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Speaker 1: You're listening to a podcast from Newstalk SEDB. Follow this

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Speaker 1: and our wide range of podcasts now on iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: I'm excited about this, Doctor Sale. Mr Cogliano is a

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Speaker 2: maritime historian at Campbell University, North Carolina, a former merchant

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Speaker 2: mariner and host of the Water Is Going On was

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Speaker 2: Shipping on YouTube. We reached out to him after enjoying

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Speaker 2: his international analysis of the Manawan Nui autopilot disaster. Good Afternoon,

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Speaker 2: sal Good afternoon, Na Sally. Manowan Nui was originally a

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Speaker 2: commercial vessel converted for the Navy. Do you think that

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Speaker 2: had a bearing on the sinking?

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Speaker 3: I think it did. The commercial vassel, the Ada Farm,

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Speaker 3: was designed for use up in the North Sea by

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Speaker 3: the Norwegians, and as such it has a very unique

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Speaker 3: propulsion system. It uses a series of what's called azipods,

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Speaker 3: and unlike conventional Navy vessels that have propellers and rudders,

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Speaker 3: as a pas require a lot of training to be

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Speaker 3: very proficient in their use. Plus, it has a sophisticated

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Speaker 3: autopilot system that requires familiarity with it. And it appears

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Speaker 3: from the inter report given by the Admiral in Charge

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Speaker 3: of Navy that there was a lacking of knowledge in

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Speaker 3: how to effectively shift from autopilot back into manual control.

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Speaker 4: Can you just explain a little bit about how the

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Speaker 4: azipods system works compeded to a traditional navy vessel.

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Speaker 3: Sure, So in a traditional vessel you would have a

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Speaker 3: propeller and a rudder, turn the wheel and you kick

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Speaker 3: the stern out of the vessel with as a pods.

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Speaker 3: When you actually have individual control of the two as

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Speaker 3: a pods, and the propellers are kind of suspended below

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Speaker 3: the vessel and spin three hundred and sixty three hundred

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Speaker 3: and sixty degrees around so that you don't actually throw

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Speaker 3: a rudder per se. You can control the azipods individually,

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Speaker 3: or you can slay them together and put them on

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Speaker 3: single control through a knob. So it's a very unique system.

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Speaker 3: It takes a lot of familiarity to know how to

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Speaker 3: operate the systems. It provides extremely precision maneuvering. It provides

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Speaker 3: the ability to stop the vessel almost immediately. But it

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Speaker 3: is an elaborate system and requires a lot of training

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Speaker 3: to be proficient in them.

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Speaker 2: Yes, so these are two independents. They're thrusters, aren't they.

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Speaker 2: But they're independent. They can be operated independently. But when

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Speaker 2: you go into the autopilot mode, you've set of course,

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Speaker 2: you've set what you wanted to do, and the azipods

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Speaker 2: are controlled by the navigation system.

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Speaker 3: Well, it actually depends on the type of autopilot system

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Speaker 3: that is on board the ship. Commercially, it had a

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Speaker 3: very sophisticated what's called dynamic positioning system that allowed you

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Speaker 3: to really input into a computer the track line basically

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Speaker 3: where you want the vessel to go. But when the

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Speaker 3: ship was converted from commercial over to the Royal New

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Speaker 3: Zealand Navy, there is a question about was the full

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Speaker 3: dynamic positioning system carried over or was there a modified

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Speaker 3: autopilot system put on board. Autopilots can do a variety

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Speaker 3: of things. They can set your course and you follow

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Speaker 3: a straight course line. They can do waypoints, so you

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Speaker 3: set up, you know, go a line and come back,

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Speaker 3: and during survey operations you really want to be on

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Speaker 3: autopilot because you want to have the straightest course available.

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Speaker 3: What was clear from the briefing was that the ship

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Speaker 3: had shifted between manual and autopilot a few times. And

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Speaker 3: what was clear is that they did not understand that

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Speaker 3: they had put the ship into autopilot, at least a

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Speaker 3: modified form of autopilot that allowed them to have throttle control.

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Speaker 3: They sped up on the vessel, but they couldn't turn

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Speaker 3: the acid pods to change course.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, so is that normal? Because if you look at

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Speaker 2: the path that traveling along and then they go out

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Speaker 2: of all a pilot and then they they execute a

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Speaker 2: turn away from the reef, and then they go back

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Speaker 2: into autopilot. So what you're saying is, in a full

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Speaker 2: autopilot system, you would just set it up to scan

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Speaker 2: that reef on its own and execute all the tunes

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Speaker 2: itself without going in and out of autopilot.

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Speaker 3: Right on an autopilot system, it's almost like a car

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Speaker 3: with automatic lane changes or changing the speed. It will

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Speaker 3: do it for you. You can program in the course change,

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Speaker 3: put in the limits to how much rudder you want

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Speaker 3: to use, or how much azipods you want to use,

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Speaker 3: and it will make those changes for you. It was

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Speaker 3: strange to me that they kept popping in and out

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Speaker 3: of that mode because it led obviously to the disaster

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Speaker 3: that you saw, and more importantly, it put them into

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Speaker 3: a mode where they had throttle control. They can make

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Speaker 3: the ship go faster or slower, but they didn't have

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Speaker 3: helm control where they can steer it.

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Speaker 2: Well, it looks like the autopilot was on for teen

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Speaker 2: minutes before it was turned off. How easily can you

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Speaker 2: check that a ship like the Mono Annui has its

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Speaker 2: autopilot on? Is there a is then?

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Speaker 4: No?

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Speaker 2: I mean, when are you talking about lane change in

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Speaker 2: the car? It's pretty clear when it's on. You can

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Speaker 2: see it on the screen. Is it not a light

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Speaker 2: flashing saying you're on autopilot?

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Speaker 3: It depends on the system. Again, we know that it

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Speaker 3: had a very sophisticated system on board when it was

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Speaker 3: a commercial vessel. It's not clear that that same system

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Speaker 3: was carried over and so familiarity with the system would

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Speaker 3: be a paramount. I mean, they should have indications for

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Speaker 3: when that system is engaged, and even if when it's

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Speaker 3: engaged in a limited fashion as it appeared to be here,

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Speaker 3: it's you know, leaving it in autopilot mode. Again, one

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Speaker 3: of the things that came up in the briefing was

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Speaker 3: the crew did not believe that they were in autopilot.

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Speaker 3: They thought they had a thruster failure, and so they

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Speaker 3: started handling it like a thruster failure, and so they

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Speaker 3: did not assume that it was locked into autopilot. It's

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Speaker 3: only later ten minutes later, when probably other crew members

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Speaker 3: came up to the bridge, senior crew members came up,

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Speaker 3: did they realize that they were locked into auto pilot.

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Speaker 4: And your experience was that a significant lack of training.

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Speaker 4: The fact that when they tried to divert course will

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Speaker 4: slow the vessel down, they ended up picking up speed.

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Speaker 4: Is that just a drastic lack of training.

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Speaker 3: It is a clear lack of familiarity with the system.

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Speaker 3: And you know, there was a very similar occasion in

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Speaker 3: twenty seventeen when the USS McCain was maneuvering going into Singapore,

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Speaker 3: and that was due to a lack of familiarity with

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Speaker 3: this system and how to switch between modes and when

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Speaker 3: you're operating close to a reef as they were, familiarity

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Speaker 3: was really keen. I mean, I'm really at a loss

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Speaker 3: to understand why they didn't just stay in manual mode

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Speaker 3: until they were on the core setting they wanted to.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, because what you've got here is they accelerate from

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Speaker 2: six knots to ten knots towards the reef, which looks

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Speaker 2: like they've increased thrust. Is that because they were assuming

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Speaker 2: that the azipods were one eighty degrees in the other

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Speaker 2: direction than what they expected. So using the azipods to

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Speaker 2: slow themselves down, they actually used them to speed themselves

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Speaker 2: up by increasing the thrust.

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Speaker 3: Right, what I would envision they did was was spin

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Speaker 3: the azipods. They assumed the azipods were rotating and actually

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Speaker 3: on on on Menawanui, it actually has propellers on both

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Speaker 3: front and halt of the azipods, and so it actually

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Speaker 3: there's a video of the dry docking of her, and

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Speaker 3: so she actually has props on both ends of the azipods.

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Speaker 3: And so they envisioned that they were reversing the props,

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Speaker 3: they were getting a spin around and actually backing down

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Speaker 3: on it. And what was clear is they didn't, and

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Speaker 3: that the speed up should have told them that they

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Speaker 3: should have been watching the gauges to tell them that

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Speaker 3: they were accelerating, not decelerating. The biggest thing they could

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Speaker 3: have done was take speed off period, just slow down,

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Speaker 3: you know, that would have at least mitigated the potential

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Speaker 3: of running as hard up on the reef as they did.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, when they started spading up towards the RAF. They

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Speaker 2: would have been quite a moment for them. During a

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Speaker 2: RAF scanning maneuval like this, would the commander of the

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Speaker 2: ship normally be on the bridge.

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Speaker 3: You know, it depends on the standard operating procedure for

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Speaker 3: the ship. They were doing that, that survey for twenty

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Speaker 3: two hours, so I mean that's obviously a long protracted

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Speaker 3: period of time to have the ship's cap on the bridge,

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Speaker 3: But it wouldn't be unusual to have you know, maybe

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Speaker 3: the captain or the executive officer on the bridge if

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Speaker 3: they deemed it as dangerous operation. You know, the fact

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Speaker 3: that they weren't up there tells me they didn't view

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Speaker 3: it as a hazardous operation. They were running lines, you know,

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Speaker 3: basically mowing the grass, trying to do their survey operations.

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Speaker 3: But as they were getting closer and closer towards the reef,

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Speaker 3: that may have you know, it may have caused more

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Speaker 3: concern and hazard for the crew. But you know, the

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Speaker 3: captains will set their standard procedures for a vessel. It

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Speaker 3: seems as if the captain here did not do that,

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Speaker 3: or the officer on watch neglected to call the captain

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Speaker 3: for a hazardous maneuver. We just don't know. There's not

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Speaker 3: enough information for us to make that call yet.

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Speaker 4: Silent was mentioned in the report that there were critical

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Speaker 4: eras that were identified, training, planning, supervision, risk assessment and readiness.

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Speaker 4: With all of those elements that have been identified, that's

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Speaker 4: probably not a good look for the command, or is it.

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Speaker 3: I think that's damning of not just the captain, but

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Speaker 3: potentially the entire Royal New Zealand Navy. If if this

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Speaker 3: is an issue across the board, that is areas, I mean,

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Speaker 3: those are critical areas you know to operate a.

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Speaker 2: Vessel, training, planning, supervision, assessment and readiness. They all seem

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Speaker 2: pretty key.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean those those are almost every area you

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Speaker 3: can envision. And so this is either very damning for

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Speaker 3: the ship's captain or it's very damning across the entire fleet.

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Speaker 3: If this isn't, you know, an issue across the entire fleet,

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Speaker 3: then it raises into question of the ability of other vessels. Again.

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Speaker 3: Manawanui is a very unique type ship. It's common out

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Speaker 3: in the commercial industry, but within navies it's very unique.

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Speaker 3: Although we do see navies adopting the use of this

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Speaker 3: type vessel. The Royal Navy has brought a very similar

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Speaker 3: vessel in and the US Navy has brought a very

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Speaker 3: similar vessel into the fleet.

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Speaker 2: We're talking to doctor sel mccagliano, Professa at the US

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Speaker 2: Merchant Marine Academy about the manoanuis thinking, how real globally

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Speaker 2: is it for a naval ship to sink in peace time?

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Speaker 3: Well, I mean, you've you've had issues like the von

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Speaker 3: Hamer Schard in San Diego catching fire and you know,

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Speaker 3: basically being not thinking but being a constructive total loss

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Speaker 3: of The US Navy lost a minesweeper aground in the

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Speaker 3: South China Sea about a decade ago. It's not a

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Speaker 3: rare occurrent. It's not a common occurrence, but it does happen.

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Speaker 3: I mean, operating on the high seas is always a risk.

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Speaker 3: And one of the big questions I have is why

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Speaker 3: was Mano Aanui performing such a very delicate operation as

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Speaker 3: close to shore when you could use autonomous vehicles, you

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Speaker 3: can use a variety of different platforms to do it. Granted,

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Speaker 3: the Royal New Zealand Navy doesn't have the money and

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Speaker 3: capabilities of many other navies, and that may have been

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Speaker 3: the reason that it was being done. Economy of scale.

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Speaker 4: Here you mentioned in your analysis, So that sources have

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Speaker 4: told you that our government did not pay the money

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Speaker 4: to get the full dynamic position system, that the autopilot

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Speaker 4: is highly likely to be incomplete. Would you expect that

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Speaker 4: to come out of the Court of Inquiry that is

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Speaker 4: currently underway.

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Speaker 3: I would hope the Court of Inquiry would talk to

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Speaker 3: the Classification Society, that is the third party entity that

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Speaker 3: certifies Bethel, and when Manoanue was a commercial lessole, the

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Speaker 3: Classification Society would have ensured that the ship had a

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Speaker 3: system suitable for use in operation so that it could

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Speaker 3: be properly insured. I would think that the Court of

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Speaker 3: Inquiry would discuss the autopilot system in detail, what type

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Speaker 3: of system. When we look at what happened on board

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Speaker 3: USS McCain in twenty seventeen, the helm system was a

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Speaker 3: major function that was looked at because the operating crew,

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Speaker 3: the personnel using that system, we're not familiar with it.

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Speaker 3: They had come over from another ship that had a

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Speaker 3: different system and therefore they were unfamiliar with it. So

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Speaker 3: I would think it would be a major issue within

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Speaker 3: the Court of inquiry.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, well, what if an autopilot system they have or

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Speaker 2: on other ships. I think it'd be good to infast

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Speaker 2: in a big flashing light that sees autopilot on at

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Speaker 2: any given times, so I know what's going on.

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Speaker 3: There's also concern that you knock a ship out of

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Speaker 3: autopilot did not know about it. There, there's there, there's

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Speaker 3: there's a reason to have kind of redundancy in your

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Speaker 3: auto pilot system so that it can't be inadvertently knocked

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Speaker 3: out of auto pilot. The airline industry learned that to

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Speaker 3: their detriment, when you know, you could just bump the

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Speaker 3: controller and the ship comes out of auto pilot and

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Speaker 3: then all of a sudden you have a plane descending

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Speaker 3: without the pilots being aware of that. So, I mean,

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Speaker 3: there's reasons for for the creation of systems. It's it's

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Speaker 3: it's usually an accident of some kind that that is

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Speaker 3: the underlying cause.

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Speaker 2: Finally, would you describe this as a humiliating incident for

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Speaker 2: the Royal New Zealand Navy.

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Speaker 3: I don't like to use that phrase because I think

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Speaker 3: it's an accident, and accidents will always happen as long

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Speaker 3: as you have humans interfacing with machinery, especially at sea,

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Speaker 3: you're going to use lose vessels. Just being at sea

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Speaker 3: on a flat, Colm day, is a risky proposition. The

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Speaker 3: sea always is trying to kill you, and it's a

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Speaker 3: way to see it. Yeah, it looks calm and inviting,

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Speaker 3: but you're always fighting that. Unfortunately, when you let your

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Speaker 3: guard down is typically when the sea wins. And so

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Speaker 3: I don't consider it a humiliating lass. I hope if anything,

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Speaker 3: like many events, we learn from it. So hopefully there's

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Speaker 3: a there's a lesson learned from it.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, well, I mean for New Zealand, it's a bit

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Speaker 2: of a problem because it's twelve point five percent of

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Speaker 2: parents or a navy fleet, so.

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Speaker 3: I know it's the big partyler.

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Speaker 2: Yeah that was doctor cel Mircogliano. If you want to

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Speaker 2: see a full analysis of his thoughts on the MANOANUI

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Speaker 2: autopilot disaster, then look up the what is going On

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Speaker 2: and Shipping channel on YouTube. Very interesting man.

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