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Speaker 1: More detail on last week's mass internet and radio outages

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Speaker 1: in the Capitol. So you can blame it. Turns out

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Speaker 1: the HMAS canbra as in the wullship, the Australian Naval

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Speaker 1: ship arrived in town and the internet went out. The

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Speaker 1: intelligence expert Paul Buchannan's back, Well, let's pull the morning

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Speaker 1: to you, good marning Mike. How does that happen?

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Speaker 2: Ah, that's the million dollar question. Apparently they were using

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Speaker 2: a commercial shared free broadband spectrum for their navigation radar,

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Speaker 2: which right there raises some serious questions. But what it did.

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Speaker 2: As they cruised down the west coast of the North Island,

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Speaker 2: they produced rolling blackouts of the five giggerhearst network, the

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Speaker 2: wireless network as well as various radio stations. And as

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Speaker 2: they came into the Cooks Strait, then they started blacking

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Speaker 2: out the upper part of the South Island. And so

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Speaker 2: the question begs a why were they on a commercial band? Yeah,

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Speaker 2: given that that's the command ship of the of the

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Speaker 2: Australian Navy, that's the most important ship in their navy.

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Speaker 2: And sure they were coming here in a ceremonial meet

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Speaker 2: and greet. Sure they may have been in our territorial

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Speaker 2: waters and didn't really expect that, you know, an adversary

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Speaker 2: would be trying to track them. But let's just say

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Speaker 2: that operational security was lacking, and it may be due

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Speaker 2: to a very simple fact. It may be that someone

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Speaker 2: simply put in the wrong frequency as they came down,

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Speaker 2: because you know, just a rating, A guy sitting in

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Speaker 2: a chair on the bridge put in, you know, plugged

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Speaker 2: in one decimal number wrong and they got onto this bandwidth.

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Speaker 2: What I found interesting is that the New Zealand Defense

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Speaker 2: Forces don't want to bar this. They said they contacted

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Speaker 2: the Australians. The Australians took care of it, and the

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Speaker 2: story see you later. All questions are being referred to

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Speaker 2: the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Enterprise, which it turns

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Speaker 2: out manages this bandwidth, you know, this shared commercial bandwidth.

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Speaker 2: And I think, you know, there may be more to this.

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Speaker 2: Let's say, for example, if the warship was actually testing

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Speaker 2: critical infrastructure cyber defenses, which the GCSB does just to

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Speaker 2: see if they're running holes in the system vulnerabilities than that,

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Speaker 2: and they're friendly so they can tell us, okay, we're

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Speaker 2: finding this sort of stuff, and the internet providers basically said,

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Speaker 2: this shows our vulnerabilities. We had to go to backup

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Speaker 2: generators and automatic switches to close down the network because

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Speaker 2: we were afraid it was going to interfere with air flights.

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Speaker 2: So there's more questions than answers. But in the scheme

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Speaker 2: of things, well, probably was human error by a relatively

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Speaker 2: low ranking sailor, and other than egg on their face,

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Speaker 2: not much harm was done.

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Speaker 1: It only mate, nice to talk to you, Paul bukenan

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Speaker 1: am I are you laughing with me? It's just like,

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Speaker 1: of course it was fat Fingerson droned the calls in

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Speaker 1: the market. For more from the Mic Asking Breakfast, listen

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