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Speaker 1: True Crime Conversations acknowledges the traditional owners of land and

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Speaker 1: waters that this podcast was recorded on.

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Speaker 2: It's a November evening in twenty sixteen, and police have

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Speaker 2: just arrived at a family home in Cottage Grove, Minneapolis.

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Speaker 2: Stephen Orwine and his nine year old son are waiting

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Speaker 2: on the street after calling nine one one. Inside, officers

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Speaker 2: are hit with the smell of roasting pumpkin on the

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Speaker 2: stovetop as they make their way towards the master bedroom. Inside,

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Speaker 2: they find the body of Amy or Wine on the

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Speaker 2: floor with a single gunshot wound to the head and

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Speaker 2: a gun lying in the crook of her left arm.

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Speaker 2: It doesn't take long to confirm that Amy is right handed,

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Speaker 2: she didn't inflict this wound herself. They realize that this

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Speaker 2: is a murder, that this has been made to look

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Speaker 2: like a suicide, but not just any murder. Amy's name

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Speaker 2: is one of one hundreds on a giant list doing

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Speaker 2: the rounds on the dark web, full of requests to

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Speaker 2: fake accidents and disappear people for money. This is just

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Speaker 2: one story on the kill list. I'm Jemma Bath and

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Speaker 2: this is True Crime Conversations Amoma mea podcast exploring the

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Speaker 2: world's most notorious crimes by speaking to the people who

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Speaker 2: know the most about them. Six months before Amy's death,

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Speaker 2: the FBI tracked her down and told her that someone

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Speaker 2: had made a death threat against her on the internet.

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Speaker 2: An unknown person going by the username dog day God

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Speaker 2: had paid thirteen thousand dollars in bitcoin to have her murdered.

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Speaker 2: But Amy wasn't the only name on that list, and

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Speaker 2: it's a list that our guest Today journalist Carl Miller

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Speaker 2: found himself staring at in twenty twenty, thanks to a

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Speaker 2: hacker friend who stumbled across it. Over the past four

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Speaker 2: year years, Miller and his team have intercepted one hundred

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Speaker 2: and seventy five kill orders, leading to thirty four arrests

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Speaker 2: and twenty eight convictions in eleven countries, resulting in over

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Speaker 2: one hundred and fifty years of custodial time. He has

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Speaker 2: dedicated his life over the past few years to infiltrating

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Speaker 2: an assassins for higher dark Web marketplace, and it's led

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Speaker 2: him to some pretty grim places, which he's been sharing

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Speaker 2: in his podcast kill List Karl joins us.

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Speaker 1: Now, Karl, how.

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Speaker 2: Did you find yourself looking at a kill list with

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Speaker 2: the names of hundreds of ordinary people on it unexpectedly.

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Speaker 1: It was really not anything that I set out to do.

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Speaker 1: It was something that honestly landed in my lap. One

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Speaker 1: day early twenty twenty, just as kind of COVID was

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Speaker 1: collapsing society around all of us, a hacker who I

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Speaker 1: had come to know Kres. Myself and him, we had

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Speaker 1: been looking at these assassination markets on the Darknet, which

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Speaker 1: were hiding in plain sight. They were very they were

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Speaker 1: very obvious, they were very visible. They were marketing themselves

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Speaker 1: in factors being the kind of go to places for

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Speaker 1: someone to take out a hit on someone else. And

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Speaker 1: then in twenty twenty one day, Chris phones me. He

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Speaker 1: sounds like extremely agitated, quite upset, and it's because he

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Speaker 1: has found a vulnerability. He found this kind of tiny

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Speaker 1: little flaw in the way that this website worked, and

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Speaker 1: he had just kind of wiggled through it and found

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Speaker 1: himself basically in the middle or the back end of

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Speaker 1: the website. And there suddenly he can see all these

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Speaker 1: kill orders that are being sent into the into the

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Speaker 1: site itself, and the next day there they are landing

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Speaker 1: in my own box.

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Speaker 2: Where were you at this point in time? Were you

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Speaker 2: Were you a crime writer? Were you used to this

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Speaker 2: kind of thing?

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Speaker 1: No, I mean I not not a crime writer and

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Speaker 1: not a hardened journalist at all. You know my background.

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Speaker 1: So I'm basically a think tanker. I like kind of wafty,

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Speaker 1: big concepts, and I write pamphlets about how digital technology

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Speaker 1: is kind of changing the nature of society or politics.

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Speaker 1: Now I had done a bit, I'd written a book

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Speaker 1: about power in the digital age, and I was interested

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Speaker 1: in how it was changing in all these different arena

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Speaker 1: of our lives, including crime. So I had spent a

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Speaker 1: bit of time with the police, I'd spent a bit

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Speaker 1: of time interviewing cyber criminals, and a bit of time

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Speaker 1: with people like Chris who were digging into the kind

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Speaker 1: of how crime was really working on places like the darknet.

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Speaker 1: But absolutely at the kind of most general level, like

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Speaker 1: nothing so tangible was what I was going to be

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Speaker 1: facing them. Then they're kind of years ahead.

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Speaker 2: What does the front end of this marketplace or website

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Speaker 2: that Chris found? What does it look like to someone

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Speaker 2: that stumbles across it, someone.

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Speaker 1: Was stumbles across it, or someone that finds it deliberately. Yeah, well,

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Speaker 1: so the website looks like a out of the nineteen nineties. Right,

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Speaker 1: it's black, it's kind of got white text. There's kind

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Speaker 1: of stock imagery of people wearing hoodies. Actually, ironically, some

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Speaker 1: of the same stock imagery has been used by kind

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Speaker 1: of media organizations reporting on the podcast Believe It or Not.

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Speaker 1: Oh really yeah, and kind of interlates with all of

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Speaker 1: that is nasty pictures of dead bodies, people holding guns,

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Speaker 1: blood and the kind of pitch is hey with a mafia.

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Speaker 1: Now we have a kind of dishtol wing as well.

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Speaker 1: You know, we too have have gone into e commerce,

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Speaker 1: you know, and we set up this kind of portal

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Speaker 1: so that you can use us as a trusted third

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Speaker 1: party to hire a hit man. So they say, we'll

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Speaker 1: take your money, we'll connect up with a hit man,

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Speaker 1: but we're only going to release some money to them

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Speaker 1: once you tell us that you're happy that the person

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Speaker 1: that you've targeted has really been killed. To be honest,

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Speaker 1: like Jemmy, for anyone carrying any kind of skeepticism with

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Speaker 1: them onto that site, there's pretty loud flags that it

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Speaker 1: isn't that legitimate. I mean, it's got a copyright symbol

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Speaker 1: on it, it's got lots of things that kind of

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Speaker 1: make it appear like it's trying to be a legitimate

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Speaker 1: website and wouldn't even remotely have on if it was

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Speaker 1: actually genuinely being written by the mafia.

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Speaker 2: I guess if you have decided you want to kill someone,

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Speaker 2: you're not looking at those red flags, No.

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Speaker 1: You're looking for the green flags. You're desperately looking for

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Speaker 1: a solution to your problem, and here is a website

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Speaker 1: that purports to offer you exactly that safe. Anonymous remotely

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Speaker 1: transacted murder for higher and for people around the world,

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Speaker 1: that is, at least it seems to them at the

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Speaker 1: time like an absolute you know, like a panacea.

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Speaker 2: One of the names on the list was amial Wine.

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Speaker 2: She was murdered in twenty sixteen. How did police unravel

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Speaker 2: that case because they realized pretty quickly it wasn't suicide

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Speaker 2: as it initially appeared. What actually transpired, what.

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Speaker 1: I transpired, was that an anonymous tipster had initially gone

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Speaker 1: to the police with some information to say that a

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Speaker 1: shadowy darknet music called dog Day God had been trying

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Speaker 1: to hire someone to kill Amy. The police had in

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Speaker 1: fact gone to Amy's house. I think a member of

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Speaker 1: the local police department in Cottage Grove and a member

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Speaker 1: of the FBI, and warned her and her husband that

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Speaker 1: there was internet threats. I think that was the vocabulary

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Speaker 1: they used, kind of these internet threats about her. They

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Speaker 1: said that she should stay alert, and I believe they

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Speaker 1: actually also said that they should buy a firearm to

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Speaker 1: protect themselves. And then it was exactly that firearm that

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Speaker 1: was used in an apparent suicide by Amy I think

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Speaker 1: a couple of weeks later, and that was when the

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Speaker 1: police kind of reattended the house sadly, of course, found

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Speaker 1: Amy's body and then began an investigation to try and

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Speaker 1: work out what happened. I think there was a hair's

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Speaker 1: breadth diction between them closing the case that night and

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Speaker 1: deciding it was a suicide and actually keeping it open.

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Speaker 1: I think there was one police detective at the scene

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Speaker 1: that night that had a kind of a bad feeling

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Speaker 1: thought let's us keep it open. He was about to

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Speaker 1: kind of declare it a suicide and they were going

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Speaker 1: to scrub the house down, and he didn't, and they

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Speaker 1: sent a forensics team and began to learn very quickly

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Speaker 1: that something much more sinous to had happened.

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Speaker 2: Jumping ahead and spoiling the story but it turns out

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Speaker 2: to be her husband that murdered her in that house,

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Speaker 2: and he'd gone through this website, hadn't he.

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Speaker 1: He was dog Day God. So they found clear evidence

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Speaker 1: actually then used in the trial linking him to the

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Speaker 1: payments that dog Day God had made to the site,

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Speaker 1: and in fact, I think other kind of technical information

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Speaker 1: regarding the login and things like that that basically proved

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Speaker 1: that he was dog Day God and he was using

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Speaker 1: the site to try and have Amy kield before he

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Speaker 1: decided to take into his own hands.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and why was the reason he took it into

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Speaker 2: his own hands.

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Speaker 1: Because the site never delivered the murder, and the site

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Speaker 1: never delivers.

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Speaker 2: The murders, so it's a scam.

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Speaker 1: So it's a scam. What happened to Stephen Rwine dog

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Speaker 1: de God happened to every other user of the site

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Speaker 1: eventually as well, which is after the payment was made.

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Speaker 1: And apparently the hitmen is dispatched, they get lost and

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Speaker 1: they lose their weapon and they can't find their way

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Speaker 1: to the house, and a more highly trained hit man

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Speaker 1: has to be hired instead. And you could see in

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Speaker 1: the messages that dog dea God sent this kind of

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Speaker 1: climbing sense of urgency, of frustration, time and again. You know,

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Speaker 1: he saw that the murder hadn't been carried out of

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Speaker 1: the allotted time, and eventually, he, like lots of users

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Speaker 1: on that site, he was asking for his money back.

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Speaker 2: I'm sure that the listeners are starting to it's starting

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Speaker 2: to tick over in their head why this is so dangerous.

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Speaker 2: It's You've got these ordinary people ordering hits on people

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Speaker 2: in their lives, realizing it's not going to happen, and

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Speaker 2: then the threat of something like what Stephen did is

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Speaker 2: really high that they could end up taking matters into

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Speaker 2: their own hands.

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Speaker 1: That's right, and in twenty twenty, the memory of Amy

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Speaker 1: was the first thing that I think was in my

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Speaker 1: head and in the head of all of us when

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Speaker 1: we were then reading these kid orders for the first time.

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Speaker 1: We knew as soon as we could see the kid

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Speaker 1: orders again, we knew that it wasn't just Steven All

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Speaker 1: weren't being scammed. Every single one of these users was.

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Speaker 1: But we knew that Amy had been killed exactly by

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Speaker 1: the person like all of these other people who were

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Speaker 1: using the site trying to have someone killed, and so

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Speaker 1: it was an immediate reminder about how dangerous the circumstances

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Speaker 1: that each of these targets on the kill list must

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Speaker 1: be in and how close possibly the people were to

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Speaker 1: them in their lives, who were actually in secret or

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Speaker 1: they thought trying to plan for their murder.

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Speaker 2: How many people over the course of your investigation. I

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Speaker 2: know Chris started to find more and more names, but

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Speaker 2: how many names did you see on that list?

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Speaker 1: We ended up over the years investigation disclosing one hundred

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Speaker 1: and seventy five kill orders to police around the world.

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Speaker 1: Each one of those was a we believe a serious

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Speaker 1: threat to life in the sense that it was a

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Speaker 1: person normally addressed pattern of life information, really serious sustained

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Speaker 1: determination to have them killed. This wasn't someone erantly sending

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Speaker 1: a single message to the site. Every single one of

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Speaker 1: these cases, you know that it was very clear what

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Speaker 1: the person wanted. And then also payments, So each and

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Speaker 1: every single one of those one hundred and seventy five

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Speaker 1: have payments attached to them. In terms of the total

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Speaker 1: number names on the list, if you look at the

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Speaker 1: people that didn't have payments, though, it's probably in the

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Speaker 1: five hundreds, maybe even not to one thousands.

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Speaker 2: That's terrifying.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's pretty staggering.

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Speaker 2: Why do they want those people killed? What were you

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Speaker 2: seeing as the reasons?

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Speaker 1: When I first started this, my kind of assumption was

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Speaker 1: that we were going to be stepping into like organized

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Speaker 1: crime of one kind or another. I was expecting to

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Speaker 1: see drug deals gone wrong, like kind of feuds, kind

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Speaker 1: of revenge attacks. But you know what was striking Jenba

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Speaker 1: was that when we began to kind of unravel these cases,

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Speaker 1: reach the people on the list, get to know them,

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Speaker 1: and then ultimately get to know in the police investigations

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Speaker 1: the people that were trying to put them, but that

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Speaker 1: had put them there were trying to have them killed.

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Speaker 1: They were normal people, like everyone was a normal person

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Speaker 1: apart from someone that determined that someone else should die.

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Speaker 1: I mean they were They lived normal lives. They look

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Speaker 1: like you and me. They are often hiding in plain sight,

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Speaker 1: and they almost always I think, were driven by some

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Speaker 1: kind of desire for control. Most of the cases ended

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Speaker 1: up being about coercive control within spousal relationships, So basically

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Speaker 1: some kind of romantic relationship gone terribly terribly awry, either

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Speaker 1: that existed or someone trying to leave it, and it

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Speaker 1: was kind of in those contexts. Generally, we found these

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Speaker 1: kid orders to emerge from.

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Speaker 2: Am I right in saying that you saw a lot

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Speaker 2: of the victims were women and it was kind of

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Speaker 2: ex partners or partners that had put these hits out

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Speaker 2: on them.

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Speaker 1: That's right. It was somewhere between sixty to seventy percent

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Speaker 1: of the targets were women. But then almost all the

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Speaker 1: cases were going between genders, so it was women trying

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Speaker 1: to kill men, men trying to kill women within the

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Speaker 1: context of some relationship. Always, I think control was at

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Speaker 1: the core of it. You know, sometimes it was romantic,

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Speaker 1: sometimes the motivation seemed to be sexual or possessive. Sometimes

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Speaker 1: it was to do with control of children, though it

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Speaker 1: could have been an adoption conflict. And sometimes there was

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Speaker 1: kind of money mixed in and around there as well,

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Speaker 1: you know, a divorce with money on the table, or

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Speaker 1: maybe some kind of inheritance or idea that money's been

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Speaker 1: stolen from someone as well.

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Speaker 2: And we're talking all over the world. This isn't just

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Speaker 2: kind of in the UK, where you are.

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Speaker 1: All over the world eleven countries. I think we've seen

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Speaker 1: convict in now dozens of countries in terms of where

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Speaker 1: we were disclosing these cases. There were cases in Australia,

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Speaker 1: cases in Switzerland, lots of cases in America, Germany, the UK.

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Speaker 1: I mean, it was truly a kind of global sprinkling

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Speaker 1: of conspiracy to commit murder.

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Speaker 2: Before we jump into you taking control of the kill list,

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Speaker 2: you and Chris, separately as well, tried to go to police,

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Speaker 2: didn't you. How did that go for both of you?

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Speaker 1: I did what any sane person would do is their

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Speaker 1: first thing when receiving these orders and reading those kinds

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Speaker 1: of documents, which is I phoned the police in the

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Speaker 1: UK and I was like, Hey, this is horribly serious,

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Speaker 1: this is very worrying, and they came to my house

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Speaker 1: the middle of COVID. I remember it actually still very vividly.

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Speaker 1: It was the first time that I'd seen anyone in

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Speaker 1: months face to face, and they were very young and

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Speaker 1: very serious. And after they they did admit to me

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Speaker 1: that one of the reasons they were there was to

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Speaker 1: conduct a mental health check on me. They thought I

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Speaker 1: was mad once they were convinced I wasn't, though they

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Speaker 1: did take it seriously, actually, the British police. But the

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Speaker 1: problem was because there weren't any British cases, they basically

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Speaker 1: didn't think it was their problem, right they kind of

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Speaker 1: packaged up the cases, sent them off to Winter Poll,

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Speaker 1: kind of washed their hands of it.

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Speaker 2: And that was that tell me about the decision to

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Speaker 2: actually start contacting people on the list, because that's a

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Speaker 2: big next step. You've basically taken the police work into

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Speaker 2: your own hands.

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Speaker 1: It's a massive next step. But I think it was.

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Speaker 1: It was one of the most important and probably reluctant

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Speaker 1: decisions of my life, of my career. For sure. It

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Speaker 1: was somewhat born out of desperation, if I'm honors with you.

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Speaker 1: So once we disclose these cases to the police, this

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Speaker 1: is a somewhat technical explanation, you have to bear with me,

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Speaker 1: but it's extremely important and it does kind of provide

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Speaker 1: the grounding for what happens. So the British Police said, hey,

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Speaker 1: we're going to send everything off to to POLL. Now,

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Speaker 1: Interpol is this kind of global policing organization that tries

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Speaker 1: to be the glue between all these national police forces

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Speaker 1: around the world, and Interpol said, we're going to send

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Speaker 1: all of these to the local police forces. Now, the

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Speaker 1: problem was that going via the Metropolitan Police to Interpol

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Speaker 1: to another police force around the world, they would have

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Speaker 1: no idea. This receiving police force who we were, we

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Speaker 1: had no idea who they were, and being discollected in

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Speaker 1: that way, they could not do any kind of mental

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Speaker 1: health checks on us. They would have had no idea

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Speaker 1: about whether we were credible, legitimate journalists, crazy people, or

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Speaker 1: anyone else, and we couldn't send them any further information.

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Speaker 1: So when we later on began to work with the

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Speaker 1: police on investigations, it was a very very like two

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Speaker 1: way street. They'd be asking for us for explanations about

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Speaker 1: the technical information about the payment, We'd be sending them

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Speaker 1: updates on the orders. We'd be doing all kinds of things,

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Speaker 1: and we were just convinced that going via Interpol, none

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Speaker 1: of that was likely to happen. And so the only

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Speaker 1: thing that we then thought we could do was to

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Speaker 1: begin to reach out to the people on the list,

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Speaker 1: warn them directly they're in danger, and then work with

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Speaker 1: them in whatever way they wanted to go to the

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Speaker 1: local police, go to the national police, do whatever in

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Speaker 1: order to try and precipitate a law enforcement investigation with

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Speaker 1: them in the middle of it, which.

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Speaker 2: Is easier said than done, because how do you do that.

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Speaker 2: You kind of jump on the phone and what do

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Speaker 2: you say Hi, I'm Carl, I'm a journo, as someone

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Speaker 2: wants to kill you.

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Speaker 1: How did it go exactly? And they just slam the

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Speaker 1: phone down. I think it was a mixture of me

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Speaker 1: stepping into all of this somewhat naively thinking that my

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Speaker 1: kind of good meaning, kind of jawn T Foe like

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Speaker 1: voice on the end of the phone was somehow going

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Speaker 1: to convince these people that I wasn't a scammer, and

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Speaker 1: that was overwhelmingly not the case. The story is so ridiculous.

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Speaker 1: I mean I actually to this day believe the story

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Speaker 1: is so ridiculous. No self respecting scammer would ever would

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Speaker 1: ever choose something so unbelievable. I think they would go

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Speaker 1: for something far more kind of likely sounding than all

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Speaker 1: of that. The other problem, though, was as we began

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Speaker 1: to tackle this kind of challenge of reaching people, one

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Speaker 1: of the things that I was terrified of was that

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Speaker 1: the person that had put them on the kill list

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Speaker 1: would be literally stood right next to them as I

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Speaker 1: was making the call. Right We remember the Stephen or one.

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Speaker 1: He was in the house with Amy, He was there

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Speaker 1: when the police warned her. We thought that was going

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Speaker 1: to be the case again and again there would be

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Speaker 1: there were going to be people very close to the targets.

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Speaker 1: The targets might be completely unawares. What kept me up

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Speaker 1: at night at that point was being worried that my

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Speaker 1: phone call might actually precipitate a murder. You know, they

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Speaker 1: would listen to my warning, they would realize that their

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Speaker 1: kind of window of opportunity was closing, and they would

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Speaker 1: act in that moment, or they'd act. They'd act as

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Speaker 1: soon as they felt they could. So the calls are

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Speaker 1: quite angular. I'd worked with this kind of psychologist. We'd

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Speaker 1: thought a lot about it internally, we'd kind of designed

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Speaker 1: this approach where I was. I came on the phone

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Speaker 1: line and I was like, hey, we're these journalists doing

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Speaker 1: this kind of investigation into scam sites. Probably not actually

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Speaker 1: helpful to mention scam sites in the context of the

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Speaker 1: concerns around me being a scammer, but that's what we

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Speaker 1: decided to do. The idea didn't work, but the idea

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Speaker 1: was that we were trying to arrange a separate follow

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Speaker 1: on call for them at some time whenever they wanted to,

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Speaker 1: wherever they felt safe and alone. That's what we were

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Speaker 1: trying to do. So I could and I thought that

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Speaker 1: was the only way we could really deliver that safely,

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Speaker 1: the warning safely to them.

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Speaker 2: But you can understand, you know, someone on the other

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Speaker 2: side of the phone being like, I don't know what's

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Speaker 2: going on. It's probably easier for me to just ignore

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Speaker 2: this call as even happening. So you didn't have a

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Speaker 2: lot of luck when you were on the phone call,

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Speaker 2: so you decided to track down these people in real

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Speaker 2: life instead. But remembering it's twenty twenty, pretty much the

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Speaker 2: whole world is in lockdown, so it's not like you

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Speaker 2: can just jump on a plane. How did you go

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Speaker 2: about recruiting people in the countries to track down these

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Speaker 2: people in real life?

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Speaker 1: Yeah? I mean I don't think I was legally allowed

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Speaker 1: to leave my flat at that point, let alone jump

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Speaker 1: on a plane. Yeah. It was just the worst circumstances

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Speaker 1: to be trying to do an international investigation requiring face

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Speaker 1: to face contact. I can't think of any other circumstances

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Speaker 1: full of less privy to that. So we reached out,

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Speaker 1: like there's all these brilliant journalist networks that exist around

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Speaker 1: the world for journalists to reach other journalists. That in

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Speaker 1: fact actually wasn't the problem. We could kind of reach

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Speaker 1: these there's all these websites where you can hire stringers

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Speaker 1: and you can hire fixers, and you can hire people

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Speaker 1: on the ground, and we quite quickly found that we

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Speaker 1: could reach kind of predominantly young journalists in these areas

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Speaker 1: that were willing to go out and actually try and

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Speaker 1: reach these people for us. And the idea was to

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Speaker 1: kind of on board them, so to speak, onto an investigation,

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Speaker 1: explain to them what happened, see their kind of mounting

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Speaker 1: horror and surprise as we kind of laid out the investigation,

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Speaker 1: and then work with them to basically on a case

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Speaker 1: by case basis, like design the approach like which quite

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Speaker 1: often meant they would be driving past the house for

401
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Speaker 1: days as we were trying to get a fix on

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Speaker 1: where the person was. And of course, as I said,

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Speaker 1: you know, we're trying to reach them alone, so we're

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00:21:28,952 --> 00:21:30,672
Speaker 1: trying to learn as much about them as we can

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Speaker 1: so that when we do in fact actually make contact,

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Speaker 1: we are doing that in a way which is most

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Speaker 1: likely to be able to reach them safely. Of course,

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Speaker 1: with an actual young journalist, well, with a journalist there,

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Speaker 1: it made it a bit easier actually, because it meant

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Speaker 1: that they could like kind of read the situation, you know,

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Speaker 1: and kind of make kind of judgment calls on the ground.

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Speaker 1: And you know what I still find unbelievable when I

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Speaker 1: listen back, you know, to the podcast. Is the bit

414
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Speaker 1: that makes me more emotional than anything else is in

415
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Speaker 1: one of the early episodes where there's a whole medley

416
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Speaker 1: of all these voices in all these different accents around

417
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Speaker 1: the world. Yes, they all said yes. It was just

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Speaker 1: the bravest thing I can possibly imagine. You know, we

419
00:22:12,712 --> 00:22:16,191
Speaker 1: weren't stepping into these circumstances. They were. They were physically

420
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Speaker 1: stepping into a circumstance. The only thing about which they

421
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Speaker 1: knew was that it was super dangerous.

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Speaker 2: But they wanted to help these people.

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Speaker 1: They wanted to help them. Yeah, Yeah, they wanted to

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Speaker 1: help them, and they were willing just to try. And

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Speaker 1: it was just so moving to me that they agreed

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Speaker 1: to do it. I don't think we had no right

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Speaker 1: to expect that they were going to say yes to

428
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Speaker 1: this kind of assignment. And it's just yeah, to this day,

429
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Speaker 1: I think for all of the kind of darkness and

430
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Speaker 1: gruesomeness of the kill List and as story, the fact

431
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Speaker 1: that there are those shining lights of human bravery as

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00:22:48,111 --> 00:22:49,991
Speaker 1: part of you know, part of the story too. I

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Speaker 1: think it's something that I kind of have flung on

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Speaker 1: to and actually remember kind of more vividly.

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Speaker 2: You're listening to true crime Conversations with me Jimmy Bass.

436
00:23:01,911 --> 00:23:05,471
Speaker 2: I'm speaking with journalist and podcaster Kyl Miller about his

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Speaker 2: podcast kill List. Up next, Kyle tells us about the

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Speaker 2: moment he met Elaina and warned her that someone was

439
00:23:12,512 --> 00:23:18,631
Speaker 2: plotting to have her killed. I want to touch on

440
00:23:18,831 --> 00:23:21,472
Speaker 2: Elna's story, which is a fake name that you gave

441
00:23:21,831 --> 00:23:24,032
Speaker 2: a woman who was on the kill list in Switzerland

442
00:23:24,831 --> 00:23:27,391
Speaker 2: and you saw a hit against her on the list.

443
00:23:28,192 --> 00:23:31,151
Speaker 2: What happened when you told her about it, when you

444
00:23:31,192 --> 00:23:33,392
Speaker 2: said someone wants you to die?

445
00:23:33,752 --> 00:23:37,712
Speaker 1: Well, so Elena was the first person from the kill

446
00:23:37,752 --> 00:23:40,831
Speaker 1: list I saw face to face fire zoom, and that

447
00:23:40,911 --> 00:23:43,271
Speaker 1: was a strange experience because it's kind of like meeting

448
00:23:43,311 --> 00:23:47,231
Speaker 1: a celebrity. I've been staring at her face for weeks

449
00:23:47,232 --> 00:23:50,271
Speaker 1: on ends. And they're always nice photos, by the way,

450
00:23:50,552 --> 00:23:57,792
Speaker 1: they are always these really glitsy, glamorous photos from people's Facebook.

451
00:23:58,151 --> 00:24:01,311
Speaker 2: So people submit photos of the people they want to

452
00:24:01,391 --> 00:24:03,512
Speaker 2: kill well obviously, so the hitman can find them.

453
00:24:04,272 --> 00:24:08,631
Speaker 1: Yeah, they do, and they're always staring back at you

454
00:24:08,752 --> 00:24:14,792
Speaker 1: from the kill list what we compiled with these unknowing eyes, relaxed, happy,

455
00:24:14,992 --> 00:24:17,712
Speaker 1: surrounded by their family. That was when it all became

456
00:24:17,712 --> 00:24:21,392
Speaker 1: emotionally difficult, because they're becoming real people then, and you're

457
00:24:21,431 --> 00:24:24,831
Speaker 1: just staring at these photos just thinking, you know, does

458
00:24:24,831 --> 00:24:27,151
Speaker 1: Elane have any idea about the kind of danger that

459
00:24:27,192 --> 00:24:31,111
Speaker 1: she's in? Finally got her on zoom. It was extremely nervy,

460
00:24:31,232 --> 00:24:34,191
Speaker 1: kind of twenty twenty five minutes, thirty minutes way as

461
00:24:34,232 --> 00:24:36,831
Speaker 1: the local journalist was kind of going around I think

462
00:24:36,871 --> 00:24:39,792
Speaker 1: a kind of block of flats in a suburban Zurich,

463
00:24:40,351 --> 00:24:43,512
Speaker 1: trying to find hers. And finally she comes on the

464
00:24:43,552 --> 00:24:48,831
Speaker 1: zoom call and I like stammer out like probably the nervoest,

465
00:24:49,712 --> 00:24:53,711
Speaker 1: most halting warning that you could possibly imagine. I'd been

466
00:24:53,792 --> 00:24:55,632
Speaker 1: like rehearsing it for weeks.

467
00:24:55,831 --> 00:24:57,631
Speaker 2: I've heard it. It doesn't sound that bad.

468
00:24:58,272 --> 00:25:01,671
Speaker 1: It's pretty bad. And that's after the edit. Believe me,

469
00:25:01,792 --> 00:25:04,871
Speaker 1: there was there was a lot of halting, stammeringness. That

470
00:25:05,111 --> 00:25:06,991
Speaker 1: was the can't hear the.

471
00:25:06,992 --> 00:25:08,952
Speaker 2: Big thing to tell someone.

472
00:25:09,391 --> 00:25:11,831
Speaker 1: Yeah, it was awful. Going into this. I was like,

473
00:25:11,952 --> 00:25:15,631
Speaker 1: the two things to avoid were one Elena having some

474
00:25:15,712 --> 00:25:20,192
Speaker 1: kind of breakdown, to Elena deciding that she knows who

475
00:25:20,192 --> 00:25:22,951
Speaker 1: it is and decided to take matters in her own hands.

476
00:25:22,992 --> 00:25:24,951
Speaker 1: I was like, those are the two dangers. That's what

477
00:25:24,992 --> 00:25:27,951
Speaker 1: we have try and manage. What I had not anticipated

478
00:25:28,351 --> 00:25:31,032
Speaker 1: was that Elena is made a sterner stuff than that.

479
00:25:31,512 --> 00:25:36,151
Speaker 1: Elena took it absolutely brilliantly. There's no easy way of

480
00:25:36,192 --> 00:25:39,352
Speaker 1: really saying this. We've come across some information which might

481
00:25:39,472 --> 00:25:42,472
Speaker 1: mean that someone had put some information regarding you on

482
00:25:42,512 --> 00:25:42,911
Speaker 1: the site.

483
00:25:43,752 --> 00:25:47,952
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm actually not really surprised, really in what way

484
00:25:48,431 --> 00:25:49,952
Speaker 2: I'm having an ugly divorce.

485
00:25:50,911 --> 00:25:54,272
Speaker 1: She didn't even become visibly nervous. In fact, you know,

486
00:25:54,351 --> 00:25:56,231
Speaker 1: I was like trying to convince Elena to kind of

487
00:25:56,351 --> 00:26:00,752
Speaker 1: leave her flat that night. I was like, she thought

488
00:26:00,752 --> 00:26:03,071
Speaker 1: she knew who it was, and I was like, okay,

489
00:26:03,071 --> 00:26:06,071
Speaker 1: he's nearby, leave the flat. Elena didn't even change her

490
00:26:06,071 --> 00:26:09,151
Speaker 1: plan for the evening. She went and met a friend

491
00:26:09,232 --> 00:26:12,032
Speaker 1: of hers who is like next door neighbors with the

492
00:26:12,071 --> 00:26:14,071
Speaker 1: person that she thought had put her on the list.

493
00:26:14,472 --> 00:26:17,751
Speaker 1: She did believe me, this wasn't a story of Elena

494
00:26:18,032 --> 00:26:20,871
Speaker 1: brushing us off and thinking this isn't real It's just

495
00:26:20,871 --> 00:26:25,951
Speaker 1: that Elena is basically tough as old boots and and

496
00:26:26,192 --> 00:26:29,552
Speaker 1: just isn't particularly flappable and certainly wasn't going to change

497
00:26:29,591 --> 00:26:31,151
Speaker 1: her life, particularly as a result.

498
00:26:31,671 --> 00:26:35,272
Speaker 2: Her situation was, you know, an ugly divorce. Her ex

499
00:26:35,311 --> 00:26:38,712
Speaker 2: didn't want her to get money, so he paid this site,

500
00:26:39,192 --> 00:26:41,391
Speaker 2: you know, upwards of thirty three thousand dollars in the

501
00:26:41,512 --> 00:26:46,712
Speaker 2: end to kill her. What was the outcome with that story?

502
00:26:46,752 --> 00:26:47,871
Speaker 2: Did he get arrested?

503
00:26:48,911 --> 00:26:53,271
Speaker 1: Yes, he was arrested. The police then found that he

504
00:26:53,512 --> 00:26:59,991
Speaker 1: was renting a secret flat near to hers, containing weaponry,

505
00:27:00,431 --> 00:27:07,071
Speaker 1: zip ties, lock picks, masks, black bin bags, just horrendous

506
00:27:07,552 --> 00:27:12,272
Speaker 1: like arsenal of equipment. It looks like he was in

507
00:27:12,351 --> 00:27:15,152
Speaker 1: some kind of practical planning stage actually of killing her,

508
00:27:15,391 --> 00:27:19,071
Speaker 1: of trying to kill her himself. He's now convicted and

509
00:27:19,151 --> 00:27:20,191
Speaker 1: is in prison.

510
00:27:20,831 --> 00:27:23,791
Speaker 2: Carl, how did that feel to be the one that

511
00:27:23,871 --> 00:27:26,831
Speaker 2: warned her, to be the one that kind of intercepted

512
00:27:26,871 --> 00:27:27,392
Speaker 2: that for her?

513
00:27:27,992 --> 00:27:30,831
Speaker 1: I mean that was awful. I mean I got recurrent

514
00:27:30,911 --> 00:27:35,032
Speaker 1: nightmares about this for months afterwards. When Elena told me

515
00:27:35,351 --> 00:27:37,792
Speaker 1: that they had found that flat, it was just this

516
00:27:39,391 --> 00:27:43,191
Speaker 1: just a kind of indescribable kind of gut churning sense

517
00:27:43,272 --> 00:27:48,471
Speaker 1: of how dangerous these people could be, and the fact

518
00:27:48,472 --> 00:27:51,471
Speaker 1: that was he I mean, it just begins a kind

519
00:27:51,512 --> 00:27:53,672
Speaker 1: of whole like line of thinking that actually you shouldn't

520
00:27:53,712 --> 00:27:56,952
Speaker 1: really do Was he there when we sent the journalists around?

521
00:27:57,671 --> 00:27:59,911
Speaker 1: You know, like, was he there the next time I

522
00:27:59,952 --> 00:28:03,231
Speaker 1: phoned her? We were tracking his orders, so we were

523
00:28:03,311 --> 00:28:06,232
Speaker 1: kind of intercepting in the days after we met Elee

524
00:28:06,391 --> 00:28:10,431
Speaker 1: in this increasing urgency and more money being paid, and

525
00:28:10,512 --> 00:28:12,711
Speaker 1: over that whole time, I was thinking, you know, was

526
00:28:12,712 --> 00:28:14,911
Speaker 1: he about to do it himself? You know, at any point?

527
00:28:15,032 --> 00:28:17,632
Speaker 1: How close did he become? So yeah, that was really difficult.

528
00:28:17,631 --> 00:28:19,871
Speaker 1: I mean that that might one of the just personally

529
00:28:19,911 --> 00:28:21,792
Speaker 1: for me, one of the kind of lowest like emotionally

530
00:28:21,792 --> 00:28:23,471
Speaker 1: lowest moments of the whole investigation.

531
00:28:24,071 --> 00:28:28,232
Speaker 2: And that's only one name, one woman's story. How did

532
00:28:28,391 --> 00:28:31,392
Speaker 2: this investigation as it started to unfold for you take

533
00:28:31,431 --> 00:28:33,831
Speaker 2: over your life? How much time are you dedicating to this?

534
00:28:35,111 --> 00:28:39,352
Speaker 1: Well? I mean it was very consuming when you're planning

535
00:28:39,752 --> 00:28:43,112
Speaker 1: a kind of to approach someone and tell them something

536
00:28:43,192 --> 00:28:46,352
Speaker 1: like that, it isn't I mean, of course we're having

537
00:28:46,352 --> 00:28:49,352
Speaker 1: to be up at three am, four am to speak

538
00:28:49,352 --> 00:28:51,632
Speaker 1: to someone in Australia or one am for someone in

539
00:28:51,671 --> 00:28:55,271
Speaker 1: Canada in the UK, so it was definitely extremely weird hours.

540
00:28:55,312 --> 00:28:56,992
Speaker 1: But I think more than that is just the way

541
00:28:57,032 --> 00:29:00,712
Speaker 1: it always sits in your kind of peripheral vision, kind

542
00:29:00,712 --> 00:29:03,431
Speaker 1: of like you know, some kind of just just something

543
00:29:03,512 --> 00:29:05,552
Speaker 1: looming over you that you really don't want to do

544
00:29:06,032 --> 00:29:09,112
Speaker 1: and sits there for days or weeks on end. So

545
00:29:09,671 --> 00:29:12,072
Speaker 1: I remember I was kind of walking around the kind

546
00:29:12,072 --> 00:29:14,471
Speaker 1: of you know, a nice garden in the UK and

547
00:29:14,512 --> 00:29:18,911
Speaker 1: my friends. I would just errantly find myself basically thinking

548
00:29:18,952 --> 00:29:22,032
Speaker 1: about the call that I needed to make the next

549
00:29:22,072 --> 00:29:24,832
Speaker 1: morning to someone on the other side of the world.

550
00:29:25,272 --> 00:29:28,832
Speaker 1: So it was very consuming, but it got better, and

551
00:29:29,112 --> 00:29:33,632
Speaker 1: you know, as the investigation developed, we learned how to

552
00:29:33,671 --> 00:29:37,832
Speaker 1: do it, and I think I learned myself how to

553
00:29:38,032 --> 00:29:41,512
Speaker 1: make it all more sustainable and to compartmentalize things better

554
00:29:42,152 --> 00:29:46,312
Speaker 1: and to stop allowing it to kind of consume all

555
00:29:46,312 --> 00:29:47,352
Speaker 1: of my waking moments.

556
00:29:48,152 --> 00:29:51,472
Speaker 2: One of the parts of your investigation I found interesting,

557
00:29:52,072 --> 00:29:56,471
Speaker 2: I was going to say saddening, was the way some

558
00:29:56,512 --> 00:30:00,711
Speaker 2: of the police stations in the different countries responded to

559
00:30:00,832 --> 00:30:03,552
Speaker 2: these people, often women coming into the station and telling

560
00:30:03,552 --> 00:30:06,312
Speaker 2: them about this kill list. I want to use Anna's

561
00:30:06,352 --> 00:30:09,432
Speaker 2: story to kind of tell a little bit of that story,

562
00:30:09,512 --> 00:30:11,751
Speaker 2: because she was a woman that you contacted on the

563
00:30:11,752 --> 00:30:14,751
Speaker 2: Spanish coast via one of these freelance journalists that you

564
00:30:14,952 --> 00:30:17,991
Speaker 2: kind of hired, and she went to the police to

565
00:30:18,032 --> 00:30:20,471
Speaker 2: tell them what had happened. How did they react?

566
00:30:20,792 --> 00:30:24,231
Speaker 1: So, yeah, so she physically went into the police station

567
00:30:24,431 --> 00:30:27,592
Speaker 1: with Esperanza the local journalists and one of the things

568
00:30:27,632 --> 00:30:30,912
Speaker 1: actually we didn't anticipate was how supportive the local journalists

569
00:30:30,911 --> 00:30:33,231
Speaker 1: could be to those people in those crisis moments. And

570
00:30:33,392 --> 00:30:38,272
Speaker 1: Esperanza was absolutely brilliant. She's actually become really good friends

571
00:30:38,312 --> 00:30:40,152
Speaker 1: with that. And now, in fact, Anna invited both me

572
00:30:40,192 --> 00:30:46,432
Speaker 1: and Esperanza to her wedding. Went that's amazing, which which

573
00:30:46,512 --> 00:30:49,152
Speaker 1: is just like one of my kind of most favorite

574
00:30:49,192 --> 00:30:52,312
Speaker 1: memories of all of this. So Esperanza, they both went

575
00:30:52,352 --> 00:30:57,512
Speaker 1: in and sat in a room surrounded by posters kind

576
00:30:57,512 --> 00:31:02,312
Speaker 1: of announcing new campaigns to fight gendered violence. They told

577
00:31:02,312 --> 00:31:06,231
Speaker 1: the police about this case, about how kind of un

578
00:31:06,392 --> 00:31:08,951
Speaker 1: safe kind of Anna felt it was. It was in

579
00:31:08,992 --> 00:31:12,272
Speaker 1: the late evening, in fact, as well, we'd taken all

580
00:31:12,392 --> 00:31:15,072
Speaker 1: day to get hold of Anna, and it was it

581
00:31:15,112 --> 00:31:16,912
Speaker 1: was as the kind of dusk was building. That's when

582
00:31:16,952 --> 00:31:19,551
Speaker 1: finally I managed to get on the call with her

583
00:31:19,552 --> 00:31:21,632
Speaker 1: andes Brands had managed to track her down, and the

584
00:31:21,671 --> 00:31:25,312
Speaker 1: police laughed her out of the police station. I mean

585
00:31:25,911 --> 00:31:28,752
Speaker 1: literally like it's on it, we have it. It's part

586
00:31:28,752 --> 00:31:30,991
Speaker 1: of the podcast is you can hear this kind of

587
00:31:31,512 --> 00:31:35,552
Speaker 1: chortilling in the background as they leave, And sadly that

588
00:31:35,712 --> 00:31:38,432
Speaker 1: wasn't the kind of one off. One of the complexities

589
00:31:38,431 --> 00:31:40,312
Speaker 1: with this story is that the police aren't a single

590
00:31:40,392 --> 00:31:44,232
Speaker 1: character in it. Yeah, like they the police are in

591
00:31:44,872 --> 00:31:49,951
Speaker 1: different times amazing and resourceful and proactive and terrible and

592
00:31:50,032 --> 00:31:54,751
Speaker 1: downright dangerous at others. But we did at that especially

593
00:31:54,792 --> 00:31:58,112
Speaker 1: at that point investigation, we were really struggling to kind

594
00:31:58,112 --> 00:32:01,751
Speaker 1: of overcome this kind of skepticism that police forces were

595
00:32:01,792 --> 00:32:03,872
Speaker 1: having with us around the world. Yeah, it was a

596
00:32:03,911 --> 00:32:06,352
Speaker 1: difficult time to try and convince the police that we

597
00:32:06,352 --> 00:32:11,471
Speaker 1: weren't like mendacious, cynical, headline grabbing kind of journalists. We

598
00:32:11,712 --> 00:32:14,352
Speaker 1: were just genuinely like doing our best to try and

599
00:32:14,832 --> 00:32:20,792
Speaker 1: disclose these cases safely and precipitate effective law enforcement investigations.

600
00:32:21,392 --> 00:32:24,432
Speaker 2: Did you intercept an he kills in Australia And how

601
00:32:24,431 --> 00:32:26,231
Speaker 2: did our authorities react.

602
00:32:26,752 --> 00:32:31,152
Speaker 1: We did in Canberra. It is a woman who tried

603
00:32:31,152 --> 00:32:32,512
Speaker 1: to have her parents killed.

604
00:32:32,832 --> 00:32:33,472
Speaker 2: Oh my god.

605
00:32:33,592 --> 00:32:39,352
Speaker 1: The alleged motivation was for a share of inheritance. We

606
00:32:39,431 --> 00:32:44,632
Speaker 1: did not manage to reach them directly, so our engagement

607
00:32:44,632 --> 00:32:47,712
Speaker 1: in this case was with the police of the Australian

608
00:32:47,752 --> 00:32:53,551
Speaker 1: Capital Territories. We assisted them and they conducted a law

609
00:32:53,592 --> 00:32:55,592
Speaker 1: and this was one of the earliest cases, by the way,

610
00:32:55,632 --> 00:32:58,392
Speaker 1: So this was all happening in like twenty twenty and

611
00:32:58,512 --> 00:33:02,112
Speaker 1: it led to a arrest and then a year's long

612
00:33:02,232 --> 00:33:07,472
Speaker 1: legal battle, which is actually very interesting. So the defense

613
00:33:07,832 --> 00:33:14,312
Speaker 1: were argued for ages that the kill order itself, the

614
00:33:14,352 --> 00:33:19,432
Speaker 1: evidence that we'd submitted was basically hearsay, and the reason

615
00:33:19,472 --> 00:33:21,632
Speaker 1: that they were trying to do that was because we

616
00:33:21,671 --> 00:33:25,191
Speaker 1: could not go into the courtroom and testify. And this

617
00:33:25,272 --> 00:33:27,551
Speaker 1: actually was a general pressure that we were under at

618
00:33:27,552 --> 00:33:32,112
Speaker 1: that point, you know. The very understandably actually, the Australian Police,

619
00:33:32,512 --> 00:33:35,512
Speaker 1: like other police forces around the world, were like, okay, great,

620
00:33:35,512 --> 00:33:38,592
Speaker 1: you've given us this information. Can you please come to court,

621
00:33:39,272 --> 00:33:41,032
Speaker 1: you know, and tell us how you got the information.

622
00:33:41,112 --> 00:33:45,031
Speaker 1: We need you to demonstrate to the jury how you

623
00:33:45,112 --> 00:33:47,711
Speaker 1: acquired these messages from the site. Otherwise it's as a

624
00:33:47,712 --> 00:33:49,792
Speaker 1: word document, you know, with some words written on it. It

625
00:33:49,792 --> 00:33:52,152
Speaker 1: could be anything. We could not do that. We could

626
00:33:52,152 --> 00:33:54,072
Speaker 1: not go into the court, we could not testify because

627
00:33:54,112 --> 00:33:57,632
Speaker 1: what we were having to do was to balance that

628
00:33:57,671 --> 00:34:02,352
Speaker 1: particular case with our access to the website in general.

629
00:34:02,832 --> 00:34:06,032
Speaker 1: We were terrified that basically the first time we stept

630
00:34:06,032 --> 00:34:09,272
Speaker 1: foot in court, it will be obviously publicly reported by

631
00:34:09,272 --> 00:34:12,672
Speaker 1: the press. It was an open court, and you were

632
00:34:12,552 --> 00:34:14,752
Speaker 1: the person running the site could see that it was

633
00:34:14,792 --> 00:34:17,272
Speaker 1: one Google away, and then he could see that we're

634
00:34:17,272 --> 00:34:19,551
Speaker 1: in the middle of the site and he could then

635
00:34:19,551 --> 00:34:23,471
Speaker 1: shut us out. So we thought, we have to balance

636
00:34:23,632 --> 00:34:26,632
Speaker 1: all these future cases and all these other warnings with

637
00:34:26,872 --> 00:34:29,392
Speaker 1: not being able to assist in the prosecution of any

638
00:34:29,431 --> 00:34:34,472
Speaker 1: individual case. And that's what led to this very long

639
00:34:34,632 --> 00:34:39,152
Speaker 1: kind of legal interplay that happened in Canberra very recently.

640
00:34:39,152 --> 00:34:43,792
Speaker 1: A very senior judicial figure finally ruled to say that

641
00:34:44,112 --> 00:34:46,191
Speaker 1: our evidence was admissible in the.

642
00:34:46,152 --> 00:34:48,232
Speaker 2: Case, Oh my gosh.

643
00:34:48,272 --> 00:34:53,031
Speaker 1: And then immediately after that the perpetrator changed her plea.

644
00:34:53,632 --> 00:34:56,232
Speaker 2: There was one request on the kill list that was

645
00:34:56,232 --> 00:34:58,392
Speaker 2: a little bit different. Can you tell us about the

646
00:34:58,551 --> 00:35:02,072
Speaker 2: kidnapping torture plot that was ordered on an American woman

647
00:35:02,272 --> 00:35:03,032
Speaker 2: named Jennifer.

648
00:35:03,431 --> 00:35:06,591
Speaker 1: Jennifer, Yes, well, I mean this one was horrendous in

649
00:35:06,632 --> 00:35:09,312
Speaker 1: the sense that it wasn't trying to have Jennifer killed.

650
00:35:10,592 --> 00:35:16,471
Speaker 1: So the order was for Jennifer to be kidnapped forcibly

651
00:35:16,511 --> 00:35:23,031
Speaker 1: addicted to heroin, filmed, and then released. There was a

652
00:35:23,072 --> 00:35:27,592
Speaker 1: bonus structure associated with this, so there was a series

653
00:35:27,632 --> 00:35:31,872
Speaker 1: of like sub awards and money attached to each of

654
00:35:31,911 --> 00:35:35,792
Speaker 1: them being fulfilled. The dog was to be beaten or killed,

655
00:35:35,832 --> 00:35:39,712
Speaker 1: other things like that. It was probably the most graphic

656
00:35:40,672 --> 00:35:44,072
Speaker 1: order I ever read. It also had the largest amount

657
00:35:44,112 --> 00:35:47,632
Speaker 1: of money attached to it, So about ninety thousand dollars

658
00:35:48,272 --> 00:35:51,112
Speaker 1: payment had been sent for this. Yeah, and it was

659
00:35:51,712 --> 00:35:56,512
Speaker 1: for a woman called Jennifer in Spokane County at Washington

660
00:35:56,551 --> 00:35:59,071
Speaker 1: State to be to have that all done to her.

661
00:35:59,991 --> 00:36:02,872
Speaker 2: It kind of became common that you would approach these

662
00:36:03,431 --> 00:36:06,872
Speaker 2: often women, and say that you're on this, and they

663
00:36:06,872 --> 00:36:09,352
Speaker 2: would know immediately who it was. Did that shock.

664
00:36:09,152 --> 00:36:12,792
Speaker 1: You, No, I don't think it did shock me. My

665
00:36:12,951 --> 00:36:17,392
Speaker 1: working assumption was for most people to have someone else

666
00:36:17,471 --> 00:36:22,072
Speaker 1: want them to be killed, that would make some kind

667
00:36:22,112 --> 00:36:26,552
Speaker 1: of contextual sense about that slotted into other things happening

668
00:36:26,592 --> 00:36:29,992
Speaker 1: in their lives now, and Jennifer is a good example here.

669
00:36:30,471 --> 00:36:33,112
Speaker 1: It was often surprising and it made sense at the

670
00:36:33,152 --> 00:36:38,272
Speaker 1: same time. So the escalation was surprising. The fact that

671
00:36:38,312 --> 00:36:41,632
Speaker 1: they had were capable of having them her or killed

672
00:36:41,632 --> 00:36:43,511
Speaker 1: in the way that they were trying to was surprising,

673
00:36:43,872 --> 00:36:47,752
Speaker 1: But it wasn't surprising that someone was trying to do

674
00:36:47,872 --> 00:36:51,991
Speaker 1: them harm or someone was trying to control them. So

675
00:36:53,152 --> 00:36:58,511
Speaker 1: Jennifer immediately knew that her estranged husband, Ron, you know,

676
00:36:58,592 --> 00:37:02,792
Speaker 1: who was a eminent neonatologist, you know, and a senior

677
00:37:02,872 --> 00:37:06,432
Speaker 1: kind of clinical figure within one of the local hospitals,

678
00:37:06,712 --> 00:37:10,192
Speaker 1: was behind that order. But then you know, Jennifer was

679
00:37:10,232 --> 00:37:13,471
Speaker 1: in the middle of leaving Ron, you know, Ron was

680
00:37:15,112 --> 00:37:19,192
Speaker 1: leaving GPS trackers in her car, spiking her drink, had

681
00:37:19,352 --> 00:37:23,312
Speaker 1: started relationships with a series of other women, had been

682
00:37:23,352 --> 00:37:25,751
Speaker 1: physically threatening her, you know, so it kind of made

683
00:37:25,792 --> 00:37:28,592
Speaker 1: sense to her to have this warning arrived.

684
00:37:29,272 --> 00:37:32,912
Speaker 2: The police obviously got involved with that case, and Ron

685
00:37:33,232 --> 00:37:37,751
Speaker 2: was arrested in the end. How did that change things?

686
00:37:37,792 --> 00:37:40,792
Speaker 2: Because the FBI kind of started to get more involved

687
00:37:40,951 --> 00:37:42,511
Speaker 2: in your investigation, didn't they?

688
00:37:43,632 --> 00:37:45,272
Speaker 1: It did? I mean, it changed everything. I mean, that

689
00:37:45,592 --> 00:37:49,192
Speaker 1: was the case that saw this this step change in

690
00:37:49,352 --> 00:37:53,671
Speaker 1: like law enforcement emphasis. So until then, you know, we'd

691
00:37:53,672 --> 00:37:57,152
Speaker 1: been talking to police forces and kind of trying to

692
00:37:57,152 --> 00:38:00,151
Speaker 1: convince them, and sometimes it was working and sometimes it wasn't.

693
00:38:00,272 --> 00:38:04,031
Speaker 1: But we would be giving over this technical information to

694
00:38:04,312 --> 00:38:07,152
Speaker 1: someone in the local police force, and then kind of

695
00:38:07,192 --> 00:38:09,591
Speaker 1: there'd be these weeks would go by and like no

696
00:38:09,632 --> 00:38:12,832
Speaker 1: one would even be asking us any questions, and we

697
00:38:12,832 --> 00:38:15,152
Speaker 1: were like, this isn't good, you know. I mean, if

698
00:38:15,192 --> 00:38:19,312
Speaker 1: you're sending like bitcoin wallet transferred data, you kind of

699
00:38:19,352 --> 00:38:21,872
Speaker 1: expect there's going to be some follow up questions. You

700
00:38:21,951 --> 00:38:24,392
Speaker 1: want there to be follow up questions. If no one's

701
00:38:24,392 --> 00:38:28,152
Speaker 1: asking you followup questions, they're not investigating it. But with Jennifer,

702
00:38:28,872 --> 00:38:32,111
Speaker 1: all of that suddenly changed. So so Ron flew to

703
00:38:32,352 --> 00:38:36,312
Speaker 1: Mexico as an alibi, we think in the run up

704
00:38:36,471 --> 00:38:40,752
Speaker 1: to this kidnapping happening, and when he landed, he obviously

705
00:38:40,792 --> 00:38:43,791
Speaker 1: expected this all to be in motion. What it wasn't

706
00:38:43,792 --> 00:38:49,031
Speaker 1: expecting was eleven FBI agents scattered across the international airport,

707
00:38:49,672 --> 00:38:53,071
Speaker 1: you know, and another fifteen combing his house, you know,

708
00:38:53,152 --> 00:38:57,352
Speaker 1: And suddenly like there's there's a giant FBI investigation like

709
00:38:57,471 --> 00:39:00,792
Speaker 1: unfolding across the state, and we can hear the interviews.

710
00:39:01,232 --> 00:39:03,872
Speaker 1: You know, they've got a strategy that they've got away

711
00:39:04,471 --> 00:39:08,471
Speaker 1: of kind of beginning to get the information from him

712
00:39:08,471 --> 00:39:11,471
Speaker 1: that they need and to us, it was this dramatic

713
00:39:11,632 --> 00:39:14,352
Speaker 1: change in how law enforcement was treating all of this,

714
00:39:14,872 --> 00:39:16,551
Speaker 1: a change by the way that we saw all the

715
00:39:16,592 --> 00:39:19,751
Speaker 1: way through. So the very latest case that we've seen

716
00:39:19,911 --> 00:39:22,872
Speaker 1: where we're not involved, you know for one whey or another,

717
00:39:22,911 --> 00:39:25,752
Speaker 1: the case from the kill list, are still seeing prosecutions.

718
00:39:26,232 --> 00:39:30,832
Speaker 1: That one involved five different law enforcement organizations and the

719
00:39:31,112 --> 00:39:34,072
Speaker 1: Home Secretary of Austria, the Home Mistry of Austria. Wow,

720
00:39:34,112 --> 00:39:36,471
Speaker 1: So we've like, it's just a completely different world now

721
00:39:36,511 --> 00:39:39,431
Speaker 1: in terms of how seriously this is being taken to

722
00:39:40,072 --> 00:39:42,591
Speaker 1: how it was in those early days of twenty twenty.

723
00:39:42,872 --> 00:39:45,712
Speaker 2: When the FBI, because after Jennifer's case they started to

724
00:39:45,712 --> 00:39:48,151
Speaker 2: take on more of the names and investigate more of

725
00:39:48,232 --> 00:39:49,872
Speaker 2: the kind of cases and take it out of your

726
00:39:49,911 --> 00:39:50,951
Speaker 2: hands quite a lot.

727
00:39:51,272 --> 00:39:51,952
Speaker 1: Was that a relief?

728
00:39:52,072 --> 00:39:54,112
Speaker 2: Was that frustrating for you because you had this great

729
00:39:54,312 --> 00:39:56,272
Speaker 2: story that you were on. Oh were you happy to

730
00:39:56,272 --> 00:39:57,272
Speaker 2: step back at that point?

731
00:39:57,511 --> 00:40:00,712
Speaker 1: Oh? It was an enormous relief. We wanted them to

732
00:40:00,712 --> 00:40:02,832
Speaker 1: do it. I mean, you know they took all the cases.

733
00:40:03,712 --> 00:40:06,312
Speaker 1: So you know, they were the first law enforcement agents

734
00:40:06,352 --> 00:40:09,911
Speaker 1: see that looked at the whole thing from a global perspective.

735
00:40:10,471 --> 00:40:13,392
Speaker 1: They weren't just interested in the one case, and they

736
00:40:13,392 --> 00:40:16,231
Speaker 1: weren't just trying to pressure us to testify in one

737
00:40:16,312 --> 00:40:19,832
Speaker 1: case to jeopardize all the others. They saw the whole thing,

738
00:40:20,352 --> 00:40:23,431
Speaker 1: and they realized how serious it was. And not only

739
00:40:23,471 --> 00:40:27,151
Speaker 1: did they agree to start investigating the American case, they

740
00:40:27,192 --> 00:40:30,872
Speaker 1: also agreed to vouch for us when it came to

741
00:40:31,672 --> 00:40:35,352
Speaker 1: talking to police. I mean, honestly, like, I don't know

742
00:40:35,431 --> 00:40:37,792
Speaker 1: if people are going to believe this or whatever, but

743
00:40:39,112 --> 00:40:41,031
Speaker 1: during the whole time of all of this twenty twenty

744
00:40:41,431 --> 00:40:44,071
Speaker 1: twenty one, twenty twenty two, we are I'm genuinely not

745
00:40:44,152 --> 00:40:47,672
Speaker 1: thinking as a podcast or as a storyteller or as

746
00:40:47,672 --> 00:40:51,752
Speaker 1: a journalist. We're recording everything we're doing, but what we're

747
00:40:51,792 --> 00:40:55,632
Speaker 1: trying to do is just handle this information in whatever

748
00:40:55,672 --> 00:41:00,071
Speaker 1: way is the safest, genuinely, so, like it was, I

749
00:41:00,112 --> 00:41:03,392
Speaker 1: loved the idea that the FBI was getting involved in

750
00:41:03,392 --> 00:41:05,471
Speaker 1: the way they did and taking the beginning to take

751
00:41:05,511 --> 00:41:08,471
Speaker 1: with responsibility away from us. In fact, actually my key

752
00:41:08,471 --> 00:41:11,872
Speaker 1: frustration was they wouldn't do more of that. So what

753
00:41:11,911 --> 00:41:13,832
Speaker 1: we were trying to convince them to also do was

754
00:41:13,832 --> 00:41:17,392
Speaker 1: actually to break into the site itself. We were still

755
00:41:17,431 --> 00:41:19,111
Speaker 1: the only people that were doing that bit, So we

756
00:41:19,112 --> 00:41:22,312
Speaker 1: were still intercepting the messages, packaging them up, and then

757
00:41:22,632 --> 00:41:25,192
Speaker 1: tracing the money and then sending over to the FBI.

758
00:41:25,632 --> 00:41:28,431
Speaker 1: And I always felt, and that went on for years,

759
00:41:29,112 --> 00:41:32,032
Speaker 1: I could not get them or any other police force

760
00:41:32,072 --> 00:41:34,471
Speaker 1: to do that bit. And I always felt that was

761
00:41:34,551 --> 00:41:38,752
Speaker 1: so tenuous because without a police force breaking into the site,

762
00:41:38,991 --> 00:41:41,512
Speaker 1: I always felt that our you know, we were stepping

763
00:41:41,551 --> 00:41:43,912
Speaker 1: on eggshells. Our kind of access was kind of hanging

764
00:41:43,951 --> 00:41:46,872
Speaker 1: by a thread, you know, and that really to make

765
00:41:46,911 --> 00:41:49,992
Speaker 1: all of this safe, you know, that needed to happen,

766
00:41:50,072 --> 00:41:51,792
Speaker 1: and we needed to step away completely.

767
00:41:54,192 --> 00:41:56,872
Speaker 2: After the break, we learn what happened when Kyl, his

768
00:41:57,112 --> 00:42:00,792
Speaker 2: team and the police decided to go after Eura, the

769
00:42:00,872 --> 00:42:09,392
Speaker 2: mysterious figure running the site. You've mentioned that the administrator

770
00:42:09,471 --> 00:42:11,872
Speaker 2: or the person behind the site was someone who called

771
00:42:11,872 --> 00:42:16,832
Speaker 2: themselves Eura, And you did try and track this Eura down.

772
00:42:17,272 --> 00:42:20,511
Speaker 2: What did you find out about the personal people behind it?

773
00:42:20,752 --> 00:42:23,551
Speaker 1: Yes, we did. I mean we decided that that was

774
00:42:23,592 --> 00:42:26,511
Speaker 1: the only way actually for us to get rid of

775
00:42:26,551 --> 00:42:30,232
Speaker 1: the responsibility of the kill lists. So we decided that,

776
00:42:30,312 --> 00:42:34,072
Speaker 1: you know, okay, if we need to kind of try

777
00:42:34,112 --> 00:42:36,952
Speaker 1: and gather as much information to basically lead the FBI

778
00:42:37,031 --> 00:42:39,791
Speaker 1: to Era, because then that we thought, maybe they'll arrest

779
00:42:39,872 --> 00:42:42,272
Speaker 1: him and then they'll break into the site, and then

780
00:42:42,312 --> 00:42:45,191
Speaker 1: we can finally stop doing this. By this point, by

781
00:42:45,232 --> 00:42:47,952
Speaker 1: the way, you know, the kind of gut wrenching terror

782
00:42:48,031 --> 00:42:50,792
Speaker 1: of twenty twenty is kind of transformed into a kind

783
00:42:50,792 --> 00:42:54,952
Speaker 1: of real long term fatigue. I mean, by like twenty

784
00:42:54,991 --> 00:42:58,872
Speaker 1: twenty two into twenty twenty three, we are very very

785
00:42:58,911 --> 00:43:02,832
Speaker 1: tired of doing this. Like it's become this kind of

786
00:43:02,911 --> 00:43:10,911
Speaker 1: drum beat of flashes of scary, gruesome incidents scenarios, and

787
00:43:11,511 --> 00:43:15,111
Speaker 1: it just wasn't something that we felt like we need

788
00:43:15,152 --> 00:43:17,911
Speaker 1: we could be doing forever. We got very tired, we

789
00:43:17,991 --> 00:43:20,631
Speaker 1: got very stretched. We needed to stop doing it. We

790
00:43:20,911 --> 00:43:22,951
Speaker 1: tried to learn as much as we could about euro

791
00:43:23,232 --> 00:43:27,312
Speaker 1: He's someone that we managed to learn quite a lot about.

792
00:43:27,672 --> 00:43:30,832
Speaker 1: We were very confident it was from Romania. We were

793
00:43:30,872 --> 00:43:35,632
Speaker 1: confident that he was a financially motivated scammer. We thought

794
00:43:36,232 --> 00:43:39,192
Speaker 1: that he was under the protection of the Russian state

795
00:43:40,192 --> 00:43:44,591
Speaker 1: very like loosely, which is, and we thought we identified

796
00:43:44,632 --> 00:43:47,832
Speaker 1: some members of his circle actually by name and by address.

797
00:43:47,911 --> 00:43:50,872
Speaker 1: So we managed to uncover some information which kind of

798
00:43:50,872 --> 00:43:54,352
Speaker 1: pointed towards a couple of individuals in Romania who were

799
00:43:54,352 --> 00:43:57,312
Speaker 1: associated with the wallets that he was using to get

800
00:43:57,352 --> 00:44:01,711
Speaker 1: the money out of the marketplace of the site. Yeah,

801
00:44:01,752 --> 00:44:06,591
Speaker 1: so that together was we turned into a package. And

802
00:44:06,592 --> 00:44:08,471
Speaker 1: then I kind of merreadly flew on over to New

803
00:44:08,551 --> 00:44:12,471
Speaker 1: York then met the FBI rather odd location for a

804
00:44:12,511 --> 00:44:14,591
Speaker 1: secret meeting. It was above Times.

805
00:44:14,312 --> 00:44:17,911
Speaker 2: Square, hiding in plain sight.

806
00:44:18,832 --> 00:44:21,112
Speaker 1: Indeed, Yeah, it was very odd in this kind of restaurant,

807
00:44:21,152 --> 00:44:24,151
Speaker 1: like surrounded by literally thousands of tourists all around us.

808
00:44:24,471 --> 00:44:26,591
Speaker 1: As I was trying to kind of lay out the

809
00:44:26,592 --> 00:44:29,312
Speaker 1: information that we had and then try to do what

810
00:44:29,632 --> 00:44:32,592
Speaker 1: we could to support the FBI basically going after Europe

811
00:44:32,592 --> 00:44:34,911
Speaker 1: and ultimately wrestling control of the site away from him.

812
00:44:35,511 --> 00:44:38,631
Speaker 2: Or they did do a massive raid in Romania in

813
00:44:38,991 --> 00:44:42,112
Speaker 2: around April twenty twenty two. Did that make a difference,

814
00:44:42,152 --> 00:44:44,991
Speaker 2: did do anything to the site? Was Eura arrested?

815
00:44:45,352 --> 00:44:48,912
Speaker 1: We do not know, if absolutely for certain, whether Eura

816
00:44:49,112 --> 00:44:51,671
Speaker 1: was part of any of this. Like we know it

817
00:44:51,792 --> 00:44:55,312
Speaker 1: was the same location in Romania that we were looking

818
00:44:55,352 --> 00:44:58,551
Speaker 1: at in part, and we knew that it at the

819
00:44:58,592 --> 00:45:01,272
Speaker 1: site that we were looking at began to change immediately

820
00:45:01,352 --> 00:45:04,671
Speaker 1: after all of this happened. So we began to see

821
00:45:04,712 --> 00:45:08,912
Speaker 1: like this, like technical rum around on the site. People

822
00:45:09,072 --> 00:45:13,432
Speaker 1: kept getting kind of moved around, They try to hire

823
00:45:13,511 --> 00:45:16,592
Speaker 1: people in quickly. It's all very confused, if I'm honest

824
00:45:16,632 --> 00:45:20,511
Speaker 1: with you. We never saw any court cases emerge. But

825
00:45:20,632 --> 00:45:23,911
Speaker 1: then by the end of that year, we finally were

826
00:45:23,951 --> 00:45:27,111
Speaker 1: locked out of the site, so we finally could see

827
00:45:27,112 --> 00:45:29,792
Speaker 1: no more messages. I think it was New Year's Eve

828
00:45:30,392 --> 00:45:33,552
Speaker 1: into yeah, into New Year's Day of that year. Finally

829
00:45:33,752 --> 00:45:34,872
Speaker 1: it all stopped.

830
00:45:35,672 --> 00:45:39,031
Speaker 2: So this is since then has has stopped for you?

831
00:45:39,272 --> 00:45:41,951
Speaker 2: Are you still investigating the kill list or are you

832
00:45:42,031 --> 00:45:45,312
Speaker 2: now just kind of it's in the police's hands.

833
00:45:45,872 --> 00:45:47,912
Speaker 1: Well, yeah, and I think it is in the police's hands.

834
00:45:47,951 --> 00:45:50,912
Speaker 1: So for months actually after that, I mean, it really

835
00:45:50,951 --> 00:45:52,712
Speaker 1: was a kind of an end that didn't feel like

836
00:45:52,752 --> 00:45:56,111
Speaker 1: an ending, if I'm honest, it was very dissatisfying. You know,

837
00:45:56,152 --> 00:45:58,552
Speaker 1: we were locked out, We didn't know what had happened,

838
00:45:58,911 --> 00:46:00,752
Speaker 1: We didn't know who had done what, We didn't know

839
00:46:00,792 --> 00:46:04,512
Speaker 1: if Europe was free or in prison, and we didn't

840
00:46:04,551 --> 00:46:07,911
Speaker 1: know whether the people on the keill list were being protected,

841
00:46:08,752 --> 00:46:12,431
Speaker 1: and that, you know, made me feel that very impotent,

842
00:46:12,911 --> 00:46:15,272
Speaker 1: like very unable to help. And for all the kind

843
00:46:15,312 --> 00:46:18,191
Speaker 1: of you know, the difficulty of the killers, the responsibility

844
00:46:18,192 --> 00:46:21,232
Speaker 1: of it, it was also like, you know, enormously meaningful

845
00:46:21,272 --> 00:46:23,232
Speaker 1: to be doing this. I mean, I was sure, from

846
00:46:23,272 --> 00:46:24,551
Speaker 1: the very beginning to the very end of the whole

847
00:46:24,592 --> 00:46:26,792
Speaker 1: thing the most meaningful thing I'd ever do in my life.

848
00:46:27,392 --> 00:46:29,792
Speaker 1: But then right at the very end of all of this,

849
00:46:30,272 --> 00:46:33,271
Speaker 1: the best news story I ever saw wasn't actually the raid.

850
00:46:33,991 --> 00:46:39,352
Speaker 1: It was another prosecution and another conviction that looked exactly

851
00:46:39,511 --> 00:46:44,592
Speaker 1: like ours. It was the same evidence, the same bitcoin,

852
00:46:44,712 --> 00:46:47,872
Speaker 1: tracing the same kind of perpetray to the same site.

853
00:46:47,911 --> 00:46:50,431
Speaker 1: The only difference was it had nothing to do with us.

854
00:46:51,152 --> 00:46:53,431
Speaker 1: You know, we hadn't seen any of the information. We

855
00:46:53,471 --> 00:46:56,272
Speaker 1: hadn't seen the kill orders, you know, we had never

856
00:46:56,312 --> 00:46:58,752
Speaker 1: passed any of that over to the police. And then

857
00:46:58,792 --> 00:47:02,112
Speaker 1: we got an email from the police basically saying about

858
00:47:02,112 --> 00:47:04,951
Speaker 1: that case, Hey, we hope you saw this, and we

859
00:47:05,031 --> 00:47:07,911
Speaker 1: hope that you know that, like, you know, it was

860
00:47:07,951 --> 00:47:09,552
Speaker 1: kind of linked to the work that you'd been doing,

861
00:47:10,072 --> 00:47:12,991
Speaker 1: and so I think without in so many words, that

862
00:47:13,112 --> 00:47:15,471
Speaker 1: was the police telling us that they had broken into

863
00:47:15,471 --> 00:47:17,392
Speaker 1: the site and they were then running it, and that

864
00:47:17,511 --> 00:47:21,792
Speaker 1: meant that I and you know, Caroline and the other producers,

865
00:47:21,792 --> 00:47:23,312
Speaker 1: that we work on this for so long, we could

866
00:47:23,352 --> 00:47:26,152
Speaker 1: kind of like walk away, I think, with some sense

867
00:47:26,152 --> 00:47:29,031
Speaker 1: of closure, but not a full sense of closure. This

868
00:47:29,072 --> 00:47:31,991
Speaker 1: will never feel completely ended for me because so many

869
00:47:32,031 --> 00:47:33,671
Speaker 1: of the people on the kill list never saw any

870
00:47:33,712 --> 00:47:37,352
Speaker 1: of those convictions or prosecutions. Like most people's lives to

871
00:47:37,352 --> 00:47:39,991
Speaker 1: continue without any of that kind of ending for them.

872
00:47:40,352 --> 00:47:42,511
Speaker 1: But at least I felt that we didn't hold the

873
00:47:42,551 --> 00:47:45,792
Speaker 1: kill list anymore, but someone responsible did.

874
00:47:46,632 --> 00:47:51,071
Speaker 2: So this website is still up, it's still operating.

875
00:47:51,272 --> 00:47:53,071
Speaker 1: Well yeah, I mean I don't check every day, so

876
00:47:53,272 --> 00:47:56,312
Speaker 1: I couldn't tell you if the website's still there right now,

877
00:47:56,352 --> 00:47:58,951
Speaker 1: but yeah, last time I checked, it's still there. It's

878
00:47:58,991 --> 00:48:01,991
Speaker 1: still operating, it's still accessible. It's not us, by the way,

879
00:48:01,991 --> 00:48:03,551
Speaker 1: breaking the news that police saw in it. This has

880
00:48:03,551 --> 00:48:06,192
Speaker 1: already come out in court documents, it's already been reported.

881
00:48:06,672 --> 00:48:10,352
Speaker 1: But yes, I believe that the raids in Romania likely

882
00:48:10,392 --> 00:48:13,471
Speaker 1: scooped up some members of that gang, and I think

883
00:48:13,511 --> 00:48:17,072
Speaker 1: we haven't seen any convictions so I think something then happened,

884
00:48:17,112 --> 00:48:20,312
Speaker 1: some agreement happens, so that either they're running it for

885
00:48:20,431 --> 00:48:23,392
Speaker 1: the police or the police are running it directly themselves.

886
00:48:23,832 --> 00:48:25,472
Speaker 1: But they are now in the middle of the market

887
00:48:25,511 --> 00:48:26,231
Speaker 1: one way or the other.

888
00:48:26,832 --> 00:48:29,392
Speaker 2: Something I keep thinking about is this was one website

889
00:48:29,471 --> 00:48:33,471
Speaker 2: or one interface that people could find. Are they more

890
00:48:33,471 --> 00:48:36,352
Speaker 2: out there? Are there is this happening over and over

891
00:48:36,392 --> 00:48:38,191
Speaker 2: and over again, or do you think that this kind

892
00:48:38,232 --> 00:48:39,312
Speaker 2: of site had the monopoly.

893
00:48:39,911 --> 00:48:44,832
Speaker 1: No, there are plenty of others. We know this because Eura,

894
00:48:45,152 --> 00:48:48,471
Speaker 1: who is nothing if not a very talented and resourceful

895
00:48:48,551 --> 00:48:51,671
Speaker 1: digital marketer, has built and this is going to sound

896
00:48:51,752 --> 00:48:55,832
Speaker 1: very odd, a hit man for higher Comparison site. Oh

897
00:48:55,872 --> 00:48:59,111
Speaker 1: my gosh on the light net. So he's actually built

898
00:48:59,112 --> 00:49:02,832
Speaker 1: a funnel which begins with him hacking Google. It turns

899
00:49:02,832 --> 00:49:05,431
Speaker 1: out that people looking for a hit man go to

900
00:49:05,832 --> 00:49:08,631
Speaker 1: Google to find one. They google how to hire a

901
00:49:08,632 --> 00:49:10,951
Speaker 1: fit hit man, And right at the very top of

902
00:49:10,991 --> 00:49:14,392
Speaker 1: the search rankings for years was his hitman for high

903
00:49:14,392 --> 00:49:17,312
Speaker 1: Comparison site. And he would point to all the other

904
00:49:17,392 --> 00:49:22,272
Speaker 1: sites that existed, a dozen others, and say they're all shams,

905
00:49:22,392 --> 00:49:25,591
Speaker 1: they're all fakes. The only real deals are and he

906
00:49:25,712 --> 00:49:27,911
Speaker 1: point to his own. He actually was running a couple

907
00:49:27,991 --> 00:49:29,792
Speaker 1: of them, So we often talk about this as a

908
00:49:29,832 --> 00:49:32,631
Speaker 1: single site, like more realistically, it's actually a series of

909
00:49:32,672 --> 00:49:36,151
Speaker 1: sights with that kind of recycling brands amongst themselves. It's

910
00:49:36,152 --> 00:49:38,392
Speaker 1: a bit more chourney than that. But yeah, those were

911
00:49:38,392 --> 00:49:40,672
Speaker 1: the sites, and then the hit Man for High Comparison

912
00:49:40,712 --> 00:49:45,072
Speaker 1: site would also offer you actually some quite useful cybersecurity advice,

913
00:49:45,511 --> 00:49:48,352
Speaker 1: how to get onto the dark net, how to download

914
00:49:48,352 --> 00:49:50,911
Speaker 1: the specialist browser that you needed, and so on. And

915
00:49:50,951 --> 00:49:53,511
Speaker 1: it was from there that he then dragged people down

916
00:49:53,592 --> 00:49:55,872
Speaker 1: actually into those sites so that he could scan them.

917
00:49:56,192 --> 00:49:58,792
Speaker 1: But actually, and in an episode that hasn't come out yet,

918
00:49:59,272 --> 00:50:01,151
Speaker 1: we're going to look at another hit Man of Higher

919
00:50:01,192 --> 00:50:05,792
Speaker 1: Comparison site and actually interview someone a bit like Eura.

920
00:50:06,352 --> 00:50:08,992
Speaker 2: Will definitely be tuning in for that because this world

921
00:50:09,072 --> 00:50:10,911
Speaker 2: is fascinating and terrifying.

922
00:50:11,072 --> 00:50:11,991
Speaker 1: What has it taught you.

923
00:50:13,592 --> 00:50:16,431
Speaker 2: Being a part of this kind of world and seeing

924
00:50:16,951 --> 00:50:20,512
Speaker 2: what normal people are willing to do to other people

925
00:50:20,551 --> 00:50:21,272
Speaker 2: in their lives.

926
00:50:21,632 --> 00:50:26,912
Speaker 1: I mean, there is something definitely very chilling about the

927
00:50:26,951 --> 00:50:33,431
Speaker 1: capacity for some seemingly normal people to kind of reconcile

928
00:50:33,471 --> 00:50:38,111
Speaker 1: themselves with having someone else killed in secret and not

929
00:50:38,152 --> 00:50:41,751
Speaker 1: just anyone, someone very close to them, someone that has

930
00:50:41,832 --> 00:50:45,432
Speaker 1: been very close to them, like someone that they loved

931
00:50:45,872 --> 00:50:49,551
Speaker 1: or loved and maybe that loved them. And for all

932
00:50:49,592 --> 00:50:51,951
Speaker 1: of that to happen without often the kind of this

933
00:50:52,152 --> 00:50:55,872
Speaker 1: veneer of respectability and normality being broken. So all of

934
00:50:55,911 --> 00:50:59,352
Speaker 1: this kind of in the messages that we saw, this

935
00:50:59,511 --> 00:51:04,431
Speaker 1: kind of tumultuous, churning, horrible, grotesque wave happening kind of

936
00:51:04,511 --> 00:51:07,592
Speaker 1: under often lives which, as I said, on the surface,

937
00:51:07,872 --> 00:51:12,711
Speaker 1: you know, appear very normal. That's definitely there, that's definitely there.

938
00:51:13,192 --> 00:51:16,872
Speaker 1: Is there is something that looking at the kill lists

939
00:51:17,712 --> 00:51:23,792
Speaker 1: brings you towards that is deeply, profoundly unsettling and scary.

940
00:51:24,792 --> 00:51:29,152
Speaker 1: On the other hand, it is also stories of resilience

941
00:51:29,192 --> 00:51:33,832
Speaker 1: and recovery and bravery, you know, those journalists again doing

942
00:51:33,872 --> 00:51:36,471
Speaker 1: what they did. I think, you know, it is also

943
00:51:36,511 --> 00:51:39,632
Speaker 1: a kind of a story about how journalism, especially in

944
00:51:39,632 --> 00:51:42,872
Speaker 1: an age where we poor journalists are getting pulled into

945
00:51:42,872 --> 00:51:46,152
Speaker 1: all kinds of politics and all kinds of suspicion, you know,

946
00:51:46,192 --> 00:51:48,832
Speaker 1: and often cynicism. I think it is a story about

947
00:51:48,832 --> 00:51:51,792
Speaker 1: how journalism can still be important. Not to blow my

948
00:51:51,832 --> 00:51:53,792
Speaker 1: own trumpet too much, but you know, I mean, we

949
00:51:54,112 --> 00:51:57,792
Speaker 1: sat there for years trying to offload this, you know,

950
00:51:57,872 --> 00:52:00,192
Speaker 1: and not managing to get law enforcement to do it.

951
00:52:00,872 --> 00:52:02,951
Speaker 1: And I do think it is also a story about

952
00:52:02,991 --> 00:52:06,071
Speaker 1: law enforcement. I think this is a story about that

953
00:52:06,352 --> 00:52:09,672
Speaker 1: these law enforcement agencies around the world being very badly

954
00:52:09,752 --> 00:52:12,912
Speaker 1: undercut and really struggling to deal with these forms of crime.

955
00:52:13,911 --> 00:52:18,152
Speaker 1: And then lastly, it has to be maybe even primarily

956
00:52:18,192 --> 00:52:20,752
Speaker 1: a story to do with coercive control and gender violence.

957
00:52:21,392 --> 00:52:24,832
Speaker 1: I was not expecting this to be about spousal relationships,

958
00:52:25,632 --> 00:52:29,031
Speaker 1: you know, falling apart, but that's what we found. And

959
00:52:29,072 --> 00:52:32,911
Speaker 1: the kind of willingness, especially of men, to kill, especially

960
00:52:32,911 --> 00:52:35,951
Speaker 1: women who are either leaving them or have left them

961
00:52:35,991 --> 00:52:39,031
Speaker 1: from a rantom relationship. Well, I don't want to say

962
00:52:39,072 --> 00:52:41,471
Speaker 1: that shocking or astonishing, because I think plenty of people

963
00:52:41,511 --> 00:52:43,991
Speaker 1: won't find any of that shocking or any of that astonishing.

964
00:52:44,431 --> 00:52:47,071
Speaker 1: But I think it's a lesson actually there that has

965
00:52:47,152 --> 00:52:49,152
Speaker 1: nothing to do with the darknet. There's nothing to do

966
00:52:49,192 --> 00:52:52,672
Speaker 1: with technology. Has to do with some very very dangerous

967
00:52:52,712 --> 00:52:55,951
Speaker 1: capacities within some men to be willing to do that

968
00:52:55,991 --> 00:52:56,672
Speaker 1: sort of thing.

969
00:52:56,951 --> 00:53:00,631
Speaker 2: Which we're constantly dealing with as a society. Has this

970
00:53:00,712 --> 00:53:03,512
Speaker 2: got you hooked? Carl, I know you're still dropping episodes

971
00:53:03,511 --> 00:53:05,112
Speaker 2: of the pod. You're still very much in this world,

972
00:53:05,112 --> 00:53:08,551
Speaker 2: But are you going to keep doing investigations or are

973
00:53:08,551 --> 00:53:09,151
Speaker 2: you done now?

974
00:53:10,832 --> 00:53:13,352
Speaker 1: There's plenty more to come, So we're going to be

975
00:53:13,431 --> 00:53:16,112
Speaker 1: running episodes all the way through to the end of December.

976
00:53:16,312 --> 00:53:18,832
Speaker 1: You know, each one of them is actually really they're

977
00:53:18,832 --> 00:53:20,672
Speaker 1: really important to me that each one of these is

978
00:53:20,752 --> 00:53:24,552
Speaker 1: a deep dive into the cases we found on the killer.

979
00:53:24,592 --> 00:53:27,511
Speaker 1: This we tell the initial story quite quickly, only six

980
00:53:27,551 --> 00:53:31,951
Speaker 1: episodes covering four years. The next twelve really about all

981
00:53:31,991 --> 00:53:34,272
Speaker 1: of those cases and the people and the killers, and

982
00:53:34,272 --> 00:53:36,792
Speaker 1: the people that put them there and sometimes the people

983
00:53:36,832 --> 00:53:39,151
Speaker 1: that caught them. And I hope people listen to those

984
00:53:39,192 --> 00:53:42,471
Speaker 1: because they kind of are are the ways in which

985
00:53:42,551 --> 00:53:45,232
Speaker 1: this investigation kind of falls into the kind of full

986
00:53:45,672 --> 00:53:49,152
Speaker 1: three D kiotechnic color of normal human life. As for me,

987
00:53:49,312 --> 00:53:52,271
Speaker 1: I don't know. I really hope whatever I do, though,

988
00:53:52,431 --> 00:53:54,471
Speaker 1: that I don't have to deal with anything like the

989
00:53:54,511 --> 00:53:58,392
Speaker 1: kill list. Again, Honestly, it's wonderful to see this investigation out.

990
00:53:58,431 --> 00:54:02,591
Speaker 1: It's wonderful to talk about it and to reflect on

991
00:54:02,632 --> 00:54:04,511
Speaker 1: all of the things it might mean for us, and

992
00:54:05,031 --> 00:54:09,232
Speaker 1: it is certainly what it means for me, but to

993
00:54:09,272 --> 00:54:12,551
Speaker 1: transport myself back into those moments in twenty twenty when

994
00:54:12,592 --> 00:54:14,712
Speaker 1: we were in the dead of night, in the midst

995
00:54:14,712 --> 00:54:17,712
Speaker 1: of COVID, having to try and work out how we

996
00:54:17,712 --> 00:54:19,951
Speaker 1: could reach someone in their home alone so that their

997
00:54:19,951 --> 00:54:22,312
Speaker 1: possible spouse didn't know that we were trying to warm

998
00:54:22,312 --> 00:54:24,111
Speaker 1: themselves being killed. That is just a horrible thing to

999
00:54:24,112 --> 00:54:25,592
Speaker 1: do and I wish I never have to do anything

1000
00:54:25,632 --> 00:54:26,232
Speaker 1: like that again.

1001
00:54:30,511 --> 00:54:32,712
Speaker 2: Thanks to Carl for helping us to tell this story.

1002
00:54:33,152 --> 00:54:37,151
Speaker 2: Kill List is still dropping episodes exploring different stories on

1003
00:54:37,192 --> 00:54:39,431
Speaker 2: the kill List. You can find a link in our

1004
00:54:39,471 --> 00:54:43,031
Speaker 2: show notes. True Crime Conversations is a Muma mea podcast

1005
00:54:43,232 --> 00:54:46,072
Speaker 2: hosted and produced by me Jemma Bath and Tarlie Blackman,

1006
00:54:46,392 --> 00:54:50,032
Speaker 2: with audio design by Tom Lyon. Thanks so much for listening.

1007
00:54:50,112 --> 00:54:52,911
Speaker 2: I'll be back next week with another True Crime Conversation