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Speaker 1: I'd either due to see our.

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Speaker 2: Now Land Revenue has admitted it gave Facebook the names,

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Speaker 2: the addresses and other contact details of almost two hundred

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Speaker 2: and seventy thousand taxpayers. So you remember, IID has already

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Speaker 2: got itself in a little bit of trouble because it's

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Speaker 2: been given these these encrypted bits of information, hashed bits

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Speaker 2: of information. But then when they went and looked at it,

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Speaker 2: they realized they were also giving out some raw information.

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Speaker 2: David Buckingham is a Queenstown employment relations consultant who first

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Speaker 2: complained about this, and he's with us.

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Speaker 1: Now, hey, David, hey, good evening.

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Speaker 2: This is mental. I mean, we thought that they were

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Speaker 2: at least trying to hide the stuff. Now it turns

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Speaker 2: out they're just giving the information over completely in the

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Speaker 2: raw form.

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Speaker 1: Did this surprise you? Look, it actually did a little bit.

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Speaker 1: I did actually think that they had some pretty good

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Speaker 1: processes around, at least hashing it. That wasn't really the

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Speaker 1: focus of my initial complaints. It was the fact that

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Speaker 1: information was being matched against databases that were in some

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Speaker 1: of the biggest data brokerages in world, people like Meta

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Speaker 1: that has a checkered history in terms of the way

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Speaker 1: that they deal with data. And look, I'm not suggesting

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Speaker 1: that I have any smoking gun evidence that they've done

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Speaker 1: anything illegal or wrong, but I want this is wrong

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Speaker 1: to you, and morally I think it's wrong, but I'm

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Speaker 1: not suggesting legally wrong. What I do say is is

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Speaker 1: that when you upload hashed information, and this is a

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Speaker 1: way of scrambling things so that there's almost like a

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Speaker 1: game of snap, sort of a digital game of cryptographic snap,

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Speaker 1: so that if a face has already has the information,

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Speaker 1: they can kind of make the inference that that's who

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Speaker 1: they want to target. The problem is this number one

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Speaker 1: is identifiable to somebody with this level of data. Second

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Speaker 1: of all, these were small batches. These were little batches

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Speaker 1: of data that were identified as being attached to particular

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Speaker 1: taxpayer behavior. So let me just give you a really

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Speaker 1: a good meta for if I gave you twenty ring binders,

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Speaker 1: small lit ring binders with a whole attached information on

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Speaker 1: the side of it, and you could say, well, that's

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Speaker 1: sort of secure. I mean, I still don't think it's right.

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Speaker 1: But let's just say that we run with what ID

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Speaker 1: you've said, which is that this data's scrambled. Now le's

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Speaker 1: assuming that they are twenty ring binders of the scrambled information,

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Speaker 1: and on the binder, on the outside binder of each

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Speaker 1: one of these ring binders, it's got a label on

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Speaker 1: it with very specific taxpayer behavior. That's what they've done.

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Speaker 1: This report talks about what's in the binder, and we're

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Speaker 1: saying the breach of privacy was the fact that their

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Speaker 1: data was included within one of those folders, right, and

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Speaker 1: the label on the outside.

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Speaker 2: Now, can you explain something to me, David, because I

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Speaker 2: don't get this, okay, Ird, If there are a specific

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Speaker 2: taxpayer behavior that they're trying to stop, which is, let's

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Speaker 2: say I haven't paid my taxes and they're trying to

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Speaker 2: get a hold of me, why don't they just take

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Speaker 2: the information they've already got, which is my name, my email,

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Speaker 2: my contact phone number, my address and give me a call.

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Speaker 2: And so you haven't paid your taxpayer, why do they

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Speaker 2: need to go to Facebook to pay Facebook to run

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Speaker 2: an ad at me?

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Speaker 1: There's a brilliant question. But I get my notifications from

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Speaker 1: in the revenue by way this thing called my IR

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Speaker 1: I can open up and I can read it. And

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Speaker 1: the way I discovered this was that I went digging

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Speaker 1: inside the privacy settings of Facebook. When I was on Facebook,

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Speaker 1: iviousally deleted my account. But when I was on Facebook,

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Speaker 1: I was going through the number of companies that were

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Speaker 1: disclosing my personal information two meta, and by way of

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Speaker 1: doing that, I had this big, long list of companies

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Speaker 1: that had approached me. Look, i'll tell you something. When

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Speaker 1: I first actually emailed in the Revenue about this, and

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Speaker 1: I think it was March, the initial response internally, because

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Speaker 1: I was asked for this information under the privacy, their

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Speaker 1: first response was to say, well, we're just wondering if

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Speaker 1: these are just some sort of unfounded accusations. Well, today

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Speaker 1: in the Revenue we've not only had to concede that

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Speaker 1: they're not only doing it, but that's under pressure to

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Speaker 1: stop this practice.

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Speaker 2: Yeah too, Right now, do you know if we can

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Speaker 2: find out if we're part of the two hundred and

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Speaker 2: seventy thousand taxpayers who just had our information handed to

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Speaker 2: meet it.

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Speaker 1: What in their Revenue is said at the press conference

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Speaker 1: and then their media communications todays is that they're going

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Speaker 1: to be contacting those people in the next twenty four hours.

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Speaker 1: They say also that the other many hundreds of thousands

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Speaker 1: of people who may have got caught up in some

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Speaker 1: of these previous uploads of data. However, which way they

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Speaker 1: want to frame it that they don't even know they

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Speaker 1: don't know. The Commissioner that day has been saying, by

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Speaker 1: all reports, they're actually not sure and it would be

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Speaker 1: too hard together.

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Speaker 2: Interesting, David, thanks for runningus through to really appreciate that.

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Speaker 2: Buckingham Queen Sound Employment Relations consultant.

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