WEBVTT - NZ tech should be taking on the world, now 0:00:00.520 --> 0:00:04.240 The USA the holy grail of markets for entrepreneurs all 0:00:04.280 --> 0:00:04.880 over the world. 0:00:05.040 --> 0:00:08.560 While we Kiwis have many cultural distinctions that separate us 0:00:08.600 --> 0:00:11.479 from our western piers, we also have a huge number 0:00:11.560 --> 0:00:12.680 of similarities. 0:00:13.000 --> 0:00:15.400 This fact, as well as the sheer amount of money 0:00:15.560 --> 0:00:17.880 and the number of people, make the US market a 0:00:17.920 --> 0:00:19.920 golden goose for local entrepreneurs. 0:00:20.360 --> 0:00:23.840 Our guest this week is Mahesh Moralda, a venture capitalist 0:00:23.920 --> 0:00:28.240 who was the twenty fifth employee at Australian unicorn startup Canva, 0:00:28.320 --> 0:00:30.400 and he has strong feelings about the need for New 0:00:30.480 --> 0:00:34.560 Zealand companies, especially tech and software companies, to expand beyond 0:00:34.600 --> 0:00:35.159 New Zealand. 0:00:35.520 --> 0:00:38.880 With his deep experience in the VC world, maheshkiv's advice 0:00:38.920 --> 0:00:41.920 to startups on how to capture some of that American cash, 0:00:41.960 --> 0:00:44.839 as well as his view on why it's so important 0:00:44.840 --> 0:00:47.800 for New Zealand businesses to break into the US market. 0:00:48.080 --> 0:00:51.600 QUI founders who make it to the US are better 0:00:52.040 --> 0:00:57.160 than the top tier American founders because American founders they're like, hey, 0:00:57.440 --> 0:01:00.600 if this doesn't work out, I'll be fine. We founder 0:01:00.600 --> 0:01:04.679 who makes the US knows and believes they have one shot, 0:01:04.840 --> 0:01:05.600 and then they go. 0:01:05.760 --> 0:01:08.800 All that's coming up later in this week's episode of 0:01:08.840 --> 0:01:11.520 the Business of Tech, Howard by two Degrees for business. 0:01:11.600 --> 0:01:14.160 But first, Peter, have you ever been smashed? 0:01:14.800 --> 0:01:18.280 I haven't been successfully smashed, but I got to say, 0:01:19.640 --> 0:01:22.840 literally last week I almost fell for one for the 0:01:22.880 --> 0:01:26.840 first time, which was a message from supposedly from New 0:01:26.959 --> 0:01:32.399 Zealand Post about a package that hadn't been delivered, had 0:01:32.400 --> 0:01:34.600 been held up. I needed to give some more information 0:01:34.680 --> 0:01:38.360 and I literally was waiting for a package that had 0:01:38.360 --> 0:01:40.880 been held up. So I was like, finally they've got 0:01:40.920 --> 0:01:43.399 in touch with me. It clicked through to it looked 0:01:43.440 --> 0:01:45.440 just a little bit off, didn't look like the New 0:01:45.560 --> 0:01:49.160 Zealand Post website, and then I looked at the URL 0:01:49.200 --> 0:01:52.200 and it was not ented post dot code into ed. So, 0:01:52.960 --> 0:01:55.560 I mean a lot of people will be familiar with 0:01:55.600 --> 0:02:01.240 these smashing text messages. It's basically SMS fishing, which is 0:02:01.240 --> 0:02:05.360 an attempt to get you to divulge sensitive information or 0:02:05.400 --> 0:02:08.440 to click a link to download some malware onto your phone. 0:02:08.480 --> 0:02:11.720 That's often the case as well, so I think kiwis 0:02:11.760 --> 0:02:15.120 are quite familiar with this. But a case that's just 0:02:15.240 --> 0:02:19.320 been uncovered that played out earlier in the year was 0:02:20.560 --> 0:02:24.519 a smashing campaign that didn't just rely on the existing 0:02:24.600 --> 0:02:28.519 networks of two degrees or one end Z or a spark. 0:02:29.360 --> 0:02:31.760 What these people did is a lot more sophisticated. They 0:02:31.840 --> 0:02:36.800 set up effectively a fake mobile base station in Auckland 0:02:37.600 --> 0:02:40.280 to try and get people to connect to that base 0:02:40.360 --> 0:02:44.200 station automatically thinking they were on a regular network, and 0:02:44.240 --> 0:02:48.040 then they sent them dodgy SMS messages. And the reason 0:02:48.120 --> 0:02:50.920 they would go to all that trouble is to bypass 0:02:51.120 --> 0:02:54.920 all the sort of filtering systems that the other legitimate 0:02:54.960 --> 0:02:58.280 networks have in place to try and weed out a 0:02:58.280 --> 0:03:01.200 lot of these smishing messages. And then they could basically 0:03:01.240 --> 0:03:04.360 tailor messages with their own phone numbers from this fake 0:03:04.520 --> 0:03:08.720 base station and communicate with these people who thought they 0:03:08.720 --> 0:03:15.000 were responding to legitimate messages. It's incredible how far they 0:03:15.040 --> 0:03:19.120 went to make this happen. You've been very few examples 0:03:19.200 --> 0:03:21.840 of this, mainly out of China where this sort of 0:03:21.960 --> 0:03:25.040 level of sophistication of smishing messages has been seen. 0:03:25.400 --> 0:03:28.519 Yeah, I mean it's almost kind of cool in a 0:03:28.680 --> 0:03:31.200 way when you look at the technology that's involved, and 0:03:31.840 --> 0:03:34.960 it's kind of this very ad hoc thrown together thing. 0:03:35.120 --> 0:03:37.200 You can see the picture in the article will link, 0:03:37.720 --> 0:03:42.240 but to kind of know there's some teenage amateur engineer 0:03:42.240 --> 0:03:44.520 out there who's throwing together one of these things in 0:03:44.560 --> 0:03:49.440 an attempt to defraud people. Obviously terrible behavior and not 0:03:49.520 --> 0:03:52.000 something to be encouraged at all, but at the same 0:03:52.040 --> 0:03:56.200 time kind of amazing that they were managed to get 0:03:56.200 --> 0:03:59.720 the kit, put it together and successfully actually do this. 0:04:00.400 --> 0:04:03.480 Yeah, and I wonder if there is a China link here, 0:04:03.520 --> 0:04:08.600 either Chinese students in New Zealand doing this or someone 0:04:08.680 --> 0:04:11.840 working with people in China to get the equipment here. 0:04:12.520 --> 0:04:17.440 It was a operation by the police Operation ORCA. Funnily enough, 0:04:17.480 --> 0:04:19.040 they had a bit of a sense of humor around 0:04:19.080 --> 0:04:22.640 that one, and the Department of Internal Affairs was made 0:04:22.640 --> 0:04:25.080 aware of the scam in July. I don't know whether 0:04:26.600 --> 0:04:29.360 she was dabbed in or what happened, but they've been 0:04:29.400 --> 0:04:33.360 on the case. These fake base stations, they call them 0:04:33.720 --> 0:04:39.159 base transceiver stations BTS towers, and there is in China 0:04:39.160 --> 0:04:43.919 again malware called swearing Trojan, which is Android based banking 0:04:43.920 --> 0:04:48.600 malware which have been used in conjunction with these BTS towers, 0:04:48.640 --> 0:04:53.479 which ultimately have a range. According to reports out of China, 0:04:53.560 --> 0:04:56.080 off ten to twenty kilometers, so you could have a 0:04:56.080 --> 0:04:58.800 lot of people. What I don't understand is how they 0:04:58.839 --> 0:05:02.320 get you know, my phone, I'm on the skinny network 0:05:02.360 --> 0:05:05.720 on a skinny sim. How they get my phone and 0:05:05.720 --> 0:05:08.880 my sim to connect to their network. There must be 0:05:08.880 --> 0:05:13.719 some authentication that there's somehow mimicking or bypassing there for 0:05:13.760 --> 0:05:14.400 that to happen. 0:05:15.120 --> 0:05:18.120 Yeah, because they talk about it just auto connecting as well. 0:05:18.279 --> 0:05:22.280 Your phone will auto connect and you won't even know 0:05:22.320 --> 0:05:24.400 that it's done it because and it will use I 0:05:24.400 --> 0:05:27.320 think like a two G network as well, rather than 0:05:27.360 --> 0:05:31.479 the three G or four G because for whatever reason, 0:05:31.480 --> 0:05:33.719 it tricks your phone into thinking it's the network that 0:05:33.760 --> 0:05:37.719 it should be connected to. There's some instructions where you 0:05:37.720 --> 0:05:40.640 can actually disable the two G network on your phone 0:05:41.160 --> 0:05:43.240 to be able to make sure you can avoid these 0:05:43.320 --> 0:05:47.720 kinds of things. But realistically, the smishing is no more 0:05:47.760 --> 0:05:50.839 sophisticated than any other text fishing, and they can be 0:05:50.880 --> 0:05:53.560 pretty convincing. You know, you're not the only one who's 0:05:53.760 --> 0:05:56.679 definitely clicked on one of these links and then gone, 0:05:56.720 --> 0:05:59.560 oh no, that's actually not something I should be clicking on. 0:06:00.080 --> 0:06:03.479 Yeah, And I think obviously a lot of those messages 0:06:03.520 --> 0:06:06.400 still get through, because I got one just last week, 0:06:06.760 --> 0:06:10.320 so that the networks aren't doing enough to keep up 0:06:10.360 --> 0:06:14.719 with this deluge of smashing messages. But to go to 0:06:14.760 --> 0:06:19.479 the next step of installing some physical hardware, you know 0:06:19.480 --> 0:06:21.480 there must be a real incentive to do that, which 0:06:21.560 --> 0:06:23.880 is and I think it is when you're on that 0:06:23.920 --> 0:06:27.960 fake base station that's down the road from you or whatever, 0:06:28.160 --> 0:06:32.720 they can tailor official looking numbers, They can create their 0:06:32.760 --> 0:06:35.279 own basically their own phone number network to send you 0:06:35.880 --> 0:06:39.280 official looking text numbers and phone numbers, which then you 0:06:39.640 --> 0:06:43.440 might make you think, oh, okay, this is legitimate, but 0:06:43.520 --> 0:06:46.400 ultimately they're still going to send you to a dodgy website. 0:06:46.440 --> 0:06:49.960 So all the same preventative measures are in place. Is 0:06:49.960 --> 0:06:52.760 it the right url? Are they asking for information my 0:06:52.920 --> 0:06:57.760 bank normally wouldn't ask for over email or via a 0:06:57.760 --> 0:07:00.080 web form? All those things come into play again, and 0:07:00.160 --> 0:07:04.559 which should hopefully eliminate ninety nine percent of the chance 0:07:04.600 --> 0:07:05.960 of you actually getting schmished. 0:07:08.560 --> 0:07:10.440 I know it sounds like it's something you might want, 0:07:10.480 --> 0:07:12.080 but trust me, you don't want to get smished. 0:07:13.640 --> 0:07:14.200 Definitely not. 0:07:14.440 --> 0:07:18.280 And of course cybercrime isn't just restricted to teenagers in Auckland. 0:07:19.160 --> 0:07:22.960 There are nation state actors as well, and China, it 0:07:23.000 --> 0:07:26.520 turns out, has been able to take advantage of backdoors 0:07:27.000 --> 0:07:31.320 in telecommunications companies which were left open to meet US 0:07:31.360 --> 0:07:35.440 federal regulations. That was a really interesting story that you 0:07:35.960 --> 0:07:40.640 sent me on this one. Basically a bunch of professionals going, 0:07:40.920 --> 0:07:43.760 we told you these backdoors were a bad idea, that 0:07:43.880 --> 0:07:47.160 there were a weakness in the armor, and it turns 0:07:47.160 --> 0:07:50.200 out that that some hackers have found those weaknesses. 0:07:50.720 --> 0:07:54.600 Yeah, we talked earlier in the year about this vault 0:07:54.640 --> 0:07:59.640 Typhoon hacking group again out of China. That was leaving 0:08:00.240 --> 0:08:04.160 were packages and critical infrastructure the likes of power stations 0:08:04.640 --> 0:08:09.880 and water infrastructure companies in the US, and this happened 0:08:09.920 --> 0:08:12.680 several years ago, but the US governments and the Five 0:08:12.760 --> 0:08:15.160 Eyes partners, including New Zealand, came out earlier this year 0:08:15.160 --> 0:08:18.480 and said you need if you run critical infrastructure, you 0:08:18.560 --> 0:08:21.360 need to go in and check your systems because this 0:08:22.360 --> 0:08:25.320 vault Typhoon group is through a lot of companies in 0:08:25.360 --> 0:08:29.200 the US. So fast forward sort of nine months, we've 0:08:29.200 --> 0:08:33.840 got Salt Typhoon, and this is apparently a slightly different 0:08:33.880 --> 0:08:36.760 group of hackers who have been very much focusing on 0:08:36.800 --> 0:08:42.560 the wire tapping infrastructure that the US requires big telecommunications 0:08:42.559 --> 0:08:45.760 and internet companies in the US to maintain by law. 0:08:45.840 --> 0:08:48.199 So that's a law from about thirty years ago that says, 0:08:48.280 --> 0:08:52.560 you need to make your network's interception capable, and there's 0:08:52.559 --> 0:08:54.559 some little black box that hangs off the back of 0:08:54.640 --> 0:08:56.960 your network that we need to be able to connect to. 0:08:57.160 --> 0:08:59.520 We have that here in New Zealand as well. Most 0:08:59.520 --> 0:09:03.880 countries do that, and when you get a warrant, then 0:09:04.360 --> 0:09:07.360 that will activate the ability to use the y tapping 0:09:08.120 --> 0:09:13.040 method to either infiltrate or listen to calls as well 0:09:13.080 --> 0:09:16.520 as Internet traffic. So you know that is effectively a 0:09:16.520 --> 0:09:20.360 backdoor in the network that the FEDS in the US 0:09:20.400 --> 0:09:22.559 can access. Well, it turns out, according to the Wall 0:09:22.600 --> 0:09:27.440 Street Journal, which reported this on Friday massive story, the 0:09:27.600 --> 0:09:32.160 likes of AT and T and Verizon and Lumen Networks 0:09:32.800 --> 0:09:36.800 formerly century Link have all been compromised. These y tapping 0:09:36.960 --> 0:09:45.199 facilities have been compromised, potentially exposing customer data to these hackers. Now, 0:09:45.200 --> 0:09:48.640 if that's the case, if we're talking about huge volumes 0:09:48.640 --> 0:09:50.560 of traffic that go through the likes of AT and 0:09:50.600 --> 0:09:53.760 T and Verizon, if that's the case. You know, that's 0:09:53.760 --> 0:09:58.240 one of the biggest exploits in many years. It hearkens 0:09:58.280 --> 0:10:01.679 back to the Edward snow and revelations of twenty thirteen 0:10:01.720 --> 0:10:05.679 when he basically revealed and all the documents he leaked 0:10:06.080 --> 0:10:09.680 a mass surveillance effort underway by the US government that 0:10:09.720 --> 0:10:14.160 even some of the telcos and internet companies didn't really 0:10:14.160 --> 0:10:19.400 know what was happening. Yeah. Effectively, that infrastructure still exists 0:10:19.679 --> 0:10:23.600 to some extent, but has been cleaned up a lot 0:10:23.679 --> 0:10:26.240 so that the tech companies are more aware of what's 0:10:26.280 --> 0:10:30.120 going on, and you need sort of legal permission to 0:10:30.640 --> 0:10:35.640 utilize that technology. But it's been found to be insecure, 0:10:35.640 --> 0:10:37.880 and I guess it really sort of highlights that whole 0:10:37.880 --> 0:10:41.079 point of the tech sect has been making about encryption 0:10:41.400 --> 0:10:43.040 and back doors, and if you put a back door 0:10:43.040 --> 0:10:45.679 in encryption, you're going to have this problem to an 0:10:45.679 --> 0:10:46.720 even greater degree. 0:10:47.240 --> 0:10:51.600 It reminds me of the telegram story from not long ago. Yeah, yeah, 0:10:51.640 --> 0:10:53.679 you know, with the founder was at risk of getting 0:10:53.720 --> 0:10:57.200 arrested by the French or did get arrested by the French. 0:10:57.000 --> 0:10:58.160 Authority, still sitting there. 0:10:58.440 --> 0:11:00.760 So the question then becomes like it's that age or 0:11:00.840 --> 0:11:03.920 question of is it more important to have privacy or 0:11:03.960 --> 0:11:08.920 is it more important to have a governmental oversight and 0:11:09.080 --> 0:11:13.760 access into communications. It's difficult to find that balance. 0:11:14.200 --> 0:11:19.400 Yeah, and I think this legislation which was introduced about 0:11:19.440 --> 0:11:22.959 thirty years ago, it's called the Communications Assistance for Law 0:11:23.120 --> 0:11:26.840 Enforcement Act ninety ninety four, that came into effect just 0:11:26.880 --> 0:11:29.360 as sort of cell phones were starting to take off 0:11:29.360 --> 0:11:32.600 and the Internet was in its infancy. But then after 0:11:32.880 --> 0:11:35.920 September eleven we had a lot of wire tapping, huge 0:11:36.320 --> 0:11:39.840 ramp up in wire tapping activity, so this was really 0:11:40.040 --> 0:11:43.280 called on. But the interesting thing about that legislation, if 0:11:43.320 --> 0:11:47.640 your network is fully encrypted, you obviously don't have to 0:11:47.679 --> 0:11:51.560 comply with that. You can say, well, my mobile network 0:11:51.640 --> 0:11:54.800 is end to end encrypted, I can't help you with 0:11:54.840 --> 0:11:57.920 a wiretap. Sorry about that. Most of the telcos and 0:11:58.000 --> 0:12:02.640 internet providers have an encrypted their networks, while they have 0:12:02.720 --> 0:12:07.319 other security measures, and they facilitate their customers encrypting their 0:12:07.320 --> 0:12:10.240 own data. A lot of traffic isn't and a lot 0:12:10.240 --> 0:12:14.360 of that metadata obviously isn't as well. So I think 0:12:14.360 --> 0:12:17.959 the next step will be Okay, the likes of Horizon 0:12:18.000 --> 0:12:19.920 and AT and T will go well, this was really 0:12:19.960 --> 0:12:23.720 embarrassing and this hurt us. We're going to encrypt our 0:12:24.120 --> 0:12:26.760 entire network, and it's probably quite a lot of work 0:12:27.000 --> 0:12:31.800 doing that, even on mobile networks and five G modern infrastructure, 0:12:31.880 --> 0:12:35.640 encrypting the whole thing so that we can literally say 0:12:35.679 --> 0:12:38.800 to the authorities so we don't have the ability to 0:12:40.280 --> 0:12:43.280 wy tap our customers anymore. And that's really where the 0:12:43.400 --> 0:12:46.440 likes of Meta and Signal and others have gone with 0:12:46.760 --> 0:12:47.560 messaging apps. 0:12:48.040 --> 0:12:50.600 It's just an absurd bureaucratic difference, isn't it really at 0:12:50.600 --> 0:12:53.319 the end of the day, where you know, you just say, well, 0:12:53.360 --> 0:12:55.080 if you spend a little bit more money and make 0:12:55.120 --> 0:12:57.640 sure that everything is super secret, then we won't ask it. 0:12:57.640 --> 0:13:00.920 We can't. You know, it just feels a little bit arbitrary. 0:13:01.679 --> 0:13:03.720 But I suppose at the same time it's just going 0:13:03.760 --> 0:13:06.599 to push everybody towards more encryption, which maybe at the 0:13:06.640 --> 0:13:09.480 end of the day is beneficial for privacy and security. 0:13:09.960 --> 0:13:13.959 Yeah. Well, the alternative is that you capitulate to the 0:13:15.280 --> 0:13:18.640 FBI and the US administration and say, okay, we're going 0:13:18.720 --> 0:13:22.240 to build a back door into encryption, and it turns out, 0:13:22.280 --> 0:13:24.320 as has been the case here, that your customers are 0:13:24.360 --> 0:13:29.719 even more vulnerable to foreign interference and terror, terrorism and 0:13:29.760 --> 0:13:32.800 the like because of that back door and encryption systems. 0:13:32.800 --> 0:13:35.760 And I think that's why it hasn't progressed any mandate 0:13:36.080 --> 0:13:40.200 because they know that things are not secure. There's always 0:13:40.280 --> 0:13:43.480 going to be a way in and if you building 0:13:43.559 --> 0:13:45.480 that back door, someone is going to come through it. 0:13:46.040 --> 0:13:50.200 Yeah. Signal president Meredith Whittaker is quoted in this tech 0:13:50.240 --> 0:13:52.960 Crunch article saying there is no way to build a 0:13:53.000 --> 0:13:57.760 backdoor that only the good guys can use. It's pretty 0:13:57.800 --> 0:13:59.400 much like the summary, there isn't it. 0:13:59.520 --> 0:13:59.720 Yeah. 0:14:00.080 --> 0:14:01.520 Keeping an eye on what that might mean for the 0:14:01.520 --> 0:14:04.960 future of regulation around privacy and encryption, But what isn't 0:14:05.000 --> 0:14:07.440 going to change anytime soon is the fact there are 0:14:07.480 --> 0:14:11.199 a whole lot of people and businesses in the USA. 0:14:11.720 --> 0:14:14.520 Definitely. We've seen a bunch of New Zealand companies grow 0:14:14.679 --> 0:14:17.960 really quickly once they break into the US, like startup 0:14:18.040 --> 0:14:20.960 Parkable and INSIDEX listed Black Pearl Group. 0:14:21.280 --> 0:14:24.840 Mahesh Moeralda is a venture capitalist and startup advisor who 0:14:24.960 --> 0:14:26.440 runs Phase One. 0:14:27.080 --> 0:14:30.560 His experience across New Zealand, Australia and the US has 0:14:30.600 --> 0:14:33.160 led him to become a massive advocate for the potential 0:14:33.320 --> 0:14:37.560 for New Zealand's economy offered by the US market, particularly 0:14:37.600 --> 0:14:39.960 when it comes to software. Ben you spoke to him 0:14:40.240 --> 0:14:43.000 about what needs to happen to see that potential realized. 0:14:43.280 --> 0:14:45.640 Yeah, he's got some strong feelings about the topic and 0:14:45.720 --> 0:14:48.080 we're more than happy to share them. So let's have 0:14:48.120 --> 0:14:57.360 a listen to that interview now. Hi, Mahesh, thank you 0:14:57.400 --> 0:14:59.600 so much for joining us on the Business of Tech podcast. 0:14:59.600 --> 0:15:00.360 How are you today? 0:15:00.560 --> 0:15:04.200 I am feeling pumped, really excited, great, energized. 0:15:03.920 --> 0:15:07.120 Excellent, and I'm assuming that's related to your recent trip 0:15:07.160 --> 0:15:09.320 to the US and what you've seen over there. 0:15:09.400 --> 0:15:09.600 Yeah. 0:15:09.680 --> 0:15:13.120 Yeah, it was a very powerful, informative, insightful trip. 0:15:14.200 --> 0:15:16.760 Give us a little bit of information about your backgrounds. 0:15:17.240 --> 0:15:20.960 What's your interest in the innovation VC startup scene in 0:15:21.000 --> 0:15:21.560 New Zealand. 0:15:21.720 --> 0:15:25.080 Yeah, quick story, right, So I came to New Zealand 0:15:25.160 --> 0:15:27.280 on my own when I was fourteen from Singapore in 0:15:27.360 --> 0:15:30.600 the mid nineties when Nape boys from which is a 0:15:30.720 --> 0:15:34.320 very good cultural grounding. And you grew up in Auckland 0:15:34.320 --> 0:15:37.800 City and started work here. After that, I had a 0:15:37.880 --> 0:15:40.480 career professional services and NBA and then had my own 0:15:40.520 --> 0:15:45.120 startup in the early twenty tens in Sydney en route 0:15:45.200 --> 0:15:49.320 coming back home somewhat successful, but then was fortunate enough 0:15:49.320 --> 0:15:50.880 to be invited to be one of the first leaders 0:15:50.880 --> 0:15:55.000 at Canva. So number twenty five, I think business was 0:15:55.160 --> 0:15:58.640 probably about twenty mil and obviously now it's two thousand 0:15:58.680 --> 0:16:03.760 plus strong, well north of twenty billion. And then I 0:16:04.000 --> 0:16:05.920 was a C suite in a few other major startups 0:16:05.960 --> 0:16:09.200 and Ossie came back home. And what I've done for 0:16:09.240 --> 0:16:12.400 the last three years is cultivate a group of an 0:16:12.400 --> 0:16:15.560 early stage founder community called Phase one Phase one Ventures, 0:16:16.920 --> 0:16:20.040 and the target we have is six unicorns from that 0:16:20.080 --> 0:16:23.720 community community, right, and a key part of that is 0:16:23.760 --> 0:16:27.040 global ambition, right, and how we need to be braver 0:16:27.160 --> 0:16:31.120 and boulder because to be honest, we're an entrepreneurial country, 0:16:31.440 --> 0:16:33.680 two islands and the corner of the world. You have 0:16:33.800 --> 0:16:38.040 to be. But the truth is we haven't been able 0:16:38.040 --> 0:16:41.080 to see scale. And that's all we've got to do. 0:16:41.240 --> 0:16:44.320 We've just got to start reaching up and looking up 0:16:44.520 --> 0:16:48.240 and seeing that our skills and experience applied to the 0:16:48.240 --> 0:16:51.960 world's problems drives incredible even more innovation. 0:16:52.200 --> 0:16:55.440 So you've been part of the venture system in various 0:16:55.480 --> 0:16:58.600 places throughout the world, and you mentioned Canva there considered 0:16:58.600 --> 0:17:01.680 one of the world's you know start up. Darling's really 0:17:01.960 --> 0:17:06.600 an incredible success story. What are you seeing in terms 0:17:06.600 --> 0:17:09.159 of New Zealand's space at the moment. 0:17:09.400 --> 0:17:15.159 Yeah, incredible opportunity and perhaps over the last couple of decades, 0:17:15.640 --> 0:17:20.800 perhaps we haven't taken advantage of the of our foundational 0:17:21.640 --> 0:17:26.520 entrepreneurial zeal And then some early wins like Navman and 0:17:27.040 --> 0:17:29.760 a few others, you know, we started. We've always been 0:17:29.760 --> 0:17:32.720 an entrepreneur and we actually have had a very strong 0:17:32.800 --> 0:17:37.800 electrical engineering background, which ellen electrical engineering is a base 0:17:37.840 --> 0:17:41.439 for software engineering. But for a variety of reasons, we 0:17:41.600 --> 0:17:46.719 didn't really hook into the software engineering and software and 0:17:46.840 --> 0:17:53.320 SaaS growth curve. And you need role models, right, So 0:17:53.359 --> 0:17:56.560 when I give a speech in Sydney, three hundred people 0:17:56.560 --> 0:17:59.120 show up and I'm there answering questions for two hours 0:17:59.200 --> 0:18:01.119 because there's a whole bunch of people who want to 0:18:01.119 --> 0:18:03.760 be the next Melanie Perkins from Canvas and safety culture 0:18:03.760 --> 0:18:06.879 and culture app we've got zero. We've had then to 0:18:06.880 --> 0:18:10.960 a certain extent, but we haven't had that role modeling, 0:18:11.240 --> 0:18:15.640 which then doesn't allow investor class to believe that Canvas 0:18:15.640 --> 0:18:19.440 secondary sale of two billion dollars of Aussie flooding back 0:18:19.440 --> 0:18:24.560 into the Sydney market last year this year can happen here, right, 0:18:24.600 --> 0:18:27.439 So you need those role models just both for founders 0:18:28.119 --> 0:18:31.920 and for the investor class so that it's really exciting 0:18:31.960 --> 0:18:35.040 companies like Tracksuit, Next Work, Kiki, there's a whole bunch 0:18:35.040 --> 0:18:40.399 of now New Quodis new new software scale ups that 0:18:40.480 --> 0:18:42.840 are startups that are coming through. So we need that 0:18:43.040 --> 0:18:46.920 role modeling. So we need a few winners to really supercharge, 0:18:47.000 --> 0:18:48.960 a few more winners to supercharge. 0:18:49.240 --> 0:18:55.000 Yeah, for sure. That's obviously, you know, a difficult thing, 0:18:55.240 --> 0:18:58.200 right because as they say, the hardest part of getting 0:18:58.200 --> 0:19:01.280 the boulder rolling is that first push. And in some 0:19:01.359 --> 0:19:04.000 ways we've kind of had that. We had a zero 0:19:04.119 --> 0:19:06.680 as you mentioned, and we've had trade me and are 0:19:06.720 --> 0:19:10.960 you starting to see the Jacob happening, do you think? 0:19:11.080 --> 0:19:14.120 Or are we still still kind of trying to get 0:19:14.160 --> 0:19:15.320 that first push. 0:19:15.880 --> 0:19:19.800 No, it's going to be an incredibly exciting time in 0:19:19.880 --> 0:19:23.359 the next ten to fifteen years, right, and it is 0:19:23.480 --> 0:19:27.000 well started as well. Started that likes of gd one 0:19:27.560 --> 0:19:31.200 and Samantha Wong from Blackbird coming into New Zealand and 0:19:31.560 --> 0:19:35.399 going hey, let's play like a global game and New 0:19:35.480 --> 0:19:39.520 Zealand VCS ice House has been an incredible pioneer in 0:19:40.800 --> 0:19:45.199 kicking off the space but having global counterparts. So Vicnation 0:19:45.200 --> 0:19:48.480 from GD one came from Apple in the US as 0:19:48.600 --> 0:19:52.080 Kiri come back home and I think your question regards 0:19:52.119 --> 0:19:55.480 to one is the Jacob happening? Absolutely? It is? How 0:19:55.520 --> 0:20:00.280 do why is that happening? It's not a surprise a 0:20:00.320 --> 0:20:05.120 group of overseas Kiwis who've gone overseas and done some 0:20:05.160 --> 0:20:09.520 stuff and seeing some stuff coming back home and going hey, 0:20:09.720 --> 0:20:12.719 so maybe we could do this differently. We can have 0:20:12.760 --> 0:20:15.399 a different horizon, a different We need to think about 0:20:15.400 --> 0:20:18.240 early stage differently, like myself. Right, So when I came 0:20:18.280 --> 0:20:21.560 back home three years ago, all I've done for the 0:20:21.640 --> 0:20:23.600 last three years, and I started in a living room, 0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:27.240 is give free strategic support to a group of early 0:20:27.240 --> 0:20:30.879 stage founders, going hey, let's get the foundations and fundamentals 0:20:30.960 --> 0:20:33.960 right if you really want to go big. So that 0:20:34.119 --> 0:20:37.440 ecosystem is now expanding with a Kiwi diaspora that's coming 0:20:37.480 --> 0:20:41.600 back home and a group of early founders listening, what 0:20:41.640 --> 0:20:44.560 could we do to help is actually make even more 0:20:44.680 --> 0:20:49.200 space for that Kii diaspora to come in because sometimes 0:20:49.200 --> 0:20:52.200 in a small country, when you hit the ceiling, there 0:20:52.280 --> 0:20:55.200 is a desire to maintain that ceiling. You know, that's 0:20:55.200 --> 0:20:58.080 a normal thing. So if we can be more open 0:20:58.200 --> 0:21:02.480 to hey, people overseas and you've come back home, let's 0:21:02.560 --> 0:21:06.120 listen a bit more and understand what you've seen that 0:21:06.200 --> 0:21:08.800 I think would accelerate things even further. 0:21:09.200 --> 0:21:11.679 What are us What would you say are some of 0:21:11.720 --> 0:21:14.440 those key things you mentioned? You know, there are things 0:21:14.520 --> 0:21:16.800 people have seen an experience and they're bringing that home. 0:21:17.560 --> 0:21:20.719 What you what are the lessons that you've seen overseas 0:21:21.080 --> 0:21:23.280 or that you've seen other people bring back that are 0:21:23.280 --> 0:21:25.280 really important that we should be capitalizing on. 0:21:25.560 --> 0:21:27.760 Yeah, and we discussed this just before we chat it. Right, 0:21:27.880 --> 0:21:30.679 like a tech company, you could argue, let's break it 0:21:30.760 --> 0:21:33.399 up into three tiers, right, a tech company that wants 0:21:33.440 --> 0:21:37.120 to reach some sort of exit or ceiling at one two, 0:21:37.840 --> 0:21:40.040 one hundred mil, right, and then you have the one 0:21:40.080 --> 0:21:42.960 hundred mil to a billion ceilings second swim lane, and 0:21:42.960 --> 0:21:46.040 then the third swim lane is a billion two billion 0:21:46.080 --> 0:21:49.600 north right. And it's very important that any one of 0:21:49.600 --> 0:21:53.480 those swim lanes is equally cool, right, But it's they're 0:21:53.520 --> 0:21:57.840 different founders with different constraints and different ambitions that work 0:21:57.880 --> 0:22:00.399 in each of those swim lanes. And it's really important. 0:22:00.400 --> 0:22:03.200 There's a set of different conditions. But let's talk about 0:22:03.200 --> 0:22:06.679 that last swim lane, right, like that two billion north 0:22:06.800 --> 0:22:10.800 world changing company. And again I can't state this enough. 0:22:10.840 --> 0:22:13.240 The other two swim lanes and entrepreneurs are equally cool. 0:22:13.280 --> 0:22:15.560 What's cool is doing what's right by you. But that 0:22:15.680 --> 0:22:20.480 last swim lane, what's important is a founder that wants 0:22:20.560 --> 0:22:25.080 to change the world that has unheralded like ambition, right, 0:22:25.280 --> 0:22:29.560 I want to six fix a global problem. Right. So 0:22:29.600 --> 0:22:31.880 something conversation I have with all the Phase one founders 0:22:31.920 --> 0:22:34.400 is you know what's your why, and you know when 0:22:34.440 --> 0:22:37.840 you as you as you gain in influence and so forth, 0:22:38.000 --> 0:22:39.399 what are you going to do with that? And you 0:22:39.480 --> 0:22:44.000 have that conversation early on. Outside of that what's really important? 0:22:44.160 --> 0:22:46.239 So and you actually have to have a US from 0:22:46.320 --> 0:22:51.200 day one customer approach because it's the largest homogeneous market 0:22:51.240 --> 0:22:56.000 that works. And finally you have to build. You have 0:22:56.040 --> 0:23:00.159 to have customer and problem obsession, right, because you're trying 0:23:00.160 --> 0:23:03.399 to build a love product that scales the world, and 0:23:03.440 --> 0:23:06.239 the only way you do that is by having an 0:23:06.280 --> 0:23:13.720 incredible thesis on a deep problem with this huge ambition 0:23:14.400 --> 0:23:16.639 that said, and that delta is really hard to manage. 0:23:17.040 --> 0:23:18.000 Does that make sense? 0:23:18.200 --> 0:23:21.880