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Speaker 1: Mark Wales walking straight talk mate, Thanks for me good timing.

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Speaker 1: Do you feel you're putting on a uniform and sort

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Speaker 1: of going back out there?

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Speaker 2: Oh no, I had a few mates joke with me

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Speaker 2: about I think my back will We saw the day

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Speaker 2: they asked us to return.

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Speaker 1: So you have some background in this. Certainly give us

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Speaker 1: a bit of background on what Mark Wales did before

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Speaker 1: he became a survivor a survival player.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I was so. I joined the Army young, but

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Speaker 2: then I was at the mid nineties, went through off

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Speaker 2: training and then by two thousand and one Army starting

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Speaker 2: to go to East Team or plays like that. But

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Speaker 2: Afghanistan hadn't really picked up until two thousand and five.

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Speaker 2: That's when I joined SAS and then we deployed their

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Speaker 2: flat out for kind of six seven years and that

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Speaker 2: was the start of Australia's experience there and that was

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Speaker 2: when I got most of my exposure to the Middle

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Speaker 2: East from that two thousand and five to maybe twenty

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Speaker 2: ten period. But during that time I was in Afghanistan

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Speaker 2: a lot, Iraq quite a bit, Lebanon a bit, and

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Speaker 2: plenty of time in the golf states like Iman Abadhabi

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Speaker 2: sorry not Ababi Dubai, So I saw the region a

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Speaker 2: fair bit during that time.

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Speaker 1: As an essay soldier assayer as a soldier, but seeing

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Speaker 1: active duty in all those areas.

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Speaker 2: Active duty in pretty much all those areas, mostly Afghanistan

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Speaker 2: was where a heavy lifting was happening for sure.

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Speaker 1: What's like, I mean, I guess you're finding the Taliban

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Speaker 1: as well as who ruses are the Russians who are

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Speaker 1: ruses in the area. I mean, with the Russians still

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Speaker 1: in Afghanistan during that period, no, that would go out.

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Speaker 2: But I mean, and the reason we went there is

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Speaker 2: to deal with the al Qaeda guys initially which and

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Speaker 2: then the Taliban who were obviously housing them. But the

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Speaker 2: Taliban never really had this broad kind of apocalyptic agenda

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Speaker 2: the way al Qaida did. They're very different groups, so.

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Speaker 1: I think it'd explained who both are. It's just for

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Speaker 1: a history historical sense.

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Speaker 2: So a quick breakdown. Al Qaeda came from I guess

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Speaker 2: Saudi Arabia and this extremist belief in establishing Islamic caliphate.

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Speaker 2: They very aligned against the West. They wanted to break

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Speaker 2: down our dominance in the Middle East, which led to

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Speaker 2: attacks on the US, the coal in Yemen and then

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Speaker 2: eventually September eleventh. So they were a serious terrorist organization

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Speaker 2: led by Bin Laden, whereas the Taliban were a nationalist

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Speaker 2: force that took over in the civil wars that happened

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Speaker 2: after the Soviets left. So in the nineties the place

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Speaker 2: collapsed into chaos. Taliban came in imposed order, very strict

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Speaker 2: through Islamic three, you know, formed their own courts.

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Speaker 1: And everything, their warlord style, warlard style.

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Speaker 2: Some of these strong men came out and took control

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Speaker 2: out of Kandahar, took control of most of Afghanistan, and

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Speaker 2: our Pastun's a very dominant tribe in the south, eventually

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Speaker 2: al Qaeda, because they were being hunted by the US

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Speaker 2: and we're looking for a place to house themselves. We

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Speaker 2: did go to Afghanistan and Bin Larten had fought there

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Speaker 2: as well. He'd fought the Soviets in Afghanistan, so he

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Speaker 2: was able to form our Kaida in the mountains, train

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Speaker 2: them up, based it as a logistics era, and then

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Speaker 2: we went and invaded him. We dealt with our Kita

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Speaker 2: quite quickly, you know, the Americans surround them and sorted

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Speaker 2: the mountain, ejected him from the country within the first

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Speaker 2: six months. And then the war kind of transitioned into

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Speaker 2: a war against the Taliban.

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Speaker 1: And what was Australia's role and your role?

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Speaker 2: And we so we had I know, an Essays squadron

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Speaker 2: went in two thousand and one straight away, so about

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Speaker 2: ninety one hundred guys and we were supporting the Americans

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Speaker 2: with the reconnaissance work. And when eventually we went back,

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Speaker 2: which was two thousand and five, John Howard committed us.

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Speaker 2: We sent sas squadrons into Orosgaran Province, which is in

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Speaker 2: the south, and we were kind of the same as

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Speaker 2: in Vienna. We had an area that we were responsible

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Speaker 2: for securing and we worked with coalition to target enemy leaders,

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Speaker 2: do recon areas that we hadn't seen in years, and

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Speaker 2: we go out into parts of Afghanistan no one wanted

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Speaker 2: to go to and why wouldn't go there because it's

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Speaker 2: such a hard like it's hard to believe that a

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Speaker 2: modern army couldn't impose its control over a country. But

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Speaker 2: when you see it, like the mounds and the ravines

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Speaker 2: and the way the tribes set up, you can't really

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Speaker 2: get in there. That's why they've existed as tribes as

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Speaker 2: they have for thousands of is hard to get in

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Speaker 2: and out of the valleys.

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Speaker 1: But logistically, like in a physical sense.

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Speaker 2: In a physical sense, yeah, just even just driving in there,

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Speaker 2: you'd have to you're susceptible to ambush because there's only

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Speaker 2: one rode in and one rode out. So and there

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Speaker 2: weren't a lot of helicopters in the early days, and

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Speaker 2: then by as the years went by, more and more

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Speaker 2: came out of Iraq, which they were trying to win,

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Speaker 2: and went into Afghanistan, which they then tried to stabilize.

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Speaker 2: It was kind of we're fighting in two front war

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Speaker 2: the whole time.

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Speaker 1: And what is it? What is an essays soldier, like,

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Speaker 1: in particular, what would you be doing like surveillance? What

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Speaker 1: does that mean?

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Speaker 2: So we would. So I'll give you an example. When

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Speaker 2: I first I did a trip in two thousand and seven,

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Speaker 2: I was a true commander, which is about thirty guys.

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Speaker 2: We landed in the main base which is called Taran Cow.

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Speaker 2: We landed there, Me and my boss were looking at

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Speaker 2: how we're going to support the operations that were happening

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Speaker 2: that year, and he goes, look, we're going to have

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Speaker 2: to take back this valley in the north. It's called

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Speaker 2: Tauer it's thirty k's away. We've had a lot of

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Speaker 2: trouble trying to get it back. It's important. Taliban had

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Speaker 2: been there for ages. Let's go secure it. And our

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Speaker 2: role was to go in, find out exactly where all

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Speaker 2: the enemy were in that area, try and find out

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Speaker 2: that heavy weapons. We're going to land helicopters in there,

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Speaker 2: so I want to make sure they didn't have all

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Speaker 2: these heavy machine guns that could shoot them down. So

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Speaker 2: we'd be out there on foot at night looking for

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Speaker 2: enemy positions and watching them during the day and just

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Speaker 2: building a picture of what was in that valley.

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Speaker 1: They're taking notes, drawing stuff.

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Speaker 2: Drawing stuff. One of the guys I worked with got

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Speaker 2: into an enemy pit at night and measured the thing

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Speaker 2: out and was.

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Speaker 1: The enemy there.

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Speaker 2: They were around the area, but they weren't in that pit.

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Speaker 2: But and we gave the intelligence back to the Brits

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Speaker 2: and they said, well, they looked at the drawing of

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Speaker 2: the pit and they said to your guys are either

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Speaker 2: lying or they're mad, like they get this intelligence. But yeah,

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Speaker 2: it was old fashioned, going behind EMIL lines and getting

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Speaker 2: in from at nighttime at nighttime. We do it during

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Speaker 2: the day too, but during the day you might sit

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Speaker 2: back and sit on a hell and watch. You know,

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Speaker 2: you might see enemy moving around during the day and

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Speaker 2: then at night you go on look at that area.

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Speaker 1: But obviously under the cover of darkness. Is why are

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Speaker 1: you going to nighttime? So you're not going to be detected.

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Speaker 1: But surely they'd be expecting you to do that anyway,

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Speaker 1: I mean.

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Speaker 2: They did, they did. The problem is because our teams

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Speaker 2: were small, we moved at night, and we had that

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Speaker 2: cover of darkness. It's very hard to go up against

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Speaker 2: those teams at night because you can't you can't sneak

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Speaker 2: up on them. Theyre going to see you coming.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, totally. So what's going through your head when that's happening,

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Speaker 1: like or are you sitting back in the command part?

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Speaker 2: Well, I did a bit of both, so I was

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Speaker 2: leading the mission, but a couple times I'd attached myself

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Speaker 2: to a team and go in with a team. And

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Speaker 2: it's a weird thing because all of our training centers

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Speaker 2: around the basics of moving in country and not being

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Speaker 2: seen in country, being in a theater like a could

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Speaker 2: be jungle bush in bush, whatever it is, but not

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Speaker 2: in desert in desert as well. But obviously obviously it's

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Speaker 2: a bit harder. But yeah, once you're in vegetation though,

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Speaker 2: and there's a bit of cover and you can move

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Speaker 2: around and not be seen.

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Speaker 1: You're basically crawling around in your belly sort of thing.

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Speaker 2: Not really, but you because you know, because you've done

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Speaker 2: so much training it. You know, if you're moving at

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Speaker 2: night then there's a bit of moonlight, you stay in

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Speaker 2: the shadows and you don't move fast, and you don't

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Speaker 2: make noise, and you traverse through certain areas to try

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Speaker 2: and mask noise, like if it's raining, you might move

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Speaker 2: a bit quicker. So you just learn all these things

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Speaker 2: from experience and means you can move around the enemy.

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Speaker 1: Do you ever have a fitbidder on something to bridge

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Speaker 1: a heart rate?

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Speaker 2: No? But I think that now I reckon, do they

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Speaker 2: really wind? Would be right up there?

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Speaker 1: Well, it's your heart rate going that or you learn

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Speaker 1: how to sort of control it.

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Speaker 2: No, you learn how to control it because you're always

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Speaker 2: put in these highly stressful situation and just learn to

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Speaker 2: like get that breathing to kind of calm yourself down

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Speaker 2: a bit.

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Speaker 1: Do you worry about losing your life or is it

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Speaker 1: so hectic that you don't have time to worry? About that,

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Speaker 1: you're just always on alert.

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Speaker 2: I think no, everyone does at some point, and I did,

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Speaker 2: especially when I was younger and new to it. I

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Speaker 2: was quite like, you're trained to deal with it, but

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Speaker 2: that thought does cross your mind. But I think once

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Speaker 2: you start moving and taking action kind of all that

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Speaker 2: fear goes away quite a bit. And it's like a

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Speaker 2: waiting for a school yard fight. Waiting for it's always worse.

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Speaker 1: Than getting into it.

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Speaker 2: When it actually happens, your ey, it's not so bad.

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Speaker 1: You know, Yes, I got a broken nose, It's exactly so.

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Speaker 1: And in terms of that period that we're talking about,

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Speaker 1: the early two thousands, was tech a big deal? Technology?

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Speaker 1: Big deal?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it was a big deal. Ill it was, and

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Speaker 2: what But what's surprising about the campaign is that every

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Speaker 2: time we go into battle, there's some new tech, some

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Speaker 2: new amazing tech, and they go, this is going to

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Speaker 2: change warfare, and it never does. Really well, it does

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Speaker 2: to some extent, but it's always just it's an incremental

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Speaker 2: adaptation to the battlefield. It's not like a revolution the

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Speaker 2: way maybe gunpowder was or information warfare was like these

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Speaker 2: new drones and that I know, it looks interesting and exciting,

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Speaker 2: but really it's an adaptation of stuff we've always had.

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Speaker 1: So because I was going to ask about the drones,

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Speaker 1: We'll get onto the jet political stuff in a second too,

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Speaker 1: because that's really interesting to me. But if I just

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Speaker 1: talk about the drone tech instead of sending someone in

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Speaker 1: to draw pictures and you know, like to do the reconnaissance,

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Speaker 1: wouldn't be just easy to send it, can you? I

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Speaker 1: don't know if there's such a thing but a cent

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Speaker 1: a drone and that it doesn't make that worrying noise

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Speaker 1: and actually for it to take photographs from the sky.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, well they've got I mean, we have. There's so

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Speaker 2: many different layers of what they what they have in

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Speaker 2: terms of drones, all the way from the strategic ones

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Speaker 2: that are in the bloody stratosphy all the way down

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Speaker 2: to the tiny ones you can send in a house.

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Speaker 2: But they're all complimentary to people.

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Speaker 1: Because someone's got to control it.

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Speaker 2: So generally someone's got to control it, or you need

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Speaker 2: someone on the ground that can actually direct the effects,

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Speaker 2: you know what I mean. We're not at that point

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Speaker 2: where machines can do that alone. And so it's like

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Speaker 2: what you're seeing now in Iran. There are limits to

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Speaker 2: what air power can do, and they've tried this before.

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Speaker 2: It's it's how you do need people on the ground

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Speaker 2: to shape the outcomes that happen.

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Speaker 1: For sure, because I saw something interesting. I don't know

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Speaker 1: it was ullshit or not, but I saw something on

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Speaker 1: them as embarrasses on social media where the Chinese Chinese

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Speaker 1: were demonstrating robots to a foreign minister from one another country.

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Speaker 1: It wasn't the US, and it wasn't Australia, and it

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Speaker 1: could have been AI produced. I don't know the sis,

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Speaker 1: and you've probably got a better much but you've definitely

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Speaker 1: got a much better idea of me. But these these robots,

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Speaker 1: we're doing kung fu or something like kung fu, and

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Speaker 1: they were moving like a person. Now, I don't know

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Speaker 1: how long they could go for. Maybe they're going to

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Speaker 1: have battery limits and all that sort of stuff. I

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Speaker 1: don't know the answer to those questions, and maybe they

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Speaker 1: just can only do one thing. But are we ad

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Speaker 1: a stage, as some are, we're getting close to when

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Speaker 1: sovereign nations will start to have this type of technology

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Speaker 1: instead of sending an sas soldier in, but they might

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Speaker 1: send one in and ten robots.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think robotics will be could be that game changer.

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Speaker 2: I know their countries are throwing a lot out and

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Speaker 2: making sure we have these autonomous partners that we can

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Speaker 2: go into battle with, because when you think about how

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Speaker 2: complimentary that is to people. Whenever get tired, they can

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Speaker 2: carry out a bat or they don't get afraid. There's

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Speaker 2: limits what they can do, of course, but over time

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Speaker 2: they'll just get better and better, and even the early

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Speaker 2: ones are looking pretty good now. I know there was

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Speaker 2: a rescue of the Ukrainian soldier using a remote drone

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Speaker 2: that was able to drive thirty klimbers out to pick

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Speaker 2: this guy up, put him in there and he had

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Speaker 2: an armored cage and they drove him back out again. Wow,

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Speaker 2: he was getting attacked by drones. And so there's a

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Speaker 2: place for him in the battlefield. There's all these things

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Speaker 2: that you have to do in battle, like move casualties out,

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Speaker 2: get AMMO forward, clear houses. All these things can be

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Speaker 2: done by robots for sure.

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Speaker 1: And the robots don't have to look like human. I mean,

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Speaker 1: you don't have to be like a drone. Yeah, drone

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Speaker 1: is sort of like a robot is a robot. It's

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Speaker 1: based on robotics and you know, and cameras and stuff

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Speaker 1: like that, but it's based on robotics, and cameras are

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Speaker 1: just a set of eyes, but just a bit of

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Speaker 1: a mechanical version. Are you in your intense interest in warfare,

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Speaker 1: which it is fair to say and particular and so

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Speaker 1: also your intense interest in political environments? Do you think

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Speaker 1: is there anyone more advanced in the world on this

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Speaker 1: stage relative to robotics than anyone else, Like, I mean,

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Speaker 1: I'm sure Australia is way behind, but anyone out there

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Speaker 1: is outstanding, do you hear?

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Speaker 2: I think the Yanks have a lot of capabilities that

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Speaker 2: are really far far advanced, and it's some things are

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Speaker 2: even difficult to can septualize now, like if you go

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Speaker 2: back to the nineteen sixties, for example, and look at

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Speaker 2: the Blackbird, for example, the spy plane they created. This

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Speaker 2: looks like a space age weapon even now. So I

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Speaker 2: know they've built stuff recently in aerospace and probably in

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Speaker 2: the robotics that is super advanced, and they keep it

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Speaker 2: in the locker in case there's some major conflict. So

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Speaker 2: I think the Americans will have a huge interest in

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Speaker 2: and they'll have massive capabilities, and then all the other

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Speaker 2: nations will be playing cash up. They you know, trying

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Speaker 2: to and rush all out of adversaries, are trying to

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Speaker 2: get that information wherever they can to find out what

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Speaker 2: the direction we're going in to exploit it or get

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Speaker 2: samples or whatever they can.

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Speaker 1: It's all fair game because the constant promotion we get

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Speaker 1: is China has actually got better technology than everybody else,

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Speaker 1: just that they're not showing anybody. Do you think that's

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Speaker 1: a possibility.

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Speaker 2: I think that made big advances in sensitive parts of

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Speaker 2: warfare that have worried the Americans, like hypersonics, what typeersonics?

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Speaker 2: Hypersonics super fast moving missiles for example, So I think

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Speaker 2: it's more than five times a speed of sound is

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Speaker 2: hype wow, like really fast because they're hard to defend against.

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Speaker 2: So I know some of the the carrier killer missiles

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Speaker 2: that've developed.

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Speaker 1: Sorry, what's a carry a killer missile?

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Speaker 2: An aircraft carry The Chinese have developed some super heavy

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Speaker 2: ballistic missiles that can go on the atmosphere and then

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Speaker 2: strike a moving American carry out because they're moving so fast,

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Speaker 2: so fast.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and also obviously they must be using some sort

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Speaker 1: of satellite technology to satellite tracking to direct it where

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Speaker 1: it's going to go. I'm going to someone like what

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Speaker 1: scares you most right now?

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Speaker 2: I think the one. I mean, there's that which is

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Speaker 2: a bit of a black swan, you know, American carry

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Speaker 2: gets sunk. That means that's a pretty substantial, pretty substantial

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Speaker 2: thing that would create a much broader war because I

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Speaker 2: don't think they could. For example, Iran could do that

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Speaker 2: without support from China or Russia. I don't think they could.

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Speaker 2: So that's one and the other one is I think

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Speaker 2: the thing that keeps the three major powers from going

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Speaker 2: to war is they've all got nuclear weapons. So in

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Speaker 2: a way that kind of World War two, all the

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Speaker 2: major powers did end up fighting a total war. Sometimes

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Speaker 2: I think that probably is less likely now because it

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Speaker 2: would lead to an escalation that could you could destroy

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Speaker 2: the world. So I think that I think that stops

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Speaker 2: them from entering into full combat.

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Speaker 1: And therefore less on that basis, let's just look at it.

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Speaker 1: What's going on at the moment with Iran, is that

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Speaker 1: does that that actual point legitimize why Israel and the

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Speaker 1: United States have sort of gone it's called gone to

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Speaker 1: war with Iran because you don't need a fourth power

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Speaker 1: of this nuclear ability.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, if Iran did secure the bomb, it would precipitate

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Speaker 2: an arms race in that region. I think Saudi Arabia said,

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Speaker 2: if Iran get it, we will have a bomb straight away.

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Speaker 2: So it would have been a much broader proliferation of

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Speaker 2: nukes which the Americans were trying to stop. And then

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Speaker 2: Israel would have been potentially, you know, under threat straight

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Speaker 2: away because they're a small nation and pretty if if

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Speaker 2: they were targeted with a new Cole weapon, you probably

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Speaker 2: that'd be the end of them. So I know the

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Speaker 2: Americans has said it's a red line, you can't have

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Speaker 2: a bomb, and that's what the negotiations were. Either. It's like,

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Speaker 2: we don't want you enriching uranium, will give you what

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Speaker 2: you need, We just need you to not pursue the bomb.

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Speaker 2: And they could never get that assurance, and with good

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Speaker 2: reason too if you look at it from Aram's perspective,

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Speaker 2: the minute you give up that capability, there is a

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Speaker 2: chance that your country can be hit. And that happens

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Speaker 2: to Libya when they surrendered their WMDs, and it happened.

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Speaker 1: To a mass destruction weapons of mass destruction.

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Speaker 2: They surrendered there. I think they had a new Colear

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Speaker 2: program a while back, and the Americans were able to

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Speaker 2: stop that. And also Iraq they because they didn't have

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Speaker 2: WMD's in the end, they weren't able to defend themselves.

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Speaker 2: So it's kind of this chicken and egg issue. But

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Speaker 2: North Korea, for example, that did get new core weapons,

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Speaker 2: they're not going to get invaded by the Americans anytime soon,

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Speaker 2: so it is a security guarantee they wanted clearly, but

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Speaker 2: Americans wouldn't let him have it.

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Speaker 1: And it's interesting because Israel has nuclear power, yes weapons,

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Speaker 1: I should say, yeah, it's interesting if well, if you're

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Speaker 1: if you get if you allow someone to develop nuclear

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Speaker 1: power and nuclear weapons, I should say, to some extent,

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Speaker 1: it's likely they won't use it because that gives the

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Speaker 1: opposition a reason to use nuclear power back a nuclear

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Speaker 1: weapon back or and maybe that's the way to go.

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Speaker 1: Or is it better that you don't give them the

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Speaker 1: opportunity to have nuclear weapons at all? I mean, which

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Speaker 1: means they will never be a really really will be

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Speaker 1: a threat to anybody. How do you look at it

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Speaker 1: as a it's.

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Speaker 2: A bit of a double standard because we've all these

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Speaker 2: major powers of developed nucle wesens saying that's it. No

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Speaker 2: one else can do this, But there is a good

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Speaker 2: reason for it because when they when they do it,

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Speaker 2: all the other adversaries are going to follow suit, and

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Speaker 2: then we'll have so many weapons on the planet.

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Speaker 1: Everyone will have them.

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Speaker 2: Everyone will have them. Your chance of mistake is much higher.

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Speaker 2: So that's why they try and stop it from proliferic.

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Speaker 1: Are more about mistakes. I mark like because it's interesting

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Speaker 1: you should say that, because I would just imagine just

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Speaker 1: following through what you just said. So let's say Iran

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Speaker 1: got it, you know, for the reason they all decided

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Speaker 1: to Look, let's let them do it, and then you

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Speaker 1: just said, Saudi would say, if you've got it, we

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Speaker 1: want it for whatever reason. Then Saudi has it. Then

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Speaker 1: let's say just cascades through the whole region. The issue is, okay,

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Speaker 1: if everyone in the reagions got it, then to no

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Speaker 1: one's going to press the button. But if if it's

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Speaker 1: the mistake that you just mentioned, let's explore that a

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Speaker 1: little bit. What is what do you mean by the mistake?

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Speaker 2: First, Well, there's been a lot of cases in the

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Speaker 2: past where sensor systems from say the Americans or the

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Speaker 2: Russians have picked up signals that look like ballistic missiles

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Speaker 2: had been fired at them. I think there was an

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Speaker 2: example in the eighties where there was a someone will

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Speaker 2: crack me forget this wrong, but they basically detected I

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Speaker 2: think it was three or five ICBM being launched the

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Speaker 2: in They picked up that some had been launched from

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Speaker 2: the US over Alaska towards Russia, and the Russian based

401
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Speaker 2: commander that had picked up this signal just thought it

402
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Speaker 2: was odd. He goes, if it really is an attack,

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Speaker 2: why is there only three to five? They didn't fire

404
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Speaker 2: back even though they were meant to. They found out

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Speaker 2: later that was it was either a flock of geese

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Speaker 2: or some I think once there was a rising moon

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Speaker 2: that reflected radio signals back, but it was a mistaken

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Speaker 2: case of a system that was meant to pick.

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Speaker 1: Up a launch missing tensity detection. Yeah, detection as opposed

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Speaker 1: to a mistake in terms of actually pressing the buttons section.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, And there's been other cases where we missed it.

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Speaker 2: I know that there was Soviet subs that were armed

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Speaker 2: with nuclear torpedoes in the Cuban Missile crisis in the sixties,

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Speaker 2: and they were told to use them if they were

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Speaker 2: threatened or if the blockade was run or anything like that.

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Speaker 2: And I think the local command of the actual sub

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Speaker 2: commander XO refused to use these. So if the more

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Speaker 2: there are, the more chances there is a major accident.

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Speaker 1: So it's not like, let's call it Trump making an error,

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Speaker 1: saying accidentally pressing the button.

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Speaker 2: Well, it's it's a bizarre one because there's no The

422
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Speaker 2: chain of command for the use of nickel weapons is

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Speaker 2: one person in the US system. It's literally the.

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Speaker 1: President, Yeah, the commander in chief, and all.

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Speaker 2: Orders from the president then are followed. But there's no

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Speaker 2: he doesn't have to consult anyone to do it. It

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Speaker 2: is a pretty crazy system.

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Speaker 1: But he has to tell someone. He's not the guy

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Speaker 1: actually sets it off. He has to tell someone to

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Speaker 1: do it.

431
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Speaker 2: He can authorize the launch of nickel weapons from this

432
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Speaker 2: case that's carried around has never further than ten free

433
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Speaker 2: from him. There is, yeah, and this is there's a

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Speaker 2: book about this called I Think It's Nuclear War Scenario

435
00:21:51,240 --> 00:21:54,400
Speaker 2: by Annie Jacobson, And there's been a lot of research

436
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Speaker 2: that's normally classified that's been declassified but talks about American

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00:22:00,080 --> 00:22:02,480
Speaker 2: nuclear weapon strategy and how that deploy it. And you

438
00:22:02,520 --> 00:22:06,000
Speaker 2: can imagine it's pretty closely closely held stuff. But yeah,

439
00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:08,919
Speaker 2: that he has a there's an there's a tache that

440
00:22:09,000 --> 00:22:11,720
Speaker 2: walks with him that has a case which is called

441
00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:16,760
Speaker 2: the football that's got all the targeting material and radio

442
00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:20,360
Speaker 2: systems needed to initiate a nuclear launch, and that's never

443
00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:21,479
Speaker 2: separated from the president.

444
00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:25,679
Speaker 1: Surely someone Yeah, I'm getting nervous, but surely someone's on

445
00:22:25,720 --> 00:22:28,000
Speaker 1: on the other side. Yes, mister president leak, is that

446
00:22:28,080 --> 00:22:31,280
Speaker 1: a good idea? I'll launch this stuff, but you really

447
00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:34,360
Speaker 1: want it? There's no double checking system there.

448
00:22:34,760 --> 00:22:39,919
Speaker 2: There would be obviously as his advisors, but the actual

449
00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,239
Speaker 2: chain of command for authorizing it is literally from the

450
00:22:42,240 --> 00:22:44,440
Speaker 2: president to the to the missile systems.

451
00:22:44,760 --> 00:22:49,040
Speaker 1: So, yeah, you're a as a former army person, like

452
00:22:49,560 --> 00:22:53,239
Speaker 1: do you take if your orders are given, whether you

453
00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:55,720
Speaker 1: agree with the orders or disagree with the orders. Do

454
00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:56,840
Speaker 1: you just have to do it?

455
00:22:56,880 --> 00:22:57,000
Speaker 2: Like?

456
00:22:57,000 --> 00:22:57,520
Speaker 1: How does it work?

457
00:22:57,600 --> 00:23:01,360
Speaker 2: Like you don't have to follow unlawful order? Right, so

458
00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:04,040
Speaker 2: you get trained in the laws of war and if

459
00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:06,600
Speaker 2: if it's an unlawful order, you don't have to follow it.

460
00:23:06,640 --> 00:23:08,560
Speaker 2: So if someone says, you know, blow that school up

461
00:23:08,600 --> 00:23:13,040
Speaker 2: and it's not a legitimate target and it's not allowed,

462
00:23:13,080 --> 00:23:15,720
Speaker 2: you can say no. That's how it works in theory,

463
00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:19,600
Speaker 2: but in practice, it's not always as easy as that.

464
00:23:19,760 --> 00:23:23,880
Speaker 1: So what would happen if your commanding officers said to you, look,

465
00:23:23,920 --> 00:23:26,080
Speaker 1: we want to blow up that shopping center or something

466
00:23:26,119 --> 00:23:29,240
Speaker 1: like that, you know, and hit it with a berzerk

467
00:23:29,320 --> 00:23:31,120
Speaker 1: or whatever the sort of weapon you're going to use,

468
00:23:32,359 --> 00:23:34,920
Speaker 1: and you have to make the call as to whether

469
00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:36,840
Speaker 1: or not that's a legitimate target.

470
00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:40,560
Speaker 2: It's even there are there's rules about chaining command, but

471
00:23:40,600 --> 00:23:42,680
Speaker 2: it's still a human system. Like if you don't think

472
00:23:42,680 --> 00:23:45,280
Speaker 2: something's right, you can still challenge.

473
00:23:45,160 --> 00:23:48,120
Speaker 1: You can you can challenge whatever your commanding officer says, Hey,

474
00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:50,720
Speaker 1: Mark me mate, what would want to call your mark?

475
00:23:50,760 --> 00:23:53,919
Speaker 1: You will probably call you whatever you know you're supposed

476
00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:56,840
Speaker 1: to be called by. Do what you're told. Yeah, otherwise

477
00:23:56,840 --> 00:23:57,399
Speaker 1: you're in trouble.

478
00:23:57,800 --> 00:24:00,840
Speaker 2: I'll be okay. And then you'd hit it that's five

479
00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:02,639
Speaker 2: and meres to the north of it and say they missed.

480
00:24:02,680 --> 00:24:06,119
Speaker 2: He missed. Yeah. People figure out a way to kind

481
00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:07,959
Speaker 2: of not do it, not do it. Yeah.

482
00:24:08,160 --> 00:24:11,440
Speaker 1: But then the commander comes back and he says, we'll

483
00:24:11,480 --> 00:24:14,000
Speaker 1: have another crack. I mean, do I can you do

484
00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:15,160
Speaker 1: you get a chance I argue the toss?

485
00:24:16,320 --> 00:24:16,520
Speaker 2: Yeah?

486
00:24:17,119 --> 00:24:19,000
Speaker 1: Do you think that would be the case? In terms

487
00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:21,399
Speaker 1: of the US for example, or Russia for the example,

488
00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:21,960
Speaker 1: China for.

489
00:24:22,119 --> 00:24:24,879
Speaker 2: I know that I know they debated this, this Iran

490
00:24:24,920 --> 00:24:27,840
Speaker 2: mission heavily before they went in there, and I know

491
00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:29,880
Speaker 2: there were a couple of camps. One that was kind

492
00:24:29,920 --> 00:24:33,800
Speaker 2: of pro targeting Iran and another was against it. And

493
00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:36,800
Speaker 2: I think the Vice president was actually against it.

494
00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:39,120
Speaker 1: Jadie Vance j Advance.

495
00:24:39,359 --> 00:24:40,800
Speaker 2: Yeah. And I don't know too much about the MAC

496
00:24:40,840 --> 00:24:44,560
Speaker 2: and like how it all works, but they would have

497
00:24:44,600 --> 00:24:48,760
Speaker 2: had strong competing arguments about fore and against views of

498
00:24:49,119 --> 00:24:51,160
Speaker 2: actually doing this. I've talked about it for years.

499
00:24:51,359 --> 00:24:55,000
Speaker 1: That would that get brought to the president to attack Iran?

500
00:24:55,480 --> 00:24:57,639
Speaker 1: Or does that is a president is a sort of

501
00:24:57,640 --> 00:25:03,200
Speaker 1: top down and he says this d yeah, which way Trump?

502
00:25:03,520 --> 00:25:06,480
Speaker 2: Nothing would have happened if the President didn't I didn't

503
00:25:06,520 --> 00:25:07,040
Speaker 2: want that.

504
00:25:07,280 --> 00:25:09,320
Speaker 1: Didn't agree, or didn't want it to happen. So do

505
00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:11,080
Speaker 1: you think he sort of pushes for it? Did he

506
00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:14,600
Speaker 1: speak to Netnahu and say, well, may we're together and

507
00:25:14,840 --> 00:25:16,000
Speaker 1: we're going to do it. I'm going to till my

508
00:25:16,000 --> 00:25:17,800
Speaker 1: generals to do it. Or is it the generals from

509
00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:21,680
Speaker 1: both sides get together and say, listen, mister promister, mister

510
00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:24,760
Speaker 1: President Trump this is what we think needs to happen.

511
00:25:24,800 --> 00:25:26,240
Speaker 1: How's it? What's the process?

512
00:25:26,320 --> 00:25:28,639
Speaker 2: They would have been. They've talked about this for decades,

513
00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:31,800
Speaker 2: about a mission to go and attack Iran, So all

514
00:25:31,840 --> 00:25:34,159
Speaker 2: the militaries would have talked about this and planned for it.

515
00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:36,320
Speaker 2: And I know I had mates that I was in

516
00:25:36,359 --> 00:25:39,240
Speaker 2: business school with that had planned for these missions to

517
00:25:39,280 --> 00:25:44,239
Speaker 2: go and capture the enrichment sites. Really those Yeah, One

518
00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:46,840
Speaker 2: of my mates was was a pilot with the Special

519
00:25:46,840 --> 00:25:50,879
Speaker 2: Ops aviation unit there, the one sixtieth and he was

520
00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:53,600
Speaker 2: a black Hawk and a little Bird, part of the helicopters,

521
00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:56,480
Speaker 2: and he was combat pilot, combat pilot, and he goes, mate,

522
00:25:56,480 --> 00:25:59,520
Speaker 2: we had plans and this was a one way mission.

523
00:26:00,119 --> 00:26:02,119
Speaker 2: We get in there, we try and secure these sites,

524
00:26:02,119 --> 00:26:03,840
Speaker 2: and there was really no way for us to get out.

525
00:26:03,880 --> 00:26:06,640
Speaker 1: It was just how have we may not come back?

526
00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:08,879
Speaker 2: And I thought, I thought there was no way the

527
00:26:08,920 --> 00:26:11,879
Speaker 2: Americans would do it because it's such a big This

528
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:14,720
Speaker 2: is different to Iraq. Again, it's a much bigger country,

529
00:26:16,080 --> 00:26:19,360
Speaker 2: huge simulation, it's huge population, it's much bigger, ninety million people,

530
00:26:19,840 --> 00:26:24,439
Speaker 2: a million, the standing security forces is around a million people.

531
00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:28,920
Speaker 2: It's a much bigger problem. So I didn't think they'd

532
00:26:28,920 --> 00:26:30,920
Speaker 2: do it, and I don't think it would have happened

533
00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:33,560
Speaker 2: unless that it would have been driven by the political

534
00:26:33,680 --> 00:26:34,520
Speaker 2: leaders for sure.

535
00:26:34,680 --> 00:26:39,240
Speaker 1: But is it would be fair to say that from

536
00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:44,439
Speaker 1: top down it's a decision that gets made based on logic.

537
00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:46,480
Speaker 1: I mean, do we sit down, Do they sit down

538
00:26:46,480 --> 00:26:49,119
Speaker 1: and say, Okay, we've been working on this for a

539
00:26:49,160 --> 00:26:51,520
Speaker 1: long time, just in case we're ever going to do it,

540
00:26:52,160 --> 00:26:55,000
Speaker 1: but here's here's the logic and the let's call it

541
00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:57,440
Speaker 1: the ethics around all this is just why we should

542
00:26:57,480 --> 00:26:59,720
Speaker 1: do this, as opposed to what we just hear the

543
00:26:59,720 --> 00:27:01,240
Speaker 1: present and say, because he's not going to tell us

544
00:27:01,280 --> 00:27:02,840
Speaker 1: all the details, you're going to say, we've been looking

545
00:27:02,880 --> 00:27:06,880
Speaker 1: at this for fifteen years or something for obvious reasons.

546
00:27:06,880 --> 00:27:09,919
Speaker 1: But these guys and girls have been working on us

547
00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:12,760
Speaker 1: for a long time. Do they look at do they

548
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:14,960
Speaker 1: debate to get to debate the ethics of this stuff,

549
00:27:14,960 --> 00:27:16,520
Speaker 1: because everyone's sort of saying, oh, we're just doing what

550
00:27:16,960 --> 00:27:18,600
Speaker 1: us doing what Israel told us to do it. I mean,

551
00:27:18,640 --> 00:27:19,600
Speaker 1: I just can't cop.

552
00:27:19,400 --> 00:27:22,639
Speaker 2: That like they would debate the ethics. But being in

553
00:27:22,640 --> 00:27:26,760
Speaker 2: a military system, it's like once it's decided and that's

554
00:27:26,920 --> 00:27:29,280
Speaker 2: that's what you're going to be doing. So if you

555
00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:31,040
Speaker 2: don't agree with the ethics, it's not a case of

556
00:27:31,080 --> 00:27:32,560
Speaker 2: further to pay it. You kind of have to get

557
00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:34,400
Speaker 2: out of the way or leave.

558
00:27:34,480 --> 00:27:37,000
Speaker 1: Or leave you have an opportunity you can do you

559
00:27:37,080 --> 00:27:38,480
Speaker 1: just say, look, I don't feel right about it.

560
00:27:38,640 --> 00:27:41,160
Speaker 2: Participate in it, for sure. But it's one of those things,

561
00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:43,479
Speaker 2: like a fast moving train. Once you're on board it,

562
00:27:43,480 --> 00:27:46,600
Speaker 2: it's very hard to kind of get off once these

563
00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:49,320
Speaker 2: things are moving. I could see because they were saying

564
00:27:49,359 --> 00:27:52,200
Speaker 2: to Rhyme with his negotiations, like this is what we need,

565
00:27:53,040 --> 00:27:56,800
Speaker 2: and they they weren't able to get those responses they wanted,

566
00:27:56,800 --> 00:27:58,480
Speaker 2: and they warned like we're going to hit you if

567
00:27:58,520 --> 00:27:59,160
Speaker 2: you don't do it.

568
00:28:00,040 --> 00:28:02,119
Speaker 1: But what did you think we saw the US Navy,

569
00:28:02,920 --> 00:28:05,919
Speaker 1: I mean something like you and you know every day.

570
00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:07,760
Speaker 1: I mean, I'm too busy with my job. I'm not.

571
00:28:07,960 --> 00:28:11,159
Speaker 1: This is not my territories on my theater. But you know,

572
00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:13,240
Speaker 1: I thought to myself, I should have seen it coming

573
00:28:13,240 --> 00:28:15,919
Speaker 1: when I saw there were so many ships deployed to

574
00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:19,720
Speaker 1: the you know, to the Gulf there. Yeah, with suddenly

575
00:28:19,800 --> 00:28:21,719
Speaker 1: you think yourself, this is going to be it's inevitable.

576
00:28:22,000 --> 00:28:23,840
Speaker 2: Well, I made it the point. I made a video

577
00:28:23,840 --> 00:28:25,719
Speaker 2: about this. I was like, a day before they hit,

578
00:28:26,200 --> 00:28:29,680
Speaker 2: I said that you can't as a political leader, put

579
00:28:29,720 --> 00:28:35,040
Speaker 2: that much military pressure on someone and mass that much

580
00:28:35,119 --> 00:28:37,920
Speaker 2: force and then not use it because it's a big

581
00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:41,920
Speaker 2: blow to your credibility internationally and also from your own

582
00:28:42,000 --> 00:28:44,320
Speaker 2: military as well. There's a big bluff, isn't it. It's

583
00:28:44,360 --> 00:28:47,600
Speaker 2: just a big bluff. So he wasn't bluffing. That was

584
00:28:47,600 --> 00:28:50,920
Speaker 2: the point. And Putin did the same thing. Yeah, massed

585
00:28:50,960 --> 00:28:53,480
Speaker 2: all these forces and then once you start seeing these

586
00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,680
Speaker 2: unusual things in that force, you kind of know something's coming.

587
00:28:56,760 --> 00:29:01,760
Speaker 2: Like once I heard Putin had bakeryes and mortuaries and

588
00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:03,320
Speaker 2: blood banks.

589
00:29:04,040 --> 00:29:06,920
Speaker 1: Say bakeries, bakeries those in bread.

590
00:29:06,920 --> 00:29:09,280
Speaker 2: Bread bake yet all the all the stuff you need

591
00:29:09,280 --> 00:29:12,080
Speaker 2: for an extended invasion. I was like, they're actually going

592
00:29:12,160 --> 00:29:14,320
Speaker 2: to do this. You don't get that stuff in when

593
00:29:14,320 --> 00:29:18,360
Speaker 2: it's a when it's an exercise, that's a real they're

594
00:29:18,360 --> 00:29:18,720
Speaker 2: planning to.

595
00:29:19,040 --> 00:29:21,440
Speaker 1: It's different because you know at one stage a little

596
00:29:21,440 --> 00:29:24,640
Speaker 1: why we're just posturing. You know the art of the deal. Yeah,

597
00:29:24,680 --> 00:29:27,760
Speaker 1: you know I'm gonna I'm going to crush you unless

598
00:29:27,760 --> 00:29:29,400
Speaker 1: you do the deal that I want you to deal.

599
00:29:29,720 --> 00:29:34,720
Speaker 1: Do you know, typical posturing, which, by the way, Trump's brilliant.

600
00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:37,760
Speaker 1: He used posturing all the time. He does it with tariffs,

601
00:29:37,800 --> 00:29:40,920
Speaker 1: all sorts of things, threats of tariffs. I should say,

602
00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:42,840
Speaker 1: you saw it, Did you see it as much more

603
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:43,480
Speaker 1: than posturing?

604
00:29:44,120 --> 00:29:46,320
Speaker 2: I thought he was. I thought he was being serious.

605
00:29:46,680 --> 00:29:48,960
Speaker 2: And the reason I thought it is because in the past,

606
00:29:48,960 --> 00:29:51,680
Speaker 2: when he said he's going to do something militarily, he

607
00:29:51,760 --> 00:29:55,480
Speaker 2: almost always followed through at some stage in his first term,

608
00:29:55,480 --> 00:29:57,960
Speaker 2: where you did with Syria when they use the chemical weapons,

609
00:29:58,680 --> 00:30:01,360
Speaker 2: you threaten them and then and then executed on it.

610
00:30:02,560 --> 00:30:04,800
Speaker 2: With Venezuela, was talking about that for a while. With

611
00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:07,160
Speaker 2: Iran the first time, he was telling them for a while,

612
00:30:07,200 --> 00:30:09,800
Speaker 2: if you don't you know, if you don't stop, We're

613
00:30:09,800 --> 00:30:13,360
Speaker 2: going to bomb your facilities. And so he'd done it

614
00:30:13,360 --> 00:30:15,520
Speaker 2: three times so that I could remember, and this was

615
00:30:15,520 --> 00:30:16,040
Speaker 2: the fourth.

616
00:30:17,240 --> 00:30:26,120
Speaker 1: So in terms of the so called Americans, so called

617
00:30:26,520 --> 00:30:31,000
Speaker 1: just doing Israel's bidding, you would reject that.

618
00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:36,040
Speaker 2: I think both things are true. It is it was

619
00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:39,960
Speaker 2: Israel's plan all along, and especially Naniahu. And people don't

620
00:30:40,000 --> 00:30:43,040
Speaker 2: realize this about ninia was his brother was killed in

621
00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:45,680
Speaker 2: the n TEB raid which happened in the seventies. They

622
00:30:45,720 --> 00:30:48,760
Speaker 2: were trying to recover Oh wow, Israeli hostages. His brother

623
00:30:48,840 --> 00:30:54,000
Speaker 2: was killed, he himself was wounded. He's a hardcore military

624
00:30:54,080 --> 00:30:57,680
Speaker 2: tree guy that understands that region and has had a

625
00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:00,600
Speaker 2: plan for a long time to just dismantle enemies. And

626
00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:04,480
Speaker 2: then the way I've seen this unfold, I think is

627
00:31:04,480 --> 00:31:08,400
Speaker 2: when they the har mass attack on Israel happened, they

628
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:12,080
Speaker 2: use that as their opportunity to knock down these players,

629
00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:16,720
Speaker 2: the Hezwa Hamas and the Hoogis, and the final piece

630
00:31:16,760 --> 00:31:17,880
Speaker 2: of that puzzle is Iran.

631
00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:21,400
Speaker 1: But do you think that this war will finish in

632
00:31:21,960 --> 00:31:25,000
Speaker 1: this skirmish will finish in a two week period like

633
00:31:25,160 --> 00:31:26,880
Speaker 1: Trump or four period of Trump's talking.

634
00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:29,720
Speaker 2: About No, now that he started it, it's not up

635
00:31:29,760 --> 00:31:31,640
Speaker 2: to him when hostility cease.

636
00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:34,480
Speaker 1: What makes you think that like or is it just

637
00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:35,800
Speaker 1: your experience in war?

638
00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:39,840
Speaker 2: It's just the genie is out of the bottle. And

639
00:31:40,040 --> 00:31:42,840
Speaker 2: this happened in two thousand and three. They land and

640
00:31:42,880 --> 00:31:46,320
Speaker 2: said that's it. Missions accomplished, land on the aircraft carrier,

641
00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:50,160
Speaker 2: that's it. Major combat operations are over. We fought there

642
00:31:50,200 --> 00:31:52,280
Speaker 2: for another seven years, and the same thing will happen

643
00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:53,360
Speaker 2: in Iran.

644
00:31:53,520 --> 00:31:58,000
Speaker 1: I think maybe worse because Iran's is much better organized

645
00:31:58,880 --> 00:32:01,080
Speaker 1: than any of the any of the other countries in

646
00:32:01,120 --> 00:32:04,080
Speaker 1: the zone. I mean other than say Saudi or Israelid

647
00:32:04,160 --> 00:32:05,960
Speaker 1: like much better organized.

648
00:32:06,320 --> 00:32:10,280
Speaker 2: So it's like huge risk, potentially a huge reward. Like

649
00:32:10,320 --> 00:32:13,880
Speaker 2: if they do, they might find a way to subjugate

650
00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:16,760
Speaker 2: and come up with a sympathetic administration and all of

651
00:32:16,800 --> 00:32:19,000
Speaker 2: a sudden, you've got a more compliant kind of Iran,

652
00:32:20,160 --> 00:32:23,400
Speaker 2: and the Middle East could be secured for generations, or

653
00:32:23,960 --> 00:32:28,440
Speaker 2: it could descend into inter regional conflicts what you'll read.

654
00:32:29,320 --> 00:32:31,600
Speaker 2: I think it will descend into conflicts. I don't think

655
00:32:31,640 --> 00:32:33,480
Speaker 2: it will end the way they think it will.

656
00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:39,320
Speaker 1: Well, given the Trump and his administration keeps saying there's

657
00:32:39,320 --> 00:32:40,520
Speaker 1: not going to be any feet on the ground, so

658
00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:42,080
Speaker 1: in other words, are going to put troops in there.

659
00:32:43,160 --> 00:32:46,120
Speaker 1: Bombing it's one thing, and having control all the guys

660
00:32:46,240 --> 00:32:49,960
Speaker 1: is another thing. But these guys are probably burrowing underground,

661
00:32:50,040 --> 00:32:53,080
Speaker 1: and you would seem to meet logical. You've got somebody's

662
00:32:53,080 --> 00:32:55,480
Speaker 1: got to send some people in there to find someone.

663
00:32:56,480 --> 00:33:00,600
Speaker 2: You're off the slippery slope, you know. I think there's

664
00:33:00,760 --> 00:33:04,920
Speaker 2: there'll be that temptation and I just heard this anecdotally

665
00:33:05,000 --> 00:33:08,000
Speaker 2: and then I researched it quickly, and I think it's

666
00:33:07,680 --> 00:33:12,080
Speaker 2: the truth that they've canceled training and leave passes, or

667
00:33:12,120 --> 00:33:15,200
Speaker 2: at least training for the eighty second Airborne and one

668
00:33:15,240 --> 00:33:17,280
Speaker 2: hundred and first Airborne units in America, which are the

669
00:33:17,320 --> 00:33:21,400
Speaker 2: storied parachute units that landed behind enemy lines on D Day.

670
00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:24,640
Speaker 2: They're really famous units. There's a chance they could use

671
00:33:24,640 --> 00:33:28,200
Speaker 2: them to secure key infrastructure. That's like a bread and

672
00:33:28,200 --> 00:33:29,400
Speaker 2: butter kind of job for them.

673
00:33:30,120 --> 00:33:34,240
Speaker 1: But that's sort of what you participated in in Afgani

674
00:33:34,240 --> 00:33:35,520
Speaker 1: to stand in Iraq, like you put a.

675
00:33:35,520 --> 00:33:38,880
Speaker 2: Little bit that's it's more inventional role like parachuting into

676
00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,920
Speaker 2: enemy territory, you know, you know, securing a bridgehead or

677
00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:45,440
Speaker 2: whatever it is. That's they might try and do something

678
00:33:45,480 --> 00:33:49,680
Speaker 2: like that with the either the enrichment sites. This the

679
00:33:49,840 --> 00:33:52,280
Speaker 2: opening of the straight up hor moves. If they want

680
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:55,320
Speaker 2: to reopen it, they might get troops into secure something

681
00:33:56,120 --> 00:33:59,640
Speaker 2: really strategically important. And once you do that, you then

682
00:34:00,040 --> 00:34:02,440
Speaker 2: opening more casualties and then you're really.

683
00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:04,240
Speaker 1: In the grind starts.

684
00:34:04,360 --> 00:34:06,120
Speaker 2: Then the grind starts, then you're in a war.

685
00:34:06,440 --> 00:34:10,719
Speaker 1: And so the the Iranian whatever consoles that I am

686
00:34:10,960 --> 00:34:15,920
Speaker 1: whatever it's called, I MPG, whatever they call themselves. The hardliners.

687
00:34:16,640 --> 00:34:18,960
Speaker 1: Would they be would you consider them to be well

688
00:34:19,000 --> 00:34:21,839
Speaker 1: trained soldiers? There's quite a few.

689
00:34:22,480 --> 00:34:26,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, And I know you spoke to I think it

690
00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:29,399
Speaker 2: was Mick Ryan, Yeah, so, and he was talking about

691
00:34:29,400 --> 00:34:32,440
Speaker 2: it when I was in Bagdad as well, in like

692
00:34:32,480 --> 00:34:34,920
Speaker 2: two thousand and six, two thousand and seven, and the

693
00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:38,160
Speaker 2: Urans had gotten in there and were supplying were they

694
00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:42,600
Speaker 2: They were supplying the militias with these really advanced shaped charges.

695
00:34:42,680 --> 00:34:46,960
Speaker 2: These are like they it's like a copper disc that

696
00:34:46,719 --> 00:34:49,120
Speaker 2: your house on the front of it explosive and when

697
00:34:49,120 --> 00:34:52,120
Speaker 2: when it's blown up, it turns into a molten slug

698
00:34:52,200 --> 00:34:54,839
Speaker 2: that moves it many times a speed of sound. Really

699
00:34:54,840 --> 00:34:59,680
Speaker 2: fast moving can penetrate armor. So tanks, any kind of

700
00:35:00,080 --> 00:35:03,200
Speaker 2: armor can go through quite a really And so the

701
00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:05,440
Speaker 2: Americans were getting hibit these, and they were going through

702
00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:09,719
Speaker 2: the serious armored vehicles like Bradley's and Humbies and all

703
00:35:09,800 --> 00:35:14,080
Speaker 2: that armored Humbies. A lot of Americans lost, you know,

704
00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:19,879
Speaker 2: double triple im amputations. Uranians really gave them hell. And

705
00:35:20,080 --> 00:35:24,399
Speaker 2: I think, I mean Trump's it's not a reason enough.

706
00:35:24,440 --> 00:35:26,160
Speaker 2: Once you're in a war like that, you kind of

707
00:35:26,160 --> 00:35:27,800
Speaker 2: fair game for the for the rest of the region.

708
00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:30,160
Speaker 2: But that's they certainly had a lot of blood on

709
00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:33,200
Speaker 2: their hands from from that. Were thousands of troops killed

710
00:35:33,239 --> 00:35:34,280
Speaker 2: and injured from that stuff.

711
00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:37,000
Speaker 1: What's your sense then, do you think that they will

712
00:35:37,239 --> 00:35:41,160
Speaker 1: deploy a first and eighty second or they won't, I mean,

713
00:35:41,320 --> 00:35:43,000
Speaker 1: or will they rewind they'll be attempted to.

714
00:35:43,200 --> 00:35:46,759
Speaker 2: I think as there be there'll be ground force operators

715
00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:50,719
Speaker 2: in there already. There'll be you know, CIA ground operations

716
00:35:51,160 --> 00:35:54,919
Speaker 2: linked up with more intelligence, well not necessarily that could

717
00:35:54,920 --> 00:36:00,719
Speaker 2: be organizing air strikes. There be, they'll have subterfusion, sabotage

718
00:36:00,719 --> 00:36:03,120
Speaker 2: and all sorts happening because they're able to move a

719
00:36:03,120 --> 00:36:05,759
Speaker 2: bit more freely now. But there'll be grand face in

720
00:36:05,760 --> 00:36:09,200
Speaker 2: there right now that are not the conventionals.

721
00:36:09,080 --> 00:36:11,560
Speaker 1: Not not not uniformed, not uniformed.

722
00:36:12,040 --> 00:36:15,239
Speaker 2: So they'll all be in there for sure. But as

723
00:36:15,280 --> 00:36:18,080
Speaker 2: for uniformed boots on the ground, I mean Trump said

724
00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:20,239
Speaker 2: he hasn't wouldn't rule it out, so I think there'll

725
00:36:20,280 --> 00:36:21,879
Speaker 2: be a chance they'll do it.

726
00:36:22,120 --> 00:36:25,120
Speaker 1: So what's the general view on Israeli soldiers, Because I mean,

727
00:36:25,120 --> 00:36:28,959
Speaker 1: they're already they're now being deployed to Lebanon after has Botta.

728
00:36:29,440 --> 00:36:33,839
Speaker 1: Obviously there's still a force in Gaza doing whatever they

729
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,040
Speaker 1: continue to do there. Does it seem like they've had

730
00:36:37,080 --> 00:36:39,280
Speaker 1: to do any down with the whot Is at this stage.

731
00:36:40,960 --> 00:36:44,359
Speaker 1: Does Israel have enough soldiers to send able to run No.

732
00:36:44,480 --> 00:36:46,960
Speaker 2: I don't well, I think they would. They'll obviously be

733
00:36:47,000 --> 00:36:50,279
Speaker 2: securing their immediate they might have something coalition for sure,

734
00:36:50,320 --> 00:36:52,840
Speaker 2: because they're so they're so good with that region, and

735
00:36:52,920 --> 00:36:57,040
Speaker 2: I know they do. The Masade have a lot of

736
00:36:57,120 --> 00:37:00,279
Speaker 2: undercover agents and operatives that work in Irana as well,

737
00:37:00,360 --> 00:37:02,239
Speaker 2: which is one of the reasons they were so successful.

738
00:37:03,200 --> 00:37:06,520
Speaker 2: In the middle of last year, they had weapons prepositioned drones,

739
00:37:07,400 --> 00:37:10,080
Speaker 2: all the launch sites were being tiged, all their defense sites.

740
00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:13,279
Speaker 2: Because the playbook for the Israelis and Americans has been

741
00:37:13,280 --> 00:37:16,400
Speaker 2: fired for for years. It's like target the ed defense systems,

742
00:37:17,000 --> 00:37:20,759
Speaker 2: get more aircraft in, hit more targets, and then if

743
00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:22,920
Speaker 2: you can hit that crack, you kind of break the

744
00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:26,239
Speaker 2: whole system open. So they've been good at that. Israelis

745
00:37:26,239 --> 00:37:28,320
Speaker 2: have been No one's been been better.

746
00:37:28,120 --> 00:37:31,360
Speaker 1: Than them, MARKI, if you wouldn't mind, I mean you

747
00:37:31,440 --> 00:37:34,359
Speaker 1: obviously stuff backwards, but let's just go back through that

748
00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:37,600
Speaker 1: on what you just said. They've been using the same

749
00:37:37,640 --> 00:37:40,400
Speaker 1: sort of called strategy for a long time. Obviously be

750
00:37:40,480 --> 00:37:44,239
Speaker 1: tactical changes, but just the overall strategy. It seems as

751
00:37:44,239 --> 00:37:48,960
Speaker 1: though what Israel someone's very good at anyway, maybe a

752
00:37:48,960 --> 00:37:54,879
Speaker 1: combination of intelligence people intelligence people. We're talking about knowing

753
00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:58,080
Speaker 1: where everybody's hanging out, you know, where the leadership is,

754
00:37:59,040 --> 00:38:03,400
Speaker 1: where the very sites are. That stuff takes years. Mossad

755
00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:05,280
Speaker 1: seem to be really good at this stuff.

756
00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:06,560
Speaker 2: Ye really good, and.

757
00:38:08,360 --> 00:38:10,880
Speaker 1: I of wondered how is they do it?

758
00:38:10,920 --> 00:38:11,120
Speaker 2: Though?

759
00:38:11,360 --> 00:38:14,799
Speaker 1: Do they do it by paying local people off? I mean,

760
00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:18,879
Speaker 1: do they get people to be treason all.

761
00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:23,000
Speaker 2: The above, like they use human intelligence by getting agents

762
00:38:23,000 --> 00:38:26,120
Speaker 2: to work with them. They hack I think the way

763
00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:28,280
Speaker 2: they got coming and I read this in open sources.

764
00:38:28,320 --> 00:38:30,800
Speaker 2: They had hacked some of the traffic cameras in that area.

765
00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:34,320
Speaker 2: They picked up vehicles that were associated with his protection

766
00:38:34,440 --> 00:38:37,360
Speaker 2: detail that were in that area, so they knew he

767
00:38:37,440 --> 00:38:39,439
Speaker 2: was likely there. Then they mashed it with some human

768
00:38:39,440 --> 00:38:43,799
Speaker 2: intelligence and probably signals intelligence. So you do need all

769
00:38:43,840 --> 00:38:47,440
Speaker 2: those working together, everything, satellite, everything, and you need to

770
00:38:48,520 --> 00:38:50,560
Speaker 2: fuse all that information so you've got a clear picture

771
00:38:50,560 --> 00:38:53,080
Speaker 2: of what what might be happening on the ground.

772
00:38:53,200 --> 00:38:55,800
Speaker 1: But it's a probability event though probability.

773
00:38:56,000 --> 00:38:57,680
Speaker 2: They're trying to say, look, we've got now, I got

774
00:38:57,760 --> 00:39:00,319
Speaker 2: very high confidence that he's in this building.

775
00:39:01,080 --> 00:39:02,920
Speaker 1: And with you, because he was there with all these

776
00:39:04,600 --> 00:39:09,440
Speaker 1: senior leadership team, let's call it. And then someone that

777
00:39:09,560 --> 00:39:12,640
Speaker 1: just says, okay, well, let's target that particular position at

778
00:39:12,640 --> 00:39:19,120
Speaker 1: that particular moment, that particular day. And it's interesting you

779
00:39:19,160 --> 00:39:21,880
Speaker 1: just said like that, they get satellited information and then they,

780
00:39:21,920 --> 00:39:24,279
Speaker 1: as you say, they hack into the cameras because there'll

781
00:39:24,280 --> 00:39:26,600
Speaker 1: be cameras everywhere in a run for sure, because it's

782
00:39:26,600 --> 00:39:28,799
Speaker 1: that type of state where they want watch what the

783
00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:30,440
Speaker 1: citizens are doing. They wouldn't make sure. No I was

784
00:39:30,480 --> 00:39:33,120
Speaker 1: playing up, but no one even knew they were being hacked.

785
00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:38,040
Speaker 2: No, not necessarily. No, they just again that they might

786
00:39:38,040 --> 00:39:39,880
Speaker 2: have done this ten years ago. They've been sitting on

787
00:39:39,920 --> 00:39:42,440
Speaker 2: it for that long until that need to. It's like

788
00:39:42,480 --> 00:39:43,320
Speaker 2: that page operation.

789
00:39:43,719 --> 00:39:48,640
Speaker 1: Unbelievable that they were selling pages to Lebanese Hesbela, yeah

790
00:39:48,760 --> 00:39:52,239
Speaker 1: or Hesla, and they sat on it for years and

791
00:39:52,239 --> 00:39:55,320
Speaker 1: they just decided to buy them all over once. It's mental.

792
00:39:55,760 --> 00:39:57,840
Speaker 2: I'm not laughing about it, but it's obviously.

793
00:39:58,480 --> 00:40:00,279
Speaker 1: The intellect of it is crazy.

794
00:40:01,160 --> 00:40:03,880
Speaker 2: In terms of an operation. That's yeah, it's crazy what

795
00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:07,120
Speaker 2: they've what they've been able to achieve. And obviously they've

796
00:40:07,120 --> 00:40:10,399
Speaker 2: had so much time being surrounded by people that and

797
00:40:10,520 --> 00:40:12,840
Speaker 2: it Ryan said that, you know, we would wipe his

798
00:40:12,920 --> 00:40:16,879
Speaker 2: railph the map, so they they did take it seriously. Yeah,

799
00:40:16,920 --> 00:40:17,680
Speaker 2: we're now war over.

800
00:40:18,400 --> 00:40:20,960
Speaker 1: So for years and years and years have been setting

801
00:40:21,040 --> 00:40:25,960
Speaker 1: up this process like it's been a major stitch up,

802
00:40:26,200 --> 00:40:28,880
Speaker 1: as we say here in Austrated Yeah, a major stitch

803
00:40:28,960 --> 00:40:32,719
Speaker 1: up at political and at a personal level. And then

804
00:40:34,280 --> 00:40:36,440
Speaker 1: would it be the case that let's call it the c

805
00:40:37,120 --> 00:40:39,680
Speaker 1: c I A or the Americans would be shared with

806
00:40:39,680 --> 00:40:40,920
Speaker 1: that information the whole time?

807
00:40:41,480 --> 00:40:45,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, they'd be collaborating pretty closely, ither think, Yeah sure.

808
00:40:45,080 --> 00:40:48,160
Speaker 1: And so is this an example of where tech is

809
00:40:48,239 --> 00:40:49,160
Speaker 1: changing warfare?

810
00:40:49,719 --> 00:40:54,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's always It's funny. I remember being in Afghanistan

811
00:40:54,400 --> 00:40:58,000
Speaker 2: and getting briefed on American special capabilities. These are really

812
00:40:58,040 --> 00:41:01,640
Speaker 2: advanced ones. They had the tracking or weapons or whatever.

813
00:41:02,920 --> 00:41:06,120
Speaker 2: And for all that we had so much stuff, they're

814
00:41:06,280 --> 00:41:08,720
Speaker 2: all the best tech in the world. All these tricks

815
00:41:08,719 --> 00:41:11,880
Speaker 2: and traps and aircraft and none of them mattered. In

816
00:41:11,880 --> 00:41:13,200
Speaker 2: the end, we still didn't win.

817
00:41:14,040 --> 00:41:15,719
Speaker 1: Yeah, So it's what do you put that down to.

818
00:41:17,040 --> 00:41:21,640
Speaker 2: It comes down to political political priorities and political will

819
00:41:22,160 --> 00:41:25,000
Speaker 2: and whether it's an achievable mission in the first place.

820
00:41:25,600 --> 00:41:27,640
Speaker 2: And I think we kind of wasn't. What we were

821
00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:30,479
Speaker 2: trying to do wasn't really achievable. And there also wasn't

822
00:41:30,480 --> 00:41:33,400
Speaker 2: the political impetus to make it happen because it was

823
00:41:33,400 --> 00:41:36,640
Speaker 2: too it would have been too costly a mission.

824
00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:40,440
Speaker 1: And relative to the benefit relatives.

825
00:41:40,400 --> 00:41:43,239
Speaker 2: The benefit, this is a terrible trade off. Yeah.

826
00:41:43,320 --> 00:41:45,279
Speaker 1: So, and of course if you get a change in

827
00:41:45,320 --> 00:41:48,239
Speaker 1: the administration, that makes a big difference, because then you

828
00:41:48,320 --> 00:41:50,440
Speaker 1: got Biden come in, et cetera. And then others sort

829
00:41:50,480 --> 00:41:52,759
Speaker 1: of say, well, that's too hard, we're getting out of it.

830
00:41:52,760 --> 00:41:54,200
Speaker 1: But in fact, I think it was Trump pulled them

831
00:41:54,200 --> 00:41:55,320
Speaker 1: out in the end.

832
00:41:55,320 --> 00:41:58,440
Speaker 2: Biden pulled them out Trump. I think Trump wanted to.

833
00:41:58,480 --> 00:42:00,960
Speaker 2: He reduced the size of the but here on to

834
00:42:00,960 --> 00:42:04,680
Speaker 2: retain some of the key bases there, I think Bagroom

835
00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:07,680
Speaker 2: and a few others, and then Biden pulled.

836
00:42:07,520 --> 00:42:08,680
Speaker 1: Hi out of Afghanistan.

837
00:42:08,719 --> 00:42:11,919
Speaker 2: That's right, but almost I can't put I don't put

838
00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:15,360
Speaker 2: too much blame on him because we deluded ourselves for

839
00:42:15,400 --> 00:42:16,880
Speaker 2: a long time as a military that it was an

840
00:42:16,920 --> 00:42:19,960
Speaker 2: achievable task and it wasn't achievable.

841
00:42:20,280 --> 00:42:22,640
Speaker 1: Did you think do you when you say we, do

842
00:42:22,719 --> 00:42:25,920
Speaker 1: you think you were someone who was in those theaters?

843
00:42:26,200 --> 00:42:29,560
Speaker 1: Do you feel as though you were sort of deluded

844
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:30,040
Speaker 1: a little bit?

845
00:42:30,600 --> 00:42:32,840
Speaker 2: Oh? Yeah, like I was. You've got to be a

846
00:42:32,840 --> 00:42:35,200
Speaker 2: bit optimistic, even if it's a hard job. You've got

847
00:42:35,239 --> 00:42:37,000
Speaker 2: to be optimistic and you have to work towards.

848
00:42:36,840 --> 00:42:39,280
Speaker 1: There's a difference between optimism delusion, I guess exactly.

849
00:42:39,360 --> 00:42:42,000
Speaker 2: But towards the end, I was like, this isn't working.

850
00:42:42,120 --> 00:42:44,640
Speaker 2: Because I've been every year for I think four or

851
00:42:44,640 --> 00:42:47,560
Speaker 2: five years, and I was like, this isn't working because

852
00:42:47,560 --> 00:42:51,840
Speaker 2: it has gotten worse. We get more casualties, We've thrown

853
00:42:51,880 --> 00:42:54,560
Speaker 2: more equipment and troops and firepower of the problem, and

854
00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:58,000
Speaker 2: we're still not getting ahead. And the reason was because

855
00:42:58,000 --> 00:43:01,840
Speaker 2: we were bound by Pakistan, so we couldn't stop ammunition

856
00:43:01,920 --> 00:43:05,440
Speaker 2: and troops and IDs of the roadside bombs coming over

857
00:43:05,480 --> 00:43:10,320
Speaker 2: the border. There wasn't a functioning Afghan government and police force.

858
00:43:11,160 --> 00:43:14,640
Speaker 2: They are only effective around theable, So it wasn't a

859
00:43:14,680 --> 00:43:16,560
Speaker 2: mission wicked to achieve realistically.

860
00:43:17,040 --> 00:43:22,000
Speaker 1: So do you think that this is this event right

861
00:43:22,040 --> 00:43:31,359
Speaker 1: now more likely to create a larger event or more

862
00:43:31,480 --> 00:43:34,720
Speaker 1: likely to fizzle like everything else that's happened like Afghanistani

863
00:43:34,840 --> 00:43:35,239
Speaker 1: rock etc.

864
00:43:36,560 --> 00:43:40,879
Speaker 2: It's a good question. I think that it's if ever

865
00:43:40,920 --> 00:43:44,239
Speaker 2: there's been a probability of a major escalation something that

866
00:43:44,400 --> 00:43:45,919
Speaker 2: this makes it more likely.

867
00:43:46,000 --> 00:43:49,160
Speaker 1: Again, why do you think that then, Because.

868
00:43:49,120 --> 00:43:52,960
Speaker 2: It's there's multi front wars happening at the same time.

869
00:43:53,000 --> 00:43:56,879
Speaker 2: If you go back to that, we've got major European war,

870
00:43:57,160 --> 00:44:00,239
Speaker 2: major Middle Eastern war, and the chance of as your

871
00:44:00,239 --> 00:44:02,920
Speaker 2: conflict in the Pacific, of quite a high chance if

872
00:44:03,440 --> 00:44:08,160
Speaker 2: in Taiwan, Taiwan, if you believe what the Chinese presidents

873
00:44:08,160 --> 00:44:11,440
Speaker 2: are saying, you know, we are going to reunify with Taiwan.

874
00:44:11,520 --> 00:44:13,000
Speaker 2: We're going to do it. It's just a matter of when.

875
00:44:13,960 --> 00:44:15,640
Speaker 2: And if you go all the way back to say

876
00:44:15,640 --> 00:44:18,320
Speaker 2: the start of World War two, even like the early

877
00:44:18,440 --> 00:44:22,080
Speaker 2: like the summer of nineteen forty one, for example, the

878
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:23,960
Speaker 2: war had been going for about a year by that point,

879
00:44:25,320 --> 00:44:28,640
Speaker 2: almost two years, and then there's no Eastern Front that

880
00:44:28,719 --> 00:44:32,560
Speaker 2: hasn't opened up, So the Germans haven't started the operation

881
00:44:32,640 --> 00:44:36,920
Speaker 2: to enforce Russia. The Americans haven't been attacked at Pearl

882
00:44:36,920 --> 00:44:40,880
Speaker 2: Harbor yet. There's just some battle of Britains being fought.

883
00:44:40,920 --> 00:44:44,239
Speaker 2: There's some action in North Africa and Scandinavia, and that's it.

884
00:44:44,680 --> 00:44:47,160
Speaker 2: So I didn't really feel like a world war in

885
00:44:47,239 --> 00:44:50,400
Speaker 2: ninety forty one, but within six months the whole world was,

886
00:44:50,800 --> 00:44:54,320
Speaker 2: you know, a flame. So I keep seeing a similar

887
00:44:54,360 --> 00:44:57,600
Speaker 2: parallel here. I'm like, there are these major spotfires that

888
00:44:57,719 --> 00:44:59,839
Speaker 2: if you, if you rewound the clock even ten years,

889
00:45:00,080 --> 00:45:02,480
Speaker 2: be shocked by one of them. We now have two

890
00:45:02,560 --> 00:45:06,399
Speaker 2: happening at once, with the possibility of the third one opening.

891
00:45:06,120 --> 00:45:11,960
Speaker 1: Up, the third one being the Pacific. The Pacific, and

892
00:45:12,000 --> 00:45:15,960
Speaker 1: so the ones you're referring to is Rushia Ukraine. If

893
00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:20,120
Speaker 1: I'm putent and I'm sitting here feeling, I think to

894
00:45:20,160 --> 00:45:21,960
Speaker 1: myself or the world has been criticizing me for what

895
00:45:21,960 --> 00:45:24,719
Speaker 1: I'm doing in the Ukraine. Then the next in my

896
00:45:24,719 --> 00:45:26,000
Speaker 1: next per I think, I said, yeah, but hang on,

897
00:45:26,080 --> 00:45:28,120
Speaker 1: the people criticizing me, you're doing exactly the same thing

898
00:45:28,120 --> 00:45:31,839
Speaker 1: and you run. Therefore, I'm now justified doing what I'm doing.

899
00:45:31,960 --> 00:45:34,640
Speaker 1: And by the way, the tensions off, the tension has

900
00:45:34,640 --> 00:45:37,960
Speaker 1: come away from Ukraine. And I'm also thinking myself. America

901
00:45:38,080 --> 00:45:40,520
Speaker 1: right now is now spending a lot of money a

902
00:45:40,520 --> 00:45:44,319
Speaker 1: lot of times, sending a lot of ordinances. They're going

903
00:45:44,320 --> 00:45:50,560
Speaker 1: to run out of stuff, money, stuff, political will everything.

904
00:45:50,880 --> 00:45:52,520
Speaker 1: So this is a good time for me to just

905
00:45:52,560 --> 00:45:55,799
Speaker 1: put more pressure on Ukraine. Which is like, if I'm

906
00:45:55,920 --> 00:45:58,239
Speaker 1: doing the art of the deal, if I'm negotiating, then

907
00:45:58,280 --> 00:46:00,359
Speaker 1: if I'm over in China, I'm thinking of myself, well

908
00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:03,440
Speaker 1: maybe now no one can really criticize me America. The

909
00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:07,839
Speaker 1: ones I'm worried about is America, uk Aucus, Japan were

910
00:46:07,960 --> 00:46:10,760
Speaker 1: they're the ones I'm worried about criticizing me. If I'm China,

911
00:46:11,120 --> 00:46:12,160
Speaker 1: they can't criticize me.

912
00:46:12,520 --> 00:46:17,160
Speaker 2: No, people have People don't think about this in the West.

913
00:46:17,280 --> 00:46:21,960
Speaker 2: We especially because of Iraq for example, it's very hard

914
00:46:22,040 --> 00:46:25,799
Speaker 2: for Russia to take how seriously in Ukraine when we say,

915
00:46:25,840 --> 00:46:28,200
Speaker 2: you know, don't, don't invade that country, it's the wrong

916
00:46:28,239 --> 00:46:30,839
Speaker 2: thing to do, when we did exactly the same thing

917
00:46:31,000 --> 00:46:33,200
Speaker 2: not that long ago, and we've done it again now.

918
00:46:33,239 --> 00:46:35,080
Speaker 2: So I'm not talking about right or wrong here, I'm

919
00:46:35,120 --> 00:46:36,560
Speaker 2: just saying that's the dynamic.

920
00:46:37,120 --> 00:46:37,760
Speaker 1: It's the logic.

921
00:46:37,800 --> 00:46:39,560
Speaker 2: It's the logic that plays out. It's like, who are

922
00:46:39,560 --> 00:46:42,400
Speaker 2: you to now tell us not to take Taiwan when

923
00:46:42,440 --> 00:46:44,680
Speaker 2: you've just done that in in Iran.

924
00:46:44,680 --> 00:46:47,239
Speaker 1: And you know, you did take us back to World

925
00:46:47,239 --> 00:46:49,719
Speaker 1: War two, And it sort of makes a little bit

926
00:46:49,719 --> 00:46:52,320
Speaker 1: of sense because Musolini came into the into the Fray.

927
00:46:52,800 --> 00:46:56,680
Speaker 1: He then decided to attack Greece, and then the Greek

928
00:46:56,760 --> 00:46:59,839
Speaker 1: Greeks kicked him out and Germany had to go back

929
00:46:59,840 --> 00:47:03,279
Speaker 1: and support their ally and they took control. And then

930
00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:06,279
Speaker 1: of course, little bit after that, the Japanese Si miles

931
00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:08,960
Speaker 1: of a crack too, and then it was just one

932
00:47:09,040 --> 00:47:12,640
Speaker 1: cascade after another. As someone who's you know, none of

933
00:47:12,719 --> 00:47:16,080
Speaker 1: us have been in war. We're all sort of you know, citizens,

934
00:47:16,280 --> 00:47:18,879
Speaker 1: citizen warriors, all of us. The best we ever doing

935
00:47:18,880 --> 00:47:20,800
Speaker 1: close to wars we get in the jiu jitsu mats

936
00:47:21,400 --> 00:47:25,799
Speaker 1: as we ever get. There's no worse. I think what

937
00:47:25,880 --> 00:47:28,520
Speaker 1: you've done is worse. But you've actually been there and

938
00:47:28,560 --> 00:47:31,879
Speaker 1: you've seen how these things can escalate. Do you think

939
00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:35,520
Speaker 1: then that irrespect of all the technology, it comes down

940
00:47:35,560 --> 00:47:40,000
Speaker 1: to a game of who wants it the most just.

941
00:47:39,920 --> 00:47:44,840
Speaker 2: About well, yeah, that and the kind of the national

942
00:47:44,880 --> 00:47:50,279
Speaker 2: imperative to win is what matters most. Like Ukraine, that's

943
00:47:50,680 --> 00:47:51,320
Speaker 2: their backs.

944
00:47:51,080 --> 00:47:53,399
Speaker 1: Against the war they want to win. They've got to win,

945
00:47:53,719 --> 00:47:54,399
Speaker 1: and they talk this.

946
00:47:54,360 --> 00:47:57,440
Speaker 2: Is where they talk about theorists will talk about that

947
00:47:57,960 --> 00:48:03,000
Speaker 2: just war versus you, war choice or what is it,

948
00:48:03,040 --> 00:48:06,759
Speaker 2: war of choice versus the es central war. We're in

949
00:48:06,760 --> 00:48:08,360
Speaker 2: a war of choice here and we've been doing that

950
00:48:08,400 --> 00:48:10,439
Speaker 2: for a while. So they're much harder to win once

951
00:48:10,440 --> 00:48:11,240
Speaker 2: they get hard.

952
00:48:11,560 --> 00:48:16,360
Speaker 1: Because, like you know, if they're going to secure places

953
00:48:16,360 --> 00:48:18,839
Speaker 1: in Iran, because if they don't, if they don't secure it,

954
00:48:18,880 --> 00:48:20,840
Speaker 1: if that there's no point bombing the shit out of it,

955
00:48:20,880 --> 00:48:24,000
Speaker 1: and they're not securing situations because they'll go back to

956
00:48:24,040 --> 00:48:26,520
Speaker 1: doing what they're doing before. I mean, so you've got

957
00:48:26,560 --> 00:48:28,920
Speaker 1: to go secure it. If you don't secure it, if

958
00:48:28,920 --> 00:48:30,799
Speaker 1: you try to secure it, I should say, they're going

959
00:48:30,800 --> 00:48:33,799
Speaker 1: to say, well, hey, this is my country. I'm going

960
00:48:33,800 --> 00:48:36,440
Speaker 1: to fight to the death, a bit like the Ukrainians,

961
00:48:37,200 --> 00:48:40,480
Speaker 1: like you're not giving me any choice unless there's some

962
00:48:40,480 --> 00:48:42,680
Speaker 1: sort of revolution or something, which is maybe what they're

963
00:48:42,680 --> 00:48:44,640
Speaker 1: hoping for. What about that part of it.

964
00:48:44,719 --> 00:48:48,240
Speaker 2: Well, that's that's what they're homeful. They're hoping opposition government

965
00:48:48,320 --> 00:48:52,319
Speaker 2: forms that can assert control over the place, and that

966
00:48:52,360 --> 00:48:54,000
Speaker 2: they don't need to go in there with troops and

967
00:48:55,320 --> 00:48:55,640
Speaker 2: do it.

968
00:48:56,200 --> 00:48:57,680
Speaker 1: That sounds a bit fanciful to me.

969
00:48:57,719 --> 00:48:59,880
Speaker 2: It does sound fanciful, I mean.

970
00:49:00,400 --> 00:49:06,439
Speaker 1: Because it's not like the Iranian Presidential guard. I think

971
00:49:06,440 --> 00:49:08,880
Speaker 1: that's what they're call But whatever they're called, there's like

972
00:49:08,960 --> 00:49:10,640
Speaker 1: a million of them or something on it. There's a

973
00:49:10,640 --> 00:49:11,520
Speaker 1: big body.

974
00:49:11,239 --> 00:49:14,280
Speaker 2: Force, yeah, I think across all the branches, so like army,

975
00:49:14,280 --> 00:49:18,200
Speaker 2: police forces, Republican guard I think it's about a million

976
00:49:18,239 --> 00:49:20,560
Speaker 2: from total, but it's a huge force. So they want

977
00:49:20,560 --> 00:49:24,200
Speaker 2: to suppress a revolution. They might still be able to

978
00:49:24,200 --> 00:49:27,560
Speaker 2: do it. I know they're breaking down their ability to

979
00:49:28,040 --> 00:49:32,360
Speaker 2: the structures, the military equipment, all that stuff is being destroyed.

980
00:49:32,400 --> 00:49:35,320
Speaker 2: But it doesn't mean that out of the ashes is

981
00:49:35,320 --> 00:49:37,840
Speaker 2: going to come this opposition and everything's going to be fine.

982
00:49:38,040 --> 00:49:40,400
Speaker 2: It might descend into civil war, like who.

983
00:49:40,280 --> 00:49:42,239
Speaker 1: Knows, but that's what I'm saying. It could end up

984
00:49:42,239 --> 00:49:43,600
Speaker 1: being a civil war. But the ones are going to win,

985
00:49:43,719 --> 00:49:46,480
Speaker 1: the ones with the guns and the training in.

986
00:49:46,440 --> 00:49:49,520
Speaker 2: Afghanistan, after is it, after ten years of the Soviets

987
00:49:49,560 --> 00:49:53,160
Speaker 2: fighting there for ten years, it became kind of war audism, and.

988
00:49:54,760 --> 00:49:58,920
Speaker 1: I'd imagine, you know, the push for power, So right now,

989
00:49:58,960 --> 00:50:03,560
Speaker 1: of course you run as anointed their new leader who's

990
00:50:03,800 --> 00:50:09,680
Speaker 1: the commande's son. Do you think that he would be

991
00:50:09,719 --> 00:50:11,960
Speaker 1: a dead man walking? I mean, it would it be

992
00:50:11,960 --> 00:50:14,360
Speaker 1: a case that the Israelis or the Mossad or the

993
00:50:14,440 --> 00:50:16,839
Speaker 1: United States of all of them know exactly where he's

994
00:50:16,840 --> 00:50:18,560
Speaker 1: hanging out because they've been looking at the cameras.

995
00:50:18,680 --> 00:50:21,319
Speaker 2: That would be pretty desperate, yeah, to get him to

996
00:50:21,440 --> 00:50:24,520
Speaker 2: target him, I think. But all but you're right that

997
00:50:24,600 --> 00:50:26,839
Speaker 2: all this is like they don't actually know where it's

998
00:50:26,840 --> 00:50:28,719
Speaker 2: going to go. And once you start a war like that,

999
00:50:28,840 --> 00:50:32,799
Speaker 2: you can't really predict. You can't predict what how it's

1000
00:50:32,800 --> 00:50:34,440
Speaker 2: going to look at that at the end, it's just

1001
00:50:35,400 --> 00:50:38,120
Speaker 2: it's out of their hands. Now. I think the argument

1002
00:50:38,160 --> 00:50:42,000
Speaker 2: is always you better the devil, you know, and sometimes yeah,

1003
00:50:42,040 --> 00:50:42,839
Speaker 2: sometimes yeah.

1004
00:50:43,080 --> 00:50:46,120
Speaker 1: I mean, if we just talk about the net effect

1005
00:50:46,160 --> 00:50:49,160
Speaker 1: on the world, the net effect of the world's economy,

1006
00:50:50,000 --> 00:50:52,880
Speaker 1: you know, unfortunately we're in a region where we are

1007
00:50:53,080 --> 00:50:55,759
Speaker 1: the biggest export is something that the whole world still

1008
00:50:55,760 --> 00:51:00,320
Speaker 1: relies on fossil fuels, well gas, gas in particular oil

1009
00:51:00,360 --> 00:51:04,879
Speaker 1: for sure. Still there are other oil producing countries, but

1010
00:51:05,040 --> 00:51:08,000
Speaker 1: a lot of gas comes out of that area, and

1011
00:51:08,040 --> 00:51:10,920
Speaker 1: it's got to come through the straight sea of war. Wars.

1012
00:51:12,480 --> 00:51:18,200
Speaker 1: Is it possible for Trump to control that with you

1013
00:51:18,320 --> 00:51:20,319
Speaker 1: with all the navy that he's got sitting there, can

1014
00:51:20,320 --> 00:51:22,960
Speaker 1: he control that and sort of protect those all tankers

1015
00:51:22,960 --> 00:51:26,520
Speaker 1: to come through. Let's put the insurance side part aside.

1016
00:51:26,719 --> 00:51:29,400
Speaker 2: Yeah they can. I know, they've they would have war

1017
00:51:29,520 --> 00:51:31,759
Speaker 2: gained this a lot, and they'll have the ability to

1018
00:51:31,760 --> 00:51:33,680
Speaker 2: do it. But it will take a lot of a

1019
00:51:33,719 --> 00:51:36,319
Speaker 2: lot of navel as said, it's a lot of Like

1020
00:51:36,440 --> 00:51:38,919
Speaker 2: it's only thirty nine kilometers wide at the mouth, it's

1021
00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:42,480
Speaker 2: like tiny, yeah, tiny space, but yeah, they were twenty

1022
00:51:42,520 --> 00:51:45,560
Speaker 2: four miles whatever that is kilumbus not big, and so

1023
00:51:45,640 --> 00:51:48,320
Speaker 2: they'll have a plan to secure and keep the traffic moving,

1024
00:51:48,680 --> 00:51:50,920
Speaker 2: but it's another train of resources.

1025
00:51:50,960 --> 00:51:52,440
Speaker 1: Like it's how long can they do that for?

1026
00:51:52,520 --> 00:51:53,440
Speaker 2: Though? I don't know?

1027
00:51:53,520 --> 00:51:55,120
Speaker 1: I mean, like I can't imagine what one of those

1028
00:51:55,120 --> 00:51:57,160
Speaker 1: big aircraft carriers cost to run.

1029
00:51:57,560 --> 00:52:00,080
Speaker 2: Enormous, enormous and one's been already been on deployment eight

1030
00:52:00,120 --> 00:52:02,880
Speaker 2: months age to have for cyclight out soon. So you

1031
00:52:02,920 --> 00:52:05,200
Speaker 2: don't have and you make a point, you don't have

1032
00:52:05,880 --> 00:52:09,600
Speaker 2: infinite resources. So if another front did open up somewhere

1033
00:52:09,600 --> 00:52:12,759
Speaker 2: in the world, what happens now? How are you going

1034
00:52:12,840 --> 00:52:16,120
Speaker 2: to deal with. You got all of a sudden half

1035
00:52:16,160 --> 00:52:18,600
Speaker 2: your resources diverted to another front. This is what happened

1036
00:52:18,640 --> 00:52:22,920
Speaker 2: in Iran, sorry, Iraq and Afghanistan. It was effectively a

1037
00:52:22,920 --> 00:52:24,680
Speaker 2: two front war and we just didn't have what we

1038
00:52:24,719 --> 00:52:25,319
Speaker 2: needed to win.

1039
00:52:26,280 --> 00:52:29,520
Speaker 1: Did you think that? Because the oil price the last

1040
00:52:29,560 --> 00:52:31,439
Speaker 1: couple of days has been like you get brain demy,

1041
00:52:31,440 --> 00:52:32,719
Speaker 1: he's trying to follow it, but it has gone up,

1042
00:52:32,719 --> 00:52:34,759
Speaker 1: it's gone down, it's gone up. He has gone back

1043
00:52:34,800 --> 00:52:37,840
Speaker 1: down that whilst you and I are talking, and the

1044
00:52:37,880 --> 00:52:40,359
Speaker 1: share markets responded each time. So you know, we lost

1045
00:52:40,360 --> 00:52:42,760
Speaker 1: ada billion off the share market of the ASEX yesterday,

1046
00:52:42,800 --> 00:52:45,880
Speaker 1: but it's recovering today and people sort of looking at

1047
00:52:45,880 --> 00:52:48,200
Speaker 1: their superinnovation and you know the thing of war, what

1048
00:52:48,280 --> 00:52:52,160
Speaker 1: the hell America would be worse? Do you think the

1049
00:52:52,200 --> 00:52:58,560
Speaker 1: political pressure relating to oil prices is the strength? Is

1050
00:52:58,600 --> 00:53:03,040
Speaker 1: the the string in the bow of Iran that they

1051
00:53:03,080 --> 00:53:04,239
Speaker 1: haven't played enough of yet.

1052
00:53:04,680 --> 00:53:06,960
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a big pressure point. And also the Gulf

1053
00:53:07,000 --> 00:53:09,960
Speaker 2: States will be pressuring America to keep it as short

1054
00:53:10,080 --> 00:53:12,759
Speaker 2: as short a war as they can because their economy

1055
00:53:12,880 --> 00:53:17,600
Speaker 2: relies on expats and all the oil industries and whatnot,

1056
00:53:17,680 --> 00:53:20,680
Speaker 2: so they want to keep this as short as they can,

1057
00:53:21,680 --> 00:53:23,680
Speaker 2: and then the average consumer in the West, it's going

1058
00:53:23,719 --> 00:53:27,800
Speaker 2: to hire inflation. I think the predicted five percent flash,

1059
00:53:27,880 --> 00:53:31,359
Speaker 2: we've already had interest rates or like, there's a lot

1060
00:53:31,440 --> 00:53:32,319
Speaker 2: to deal with it once.

1061
00:53:32,640 --> 00:53:35,120
Speaker 1: Do you think they've worked there? Do you think the

1062
00:53:35,120 --> 00:53:37,879
Speaker 1: the iler they knew this stuff before.

1063
00:53:38,239 --> 00:53:41,600
Speaker 2: They know they've got some sway. But one advantage for

1064
00:53:41,600 --> 00:53:43,520
Speaker 2: the Americans is I think only three percent of the

1065
00:53:43,560 --> 00:53:45,480
Speaker 2: exports that come out of they go to the US.

1066
00:53:45,280 --> 00:53:47,879
Speaker 1: Because US is quite self self sufficient when it comes

1067
00:53:47,920 --> 00:53:51,280
Speaker 1: to oil. But the rest of US, like Asia, Asia

1068
00:53:51,400 --> 00:53:54,400
Speaker 1: suffers big time, particularly with gas and oil and a

1069
00:53:54,400 --> 00:53:57,319
Speaker 1: lot of in Australia, like a lot of our we've

1070
00:53:57,360 --> 00:54:00,160
Speaker 1: only got a month's worth of supplies.

1071
00:54:00,400 --> 00:54:03,040
Speaker 2: Yeah literally, yeah, thirty five days.

1072
00:54:02,840 --> 00:54:05,960
Speaker 1: Or yeah, yeah, maybe you could explain what is this

1073
00:54:06,440 --> 00:54:08,319
Speaker 1: general I don't even know about this, but I heard

1074
00:54:08,320 --> 00:54:10,239
Speaker 1: about it on the news, but the general consensus around

1075
00:54:10,280 --> 00:54:13,520
Speaker 1: the world that there's everyone should carry ninety days supply,

1076
00:54:14,480 --> 00:54:15,960
Speaker 1: every nation should carry nine days.

1077
00:54:16,120 --> 00:54:18,640
Speaker 2: They need to Yeah, they need to expand it. I

1078
00:54:18,719 --> 00:54:21,160
Speaker 2: know it's expensive to hold those reserves, and I don't

1079
00:54:21,160 --> 00:54:23,839
Speaker 2: know what some of the other countries have, like the US,

1080
00:54:23,840 --> 00:54:26,680
Speaker 2: for example, but I know here, we've got about thirty

1081
00:54:26,880 --> 00:54:29,840
Speaker 2: something days. If that runs out all of a sudden,

1082
00:54:30,200 --> 00:54:35,520
Speaker 2: you know, all heavy industries, hospitals, medicines, foods, all, it

1083
00:54:35,600 --> 00:54:39,560
Speaker 2: all stops, farmers, farmers, it all stops. The economy will

1084
00:54:39,600 --> 00:54:42,760
Speaker 2: just grin into a wholt. And if Australia in particular,

1085
00:54:42,800 --> 00:54:44,640
Speaker 2: if we can't control and all the tools and get

1086
00:54:45,440 --> 00:54:48,880
Speaker 2: imports coming in, if there's a Pacific war, for example,

1087
00:54:48,960 --> 00:54:52,000
Speaker 2: we'll run out of we'll go to fuel rationing and

1088
00:54:52,000 --> 00:54:54,520
Speaker 2: it'll be a very different economy once that happens. It'd

1089
00:54:54,560 --> 00:54:57,200
Speaker 2: be scary, be scary. Yeah, it won't have been in

1090
00:54:57,200 --> 00:54:58,560
Speaker 2: that territory since World War Two.

1091
00:54:58,680 --> 00:55:00,759
Speaker 1: Do you think we would be voe? I mean, like

1092
00:55:00,800 --> 00:55:07,160
Speaker 1: if we're on these vulnerable Jim Nolan when he was

1093
00:55:07,160 --> 00:55:09,040
Speaker 1: a senator, I'm not so much prior to that, but

1094
00:55:09,200 --> 00:55:10,520
Speaker 1: I used to follow him a lot when he's a

1095
00:55:10,560 --> 00:55:16,680
Speaker 1: senator and he's his thinking back then before he passed away,

1096
00:55:16,880 --> 00:55:21,640
Speaker 1: was about how vulnerable we are to our neighbors if

1097
00:55:21,640 --> 00:55:24,319
Speaker 1: anybody decided to sort of poke the nose in here.

1098
00:55:24,400 --> 00:55:26,439
Speaker 1: We're a country full of resources, even though we don't

1099
00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:30,400
Speaker 1: we don't mind most of it, but were full of resources.

1100
00:55:30,520 --> 00:55:33,520
Speaker 1: We're a very attractive place to come to in terms

1101
00:55:33,560 --> 00:55:38,680
Speaker 1: of but we're completely undermanned, both in terms of people

1102
00:55:38,760 --> 00:55:43,120
Speaker 1: joining the army or the military, but also you know,

1103
00:55:43,600 --> 00:55:48,680
Speaker 1: our equipment hopeless. We could not defend ourselves, could be.

1104
00:55:50,239 --> 00:55:52,879
Speaker 2: For a short time, and then we wouldn't be able

1105
00:55:52,920 --> 00:55:55,400
Speaker 2: to We don't have the kind of mass to be

1106
00:55:55,440 --> 00:55:58,200
Speaker 2: able to do it. And I think our entire military

1107
00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:02,080
Speaker 2: is I think seventy thousand rough doesn't even fill the MCG.

1108
00:56:03,080 --> 00:56:06,360
Speaker 2: It's a tiny group, and we've got good equipment and

1109
00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:08,360
Speaker 2: good training all that stuff, but it just it won't

1110
00:56:08,360 --> 00:56:13,960
Speaker 2: matt It relies on external support to allies and whatnot.

1111
00:56:14,160 --> 00:56:16,120
Speaker 2: So my oppoint has always been like, why would you

1112
00:56:16,200 --> 00:56:20,920
Speaker 2: not have a fully self sufficient defense force or the

1113
00:56:20,960 --> 00:56:24,320
Speaker 2: capability to protect yourself with no eyes, because we won't

1114
00:56:24,360 --> 00:56:27,520
Speaker 2: if there is a major war. This happened in World

1115
00:56:27,520 --> 00:56:32,040
Speaker 2: War Two when we lost Singapore, the US, the UK

1116
00:56:32,239 --> 00:56:35,440
Speaker 2: or our major northern hemisphere. Our allies might be totally

1117
00:56:35,440 --> 00:56:36,360
Speaker 2: committed to other.

1118
00:56:36,320 --> 00:56:40,200
Speaker 1: Battles totally, Like if something happens in Taiwan and the

1119
00:56:40,280 --> 00:56:42,200
Speaker 1: US is already stuck in the Middle East, they have

1120
00:56:42,200 --> 00:56:44,319
Speaker 1: to go a center for there's nothing left for us.

1121
00:56:45,160 --> 00:56:47,799
Speaker 2: And to his credit. Kevin Rudd picked this up and

1122
00:56:48,320 --> 00:56:50,480
Speaker 2: the first I think it was the first white paper

1123
00:56:50,480 --> 00:56:52,279
Speaker 2: he did in two thousand and nine, he said, we

1124
00:56:52,320 --> 00:56:55,560
Speaker 2: need to have a sub fleet that's at least twelve submarines.

1125
00:56:55,560 --> 00:56:57,520
Speaker 2: We need to be able to protect shipping to our north.

1126
00:56:58,239 --> 00:57:00,320
Speaker 1: Are you men now shipping? Yeah?

1127
00:57:00,360 --> 00:57:04,080
Speaker 2: And now fifteen sixteen years later, we still don't have submarines.

1128
00:57:04,400 --> 00:57:05,360
Speaker 2: We're very vulnerable.

1129
00:57:06,760 --> 00:57:08,880
Speaker 1: But how will we get even to get people to

1130
00:57:08,960 --> 00:57:15,360
Speaker 1: join the military? Man, you're ex military? As I understand it,

1131
00:57:15,560 --> 00:57:17,000
Speaker 1: this billow of the police force, no one wants to

1132
00:57:17,080 --> 00:57:21,120
Speaker 1: join either one. How do we get people to become

1133
00:57:21,520 --> 00:57:25,120
Speaker 1: more keen or interested to join the military?

1134
00:57:25,400 --> 00:57:29,120
Speaker 2: I think that they've the recruiting for it has been

1135
00:57:29,280 --> 00:57:31,680
Speaker 2: off the mark quite a bit. The way they present

1136
00:57:31,760 --> 00:57:35,400
Speaker 2: the force is this coming here for an opportunity. You know,

1137
00:57:35,440 --> 00:57:37,520
Speaker 2: it don't work too hard. You know, you get your

1138
00:57:37,520 --> 00:57:41,560
Speaker 2: stuff paid for a super diverse force. The traditional marketing

1139
00:57:41,560 --> 00:57:45,040
Speaker 2: they did was very service orientated, adventure orientated, and I

1140
00:57:45,080 --> 00:57:47,800
Speaker 2: think that works better. But also the economy, the broader

1141
00:57:47,800 --> 00:57:51,160
Speaker 2: economy is a big, big effect too. So once unemployment

1142
00:57:51,160 --> 00:57:55,120
Speaker 2: goes up a bit, military recruiting kicks doesn't.

1143
00:57:55,520 --> 00:57:57,360
Speaker 1: Because I can get a job and get paid, definitely.

1144
00:57:57,400 --> 00:58:00,760
Speaker 2: And I watched in the army during certain economic burn periods,

1145
00:58:00,800 --> 00:58:03,120
Speaker 2: we just couldn't get people in the door because it's

1146
00:58:03,120 --> 00:58:04,560
Speaker 2: more lucrative jobs out there.

1147
00:58:05,000 --> 00:58:07,360
Speaker 1: Yeah, because I mean, do we need to go as

1148
00:58:07,400 --> 00:58:10,600
Speaker 1: far as what the United States started, you know, changing

1149
00:58:10,640 --> 00:58:12,680
Speaker 1: from the Department of Defense to the Department of War.

1150
00:58:12,720 --> 00:58:16,240
Speaker 1: I mean, like and a rebranded at that point, Pete

1151
00:58:16,240 --> 00:58:19,040
Speaker 1: hegxas like you know, Karl Stefanovic or something. I don't know,

1152
00:58:19,600 --> 00:58:22,760
Speaker 1: but you know what I'm saying, Like, because I wouldn't

1153
00:58:22,760 --> 00:58:26,160
Speaker 1: mind your views on this, because it seems to me

1154
00:58:26,240 --> 00:58:29,720
Speaker 1: that the United States has actually completely repackaged their whole

1155
00:58:29,760 --> 00:58:33,640
Speaker 1: offering when it comes to military and there's no coincidence

1156
00:58:33,640 --> 00:58:37,120
Speaker 1: that they're now at a war or in a war theater.

1157
00:58:38,640 --> 00:58:41,919
Speaker 1: But these things, these changes were made sometime ago. It's

1158
00:58:42,000 --> 00:58:43,880
Speaker 1: nearly like they were building up for it. I mean

1159
00:58:43,920 --> 00:58:46,120
Speaker 1: it's nearly. I mean, I feel stupid, but it's nearly

1160
00:58:46,160 --> 00:58:51,200
Speaker 1: like when they renamed the Defense portfolio as the Department

1161
00:58:51,200 --> 00:58:54,040
Speaker 1: of War. I should have worked that out because like,

1162
00:58:54,440 --> 00:58:57,560
Speaker 1: because we're going to war. We know we might be

1163
00:58:57,600 --> 00:59:00,840
Speaker 1: going to war at some stage, and hex is an

1164
00:59:00,840 --> 00:59:04,280
Speaker 1: ex military guy, anyway, I'm not taking it away from me. Yeah,

1165
00:59:05,240 --> 00:59:05,840
Speaker 1: he was reserved.

1166
00:59:05,880 --> 00:59:07,320
Speaker 2: I thought he went to I think he was reserved,

1167
00:59:07,400 --> 00:59:09,200
Speaker 2: but he deployed. I know he deployed, I think to

1168
00:59:09,280 --> 00:59:10,400
Speaker 2: Iraq and whatnot.

1169
00:59:10,560 --> 00:59:13,760
Speaker 1: So like, do you think we need to be sending

1170
00:59:13,800 --> 00:59:21,000
Speaker 1: those messages though to our potential you know, threats.

1171
00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:24,320
Speaker 2: Well, I think, And to talk about the rebrand quickly,

1172
00:59:25,240 --> 00:59:27,560
Speaker 2: And you have to give Trump credit with that because

1173
00:59:27,560 --> 00:59:31,640
Speaker 2: of his experience in television and business. He does understand

1174
00:59:31,720 --> 00:59:35,120
Speaker 2: branding and marketing and how he presents something. And I

1175
00:59:35,160 --> 00:59:38,200
Speaker 2: think they've done that with the military, that've have repackaged

1176
00:59:38,200 --> 00:59:41,080
Speaker 2: it as you said, and presented as this fighting force

1177
00:59:41,120 --> 00:59:46,200
Speaker 2: and conventure flag and adventure and all those kind of

1178
00:59:46,400 --> 00:59:48,720
Speaker 2: Department of War. All those things point to a certain

1179
00:59:49,560 --> 00:59:51,480
Speaker 2: feel that it didn't have before, felt a bit more

1180
00:59:51,560 --> 00:59:55,479
Speaker 2: bureaucratic maybe, So they do have to give him credit

1181
00:59:55,480 --> 00:59:57,560
Speaker 2: on that front. They have repackaged it to something that's

1182
00:59:58,120 --> 00:59:59,880
Speaker 2: been more suited to what they wanted to use it for.

1183
01:00:00,600 --> 01:00:03,680
Speaker 2: Australia hasn't really done that, but I haven't said that.

1184
01:00:03,720 --> 01:00:05,240
Speaker 2: I know a few a few of the officers that

1185
01:00:05,240 --> 01:00:07,080
Speaker 2: are at the top of the army now I served

1186
01:00:07,160 --> 01:00:10,440
Speaker 2: with when I joined, and they're all really capable. But

1187
01:00:10,480 --> 01:00:14,240
Speaker 2: again they're restricted by the budget, which is not big,

1188
01:00:15,240 --> 01:00:21,200
Speaker 2: and they're restricted by the government's aggressiveness or assertiveness around

1189
01:00:21,640 --> 01:00:23,640
Speaker 2: building defense capability.

1190
01:00:23,800 --> 01:00:26,000
Speaker 1: Or lack of aggressive aggressive aggressive.

1191
01:00:26,200 --> 01:00:30,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, some governments just don't have a good grasp of

1192
01:00:30,680 --> 01:00:35,919
Speaker 2: security and force and foreign policy. They don't they don't

1193
01:00:36,040 --> 01:00:38,400
Speaker 2: kind of get the military. I feel a lot of

1194
01:00:38,520 --> 01:00:39,360
Speaker 2: politicians don't.

1195
01:00:39,720 --> 01:00:42,760
Speaker 1: Well, some of the utterings in the last couple of

1196
01:00:42,840 --> 01:00:48,880
Speaker 1: days between the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister

1197
01:00:48,880 --> 01:00:51,760
Speaker 1: of Defense have been about yes, we are going to

1198
01:00:51,800 --> 01:00:56,400
Speaker 1: send some some support to I think Dubai or to

1199
01:00:56,400 --> 01:01:02,960
Speaker 1: the Emirates, but making it really really clear that the

1200
01:01:03,000 --> 01:01:06,360
Speaker 1: only part they're going to play in all this is defense.

1201
01:01:06,840 --> 01:01:09,920
Speaker 1: They're defending environments, like we're going to help defend the

1202
01:01:09,920 --> 01:01:15,440
Speaker 1: twenty four thousand both ways, yeah, both ways. Or the

1203
01:01:15,480 --> 01:01:19,720
Speaker 1: two or three guys or people who were on the

1204
01:01:19,760 --> 01:01:23,840
Speaker 1: submarine that sunk that frigate, they had no part in

1205
01:01:24,000 --> 01:01:26,160
Speaker 1: all this. They were just a sort of you know,

1206
01:01:26,280 --> 01:01:28,760
Speaker 1: war tourists or something, I don't know, you know, it.

1207
01:01:28,760 --> 01:01:31,280
Speaker 2: Was like, well, they're on a New York submarine. Yeah,

1208
01:01:31,360 --> 01:01:33,120
Speaker 2: they're probably engaged in the fensive.

1209
01:01:32,840 --> 01:01:34,920
Speaker 1: Operations, they'd have a role. They're not just sort of

1210
01:01:35,280 --> 01:01:37,400
Speaker 1: push the button. But no. But like the way that

1211
01:01:37,440 --> 01:01:41,040
Speaker 1: it was described was that, well, they're just onlookers the

1212
01:01:41,080 --> 01:01:41,480
Speaker 1: type of thing.

1213
01:01:41,640 --> 01:01:44,400
Speaker 2: I find that frustrating because everyone knows that's not true.

1214
01:01:45,560 --> 01:01:48,240
Speaker 2: Anyone with common sense would say, well that they participating

1215
01:01:48,360 --> 01:01:49,520
Speaker 2: it for sure, but they.

1216
01:01:49,680 --> 01:01:51,520
Speaker 1: They have a role because something.

1217
01:01:51,840 --> 01:01:56,240
Speaker 2: But obviously they're trying not to put Australian situation. Might

1218
01:01:56,280 --> 01:01:58,200
Speaker 2: we maybe don't want to be in where we're but

1219
01:01:58,440 --> 01:01:58,760
Speaker 2: we're not.

1220
01:01:58,880 --> 01:02:01,120
Speaker 1: They're not going to come down here that are they? Right?

1221
01:02:02,080 --> 01:02:04,920
Speaker 2: The big dilemma is now where partnered with the US.

1222
01:02:04,960 --> 01:02:07,120
Speaker 2: We've got these bases up north, We've got the submarines

1223
01:02:07,240 --> 01:02:10,120
Speaker 2: or orcast and all that. If there is a major conflict,

1224
01:02:10,200 --> 01:02:13,080
Speaker 2: we're going to war with Americans. That decision has been

1225
01:02:13,080 --> 01:02:16,560
Speaker 2: made for us with this kind of orcust plan, and

1226
01:02:16,600 --> 01:02:18,600
Speaker 2: I don't know if that's the right way to do it.

1227
01:02:20,240 --> 01:02:23,200
Speaker 2: That's something that wasn't debated nationally. He was kind of

1228
01:02:23,520 --> 01:02:25,480
Speaker 2: foisted upon us a bit.

1229
01:02:27,160 --> 01:02:30,480
Speaker 1: I've often wondered to hear stories about this, but how

1230
01:02:31,000 --> 01:02:34,560
Speaker 1: important is Australia from an intelligence point of view relative

1231
01:02:34,600 --> 01:02:38,840
Speaker 1: to how wars play out? Given physically where we sit

1232
01:02:38,920 --> 01:02:40,840
Speaker 1: on the globe relative to satellites and a lot of

1233
01:02:40,880 --> 01:02:43,120
Speaker 1: other stuff, time zones, etc.

1234
01:02:44,240 --> 01:02:47,920
Speaker 2: Pretty important. And surprisingly it's not until I read a

1235
01:02:47,920 --> 01:02:51,040
Speaker 2: bit about how they how they signal submarines in the

1236
01:02:51,040 --> 01:02:54,600
Speaker 2: Southern Hemisphere. It comes from the bases up in northwest Wa.

1237
01:02:54,760 --> 01:03:00,360
Speaker 2: So these ultra low frequency towers that send radio into

1238
01:03:00,400 --> 01:03:03,640
Speaker 2: the ocean basically to communicate with submarines in the event

1239
01:03:03,680 --> 01:03:07,360
Speaker 2: of especially in nuclear conflict, our bases are the ones

1240
01:03:07,360 --> 01:03:09,480
Speaker 2: that are going to pass that signal on. So Australia

1241
01:03:09,560 --> 01:03:11,040
Speaker 2: is uniquely positioned in that sense.

1242
01:03:11,080 --> 01:03:13,840
Speaker 1: And then physically on the globe.

1243
01:03:13,440 --> 01:03:16,160
Speaker 2: And if anything happens in the Pacific, again, we're a

1244
01:03:16,200 --> 01:03:18,720
Speaker 2: really good base that's far enough out of the firing

1245
01:03:18,760 --> 01:03:22,440
Speaker 2: line that they won't be high volume. There'll be missiles

1246
01:03:22,600 --> 01:03:24,040
Speaker 2: that can reach us, but it won't be as high

1247
01:03:24,120 --> 01:03:27,600
Speaker 2: volume if we're in Sagua, you know. So our having

1248
01:03:27,600 --> 01:03:30,520
Speaker 2: our base back where they've got bombers and support and

1249
01:03:30,960 --> 01:03:33,000
Speaker 2: we're able to retool all that was all true during

1250
01:03:33,040 --> 01:03:35,560
Speaker 2: World War Two as well. Oh really yeah, and they're

1251
01:03:35,600 --> 01:03:37,280
Speaker 2: just doing it again like it was a good launching

1252
01:03:37,280 --> 01:03:39,840
Speaker 2: pad into the Pacific for the Pacific. Yeah.

1253
01:03:40,120 --> 01:03:43,480
Speaker 1: But Obviously they weren't using the same technology in World

1254
01:03:43,480 --> 01:03:45,120
Speaker 1: War two as out now. But we've got places like

1255
01:03:45,160 --> 01:03:49,840
Speaker 1: Pine Gap, we get like this satellite. You know, you

1256
01:03:49,920 --> 01:03:53,560
Speaker 1: talked about it earlier about using satellites and hacking into

1257
01:03:53,600 --> 01:03:56,720
Speaker 1: the cameras and all that sort of stuff, and you know,

1258
01:03:56,720 --> 01:03:58,840
Speaker 1: you're not they're not using the Internet, they're using something

1259
01:03:58,840 --> 01:04:01,760
Speaker 1: else and not making phone calls the mobile phones, using

1260
01:04:01,800 --> 01:04:06,120
Speaker 1: some other signal system. Australia's physical position in terms of

1261
01:04:06,240 --> 01:04:09,600
Speaker 1: technology would I would have think it would be pretty important.

1262
01:04:09,600 --> 01:04:13,080
Speaker 1: Therefore I would have thought we're therefore at risk. Oh yeah,

1263
01:04:13,400 --> 01:04:16,120
Speaker 1: because like if I am the enemy and well let's

1264
01:04:16,360 --> 01:04:21,320
Speaker 1: try and stuff there, you know the signal signaling capability.

1265
01:04:21,640 --> 01:04:23,960
Speaker 2: Oh, they're all targets. And that's what I found interesting

1266
01:04:23,960 --> 01:04:27,800
Speaker 2: about the Chinese fleet kind of circumnavigate in Australia as

1267
01:04:27,760 --> 01:04:31,160
Speaker 2: they were they were testing that ability to kind of

1268
01:04:31,200 --> 01:04:33,360
Speaker 2: reach out and hit whatever we've got on the east

1269
01:04:33,360 --> 01:04:36,080
Speaker 2: and seaboard that might house really capabilities. Yeah, they would

1270
01:04:36,080 --> 01:04:37,160
Speaker 2: have been practicing for that for.

1271
01:04:37,160 --> 01:04:39,600
Speaker 1: Sure, or sort of doing simulations.

1272
01:04:39,640 --> 01:04:40,520
Speaker 2: Simulations yep.

1273
01:04:40,920 --> 01:04:43,600
Speaker 1: Yeah. So okay, so it's you.

1274
01:04:43,560 --> 01:04:45,120
Speaker 2: Know, we go to the south trying to see them

1275
01:04:45,120 --> 01:04:50,240
Speaker 2: do the same thing. So do we Australia Australia in

1276
01:04:50,320 --> 01:04:52,840
Speaker 2: concert with the Americans and other but.

1277
01:04:52,880 --> 01:04:54,880
Speaker 1: We send out we don't have ships, do we with

1278
01:04:54,920 --> 01:04:55,880
Speaker 1: many ships we've sent.

1279
01:04:56,080 --> 01:04:59,120
Speaker 2: No, we've sent I think frigates up there. I'm not

1280
01:04:59,120 --> 01:05:01,360
Speaker 2: sure what type. I'm not that across the navy ops,

1281
01:05:01,360 --> 01:05:03,000
Speaker 2: but they're definitely up there for sure.

1282
01:05:03,360 --> 01:05:06,360
Speaker 1: Like just sort of seeing how what the distance is

1283
01:05:06,400 --> 01:05:09,360
Speaker 1: to a certain point that we might be interested.

1284
01:05:09,080 --> 01:05:15,080
Speaker 2: In showerforce around in your reconnaissance in international waters supporting

1285
01:05:15,120 --> 01:05:18,680
Speaker 2: the Americans. There might be a shoal or some some

1286
01:05:18,760 --> 01:05:21,000
Speaker 2: activity they're trying to monusor our submarines that probably go

1287
01:05:21,120 --> 01:05:23,800
Speaker 2: up that far. So there's a lot of we play

1288
01:05:23,840 --> 01:05:26,000
Speaker 2: in their front yard a lot, and they've come down

1289
01:05:26,040 --> 01:05:27,160
Speaker 2: here and done the same thing.

1290
01:05:27,400 --> 01:05:30,080
Speaker 1: Because I thought to myself originally that it was just

1291
01:05:30,200 --> 01:05:34,160
Speaker 1: like a bit of posturing and shell force or show

1292
01:05:34,240 --> 01:05:36,640
Speaker 1: of that we can do this, we do whatever we want.

1293
01:05:36,800 --> 01:05:39,400
Speaker 1: But you just open up another thinking process for me.

1294
01:05:39,880 --> 01:05:43,480
Speaker 1: Maybe it may well be they were actually snooping. Yeah,

1295
01:05:43,600 --> 01:05:44,160
Speaker 1: at that time.

1296
01:05:44,520 --> 01:05:49,080
Speaker 2: All the above, they're like training for offensive strike missions,

1297
01:05:49,200 --> 01:05:53,720
Speaker 2: collecting whatever intelligence they can, testing our maritime capability or

1298
01:05:53,720 --> 01:05:56,720
Speaker 2: our surveillance capabilities, how well we can monitor our coastline.

1299
01:05:56,840 --> 01:05:58,320
Speaker 1: Do you think we were monitoring them?

1300
01:05:58,920 --> 01:06:03,680
Speaker 2: I think we were. But it was interesting when Defense

1301
01:06:03,720 --> 01:06:06,080
Speaker 2: got caught out because they did that live fire drill

1302
01:06:06,760 --> 01:06:08,960
Speaker 2: and it was picked up on her commercial aircraft down

1303
01:06:09,000 --> 01:06:11,560
Speaker 2: to New Zealand going to New Zealand rather than the

1304
01:06:11,600 --> 01:06:13,840
Speaker 2: Defense Force. So something's gone wrong with I don't know.

1305
01:06:14,280 --> 01:06:16,440
Speaker 2: I don't know if they didn't have eyes on for

1306
01:06:16,480 --> 01:06:18,520
Speaker 2: a period, I'm not sure why that didn't picked that up.

1307
01:06:19,240 --> 01:06:23,640
Speaker 1: Are you worried about anything like relative to what's going

1308
01:06:23,680 --> 01:06:24,360
Speaker 1: on right The.

1309
01:06:24,320 --> 01:06:26,000
Speaker 2: Only thing that I'm worried about is that I don't

1310
01:06:26,040 --> 01:06:31,400
Speaker 2: think people understand how at risk our countries and even

1311
01:06:31,640 --> 01:06:33,760
Speaker 2: and we're not doing the things that you need to

1312
01:06:33,800 --> 01:06:35,680
Speaker 2: do with a lot of le time to improve it.

1313
01:06:36,320 --> 01:06:41,400
Speaker 2: Because it takes so long to build military capabilities, fuel

1314
01:06:41,400 --> 01:06:47,040
Speaker 2: storage depots, defense infrastructure, whatever it is you need to

1315
01:06:47,080 --> 01:06:49,760
Speaker 2: be self sufficient. It takes a long time, a lot

1316
01:06:49,760 --> 01:06:51,440
Speaker 2: of money, a lot of effort to do it, and

1317
01:06:51,520 --> 01:06:55,480
Speaker 2: commitment and commitment, political commitment, all those things. And I

1318
01:06:55,560 --> 01:06:58,560
Speaker 2: just think people don't fully understand that we're at that

1319
01:06:58,600 --> 01:07:00,600
Speaker 2: point where we should be doing it. We might not

1320
01:07:00,680 --> 01:07:03,480
Speaker 2: need it, but better to have it not need it.

1321
01:07:04,040 --> 01:07:05,960
Speaker 1: You know, I was singing last and listening to the

1322
01:07:05,960 --> 01:07:08,160
Speaker 1: news because like you know, during these periods, and I

1323
01:07:08,160 --> 01:07:12,600
Speaker 1: get fascinated with CNN, Fox News, the Sky News, like

1324
01:07:12,600 --> 01:07:16,480
Speaker 1: I just become obsessed by it all. And I was

1325
01:07:16,480 --> 01:07:21,160
Speaker 1: thinking to myself, they're talking about the cost of production

1326
01:07:21,680 --> 01:07:24,960
Speaker 1: of the ordinances that that have been like then the

1327
01:07:25,000 --> 01:07:27,680
Speaker 1: cost of a long range missile compared to the you

1328
01:07:27,760 --> 01:07:31,200
Speaker 1: know the stuff, like the massive costs. And I thought

1329
01:07:31,280 --> 01:07:34,040
Speaker 1: to myself, someone has to physically produced all this stuff

1330
01:07:34,080 --> 01:07:36,400
Speaker 1: made out of steel or whatever it's made out of.

1331
01:07:37,320 --> 01:07:39,480
Speaker 1: And given that we have a lot of resources here

1332
01:07:39,480 --> 01:07:41,560
Speaker 1: in Australia, I wonder why Australia has ever thought to

1333
01:07:41,600 --> 01:07:45,280
Speaker 1: itself to become a supply to the world of manufacturing

1334
01:07:45,320 --> 01:07:47,960
Speaker 1: this stuff. I mean, I mean, is it some specialists.

1335
01:07:48,040 --> 01:07:50,120
Speaker 1: I mean, obviously it's got to be specialized, But is

1336
01:07:50,120 --> 01:07:53,160
Speaker 1: there something beyond our capability to manufacturing these ordinances and

1337
01:07:53,200 --> 01:07:55,320
Speaker 1: actually sell them to America or sell them to whoever?

1338
01:07:56,160 --> 01:07:59,000
Speaker 2: It's not And we've got to I know, they've got

1339
01:07:59,040 --> 01:08:02,800
Speaker 2: some until production facilities. They're starting to expand out in

1340
01:08:02,800 --> 01:08:05,880
Speaker 2: Australia now there's new ones getting built because they're seeing

1341
01:08:05,880 --> 01:08:09,680
Speaker 2: in Europe with the Ukraine War that just the volume

1342
01:08:09,760 --> 01:08:13,560
Speaker 2: of artillery they're using is so enormous that they might

1343
01:08:13,640 --> 01:08:15,840
Speaker 2: use I think I read six to eight thousand rounds

1344
01:08:15,880 --> 01:08:19,840
Speaker 2: a day during the offensive operation. These rounds are they're

1345
01:08:19,880 --> 01:08:23,240
Speaker 2: like as tall, you know, they're waist height thirty kilo

1346
01:08:23,439 --> 01:08:27,240
Speaker 2: rounds and they're churning out thousands a day. And in Australia,

1347
01:08:27,280 --> 01:08:29,840
Speaker 2: I think we're producing six thousand a year or something,

1348
01:08:30,680 --> 01:08:33,800
Speaker 2: so we've got they're now looking at factories that are

1349
01:08:33,840 --> 01:08:36,439
Speaker 2: able to ramp that capability up. The US are building

1350
01:08:36,520 --> 01:08:39,120
Speaker 2: ones that are automated and just run with minimal people.

1351
01:08:40,439 --> 01:08:43,960
Speaker 2: Apparently the Chinese have fully automated factories that work around

1352
01:08:44,000 --> 01:08:48,280
Speaker 2: the clock building cruise missiles, so really advanced, really advanced missiles.

1353
01:08:49,040 --> 01:08:51,080
Speaker 2: And there are some defense startups in the US now

1354
01:08:51,080 --> 01:08:53,200
Speaker 2: that are trying to build really low cost munitions and

1355
01:08:53,240 --> 01:08:55,320
Speaker 2: weapons and all that to compete with this.

1356
01:08:55,800 --> 01:08:58,040
Speaker 1: Would Is there anything you've often thought yourself would be

1357
01:08:58,040 --> 01:09:01,519
Speaker 1: a great opportunity from Australia from an export point of view,

1358
01:09:01,600 --> 01:09:05,200
Speaker 1: maybe becoming the drone capital of the world, like build

1359
01:09:05,200 --> 01:09:07,519
Speaker 1: the best drones or and I know a few companies

1360
01:09:07,520 --> 01:09:09,599
Speaker 1: like Drone Shield try to sort of start that up.

1361
01:09:09,920 --> 01:09:12,040
Speaker 1: But is there anything that you see as an opportunity

1362
01:09:12,280 --> 01:09:14,200
Speaker 1: that the world needs that we could we could be

1363
01:09:14,240 --> 01:09:18,920
Speaker 1: providing apart from our you know, our position on the

1364
01:09:18,960 --> 01:09:22,920
Speaker 1: globe relative to intelligence, what other things do you think

1365
01:09:22,960 --> 01:09:25,800
Speaker 1: someone could do really well in Australia. The world's in

1366
01:09:25,960 --> 01:09:26,840
Speaker 1: demand for now.

1367
01:09:27,960 --> 01:09:32,040
Speaker 2: We've got certain advantages when it comes to niche manufacturing,

1368
01:09:32,080 --> 01:09:33,920
Speaker 2: like we don't have all the broader stuff of the

1369
01:09:34,000 --> 01:09:38,200
Speaker 2: US has. But you're right, some robotics, there's been Rocket

1370
01:09:38,200 --> 01:09:40,680
Speaker 2: Company starting. There are a lot of and tech as well,

1371
01:09:40,760 --> 01:09:43,760
Speaker 2: so nai as well. So there are some fields where

1372
01:09:43,760 --> 01:09:46,599
Speaker 2: if we really put some impetus behind it, we could

1373
01:09:46,600 --> 01:09:49,320
Speaker 2: become known for some of those industries. And I think

1374
01:09:49,320 --> 01:09:52,479
Speaker 2: it'd be smart because we're we're not a complex economy.

1375
01:09:52,479 --> 01:09:57,160
Speaker 2: It's really quite a basic economy, mining, engineering, tourism.

1376
01:09:57,240 --> 01:10:00,200
Speaker 1: Because it's been too good for us, say ro the

1377
01:10:00,200 --> 01:10:01,120
Speaker 1: Grand Center somewhere else.

1378
01:10:01,160 --> 01:10:03,360
Speaker 2: So well, yeah, we've gotten rich off the back of.

1379
01:10:03,320 --> 01:10:06,200
Speaker 1: That, sort of like semi lazy if you know what

1380
01:10:06,200 --> 01:10:08,880
Speaker 1: I mean. I don't mean more lucky than good, Yeah,

1381
01:10:08,920 --> 01:10:11,519
Speaker 1: more lucky than good, more more yeah, correct, more lucky

1382
01:10:11,560 --> 01:10:14,840
Speaker 1: than competency and commitment. I mean we are confident what

1383
01:10:14,880 --> 01:10:17,479
Speaker 1: we do, but it's more like it's been but we've

1384
01:10:17,520 --> 01:10:19,519
Speaker 1: been able to live off our luck and we did

1385
01:10:19,600 --> 01:10:21,400
Speaker 1: off the sheeps back for a long time and you know,

1386
01:10:21,479 --> 01:10:23,120
Speaker 1: sheep brow their own. Well, we don't grow it. We

1387
01:10:23,240 --> 01:10:24,960
Speaker 1: just have to take it off and send it somewhere.

1388
01:10:25,200 --> 01:10:28,240
Speaker 1: And at the same with minerals. And it seems to

1389
01:10:28,280 --> 01:10:31,720
Speaker 1: me that artificial intelligence seems like one way we could go.

1390
01:10:32,680 --> 01:10:35,800
Speaker 1: Where do you see AI performing in the theater of

1391
01:10:35,840 --> 01:10:39,559
Speaker 1: war today? I mean compared to say, when you were deployed.

1392
01:10:39,840 --> 01:10:42,519
Speaker 2: Well, actually, and tell you the fact that data Centers

1393
01:10:42,560 --> 01:10:44,800
Speaker 2: was one data centers, I know that. Yeah, coming down

1394
01:10:44,880 --> 01:10:47,719
Speaker 2: saying you could be a center that hosts data centers,

1395
01:10:47,720 --> 01:10:49,800
Speaker 2: I know that you're trying to do the same thing. Yeah,

1396
01:10:49,880 --> 01:10:50,519
Speaker 2: so you could do.

1397
01:10:50,520 --> 01:10:53,160
Speaker 1: That, but u A right now is a bit of

1398
01:10:53,160 --> 01:10:56,160
Speaker 1: a drama because you're in the theater. I mean, and

1399
01:10:56,560 --> 01:10:59,000
Speaker 1: if I'm an investor in because you know, you need

1400
01:10:59,040 --> 01:11:01,640
Speaker 1: investors to put money build these things. They're expensive and

1401
01:11:01,920 --> 01:11:04,559
Speaker 1: you need to build infrastructure around like water and power

1402
01:11:04,640 --> 01:11:08,479
Speaker 1: of course electricity. I would think Australia would be a

1403
01:11:08,560 --> 01:11:12,840
Speaker 1: better at a less risky position. Yeah, you can put

1404
01:11:12,840 --> 01:11:14,559
Speaker 1: it out in the desert or not a desert, but

1405
01:11:14,560 --> 01:11:16,200
Speaker 1: you can put out something a bit more remote, doesn't

1406
01:11:16,200 --> 01:11:17,639
Speaker 1: have to be in the middle of Brisbane or something.

1407
01:11:17,840 --> 01:11:21,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, so that's one opportunity or reckon would be perfect and.

1408
01:11:21,600 --> 01:11:24,519
Speaker 1: The people like the Aws's of the world could heavily

1409
01:11:24,560 --> 01:11:29,080
Speaker 1: rely on us in that regard. So, but do you

1410
01:11:29,120 --> 01:11:31,160
Speaker 1: think do you think when I want to go back

1411
01:11:31,160 --> 01:11:33,519
Speaker 1: to the question as before bad, is there something that

1412
01:11:33,560 --> 01:11:36,920
Speaker 1: worries you about us? Just if I could just think

1413
01:11:36,920 --> 01:11:40,960
Speaker 1: about Australia at the moment, be selfish, is there do

1414
01:11:41,040 --> 01:11:43,200
Speaker 1: we really need to be worried or is it just

1415
01:11:43,200 --> 01:11:44,400
Speaker 1: something we need to keep eyes on.

1416
01:11:44,960 --> 01:11:46,840
Speaker 2: It's one of those things where I think we'll be fine,

1417
01:11:48,160 --> 01:11:52,960
Speaker 2: but the probability of something catastrophic happening has gone from

1418
01:11:53,439 --> 01:11:55,760
Speaker 2: one percent to now ten percent, right, you know, it's

1419
01:11:55,760 --> 01:11:57,479
Speaker 2: just a much higher chance than it used to be.

1420
01:11:58,840 --> 01:12:00,880
Speaker 2: And so because of that, I think you've got to

1421
01:12:00,920 --> 01:12:03,800
Speaker 2: take dramatic steps to try and make sure that worst

1422
01:12:03,800 --> 01:12:06,280
Speaker 2: case doesn't happen or if it does, so we are

1423
01:12:06,320 --> 01:12:09,599
Speaker 2: cut off in our economy grind so hols, we've got

1424
01:12:09,680 --> 01:12:12,959
Speaker 2: trouble with fuel or not able to get import exports

1425
01:12:13,040 --> 01:12:15,680
Speaker 2: going because we've lost control of our northern waterways, Like

1426
01:12:16,640 --> 01:12:19,040
Speaker 2: what do we need to have set up now so

1427
01:12:19,080 --> 01:12:20,840
Speaker 2: that if that if we encounter that problem, we're going

1428
01:12:20,920 --> 01:12:22,040
Speaker 2: to be in much better shape.

1429
01:12:22,120 --> 01:12:23,760
Speaker 1: Does anyone ever come and talk to you? Do you

1430
01:12:23,800 --> 01:12:26,400
Speaker 1: ever get them apart from this type of environment? Does

1431
01:12:26,680 --> 01:12:28,840
Speaker 1: government ever talked to someone like you, someone's actually been

1432
01:12:28,880 --> 01:12:30,880
Speaker 1: in the theater, like you know what it's about. Just

1433
01:12:30,960 --> 01:12:31,799
Speaker 1: do you ever get contact?

1434
01:12:32,120 --> 01:12:36,920
Speaker 2: Sometimes sometimes Andrew Hasty's a good mate. We talk about

1435
01:12:36,920 --> 01:12:39,920
Speaker 2: this apheir bit. He's got a strong interest in this

1436
01:12:39,960 --> 01:12:42,439
Speaker 2: as well. And I think people who have been have

1437
01:12:42,520 --> 01:12:43,439
Speaker 2: seen war zones.

1438
01:12:44,720 --> 01:12:45,360
Speaker 1: That's what I'm saying.

1439
01:12:45,680 --> 01:12:48,000
Speaker 2: You understand how bad it can get for people, you know,

1440
01:12:48,080 --> 01:12:50,040
Speaker 2: like you don't really want that coming up. I feel

1441
01:12:50,040 --> 01:12:52,120
Speaker 2: like they're not listening to very much. Jim Mullen was

1442
01:12:52,160 --> 01:12:54,960
Speaker 2: another one. Yeah, he was banging in the cage for

1443
01:12:55,000 --> 01:12:59,280
Speaker 2: a long time about the Pacific. And I just don't

1444
01:12:59,320 --> 01:13:02,719
Speaker 2: feel like though lessons have really landed because the budget

1445
01:13:02,760 --> 01:13:06,280
Speaker 2: hasn't changed, that the psychology of the country hasn't changed.

1446
01:13:07,120 --> 01:13:09,479
Speaker 1: Do you think it's because we as a nation they

1447
01:13:09,560 --> 01:13:12,759
Speaker 1: put enough emphasis or pressure on governments to take pay attention,

1448
01:13:12,760 --> 01:13:14,880
Speaker 1: Because I mean a lot of gums these days are

1449
01:13:14,880 --> 01:13:17,559
Speaker 1: pole driven and if they thought the Poles were saying

1450
01:13:17,640 --> 01:13:20,280
Speaker 1: let's do something, I'll guarantee they would do something.

1451
01:13:20,080 --> 01:13:22,760
Speaker 2: That would change. Yeah, yeah, I don't think. I think

1452
01:13:22,760 --> 01:13:24,640
Speaker 2: we're so far removed from a lot of it that

1453
01:13:24,720 --> 01:13:28,639
Speaker 2: we don't think this way. We don't really we don't

1454
01:13:28,640 --> 01:13:30,839
Speaker 2: get touched by war in the way that other countries

1455
01:13:30,840 --> 01:13:33,280
Speaker 2: do in the Northern Hemisphere. But in World War Two

1456
01:13:33,320 --> 01:13:36,240
Speaker 2: we did. We got bombs. You know, my grandma told

1457
01:13:36,280 --> 01:13:38,880
Speaker 2: me she was getting to bomb shellters in person without

1458
01:13:38,880 --> 01:13:42,280
Speaker 2: bombing broom. And that was eighty plus years ago. If

1459
01:13:42,320 --> 01:13:44,200
Speaker 2: it happened again today, they could reach us with no

1460
01:13:44,680 --> 01:13:45,360
Speaker 2: issues at all.

1461
01:13:45,479 --> 01:13:46,800
Speaker 1: Or Summaris come to Sydney Harbor.

1462
01:13:47,200 --> 01:13:50,600
Speaker 2: Sydney Harbor exactly. They are shelling past in Sydney.

1463
01:13:50,360 --> 01:13:52,840
Speaker 1: Harper totally because because where I lived there there was

1464
01:13:52,920 --> 01:13:57,760
Speaker 1: there's an obelisk there which commemorates the net that went

1465
01:13:57,840 --> 01:14:01,960
Speaker 1: from Southead across the north Head Leak across the Mossman tyboy.

1466
01:14:03,080 --> 01:14:05,400
Speaker 1: It was a net we're meant to catch summary stop

1467
01:14:05,479 --> 01:14:08,000
Speaker 1: them from somebody going through it. Again, that's that's only

1468
01:14:08,000 --> 01:14:08,519
Speaker 1: your front door.

1469
01:14:08,640 --> 01:14:12,320
Speaker 2: So what could they do now We've got autonomous things

1470
01:14:12,439 --> 01:14:15,920
Speaker 2: and you know, so we're not as separated from this

1471
01:14:16,040 --> 01:14:18,479
Speaker 2: as we think we are, And I just think that

1472
01:14:18,760 --> 01:14:23,880
Speaker 2: our psychology around it is one where it just needs

1473
01:14:23,880 --> 01:14:25,760
Speaker 2: a little shove so that we can take steps now

1474
01:14:25,800 --> 01:14:28,240
Speaker 2: and be way more prepared later. Not it's not need

1475
01:14:28,280 --> 01:14:30,920
Speaker 2: to panic. It's just we need to be proven about

1476
01:14:31,280 --> 01:14:35,800
Speaker 2: defense capabilities, fuel and oil capabilities, and manufacturing. If we've

1477
01:14:35,800 --> 01:14:37,960
Speaker 2: got those things down, we can be pretty resilient.

1478
01:14:38,120 --> 01:14:41,800
Speaker 1: And budget and budget started allocating more stuff towards these things.

1479
01:14:42,120 --> 01:14:45,120
Speaker 1: So your YouTube's have been going pretty good. What's been

1480
01:14:45,240 --> 01:14:48,080
Speaker 1: flying off the handle? What's what's what's been the bees response?

1481
01:14:48,080 --> 01:14:49,920
Speaker 2: It's funny because when I started, I was going to

1482
01:14:50,000 --> 01:14:53,439
Speaker 2: do a lot of business content, and then I did

1483
01:14:53,520 --> 01:14:56,840
Speaker 2: one on the Chinese fleet that started around I just

1484
01:14:56,920 --> 01:14:58,640
Speaker 2: did if it was like one at night, recorded a

1485
01:14:58,680 --> 01:15:00,280
Speaker 2: short video on it, and a ring made it's how

1486
01:15:00,320 --> 01:15:02,080
Speaker 2: I go, don't don't edit this much because I don't

1487
01:15:02,080 --> 01:15:05,240
Speaker 2: think anyone's going to watch it, And that one really

1488
01:15:05,280 --> 01:15:08,080
Speaker 2: took off, like four hundred thousand views or something. So

1489
01:15:08,160 --> 01:15:10,280
Speaker 2: I thought I'll do a bit more on current affairs

1490
01:15:10,400 --> 01:15:13,160
Speaker 2: and just started talking more about current affairs. And I

1491
01:15:13,280 --> 01:15:16,000
Speaker 2: was a history undergrad and I've always had an interest

1492
01:15:16,040 --> 01:15:18,519
Speaker 2: in it. So I just talk about current affairs that's

1493
01:15:18,520 --> 01:15:21,880
Speaker 2: happening and throwing a few business things occasionally, and yeah,

1494
01:15:21,880 --> 01:15:23,960
Speaker 2: it's just a good, good medium to do it on.

1495
01:15:24,320 --> 01:15:27,120
Speaker 1: You've taken a different path as opposed the typical path

1496
01:15:27,200 --> 01:15:29,560
Speaker 1: of a former soldier. I mean, you've you've got to

1497
01:15:29,600 --> 01:15:33,200
Speaker 1: Wharton business schools and you've got to dig an MBA

1498
01:15:33,280 --> 01:15:36,120
Speaker 1: there or something. But in addition that, you've done some

1499
01:15:36,240 --> 01:15:40,320
Speaker 1: other studies. You worked with one of the one of

1500
01:15:40,400 --> 01:15:46,559
Speaker 1: the big consultancy organizationally McKinsey, and worked McKinsey. I think

1501
01:15:46,600 --> 01:15:51,479
Speaker 1: you've written a book, you're now doing your you're doing

1502
01:15:51,520 --> 01:15:54,320
Speaker 1: your commentary. Just just a fun thing. But it's sort

1503
01:15:54,360 --> 01:16:01,880
Speaker 1: of pretty spot on from what I've seen. Your level

1504
01:16:01,960 --> 01:16:06,280
Speaker 1: of research is not just not just sitting here making

1505
01:16:06,800 --> 01:16:09,200
Speaker 1: stuff up. I mean you're actually in the guts of it.

1506
01:16:09,240 --> 01:16:11,439
Speaker 1: I mean, you've come from that background, but you're in

1507
01:16:11,479 --> 01:16:13,639
Speaker 1: the guts of this stuff, like you're researching these things,

1508
01:16:13,720 --> 01:16:17,240
Speaker 1: probably as a civilian. You know, you're not sort of

1509
01:16:17,280 --> 01:16:19,519
Speaker 1: tapping into the Department of Defense Ron Office, a national

1510
01:16:19,560 --> 01:16:23,560
Speaker 1: intelligence ring like that. Maybe you are, don't know, but

1511
01:16:23,640 --> 01:16:28,439
Speaker 1: I mean, but this is just observational stuff, but based

1512
01:16:28,520 --> 01:16:34,000
Speaker 1: on what you've experienced, as opposed to say something like me,

1513
01:16:34,520 --> 01:16:39,519
Speaker 1: who might be a civilian observation, you're actually a former

1514
01:16:40,360 --> 01:16:44,559
Speaker 1: engaged observational Like you're actually making observations based on your

1515
01:16:44,680 --> 01:16:47,080
Speaker 1: former engagement. In other words, what can be the effect

1516
01:16:47,160 --> 01:16:50,360
Speaker 1: of what I'm seeing based on what I've experienced before?

1517
01:16:51,200 --> 01:16:54,000
Speaker 1: So apart from you know, people looking at this stuff,

1518
01:16:54,479 --> 01:16:57,360
Speaker 1: is it getting any traction? Like the gym Molon stuff

1519
01:16:57,600 --> 01:17:01,320
Speaker 1: was like Andrew Hasty could do you sort of like

1520
01:17:01,520 --> 01:17:03,519
Speaker 1: in that position? Is getting any traction?

1521
01:17:04,560 --> 01:17:07,320
Speaker 2: You mean that the warnings about what could I think

1522
01:17:07,360 --> 01:17:10,880
Speaker 2: it is. I think people are starting to gore, starting

1523
01:17:10,920 --> 01:17:13,880
Speaker 2: to see the direction of the world's heading in and

1524
01:17:14,000 --> 01:17:17,479
Speaker 2: these constant arguments about Australian capabilities not being where they

1525
01:17:17,520 --> 01:17:19,880
Speaker 2: should be. And there's a bit of a mismatch because

1526
01:17:19,880 --> 01:17:21,800
Speaker 2: they're saying, on one hand, yet it is a really

1527
01:17:21,920 --> 01:17:25,840
Speaker 2: dangerous environment, but on the other hand, we're saying we

1528
01:17:25,960 --> 01:17:28,160
Speaker 2: need to raise all these capabilities. But to do it,

1529
01:17:28,439 --> 01:17:31,240
Speaker 2: we're just going to reorganize a defense budget without increasing it,

1530
01:17:32,160 --> 01:17:36,080
Speaker 2: including selling properties or what. It's just they're tinkering at

1531
01:17:36,120 --> 01:17:36,640
Speaker 2: the edges of it.

1532
01:17:36,840 --> 01:17:39,439
Speaker 1: Yeah, just move the deck chairs around, just to move.

1533
01:17:39,400 --> 01:17:41,680
Speaker 2: In debt like it really needs a hard push and

1534
01:17:42,240 --> 01:17:44,080
Speaker 2: they need to find the money from somewhere to do it.

1535
01:17:44,240 --> 01:17:47,200
Speaker 2: That's just a key part of it. It's expensive to

1536
01:17:47,280 --> 01:17:49,680
Speaker 2: do it, and we take plenty of money out there.

1537
01:17:49,720 --> 01:17:50,960
Speaker 2: They can they can find the money.

1538
01:17:51,080 --> 01:17:52,920
Speaker 1: It takes balls, mate, they need starts to do this,

1539
01:17:53,040 --> 01:17:53,679
Speaker 1: or takes.

1540
01:17:53,560 --> 01:17:57,400
Speaker 2: Political capital, which you know maybe some governments don't prioritize it.

1541
01:17:57,560 --> 01:17:59,800
Speaker 2: And and this is where you have to give how

1542
01:17:59,880 --> 01:18:02,439
Speaker 2: to to credit because he committed, I was he forces

1543
01:18:02,479 --> 01:18:05,639
Speaker 2: to his team or in ninety nine, we've been neglected

1544
01:18:05,720 --> 01:18:09,160
Speaker 2: for fifteen plus years after being arm We could barely

1545
01:18:09,200 --> 01:18:11,840
Speaker 2: pull off that mission properly, couldn't deploy it. It was

1546
01:18:12,360 --> 01:18:15,320
Speaker 2: four hundred commas off Darwin and we still could barely

1547
01:18:15,400 --> 01:18:17,120
Speaker 2: deploy there. So he said that's it. We're going to

1548
01:18:17,160 --> 01:18:20,360
Speaker 2: build military back and through a lot of effort, time, money,

1549
01:18:20,400 --> 01:18:23,439
Speaker 2: budget at it and that it took ten years, but

1550
01:18:23,640 --> 01:18:25,400
Speaker 2: we built a pretty good capability out of that.

1551
01:18:26,040 --> 01:18:29,840
Speaker 1: So I don't want to draw it too long, Abo.

1552
01:18:30,000 --> 01:18:33,519
Speaker 1: But there was some evidence that was put out there

1553
01:18:33,560 --> 01:18:38,320
Speaker 1: by Asio maybe six months ago that Iran was behind

1554
01:18:39,479 --> 01:18:44,800
Speaker 1: some of the attacks on the Jewish synagogues and various

1555
01:18:44,840 --> 01:18:48,080
Speaker 1: other things, and I'm sure Asia not saying that just

1556
01:18:48,160 --> 01:18:51,360
Speaker 1: for for political capital. Is they just tell the truth?

1557
01:18:52,880 --> 01:18:56,960
Speaker 1: Do you think that terrorism is a soft form of

1558
01:18:57,200 --> 01:19:00,880
Speaker 1: war against other nations where there's distance between us.

1559
01:19:01,479 --> 01:19:05,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, they will try and influence countries as much as

1560
01:19:05,439 --> 01:19:08,280
Speaker 2: they can without going to war. And it's the Americans

1561
01:19:08,320 --> 01:19:10,360
Speaker 2: are good at this too, that they formed the CIA

1562
01:19:10,479 --> 01:19:13,320
Speaker 2: after World War Two to try and avert really a

1563
01:19:13,400 --> 01:19:16,320
Speaker 2: Third World War, because if you had a functioning CIA

1564
01:19:16,400 --> 01:19:18,679
Speaker 2: before World War Two that could go in and influence

1565
01:19:18,880 --> 01:19:24,200
Speaker 2: the German elections or you know, elevate someone over who

1566
01:19:24,320 --> 01:19:28,760
Speaker 2: eventually came to power in Nazi Germany, you might have

1567
01:19:28,840 --> 01:19:31,720
Speaker 2: a totally different outcome. So even though what they do

1568
01:19:31,840 --> 01:19:35,760
Speaker 2: with interfering in other countries might seem morally bad, if

1569
01:19:35,800 --> 01:19:38,960
Speaker 2: it averts a Third World war, is it is it bad?

1570
01:19:39,040 --> 01:19:40,880
Speaker 2: Or you know, it might be good. So all countries

1571
01:19:40,920 --> 01:19:42,320
Speaker 2: are doing that. Rhan's no different.

1572
01:19:43,800 --> 01:19:47,519
Speaker 1: They're doing it too, perhaps not necessarily averted a war

1573
01:19:47,600 --> 01:19:49,280
Speaker 1: that could be there, trying to influence the war.

1574
01:19:49,280 --> 01:19:52,960
Speaker 2: Exactly, but you know it's all conflict. Yeah, so everyone's

1575
01:19:53,000 --> 01:19:56,880
Speaker 2: doing it to some level. But you know, like boxing,

1576
01:19:56,960 --> 01:20:00,360
Speaker 2: kind of the trick is hid and don't get hit It's.

1577
01:20:00,200 --> 01:20:04,400
Speaker 1: Not always that easy, none that is at all. But

1578
01:20:04,479 --> 01:20:07,080
Speaker 1: do you think that do you do you expect that

1579
01:20:08,240 --> 01:20:11,799
Speaker 1: those cells of a bit like what in a Mossad

1580
01:20:11,800 --> 01:20:14,560
Speaker 1: probably did in Iran ten to fifteen years ago. I

1581
01:20:14,640 --> 01:20:16,680
Speaker 1: think those cells have been well established here for a

1582
01:20:16,720 --> 01:20:18,439
Speaker 1: long time at the month, and we just we just

1583
01:20:18,640 --> 01:20:19,840
Speaker 1: have no sense of it at the moment.

1584
01:20:20,800 --> 01:20:23,360
Speaker 2: I think there are a lot of cells. Hes Boa

1585
01:20:23,760 --> 01:20:26,920
Speaker 2: especially have done it. Iran has done it as well.

1586
01:20:27,120 --> 01:20:29,320
Speaker 2: The Russians have been really good at it. They put

1587
01:20:29,400 --> 01:20:32,120
Speaker 2: people into countries that from a young age and left

1588
01:20:32,160 --> 01:20:34,680
Speaker 2: them there for twenty plus years, only to activate them

1589
01:20:34,680 --> 01:20:35,400
Speaker 2: at a certain point.

1590
01:20:35,560 --> 01:20:37,240
Speaker 1: I'm seeing that Netflix series on that.

1591
01:20:37,479 --> 01:20:40,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, that's all real. I don't know how effective

1592
01:20:40,080 --> 01:20:43,760
Speaker 2: it is. And a lot of this obviously happens in

1593
01:20:43,800 --> 01:20:45,320
Speaker 2: the shadows and you only hear about it when it

1594
01:20:45,360 --> 01:20:48,200
Speaker 2: goes wrong. But it's definitely a technique. Countries have to

1595
01:20:48,280 --> 01:20:51,640
Speaker 2: try and have agents that are in countries fully integrated,

1596
01:20:51,800 --> 01:20:53,240
Speaker 2: that still operate on their behalf.

1597
01:20:54,080 --> 01:20:57,040
Speaker 1: Now I'm going to walk around the hell was looking

1598
01:20:57,040 --> 01:20:58,640
Speaker 1: at me here? Why they want to talk to me?

1599
01:20:59,080 --> 01:20:59,639
Speaker 1: Well made?

1600
01:20:59,680 --> 01:20:59,920
Speaker 2: I I.

1601
01:21:02,040 --> 01:21:05,080
Speaker 1: Thank you, by the way for your service to our nation,

1602
01:21:05,840 --> 01:21:10,840
Speaker 1: and I don't think enough people in our country thank

1603
01:21:11,160 --> 01:21:15,599
Speaker 1: our form of service people, and that goes cuts across.

1604
01:21:16,080 --> 01:21:17,760
Speaker 1: First just wonders back to people like you who go

1605
01:21:17,840 --> 01:21:19,960
Speaker 1: into other countries and put your life on the line.

1606
01:21:20,160 --> 01:21:21,880
Speaker 1: I want to say thank you for that, bealf all

1607
01:21:21,920 --> 01:21:24,639
Speaker 1: those people who would like to thank you, and I'm

1608
01:21:24,680 --> 01:21:26,320
Speaker 1: saying that, I want to say that loud and proud,

1609
01:21:26,560 --> 01:21:29,080
Speaker 1: So thank you for that. And I really appreciate your

1610
01:21:29,120 --> 01:21:32,160
Speaker 1: insights into today, and I just wish more people will

1611
01:21:32,200 --> 01:21:35,280
Speaker 1: pay attention to people like you. Whether you're right or

1612
01:21:35,280 --> 01:21:39,439
Speaker 1: wrong doesn't matter. Let's be aware and more importantless be prepared.

1613
01:21:40,200 --> 01:21:42,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, no, thanks for having me. Appreciate you giving me

1614
01:21:42,479 --> 01:21:45,640
Speaker 2: the time to talk about it. And yeah, love what

1615
01:21:45,680 --> 01:21:47,160
Speaker 2: you've done with the podcast. It's awesome.

1616
01:21:47,320 --> 01:21:47,800
Speaker 1: Thanks mate,