1 00:00:02,720 --> 00:00:03,560 Speaker 1: Life Audio. 2 00:00:05,760 --> 00:00:09,960 Speaker 2: All Right, welcome friends to our live debate review of 3 00:00:10,000 --> 00:00:13,160 Speaker 2: the conversation I had with bart erman Over's book Love 4 00:00:13,440 --> 00:00:16,560 Speaker 2: Thy Stranger. Now, technically it wasn't a debate, it was 5 00:00:16,560 --> 00:00:19,600 Speaker 2: a conversation, but we certainly what I would describe, had 6 00:00:19,600 --> 00:00:24,000 Speaker 2: a friendly debate back and forth, going really into the 7 00:00:24,079 --> 00:00:27,200 Speaker 2: question of his book. At the root of it, he 8 00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:30,040 Speaker 2: makes the case and the subtitle is how the teachings 9 00:00:30,080 --> 00:00:35,080 Speaker 2: of Jesus transformed the moral conscience of the West. So 10 00:00:35,640 --> 00:00:37,800 Speaker 2: I was stunned when I first read his book. He 11 00:00:37,840 --> 00:00:44,239 Speaker 2: says things like hospitals and orphanages and nursing homes and 12 00:00:44,360 --> 00:00:48,559 Speaker 2: charity and forgiveness existed in the ancient world, whether in 13 00:00:48,600 --> 00:00:53,400 Speaker 2: ancient Rome or in ancient Judaism, but it was never 14 00:00:54,000 --> 00:00:58,720 Speaker 2: universalized until the person of Jesus. Now there's a lot 15 00:00:58,760 --> 00:01:01,520 Speaker 2: more in his book than we cover, but a number 16 00:01:01,560 --> 00:01:04,880 Speaker 2: of times in the book he gives his account of 17 00:01:04,920 --> 00:01:09,759 Speaker 2: where moral values and duties come from. He dismisses the 18 00:01:09,800 --> 00:01:14,560 Speaker 2: moral argument, and so I was just really curious if 19 00:01:14,600 --> 00:01:17,320 Speaker 2: this transformation of the West, he would say, this is 20 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:22,959 Speaker 2: an objectively good transformation, or it's just a change. Now, 21 00:01:22,959 --> 00:01:26,600 Speaker 2: if you haven't seen that discussion yet or listen to it. 22 00:01:27,120 --> 00:01:29,160 Speaker 2: You don't have to have heard it. I think to 23 00:01:29,240 --> 00:01:32,280 Speaker 2: benefit from our conversation. We'll try to represent that fairly. 24 00:01:32,720 --> 00:01:34,240 Speaker 1: But I would really encourage you to. 25 00:01:34,240 --> 00:01:37,399 Speaker 2: Go back and listen to it. I think minimally it 26 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:40,280 Speaker 2: was a charitable exchange. It got spicy, I thought in 27 00:01:40,319 --> 00:01:42,200 Speaker 2: a good way in the sense we're both passionate and 28 00:01:42,280 --> 00:01:44,479 Speaker 2: what we care about. It ended on a great note, 29 00:01:44,520 --> 00:01:48,080 Speaker 2: and I think minimally there's clarity of where I think 30 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:53,440 Speaker 2: best explains a theistic worldview, and Bart gives an atheist, 31 00:01:53,560 --> 00:01:57,400 Speaker 2: not the only atheist account of morality, and we both 32 00:01:57,440 --> 00:02:00,640 Speaker 2: criticize the others and argued why we think we're each 33 00:02:00,720 --> 00:02:04,160 Speaker 2: being inconsistent and we're wrong. So people can watch it 34 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:07,880 Speaker 2: make up throwing minds our guest today, Doctor Dave Horner 35 00:02:08,400 --> 00:02:11,960 Speaker 2: has been a friend. Gosh, I got to think about this. 36 00:02:12,000 --> 00:02:15,239 Speaker 2: I gotta do the math. Almost twenty five years, twenty 37 00:02:15,280 --> 00:02:16,560 Speaker 2: three years. What year did you come to. 38 00:02:16,520 --> 00:02:19,240 Speaker 3: Talbot, by the way, twenty five years, twenty. 39 00:02:18,919 --> 00:02:20,440 Speaker 2: Five years, because I remember, I think it was in 40 00:02:20,480 --> 00:02:23,240 Speaker 2: your first class that you ever taught. I remember going 41 00:02:23,280 --> 00:02:26,000 Speaker 2: to office hours and you were a little overwhelmed as 42 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:30,120 Speaker 2: you were shifting into Talbot, which is understandable. But I 43 00:02:30,160 --> 00:02:32,959 Speaker 2: want people to know that when I think of who 44 00:02:32,960 --> 00:02:35,640 Speaker 2: are ethicists literally in the world, that I would want 45 00:02:35,680 --> 00:02:38,639 Speaker 2: to make sense of this discussion. You're at the top 46 00:02:38,639 --> 00:02:42,400 Speaker 2: of my list. You got your doctorate, not at Cambridge. 47 00:02:42,480 --> 00:02:43,120 Speaker 3: Thank you for that. 48 00:02:43,200 --> 00:02:47,000 Speaker 2: I want to clarify that. But Oxford, you've written a 49 00:02:47,040 --> 00:02:50,840 Speaker 2: number of books. Your book Meta Ethics is fantastic. I 50 00:02:50,880 --> 00:02:53,880 Speaker 2: recommend it all the time. And you're also one of 51 00:02:53,880 --> 00:02:56,880 Speaker 2: the funniest people I know. So don't let us down today. 52 00:02:57,000 --> 00:02:59,960 Speaker 3: Oh I'll try hard nuts too. I'll try hard nuts. 53 00:03:00,080 --> 00:03:03,320 Speaker 2: You don't have to try to be funny everything, okay, 54 00:03:03,360 --> 00:03:06,480 Speaker 2: fair enough, just be yourself as a win. So we're 55 00:03:06,480 --> 00:03:09,520 Speaker 2: going to take some of your live questions, by the way, 56 00:03:10,360 --> 00:03:12,760 Speaker 2: but to get started, I'm really curious. I haven't asked 57 00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:16,840 Speaker 2: you this yet, sent you the video, you listened to it, 58 00:03:16,880 --> 00:03:20,440 Speaker 2: you read the transcript, give us your reaction, and I'm 59 00:03:20,520 --> 00:03:23,360 Speaker 2: still in some ways your students. You can say, McDowell, 60 00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:25,760 Speaker 2: let me give you a profess oreo critique, or you 61 00:03:25,760 --> 00:03:26,799 Speaker 2: want to know what you really think. 62 00:03:27,080 --> 00:03:30,200 Speaker 3: I appreciate that. Well, I'm not going to give you 63 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:31,160 Speaker 3: much of a critique. 64 00:03:31,240 --> 00:03:33,519 Speaker 4: Because I thought it was great. I thought you did 65 00:03:33,639 --> 00:03:35,920 Speaker 4: really really well. But I think it was a I 66 00:03:35,920 --> 00:03:38,120 Speaker 4: thought it was a great exchange. I thought both of 67 00:03:38,160 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 4: you guys were gracious. As you say, there's a little 68 00:03:42,520 --> 00:03:45,240 Speaker 4: bit of spice there, but it was it was civil. 69 00:03:46,320 --> 00:03:50,440 Speaker 4: It's the way it should should be. So and you know, 70 00:03:50,640 --> 00:03:55,800 Speaker 4: I hadn't read the book. I only had a few days, 71 00:03:55,800 --> 00:03:59,040 Speaker 4: so I did get a kindle version of it and 72 00:03:59,080 --> 00:04:01,440 Speaker 4: skimmed over it, and I think it's a it's really 73 00:04:01,480 --> 00:04:05,080 Speaker 4: an excellent book. I love I love what he's arguing for, 74 00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:12,840 Speaker 4: as you you do. And so the you know, the 75 00:04:12,840 --> 00:04:16,520 Speaker 4: the sticking points that you were pushing. You know clearly 76 00:04:16,560 --> 00:04:21,760 Speaker 4: you guys were you were you were frust You're both frustrating, right, 77 00:04:22,360 --> 00:04:25,280 Speaker 4: because you weren't seeing it the way he was the 78 00:04:25,320 --> 00:04:28,720 Speaker 4: point he was trying to make about objective in particular, right, 79 00:04:29,200 --> 00:04:31,599 Speaker 4: and he wasn't getting the point that you were trying 80 00:04:31,640 --> 00:04:34,920 Speaker 4: to make about objective. And so you know, in terms 81 00:04:34,960 --> 00:04:37,840 Speaker 4: of diagnosis, we can we can kind of run with 82 00:04:37,839 --> 00:04:41,640 Speaker 4: that if you want, but uh that that really was 83 00:04:42,040 --> 00:04:47,120 Speaker 4: key and and uh so clarity on that is important. 84 00:04:47,200 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 4: I think you were you were speaking as a philosopher 85 00:04:51,160 --> 00:04:55,880 Speaker 4: trying to get philosophical conceptual clarity. I think he's approaching 86 00:04:55,920 --> 00:05:00,120 Speaker 4: it as a historian and from an anthropological point of view, 87 00:05:00,520 --> 00:05:04,360 Speaker 4: and has a kind of view of what objective means. 88 00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:09,040 Speaker 4: That he just filtered everything that you said, you know, 89 00:05:09,120 --> 00:05:13,400 Speaker 4: through that conception, and you weren't able to really, you know, 90 00:05:13,839 --> 00:05:17,280 Speaker 4: land either one of you, because you're operating in different conceptions. 91 00:05:17,320 --> 00:05:21,960 Speaker 4: I think you're right. The conception of objective that you 92 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:25,800 Speaker 4: were operating with is the way philosophers think about it, 93 00:05:26,040 --> 00:05:29,840 Speaker 4: the way meta ethics, folks in meta ethics think about it. 94 00:05:31,080 --> 00:05:34,240 Speaker 4: I wish he would get that, but he was gracious, 95 00:05:34,440 --> 00:05:36,880 Speaker 4: and so I thought it was a great exchange. 96 00:05:37,120 --> 00:05:37,280 Speaker 3: Good. 97 00:05:37,360 --> 00:05:41,520 Speaker 2: That's interesting look at it historically versus say, philosophically, although 98 00:05:41,520 --> 00:05:44,640 Speaker 2: we were both weighing into each of those issues. I 99 00:05:44,680 --> 00:05:48,480 Speaker 2: also think he's looking at the issues somewhat pragmatically. And 100 00:05:48,520 --> 00:05:50,200 Speaker 2: I drew this out a little bit again, and we'll 101 00:05:50,200 --> 00:05:53,200 Speaker 2: come back to this. Is at the very beginning, he's 102 00:05:53,240 --> 00:05:56,760 Speaker 2: talking about how he lost his faith, went to Moody Wheaton, 103 00:05:56,800 --> 00:05:58,840 Speaker 2: grew up in the church. Real struggle for him. He 104 00:05:58,920 --> 00:06:03,159 Speaker 2: describes in his book On Suffering that it was not 105 00:06:03,320 --> 00:06:07,640 Speaker 2: something he took lightly but he describes here how he 106 00:06:07,800 --> 00:06:12,080 Speaker 2: was afraid somewhat that if he left his faith, he 107 00:06:12,080 --> 00:06:14,880 Speaker 2: would have no moral compass and he wouldn't be an 108 00:06:14,920 --> 00:06:15,719 Speaker 2: ethical person. 109 00:06:16,440 --> 00:06:18,040 Speaker 1: And he's like, I'm still ethical. 110 00:06:18,440 --> 00:06:18,839 Speaker 3: Yeah. 111 00:06:18,920 --> 00:06:21,000 Speaker 2: Well, what I was trying to get at is say, 112 00:06:21,279 --> 00:06:23,919 Speaker 2: of course you can be ethical without believing in God, 113 00:06:24,720 --> 00:06:29,360 Speaker 2: But what is the basis of what is a good life? 114 00:06:29,920 --> 00:06:33,720 Speaker 2: That deeper question is the philosophical one that I was 115 00:06:33,760 --> 00:06:36,440 Speaker 2: getting at. Yeah, we'll circle back to that. I'm curious 116 00:06:36,480 --> 00:06:37,720 Speaker 2: if you don't, we can move on the next one. 117 00:06:37,760 --> 00:06:40,640 Speaker 2: But did you have any questions for me from going 118 00:06:40,680 --> 00:06:42,320 Speaker 2: through this. I'm certainly not going to pretend to be 119 00:06:42,320 --> 00:06:44,800 Speaker 2: the expert on this. You've studied it more than I have. 120 00:06:45,000 --> 00:06:48,160 Speaker 4: Well, I mean I would just say one area we 121 00:06:48,200 --> 00:06:51,000 Speaker 4: need to talk about objective and try to land the 122 00:06:51,000 --> 00:06:55,039 Speaker 4: plane on that. But I think the word universal, I 123 00:06:55,040 --> 00:06:56,440 Speaker 4: think that's another term that. 124 00:06:56,480 --> 00:06:57,680 Speaker 3: Was probably okay. 125 00:06:58,000 --> 00:06:59,960 Speaker 4: There are two ways you can interpret the term universe. 126 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 4: One is it applies to everyone, and that's the way 127 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:08,560 Speaker 4: you were using it. I think these are universal objective 128 00:07:08,600 --> 00:07:13,160 Speaker 4: moral values, that is that they apply to everyone. He 129 00:07:13,400 --> 00:07:17,560 Speaker 4: was I think interpreting universal as everyone agrees with it, 130 00:07:18,680 --> 00:07:22,480 Speaker 4: and so he saw well, Hey, you know, there are 131 00:07:22,560 --> 00:07:26,520 Speaker 4: cultures that don't agree with lots of things that you 132 00:07:26,560 --> 00:07:29,200 Speaker 4: hold morally and he holds morally. 133 00:07:29,040 --> 00:07:31,360 Speaker 3: So therefore it's not a universal Okay. 134 00:07:31,560 --> 00:07:36,000 Speaker 4: So you know, that's just one of those things that 135 00:07:36,800 --> 00:07:39,800 Speaker 4: I don't know if universal is worth dropping from the 136 00:07:39,880 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 4: vocabulary or with at least explaining. 137 00:07:42,560 --> 00:07:44,960 Speaker 1: But objective is the term we should use, is yeah? 138 00:07:45,120 --> 00:07:45,360 Speaker 4: Clear? 139 00:07:45,600 --> 00:07:48,600 Speaker 2: Okay, So let's come back to that. I think that's important. 140 00:07:48,600 --> 00:07:49,880 Speaker 2: I want to ask you to find it because you 141 00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:52,160 Speaker 2: do in your book on meta ethics. We're going to 142 00:07:52,240 --> 00:07:55,800 Speaker 2: take some questions if you have question type question in 143 00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 2: caps stated as succinctly as you can. I already see 144 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:02,480 Speaker 2: some popping up here. I see you a comment from 145 00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:04,920 Speaker 2: somebody says, someone like Sean claiming he has access to 146 00:08:05,000 --> 00:08:10,360 Speaker 2: objective morality from a source shows he suffers from delusions 147 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:15,320 Speaker 2: of grandeur. Now, partly I'm not offended by this, remotely, 148 00:08:15,640 --> 00:08:19,280 Speaker 2: I goes there's something wrong with having delusions of grandeur? 149 00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:24,000 Speaker 2: Is that the way we shouldn't operate. At one point 150 00:08:24,040 --> 00:08:26,840 Speaker 2: there seems to be a criticism that I'm claiming to 151 00:08:26,840 --> 00:08:31,480 Speaker 2: have access to objective morality, and then there's a criticism 152 00:08:31,640 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 2: of me which seems to imply at least an objective, 153 00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:39,000 Speaker 2: standard and enormative way that we should live. Part of 154 00:08:39,000 --> 00:08:41,840 Speaker 2: what I'm trying to point out in this discussion is 155 00:08:41,840 --> 00:08:44,760 Speaker 2: that because people are made in the image of God 156 00:08:45,280 --> 00:08:50,439 Speaker 2: and we live in God's world, we can't escape awareness 157 00:08:50,480 --> 00:08:53,960 Speaker 2: that we do know right and wrong. Even those like 158 00:08:54,040 --> 00:08:57,640 Speaker 2: Bart who are atheists and agnostics. At some point they're 159 00:08:57,640 --> 00:09:00,480 Speaker 2: going to say things like, while I think my moray 160 00:09:00,600 --> 00:09:05,120 Speaker 2: is superior, well it's subjective. That makes no sense. At 161 00:09:05,120 --> 00:09:07,960 Speaker 2: some point they're going to criticize others for being racist 162 00:09:08,040 --> 00:09:10,920 Speaker 2: and sexist and fill in the blank, which, if it's 163 00:09:10,960 --> 00:09:14,800 Speaker 2: all preference, actually makes no sense. And so I think 164 00:09:14,840 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 2: this comment to me is pointing out that the person 165 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:21,640 Speaker 2: is not understanding my point. And by the way, would 166 00:09:21,640 --> 00:09:24,760 Speaker 2: you agree with this that I'm not uniquely saying I 167 00:09:24,800 --> 00:09:29,360 Speaker 2: have access to objective morality. The vast majority people who 168 00:09:29,440 --> 00:09:34,440 Speaker 2: have ever lived either claim or function as if they 169 00:09:34,440 --> 00:09:38,760 Speaker 2: are moral realists and that we can know right and wrong. 170 00:09:39,440 --> 00:09:40,000 Speaker 1: Is that fair? 171 00:09:40,360 --> 00:09:43,520 Speaker 3: Yeah? It's In fact. J. L. 172 00:09:43,679 --> 00:09:48,520 Speaker 4: Mackie, who was an Oxford atheist philosopher, said that the 173 00:09:48,880 --> 00:09:53,480 Speaker 4: that is the common view our moral practices, our moral language, 174 00:09:53,520 --> 00:09:58,760 Speaker 4: our moral concepts all presuppose moral realism, That is that 175 00:09:58,800 --> 00:10:04,040 Speaker 4: there are a real moral facts, moral obligations, moral duties. 176 00:10:04,360 --> 00:10:08,400 Speaker 4: When we make moral judgments, they are objectively true or false. 177 00:10:09,360 --> 00:10:10,920 Speaker 3: That's how you know. 178 00:10:11,080 --> 00:10:14,840 Speaker 4: That's the common view, that's common sense morality. Now he 179 00:10:14,920 --> 00:10:18,240 Speaker 4: disagrees with it, but he understands, and he says, I 180 00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:19,560 Speaker 4: have a burden of proof here. 181 00:10:19,600 --> 00:10:20,520 Speaker 3: Then if I'm going. 182 00:10:20,520 --> 00:10:26,199 Speaker 4: To reject that, and all of our common moral experience 183 00:10:26,280 --> 00:10:28,880 Speaker 4: points to that, I'd better have a really good argument. 184 00:10:29,640 --> 00:10:31,320 Speaker 4: I don't think he has a very good argument, but 185 00:10:31,360 --> 00:10:32,800 Speaker 4: at least he recognizes that. 186 00:10:33,400 --> 00:10:34,000 Speaker 3: Okay, good. 187 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:35,839 Speaker 2: So I think we're kind of dancing around with me 188 00:10:35,960 --> 00:10:40,040 Speaker 2: my moral realism and objective morality. So I could read 189 00:10:40,080 --> 00:10:44,160 Speaker 2: this from your book. Here's a quote that Bart says, 190 00:10:44,160 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 2: and that I like, we just clarify us at least 191 00:10:46,360 --> 00:10:50,520 Speaker 2: what we mean and what philosophers mean by objective morality. 192 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:53,959 Speaker 2: But here's one thing Bart wrote. When I pressed him, 193 00:10:53,960 --> 00:10:56,000 Speaker 2: he said, direct quote, I would say some things are 194 00:10:56,040 --> 00:11:00,920 Speaker 2: objectively good in my opinion, I think it's good that 195 00:11:00,960 --> 00:11:05,320 Speaker 2: we have hospitals, it's good we have orphanages. These are 196 00:11:05,480 --> 00:11:08,520 Speaker 2: it's good that we have disaster relief programs. I think 197 00:11:08,520 --> 00:11:11,960 Speaker 2: these are a good thing. It's my this is my 198 00:11:12,120 --> 00:11:17,079 Speaker 2: personal opinion. Since it's my personal opinion, I don't think 199 00:11:17,120 --> 00:11:20,040 Speaker 2: it's objective. Now in some ways, I mean I could 200 00:11:20,080 --> 00:11:22,640 Speaker 2: nitpick here. I realize this is a transcript and we're 201 00:11:22,640 --> 00:11:25,080 Speaker 2: talking things tough. He goes it's objective, and that ends 202 00:11:25,280 --> 00:11:28,840 Speaker 2: by saying I don't think it's objective. On one hand, 203 00:11:28,880 --> 00:11:32,160 Speaker 2: he's like, oh, these are objectively good, but then says 204 00:11:32,160 --> 00:11:33,600 Speaker 2: they're his opinion. 205 00:11:34,320 --> 00:11:35,040 Speaker 1: So what do. 206 00:11:35,080 --> 00:11:40,679 Speaker 2: Philosophers mean by objective morality? Not even Christian philosophers? What 207 00:11:40,679 --> 00:11:42,080 Speaker 2: does that mean? Objective reality? 208 00:11:42,280 --> 00:11:45,160 Speaker 4: Well, objectivity in this sense, And we use the term 209 00:11:45,200 --> 00:11:48,680 Speaker 4: objectivity in different ways, right, you know, being objective when 210 00:11:48,679 --> 00:11:50,400 Speaker 4: we look at evidence and all that kind of stuff. 211 00:11:50,400 --> 00:11:55,520 Speaker 4: But when we talk about objective moral properties or objective 212 00:11:55,679 --> 00:11:57,920 Speaker 4: moral claims and judgments and so on. 213 00:11:58,679 --> 00:12:00,840 Speaker 3: We're talking about the status. 214 00:12:01,520 --> 00:12:04,880 Speaker 4: So if we're talking about facts, moral facts, we're talking 215 00:12:04,880 --> 00:12:09,120 Speaker 4: about the nature of those facts and the ontological status. 216 00:12:10,280 --> 00:12:13,640 Speaker 4: We're basically saying that that their existence doesn't depend on 217 00:12:13,760 --> 00:12:14,680 Speaker 4: might be leaving that. 218 00:12:14,600 --> 00:12:16,559 Speaker 3: They exists or approving that the exists. 219 00:12:16,880 --> 00:12:20,440 Speaker 4: And maybe it's easier to talk more about moral judgment. 220 00:12:20,600 --> 00:12:25,120 Speaker 4: Statements that refer to those moral facts like the one 221 00:12:25,160 --> 00:12:28,400 Speaker 4: you used in the well. Let's just take his that 222 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:32,679 Speaker 4: it's good that there is there are hospitals. Let's say, Okay, 223 00:12:33,080 --> 00:12:39,280 Speaker 4: that's a that's a moral judgment, right, and it's an 224 00:12:39,320 --> 00:12:44,559 Speaker 4: objective moral judgment. H Most of us would say, all 225 00:12:44,600 --> 00:12:48,160 Speaker 4: that means is what makes it true or false is 226 00:12:48,200 --> 00:12:51,520 Speaker 4: not the person speaking, not the subject he is talking, 227 00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:55,559 Speaker 4: who believes it or approves of it or prefers it. 228 00:12:55,559 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 4: It's the object of the proposition. That's where we get 229 00:12:58,600 --> 00:13:01,480 Speaker 4: the word objective. That is to say, what makes it 230 00:13:01,520 --> 00:13:05,440 Speaker 4: true that hospitals are good? Are that hospitals are in 231 00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 4: fact good, the goodness of hospitals, the goodness of the 232 00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:13,480 Speaker 4: existence of hospitals. Notice that doesn't that doesn't imply anything 233 00:13:13,559 --> 00:13:16,360 Speaker 4: about Hey, if I say that, if I believe that 234 00:13:16,400 --> 00:13:20,240 Speaker 4: to be the case, I am claiming omniscience or I 235 00:13:20,240 --> 00:13:23,000 Speaker 4: could never possibly be wrong, you. 236 00:13:22,920 --> 00:13:24,000 Speaker 3: Know, or anything like that. 237 00:13:24,400 --> 00:13:26,800 Speaker 4: I just think that the truth status of that. 238 00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:29,560 Speaker 3: Statement is something that's just It's not on me. 239 00:13:30,280 --> 00:13:34,080 Speaker 4: It's about the you know, the thing that I'm talking 240 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:37,439 Speaker 4: about now. Of course, I as a subject am important. 241 00:13:37,760 --> 00:13:40,240 Speaker 4: You know, whether or not I believe it, that's an 242 00:13:40,280 --> 00:13:43,800 Speaker 4: important thing. But I'm not making it true by believing it, 243 00:13:43,840 --> 00:13:46,480 Speaker 4: and I'm not making it false by not believing it's 244 00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 4: that's really the distinction. 245 00:13:48,280 --> 00:13:52,080 Speaker 2: Okay, So if I said, like, Kobe Bryant was six 246 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:57,560 Speaker 2: foot seven, that's about the object Kobe Bryant. Yeah, Now 247 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:00,480 Speaker 2: if you say, no, he's six foot five, he was 248 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:05,640 Speaker 2: the fact that you think he's six foot five doesn't change. 249 00:14:05,200 --> 00:14:08,440 Speaker 1: The objective fact that he was six foot seven. 250 00:14:08,559 --> 00:14:09,000 Speaker 3: Yeah. 251 00:14:09,080 --> 00:14:11,280 Speaker 4: Well, in you saying that he was six of seven 252 00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:14,720 Speaker 4: doesn't make it true, right, makes it true or false? 253 00:14:14,880 --> 00:14:16,800 Speaker 4: Is the is the height of Kobe Bryant? 254 00:14:17,160 --> 00:14:20,240 Speaker 2: Okay, simply Now, if I said Kobe Bryant was fun 255 00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:25,040 Speaker 2: to watch, now that's more of that's more about me 256 00:14:25,360 --> 00:14:29,920 Speaker 2: the subject exactly whether I enjoy watching him player Lebron 257 00:14:30,160 --> 00:14:32,520 Speaker 2: or Jordan or I don't even like basketball. Now we're 258 00:14:32,520 --> 00:14:37,440 Speaker 2: talking about references that are subject dependent. Right, So the 259 00:14:37,480 --> 00:14:40,280 Speaker 2: first one you can be right or wrong based on 260 00:14:40,360 --> 00:14:43,240 Speaker 2: the object itself. The other one it's not really right 261 00:14:43,280 --> 00:14:45,240 Speaker 2: wrong because it's just if I enjoy it or not right. 262 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:46,800 Speaker 4: Right again, if if we if we put it in 263 00:14:46,800 --> 00:14:49,840 Speaker 4: the language I was using before, what makes that statement true? 264 00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:50,080 Speaker 3: Yeah? 265 00:14:50,320 --> 00:14:55,760 Speaker 4: I like watching Michael Jordan or whoever, Kobe Bryant, whoever we. 266 00:14:55,640 --> 00:15:00,480 Speaker 3: Were talking about. Sorry, yeah, great, the we makes that 267 00:15:00,520 --> 00:15:02,240 Speaker 3: true just that you. 268 00:15:02,360 --> 00:15:07,120 Speaker 4: Like it, right, it's not Kobe Bryant that makes it true. 269 00:15:07,320 --> 00:15:09,120 Speaker 3: It's your preferences. 270 00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:12,880 Speaker 4: So that is a subjective claim, we might say, whereas 271 00:15:12,920 --> 00:15:16,600 Speaker 4: the claim that he is at whatever height, that's an 272 00:15:16,640 --> 00:15:20,240 Speaker 4: objective claim. It's about what makes it true or. 273 00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:24,320 Speaker 2: fALS, either the object versus the sububjects. And we do 274 00:15:24,400 --> 00:15:28,240 Speaker 2: this in science, we do this through history. We also 275 00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:32,120 Speaker 2: do this in morality. But the way we know science 276 00:15:32,680 --> 00:15:35,360 Speaker 2: is different than the way we know history, right, It's 277 00:15:35,400 --> 00:15:39,400 Speaker 2: different than the way we know moral claims exactly. Okay, 278 00:15:39,400 --> 00:15:41,440 Speaker 2: So there's not a lot of debate about how we 279 00:15:41,440 --> 00:15:44,200 Speaker 2: Well maybe there is, depends on how deep we get 280 00:15:44,240 --> 00:15:48,640 Speaker 2: in academics, but science very simply we can test things. 281 00:15:48,720 --> 00:15:53,360 Speaker 2: We can study things empirical analysis. History, we're looking at 282 00:15:53,360 --> 00:15:57,880 Speaker 2: some physical remains, documents, and we're assessing things, maybe not 283 00:15:57,960 --> 00:16:01,640 Speaker 2: with certainty, but probability. That's how we know things in 284 00:16:01,680 --> 00:16:05,120 Speaker 2: science and history. How do we know things when it 285 00:16:05,160 --> 00:16:09,080 Speaker 2: comes to morality because we don't assess them on probability 286 00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:12,040 Speaker 2: skills like we do history. For the past, we don't 287 00:16:12,040 --> 00:16:15,720 Speaker 2: study them and say a test tube like we do science. 288 00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:18,920 Speaker 1: How do we know things in morality? 289 00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:24,440 Speaker 4: The way we know things in morality is insight into 290 00:16:25,040 --> 00:16:29,239 Speaker 4: the moral structure of things that doesn't come from empirical 291 00:16:29,280 --> 00:16:33,240 Speaker 4: investigation or something like that. It's a good parallel would 292 00:16:33,240 --> 00:16:35,600 Speaker 4: be how do we know the laws of logic? 293 00:16:36,880 --> 00:16:40,360 Speaker 3: How do we know math? How do we. 294 00:16:41,760 --> 00:16:45,400 Speaker 4: Understand our own states of consciousness? None of those are 295 00:16:45,400 --> 00:16:49,360 Speaker 4: physical things. Truth is not a physical thing, but it's real. 296 00:16:50,200 --> 00:16:52,280 Speaker 4: So one of the problems that a lot of people 297 00:16:52,320 --> 00:16:55,280 Speaker 4: have is they think that the only thing that could 298 00:16:55,280 --> 00:17:01,200 Speaker 4: be objective is what is somehow empirically very fiable, you know. 299 00:17:02,480 --> 00:17:07,000 Speaker 4: But you know, we all holds things to be true 300 00:17:07,680 --> 00:17:11,280 Speaker 4: that aren't physical. As our friend Greg Kochel puts it, 301 00:17:11,600 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 4: you can't weigh truth, you know, you can't put truth 302 00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:18,960 Speaker 4: in a beaker or or weigh it with a yardstick or. 303 00:17:18,880 --> 00:17:19,320 Speaker 3: Something like that. 304 00:17:19,400 --> 00:17:20,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, that's that's a good way to put it. 305 00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:24,080 Speaker 4: But it's but but if we didn't have truth, we 306 00:17:24,119 --> 00:17:24,800 Speaker 4: couldn't operate. 307 00:17:25,000 --> 00:17:25,160 Speaker 3: Right. 308 00:17:25,280 --> 00:17:30,520 Speaker 4: We understand it's a relationship between a proposition and reality, Okay, 309 00:17:30,720 --> 00:17:36,240 Speaker 4: and relations are not physical things, but they're real, And 310 00:17:36,280 --> 00:17:38,919 Speaker 4: that's part of one of the things that we have 311 00:17:39,000 --> 00:17:41,920 Speaker 4: to kind of get over sometimes when it comes to morality. 312 00:17:42,080 --> 00:17:48,280 Speaker 4: So when we're talking about moral properties and moral duties 313 00:17:48,320 --> 00:17:53,200 Speaker 4: and so on, we're talking about non physical relations between things. 314 00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:57,760 Speaker 2: Okay, So I've heard someone compared to like, say, a 315 00:17:57,800 --> 00:18:02,040 Speaker 2: logical premise of like all men aretal sock cheese is man. 316 00:18:02,960 --> 00:18:08,119 Speaker 2: Therefore Socrates is moral. And somebody goes prove that, And 317 00:18:08,160 --> 00:18:10,159 Speaker 2: all I do is I say, well, look at it. 318 00:18:10,240 --> 00:18:15,439 Speaker 2: You can see it follows logically, if you think it's false, 319 00:18:15,600 --> 00:18:19,680 Speaker 2: you just can't see what it is. You can't prove 320 00:18:19,720 --> 00:18:23,320 Speaker 2: it beyond that other than make connections and you see 321 00:18:23,320 --> 00:18:28,080 Speaker 2: it or you don't. Our moral faculties are similar to this, 322 00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:31,760 Speaker 2: And that was a point I was raising, like if 323 00:18:31,800 --> 00:18:35,760 Speaker 2: you think it's is it morally wrong to burn a 324 00:18:35,880 --> 00:18:40,920 Speaker 2: child alive for adult entertainment? And some people have said 325 00:18:40,960 --> 00:18:42,920 Speaker 2: to me, Sean, why do you use such a graphic example, 326 00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:45,760 Speaker 2: because I want to use one that's clear that it's 327 00:18:45,800 --> 00:18:47,760 Speaker 2: really hard to wiggle out of, like is it okay 328 00:18:47,760 --> 00:18:49,640 Speaker 2: to torture? Someone's like, well, what if you have a 329 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:52,679 Speaker 2: nuclear weapon? Maybe I don't want that nuance. I want what, 330 00:18:52,720 --> 00:18:55,720 Speaker 2: hopefully is a clear example. And this is where William 331 00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:58,359 Speaker 2: and Craig is like, if you don't think that's wrong, 332 00:18:59,200 --> 00:19:02,399 Speaker 2: you don't need an art. Gimmit, you need a therapist. 333 00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:05,280 Speaker 1: You're not seen exactly. 334 00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:06,199 Speaker 3: You know. 335 00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:11,520 Speaker 4: An Aristotle said, you know all arguments ultimately, you know, 336 00:19:12,200 --> 00:19:15,639 Speaker 4: you can't prove everything. There are things that are true 337 00:19:15,920 --> 00:19:19,399 Speaker 4: and necessarily true that don't need an argument. And you 338 00:19:19,440 --> 00:19:23,600 Speaker 4: can't give an argument for me. But you can pull 339 00:19:23,640 --> 00:19:28,480 Speaker 4: a you can pull away certain illusions that cloud it, 340 00:19:28,720 --> 00:19:31,639 Speaker 4: but you have to see it. So I think that 341 00:19:31,680 --> 00:19:35,320 Speaker 4: your example is great because that's what you're doing. You know, say, okay, 342 00:19:35,359 --> 00:19:38,600 Speaker 4: let's find a very vivid, clear example. 343 00:19:38,720 --> 00:19:39,520 Speaker 3: Do you see that? 344 00:19:40,800 --> 00:19:44,840 Speaker 4: And you know somebody doesn't, Well they don't. 345 00:19:45,440 --> 00:19:49,040 Speaker 3: You know, one hundred percent of people pretty much see it. 346 00:19:49,440 --> 00:19:49,760 Speaker 3: They do. 347 00:19:49,920 --> 00:19:52,399 Speaker 2: No, And again I don't want people to confuse. We 348 00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:57,240 Speaker 2: might differ over the particulars, is torture ever right for 349 00:19:57,400 --> 00:20:03,199 Speaker 2: particulars of immigration, gun control, whatever, But the underlying moral sense, 350 00:20:03,840 --> 00:20:09,200 Speaker 2: an expectation that we have real right and real wrong, 351 00:20:10,359 --> 00:20:11,879 Speaker 2: that's what's universal. 352 00:20:12,160 --> 00:20:13,160 Speaker 3: Yes, So I was trying to. 353 00:20:13,119 --> 00:20:19,280 Speaker 2: Argue that Jesus expanded our commitment to strangers, but he's 354 00:20:19,320 --> 00:20:23,399 Speaker 2: not introducing people who didn't believe an objective right and 355 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:27,760 Speaker 2: wrong to objective right and wrong. He's expanding the way 356 00:20:27,800 --> 00:20:32,280 Speaker 2: they should live out that awareness of right and wrong. 357 00:20:32,320 --> 00:20:35,400 Speaker 2: And that's what Lewis argued, of course, an abolition of man, 358 00:20:35,760 --> 00:20:36,800 Speaker 2: that sense of the universe. 359 00:20:36,840 --> 00:20:39,600 Speaker 4: And I think that's a great way to do it. 360 00:20:40,400 --> 00:20:41,520 Speaker 3: That's exactly right. 361 00:20:41,640 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 4: So they're Another way to think about it is that 362 00:20:46,359 --> 00:20:50,359 Speaker 4: those things that are common that we find across the board, 363 00:20:50,560 --> 00:20:54,119 Speaker 4: you know, morally speaking, are general. There's sort of like 364 00:20:54,160 --> 00:20:55,240 Speaker 4: the general. 365 00:20:54,880 --> 00:20:56,120 Speaker 3: Structure of reality. 366 00:20:56,200 --> 00:21:00,480 Speaker 4: That's what philosophers call the natural moral law right. But 367 00:21:00,760 --> 00:21:04,639 Speaker 4: then there are more specific ways of living those things 368 00:21:04,680 --> 00:21:13,000 Speaker 4: out that are going to be much more sensitive to worldview, beliefs. 369 00:21:13,080 --> 00:21:13,520 Speaker 3: And so on. 370 00:21:13,600 --> 00:21:16,840 Speaker 4: They're going to start and cultural practices and things like that, 371 00:21:16,840 --> 00:21:17,320 Speaker 4: they're going. 372 00:21:17,240 --> 00:21:18,160 Speaker 3: To differ a bit. 373 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:25,240 Speaker 4: So what Jesus did was fill out and specify in 374 00:21:25,600 --> 00:21:29,919 Speaker 4: a thicker way, a more specific way, something that was 375 00:21:30,320 --> 00:21:35,199 Speaker 4: there intuitively to everyone, but they would not apply it 376 00:21:35,200 --> 00:21:37,879 Speaker 4: that way without the specific content. 377 00:21:37,560 --> 00:21:38,680 Speaker 3: Of what Jesus was saying. 378 00:21:38,680 --> 00:21:41,720 Speaker 4: When he was saying look, because he wasn't just giving 379 00:21:42,440 --> 00:21:48,680 Speaker 4: you know, floating admonitions to love thy stranger. He was saying, No, 380 00:21:48,720 --> 00:21:52,600 Speaker 4: here's what God is like, and here's what human beings 381 00:21:52,640 --> 00:21:55,119 Speaker 4: are like. Every single human being is created in the 382 00:21:55,119 --> 00:21:58,320 Speaker 4: image of God and has worth and dignity, and therefore 383 00:21:58,359 --> 00:22:00,080 Speaker 4: we need to take care of him. It was a 384 00:22:00,720 --> 00:22:04,280 Speaker 4: you know, a new vision not just of morality, bit 385 00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:07,840 Speaker 4: of a vision of reality that built on what they 386 00:22:08,520 --> 00:22:10,359 Speaker 4: you know, some of the general things they had, but 387 00:22:10,400 --> 00:22:13,400 Speaker 4: it was more specific and it actually entailed these new 388 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:16,920 Speaker 4: things that Bart is arguing came into the world. They're 389 00:22:16,960 --> 00:22:21,159 Speaker 4: not radically new, as you say, they're expansions or you know, 390 00:22:21,240 --> 00:22:23,800 Speaker 4: developments or specifications. 391 00:22:24,080 --> 00:22:27,199 Speaker 2: More that's good and that's kind of the heart of 392 00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:32,080 Speaker 2: what I'm getting at here is we can make a 393 00:22:32,119 --> 00:22:37,399 Speaker 2: case for objective morality historically, speaking as Lewis does, across 394 00:22:37,600 --> 00:22:43,120 Speaker 2: the different moral codes basic beneficence and justice and mercy 395 00:22:43,240 --> 00:22:46,320 Speaker 2: and care for elder We can get it through the 396 00:22:46,320 --> 00:22:51,080 Speaker 2: way that we actually live by introspection and awareness. And 397 00:22:51,080 --> 00:22:54,439 Speaker 2: I would also say by people who say there's no 398 00:22:54,520 --> 00:22:58,600 Speaker 2: such thing as rejector rality, at some point are going 399 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:02,280 Speaker 2: to reveal that they're living as if they believe there's 400 00:23:02,320 --> 00:23:06,720 Speaker 2: an objective moral code and will contradict themselves. 401 00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:08,080 Speaker 1: That was my argument. 402 00:23:08,119 --> 00:23:10,280 Speaker 2: Now our viewers and listeners can decide if they think 403 00:23:10,320 --> 00:23:12,800 Speaker 2: bart is right and I contradicted. I think I'm right 404 00:23:12,840 --> 00:23:15,560 Speaker 2: and he contradicts, So of course I'm making my argument here. 405 00:23:16,119 --> 00:23:17,080 Speaker 1: They can decide that. 406 00:23:17,440 --> 00:23:22,359 Speaker 2: But that's where I think morality is inescapable, and so 407 00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:25,560 Speaker 2: in part of the book, he talks about morality being subjective, 408 00:23:26,240 --> 00:23:31,520 Speaker 2: but then makes very clear moral condemnations of certain behavior, 409 00:23:32,440 --> 00:23:36,400 Speaker 2: which if his ethic is actually taking to its logical 410 00:23:36,440 --> 00:23:41,080 Speaker 2: extreme or its natural conclusion, because he talked about having 411 00:23:41,240 --> 00:23:47,879 Speaker 2: certain inclinations for a drink and then certain inclinations for 412 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:54,240 Speaker 2: moral behavior, then there really is no difference between racism 413 00:23:54,359 --> 00:23:58,280 Speaker 2: and sexism, giving to the poor, taking advantage of the poor, 414 00:23:59,040 --> 00:24:04,240 Speaker 2: but his life life doesn't reflect that. Hence he gave 415 00:24:04,280 --> 00:24:07,400 Speaker 2: away one and a half million dollars amazing, honest blog. 416 00:24:07,840 --> 00:24:10,640 Speaker 2: That's like I applaud him to that. I wish more 417 00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:14,320 Speaker 2: Christians would do that. We could take cues from that. Absolutely, 418 00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:20,399 Speaker 2: But if morality is just subjective, then why is he 419 00:24:20,480 --> 00:24:22,400 Speaker 2: doing that. We didn't get into this. I didn't want 420 00:24:22,400 --> 00:24:25,000 Speaker 2: to press it too much. But I think he's doing 421 00:24:25,040 --> 00:24:27,080 Speaker 2: it because in his heart he knows this is a 422 00:24:27,119 --> 00:24:31,919 Speaker 2: good thing to do and people have human value. I 423 00:24:31,920 --> 00:24:34,600 Speaker 2: don't think his worldview can ground it. Now, let me 424 00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:35,800 Speaker 2: we'll come back. 425 00:24:35,720 --> 00:24:36,439 Speaker 1: To that a little bit. 426 00:24:37,119 --> 00:24:41,960 Speaker 2: But here's the argument that Craig makes is he says, 427 00:24:42,359 --> 00:24:45,520 Speaker 2: if there is no if God does not exist, there's 428 00:24:45,640 --> 00:24:51,280 Speaker 2: no foundation for objective moral values and duties. So if 429 00:24:51,280 --> 00:24:57,080 Speaker 2: there is no God, doctor David Horner trained at Oxford, 430 00:24:57,960 --> 00:25:01,960 Speaker 2: why would you argue there's not an adequate foundation for 431 00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:03,720 Speaker 2: moral values and duties. 432 00:25:05,520 --> 00:25:09,320 Speaker 3: Well, let me contrast Bart with Nietzsche. 433 00:25:09,880 --> 00:25:11,080 Speaker 1: Okay, that's interesting. 434 00:25:11,119 --> 00:25:13,119 Speaker 3: So that might be one way to attack this. 435 00:25:13,800 --> 00:25:16,320 Speaker 1: So attack this I like that language. List, go, we're 436 00:25:16,320 --> 00:25:16,840 Speaker 1: attacking it. 437 00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:18,720 Speaker 3: Okay, attack this question. 438 00:25:18,760 --> 00:25:21,160 Speaker 4: I'm not attacking you, and I'm not attacking. 439 00:25:20,720 --> 00:25:23,840 Speaker 1: By a good My only defense is I might be 440 00:25:23,920 --> 00:25:25,399 Speaker 1: quicker than you. That's all I got in you. 441 00:25:25,840 --> 00:25:28,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, you are. You definitely are. 442 00:25:29,320 --> 00:25:36,720 Speaker 4: So Nietzsche made a very similar argument, similar argument to Bart. 443 00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:37,240 Speaker 3: Okay. 444 00:25:37,440 --> 00:25:43,000 Speaker 4: So, Bart's thesis is that in this book that this 445 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:50,600 Speaker 4: lovely the Stranger ethic, this Jesus ethic is new. It 446 00:25:51,240 --> 00:25:54,639 Speaker 4: came in that didn't have so loving people that are 447 00:25:54,680 --> 00:25:58,960 Speaker 4: outside your your social and biological kin just wasn't in 448 00:25:59,080 --> 00:26:02,119 Speaker 4: Greek philosophy. By the way I teach Greek philosophy in 449 00:26:02,200 --> 00:26:05,720 Speaker 4: Roman philosophy, and I mean there's you know, a lot 450 00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:08,320 Speaker 4: of great treatment that he gives at that so he 451 00:26:08,680 --> 00:26:11,720 Speaker 4: knows that stuff really well, but. 452 00:26:11,720 --> 00:26:12,359 Speaker 3: It's not there. 453 00:26:13,800 --> 00:26:17,120 Speaker 4: And so this is something new, which is Tom Holland 454 00:26:17,119 --> 00:26:25,080 Speaker 4: and others have argued this, and well, Nietzsche actually made 455 00:26:25,160 --> 00:26:31,240 Speaker 4: sort of a similar argument, or at least the same conclusion. 456 00:26:32,280 --> 00:26:38,840 Speaker 4: He said, Christian ethics, the Jesus ethic, loving thy stranger is, 457 00:26:40,200 --> 00:26:44,640 Speaker 4: came into the world through Jesus, with his very specific 458 00:26:44,800 --> 00:26:48,960 Speaker 4: set of doctrines about you know, God, about human beings 459 00:26:49,080 --> 00:26:50,760 Speaker 4: and all that kind of stuff. It makes sense in 460 00:26:50,840 --> 00:26:56,600 Speaker 4: that worldview, this conclusion which Nietzsche rejects. He thinks it's bad, 461 00:26:56,760 --> 00:27:01,880 Speaker 4: it's counter evolutionary. It actually does you know, it goes 462 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:03,200 Speaker 4: against evolution. 463 00:27:03,520 --> 00:27:04,040 Speaker 3: He says. 464 00:27:06,320 --> 00:27:08,960 Speaker 4: And he says this explicitly in Twilight of the Idols 465 00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:15,800 Speaker 4: that these secular British moral philosophers, the utilitarians and so on, 466 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:19,240 Speaker 4: you're helping yourself to a Christian ethic, but you don't 467 00:27:19,280 --> 00:27:21,720 Speaker 4: believe in the worldview that supports it, that makes sense 468 00:27:21,760 --> 00:27:26,080 Speaker 4: out of it, and to be consistent, you should reject it. Okay, 469 00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:29,080 Speaker 4: So then we have Bart making the same kind of 470 00:27:29,200 --> 00:27:33,359 Speaker 4: argument about that Jesus brought this in. But he's rejecting that. 471 00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:36,159 Speaker 4: You know, he wants to keep the ethic and he 472 00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:40,560 Speaker 4: wants to say it doesn't depend on the worldview beliefs 473 00:27:40,600 --> 00:27:45,200 Speaker 4: in which it was originally cast. And what Craig is saying, 474 00:27:45,240 --> 00:27:48,080 Speaker 4: and what what we're saying, I think is that no, 475 00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:52,399 Speaker 4: wait a minute, we're with Nietzsche on this. Actually, these 476 00:27:52,560 --> 00:27:56,760 Speaker 4: world these moral doctrines are not floating around in nothing. 477 00:27:57,920 --> 00:28:04,800 Speaker 4: They are embedded. They are actually they rest upon a 478 00:28:04,880 --> 00:28:07,440 Speaker 4: way of looking at the world. We call that worldview 479 00:28:07,720 --> 00:28:12,920 Speaker 4: or metaphysics. What's real, what's important, what's good, what human 480 00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:16,520 Speaker 4: beings are, and so on, and that that's what they 481 00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:21,160 Speaker 4: that's what makes sense out of these things. So if 482 00:28:21,200 --> 00:28:25,239 Speaker 4: you accept the conclusion, So if you're Nietzsche, you say, well, 483 00:28:25,280 --> 00:28:28,680 Speaker 4: I reject the conclusion. Therefore I have to reject the worldview. Well, 484 00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:31,879 Speaker 4: Craig is saying, if you accept the conclusion, like Bart does, 485 00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:36,760 Speaker 4: that actually there really are objective moral values, and these 486 00:28:36,840 --> 00:28:40,880 Speaker 4: I mean not just the Jesus values but in general, 487 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:45,680 Speaker 4: then you need to ask the worldview question, Okay, what 488 00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:49,520 Speaker 4: set of beliefs, what picture of reality makes sense out 489 00:28:49,560 --> 00:28:53,840 Speaker 4: of this? What's the best explanation for this that gives 490 00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:57,040 Speaker 4: an adequate foundation to it. It's just not enough to 491 00:28:57,120 --> 00:28:59,480 Speaker 4: say I like the conclusion, which of course we do 492 00:28:59,600 --> 00:29:01,880 Speaker 4: like the Bart loves the conclusion. 493 00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:04,360 Speaker 3: Sure, yeah, so it's kind of funny. 494 00:29:04,400 --> 00:29:08,800 Speaker 4: There's a sort of a three way contrast between Nietzsche 495 00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:09,440 Speaker 4: and Bart. 496 00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:13,080 Speaker 3: They're both atheists. Yeah, they both tell the story. 497 00:29:12,840 --> 00:29:17,560 Speaker 4: Of Jesus transforming things. They disagree on what to do 498 00:29:17,640 --> 00:29:21,600 Speaker 4: with that. Christians want to say, well, yeah, we affirm 499 00:29:21,840 --> 00:29:25,000 Speaker 4: that Jesus made a transformation, but it's really an expansion 500 00:29:25,040 --> 00:29:29,360 Speaker 4: of something that's even bigger, And the best explanation for 501 00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:33,800 Speaker 4: all of that is the Christian worldview that Jesus represents. 502 00:29:35,160 --> 00:29:39,000 Speaker 2: In some ways, the power of Nietzsche is he understood, 503 00:29:39,560 --> 00:29:42,640 Speaker 2: if we get rid of God and God is dead, 504 00:29:43,400 --> 00:29:47,080 Speaker 2: we have become untethered to the son, so to speak. 505 00:29:47,120 --> 00:29:47,560 Speaker 3: Exactly. 506 00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:49,040 Speaker 1: He understood that means. 507 00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:54,680 Speaker 2: There's no objective morality, there's no human value that falls 508 00:29:54,720 --> 00:29:55,040 Speaker 2: from this. 509 00:29:55,640 --> 00:29:56,200 Speaker 1: So it's the. 510 00:29:56,320 --> 00:30:00,880 Speaker 2: Uber man or the superman or power. It now rains 511 00:30:00,920 --> 00:30:03,840 Speaker 2: the day. And so as much as Nietzsche can be 512 00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:08,320 Speaker 2: the bad guy in certain circles, I think he's a brilliant. 513 00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:11,840 Speaker 4: I'm a fan in a lot of ways because he 514 00:30:12,240 --> 00:30:13,880 Speaker 4: cuts through the bologney. 515 00:30:14,440 --> 00:30:14,840 Speaker 3: He does. 516 00:30:15,480 --> 00:30:18,040 Speaker 2: There's no doubt about that. So we're doing it. 517 00:30:18,040 --> 00:30:18,880 Speaker 3: Can I just tell you. 518 00:30:19,480 --> 00:30:22,600 Speaker 4: A quick anecdote. So when I was at Oxford, I 519 00:30:22,640 --> 00:30:25,880 Speaker 4: went to a debate on the question do we need 520 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:29,720 Speaker 4: God in order to be good? And on the atheist 521 00:30:29,840 --> 00:30:32,960 Speaker 4: side was a guy named Jonathan Glover, and so he's 522 00:30:33,000 --> 00:30:37,640 Speaker 4: a prominent atheist philosopher, and we talked for quite a 523 00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:42,239 Speaker 4: long time afterwards. He's also a Nietzsche specialist, and so 524 00:30:42,280 --> 00:30:47,120 Speaker 4: we got into this very question. He said Nietzsche was afraid, Well, 525 00:30:47,160 --> 00:30:50,000 Speaker 4: he wasn't afraid, but Nietsche predicted that within one hundred 526 00:30:50,080 --> 00:30:53,520 Speaker 4: years of his time, belief in God would would disappear 527 00:30:53,640 --> 00:30:57,000 Speaker 4: and people would would actually live out the implications of that. 528 00:30:58,440 --> 00:31:02,760 Speaker 4: He and Glover said, I think he's right about that, 529 00:31:02,840 --> 00:31:07,800 Speaker 4: and I'm scared because even though I'm an atheist, I 530 00:31:07,840 --> 00:31:10,560 Speaker 4: don't want people to live that way. And is there 531 00:31:10,600 --> 00:31:14,400 Speaker 4: any way that we as that you as Christians and 532 00:31:16,360 --> 00:31:18,560 Speaker 4: we as atheists can kind. 533 00:31:18,360 --> 00:31:21,680 Speaker 3: Of work together to try to keep these values alive. 534 00:31:22,640 --> 00:31:26,840 Speaker 2: So his concern was more prudential and Pragmaticy, even hey, 535 00:31:26,840 --> 00:31:30,360 Speaker 2: if Christianity is false. We kind of what we need 536 00:31:30,400 --> 00:31:35,080 Speaker 2: we values, which is interesting because we're going to survive 537 00:31:35,400 --> 00:31:40,760 Speaker 2: and flourish and thrive better with Christian values. He seems 538 00:31:40,800 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 2: somewhat to be implying as understanding you, which doesn't make sense. 539 00:31:45,520 --> 00:31:47,560 Speaker 2: If there's no God, we're not made in God's image, 540 00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:51,240 Speaker 2: Why would evolution wire us with those kind of beliefs? 541 00:31:51,240 --> 00:31:54,000 Speaker 2: And we could tell some story. Now let's take this 542 00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:55,800 Speaker 2: a little further. I want to pause so people understand 543 00:31:55,840 --> 00:31:58,280 Speaker 2: what we're doing here. We're just doing a review of 544 00:31:58,320 --> 00:32:05,000 Speaker 2: my discussion with Barterman about whether morality is objective or subjective? 545 00:32:05,120 --> 00:32:07,040 Speaker 2: Like the way you phrased it is right. What makes 546 00:32:07,080 --> 00:32:11,800 Speaker 2: the best sense of the world. Are the feelings and 547 00:32:11,920 --> 00:32:14,520 Speaker 2: inclinations we have that we should tell the truth and 548 00:32:14,560 --> 00:32:17,600 Speaker 2: care for the poor? Are they clues that we have 549 00:32:17,760 --> 00:32:21,479 Speaker 2: duties to love one another and there's an immaterial realm 550 00:32:21,920 --> 00:32:25,560 Speaker 2: and maybe a moral law giver? And my guest today, 551 00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:28,480 Speaker 2: Dave Horner, is one of my colleagues at Taboschool Theology. 552 00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:31,800 Speaker 2: Your book is the number one I recommend. Meta Ethics, 553 00:32:31,920 --> 00:32:34,920 Speaker 2: a short companion you wrote with JP Morrelan, one of 554 00:32:34,960 --> 00:32:37,200 Speaker 2: my friends and heroes, endorsed it. 555 00:32:37,200 --> 00:32:37,640 Speaker 1: It's great. 556 00:32:37,720 --> 00:32:40,520 Speaker 2: So there's ethics we can talk about, but meta ethics 557 00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:44,719 Speaker 2: are the bigger questions about the grounding of ethics. So 558 00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:46,800 Speaker 2: I'll just hold it up here for folks. Meta Ethics 559 00:32:46,840 --> 00:32:49,080 Speaker 2: wonderful book. Check it out. 560 00:32:49,400 --> 00:32:51,320 Speaker 1: The grounding that. 561 00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:58,080 Speaker 2: Erman gave is a common one, not for objective morality, 562 00:32:58,080 --> 00:33:01,880 Speaker 2: but for the feelings and beliefs we have about morality 563 00:33:02,440 --> 00:33:06,480 Speaker 2: is an evolutionary one. And so in part I wrote 564 00:33:06,520 --> 00:33:08,680 Speaker 2: down a few things I've thought about since then. But 565 00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:10,840 Speaker 2: I want to know from you what would be the 566 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:15,960 Speaker 2: problem or problems with an evolutionary explanation for morality. 567 00:33:17,840 --> 00:33:21,080 Speaker 4: Well, can I take a slightly different direction? 568 00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:21,480 Speaker 3: First? 569 00:33:21,520 --> 00:33:23,000 Speaker 1: For the record, you can do whatever you. 570 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:25,479 Speaker 4: Want to do, Okay, Well that's right, and i'm your teacher, 571 00:33:26,200 --> 00:33:27,479 Speaker 4: so shut up. 572 00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:30,720 Speaker 3: And I'm definitely your elder. 573 00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:32,240 Speaker 2: I think you're the first one who told me to 574 00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:34,040 Speaker 2: shut up and listen on the podcast. 575 00:33:34,200 --> 00:33:36,640 Speaker 1: I will remember this. I love it, very good record. 576 00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:41,080 Speaker 4: But I think there's actually a tension. I'd love to 577 00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:43,040 Speaker 4: see what you think about this. I think there's a 578 00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:49,680 Speaker 4: tension in Bart's own view, okay, between his conviction that 579 00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:54,640 Speaker 4: that all we have is evolution has produced these inclinations 580 00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:59,920 Speaker 4: to value you know, he's got these inclinations to want 581 00:34:00,080 --> 00:34:02,040 Speaker 4: help the poor and all that kind of stuff, and 582 00:34:02,080 --> 00:34:05,280 Speaker 4: it's just it's just in the DNA thing, you know, 583 00:34:05,600 --> 00:34:08,560 Speaker 4: and that's all you need to do. That's all you 584 00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:11,000 Speaker 4: need to do, you know, there needs to there doesn't 585 00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:16,160 Speaker 4: need to be a basis for it beyond that. And 586 00:34:16,160 --> 00:34:20,120 Speaker 4: and then on the other hand, there's his thesis that 587 00:34:20,640 --> 00:34:25,320 Speaker 4: something new came into the world with Jesus that wasn't 588 00:34:25,360 --> 00:34:28,080 Speaker 4: in the world before that and doesn't exist. I would 589 00:34:28,160 --> 00:34:30,120 Speaker 4: think you would want to say, in the in the 590 00:34:30,160 --> 00:34:35,200 Speaker 4: parts of the world that are outside the influence of Christianity, 591 00:34:35,960 --> 00:34:39,120 Speaker 4: and that's what he holds. He holds to this Christian view. 592 00:34:40,320 --> 00:34:48,800 Speaker 4: He also acknowledges that evolutionary biology can explain He argues 593 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:54,279 Speaker 4: that it can explain altruism within kinship groups, but not 594 00:34:54,400 --> 00:34:59,600 Speaker 4: outside of that. And so this is new for Jesus, 595 00:34:59,640 --> 00:35:06,239 Speaker 4: you know, love thy Stranger, so that you know what 596 00:35:06,400 --> 00:35:09,759 Speaker 4: Jesus produced and he now and bart now lives. Why 597 00:35:10,000 --> 00:35:14,920 Speaker 4: doesn't seem to be to be an evolutionary explanation for 598 00:35:15,080 --> 00:35:16,800 Speaker 4: the values that he actually holds. 599 00:35:17,760 --> 00:35:19,719 Speaker 2: That's interesting when you compare it back to what you 600 00:35:19,760 --> 00:35:24,080 Speaker 2: said about Nietzsche and Jesus' ethic being kind of contrary 601 00:35:24,120 --> 00:35:24,759 Speaker 2: to evolution. 602 00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:27,000 Speaker 1: There's a certain tension that's maybe there. 603 00:35:27,080 --> 00:35:30,280 Speaker 4: Yeah, but I'm just thinking, even if we deny that, okay, 604 00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:33,600 Speaker 4: and I think Nietzsche is probably right about this. But 605 00:35:33,840 --> 00:35:37,120 Speaker 4: in any case, even if even if bart Is is 606 00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:42,200 Speaker 4: completely right about evolutionary biology and so on, the thesis 607 00:35:42,239 --> 00:35:49,000 Speaker 4: of his book is not merely evolutionary. It's that something 608 00:35:49,120 --> 00:35:54,960 Speaker 4: new came in that is inexplicable in terms of mere DNA. 609 00:35:56,280 --> 00:35:59,239 Speaker 3: Type stuff. So I don't know how that fits in. 610 00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:02,560 Speaker 2: That's an interesting that's a really interesting question. I don't 611 00:36:02,600 --> 00:36:06,120 Speaker 2: know totally how to answer that. There's so many angles 612 00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:09,799 Speaker 2: here to this that we didn't even get into. And 613 00:36:09,880 --> 00:36:11,680 Speaker 2: some of the questions I didn't ask him were not 614 00:36:11,760 --> 00:36:13,160 Speaker 2: in his book, and it felt like you would have 615 00:36:13,239 --> 00:36:18,040 Speaker 2: been taken the topic aside. But even how evolution in principle, 616 00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:24,279 Speaker 2: which is a physical, material process, can generate things like 617 00:36:24,680 --> 00:36:31,560 Speaker 2: inclinations and beliefs desires which are not physical. Those things 618 00:36:31,600 --> 00:36:36,399 Speaker 2: are not in your brains. Those things are immaterial. They're 619 00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:41,799 Speaker 2: not like muscle and blood and sinews and bones that 620 00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:46,480 Speaker 2: have weight and extension and color. They're immaterial. And you say, well, 621 00:36:46,560 --> 00:36:50,680 Speaker 2: evolution just wires us to have these feelings. They go, well, 622 00:36:50,840 --> 00:36:54,960 Speaker 2: what exactly is a feeling? Explain that to me in 623 00:36:55,160 --> 00:37:00,680 Speaker 2: material terms, and you can't. In some way, it's getting 624 00:37:00,760 --> 00:37:06,799 Speaker 2: something immaterial from something that's purely material, which you could 625 00:37:06,880 --> 00:37:09,680 Speaker 2: argue is something from nothing that there's not anything immaterial 626 00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:14,080 Speaker 2: built into matter. We didn't get into that. But that's 627 00:37:14,160 --> 00:37:17,879 Speaker 2: an additional problem to me, how a physical process can 628 00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:21,360 Speaker 2: generate things like duties and obligations and beliefs in the 629 00:37:21,400 --> 00:37:22,000 Speaker 2: first place. 630 00:37:22,880 --> 00:37:24,600 Speaker 1: It's a category fallacy. 631 00:37:25,200 --> 00:37:27,840 Speaker 2: Now I have a few other things I want to 632 00:37:28,600 --> 00:37:31,120 Speaker 2: run off you here, But in some ways, it would 633 00:37:31,160 --> 00:37:35,120 Speaker 2: seem to me that if we take an evolutionary perspective, 634 00:37:36,239 --> 00:37:41,960 Speaker 2: we have been fooled into believing that we have obligations, 635 00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:45,200 Speaker 2: fooled into believing that there's a real right and wrong 636 00:37:45,440 --> 00:37:51,240 Speaker 2: because we all do. But we're actually deeply believing something 637 00:37:51,960 --> 00:37:55,799 Speaker 2: that's false. Now, if that's the case, let me read 638 00:37:55,800 --> 00:37:59,399 Speaker 2: a couple quotes from this Michael Ruse, who passed away 639 00:37:59,440 --> 00:38:03,640 Speaker 2: a few months ago. Go really jovial, thoughtful philosopher of 640 00:38:03,719 --> 00:38:07,360 Speaker 2: science who's an atheist. He said, I appreciate when someone 641 00:38:07,400 --> 00:38:10,880 Speaker 2: says love thy neighbor, as thyself. They think they are 642 00:38:10,920 --> 00:38:14,799 Speaker 2: a fern above and beyond themselves. Nevertheless, such reference is 643 00:38:14,920 --> 00:38:18,960 Speaker 2: truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival 644 00:38:19,040 --> 00:38:24,239 Speaker 2: and reproduction, and any deeper meaning is illusory. 645 00:38:25,120 --> 00:38:31,640 Speaker 1: It's illusory, it doesn't exist. Now, you went on to say, basically, 646 00:38:31,840 --> 00:38:36,400 Speaker 1: evolution has fooled us into thinking we have these obligations, 647 00:38:36,440 --> 00:38:39,120 Speaker 1: and we don't. So when to hear that, I have 648 00:38:39,200 --> 00:38:42,240 Speaker 1: two questions, I go. Number One, if I've been fooled 649 00:38:42,239 --> 00:38:45,200 Speaker 1: into thinking I have these obligations, then why do they 650 00:38:45,239 --> 00:38:48,440 Speaker 1: have any force? Why should I follow them? 651 00:38:48,560 --> 00:38:48,640 Speaker 3: And? 652 00:38:48,760 --> 00:38:52,480 Speaker 2: Second, what else have I been fooled about with evolution 653 00:38:53,160 --> 00:38:57,319 Speaker 2: that I can't trust? That I also deeply believe as 654 00:38:57,520 --> 00:39:02,040 Speaker 2: much as I believe anything else. Those are two pretty 655 00:39:02,080 --> 00:39:07,040 Speaker 2: big problems to me that stem from taking an evolutionary ethics. 656 00:39:07,040 --> 00:39:09,160 Speaker 2: So it's like you're trying to explain it here, but 657 00:39:09,239 --> 00:39:13,160 Speaker 2: then it guts the entire project raises further problems. 658 00:39:13,840 --> 00:39:15,200 Speaker 1: Do you agree with those two? 659 00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:18,000 Speaker 2: Do you think those are real problems in the evolutionary ethic? 660 00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:19,000 Speaker 2: Tell me what you think about that? 661 00:39:19,080 --> 00:39:22,080 Speaker 4: Sure, I think you're you're exactly right? And he and 662 00:39:22,320 --> 00:39:27,719 Speaker 4: one other place, Ruth says that that uh and he says, 663 00:39:27,760 --> 00:39:29,880 Speaker 4: we believe, we believe these things. 664 00:39:30,239 --> 00:39:32,840 Speaker 3: By the way, this so this, this, this applies to. 665 00:39:33,280 --> 00:39:38,279 Speaker 4: Bart the the The only way it works is that 666 00:39:38,320 --> 00:39:46,880 Speaker 4: we come to believe these moral duties as objective duties, 667 00:39:48,160 --> 00:39:50,600 Speaker 4: or else it's not going to affect the way we believe, 668 00:39:50,719 --> 00:39:50,920 Speaker 4: you know. 669 00:39:51,160 --> 00:39:52,320 Speaker 3: So he is a scientist. 670 00:39:52,360 --> 00:39:56,239 Speaker 4: He's using the word objective, and it wouldn't work if 671 00:39:56,239 --> 00:39:58,560 Speaker 4: we didn't actually think they were objective, which is kind 672 00:39:58,560 --> 00:39:59,120 Speaker 4: of interesting. 673 00:39:59,480 --> 00:40:04,480 Speaker 3: What is it about being human? And that means I. 674 00:40:04,440 --> 00:40:07,680 Speaker 4: Should respect you, I should not exploit you, and and 675 00:40:07,719 --> 00:40:08,000 Speaker 4: so on. 676 00:40:08,040 --> 00:40:08,520 Speaker 3: What is it? 677 00:40:08,640 --> 00:40:12,280 Speaker 4: What is it about humans? And all of the human 678 00:40:12,360 --> 00:40:15,920 Speaker 4: rights doctrines, the whole, the whole idea of human rights 679 00:40:16,480 --> 00:40:21,080 Speaker 4: emerged from the conviction that every human being has created 680 00:40:21,080 --> 00:40:23,160 Speaker 4: in the image of God. So there there's a kind 681 00:40:23,160 --> 00:40:28,399 Speaker 4: of sacredness that we we should respect. I once did 682 00:40:28,440 --> 00:40:35,560 Speaker 4: an informal debate with Michael Tooley, who advocates for for infanticide, 683 00:40:36,360 --> 00:40:40,040 Speaker 4: and he makes it, advocates, Oh yeah, if you want it, 684 00:40:40,120 --> 00:40:41,640 Speaker 4: if you want to, yeah. 685 00:40:41,480 --> 00:40:42,120 Speaker 1: That makes it okay. 686 00:40:42,560 --> 00:40:44,839 Speaker 3: Not that we should go kill everything, but. 687 00:40:45,239 --> 00:40:47,760 Speaker 4: But if your if your infant is disabled or whatever, 688 00:40:48,560 --> 00:40:50,920 Speaker 4: and you want to do that, you should be perfectly 689 00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:53,239 Speaker 4: free to do that, and he makes it kind of 690 00:40:53,280 --> 00:40:56,440 Speaker 4: a similar argument. He says, in Greek and Roman times, 691 00:40:56,719 --> 00:40:59,360 Speaker 4: in many parts of the world, in fantaside is practiced. 692 00:40:59,560 --> 00:41:02,000 Speaker 4: The only reason we don't practice in fantaside, he said, 693 00:41:02,360 --> 00:41:07,040 Speaker 4: is because of the Jewish and Christian view of the 694 00:41:07,080 --> 00:41:10,400 Speaker 4: image of God. And since we don't believe that anymore, 695 00:41:10,960 --> 00:41:11,880 Speaker 4: it's open season. 696 00:41:12,320 --> 00:41:12,800 Speaker 3: Wow. 697 00:41:13,400 --> 00:41:16,200 Speaker 4: I said, well, if you really think the only way 698 00:41:16,280 --> 00:41:19,920 Speaker 4: to hold to human equality and human dignity is to 699 00:41:19,960 --> 00:41:24,400 Speaker 4: see it grounded in the doctrine of the image of God, 700 00:41:24,880 --> 00:41:28,280 Speaker 4: that's a pretty good dog on good reason to believe 701 00:41:28,480 --> 00:41:32,680 Speaker 4: in the doctrine of the image of God, right, because 702 00:41:32,840 --> 00:41:36,520 Speaker 4: we see that to be true. So this is again, 703 00:41:36,600 --> 00:41:40,839 Speaker 4: this is back to Nietzsche in Bart. I think Bart 704 00:41:40,920 --> 00:41:43,920 Speaker 4: really does believe the Christian ethic. I think he thinks 705 00:41:43,960 --> 00:41:50,040 Speaker 4: it's true. He doesn't want to anchor it in a 706 00:41:50,120 --> 00:41:53,560 Speaker 4: Christian worldview, and so, okay, it's just good enough that 707 00:41:53,640 --> 00:41:59,319 Speaker 4: I prefer this, But I think Nietzsche would say no, 708 00:41:59,360 --> 00:41:59,879 Speaker 4: it's not good. 709 00:42:00,719 --> 00:42:04,759 Speaker 2: That is the power of Nietzsche and the way he 710 00:42:04,800 --> 00:42:08,520 Speaker 2: phrase this is really helpful. Yes, we're equally human, but 711 00:42:08,719 --> 00:42:13,480 Speaker 2: what is it about us being equally human, that gives 712 00:42:13,560 --> 00:42:17,640 Speaker 2: us equal value in equal rights. And that's where we 713 00:42:17,719 --> 00:42:19,759 Speaker 2: take a step back and we go, oh, we say, 714 00:42:19,760 --> 00:42:24,759 Speaker 2: within a Judaeo Christian tradition, human beings are made in 715 00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:28,800 Speaker 2: the image of God, the imago day reflect our creator, 716 00:42:28,840 --> 00:42:32,960 Speaker 2: who's the basis of moral values in his character. So 717 00:42:33,040 --> 00:42:36,920 Speaker 2: we have a grounding and an explanation for this. But 718 00:42:37,120 --> 00:42:40,879 Speaker 2: if we place it within an evolutionary perspective, we got 719 00:42:40,880 --> 00:42:43,520 Speaker 2: here through in his own words. By the way, this 720 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:47,399 Speaker 2: is actually what I thought was really interesting. He's talking 721 00:42:47,400 --> 00:42:50,719 Speaker 2: about his Christian friends who think he's deceived when he 722 00:42:50,840 --> 00:42:53,360 Speaker 2: insists that a deep commitment to other members are species 723 00:42:53,400 --> 00:42:59,960 Speaker 2: that originated through time, matter and chance. Why would human 724 00:43:00,160 --> 00:43:06,040 Speaker 2: beings that have emerged through that process have value. It's 725 00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:09,799 Speaker 2: not an adequate grounding. So we're equally human, but on 726 00:43:09,840 --> 00:43:13,880 Speaker 2: your worldview, we're equally just products of chance. There's no purpose. 727 00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:17,080 Speaker 2: I don't know how things like value even emerge in 728 00:43:17,120 --> 00:43:19,520 Speaker 2: the first place through time, matter and chance, which is 729 00:43:19,520 --> 00:43:24,640 Speaker 2: a material process, and so being equally human doesn't account 730 00:43:24,680 --> 00:43:27,360 Speaker 2: for it. Then if you say things like well, we 731 00:43:27,480 --> 00:43:33,680 Speaker 2: have intelligence and we have creativity, these things make us value. 732 00:43:33,760 --> 00:43:35,719 Speaker 2: I always thought, you know what if animals could vote, 733 00:43:35,800 --> 00:43:38,200 Speaker 2: cheetahs would be like, nah, it's speed that makes us, 734 00:43:38,200 --> 00:43:40,279 Speaker 2: and elephants would be like, it's size that makes us. 735 00:43:40,320 --> 00:43:45,160 Speaker 2: Why do those things in themselves? Now, they have instrumental value, 736 00:43:45,800 --> 00:43:49,880 Speaker 2: but do they have intrinsic value? And if we ground 737 00:43:49,960 --> 00:43:54,360 Speaker 2: value and say intelligence, does that mean that professors who 738 00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:57,040 Speaker 2: maybe this sounds presumptions, But our job is to think 739 00:43:57,120 --> 00:44:00,840 Speaker 2: and read and analyze ideas. We live in the intellectual realm. 740 00:44:01,520 --> 00:44:02,279 Speaker 3: Do people who. 741 00:44:02,239 --> 00:44:05,360 Speaker 2: Are smarter have more value than those who have less? 742 00:44:05,800 --> 00:44:09,759 Speaker 2: These are the doors you open up into absurdity. And 743 00:44:09,800 --> 00:44:11,560 Speaker 2: so I was just talking about our students. I teach 744 00:44:11,560 --> 00:44:14,760 Speaker 2: a class here. I'm in our Apologize program at Talbot 745 00:44:15,400 --> 00:44:18,200 Speaker 2: full time, but I just got done teaching an undergrad 746 00:44:18,239 --> 00:44:22,920 Speaker 2: class Gospel Kingdom culture. And I said, you know, evolution 747 00:44:23,120 --> 00:44:28,720 Speaker 2: produced us and it produced animals. Why do human beings 748 00:44:28,760 --> 00:44:31,640 Speaker 2: have more value? And the example I gave us from 749 00:44:32,040 --> 00:44:34,920 Speaker 2: the gorilla harambe. You remember in the zoo a few 750 00:44:35,040 --> 00:44:37,800 Speaker 2: years ago and that two or three year old kid 751 00:44:37,840 --> 00:44:40,359 Speaker 2: climbed in with this massive gorilla and it was kind 752 00:44:40,360 --> 00:44:43,799 Speaker 2: of harrowing how strong this thing was, just moving this 753 00:44:43,880 --> 00:44:46,680 Speaker 2: kid around like it was a leaf. I said, did 754 00:44:46,719 --> 00:44:51,279 Speaker 2: they do the right thing shooting the gorilla and not 755 00:44:51,600 --> 00:44:54,920 Speaker 2: the child. Everyone that I heard was like, this is 756 00:44:55,040 --> 00:45:01,479 Speaker 2: tragic and it's terrible, but they did the right thing. Well, 757 00:45:02,120 --> 00:45:07,360 Speaker 2: that only makes sense if humans have intrinsic value. So 758 00:45:07,840 --> 00:45:11,919 Speaker 2: the way you're moving, if I understanding correctly, is saying, 759 00:45:11,960 --> 00:45:14,799 Speaker 2: we know we have more values and duties. We know 760 00:45:14,920 --> 00:45:18,719 Speaker 2: we have human value. Let's move back and say, what 761 00:45:18,880 --> 00:45:26,560 Speaker 2: worldview best explains that we all live and act as if. 762 00:45:26,440 --> 00:45:27,360 Speaker 1: There's moral duties. 763 00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:30,520 Speaker 2: Maybe Jesus expanded that, but throughout the history of the world, 764 00:45:31,680 --> 00:45:36,120 Speaker 2: these have been as clear to us as anything. So 765 00:45:36,360 --> 00:45:41,560 Speaker 2: what world do you best explains this? Our commitment to 766 00:45:41,640 --> 00:45:44,839 Speaker 2: moral values and duties is a clue to the kind 767 00:45:45,000 --> 00:45:46,560 Speaker 2: of universe we live in? 768 00:45:46,880 --> 00:45:49,160 Speaker 1: Is that fair? Sum up? How you connect that? 769 00:45:49,840 --> 00:45:50,040 Speaker 3: Yeah? 770 00:45:50,080 --> 00:45:54,280 Speaker 4: And I would quote one of our friends common friends, 771 00:45:54,280 --> 00:45:54,960 Speaker 4: Paul Copan. 772 00:45:55,440 --> 00:45:56,960 Speaker 1: Yeah, maybe a friend I don't know. 773 00:45:57,080 --> 00:45:59,760 Speaker 2: Okay, Well, he was on recently doing the Hello Berry 774 00:46:00,280 --> 00:46:01,040 Speaker 2: total friend. 775 00:46:00,880 --> 00:46:06,080 Speaker 4: But he has this great slogan from valuelessness, valuelessness comes 776 00:46:07,640 --> 00:46:11,200 Speaker 4: and that's that's the You know, the evolutionary story is 777 00:46:11,239 --> 00:46:16,600 Speaker 4: a causal material story, it's not a value story. So 778 00:46:16,680 --> 00:46:19,920 Speaker 4: we ask, okay, so yeah, we can we can call 779 00:46:20,040 --> 00:46:21,399 Speaker 4: homo sapiens, you. 780 00:46:21,360 --> 00:46:24,359 Speaker 3: Know, the product of all this stuff. But what gives 781 00:46:24,400 --> 00:46:26,320 Speaker 3: them value? Oh wait a minute. Value. 782 00:46:26,360 --> 00:46:31,160 Speaker 4: Now, now we're talking about something different. We're talking about 783 00:46:31,160 --> 00:46:33,840 Speaker 4: something normative that has hotness to it and all that 784 00:46:33,920 --> 00:46:37,560 Speaker 4: kind of stuff. Where does that come from? It doesn't 785 00:46:37,719 --> 00:46:41,680 Speaker 4: merely come from valuelessness. The best way to explain it 786 00:46:41,719 --> 00:46:46,040 Speaker 4: is to start with value. That ultimate reality, God is 787 00:46:46,160 --> 00:46:50,240 Speaker 4: himself a person, a moral being who created with moral 788 00:46:50,360 --> 00:46:55,719 Speaker 4: intentions and created us to flourish and to exemplify and 789 00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:58,120 Speaker 4: live out this kind of moral vision that he has, 790 00:46:58,520 --> 00:47:01,880 Speaker 4: and Jesus filled in a whole lot of it. That 791 00:47:02,080 --> 00:47:05,480 Speaker 4: wasn't clear to everybody before. But you're starting with value 792 00:47:05,520 --> 00:47:08,920 Speaker 4: and you're ending with value. If you start with valuelessness, 793 00:47:09,000 --> 00:47:10,440 Speaker 4: I don't see how you get to value. 794 00:47:11,200 --> 00:47:14,120 Speaker 2: I think that's really well said. So when it's all 795 00:47:14,160 --> 00:47:18,680 Speaker 2: said and done, there's an agreement between Bart and myself, Nietzsche 796 00:47:18,719 --> 00:47:23,880 Speaker 2: and others that we have at least moral feelings and inclinations. 797 00:47:24,719 --> 00:47:28,640 Speaker 2: We all live as if caring for people is better 798 00:47:29,200 --> 00:47:32,680 Speaker 2: than not caring for people. Hopefully you and I that 799 00:47:32,800 --> 00:47:36,600 Speaker 2: reflects our Christian faith. We certainly see that in Bart's 800 00:47:36,640 --> 00:47:39,160 Speaker 2: case given one and a half million dollars away from 801 00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:44,040 Speaker 2: this blog. Remarkable, and we expect people to keep their promises. 802 00:47:44,560 --> 00:47:48,480 Speaker 2: We expect people to tell the truth. We realize that 803 00:47:48,560 --> 00:47:54,359 Speaker 2: it's good when somebody offers forgiveness to somebody else, and 804 00:47:54,440 --> 00:47:57,759 Speaker 2: we celebrate movies like You Knew Is come back to 805 00:47:57,800 --> 00:48:02,240 Speaker 2: superheroes as a matter of time. Day celebrate movies like Endgame, 806 00:48:02,360 --> 00:48:07,200 Speaker 2: in which Iron Man willingly lays down his life as 807 00:48:07,280 --> 00:48:12,560 Speaker 2: a sacrifice for others. That's what a real hero is. 808 00:48:13,760 --> 00:48:18,000 Speaker 2: If this game from evolution, then we've been fooled and 809 00:48:18,600 --> 00:48:24,280 Speaker 2: that life is no better than any other life morally speaking. 810 00:48:25,160 --> 00:48:30,160 Speaker 2: But honestly, none of us actually believe that we know 811 00:48:30,480 --> 00:48:33,239 Speaker 2: we live in a moral universe. That means there's more 812 00:48:33,320 --> 00:48:36,800 Speaker 2: that exists than what we can touch, taste and feel. 813 00:48:37,520 --> 00:48:41,880 Speaker 2: And it raises the question what gives us obligations, what 814 00:48:42,000 --> 00:48:45,880 Speaker 2: gives us value, what gives us duties? This is sounding 815 00:48:45,920 --> 00:48:49,920 Speaker 2: a lot like God. That's my argument. Now, your book 816 00:48:49,960 --> 00:48:52,680 Speaker 2: met Ethics, it's great. I won't recommend it one more time. 817 00:48:52,719 --> 00:48:55,560 Speaker 2: That people will pick it up and maybe people will 818 00:48:55,560 --> 00:48:58,040 Speaker 2: come the philosophy program, Dave, I've said this a bunch 819 00:48:58,040 --> 00:49:01,000 Speaker 2: of times. The ma fil program was there's really life 820 00:49:01,040 --> 00:49:03,360 Speaker 2: changing for me. I've known my wife since third grade, 821 00:49:03,880 --> 00:49:06,200 Speaker 2: and there's two or three times in my life, she says, 822 00:49:06,200 --> 00:49:09,520 Speaker 2: I've distinctly seen the most change in me. 823 00:49:10,520 --> 00:49:12,000 Speaker 1: One was. 824 00:49:14,040 --> 00:49:18,439 Speaker 4: Just checking, well, checking that's right, that's right. 825 00:49:18,640 --> 00:49:19,680 Speaker 1: We've moved beyond. 826 00:49:19,719 --> 00:49:23,359 Speaker 3: Are you just preferences anyway right? Inclinations? Yes? 827 00:49:24,120 --> 00:49:29,400 Speaker 2: Positively, I should qualify and studying there was really formative 828 00:49:29,480 --> 00:49:31,759 Speaker 2: for me, and so I hope people watching will think 829 00:49:31,800 --> 00:49:33,600 Speaker 2: about studying in person or distance. 830 00:49:33,719 --> 00:49:35,800 Speaker 1: May Field program and may Apologize program. 831 00:49:36,120 --> 00:49:38,160 Speaker 2: Pick up a copy of med Ethics, and while you're 832 00:49:38,200 --> 00:49:40,279 Speaker 2: at it, make sure you hit subscribe. We've got a 833 00:49:40,280 --> 00:49:43,920 Speaker 2: lot more conversation like this coming and let us know 834 00:49:43,960 --> 00:49:47,239 Speaker 2: if these kinds of conversations are helpful to you. This 835 00:49:47,280 --> 00:49:50,840 Speaker 2: is our Talbot Tuesday, bringing faculty to you in the 836 00:49:50,880 --> 00:49:53,520 Speaker 2: case like Dave Horny here literally one of the experts 837 00:49:53,560 --> 00:49:57,359 Speaker 2: in the world who studied at Oxford University to these 838 00:49:57,440 --> 00:49:58,200 Speaker 2: kinds of issues. 839 00:49:58,400 --> 00:49:59,160 Speaker 1: Hey, friends, if. 840 00:49:59,080 --> 00:50:02,000 Speaker 2: You enjoyed this show, please hit that fall button on 841 00:50:02,040 --> 00:50:05,040 Speaker 2: your podcast app. Most of you tuning in haven't done 842 00:50:05,040 --> 00:50:07,400 Speaker 2: this yet, and it makes a huge difference in helping 843 00:50:07,480 --> 00:50:10,279 Speaker 2: us reach and equip more people and build community and 844 00:50:10,360 --> 00:50:15,319 Speaker 2: please consider leaving a podcast review. Every review helps. Thanks 845 00:50:15,360 --> 00:50:17,719 Speaker 2: for listening to The Sean McDowell Show, brought to you 846 00:50:17,800 --> 00:50:21,360 Speaker 2: by Talbot School of Theology at Biola University, where we 847 00:50:21,400 --> 00:50:25,240 Speaker 2: have on campus and online programs, and apologetic spiritual formation, 848 00:50:25,440 --> 00:50:28,080 Speaker 2: marriage and family, Bible and so much more. We would 849 00:50:28,120 --> 00:50:30,960 Speaker 2: love to train you to more effectively, live, teach, and 850 00:50:31,080 --> 00:50:33,839 Speaker 2: defend the Christian faith today and we will see you 851 00:50:33,920 --> 00:50:40,759 Speaker 2: when the next episode drops.