WEBVTT - Scam cases surge with increasingly clever tactics

0:00:06.160 --> 0:00:06.560
<v Speaker 1>Kiyota.

0:00:06.640 --> 0:00:09.840
<v Speaker 2>I'm Chelsea Daniels and this is the Front Page, a

0:00:09.920 --> 0:00:17.040
<v Speaker 2>daily podcast presented by the New Zealand Herald. It's been

0:00:17.079 --> 0:00:21.959
<v Speaker 2>revealed that Kiwi's lost a record three billion dollars to

0:00:22.079 --> 0:00:26.239
<v Speaker 2>scams this year. That's a thirty percent increase from two

0:00:26.239 --> 0:00:30.400
<v Speaker 2>point three billion last year. Net Safe and the Global

0:00:30.480 --> 0:00:34.600
<v Speaker 2>Anti Scam Alliance State of Scams in New Zealand report

0:00:34.680 --> 0:00:39.159
<v Speaker 2>shows that scammers are getting more sophisticated and victims are

0:00:39.200 --> 0:00:44.680
<v Speaker 2>facing persistent barriers to reporting and recovering their losses. So

0:00:45.080 --> 0:00:49.040
<v Speaker 2>how should we protect ourselves and who should be held accountable?

0:00:49.360 --> 0:00:53.000
<v Speaker 2>Today on the Front Page, netsafe's Sean Lyons is with

0:00:53.159 --> 0:00:56.560
<v Speaker 2>us to break down the latest figures and discuss how

0:00:56.640 --> 0:01:00.000
<v Speaker 2>New Zealand can better prepare itself for the evolving world

0:01:00.320 --> 0:01:07.480
<v Speaker 2>of scams. First off, Sean, let's dive into the report.

0:01:08.080 --> 0:01:12.000
<v Speaker 2>How many kiwis have experienced a scam within the last

0:01:12.040 --> 0:01:12.880
<v Speaker 2>twelve months.

0:01:14.280 --> 0:01:17.600
<v Speaker 3>Well, we're now talking about fairitys to the interest. From

0:01:17.640 --> 0:01:21.039
<v Speaker 3>the figures that we've been able to together, we're saying

0:01:21.040 --> 0:01:23.520
<v Speaker 3>probably close to more than eight percent, So eighty two

0:01:23.560 --> 0:01:27.000
<v Speaker 3>percent from our report are experiencing a scam at some

0:01:27.040 --> 0:01:29.560
<v Speaker 3>point in the last year, So this is not about

0:01:29.640 --> 0:01:32.679
<v Speaker 3>occasional access. And if you kind of extrapolate the figures,

0:01:32.880 --> 0:01:35.440
<v Speaker 3>you're probably talking about a person experiencing, you know, over

0:01:35.480 --> 0:01:39.280
<v Speaker 3>one hundred and fifty different scam attempts in a year,

0:01:39.400 --> 0:01:42.399
<v Speaker 3>so that this is something that we're seeing regularly. For

0:01:42.400 --> 0:01:45.560
<v Speaker 3>a lot of people, it's probably becoming the norm. So

0:01:45.640 --> 0:01:48.160
<v Speaker 3>this is not something you might go, you know, and

0:01:48.480 --> 0:01:50.240
<v Speaker 3>drop the sandwich when you see it's the kind of

0:01:50.280 --> 0:01:52.440
<v Speaker 3>thing that now you're probably saying, okay, here's another one.

0:01:52.760 --> 0:01:55.040
<v Speaker 3>And there's there's good things about that, but there's also

0:01:55.400 --> 0:01:58.280
<v Speaker 3>some concerns around it. When things become really normal, when

0:01:58.320 --> 0:02:00.840
<v Speaker 3>we start to become maybe a little bit sort of

0:02:01.760 --> 0:02:04.440
<v Speaker 3>more casual about things, we might become a little bit blase,

0:02:04.680 --> 0:02:07.920
<v Speaker 3>if we're trying to use the French word. And that's

0:02:07.960 --> 0:02:10.280
<v Speaker 3>a concern I think is when we start to feel

0:02:10.320 --> 0:02:12.880
<v Speaker 3>that things are a bit normal, maybe sometimes our guard

0:02:12.960 --> 0:02:16.000
<v Speaker 3>goes down. We look for spotting one thing. When the

0:02:16.040 --> 0:02:18.840
<v Speaker 3>scams change a little bit, then perhaps that's where some

0:02:18.919 --> 0:02:21.959
<v Speaker 3>of us are being caught out. So it's definitely much

0:02:22.000 --> 0:02:24.440
<v Speaker 3>more normal, as I say, but it doesn't mean that

0:02:24.480 --> 0:02:28.400
<v Speaker 3>we're all we're all defended against it unfortunately, and we.

0:02:28.360 --> 0:02:31.720
<v Speaker 2>Talk about experiencing scams, it's not actually people who have

0:02:31.840 --> 0:02:35.040
<v Speaker 2>fallen victim to them, but you've just encountered it on

0:02:35.080 --> 0:02:36.080
<v Speaker 2>a daily basis.

0:02:36.720 --> 0:02:39.760
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. Absolutely, So for some people, that might be that

0:02:39.880 --> 0:02:41.680
<v Speaker 3>they're you know, they're sick and tired of getting the

0:02:42.040 --> 0:02:45.160
<v Speaker 3>seventy fifth text in the last two months from to

0:02:45.200 --> 0:02:47.200
<v Speaker 3>say that they owe a toll, or that they've been

0:02:47.240 --> 0:02:49.280
<v Speaker 3>through a tunnel or something, or that there's a parcel

0:02:49.360 --> 0:02:51.800
<v Speaker 3>waiting for them at a post office. That doesn't sound

0:02:51.880 --> 0:02:55.120
<v Speaker 3>quite right. So people will see and spot those that

0:02:54.919 --> 0:02:57.679
<v Speaker 3>that's what we really mean. But in amongst those, there'll

0:02:57.720 --> 0:03:01.280
<v Speaker 3>be some people that experience a much more realistic or

0:03:01.360 --> 0:03:05.120
<v Speaker 3>much more plausible message social media, email, whatever it is,

0:03:05.520 --> 0:03:07.880
<v Speaker 3>and they'll actually follow through. So somewhere in those numbers

0:03:08.200 --> 0:03:10.720
<v Speaker 3>are unfortunately people who are also falling victims to scams

0:03:10.760 --> 0:03:11.960
<v Speaker 3>as well, And.

0:03:11.919 --> 0:03:15.519
<v Speaker 2>Because is that generally the way to go, they cast

0:03:15.960 --> 0:03:19.000
<v Speaker 2>a wide net as wide as possible, and just hope

0:03:19.000 --> 0:03:21.280
<v Speaker 2>someone buy its. Because I got I myself got one

0:03:21.320 --> 0:03:24.560
<v Speaker 2>of those messages saying Hi Mum, I've lost my phone

0:03:24.639 --> 0:03:27.120
<v Speaker 2>or something. It's like, now, I'm not a mother normal,

0:03:27.120 --> 0:03:29.840
<v Speaker 2>i'd probably ever be one so, but there will be

0:03:30.000 --> 0:03:33.880
<v Speaker 2>some mothers that have actually got someone of that age,

0:03:34.200 --> 0:03:37.960
<v Speaker 2>perhaps living out of home or living in different country.

0:03:39.320 --> 0:03:42.320
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely so that there is definitely the kind of the

0:03:42.360 --> 0:03:44.520
<v Speaker 3>scattergun approach. I suppose there's one way to put it

0:03:44.560 --> 0:03:47.480
<v Speaker 3>that you know, you buy from somewhere, somebody buys from

0:03:47.480 --> 0:03:50.200
<v Speaker 3>somewhere a list of email addresses, it might be narrowed

0:03:50.240 --> 0:03:52.320
<v Speaker 3>down to a country, it may not be, and they

0:03:52.400 --> 0:03:54.760
<v Speaker 3>just fire out an email message or a text message

0:03:54.840 --> 0:03:57.760
<v Speaker 3>or whatever mechanism they've got for contacting people. So there

0:03:57.760 --> 0:04:01.680
<v Speaker 3>are definitely those, but there are also so scams that

0:04:02.120 --> 0:04:05.120
<v Speaker 3>can feel and maybe are a little more targeted. And

0:04:05.160 --> 0:04:07.160
<v Speaker 3>now that's not to say that there's somebody out there

0:04:07.320 --> 0:04:09.040
<v Speaker 3>that's picked on you. You know, that's not someone that

0:04:09.080 --> 0:04:12.640
<v Speaker 3>said right today, I'm gonna scam Sean. But what might

0:04:12.720 --> 0:04:14.960
<v Speaker 3>be occurring, we think in some of those situations is

0:04:14.960 --> 0:04:18.119
<v Speaker 3>where there's data out there that might have been leaked

0:04:18.120 --> 0:04:20.880
<v Speaker 3>when somebody broke into a computer system, with a whole

0:04:20.880 --> 0:04:24.120
<v Speaker 3>lot of other sort of generally available information. People can

0:04:24.160 --> 0:04:27.599
<v Speaker 3>piece these things together and then direct a scam that

0:04:27.680 --> 0:04:30.279
<v Speaker 3>might feel an awful lot more targeted. I think that

0:04:30.480 --> 0:04:34.560
<v Speaker 3>the best way might be the difference between getting a

0:04:34.600 --> 0:04:37.040
<v Speaker 3>message from a bank one that you might have heard

0:04:37.080 --> 0:04:39.720
<v Speaker 3>of but don't use, and then getting a message that

0:04:39.720 --> 0:04:42.240
<v Speaker 3>comes from a bank that you do use. Now, that

0:04:42.279 --> 0:04:44.919
<v Speaker 3>could either be just luck of the drawer scatter gun,

0:04:45.440 --> 0:04:48.200
<v Speaker 3>or it might be that that particular scam is targeting

0:04:48.440 --> 0:04:52.640
<v Speaker 3>customers of a particular organization, And it's those times that

0:04:52.680 --> 0:04:55.640
<v Speaker 3>in both those situations, they can feel a lot more personal.

0:04:55.680 --> 0:04:58.560
<v Speaker 3>And when they feel personal, they can often feel a

0:04:58.600 --> 0:05:01.000
<v Speaker 3>lot more real. And that's maybe the first step that

0:05:01.279 --> 0:05:04.240
<v Speaker 3>scammers will go through to try and get us hooked in.

0:05:04.279 --> 0:05:07.360
<v Speaker 3>If they can find something that really talks to us

0:05:07.839 --> 0:05:10.920
<v Speaker 3>to use that phrase, then that they're probably over their

0:05:10.920 --> 0:05:12.880
<v Speaker 3>first hurdle. That they're not all the way through the gate,

0:05:12.880 --> 0:05:14.440
<v Speaker 3>but they're certainly over the first hurdle.

0:05:15.480 --> 0:05:17.479
<v Speaker 2>Right. So I've got another example here. I got a

0:05:17.480 --> 0:05:20.479
<v Speaker 2>message from my brother saying is this you or is

0:05:20.600 --> 0:05:26.280
<v Speaker 2>our dad getting scammed? The message read, Hi, Dad, messaging

0:05:26.400 --> 0:05:29.280
<v Speaker 2>you from my tablet a sim travel plan. My old

0:05:29.360 --> 0:05:32.760
<v Speaker 2>numbers no longer working since I changed networks. Please reply

0:05:32.920 --> 0:05:35.800
<v Speaker 2>so I can send you my new number. My dad

0:05:35.839 --> 0:05:40.760
<v Speaker 2>then replies Oki dokie love you xxx. Now, because he

0:05:40.880 --> 0:05:44.839
<v Speaker 2>has replied that has he ended up on some master

0:05:45.000 --> 0:05:48.640
<v Speaker 2>list somewhere where they're like, they've got a live one.

0:05:48.880 --> 0:05:51.320
<v Speaker 3>I think that's probably enough to get him categorized in

0:05:51.360 --> 0:05:53.600
<v Speaker 3>a different way, maybe on an existing list. I don't

0:05:53.600 --> 0:05:57.040
<v Speaker 3>think that's single them out for any kind of special treatment.

0:05:57.120 --> 0:06:00.200
<v Speaker 3>But what they're doing there is that they probably have

0:06:00.400 --> 0:06:02.880
<v Speaker 3>just got a whole list of contact details. They're looking

0:06:02.880 --> 0:06:05.640
<v Speaker 3>for people that are prepared to respond. Now the fact

0:06:05.720 --> 0:06:08.440
<v Speaker 3>that he has responded and said Okki, love you and

0:06:08.480 --> 0:06:11.160
<v Speaker 3>it was a from dad, maybe someone's going to assume, Okay,

0:06:11.839 --> 0:06:17.400
<v Speaker 3>here's a contact number that is a dad, and because

0:06:17.440 --> 0:06:19.479
<v Speaker 3>they're a dad, maybe they'd be more susceptible to a

0:06:19.520 --> 0:06:24.320
<v Speaker 3>sort of parent based scam. So yeah, that's a common

0:06:24.360 --> 0:06:27.440
<v Speaker 3>technique used. It is much more of that scatter gun.

0:06:27.839 --> 0:06:30.080
<v Speaker 3>But again it's the steps that they take to take

0:06:30.440 --> 0:06:33.159
<v Speaker 3>what might be millions of contact details and try and

0:06:33.160 --> 0:06:35.400
<v Speaker 3>whittle it down to a smaller number, a more manageable

0:06:35.480 --> 0:06:37.800
<v Speaker 3>number for them, that they can start to have a

0:06:37.839 --> 0:06:38.880
<v Speaker 3>more focused attack on.

0:06:40.400 --> 0:06:46.000
<v Speaker 2>In terms of some common scams, what you've mentioned the tolls,

0:06:46.560 --> 0:06:49.440
<v Speaker 2>the getting a message from your bank, we've messaged my dad,

0:06:49.480 --> 0:06:55.040
<v Speaker 2>falling forth, whatever that was. In terms of common ones,

0:06:55.600 --> 0:06:57.159
<v Speaker 2>that are going around at the moment. I mean, I

0:06:57.160 --> 0:07:00.000
<v Speaker 2>don't really hear too much of the Nigerian prints anymore.

0:07:00.279 --> 0:07:01.200
<v Speaker 2>Is he doing all right?

0:07:02.800 --> 0:07:05.560
<v Speaker 3>I think he may have reinvented himself into a retail

0:07:05.680 --> 0:07:08.600
<v Speaker 3>job perhaps because we're certainly seeing a lot more of

0:07:08.600 --> 0:07:12.480
<v Speaker 3>the retail based scam. Look that the mechanism of the

0:07:13.000 --> 0:07:15.600
<v Speaker 3>Nigerian princes what they used to call a four to

0:07:15.600 --> 0:07:19.280
<v Speaker 3>one nine scam because it fitted a Nigerian penal code

0:07:19.280 --> 0:07:23.560
<v Speaker 3>that was covered under this. It's those kinds of investment

0:07:23.600 --> 0:07:26.600
<v Speaker 3>scams are definitely still around. They don't look like they did.

0:07:26.640 --> 0:07:28.640
<v Speaker 3>They certainly don't come in on fax rolls, which is

0:07:28.680 --> 0:07:31.400
<v Speaker 3>the scams that I remember back back in the very

0:07:31.440 --> 0:07:35.080
<v Speaker 3>early days, but the mechanisms are the same. We're definitely

0:07:35.120 --> 0:07:38.920
<v Speaker 3>seeing retail scams as the biggest single category. Now. Some

0:07:39.000 --> 0:07:41.840
<v Speaker 3>of those might originate in offers that come in by emails.

0:07:41.840 --> 0:07:44.480
<v Speaker 3>Some of those might be because people are browsing for

0:07:44.520 --> 0:07:50.240
<v Speaker 3>certain products and coming across different sites. Investment scams, so

0:07:50.400 --> 0:07:56.920
<v Speaker 3>people offering you get rich quick schemes, prizes, lotteries, grants,

0:07:56.960 --> 0:07:59.760
<v Speaker 3>those kinds of things that the grant for being a

0:07:59.760 --> 0:08:02.320
<v Speaker 3>one full citizen, unfortunately is one that's been around for

0:08:02.360 --> 0:08:05.080
<v Speaker 3>a long time and is still going around because who

0:08:05.120 --> 0:08:07.960
<v Speaker 3>doesn't want to think that their government's identified them as

0:08:08.000 --> 0:08:09.800
<v Speaker 3>just a superb person and are going to get a

0:08:09.840 --> 0:08:12.520
<v Speaker 3>whole lot of money as a result. But there are

0:08:12.880 --> 0:08:16.680
<v Speaker 3>some scams that are constant that those would indicate what

0:08:16.720 --> 0:08:20.520
<v Speaker 3>ones that are. But also what we do see continually

0:08:20.720 --> 0:08:23.360
<v Speaker 3>is the change in what is that that very basic

0:08:23.440 --> 0:08:26.960
<v Speaker 3>scam to have elements of that, but to look very differently.

0:08:27.000 --> 0:08:30.200
<v Speaker 3>So probably the greatest example for us over the last

0:08:30.240 --> 0:08:35.120
<v Speaker 3>few years is the kind of merging of a romance scam,

0:08:35.360 --> 0:08:39.160
<v Speaker 3>a traditional you know, I meet you on a site online,

0:08:39.360 --> 0:08:43.040
<v Speaker 3>former relationship with you. Originally, romance scams would all then

0:08:43.120 --> 0:08:46.160
<v Speaker 3>be about I need some money because my mother's ill,

0:08:46.240 --> 0:08:48.760
<v Speaker 3>or I've been arrested, the things that we're very very

0:08:48.800 --> 0:08:53.200
<v Speaker 3>familiar now, those scams are often rather than pivoting into

0:08:53.320 --> 0:08:56.760
<v Speaker 3>just give me some money, often they're pivoting into I've

0:08:56.760 --> 0:08:59.720
<v Speaker 3>got a great investment opportunity for you, and I've been

0:08:59.720 --> 0:09:03.120
<v Speaker 3>in in this cryptocurrency or these shares for a while.

0:09:03.360 --> 0:09:07.640
<v Speaker 3>We should invest together like a romantic investment. And so

0:09:08.520 --> 0:09:11.760
<v Speaker 3>they're they're they're using one scam, they're they're piggybacking a

0:09:11.800 --> 0:09:15.320
<v Speaker 3>second one off of it. They are changing their tactics

0:09:15.360 --> 0:09:18.000
<v Speaker 3>depending on what's working now that might be working on

0:09:18.040 --> 0:09:21.360
<v Speaker 3>the individual or from what they know is working generally.

0:09:21.800 --> 0:09:25.520
<v Speaker 3>So you know, the mechanisms of scams are very similar

0:09:25.720 --> 0:09:28.600
<v Speaker 3>that the ways in which scammers use them, the scale

0:09:28.640 --> 0:09:32.120
<v Speaker 3>and which they're using them, and I guess the tenacity

0:09:32.200 --> 0:09:34.520
<v Speaker 3>to a lot of to a great extent that that

0:09:34.600 --> 0:09:38.160
<v Speaker 3>scammers are prepared to apply to these things are what's

0:09:38.240 --> 0:09:44.000
<v Speaker 3>changing and our indications, unfortunately of the success that they're experiencing,

0:09:44.120 --> 0:09:47.480
<v Speaker 3>just how profitable these things are for for for scammers.

0:09:50.400 --> 0:09:53.640
<v Speaker 1>This guy Jeculously came to New Zealand border the plane

0:09:53.679 --> 0:09:56.720
<v Speaker 1>and May last year as part of a crime synder

0:09:56.720 --> 0:09:59.800
<v Speaker 1>gift in. What they were doing was cold calling all

0:09:59.800 --> 0:10:03.520
<v Speaker 1>the victims, mostly elderly, and pretending that they were part

0:10:03.520 --> 0:10:08.000
<v Speaker 1>of a COVID police operation trying to catch bad crookeld

0:10:08.000 --> 0:10:11.000
<v Speaker 1>bank staff and counterfeit notes. What they'd do is they

0:10:11.040 --> 0:10:14.880
<v Speaker 1>would send this guy Jack Kennessey over by taxi to

0:10:14.960 --> 0:10:18.680
<v Speaker 1>the elderly people's homes and ask them to have withdrawn

0:10:18.760 --> 0:10:21.200
<v Speaker 1>large sums of money up to twenty thousand dollars, and

0:10:21.240 --> 0:10:22.880
<v Speaker 1>they'd hand it over when he used.

0:10:22.800 --> 0:10:24.040
<v Speaker 3>The special code word.

0:10:25.320 --> 0:10:27.840
<v Speaker 2>And they managed to get more than three hundred thousand dollars.

0:10:27.920 --> 0:10:30.480
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, within the space a day after arriving, within the

0:10:30.520 --> 0:10:34.760
<v Speaker 1>space of fourteen days, mister Hennessy had visited twenty one

0:10:35.640 --> 0:10:38.800
<v Speaker 1>residences and he managed to get three hundred and thirty

0:10:38.840 --> 0:10:41.240
<v Speaker 1>seven thousand dollars and none of that money was ever recovered.

0:10:43.200 --> 0:10:46.440
<v Speaker 2>And you mentioned retail scams. What does that entail that

0:10:46.480 --> 0:10:49.240
<v Speaker 2>you pay for something you never get at Basically.

0:10:49.840 --> 0:10:53.120
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, that's probably the biggest one. But there are some

0:10:53.320 --> 0:10:57.760
<v Speaker 3>that you pay for something and what arrives is not

0:10:58.640 --> 0:11:01.960
<v Speaker 3>what you thought. Certainly heard of people purchasing goods and

0:11:02.000 --> 0:11:06.280
<v Speaker 3>then photographs of the goods arriving, and so people then saying, well,

0:11:06.280 --> 0:11:09.240
<v Speaker 3>we didn't scam you. You didn't check the fine print

0:11:09.600 --> 0:11:11.920
<v Speaker 3>or where people will order one product and then a

0:11:12.000 --> 0:11:15.920
<v Speaker 3>totally worthless and ridiculous other product arrives, and they, rather

0:11:15.960 --> 0:11:18.559
<v Speaker 3>than saying it's a scam, they tried to bury themselves

0:11:18.600 --> 0:11:21.400
<v Speaker 3>in it being a logistics erra or an ordering error

0:11:21.480 --> 0:11:24.480
<v Speaker 3>or a system error. But the majority of them would

0:11:24.480 --> 0:11:27.200
<v Speaker 3>be you know, I'm looking for some sneakers, try and

0:11:27.280 --> 0:11:30.240
<v Speaker 3>find some they are at one price on one site

0:11:30.240 --> 0:11:32.080
<v Speaker 3>that I know really well, and then I come across

0:11:32.360 --> 0:11:35.800
<v Speaker 3>somewhere that's selling them a little bit less or a

0:11:35.800 --> 0:11:38.000
<v Speaker 3>different color that I couldn't get anywhere else, and I

0:11:38.040 --> 0:11:39.960
<v Speaker 3>think I'm going to take a risk on that, and

0:11:40.000 --> 0:11:42.600
<v Speaker 3>then those products just simply never ever arrive and when

0:11:42.600 --> 0:11:45.760
<v Speaker 3>I go back and try and text some match, and

0:11:46.360 --> 0:11:49.880
<v Speaker 3>the likelihood is that the website or the contact that

0:11:49.960 --> 0:11:52.840
<v Speaker 3>I was dealing with has disappeared into the ether. So

0:11:53.880 --> 0:11:56.520
<v Speaker 3>that that would be the kind of main mechanism of

0:11:56.559 --> 0:12:00.400
<v Speaker 3>retail scam And unfortunately that's hitting quite quite a considerable

0:12:00.440 --> 0:12:03.120
<v Speaker 3>number of New Zealanders this year, as it has in

0:12:03.160 --> 0:12:03.880
<v Speaker 3>previous years.

0:12:04.880 --> 0:12:10.040
<v Speaker 2>How does New Zealand's scam exposure compare internationally? So are

0:12:10.040 --> 0:12:12.560
<v Speaker 2>we keeping up the pace with global trends or kind

0:12:12.600 --> 0:12:15.800
<v Speaker 2>of falling behind in prevention efforts.

0:12:17.760 --> 0:12:22.280
<v Speaker 3>I think we are. We are comparable to to lots

0:12:22.320 --> 0:12:25.079
<v Speaker 3>of the countries that that that we talk to. Scamming

0:12:25.400 --> 0:12:32.560
<v Speaker 3>is not although the the impacts are very local, it's

0:12:32.920 --> 0:12:38.120
<v Speaker 3>it's absolutely a global enterprise. It's a global business. I

0:12:38.120 --> 0:12:40.920
<v Speaker 3>think many of the people that carry out the scams

0:12:41.120 --> 0:12:46.920
<v Speaker 3>would have have almost no idea originally where their targets were.

0:12:47.440 --> 0:12:50.600
<v Speaker 3>That that that might come that might come over in

0:12:50.640 --> 0:12:53.520
<v Speaker 3>the conversations that we have, But I don't think we

0:12:53.600 --> 0:12:56.280
<v Speaker 3>are particularly more vulnerable than than any of the other countries.

0:12:56.280 --> 0:12:58.760
<v Speaker 3>Certainly that that that the netsafe would would talk to

0:13:00.080 --> 0:13:04.760
<v Speaker 3>most countries are facing similar problems, similar losses, but but

0:13:04.760 --> 0:13:09.800
<v Speaker 3>but by population, similar mechanisms. That there's there's lots of

0:13:09.840 --> 0:13:12.280
<v Speaker 3>really great prevention work that goes on, there's lots of

0:13:12.360 --> 0:13:14.800
<v Speaker 3>really great awareness raising that that that goes on. And

0:13:14.840 --> 0:13:16.800
<v Speaker 3>I think you know, when you stop people in the

0:13:16.840 --> 0:13:19.760
<v Speaker 3>streets and if you ask them about the different scams

0:13:19.760 --> 0:13:21.640
<v Speaker 3>that are out there or their experience, they would probably

0:13:21.640 --> 0:13:24.160
<v Speaker 3>be able to tell you, you know, with some detail

0:13:24.320 --> 0:13:26.959
<v Speaker 3>about the scams that they had recognized. And I think

0:13:27.000 --> 0:13:31.000
<v Speaker 3>that's a really good sign. But we still see losses.

0:13:31.080 --> 0:13:35.000
<v Speaker 3>We know that that scammers are becoming increasingly more sophisticated,

0:13:35.080 --> 0:13:38.560
<v Speaker 3>more determined, as I mentioned before, and that means that

0:13:39.360 --> 0:13:43.160
<v Speaker 3>the things that we recognized as a scam yesterday. You know,

0:13:43.320 --> 0:13:47.040
<v Speaker 3>you mentioned our friend the Prince a while ago that

0:13:47.280 --> 0:13:49.640
<v Speaker 3>you know, anybody that tried to send out a message

0:13:49.720 --> 0:13:53.120
<v Speaker 3>that that that looked like look like one of those scams,

0:13:53.120 --> 0:13:56.400
<v Speaker 3>I think you know, most people would recognize that that's

0:13:56.520 --> 0:14:00.240
<v Speaker 3>just not not real, but with a slightly different dressing,

0:14:00.240 --> 0:14:03.160
<v Speaker 3>with a slightly different story, with a slightly different mechanism,

0:14:04.080 --> 0:14:07.760
<v Speaker 3>Throw a few websites in, throw a few convincing videos in,

0:14:07.920 --> 0:14:12.560
<v Speaker 3>a few fake news stories from media outlets that look

0:14:12.640 --> 0:14:16.040
<v Speaker 3>real but actually aren't, and a lot of people could

0:14:16.120 --> 0:14:20.120
<v Speaker 3>probably and actually do still lose money to the to

0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:24.760
<v Speaker 3>what is basically the same scam, but just looking an

0:14:24.760 --> 0:14:27.680
<v Speaker 3>awful lot looking off a lot different to how it

0:14:27.720 --> 0:14:30.720
<v Speaker 3>might have done. So I think as a nation we

0:14:30.800 --> 0:14:34.560
<v Speaker 3>do a good job both in prevention and awareness, but

0:14:34.680 --> 0:14:37.520
<v Speaker 3>unfortunately there's a lot more to it than just prevention

0:14:37.760 --> 0:14:39.080
<v Speaker 3>and awareness.

0:14:39.720 --> 0:14:43.640
<v Speaker 2>So that's safe and the Global Anti Scam Alliance recommend

0:14:43.680 --> 0:14:48.680
<v Speaker 2>an international network of anti scam centers. How realistic do

0:14:48.720 --> 0:14:50.320
<v Speaker 2>you reckon that is for New Zealand to be a

0:14:50.320 --> 0:14:50.720
<v Speaker 2>part of.

0:14:51.520 --> 0:14:54.000
<v Speaker 3>I think it is fairly realistic that there are lots

0:14:54.040 --> 0:14:57.720
<v Speaker 3>of organizations here that that that work in the space.

0:14:57.760 --> 0:15:02.000
<v Speaker 3>There are lots of organizations who's customers are the targets

0:15:02.440 --> 0:15:06.480
<v Speaker 3>of scams. And you know, like I said before, the

0:15:06.480 --> 0:15:09.920
<v Speaker 3>many nations, most nations, all nations, I imagine, have the

0:15:10.000 --> 0:15:15.000
<v Speaker 3>same issue. But it is absolutely a transnational crime. This

0:15:15.160 --> 0:15:18.920
<v Speaker 3>is not There are obviously frauds and scams that go

0:15:19.040 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 3>on inside New Zealand perpetrated against New Zealanders by New Zealanders,

0:15:23.840 --> 0:15:25.880
<v Speaker 3>but the majority of the scams that we're talking about

0:15:26.120 --> 0:15:30.560
<v Speaker 3>are across multiple countries where there are different staging steps

0:15:30.560 --> 0:15:34.120
<v Speaker 3>across multiple countries. It breaches laws in different countries, but

0:15:34.200 --> 0:15:36.880
<v Speaker 3>the laws are very different, and so it makes the

0:15:37.000 --> 0:15:41.360
<v Speaker 3>kind of the response much harder. International cooperation is a

0:15:41.440 --> 0:15:44.720
<v Speaker 3>huge part of this and is, as we say, I

0:15:44.760 --> 0:15:47.840
<v Speaker 3>think absolutely necessary if we're going to start making significant

0:15:47.840 --> 0:15:51.120
<v Speaker 3>inroads because when the victims here in New Zealand, but

0:15:51.200 --> 0:15:54.560
<v Speaker 3>yet the perpetrators are in Belgium, I have no idea

0:15:54.600 --> 0:15:56.800
<v Speaker 3>why I picked on Belgium, but they just came through

0:15:56.800 --> 0:16:01.800
<v Speaker 3>my mind. What that really needs is coordinated effort between

0:16:02.600 --> 0:16:06.359
<v Speaker 3>agencies and organizations in New Zealand and agencies and organizations

0:16:06.440 --> 0:16:08.800
<v Speaker 3>in Belgium to try and get a handle on both

0:16:08.960 --> 0:16:13.600
<v Speaker 3>ends of that problem. And it's that coordination that I

0:16:13.640 --> 0:16:17.000
<v Speaker 3>think can reduce the time between when the scams happen

0:16:17.320 --> 0:16:22.440
<v Speaker 3>and when we start to get a kind of footholder

0:16:22.480 --> 0:16:25.400
<v Speaker 3>grasp on who's doing it and then try to close

0:16:25.440 --> 0:16:29.760
<v Speaker 3>down those operations. Because These things are not about individuals anymore.

0:16:29.800 --> 0:16:32.240
<v Speaker 3>This is not somebody in a darkened room with a

0:16:32.240 --> 0:16:37.200
<v Speaker 3>hoodie on perpetrating a scam. These are, you know, complex

0:16:37.360 --> 0:16:43.000
<v Speaker 3>commercial albeit criminal organizations, organized prime groups that these are

0:16:43.000 --> 0:16:45.480
<v Speaker 3>who are perpetrating these scams at the scale that we're

0:16:45.520 --> 0:16:50.320
<v Speaker 3>seeing it, and that requires coordination and cooperation right across

0:16:50.320 --> 0:16:50.840
<v Speaker 3>the globe.

0:16:53.040 --> 0:16:55.680
<v Speaker 4>I have curated a list of the top one hundred

0:16:55.800 --> 0:16:58.800
<v Speaker 4>scammiest ads I have been served over the past six months,

0:16:58.880 --> 0:17:00.880
<v Speaker 4>and I bought them off. But I did it to

0:17:00.880 --> 0:17:03.880
<v Speaker 4>answer the age old question, what if it's not a

0:17:03.920 --> 0:17:08.919
<v Speaker 4>scam and it changes my life forever? This is what

0:17:08.960 --> 0:17:12.280
<v Speaker 4>everyone says right before they get scammed. We've got a watch.

0:17:12.280 --> 0:17:14.040
<v Speaker 4>You guys are about to see the most epic ad

0:17:14.080 --> 0:17:14.840
<v Speaker 4>you've ever seen.

0:17:14.960 --> 0:17:19.040
<v Speaker 3>My favorite Carbonox watch is the new X Ranger. Let's

0:17:19.080 --> 0:17:20.959
<v Speaker 3>take a look and see how tough it is.

0:17:21.119 --> 0:17:24.320
<v Speaker 2>It is able to with stand up to ten pounds

0:17:24.359 --> 0:17:25.240
<v Speaker 2>of weights.

0:17:25.440 --> 0:17:28.240
<v Speaker 4>He's making his words longer on purpose to sound cooler.

0:17:29.359 --> 0:17:31.640
<v Speaker 4>It's working. I kind of love this guy. I kind

0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:33.760
<v Speaker 4>of really like that ad. Let's test it if I

0:17:33.760 --> 0:17:35.480
<v Speaker 4>can break this thing. I'm not sure I can look

0:17:35.520 --> 0:17:41.520
<v Speaker 4>that guy in the eyes anymore. All right, the Olkley's goodness,

0:17:41.680 --> 0:17:43.679
<v Speaker 4>it didn't look like this in the ad. This was

0:17:43.720 --> 0:17:48.040
<v Speaker 4>eighty dollars form factor. Fire never felt this masculine before, honestly,

0:17:50.440 --> 0:18:03.640
<v Speaker 4>all right, let's try to break it zero stars, bro

0:18:03.840 --> 0:18:04.720
<v Speaker 4>Come on, are.

0:18:04.600 --> 0:18:07.360
<v Speaker 2>There any groups of people in particular who are susceptible

0:18:07.400 --> 0:18:09.600
<v Speaker 2>to these kind of or any kind of scam? Really?

0:18:09.680 --> 0:18:12.160
<v Speaker 2>I mean, we've got my dad here who immediately set

0:18:12.200 --> 0:18:15.159
<v Speaker 2>told a scammer that he loves them. He is of

0:18:15.200 --> 0:18:21.480
<v Speaker 2>the older generation. So but does it affect everyone or

0:18:22.200 --> 0:18:26.480
<v Speaker 2>the older people I suppose more susceptible. It's nicely for

0:18:26.600 --> 0:18:27.040
<v Speaker 2>my dad.

0:18:28.320 --> 0:18:32.360
<v Speaker 3>It's a really good question. And I think that there's

0:18:32.359 --> 0:18:34.920
<v Speaker 3>a perception. I think a lot of people have a

0:18:34.960 --> 0:18:39.200
<v Speaker 3>perception that the older people are more susceptible two scams.

0:18:41.000 --> 0:18:44.240
<v Speaker 3>I don't think that's necessarily the case. I think susceptibility

0:18:44.400 --> 0:18:49.040
<v Speaker 3>comes in the time and the place. It comes from

0:18:49.080 --> 0:18:52.600
<v Speaker 3>the type of scam that's being put before people. I

0:18:52.640 --> 0:18:56.200
<v Speaker 3>think often if there is a type NFL was pushed

0:18:56.200 --> 0:18:59.320
<v Speaker 3>on that with my arm twisted up my back, I'd

0:18:59.320 --> 0:19:05.359
<v Speaker 3>say it wasn't about age or demographic or socioeconomic states

0:19:05.359 --> 0:19:10.280
<v Speaker 3>of any description. It's probably about capability and confidence. It's

0:19:10.320 --> 0:19:14.960
<v Speaker 3>about people's familiarity with a particular technology. It's about their

0:19:15.520 --> 0:19:18.439
<v Speaker 3>confidence to push back when somebody is putting them under pressure.

0:19:18.480 --> 0:19:24.200
<v Speaker 3>It's about their ability to stop thinking and breathe in

0:19:24.680 --> 0:19:28.520
<v Speaker 3>those situations and say, hang on, I've got a bad

0:19:28.520 --> 0:19:33.160
<v Speaker 3>feeling about this. Something instinctively is wrong, and therefore I'm

0:19:33.160 --> 0:19:35.439
<v Speaker 3>going to say no. Even if the person on the

0:19:35.480 --> 0:19:37.360
<v Speaker 3>other end of the scam is saying that they're from

0:19:37.400 --> 0:19:40.960
<v Speaker 3>the police or from the government, or they're threatening them

0:19:41.000 --> 0:19:44.040
<v Speaker 3>in some way, or they in the case of those

0:19:44.080 --> 0:19:47.639
<v Speaker 3>Hello Mum scams that you mentioned before, where you know,

0:19:47.720 --> 0:19:50.919
<v Speaker 3>as those things progress, sometimes what people are hearing is

0:19:50.960 --> 0:19:54.119
<v Speaker 3>that their loved one is in danger or in harm,

0:19:54.400 --> 0:19:58.560
<v Speaker 3>or even in some extreme cases hearing messages directly from

0:19:58.600 --> 0:20:01.560
<v Speaker 3>their loved ones that they're you know, physically being harmed

0:20:02.119 --> 0:20:05.200
<v Speaker 3>at the time. Do we have the capabilities to stop

0:20:05.240 --> 0:20:08.040
<v Speaker 3>and say, you know, is this likely? Is this realistic?

0:20:08.280 --> 0:20:11.359
<v Speaker 3>Can I get somebody else's opinion that they're the people

0:20:11.359 --> 0:20:14.600
<v Speaker 3>who are less likely to be scammed? But there are

0:20:14.640 --> 0:20:18.879
<v Speaker 3>scams that target people that clearly are not older. But

0:20:18.920 --> 0:20:22.040
<v Speaker 3>there are target scams that target people who are. If

0:20:22.240 --> 0:20:26.080
<v Speaker 3>the right story at the right time when you're in

0:20:26.119 --> 0:20:29.280
<v Speaker 3>the right state of mind, comes across your mailbox or

0:20:29.320 --> 0:20:33.239
<v Speaker 3>your phone screen, whatever it might be, any one of

0:20:33.320 --> 0:20:37.320
<v Speaker 3>us is susceptible to that scam. And I think it's

0:20:37.400 --> 0:20:39.879
<v Speaker 3>really important that we all remember that none of us

0:20:39.920 --> 0:20:42.680
<v Speaker 3>are scam proof. There could be a scam out there

0:20:42.720 --> 0:20:45.520
<v Speaker 3>that makes you think, oh this is real, or oh

0:20:45.600 --> 0:20:47.880
<v Speaker 3>I must act. You may not have seen it yet,

0:20:47.880 --> 0:20:50.600
<v Speaker 3>and great if you haven't. But thinking that that any

0:20:50.640 --> 0:20:52.679
<v Speaker 3>of us are immune because of how old we are,

0:20:52.800 --> 0:20:56.640
<v Speaker 3>where we live, or what platforms were on is probably

0:20:56.720 --> 0:20:57.399
<v Speaker 3>risky thinking.

0:20:59.080 --> 0:21:02.200
<v Speaker 2>And I suppose that we should all be on our guard.

0:21:02.359 --> 0:21:05.280
<v Speaker 2>Given Black Friday sales are coming up, it must just

0:21:05.359 --> 0:21:09.240
<v Speaker 2>be scam Christmas times.

0:21:09.480 --> 0:21:12.440
<v Speaker 3>It's nearly as big as Christmas time. You're right, it is.

0:21:12.520 --> 0:21:16.560
<v Speaker 3>It is scam Christmas time, and you know, scam operations

0:21:16.680 --> 0:21:19.000
<v Speaker 3>know that this is one of those times of the

0:21:19.080 --> 0:21:24.240
<v Speaker 3>year when people are probably more active in online retail

0:21:24.800 --> 0:21:28.879
<v Speaker 3>and they definitely definitely take advantage of that, and you know,

0:21:29.000 --> 0:21:31.840
<v Speaker 3>for the reason that people maybe are more likely to

0:21:32.960 --> 0:21:35.720
<v Speaker 3>be buying things, but also because it's a time that

0:21:35.760 --> 0:21:40.400
<v Speaker 3>we're all probably that little bit more bombarded with messaging

0:21:40.800 --> 0:21:44.680
<v Speaker 3>from legitimate organizations that creates a kind of fog, if

0:21:44.680 --> 0:21:47.560
<v Speaker 3>you like, of those sort of offers and makes it

0:21:47.640 --> 0:21:50.679
<v Speaker 3>a little harder I think for all of us to

0:21:50.720 --> 0:21:54.919
<v Speaker 3>discern and differentiate the the what's real from what's not.

0:21:55.600 --> 0:22:02.040
<v Speaker 3>And scammers will absolutely jump on that that that moment,

0:22:02.119 --> 0:22:05.440
<v Speaker 3>those times where they think maybe that might be enough

0:22:05.520 --> 0:22:08.959
<v Speaker 3>just to push Somebody who was cautious on Thursday are

0:22:09.000 --> 0:22:10.640
<v Speaker 3>going to be a little bit less cautious on Black

0:22:10.680 --> 0:22:14.800
<v Speaker 3>Friday because they're so chasing hard for that stainlessteel frymepan

0:22:15.080 --> 0:22:18.040
<v Speaker 3>And if someone suddenly puts that offer in front of me,

0:22:18.160 --> 0:22:20.680
<v Speaker 3>then then maybe I'm going to take the risks. So

0:22:21.040 --> 0:22:23.119
<v Speaker 3>it is definitely a busy time for the scammers, and

0:22:23.600 --> 0:22:26.880
<v Speaker 3>Christmas will will be too. The unfortunate thing that means

0:22:26.880 --> 0:22:29.200
<v Speaker 3>it's also going to be a really disappointing time for

0:22:29.560 --> 0:22:32.280
<v Speaker 3>a number of New Zealanders when those things just don't

0:22:32.320 --> 0:22:32.760
<v Speaker 3>turn up.

0:22:33.960 --> 0:22:36.159
<v Speaker 2>Well, I know what you want for Christmas now, Sean,

0:22:36.240 --> 0:22:42.120
<v Speaker 2>thanks for joining us, no problem at all. That's it

0:22:42.160 --> 0:22:45.359
<v Speaker 2>for this episode of the Front Page. You can read

0:22:45.400 --> 0:22:49.840
<v Speaker 2>more about today's stories and extensive news coverage at enziherld

0:22:50.000 --> 0:22:53.760
<v Speaker 2>dot co dot enz. The Front Page is produced by

0:22:53.880 --> 0:22:57.280
<v Speaker 2>Jane Ye and Richard Martin, who is also our editor.

0:22:57.800 --> 0:23:02.399
<v Speaker 2>I'm Chelsea Danielscribe to the front page on iHeartRadio or

0:23:02.440 --> 0:23:05.960
<v Speaker 2>wherever you get your podcasts, and tune in tomorrow for

0:23:06.000 --> 0:23:07.840
<v Speaker 2>another look behind the headlines.