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Speaker 1: You're listening to a Muma Mia podcast. Mumma Mia acknowledges

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Speaker 1: the traditional owners of land and waters that this podcast

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Speaker 1: is recorded on.

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Speaker 2: Hi.

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Speaker 1: I'm Claire Murphy. This is Muma MIA's daily news podcast,

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Speaker 1: The Quickie. When Hannah Grundy spoke to Australian Story recently,

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Speaker 1: she made many of us question just how much we

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Speaker 1: can trust the people around us. See, Hannah found out

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Speaker 1: that she was the victim of a deep fake porn

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Speaker 1: campaign by a man who claimed to be her friend.

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Speaker 3: How do you trust other people now when you've known

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Speaker 3: someone for ten years and they can say that kind

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Speaker 3: of stuff about you?

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Speaker 4: On one I don't.

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Speaker 1: Understand Today, we speak to a forensic it T investigator

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Speaker 1: to find out exactly what information we can take to

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Speaker 1: the police if we ever find ourselves in this age

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Speaker 1: of AI scrolling through naked pictures of ourselves that we

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Speaker 1: never posed for. But first, here's the latest news headlines

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Speaker 1: from the Quickie newsroom. Tuesday October twenty two. Independent Senator

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Speaker 1: Lydia Thorpe has protested King Charles and Queen Camilla's visit

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Speaker 1: to Australia, confronting the royal couple in Canberra again.

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Speaker 4: People can not give us why this star from us?

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Speaker 1: How bone our star, our baby? How people? Thorpe, wearing

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Speaker 1: a traditional possum skin cloak, walked into the welcome ceremony,

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Speaker 1: calling on the Royals to give Aboriginal and Torres Strait

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Speaker 1: Island to people a treaty.

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Speaker 4: This treat.

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Speaker 1: She was then quickly escorted out of the building. Prime

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Speaker 1: Minister Anthony Albernezi told the King that he'd shown great

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Speaker 1: respect for Australians even during times when we've debated the

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Speaker 1: future of our own constitutional arrangements and the nature of

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Speaker 1: the relationship with the Crown, saying nothing stands still. Charles,

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Speaker 1: in the moments before Senator Thorpe's protest, knowledged Australia's long

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Speaker 1: and sometimes difficult journey towards reconciliation, saying it's in all

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Speaker 1: our interests to be good stewards of the world and

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Speaker 1: good ancestors to those who come after us. He said,

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Speaker 1: this is the timeless wisdom of Indigenous people throughout the

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Speaker 1: entire world. The Royals then spent more than half an

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Speaker 1: hour speaking to school children and fans who'd gathered to

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Speaker 1: catch a glimpse of them. The King even met with Hefner,

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Speaker 1: the al packer who appeared to sneeze on him. They

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Speaker 1: then parted ways Camilla, meeting with domestic violence campaign a

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Speaker 1: Rosy Batty along with other victim survivors and advocates for

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Speaker 1: a round table discussion. Charles visited with CSIRO scientists who

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Speaker 1: showed him a bush fire simulation. The couple head back

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Speaker 1: to Sydney today and will be at the Sydney Opera

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Speaker 1: House at four thirty this afternoon. Police in Buenos Aires

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Speaker 1: have released the name of the drug Liam Payne was

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Speaker 1: potentially high on when he fell from the balcony of

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Speaker 1: the hotel he was staying in last week. Investigators say

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Speaker 1: the drug, known as crystal, causes the user to experience

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Speaker 1: extreme highs followed by extreme lows. Police telling TMZ that

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Speaker 1: his erratic behavior year could in part be due to

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Speaker 1: the drug, which may have led to hallucinations. There are

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Speaker 1: reports so the thirty one year old was struggling with

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Speaker 1: substance abuse at the time of his death, but the

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Speaker 1: toxicology report is yet to reveal whether he had anything

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Speaker 1: in his system. The five black and Hispanic teenagers who

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Speaker 1: were wrongfully convicted over the nineteen eighty nine rape of

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Speaker 1: a white woman who was jogging in Central Park, assuing

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Speaker 1: Donald Trump for defamation. The group, who are widely known

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Speaker 1: as the Central Park Five, spent between five and thirteen

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Speaker 1: years behind bars for the crime before they were all

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Speaker 1: cleared in two thousand and two after new DNA evidence

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Speaker 1: and a confession from another person revealed they were not involved.

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Speaker 1: Trump said during the presidential debate that the five had

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Speaker 1: killed a person and had pleaded guilty. A lawyer for

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Speaker 1: the men said the remarks cast them in a harmful

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Speaker 1: life and intentionally inflicted emotional pain. The plaintiffs are seeking

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Speaker 1: an unspecified amount of money for damages reputational and emotional harm,

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Speaker 1: as well as punitive damages. There are concerns for singer

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Speaker 1: Ping after she canceled several shows in the US. She

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Speaker 1: took to social media to say she's had to cancel

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Speaker 1: due to reasons beyond her control, saying she's disappointed to

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Speaker 1: share the news, but that they're working on rescheduling them

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Speaker 1: as soon as they can. She thanked everyone for their understanding,

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Speaker 1: saying she's looking forward to seeing everyone very very soon.

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Speaker 1: Pink has canceled a show before, during her summer carnival

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Speaker 1: tour on orders from her doctor. But for a woman

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Speaker 1: who performs her aerial stunts even when injured, there are

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Speaker 1: concerns she's dealing with something more serious. That's what's going

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Speaker 1: on in the world today. Next, we find out why Hannah,

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Speaker 1: the target of deep fake porn images posted online, had

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Speaker 1: to employ a forensic Heighty specialist to get the justice

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Speaker 1: she deserved. In twenty twenty one, science teacher Hannah got

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Speaker 1: a couple of strange emails. Initially, she thought it was

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Speaker 1: a scam. The messages told her that the content they

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Speaker 1: wanted to share was really important, warning that the link

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Speaker 1: they had sent contained disturbing material. Eventually, Hannah's partner Chris,

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Speaker 1: opened the link and what they saw was shocking. It

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Speaker 1: wasn't a scam at all. It was actually a targeted

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Speaker 1: thread accompanied by deep fake porn images of Hannah. The

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Speaker 1: words on the page were violent, angry, and upsetting. The

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Speaker 1: person who'd posted them wanted to hurt Hannah, wanted to

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Speaker 1: punish her. A poll at the top of the page

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Speaker 1: asked the preferred way those who browsed this site would

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Speaker 1: want to rape Hannah, and that had attracted hundreds of responses.

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Speaker 1: Using AI technology, bruising had been added to Hannah's photos,

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Speaker 1: some showing a hand wrapped around her neck. Hannah's full name,

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Speaker 1: the city where she lives, and her social media handles

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Speaker 1: were also posted. The threats mentioned that the person behind

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Speaker 1: them lived nearby, knew where she lived, and that they

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Speaker 1: were closing in on her. It soon became clear that

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Speaker 1: the pictures had been taken from her Instagram and Facebook pages,

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Speaker 1: leading Hannah and Chris to believe it was someone she knew.

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Speaker 1: There were other women on the site too, women they

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Speaker 1: recognized friends of Hannah's, and so they used the links

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Speaker 1: to try and find out the people that they all

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Speaker 1: had in common. They managed to narrow it down to

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Speaker 1: three names, and eventually it would become clear that the

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Speaker 1: person behind the page was one of their friends.

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Speaker 4: It just became sort of more and more obvious that

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Speaker 4: there was our friend Andy.

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Speaker 3: When I started at Manning Bar, Andy was the bar supervisor.

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Speaker 3: He was someone that really cared about me and I

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Speaker 3: cared about him, and I thought of him as a

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Speaker 3: very good friend, and it was someone we trusted so much,

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Speaker 3: and he's been to our house, We've been on holidays

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Speaker 3: with him, and a lot of the big moments of

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Speaker 3: our life in the last ten years had been with

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Speaker 3: him there as a very close friend, so I guess

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Speaker 3: the shock of that was kind of so hard to bear.

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Speaker 1: Hannah and her partner collected all this information and took

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Speaker 1: it to police. They included screenshots and all the links

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Speaker 1: had gathered pointing to Andy. They had a feeling that

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Speaker 1: the evidence alone wouldn't be enough, but Hannah and Chris

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Speaker 1: thought they would use it as a start and then

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Speaker 1: police would investigate further. But that wouldn't be the case.

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Speaker 1: Five months later, police contacted Hannah to say that they

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Speaker 1: were suspending their investigation. Hannah and Chris, who at this

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Speaker 1: point had sought help from a lawyer, were angry. They

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Speaker 1: had shrunk their life down to avoid putting Hannah at risk.

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Speaker 1: They avoided going out. They installed cameras at home and

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Speaker 1: placed tracking devices on Hannah and her car. Meanwhile, the

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Speaker 1: posts about Hannah continued. Their lawyer suggested a digital forensic

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Speaker 1: analyst to collate all of their information and compile a

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Speaker 1: report that their lawyer used to get the case reopened,

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Speaker 1: and things escalated quickly from there. Police assigned a detective

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Speaker 1: who would up Rating and his home. They seized all

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Speaker 1: of his devices, his laptop, his hard drives, us b's

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Speaker 1: and his phone. He gave them his passwords and they

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Speaker 1: found all the evidence they needed to charge him. In

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Speaker 1: recent years, Australia has seen a concerning rise in reports

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Speaker 1: of deep fake pornography, a disturbing trend that has left

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Speaker 1: victims feeling violated and law enforcements struggling to keep pace.

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Speaker 1: While exact statistics are difficult to obtain due to the

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Speaker 1: nature of the crime, the Ease Safety Commissioner's Office reported

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Speaker 1: a significant increase in complaints related to image based abuse,

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Speaker 1: including deep fakes, with over seventeen hundred reports received in

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Speaker 1: the twenty twenty two to twenty three financial year. However,

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Speaker 1: it's believed that many cases go unreported due to the shame, fear,

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Speaker 1: or lack of awareness about available resources. Law enforcement agencies

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Speaker 1: across Australia have been grappling with the challenge of investigating

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Speaker 1: these complex technology driven crimes. The Australian Federal Police have

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Speaker 1: established a dedicated unit to tackle technology facilitated crime, but

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Speaker 1: those resources are stretched thin. According to AFP sources, only

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Speaker 1: a fraction of reported cases make it to full investigation

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Speaker 1: due to jurisdictional issues and the technical complexity involved in

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Speaker 1: tracing the origins of deep fake content. So if we

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Speaker 1: find ourselves in this situation, what on earth can we do?

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Speaker 1: Lachlan Javis is a private investigator at lines would Investigations

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Speaker 1: and Forensics. Lachlan, what's the first thing that you would

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Speaker 1: suggest if you do happen to be made aware that

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Speaker 1: there are deep fake images of you somewhere out there?

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Speaker 5: Well, probably the first thing you want to do is

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Speaker 5: to make sure that you're not being victimized by someone

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Speaker 5: close to you. And in this case, Hannah was being

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Speaker 5: victimized by someone.

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Speaker 2: Close to her.

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Speaker 5: It's a sad truth that it may even be someone

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Speaker 5: closer than.

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Speaker 2: Hannah in certain circumstances.

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Speaker 5: So some people, some women, some victims might be victimized

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Speaker 5: by a partner or a work colleague, or someone very

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Speaker 5: close to than the family member. So you need to

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Speaker 5: consider that option and think very carefully about what strategic

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Speaker 5: decisions you want to make at the outset. What I

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Speaker 5: think you do want to do is to document everything

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Speaker 5: that you are privy to. So, for example, in this instance,

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Speaker 5: there was online material. So it's very apparent that Hannah

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Speaker 5: was quite smart in the way she went about it,

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Speaker 5: because she did some investigating and some cross referencing herself,

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Speaker 5: which is great because a lot of the time when

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Speaker 5: we're contacted by clients, they're not too sure about what's

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Speaker 5: going on and they need our help.

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Speaker 2: So it's always helpful to have a.

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Speaker 5: Client like Hannah who's switched on and capable of doing

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Speaker 5: some investigating herself. So I think that you want to

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Speaker 5: a consider the possibilities, make sure no one close to

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Speaker 5: you is responsible, I mean very close to you who

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Speaker 5: you might confide in. B You want to document what's

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Speaker 5: going on, so you would want to take screenshots on

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Speaker 5: a safe device, store that in a safe place, document URLs,

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Speaker 5: document anything else that you feel is relevant, and you

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Speaker 5: will then have a repository of evidence that you can use,

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Speaker 5: whether you take that to the police, whether you take

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Speaker 5: that to a lawyer, whether you contact a private investigator

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Speaker 5: or a forensic expert, whether you do what Hannah did,

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Speaker 5: and that is to do a bit of investigating yourself.

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Speaker 5: Documenting the evidence in the first instance is very important,

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Speaker 5: and then you can go from that.

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Speaker 1: Is it important at these beginning stages not to tip

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Speaker 1: off the person that you are potentially investigating, because how

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Speaker 1: easy would it be to wipe everything off the Internet

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Speaker 1: once it's posted.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, this is a good point because a lot of

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Speaker 5: times in an investigation, regardless of what type of investigation

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Speaker 5: it is, people will trip themselves up by letting the

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Speaker 5: person who they're investigating know that there is an investigation

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Speaker 5: under way.

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Speaker 2: So Hannah did the right.

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Speaker 5: Thing and maintain social media contact with the person that

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Speaker 5: she ultimately found out was responsible and didn't let on.

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Speaker 2: Look, it depends on the circumstances. You have to take

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Speaker 2: into account that if there are threats to.

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Speaker 5: Life, then you need to be aware of that fact

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Speaker 5: and you need to take appropriate action. But in this

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Speaker 5: instance it was the right strategy. Hopefully Hannah did take

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Speaker 5: precautions from a security point of view, but you do

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Speaker 5: need to preclude the possibility of the person you're investigating

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Speaker 5: becoming aware until such time that that's in your favor.

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Speaker 1: The forensic digital analysts who worked on Hannah's case said

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Speaker 1: that he had to put in about fifty sixty odd

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Speaker 1: hours putting together all of the information and verifying everything,

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Speaker 1: and he said this is something that police just do

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Speaker 1: not have the resources to do for every single case

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Speaker 1: of Internet abuse that they are coming across these days,

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Speaker 1: because the numbers are just so overwhelming. Do you think

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Speaker 1: that that is a reality for police that they just

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Speaker 1: don't have the resources to put into actually investigating these

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Speaker 1: digital crimes.

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Speaker 5: When someone has an idea in their head, it's very

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Speaker 5: hard to explain that the opposite is in fact the truth,

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Speaker 5: which is something that I encountered in my work. Police

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Speaker 5: are desperately, desperately under resourced, and our business is forty

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Speaker 5: years old. We are approached literally every day and have

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Speaker 5: been for those forty years by people who have approached

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Speaker 5: police because they've been victims of certain types of crime

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Speaker 5: and the police have not been able to help them.

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Speaker 5: And so that's why there is a need, for example,

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Speaker 5: for PIS and that kind of thing, even in the

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Speaker 5: criminal space such as what this case entailed.

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Speaker 1: Now, Hannah, as you mentioned, did a lot of the

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Speaker 1: legwork herself with her partner Chris, and they took screenshots

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Speaker 1: and they kept a spreadsheet which kind of cross referenced

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Speaker 1: all of the other social media accounts and the way

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Speaker 1: in which they had narrowed it down to the man

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Speaker 1: in question. But what evidence could someone in your position,

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Speaker 1: in your profession find that maybe we who don't have

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Speaker 1: any kind of it understanding further than the sort of

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Speaker 1: base level that the majority of us have. What could

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Speaker 1: you find that we can't.

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Speaker 5: We have done a number of investigations into online culprits,

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Speaker 5: whether that be blackmail or fraud or whatever it is,

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Speaker 5: or something similar to hands where they're posting private images

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Speaker 5: or deep.

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Speaker 2: Fake porn or aiporn or whatever it is.

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Speaker 5: What we have done in the instances in which we've

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Speaker 5: been successful is we've obtained IP Internet Protocol address information,

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Speaker 5: and that may have been the case in this instance.

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Speaker 5: I'm not certain whether that was obtained, but people generally

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Speaker 5: don't have a very good understanding of what evidence entails.

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Speaker 5: What evidence really is is what you're trying to do

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Speaker 5: is trying to show the court that other possibilities are excluded.

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Speaker 5: So when Hannah turned up and said I've done all

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Speaker 5: this work and this is who's responsible, the police said, oh, well, yeah,

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Speaker 5: maybe that's true.

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Speaker 2: Maybe that's not because they get approached every day.

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Speaker 5: When she approached a private investigator, a forensic expert, he

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Speaker 5: was able to package that up to perhaps show that

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Speaker 5: there was a very limited likelihood that other opportunities existed

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Speaker 5: in this particular case. So he may have obtained IP information,

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Speaker 5: or he may have simply gone off what was public

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Speaker 5: based on the Facebook profiles and based on How's testimony

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Speaker 5: that she had her Facebook page locked down and such.

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Speaker 1: How many cases of things like this are we starting

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Speaker 1: to see? Now you said your business has been open

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Speaker 1: for forty years in twenty twenty four, how much of

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Speaker 1: your business is people coming to you and saying that

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Speaker 1: they've been the victim of an Internet crime?

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Speaker 2: A lot.

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Speaker 5: We are a very broad firm, so we do many

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Speaker 5: different types of things, and Internet fraud or blackmail or

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Speaker 5: harassments or threats, defamation. Now things like deep fake porn

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Speaker 5: and so on, these are commonplace. Unfortunately, as we've discussed,

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Speaker 5: the police, I'm not set up to handle this. The

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Speaker 5: police are capable of really good things if you turn

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Speaker 5: your mind to what they did in the Daniel Morkham case,

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Speaker 5: which was a highly publicized case roughly ten to fifteen

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Speaker 5: years ago, where they did incredibly diligent investigative work. If

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Speaker 5: you read about that case, you'll see that they have

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Speaker 5: great resources, great skills, great people, but they're very limited

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Speaker 5: in what they can do because they're approached probably hundreds

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Speaker 5: of times a day around Australia with problems like this,

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Speaker 5: So that's why there's a need for good investigators like

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Speaker 5: Hannah and good licensed investigators who can assist.

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Speaker 1: Do you think the current laws in Australia that surround

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Speaker 1: internet crimes are strong enough to deal with the perpetrators

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Speaker 1: once they do end up in court.

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Speaker 5: The laws are very strong. It's not an issue with

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Speaker 5: the laws. The laws in Australia perhaps even in certain

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Speaker 5: respects too strong. It's a matter of the way in

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Speaker 5: which they are resourced, the way in which they're policed.

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Speaker 5: For example, the New South Wales Police Force.

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Speaker 2: There are a relatively limited.

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Speaker 5: Number of people who are within the police force who

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Speaker 5: are assigned to do work that relates to cybercrime. When

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Speaker 5: I started in the industry about fifteen years ago, I

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Speaker 5: think it was about six people. It is certainly not

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Speaker 5: grown dominant with the number of people who require this service.

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Speaker 1: In June this year, Andy would come face to face

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Speaker 1: with his victims as he answered charges relating to misuse

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Speaker 1: of carriage services. There were twenty six female victims. He

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Speaker 1: claims to have had a drug, alcohol and violent porn

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Speaker 1: addiction and that posting the threats against Hannah and the

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Speaker 1: others helped him reclaim his power that he felt he

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Speaker 1: had lost due to sexual inferiority, that you.

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Speaker 2: Had just hold on. Yeah, really sorry?

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Speaker 1: Why did you do it?

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Speaker 4: Just a dark part of my psychology that came out, manifested.

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Speaker 4: Do you feel about facing all these women today?

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Speaker 1: I've got to do it, pat you guys. He was

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Speaker 1: sentenced to nine years behind bars with a five and

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Speaker 1: a half year non parole period.

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Speaker 3: I just I don't really remember anything after that point.

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Speaker 3: I think I just cried. I remember Chris was behind me,

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Speaker 3: my mom was behind me, and the girls were there.

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Speaker 4: It was very vindicating having the judge read out all

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Speaker 4: of the sort of file things that he'd written on

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Speaker 4: that website and acknowledging that they were causing harm. And

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Speaker 4: I think her words were profound harm.

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Speaker 1: It really really felt like we were listening to as victims,

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Speaker 1: like the legal system was taking it seriously. But without

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Speaker 1: that original tip off, which turns out came from a

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Speaker 1: private investigator based in New Zealand who was looking into

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Speaker 1: another case, Hannah may have never found out that those

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Speaker 1: pictures of her were even out there. And while they

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Speaker 1: were taken down on the website that Annie was using

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Speaker 1: decommissioned as we all know it's impossible to remove things

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Speaker 1: from the Internet forever, so Hannah will have to deal

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Speaker 1: with the fact that these pictures with her full name

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Speaker 1: attached will always be out there for the rest of

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Speaker 1: her life. Lachlan has these four tips for anyone who

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Speaker 1: finds out they two are the victim of a crime

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Speaker 1: like this.

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Speaker 2: Well, in any investigation.

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Speaker 5: My first piece of advice, which I learned from my

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Speaker 5: mentor in the industry, is that the most trusted have

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Speaker 5: the most opportunity. And that's what Hannah learned the hard

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Speaker 5: way here. And fortunately it wasn't her partner. It was

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Speaker 5: a friend, a person she treated as a friend. So

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Speaker 5: you need to consider whether it is someone very close

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Speaker 5: to you.

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Speaker 2: That's the first thing.

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Speaker 5: Number two, as we said earlier, you need to document

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Speaker 5: the evidence, anything that you are privy to, anything that

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Speaker 5: you see, document it, save it on a safe device,

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Speaker 5: on a safe phone, on a safe computer that only

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Speaker 5: you have access to. Number three, probably the best place

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Speaker 5: to start is a lawyer. Hopefully that lawyer has a

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Speaker 5: private investigator or a forensic expert as a contact. If

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Speaker 5: they don't, you need to seek that out yourself. Number four,

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Speaker 5: when you have your ducks in a Row. When you

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Speaker 5: have the evidence saved and when you're ready to proceed,

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Speaker 5: you would then approach the police. You are obligated to

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Speaker 5: approach the police in certain circumstances, but that.

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Speaker 2: Depends on the timing and such, so you should.

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Speaker 5: Do that at the appropriate time and police and private

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Speaker 5: investigators can give you advice. And look, there's nothing wrong

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Speaker 5: with doing what Hannah did, doing a bit.

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Speaker 2: Of investigating yourself. That's a wise step.

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Speaker 1: Thanks for taking the time to feed your mind with

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Speaker 1: us today. The quickie is produced by me Claire Murphy

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Speaker 1: our executive producer Taylor Strano, with audio production by Teagan Sadler.