: cherish to act. 82 00:03:40,920 --> 00:03:42,720 Speaker 1: They're asleep until they're activating. 83 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:45,480 Speaker 6: Yeah, they're preparing for it. A lone wolf is probably 84 00:03:45,480 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 6: more traditionally somebody who gets fired up more recently and 85 00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:51,160 Speaker 6: goes and makes a rash decision or has been coach 86 00:03:51,200 --> 00:03:53,920 Speaker 6: at the very last second. And we talked about this 87 00:03:54,000 --> 00:03:56,480 Speaker 6: last week. That's why the lone wolf is so hard 88 00:03:56,520 --> 00:03:59,000 Speaker 6: to stop, because there's no communication going back and forth, 89 00:03:59,320 --> 00:04:01,760 Speaker 6: there's no activity leading up to that, you know, preparing 90 00:04:01,760 --> 00:04:03,400 Speaker 6: with either weapons and things. It's all at the last 91 00:04:03,440 --> 00:04:07,680 Speaker 6: minute predominantly, and the sleeper cells would be a bigger concern, 92 00:04:07,760 --> 00:04:10,440 Speaker 6: probably because of the amount of damage they could do 93 00:04:10,680 --> 00:04:12,320 Speaker 6: and the preparations they've put in to try and get 94 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:12,840 Speaker 6: that stage. 95 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:16,360 Speaker 5: Now, does sleeper cell automatically mean that they're either in 96 00:04:16,480 --> 00:04:20,760 Speaker 5: communication or receiving support from like, let's say Iran in 97 00:04:20,800 --> 00:04:21,760 Speaker 5: this specific instance. 98 00:04:22,080 --> 00:04:23,800 Speaker 6: I think that's a safe assumption yet. Okay, yeah, so 99 00:04:23,839 --> 00:04:25,760 Speaker 6: I think that's why the planning takes place in advance, 100 00:04:25,800 --> 00:04:27,560 Speaker 6: so they can be activated when it's necessary. 101 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:30,600 Speaker 2: We've got former FBI Special Agent Corey Grass joining us 102 00:04:30,640 --> 00:04:32,680 Speaker 2: in the studio, and you just heard that clip from 103 00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:35,400 Speaker 2: Ted Cruz. Do you think he's spot on with that 104 00:04:35,640 --> 00:04:37,960 Speaker 2: saying that the all time risk is greater than it's 105 00:04:38,000 --> 00:04:38,520 Speaker 2: ever been. 106 00:04:39,520 --> 00:04:39,960 Speaker 3: Very much so. 107 00:04:40,240 --> 00:04:42,760 Speaker 6: I think the current times we live in the environment 108 00:04:42,800 --> 00:04:46,320 Speaker 6: for politics and terrorism, world events, there's a lot of 109 00:04:46,440 --> 00:04:49,839 Speaker 6: tension right now everywhere in the country, outside the country, 110 00:04:49,880 --> 00:04:52,320 Speaker 6: So I think he's spot on. Again, I agree with 111 00:04:52,360 --> 00:04:53,680 Speaker 6: him the vast majority of the time when I hear 112 00:04:53,760 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 6: him speak are the things he writes about. 113 00:04:55,600 --> 00:04:57,520 Speaker 3: So I do think he's spot on. 114 00:04:57,839 --> 00:05:00,960 Speaker 5: Now, what you were vciual agent in the FBI for 115 00:05:01,040 --> 00:05:03,440 Speaker 5: a long time, and I'm assuming part of that happened 116 00:05:03,480 --> 00:05:06,080 Speaker 5: during the Global War on Terror when George Bush was president, 117 00:05:06,279 --> 00:05:08,760 Speaker 5: and I'm looking at this from just a civilian standpoint 118 00:05:08,760 --> 00:05:11,280 Speaker 5: because I remember, you know, Afghanistan in two thousand and 119 00:05:11,320 --> 00:05:13,120 Speaker 5: one and Iraq in two thousand and three, and there 120 00:05:13,240 --> 00:05:15,960 Speaker 5: was there was a lot of talk of sleeper cells 121 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:18,360 Speaker 5: and lone wolves, and we had the color coded alert 122 00:05:18,440 --> 00:05:20,760 Speaker 5: chart and see something, Say Something, And you had this 123 00:05:20,800 --> 00:05:24,400 Speaker 5: administration that seemed to be kind of preparing the American 124 00:05:24,440 --> 00:05:26,120 Speaker 5: people for that, and then you have kind of the 125 00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:29,479 Speaker 5: opposite here where Donald Trump really hasn't been talking about this, 126 00:05:29,839 --> 00:05:32,160 Speaker 5: There hasn't been much mentioned about it. We don't have 127 00:05:32,440 --> 00:05:35,440 Speaker 5: any sort of coordinated campaigns like see something, Say something 128 00:05:35,560 --> 00:05:38,480 Speaker 5: or the color coded chart. What's your view on how 129 00:05:38,520 --> 00:05:41,360 Speaker 5: this is being directed differently from the last time. 130 00:05:41,920 --> 00:05:43,880 Speaker 6: There does seem to be some mixed messaging coming out 131 00:05:43,880 --> 00:05:46,000 Speaker 6: of the White House right now from DC about the 132 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:48,200 Speaker 6: war ending soon or not ending soon. And I know 133 00:05:48,240 --> 00:05:50,320 Speaker 6: there's a lot of politics involved in that, but I 134 00:05:50,680 --> 00:05:53,000 Speaker 6: mentioned it last week on your show. I think simplified 135 00:05:53,000 --> 00:05:55,120 Speaker 6: as much as you can see something, say something as it. 136 00:05:55,240 --> 00:05:58,240 Speaker 6: I don't color codes, numbers, letters, It gets confusing when 137 00:05:58,279 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 6: I was in local law enforcement, indoor federal. Just simplify 138 00:06:01,400 --> 00:06:03,560 Speaker 6: for everybody when things go bad. We want to You're 139 00:06:03,560 --> 00:06:05,000 Speaker 6: not going to be able to figure out codes and 140 00:06:05,040 --> 00:06:07,440 Speaker 6: numbers and colors in your head. It just be alert, 141 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:10,200 Speaker 6: beyond be aware of what's going on around you and 142 00:06:10,440 --> 00:06:14,200 Speaker 6: communicate those things to people. So I do think this 143 00:06:14,279 --> 00:06:19,360 Speaker 6: administration is doing a good job of not firing people out, 144 00:06:19,360 --> 00:06:21,760 Speaker 6: of getting people too scared, but also preparing them enough 145 00:06:21,800 --> 00:06:23,159 Speaker 6: to be aware of what's going on. 146 00:06:23,480 --> 00:06:25,600 Speaker 2: So Donald Trump did say that we've been very much 147 00:06:25,640 --> 00:06:27,039 Speaker 2: on top of it. One of the things we have 148 00:06:27,120 --> 00:06:29,560 Speaker 2: to do is get the Democrats to stop the Democrats 149 00:06:29,560 --> 00:06:32,359 Speaker 2: shut down because as you know, that apparatus looks into that, 150 00:06:32,400 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 2: and he's talking about DHS. Can you tell us what 151 00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:39,000 Speaker 2: are some of the warning signs or indicators that you 152 00:06:39,279 --> 00:06:44,080 Speaker 2: identify what you look into? Is there a profile of 153 00:06:44,200 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 2: people that we should be nervous about. 154 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:48,480 Speaker 6: We talked to me again a little bit last week 155 00:06:48,480 --> 00:06:52,000 Speaker 6: again about this, and I think we talked personally off 156 00:06:52,040 --> 00:06:52,919 Speaker 6: far about this also. 157 00:06:53,000 --> 00:06:55,240 Speaker 3: But anyone who cannot quit. 158 00:06:55,040 --> 00:06:57,360 Speaker 6: Talking about a topic that they're radicalized, I don't care 159 00:06:57,400 --> 00:06:59,000 Speaker 6: what the topic is. If you bring up the weather, 160 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:00,360 Speaker 6: they go back to that topic. It does not have 161 00:07:00,360 --> 00:07:03,040 Speaker 6: to be terrorism related necessarily. But during my time the 162 00:07:03,080 --> 00:07:04,839 Speaker 6: Bureau Prisons with the FBI. They loaned me out for 163 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:06,680 Speaker 6: seven years. They were nice to put inside a prison 164 00:07:06,839 --> 00:07:09,120 Speaker 6: on terro Hood, Indiana for seven years without asking. 165 00:07:09,520 --> 00:07:09,640 Speaker 2: Uh. 166 00:07:10,120 --> 00:07:11,440 Speaker 6: The most of my desk was in the prison and 167 00:07:11,480 --> 00:07:14,160 Speaker 6: it was mostly convicted terrorists. They would call them specialized 168 00:07:14,200 --> 00:07:17,560 Speaker 6: threat groups. But over time it became more anti abortion 169 00:07:18,600 --> 00:07:22,120 Speaker 6: people that we will commit violence sovereign citizens again, who 170 00:07:22,440 --> 00:07:25,480 Speaker 6: literally couldnot have a conversation without getting back to that topic. 171 00:07:25,520 --> 00:07:27,680 Speaker 6: And it's the same with terrorists in that unit. If 172 00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:29,920 Speaker 6: if you mentioned the weather, they would go back to 173 00:07:30,520 --> 00:07:31,440 Speaker 6: their their topic. 174 00:07:32,040 --> 00:07:34,480 Speaker 2: And that's why they're radicalized. They can't get away from it. 175 00:07:34,480 --> 00:07:36,040 Speaker 2: They just can't shut up about it. 176 00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:38,520 Speaker 6: And it's it's this is a very small, probably bad example, 177 00:07:38,560 --> 00:07:40,600 Speaker 6: but I put on social media story on Facebook that 178 00:07:40,680 --> 00:07:42,720 Speaker 6: was gonna be on your show. I got one quick 179 00:07:42,800 --> 00:07:45,760 Speaker 6: response from someone in my local area that's former politician, 180 00:07:45,800 --> 00:07:48,440 Speaker 6: a little elderly, but immediately went to the topic of 181 00:07:48,480 --> 00:07:52,440 Speaker 6: ice and calling me bad things and immediately and my 182 00:07:52,800 --> 00:07:54,440 Speaker 6: post was simply, we're going to be talking about the 183 00:07:54,440 --> 00:07:57,200 Speaker 6: threat environment and how to protect yourself from potential terroist events. 184 00:07:57,680 --> 00:08:00,360 Speaker 6: And it came out that somehow the real terrorists ICE 185 00:08:00,400 --> 00:08:01,800 Speaker 6: and the I was part of the problem. And so 186 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:04,000 Speaker 6: if you're that hyper focused on something, I didn't talk 187 00:08:04,000 --> 00:08:05,680 Speaker 6: about ICE. I want them an immigration I simply said 188 00:08:05,720 --> 00:08:07,000 Speaker 6: it'd be on the show talking about these things, and 189 00:08:07,040 --> 00:08:08,239 Speaker 6: then went right back to That's. 190 00:08:08,040 --> 00:08:09,760 Speaker 1: Where they went, Yeah, that's when their mind went. 191 00:08:09,840 --> 00:08:11,200 Speaker 5: I want to go back to what we talked about 192 00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:13,720 Speaker 5: just a minute ago as to what the average American 193 00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:16,239 Speaker 5: or the average Hoosier can do. And you said, see something, 194 00:08:16,280 --> 00:08:18,440 Speaker 5: say something is really kind of the simplest way of 195 00:08:18,480 --> 00:08:21,280 Speaker 5: doing it. What does that look like? I see something, 196 00:08:21,520 --> 00:08:24,680 Speaker 5: I see a neighbor who seems to talk about a 197 00:08:24,720 --> 00:08:29,840 Speaker 5: topic incessantly just generally look suspicious. What should I do? 198 00:08:29,880 --> 00:08:32,920 Speaker 5: Should I contact my local law enforcement? Should I, you know, 199 00:08:33,000 --> 00:08:36,200 Speaker 5: google the local FBI branch phone number? 200 00:08:36,600 --> 00:08:37,599 Speaker 3: Who should I reach out to? 201 00:08:37,760 --> 00:08:39,959 Speaker 6: Yes, and yes, it doesn't matter how you get it there, 202 00:08:40,040 --> 00:08:42,440 Speaker 6: just do something. Every local police department will have a 203 00:08:42,480 --> 00:08:44,880 Speaker 6: non emergency number. If you think it's that pressing, don't 204 00:08:44,880 --> 00:08:46,960 Speaker 6: hesitate to call nine one one and they'll understand. But 205 00:08:47,120 --> 00:08:49,880 Speaker 6: every police department or sheriff's office will have a non 206 00:08:49,880 --> 00:08:52,320 Speaker 6: emergency response tom you can call. The FBI has an 207 00:08:52,320 --> 00:08:55,920 Speaker 6: Indiana main switchboard number. The federal FBI at the DC 208 00:08:56,120 --> 00:08:58,040 Speaker 6: level has a switchboard level. There are websites you can 209 00:08:58,080 --> 00:09:01,200 Speaker 6: go to just Google those FBI websites. And I always 210 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:04,559 Speaker 6: focused on the FBI, but I mean DHS, Ciccret Service eight. 211 00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:07,080 Speaker 6: Yet there's a tons of places you can find to 212 00:09:07,160 --> 00:09:07,800 Speaker 6: report information. 213 00:09:07,840 --> 00:09:09,040 Speaker 3: They'll get it to the right people. Okay. 214 00:09:09,080 --> 00:09:11,240 Speaker 5: Now, I'm trying to put myself in the position of 215 00:09:11,280 --> 00:09:13,360 Speaker 5: somebody that might be looking to do that, and I 216 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:15,520 Speaker 5: can see that there would be a certain percentage of 217 00:09:15,520 --> 00:09:18,400 Speaker 5: the population that would be concerned about their own privacy. 218 00:09:18,640 --> 00:09:21,960 Speaker 5: So can I leave tips anonymously? Or am I going 219 00:09:22,000 --> 00:09:24,160 Speaker 5: to be in a situation where I'm going to get 220 00:09:24,200 --> 00:09:26,800 Speaker 5: this local law enforcement asking me a ton of questions 221 00:09:26,920 --> 00:09:29,480 Speaker 5: about me and maybe putting myself out there that makes 222 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:31,200 Speaker 5: me uncomfortable. Is anonymous an option? 223 00:09:31,800 --> 00:09:34,320 Speaker 6: It is an option? Yet, Okay, for sure, it sounds 224 00:09:34,360 --> 00:09:35,720 Speaker 6: like you speak from personal experience. 225 00:09:35,480 --> 00:09:38,400 Speaker 5: You have little no I Well, I mean we have 226 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:41,320 Speaker 5: had situations where you know they're not terrorism related, but 227 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:43,920 Speaker 5: not too long ago. Casey was the witness to a 228 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:47,199 Speaker 5: potential crime when we were traveling out of state and 229 00:09:48,040 --> 00:09:50,680 Speaker 5: the person filed the police report and gave this a 230 00:09:50,720 --> 00:09:54,040 Speaker 5: sexual assault crime and gave her Casey's phone number and name, 231 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:57,240 Speaker 5: and then she was followed up by local law enforcement 232 00:09:57,320 --> 00:10:00,840 Speaker 5: after that. But I understand everybody probably has at least 233 00:10:00,920 --> 00:10:03,319 Speaker 5: some certain level of concern about, Hey, I don't want 234 00:10:03,360 --> 00:10:06,120 Speaker 5: to put myself out there because I'm worried that that 235 00:10:06,120 --> 00:10:09,080 Speaker 5: then exposes me potentially. I just want to make sure 236 00:10:09,080 --> 00:10:10,960 Speaker 5: that everybody knew that there's a way that you can 237 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:12,880 Speaker 5: do that and still keep your anonymity. 238 00:10:12,960 --> 00:10:13,439 Speaker 3: Sure there is. 239 00:10:13,480 --> 00:10:15,320 Speaker 6: And again I'm teasing a little bit, but I make 240 00:10:15,360 --> 00:10:17,719 Speaker 6: light of it. But again, I was in local law 241 00:10:17,760 --> 00:10:20,480 Speaker 6: enforcement for ten years, federal for over twenty. And when 242 00:10:20,480 --> 00:10:21,880 Speaker 6: I see it, please card behind me, I still have. 243 00:10:21,920 --> 00:10:24,439 Speaker 1: That oh still slow down. 244 00:10:24,559 --> 00:10:26,880 Speaker 3: Yeah, probably for speeding me in something. But yeah, it's 245 00:10:26,920 --> 00:10:28,840 Speaker 3: just a natural reaction. And I'm one of them. 246 00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:30,720 Speaker 6: It's me, and I know it's going to go fine 247 00:10:30,760 --> 00:10:32,880 Speaker 6: if something happens, but I just you have that initial like, 248 00:10:32,920 --> 00:10:33,320 Speaker 6: oh jeez. 249 00:10:33,920 --> 00:10:37,520 Speaker 2: So we've got a former FBI Special Agent, Corey Grass 250 00:10:37,600 --> 00:10:40,200 Speaker 2: joining us, and we want to talk about what happened 251 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 2: in New York and also have you explained what the 252 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:46,839 Speaker 2: Joint Terrorism Task Force is in the FBI, And we'll 253 00:10:46,840 --> 00:10:49,959 Speaker 2: get to that coming up. You're listening to ninety three WIBC. 254 00:10:57,720 --> 00:11:00,959 Speaker 2: Two men from Pennsylvania were arrested in connecttion with throwing 255 00:11:01,040 --> 00:11:04,840 Speaker 2: an ied near the official residence of New York City 256 00:11:05,000 --> 00:11:09,160 Speaker 2: Mayor Zoron Mamdami, a Gracie mansion, And I'm curious. 257 00:11:09,200 --> 00:11:09,960 Speaker 1: We're joined by. 258 00:11:09,960 --> 00:11:13,000 Speaker 2: Corey Grass, who is a former FBI special agent spent 259 00:11:13,040 --> 00:11:17,319 Speaker 2: twenty years in counter intelligence counter terrorism. When does the 260 00:11:17,360 --> 00:11:21,480 Speaker 2: line get crossed? When does something go from attempted murder 261 00:11:21,559 --> 00:11:24,640 Speaker 2: or homicide into terrorism? 262 00:11:25,480 --> 00:11:27,719 Speaker 6: Typically the one that changes the terrorism is when you're 263 00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:30,200 Speaker 6: committing a violent act or threat to be a violent 264 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:34,280 Speaker 6: act to coerce the public or your government for your 265 00:11:34,280 --> 00:11:36,800 Speaker 6: own political or social agenda. You would you're trying to 266 00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:38,679 Speaker 6: push your will by the threat of violence. 267 00:11:39,320 --> 00:11:44,840 Speaker 2: Traditionally, can you tell us how propaganda affects people in 268 00:11:44,880 --> 00:11:49,760 Speaker 2: these areas because we see so much online and influencers 269 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:52,920 Speaker 2: trying to sway people's minds in different areas. 270 00:11:53,240 --> 00:11:55,680 Speaker 6: It's obviously critically effective because people use it all the time. 271 00:11:55,720 --> 00:11:56,720 Speaker 3: People pay for it. 272 00:11:56,760 --> 00:11:58,920 Speaker 6: Other people just use it for their agenda for whatever 273 00:11:59,000 --> 00:12:01,680 Speaker 6: group they work for they're with, and they're paid to 274 00:12:01,679 --> 00:12:03,760 Speaker 6: do that as well. Sometimes, I mean that's there's a 275 00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:07,199 Speaker 6: lobbyist or propaganda people like you said, social media influencers 276 00:12:07,240 --> 00:12:10,160 Speaker 6: that jump on these topics as heavy as the Iran 277 00:12:10,240 --> 00:12:12,679 Speaker 6: War or as light as what to wear or what 278 00:12:12,720 --> 00:12:14,240 Speaker 6: do you want to be seen doing. 279 00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:18,000 Speaker 2: Jim, do you have a question about this, Well, so 280 00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:19,600 Speaker 2: you wanted to ask about IDs. 281 00:12:19,640 --> 00:12:22,120 Speaker 5: I do want to get into this because what's happened 282 00:12:22,160 --> 00:12:24,400 Speaker 5: in New York And just as a quick recap there, 283 00:12:24,520 --> 00:12:28,560 Speaker 5: there was a protest that was happening outside the Mayor 284 00:12:28,600 --> 00:12:30,520 Speaker 5: of New York's house. It was it was more of 285 00:12:30,960 --> 00:12:34,040 Speaker 5: a pro military protest or pro support of what the 286 00:12:34,080 --> 00:12:36,400 Speaker 5: military actions taking place in Iran. And then there were 287 00:12:36,440 --> 00:12:39,880 Speaker 5: some people that through some IEDs that fortunately didn't go off, 288 00:12:39,920 --> 00:12:43,080 Speaker 5: but they were real explosives with nails packed around them. 289 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 5: And now it's just come out in the last day 290 00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:48,200 Speaker 5: that the two men that were arrested for that situation 291 00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:53,400 Speaker 5: they rated a storage unit in Pennsylvania and found explosive 292 00:12:53,800 --> 00:12:58,120 Speaker 5: residue there. So I'm always kind of fascinated between you know, 293 00:12:58,200 --> 00:13:00,560 Speaker 5: what we saw in Austin, which was this lone wolf, 294 00:13:00,600 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 5: and it seemed to be this guy in Austin that 295 00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:04,240 Speaker 5: just kind of spurre the moment decided to go shoot 296 00:13:04,280 --> 00:13:06,199 Speaker 5: up a place. These guys in New York seemed like 297 00:13:06,240 --> 00:13:10,920 Speaker 5: there was more planning associated with it. How does how 298 00:13:11,000 --> 00:13:13,760 Speaker 5: does the FBI go about this process? I mean, obviously 299 00:13:13,840 --> 00:13:16,480 Speaker 5: they went to the effect of finding these storage units 300 00:13:17,000 --> 00:13:20,200 Speaker 5: that these people investigate. But I'm just fascinated about the 301 00:13:20,240 --> 00:13:23,080 Speaker 5: approach that the FBI takes and the difference between what 302 00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:25,120 Speaker 5: looks to be Austin and what might be the situation 303 00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:25,640 Speaker 5: in New York. 304 00:13:27,000 --> 00:13:29,280 Speaker 6: That's that's a long question. Yeah, I have about ten 305 00:13:29,320 --> 00:13:30,560 Speaker 6: things I wanted to bring up. We try to rember 306 00:13:30,600 --> 00:13:33,160 Speaker 6: them all kindings. Back to the propaganda. Some of the 307 00:13:33,160 --> 00:13:35,600 Speaker 6: things I read were the original protests there outside the 308 00:13:35,600 --> 00:13:38,600 Speaker 6: mansion also involved in bringing a goat, a dead pig 309 00:13:38,640 --> 00:13:40,600 Speaker 6: and something. So they're trying to use propaganda. They're trying 310 00:13:40,600 --> 00:13:43,160 Speaker 6: to use their triggers to fire up the other side, 311 00:13:43,240 --> 00:13:44,960 Speaker 6: and in this case, it worked, and then the other 312 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 6: side committed the exact same kind of act that they're 313 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:50,280 Speaker 6: being accused of committing. So, but both sides got the 314 00:13:50,320 --> 00:13:53,280 Speaker 6: attention they wanted. Both sides there were talking about them 315 00:13:53,280 --> 00:13:55,720 Speaker 6: Indiana now because it's they've made themselves a name and 316 00:13:55,760 --> 00:13:58,880 Speaker 6: a topic. How kind of your second part about the 317 00:13:59,080 --> 00:14:01,760 Speaker 6: storage unit I mentioned you're earlier off the air that 318 00:14:01,960 --> 00:14:04,000 Speaker 6: I saw where they were. They had a video now 319 00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:07,520 Speaker 6: of one of the young men purchasing fireworks fuse a 320 00:14:07,559 --> 00:14:09,599 Speaker 6: couple of days before that, which is amazing if you 321 00:14:09,600 --> 00:14:11,880 Speaker 6: think about it. They went back somehow and found a 322 00:14:11,920 --> 00:14:14,840 Speaker 6: store in Pennsylvania that sold him a seven dollars fuse, 323 00:14:15,000 --> 00:14:17,520 Speaker 6: which seems kind of petty and small, but somehow probably 324 00:14:17,520 --> 00:14:19,960 Speaker 6: a joint Terism task force sent people out to start 325 00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:22,920 Speaker 6: looking for security footage, talking to neighbors, talking to friends 326 00:14:22,920 --> 00:14:26,600 Speaker 6: social media, and somehow found previously from multiple days ago, 327 00:14:26,840 --> 00:14:28,920 Speaker 6: a fireworks fuse being purchased. The title in together. 328 00:14:29,040 --> 00:14:31,680 Speaker 2: So what you're saying is that there are indicators prior 329 00:14:31,720 --> 00:14:35,160 Speaker 2: to incidents that can lead investigators. 330 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:36,680 Speaker 1: Whether it be posts or. 331 00:14:36,680 --> 00:14:40,520 Speaker 2: Purchases, communications, they all lead to the same thing. 332 00:14:41,240 --> 00:14:43,080 Speaker 6: Yeah, and we'd be very careful because again I thought 333 00:14:43,080 --> 00:14:44,520 Speaker 6: about this when I was reading the article about the 334 00:14:44,560 --> 00:14:47,160 Speaker 6: fireworks fuse, that in and of itself, just based on 335 00:14:47,240 --> 00:14:49,200 Speaker 6: who he was, is not a good indicator. You don't 336 00:14:49,200 --> 00:14:51,480 Speaker 6: want those people to call the police and say I 337 00:14:51,520 --> 00:14:53,200 Speaker 6: think he looks a certain way and did this because 338 00:14:53,240 --> 00:14:55,040 Speaker 6: he's a terrorist. We don't want to cross that line, 339 00:14:55,280 --> 00:14:59,080 Speaker 6: that's a bit too far. But if there were years ago, 340 00:14:59,160 --> 00:15:00,440 Speaker 6: many years ago, I was on the on the Joint 341 00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:02,320 Speaker 6: Tears and Task Force. I believe it was in Denver, 342 00:15:02,640 --> 00:15:04,920 Speaker 6: very similar type of event, except the guy was at 343 00:15:05,160 --> 00:15:07,640 Speaker 6: a male was at a beauty supply place and pushing 344 00:15:07,640 --> 00:15:11,000 Speaker 6: a shopping cart full full full of these exact same 345 00:15:11,080 --> 00:15:13,720 Speaker 6: chemicals and he got arrested later for making the bombs. 346 00:15:13,720 --> 00:15:15,240 Speaker 6: They search his place and that kind of stuff. So 347 00:15:15,560 --> 00:15:17,640 Speaker 6: that would be a little bigger indicator because why do 348 00:15:17,640 --> 00:15:21,240 Speaker 6: you have a shopping cart full of precursors? And oftentimes 349 00:15:21,240 --> 00:15:24,440 Speaker 6: in the FBI around national security type of things, when 350 00:15:24,480 --> 00:15:26,440 Speaker 6: something like that happens, they will put out a canvas 351 00:15:26,480 --> 00:15:28,440 Speaker 6: to all of their task forces to go out and 352 00:15:28,520 --> 00:15:31,320 Speaker 6: interview anything remotely. 353 00:15:30,920 --> 00:15:31,720 Speaker 3: Related to that topic. 354 00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:34,200 Speaker 6: So if it's beauty supply houses, storage units, as Gym 355 00:15:34,280 --> 00:15:36,640 Speaker 6: just mentioned, if something has been shown to be a 356 00:15:36,640 --> 00:15:39,920 Speaker 6: part of a terrorist act, reactively we go and talk 357 00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:43,240 Speaker 6: to many people, even pool supply places that would have 358 00:15:43,280 --> 00:15:44,240 Speaker 6: chemicals that could be used. 359 00:15:44,320 --> 00:15:48,280 Speaker 2: Can you describe how self radicalization typically looks in cases 360 00:15:48,280 --> 00:15:53,200 Speaker 2: where individuals they cite foreign extremist groups the Internet. 361 00:15:53,240 --> 00:15:55,360 Speaker 6: I mean, there is a simple answer free is just 362 00:15:55,560 --> 00:15:58,360 Speaker 6: excessive watching of videos on the Internet. And some of 363 00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:01,600 Speaker 6: these videos are horrific violent crimes that they commit against 364 00:16:02,080 --> 00:16:06,400 Speaker 6: people and other animals or anybody. It's horrific information, but 365 00:16:06,480 --> 00:16:09,320 Speaker 6: it's relentless and once they get hooked on watching. 366 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:10,720 Speaker 3: It, that is most likely. Yeah. 367 00:16:10,800 --> 00:16:13,880 Speaker 6: Yeah, and you'll notice this is typical street level crime 368 00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:16,960 Speaker 6: or terrorism. Those people tend to gravitate towards people that 369 00:16:16,960 --> 00:16:19,160 Speaker 6: are like minded, so then they kind of radicalize each other. 370 00:16:19,600 --> 00:16:20,760 Speaker 6: I mentioned you the prison you know, I was in 371 00:16:20,880 --> 00:16:24,080 Speaker 6: before the Bureau of Prisons, and I'm speaking for them, 372 00:16:24,080 --> 00:16:26,200 Speaker 6: but they they had made a decision many years ago, 373 00:16:26,200 --> 00:16:27,840 Speaker 6: after nine to eleven, that they were going to put 374 00:16:27,880 --> 00:16:30,080 Speaker 6: some very radical people in one unit and not bring 375 00:16:30,080 --> 00:16:31,280 Speaker 6: them out of that unit, so that way they could 376 00:16:31,320 --> 00:16:33,680 Speaker 6: just self radicalize each other, like we call it the 377 00:16:33,680 --> 00:16:36,480 Speaker 6: postgraduate School of Terrorism in the FBI did. But that 378 00:16:36,520 --> 00:16:38,920 Speaker 6: way they weren't radicalizing their's thirty three hundred inmates on 379 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:39,680 Speaker 6: the on the yard and. 380 00:16:39,720 --> 00:16:42,760 Speaker 1: Territory, I mean the circle small yeah, among each other. 381 00:16:42,880 --> 00:16:45,520 Speaker 2: Okay, can you were joined by Corey Grass, who is 382 00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:48,400 Speaker 2: a former FBI special agent spent twenty years in counter 383 00:16:48,520 --> 00:16:52,240 Speaker 2: intelligence and counter terrorism. What is a Joint Terrorism task 384 00:16:52,400 --> 00:16:53,640 Speaker 2: Force in the FBI. 385 00:16:54,880 --> 00:16:57,680 Speaker 6: It's an administrative function that also brings all those same 386 00:16:57,680 --> 00:16:59,960 Speaker 6: groups I mentioned earlier, state and local, especially state please 387 00:17:00,040 --> 00:17:04,400 Speaker 6: in Indiana, other agencies together, but administratively the FBI handles 388 00:17:04,720 --> 00:17:06,879 Speaker 6: they You typically house them in our space, and we 389 00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:09,480 Speaker 6: do have them, some of them detached out the smaller 390 00:17:09,480 --> 00:17:12,920 Speaker 6: resident agencies such as Bloomington, Tara Hoe, Evansville, and Self 391 00:17:12,960 --> 00:17:16,080 Speaker 6: Bend all those areas, but some of the overtime functions 392 00:17:16,119 --> 00:17:18,240 Speaker 6: are handled to the task Force. They still work for 393 00:17:18,280 --> 00:17:20,400 Speaker 6: their local department or their federal agency. They just sit 394 00:17:20,440 --> 00:17:22,919 Speaker 6: in our space and then the FBI handles the overtime 395 00:17:22,960 --> 00:17:26,160 Speaker 6: issues for that. They basically act as an FBI agent. 396 00:17:26,160 --> 00:17:28,879 Speaker 6: I mean, they have an FBI rental car, they have 397 00:17:29,080 --> 00:17:32,119 Speaker 6: cell phones, they have there. They're basically acting as an agent. 398 00:17:32,280 --> 00:17:36,040 Speaker 2: Okay, So how do you guys balance tracking dangerous behavior 399 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:38,720 Speaker 2: with also respecting people's constitutional rights. 400 00:17:40,760 --> 00:17:42,239 Speaker 6: I mean, that's that's the tough artright, I mean, that's 401 00:17:42,359 --> 00:17:44,639 Speaker 6: such a kind of a vague question. Yeah, I mean, 402 00:17:44,720 --> 00:17:47,040 Speaker 6: it's it's it's hard to explain unless you're living in 403 00:17:47,119 --> 00:17:49,440 Speaker 6: I mean again, and if it depends on who's you 404 00:17:49,520 --> 00:17:51,480 Speaker 6: have to take the totality of the circumstances. So if 405 00:17:51,520 --> 00:17:53,240 Speaker 6: it turns out it's an ex wife saying it, you 406 00:17:53,320 --> 00:17:55,040 Speaker 6: take that with a little different graine assault than you 407 00:17:55,040 --> 00:17:57,960 Speaker 6: would say a next door neighbor. If it's somebody who 408 00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:01,000 Speaker 6: makes a random complaint again and someone and then you 409 00:18:01,119 --> 00:18:02,960 Speaker 6: do some research on their social media and they do 410 00:18:03,080 --> 00:18:05,600 Speaker 6: this on a regular basis, it kind of detracts from it. Again, 411 00:18:05,640 --> 00:18:09,320 Speaker 6: if it's somebody who was independent, has legitimate concerns, and 412 00:18:09,680 --> 00:18:11,440 Speaker 6: so you kind of go down that path and handle 413 00:18:11,440 --> 00:18:14,119 Speaker 6: it a little differently. But that's the tough part, and 414 00:18:14,200 --> 00:18:16,119 Speaker 6: that's one of the things that the terrorist exploit in 415 00:18:16,119 --> 00:18:17,840 Speaker 6: our country. I thought about this after nine to eleven. 416 00:18:17,880 --> 00:18:19,760 Speaker 6: I applied to the FBI prior to nine to eleven, 417 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:21,399 Speaker 6: got hired after nine to eleven, and a lot of 418 00:18:21,400 --> 00:18:23,119 Speaker 6: things changed. The job I applied for wasn't really the 419 00:18:23,200 --> 00:18:25,280 Speaker 6: job I got because so much changed, as was proven 420 00:18:25,320 --> 00:18:29,040 Speaker 6: by the areas of counter intelligence things and terrorism. But 421 00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:32,440 Speaker 6: it's just that's the tricky part is figuring out what 422 00:18:32,840 --> 00:18:35,560 Speaker 6: is our freedoms are what they're exploiting, and that's what 423 00:18:35,600 --> 00:18:37,720 Speaker 6: they did on nine to eleven. They exploited our freedom 424 00:18:37,760 --> 00:18:39,720 Speaker 6: to travel freely and to have a knife on the 425 00:18:39,760 --> 00:18:42,320 Speaker 6: plane or whatever it was. And that's the hard part 426 00:18:42,400 --> 00:18:46,200 Speaker 6: is respecting, always respecting people's right to speak and to 427 00:18:46,359 --> 00:18:49,560 Speaker 6: act without promoting violence or committing a terari stack. 428 00:18:49,640 --> 00:18:51,359 Speaker 5: You know, we talked off the air ear during the 429 00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:53,159 Speaker 5: break about how we were amazed at some of the 430 00:18:53,240 --> 00:18:54,760 Speaker 5: video that was coming out of New York City and 431 00:18:54,800 --> 00:18:56,800 Speaker 5: we saw that one police officer that was shown, you know, 432 00:18:56,960 --> 00:19:00,440 Speaker 5: leaping a fence and running after in an extreme situation 433 00:19:00,600 --> 00:19:03,920 Speaker 5: that's happening like that. You know, how do cops prioritize 434 00:19:04,200 --> 00:19:06,280 Speaker 5: what's the most important, because it looked like the cop 435 00:19:06,640 --> 00:19:09,240 Speaker 5: was running after the perpetrators when there might be a 436 00:19:09,320 --> 00:19:11,800 Speaker 5: live bomb on the ground next to him. How does 437 00:19:11,840 --> 00:19:16,879 Speaker 5: the protection office? How do you prioritize in the moment 438 00:19:17,160 --> 00:19:19,159 Speaker 5: of a highly tense situation like that. 439 00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:22,800 Speaker 6: I once heard a law enforcement described of hours of 440 00:19:22,880 --> 00:19:25,960 Speaker 6: boredom interrupted by moments of sheer terror, and that is 441 00:19:26,040 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 6: you're making a million decisions at one time, not always right. 442 00:19:28,680 --> 00:19:30,800 Speaker 3: Sometimes that's the hard part for me. 443 00:19:31,160 --> 00:19:33,679 Speaker 6: I get aggravated with people that critique LA enforcement sometimes 444 00:19:33,760 --> 00:19:36,040 Speaker 6: because yeah, I can watch it later too on video 445 00:19:36,119 --> 00:19:39,200 Speaker 6: in this nice, bright studio, it's cool and calm, but 446 00:19:39,280 --> 00:19:41,280 Speaker 6: when you're there, it's not the same. What you're hearing, 447 00:19:41,320 --> 00:19:43,639 Speaker 6: what you're seeing, what you're living, and you got to 448 00:19:43,680 --> 00:19:46,040 Speaker 6: make those split second decisions and they're generally right, but 449 00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:48,560 Speaker 6: sometimes people have mistakes. I brought that up to you 450 00:19:48,680 --> 00:19:50,960 Speaker 6: because the video was amazing of him chasing out to 451 00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:53,000 Speaker 6: the suspects. I believe a sergeant also went and ran 452 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,000 Speaker 6: towards the IED's that he thought were still alive. 453 00:19:55,119 --> 00:19:58,560 Speaker 1: So that's counterinto it. That's against your your human nature 454 00:19:58,680 --> 00:19:59,280 Speaker 1: to run to it. 455 00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:00,560 Speaker 3: For most people. 456 00:20:00,720 --> 00:20:02,879 Speaker 6: Yeah, I mean, and it out for several years, and 457 00:20:02,960 --> 00:20:05,120 Speaker 6: those was the part you missed. It's crazy the things 458 00:20:05,280 --> 00:20:08,480 Speaker 6: how you look at things. It's totally differently than most people. 459 00:20:08,520 --> 00:20:10,800 Speaker 1: You probably fall back on a lot of your muscle 460 00:20:10,840 --> 00:20:15,040 Speaker 1: memory or training. It's instinctive for you after years of 461 00:20:15,160 --> 00:20:17,640 Speaker 1: doing it, that's just what you do. I would run 462 00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:19,679 Speaker 1: the other way as an old man. 463 00:20:19,680 --> 00:20:21,600 Speaker 6: I look at my young band's self and critique the 464 00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:23,959 Speaker 6: things I did twenty years ago and think it was insane. 465 00:20:24,000 --> 00:20:27,240 Speaker 6: Why would I drive that fast and those conditions to 466 00:20:27,320 --> 00:20:29,760 Speaker 6: get there before my buddy? So I can handle the situation. Yeah, 467 00:20:29,880 --> 00:20:31,600 Speaker 6: looking at it now as an older guy. 468 00:20:31,520 --> 00:20:33,880 Speaker 3: With a family and a lot of life to hopefully live. 469 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:36,800 Speaker 1: I'm like, why, well, your risk assessment changes, right, and. 470 00:20:36,840 --> 00:20:38,600 Speaker 6: Thank god our military people like that way, yeah, and 471 00:20:38,680 --> 00:20:41,000 Speaker 6: think aggressively and aren't living in fear. 472 00:20:41,240 --> 00:20:43,200 Speaker 2: I wanted to share this one last article with you 473 00:20:43,359 --> 00:20:46,040 Speaker 2: before you go, so you can wade into the political arena, 474 00:20:46,119 --> 00:20:48,760 Speaker 2: which is also a passion of yours. This is Corey Grass, 475 00:20:48,840 --> 00:20:52,120 Speaker 2: who is a former FBI special agent, joining us. Five 476 00:20:52,240 --> 00:20:56,520 Speaker 2: scenarios for how the Iran war could end. And I'll 477 00:20:56,640 --> 00:20:59,760 Speaker 2: just list these, and your experience being in the hostile 478 00:20:59,800 --> 00:21:02,000 Speaker 2: areas tell me what you think if any of these 479 00:21:02,040 --> 00:21:06,400 Speaker 2: are plausible. Number one negotiated ceasefire and nuclear deal. 480 00:21:07,600 --> 00:21:08,360 Speaker 1: I ran in US. 481 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:11,120 Speaker 2: They hold three rounds of indirect nuclear talks in Geneva, 482 00:21:11,320 --> 00:21:14,480 Speaker 2: and just days before and then or just days after, 483 00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:18,800 Speaker 2: and then a deal is struck. You have the Venezuela model. 484 00:21:20,600 --> 00:21:25,920 Speaker 2: You have popular uprising and then regime collapse, special forces 485 00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:30,320 Speaker 2: rate on nuclear stockpile, and then finally Trump declares victory 486 00:21:30,359 --> 00:21:31,040 Speaker 2: and withdraws. 487 00:21:32,480 --> 00:21:35,080 Speaker 3: The first three didn't seem very likely to me. They 488 00:21:35,160 --> 00:21:35,439 Speaker 3: were the. 489 00:21:37,040 --> 00:21:38,920 Speaker 6: The least likely I believe to take place. I think 490 00:21:38,960 --> 00:21:40,399 Speaker 6: the ladder I think you said five. I think I 491 00:21:40,400 --> 00:21:42,360 Speaker 6: thought they were the latter three maybe, but the latter 492 00:21:42,440 --> 00:21:44,120 Speaker 6: ones seem more likely in my mind. 493 00:21:45,160 --> 00:21:48,520 Speaker 2: Special forces rate on nuclear stockpile and then Trump declares 494 00:21:48,600 --> 00:21:50,080 Speaker 2: victory and withdraws. 495 00:21:50,119 --> 00:21:52,119 Speaker 3: Those I think maybe one before that came up with that. 496 00:21:52,119 --> 00:21:54,639 Speaker 1: One was a popular uprising and regime collapse. 497 00:21:54,720 --> 00:21:56,640 Speaker 6: Yeah, that's probably not real likely in my mind either, 498 00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:58,680 Speaker 6: just based on the history of what I know about 499 00:21:58,680 --> 00:22:00,959 Speaker 6: the region. I think we talked about this last week. 500 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:02,200 Speaker 6: I came was on the air off the air, but 501 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:05,520 Speaker 6: the war seemed to go very well early on, which 502 00:22:05,560 --> 00:22:07,320 Speaker 6: is very normal because that's the easy part. I think, 503 00:22:07,520 --> 00:22:10,480 Speaker 6: in my humble opinion, that is, we dominate the military 504 00:22:10,560 --> 00:22:12,679 Speaker 6: field with the technology we have. I mean even here 505 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:15,400 Speaker 6: in Southern Indiana and Crane Naval Base does amazing things. 506 00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:16,960 Speaker 6: I worked them for years in the FBI. It's just 507 00:22:17,119 --> 00:22:18,960 Speaker 6: insane what we have in our backyard to help the 508 00:22:19,000 --> 00:22:22,600 Speaker 6: war fighter. It's super impressive. The hard part is who 509 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:25,320 Speaker 6: takes over that country. Yeah, that's the long term. And 510 00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:27,400 Speaker 6: I've heard Jim ran on this on the air many times. 511 00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:31,400 Speaker 6: It's because it's true. I mean, that is the real 512 00:22:31,560 --> 00:22:33,600 Speaker 6: cost is there, Like you said, if we left now, 513 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:35,879 Speaker 6: I mean, in my mind, it's a huge victory. I mean, 514 00:22:36,119 --> 00:22:38,280 Speaker 6: it's been super We've had a few losses of life, 515 00:22:38,280 --> 00:22:38,919 Speaker 6: which is terrible, but. 516 00:22:39,160 --> 00:22:41,640 Speaker 1: It's going to be completely unstable, correct. 517 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:44,040 Speaker 2: And then you could potentially have had a younger version 518 00:22:44,200 --> 00:22:47,360 Speaker 2: of the Iotola in power and very likely. 519 00:22:47,680 --> 00:22:49,600 Speaker 1: So what did we do? What did we accomplish? 520 00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:51,680 Speaker 6: Then the hard part is the long term and that's 521 00:22:51,720 --> 00:22:53,680 Speaker 6: why I can't answer your question very really well. But 522 00:22:54,800 --> 00:22:56,680 Speaker 6: there's going to have to be some sort of long 523 00:22:56,840 --> 00:22:59,200 Speaker 6: term intervention, which I hope is not the case. But 524 00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:01,239 Speaker 6: it's not think we just go back to I mean, 525 00:23:01,280 --> 00:23:03,760 Speaker 6: we've set them back decades. Hopefully that's the best part. 526 00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:08,240 Speaker 6: But again I'm very hesitant to be too optimistic because 527 00:23:08,240 --> 00:23:10,879 Speaker 6: of the decades, if not hundreds of or thousands of 528 00:23:10,960 --> 00:23:13,200 Speaker 6: years of history there that it doesn't seem. 529 00:23:13,040 --> 00:23:14,320 Speaker 1: Real like generations too. 530 00:23:14,680 --> 00:23:16,680 Speaker 3: Yeah, well, we've got a good memory. 531 00:23:16,760 --> 00:23:18,880 Speaker 5: We remember what happened in Iraq in two thousand and three, 532 00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:21,080 Speaker 5: and so it's hard not to make comparisons to what's 533 00:23:21,080 --> 00:23:21,679 Speaker 5: going on right now. 534 00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:22,560 Speaker 2: Corey Grass. 535 00:23:22,600 --> 00:23:25,080 Speaker 1: We appreciate your insight, Thank you for coming in today. 536 00:23:25,040 --> 00:23:25,600 Speaker 3: Thanks for having me. 537 00:23:25,640 --> 00:23:28,040 Speaker 1: You gonna come next week too, Absolutely, we'll talk some more. 538 00:23:28,560 --> 00:23:31,920 Speaker 2: Former FBI Special agent Corey Grass. You're listening to ninety 539 00:23:31,960 --> 00:23:33,000 Speaker 2: three WIBC. 540 00:23:39,640 --> 00:23:40,560 Speaker 5: So teens are on. 541 00:23:40,640 --> 00:23:43,720 Speaker 2: Their phones nearly a third of the school day, social 542 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:46,879 Speaker 2: media games, endless scrolling. Everybody's pointing their fingers at the 543 00:23:46,920 --> 00:23:51,840 Speaker 2: schools and the students. Here's the reality. This starts at home. 544 00:23:52,280 --> 00:23:55,000 Speaker 2: Parents set the tone right. Kids are allowed to stay 545 00:23:55,040 --> 00:23:58,840 Speaker 2: glued to their devices all the time. There's no enforcement, 546 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:01,840 Speaker 2: No one teaches them so discipline. Don't be surprised when 547 00:24:01,840 --> 00:24:06,960 Speaker 2: they're checking TikTok between math problems. Schools can't parent for you. 548 00:24:07,600 --> 00:24:11,120 Speaker 2: They can't force focus and instill values that you don't 549 00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:13,480 Speaker 2: teach at home. There was a new study that came 550 00:24:13,560 --> 00:24:18,080 Speaker 2: out that said teens are using their smartphones constantly during 551 00:24:18,160 --> 00:24:22,440 Speaker 2: school hours, not just on lunch breaks, not just between classes. 552 00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:26,160 Speaker 2: They're checking their phones hourly throughout the day. About one 553 00:24:26,359 --> 00:24:29,200 Speaker 2: third of the school day is spent on their phones, 554 00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 2: roughly two hours during instructional time. 555 00:24:33,240 --> 00:24:37,280 Speaker 5: I mean, this is I maybe a little old school 556 00:24:37,359 --> 00:24:40,000 Speaker 5: with this thought and this opinion. But schools get to 557 00:24:40,080 --> 00:24:43,119 Speaker 5: set the rules. That's the way it works. We don't 558 00:24:43,320 --> 00:24:46,760 Speaker 5: let kids tell us how to run things. And I 559 00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:49,080 Speaker 5: get it. If I was fifteen years old and you know, 560 00:24:49,160 --> 00:24:52,480 Speaker 5: a sophomore in high school again and twenty twenty six, Yeah, 561 00:24:52,520 --> 00:24:54,000 Speaker 5: of course i'd want to have my phone with me. 562 00:24:54,160 --> 00:24:56,000 Speaker 5: And of course, as a fifteen year old, i'd be like, no, 563 00:24:56,119 --> 00:24:57,800 Speaker 5: it's fine, it's cool, I can have my phone with 564 00:24:57,880 --> 00:24:59,800 Speaker 5: me all day. You know, too bad. You don't get 565 00:24:59,840 --> 00:25:01,720 Speaker 5: to set the rules when you're fifteen years old. 566 00:25:01,920 --> 00:25:03,240 Speaker 3: The adults get to set the rules. 567 00:25:03,280 --> 00:25:06,960 Speaker 5: So of course, if schools feel like the phones are distracting, absolutely, 568 00:25:07,119 --> 00:25:09,879 Speaker 5: Now I think where you will get a lot of 569 00:25:09,960 --> 00:25:14,080 Speaker 5: pushback from parents is banning them entirely, because as a parent, 570 00:25:14,440 --> 00:25:16,800 Speaker 5: I know that we always felt better that if there 571 00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:20,840 Speaker 5: was an emergency, anything up to a threat of terrorism 572 00:25:20,960 --> 00:25:22,720 Speaker 5: or an active shooter in the school, all the way 573 00:25:22,760 --> 00:25:25,600 Speaker 5: down to something simple, hey my car won't start after school. 574 00:25:26,320 --> 00:25:29,080 Speaker 5: I want you know, most parents want their kids to 575 00:25:29,160 --> 00:25:33,720 Speaker 5: be able to communicate when there is a problem. So 576 00:25:33,800 --> 00:25:35,680 Speaker 5: I think that as long as the laws and the 577 00:25:35,760 --> 00:25:39,480 Speaker 5: regulations don't go to and outright ban entirely, I think 578 00:25:39,520 --> 00:25:42,639 Speaker 5: that this just is just a ton of common sense. 579 00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:43,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean this. 580 00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:45,239 Speaker 1: Goes back to usage, right. 581 00:25:45,280 --> 00:25:48,560 Speaker 2: It's the bottom line, the parent, The phones aren't ruining 582 00:25:48,640 --> 00:25:50,760 Speaker 2: the kids, it's the bad habits and the lack of 583 00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:55,160 Speaker 2: the guidance and the absent accountability, And parents who want 584 00:25:55,200 --> 00:25:58,240 Speaker 2: their kids to succeed need to take the lead on this. 585 00:25:58,440 --> 00:26:01,920 Speaker 2: They need to set the boundaries and model the behavior 586 00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:05,600 Speaker 2: they want to see. You know, kids they repeat what 587 00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:08,560 Speaker 2: they see their parents do. And if your child is 588 00:26:08,600 --> 00:26:11,280 Speaker 2: trying to having a conversation with you and you're just 589 00:26:11,400 --> 00:26:14,359 Speaker 2: glued to your phone not paying attention, what kind of 590 00:26:14,400 --> 00:26:16,640 Speaker 2: signal is that sending to your kid? 591 00:26:17,760 --> 00:26:20,399 Speaker 1: So you've got to lead by example with this. 592 00:26:20,760 --> 00:26:22,800 Speaker 5: Yeah, and I think that you know, there was this 593 00:26:22,920 --> 00:26:26,040 Speaker 5: bill in the recent term of the general assemb lead 594 00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:30,440 Speaker 5: to pass restrictions on this, and I think again, it's 595 00:26:30,480 --> 00:26:33,080 Speaker 5: what I laid out here. That's not banning it entirely, 596 00:26:33,240 --> 00:26:34,760 Speaker 5: but it is saying, hey, you got to put your 597 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:37,200 Speaker 5: phone away during school hours. And that passed the House 598 00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:41,000 Speaker 5: and Senate, and Mike Ron signed it into law, actually 599 00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:43,680 Speaker 5: just a couple of days ago. Late last week he 600 00:26:43,720 --> 00:26:45,800 Speaker 5: signed it into law. So that'll be going into effect 601 00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:48,800 Speaker 5: likely this summer, with all the rest of the new 602 00:26:48,880 --> 00:26:50,600 Speaker 5: laws that are written usually going to effect. 603 00:26:51,359 --> 00:26:54,719 Speaker 1: So this is something that I thought was different and interesting. 604 00:26:55,040 --> 00:26:59,120 Speaker 2: We talked often about healthcare and the state the horrible 605 00:26:59,160 --> 00:27:03,160 Speaker 2: state of healthcare. There's a new research that says there 606 00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:06,600 Speaker 2: are more kids going to the er the emergency room 607 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:13,720 Speaker 2: for tooth pain and preventible preventative dental problems than any 608 00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:14,439 Speaker 2: other issue. 609 00:27:15,320 --> 00:27:16,720 Speaker 1: I think we've seen this a lot. 610 00:27:16,840 --> 00:27:18,920 Speaker 5: And if you've been to the doctor a lot, you know, 611 00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:24,360 Speaker 5: since the pandemic, things have changed. You're, for starters, much 612 00:27:24,440 --> 00:27:27,760 Speaker 5: more difficult to get an appointment with any doctor, even 613 00:27:27,800 --> 00:27:30,520 Speaker 5: your general practice doctor. I remember ten or fifteen years ago, 614 00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:32,680 Speaker 5: if you were sick, you call your doctor and your 615 00:27:32,720 --> 00:27:34,399 Speaker 5: you know, your family doctor in the morning and they 616 00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:36,440 Speaker 5: could likely squeeze in in the afternoon and you know, 617 00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:38,680 Speaker 5: take a look at you and get you right and 618 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:41,080 Speaker 5: on your way. Those days, for the most part, or 619 00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:44,080 Speaker 5: at least based on my experience, are long gone. A 620 00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:46,680 Speaker 5: lot of what family doctors just do are kind of 621 00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:49,080 Speaker 5: assess you and then refer you to specialists. But when 622 00:27:49,119 --> 00:27:53,880 Speaker 5: it comes to dentistry especially, I don't think there's nearly 623 00:27:53,920 --> 00:27:58,239 Speaker 5: as much emergency dentist options on the table like there 624 00:27:58,320 --> 00:28:00,760 Speaker 5: are is an emergency room, and certainly not as there 625 00:28:00,880 --> 00:28:03,679 Speaker 5: used to be. And I so it makes sense if 626 00:28:03,720 --> 00:28:07,520 Speaker 5: you've got some sort of dental emergency, the emergency room. 627 00:28:07,760 --> 00:28:08,719 Speaker 3: Maybe you're only optional. 628 00:28:08,840 --> 00:28:10,520 Speaker 2: Well, the one thing that the emergency room is going 629 00:28:10,600 --> 00:28:12,879 Speaker 2: to do is they're going to provide the temporary pain relief, 630 00:28:13,000 --> 00:28:16,159 Speaker 2: right like medications or even antibiotics. But the experts are 631 00:28:16,160 --> 00:28:20,679 Speaker 2: saying that the ers generally can't treat the underlying dental issue. 632 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:25,880 Speaker 2: There is also a shortage of pediatric dental professionals, especially 633 00:28:26,520 --> 00:28:31,000 Speaker 2: in rural areas, and they say that pediatric er visits 634 00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:36,040 Speaker 2: for dental issues has risen almost sixty percent among children 635 00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:38,760 Speaker 2: that are under fifteen years old between the years twenty 636 00:28:38,920 --> 00:28:40,400 Speaker 2: nineteen and twenty two. 637 00:28:41,160 --> 00:28:45,880 Speaker 1: And what do you remember happening between those years pandemic? Ah, 638 00:28:45,960 --> 00:28:47,080 Speaker 1: there you go. Yeah. 639 00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:50,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, they're saying that the conditions have worsened ever since 640 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:54,360 Speaker 2: the pandemic. A lot of the professionals in that industry 641 00:28:54,720 --> 00:28:55,880 Speaker 2: they don't want to do it anymore. 642 00:28:56,040 --> 00:28:56,840 Speaker 3: Yeah, and I get it. 643 00:28:57,400 --> 00:28:58,960 Speaker 5: You made a really good point there that if you 644 00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:01,680 Speaker 5: do have a dental urgency, Look, I'm not expecting to 645 00:29:01,760 --> 00:29:04,400 Speaker 5: go to the er and for them to extract teeth 646 00:29:04,520 --> 00:29:07,080 Speaker 5: in a perform a root canal or whatever. What you're 647 00:29:07,120 --> 00:29:10,760 Speaker 5: looking for is some temporary relief until I can see 648 00:29:10,800 --> 00:29:13,080 Speaker 5: a dentist to where they take care of the underlying problem. 649 00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:14,480 Speaker 2: My name is Casey. 650 00:29:14,600 --> 00:29:18,160 Speaker 1: That is Jim new segment. What's your problem? Jim, what's 651 00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:18,600 Speaker 1: your problem? 652 00:29:18,680 --> 00:29:20,680 Speaker 5: I'll tell you what my problem is today for you 653 00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:21,600 Speaker 5: before you tell. 654 00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:24,240 Speaker 1: Me your problem. Do you want answers or do you 655 00:29:24,280 --> 00:29:26,800 Speaker 1: want empathy? Do you want a solution or do you 656 00:29:26,840 --> 00:29:27,520 Speaker 1: want sympathy? 657 00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:28,440 Speaker 2: Uh? 658 00:29:28,560 --> 00:29:28,840 Speaker 4: You know what? 659 00:29:29,040 --> 00:29:30,440 Speaker 5: In this case, I want action. 660 00:29:30,680 --> 00:29:31,560 Speaker 3: I want a solution. 661 00:29:31,960 --> 00:29:32,240 Speaker 1: Okay. 662 00:29:32,400 --> 00:29:36,880 Speaker 5: So the General Assembly last year passed a law that 663 00:29:37,120 --> 00:29:41,480 Speaker 5: basically said that students on campus can no longer use 664 00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:45,720 Speaker 5: a student ID as a form of voter ID when 665 00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:48,040 Speaker 5: you go to the ballot box. And now there is 666 00:29:48,080 --> 00:29:51,160 Speaker 5: a student here in Indiana in the Southern District Court 667 00:29:51,200 --> 00:29:55,480 Speaker 5: of Indiana that is asking for a preliminary injunction to 668 00:29:56,040 --> 00:29:59,360 Speaker 5: allow voter student IDs. Like if I go to IU 669 00:29:59,840 --> 00:30:02,840 Speaker 5: and I've got my IUID to use that to vote, 670 00:30:03,080 --> 00:30:05,720 Speaker 5: that's my problem. This goes back to what we talked 671 00:30:05,760 --> 00:30:08,960 Speaker 5: about with the Save Act earlier. Voter ID is supported 672 00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:12,560 Speaker 5: by the vast majority of Americans. But the idea that 673 00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:16,920 Speaker 5: I could use a non governmented issue governmental issue ID 674 00:30:17,120 --> 00:30:19,720 Speaker 5: to vote is ridiculous to me. And this is my 675 00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:22,520 Speaker 5: problem this morning. And State attorneys are arguing for this 676 00:30:22,600 --> 00:30:26,440 Speaker 5: federal judge to deny this request to block this ban 677 00:30:26,560 --> 00:30:29,080 Speaker 5: on using college IDs to be able to vote. 678 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:31,680 Speaker 1: Soon enough, we're going to ask you what your problem is. 679 00:30:31,760 --> 00:30:34,280 Speaker 2: But right now we turn it to a former Notre 680 00:30:34,360 --> 00:30:38,960 Speaker 2: Dame football coach, Brian Kelly, and we ask him, Brian Kelly, 681 00:30:39,040 --> 00:30:39,880 Speaker 2: what's your problem? 682 00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:44,360 Speaker 7: It's hard, I mean it's We had just finished building 683 00:30:44,760 --> 00:30:45,640 Speaker 7: our dream. 684 00:30:45,440 --> 00:30:46,520 Speaker 3: Home, my wife and I. 685 00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:49,240 Speaker 7: You could walk out our home and look at the 686 00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:54,000 Speaker 7: Golden Dome. We tore down an apartment complex to build 687 00:30:54,000 --> 00:30:59,120 Speaker 7: this beautiful home. We had no intentions of leaving Notre Dame. 688 00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:01,880 Speaker 7: I was the longest and still are the longest serving 689 00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:05,080 Speaker 7: head coach all time, winning as coach. We had no 690 00:31:05,720 --> 00:31:07,720 Speaker 7: idea that this was going to come upon us, or 691 00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:12,520 Speaker 7: we wouldn't have done those things. So they're really difficult. 692 00:31:12,960 --> 00:31:13,320 Speaker 3: I think. 693 00:31:13,880 --> 00:31:16,880 Speaker 7: I think what the ultimate decision was for us is 694 00:31:16,960 --> 00:31:19,400 Speaker 7: that we got the program back to where it needed 695 00:31:19,440 --> 00:31:23,560 Speaker 7: to be. Our deal coming in was we need to 696 00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:29,120 Speaker 7: get this program back to being an elite program. Everybody 697 00:31:29,280 --> 00:31:33,520 Speaker 7: associates success with winning national championships or winning Super Bowls 698 00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:36,680 Speaker 7: or wheelchairs. I get that, I totally get that, but 699 00:31:36,800 --> 00:31:39,000 Speaker 7: that wasn't our mindset. Our mindset was to get this 700 00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:42,240 Speaker 7: program back and be consistent force in college football. 701 00:31:42,640 --> 00:31:44,560 Speaker 3: And so in some instances, we felt. 702 00:31:44,400 --> 00:31:48,000 Speaker 7: Like our job had been completed and we had one 703 00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:51,200 Speaker 7: more challenge left, and that was to win a national championship. 704 00:31:51,560 --> 00:31:55,200 Speaker 7: And so that that's kind of what the mindset was, 705 00:31:55,560 --> 00:31:57,080 Speaker 7: you know, leading into that decision. 706 00:31:58,360 --> 00:32:01,200 Speaker 2: Ryan Kelly's problem was that he didn't want to leave 707 00:32:01,360 --> 00:32:06,280 Speaker 2: Notre Dame, but then chose to leave Notre Dame. 708 00:32:06,560 --> 00:32:10,680 Speaker 5: Yeah, here was the difference there. LSU took an entire 709 00:32:10,920 --> 00:32:13,960 Speaker 5: dump truck full of money and backed it up into 710 00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:17,000 Speaker 5: his driveway and just threw it all over his front lawn. 711 00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:18,400 Speaker 3: It's amazing what money. 712 00:32:18,520 --> 00:32:21,120 Speaker 5: Look, Brian Kelly's been pretty quiet since he got fired 713 00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:23,080 Speaker 5: as the head football coach at LSU, and I'm going 714 00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:24,920 Speaker 5: to make a recommendation to you, Brian Kelley. 715 00:32:24,960 --> 00:32:25,440 Speaker 1: Keep it that way. 716 00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:28,560 Speaker 5: You should continue to be quiet, because you're not doing 717 00:32:28,640 --> 00:32:31,280 Speaker 5: yourself any favors by opening your mouth at this point. 718 00:32:31,720 --> 00:32:34,000 Speaker 2: Hey, speaking of Notre Dame, they have put out the 719 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:38,480 Speaker 2: information about the funeral and memorial details for Lou Holtz, 720 00:32:38,520 --> 00:32:42,080 Speaker 2: who died on March fourth. The public visitation going to 721 00:32:42,120 --> 00:32:45,960 Speaker 2: be held Sunday on the fifteenth, from seven until ten 722 00:32:46,080 --> 00:32:49,440 Speaker 2: pm at the Basilica of the Sacred Heart on the 723 00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:53,840 Speaker 2: campus of Notre Dame. You're listening to ninety three WYBC. 724 00:33:00,560 --> 00:33:03,600 Speaker 2: Entertaining us on screens doesn't make you qualified to tell 725 00:33:03,680 --> 00:33:05,719 Speaker 2: us how to run a country. Most people see right 726 00:33:05,800 --> 00:33:09,080 Speaker 2: through it. You've got celebrities that yam are on about politics, 727 00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:14,080 Speaker 2: and it is a reminder that fame does not equal expertise. 728 00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 1: Here you have Gene Simmons, yes, from the rock band. 729 00:33:16,920 --> 00:33:21,320 Speaker 2: Kiss, and he's saying that celebrities like Ben Stiller should 730 00:33:21,520 --> 00:33:22,600 Speaker 2: just shut. 731 00:33:22,440 --> 00:33:23,520 Speaker 1: Up about politics. 732 00:33:23,880 --> 00:33:24,080 Speaker 2: I know. 733 00:33:24,240 --> 00:33:27,040 Speaker 8: Right now, Ben Stiller is calling out the president saying 734 00:33:27,120 --> 00:33:29,080 Speaker 8: he doesn't want him to use his movie clips for 735 00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:31,800 Speaker 8: war propaganda. I mean, it sounds like a lot of 736 00:33:31,840 --> 00:33:34,920 Speaker 8: people are kind of, you know, criticizing trunk like Hollywood right. 737 00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:36,640 Speaker 6: Now, you know, over this war thing. 738 00:33:36,840 --> 00:33:39,640 Speaker 9: Yeah, yeah, yeah, because everybody in the world should listen 739 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:45,520 Speaker 9: to what actors and comedians say because they're so qualified. Basically, 740 00:33:45,600 --> 00:33:46,400 Speaker 9: shut the fuck. 741 00:33:46,240 --> 00:33:50,080 Speaker 3: Up, do your art and shut up. Nobody's interested in 742 00:33:50,160 --> 00:33:50,800 Speaker 3: your opinions. 743 00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:53,640 Speaker 9: That includes me, who I vote for, who I like, 744 00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:57,600 Speaker 9: who the fuck you think you are. People in America 745 00:33:57,720 --> 00:33:59,480 Speaker 9: work hard for their living and they don't want to 746 00:33:59,520 --> 00:34:02,560 Speaker 9: be lecture too by people who live in mansions and 747 00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:05,960 Speaker 9: drive rolls royces. It's time for everybody in the entertainment 748 00:34:06,000 --> 00:34:10,200 Speaker 9: and to shut their pie hole and just do your art. 749 00:34:10,520 --> 00:34:11,719 Speaker 9: Nobody cares what you think. 750 00:34:12,160 --> 00:34:12,560 Speaker 3: I don't. 751 00:34:13,840 --> 00:34:14,680 Speaker 1: Yeah, he's right. 752 00:34:15,040 --> 00:34:18,399 Speaker 2: Most Americans don't care what celebrities think or what their 753 00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:22,279 Speaker 2: take is because they're typically shallow, they're inconsistent, and many 754 00:34:22,360 --> 00:34:23,400 Speaker 2: times they're performative. 755 00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:25,560 Speaker 5: Yeah, and I think Gene Simmons echoes what a lot 756 00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:28,200 Speaker 5: of Americans have said for a long time about political 757 00:34:28,239 --> 00:34:30,719 Speaker 5: opinions coming out of Hollywood. But here's the thing. It's 758 00:34:30,760 --> 00:34:34,880 Speaker 5: not going to stop. And it's because the Hollywood elites, 759 00:34:34,960 --> 00:34:36,920 Speaker 5: and this is true for any elite, whether it's financial 760 00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:40,279 Speaker 5: elite or political elite or cultural elite, they think they're 761 00:34:40,320 --> 00:34:43,520 Speaker 5: smarter than you. Keep Everyone in Hollywood just thinks you're 762 00:34:43,560 --> 00:34:46,400 Speaker 5: a bunch of dumb hicks living in red flyover states 763 00:34:46,600 --> 00:34:50,040 Speaker 5: and just uneducated. And if we can just educate you, 764 00:34:50,560 --> 00:34:53,680 Speaker 5: we're the smart ones. We obviously have all the right answers, 765 00:34:53,840 --> 00:34:57,080 Speaker 5: and eventually, if we keep educating these idiot hillbillies who 766 00:34:57,120 --> 00:34:59,120 Speaker 5: live in the middle of the country, they'll come along 767 00:34:59,160 --> 00:35:01,280 Speaker 5: and see our opinion. Yeah, that's not going to happen. 768 00:35:01,520 --> 00:35:03,040 Speaker 5: But you're never going to be able to convince the 769 00:35:03,080 --> 00:35:08,080 Speaker 5: people in Hollywood that you know, we're anything more than 770 00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:10,120 Speaker 5: just a bunch of dumb hicks from flyover states. 771 00:35:10,400 --> 00:35:14,040 Speaker 2: Well, they've been spending decades getting rewarded for entertainment, not 772 00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:16,520 Speaker 2: deep analysis. It goes back to the old meme, I 773 00:35:16,640 --> 00:35:19,160 Speaker 2: don't trust your opinions on the government because I know 774 00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:20,560 Speaker 2: you don't do your research. 775 00:35:20,920 --> 00:35:23,520 Speaker 5: Yeah, and I don't think anybody accuses many people in 776 00:35:23,600 --> 00:35:24,760 Speaker 5: Hollywood of being smart. 777 00:35:25,280 --> 00:35:27,760 Speaker 2: Thank you, Jim, Thank you Kevin, Thank you for listening today. 778 00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:29,839 Speaker 2: This is ninety three WIBC.