WEBVTT - Inside the minds of terrorists: Dr Dave Gawel Pt.2 0:00:01.960 --> 0:00:04.960 The public has had a long held fascination with detectives. 0:00:05.440 --> 0:00:08.119 Detective see a side of life the average persons never 0:00:08.200 --> 0:00:11.160 exposed to. I spent thirty four years as a cop. 0:00:11.640 --> 0:00:14.080 For twenty five of those years I was catching killers. 0:00:14.480 --> 0:00:16.280 That's what I did for a living. I was a 0:00:16.280 --> 0:00:20.599 homicide detective. I'm no longer just interviewing bad guys, said, 0:00:20.640 --> 0:00:23.200 I'm taking the public into the world in which I operated. 0:00:23.880 --> 0:00:26.480 The guests I talk to each week have amazing stories 0:00:26.480 --> 0:00:28.840 from all sides of the law. The interviews are raw 0:00:28.880 --> 0:00:31.560 and honest, just like the people I talk to. Some 0:00:31.640 --> 0:00:34.680 of the content and language might be confronting. That's because 0:00:34.720 --> 0:00:37.720 no one who comes into contact with crime is left unchanged. 0:00:38.240 --> 0:00:40.559 Join me now as I take you into this world. 0:00:46.159 --> 0:00:48.400 Dr Dave Gore, welcome back to I Catch Killers. 0:00:48.880 --> 0:00:49.199 Thank you. 0:00:49.560 --> 0:00:51.840 In case people didn't listen to part one, they might 0:00:51.880 --> 0:00:54.200 think of you as an academic, So I just want 0:00:54.240 --> 0:00:57.040 to clarify you're not just an academic. We'll call you 0:00:57.120 --> 0:00:59.920 an academic. But you also worked in the New South 0:01:00.120 --> 0:01:03.800 Els Police for thirty five years, I believe, and a 0:01:03.920 --> 0:01:07.280 large portion of that was as a count the terrorists investigator. 0:01:07.400 --> 0:01:09.120 So yeah, it was the last twenty years and so 0:01:09.160 --> 0:01:12.680 what I did was being in the authorities and on 0:01:12.760 --> 0:01:15.839 the front line of ct we got direct access to data. 0:01:16.480 --> 0:01:19.320 Now that data wasn't being used appropriately and because of 0:01:19.360 --> 0:01:22.800 the classification of that material, it couldn't be disseminated to 0:01:22.840 --> 0:01:25.679 other academics. So there was a need there to conduct 0:01:25.800 --> 0:01:29.400 research with real data to get real results. So that's 0:01:29.440 --> 0:01:32.200 where I figured out. I figured out that if I 0:01:32.280 --> 0:01:36.120 could understand the world of academia, I could apply this 0:01:36.240 --> 0:01:39.400 data to the problems we're facing and come up with solutions, 0:01:39.440 --> 0:01:41.560 which in essence is what the book is about as 0:01:41.600 --> 0:01:41.959 a solution. 0:01:42.080 --> 0:01:44.520 Congratulations to you, Dave, because it's a powerful tool to 0:01:44.560 --> 0:01:48.080 have both sides, of the practical side working in the 0:01:48.080 --> 0:01:50.480 field and also the academic side and bringing them together. 0:01:50.880 --> 0:01:53.880 As our good mate Nick identified now in part one, 0:01:53.920 --> 0:01:56.160 there was one thing that I should have should have 0:01:56.240 --> 0:02:00.160 raised because I was watching your speech in researching for 0:02:00.480 --> 0:02:04.000 the podcast for twenty fifteen Police Officer of the Year 0:02:04.080 --> 0:02:06.240 Radary Police Officer of the Year, and you made a 0:02:06.320 --> 0:02:10.160 very strong point that counter terrorism is the greatest team 0:02:10.200 --> 0:02:13.519 sport in criminal investigations because so many people play a part. 0:02:13.560 --> 0:02:16.280 Do you want to just talk us through what that 0:02:16.440 --> 0:02:16.840 was about. 0:02:16.960 --> 0:02:21.120 Yeah, So look, we're both detectives. Yeah, and you know, 0:02:21.400 --> 0:02:26.399 detectives are because there's a high reliance on us from 0:02:26.400 --> 0:02:29.880 the prosecution aspect. There's a general acceptance that the detectives 0:02:29.919 --> 0:02:32.440 will run the brief because of that responsibility and burden 0:02:32.480 --> 0:02:35.120 placed on us. But we're only the tip of the sphere. 0:02:35.919 --> 0:02:39.919 We're you know, a good intelligence or team of intelligence 0:02:40.400 --> 0:02:43.320 supports work and a lot of them go unsung heroes. 0:02:43.440 --> 0:02:46.160 And in the CTO world there's security intelligence agencies or 0:02:46.200 --> 0:02:49.919 spies now here are some fantastic people that do great 0:02:49.960 --> 0:02:52.320 work that never hear or see the light of day. 0:02:52.480 --> 0:02:54.920 Of course, of the nature of their work. We rely 0:02:55.000 --> 0:02:58.640 on surveillance, the surveillance teams. We flog them to Pillar 0:02:58.680 --> 0:03:01.000 and Post to get us results. They work around the 0:03:01.000 --> 0:03:03.720 clock and get us product that gets us over line 0:03:03.720 --> 0:03:06.280 for our Bruce, our tactical boyson. We spoke a little 0:03:06.280 --> 0:03:08.480 bit about pandemics. They were always on call and we 0:03:08.520 --> 0:03:12.640 put them in horrendous circumstances with very minimal time to prepare, 0:03:13.000 --> 0:03:16.119 and they never say no. They always stand up Our techs. 0:03:16.280 --> 0:03:19.240 They walk around and put devices in and do things 0:03:19.280 --> 0:03:21.680 that we could never do. And in the CT space, 0:03:21.760 --> 0:03:23.600 there's a world that there's an area that we really 0:03:23.639 --> 0:03:27.000 took off on, and that was cyber operations. So very 0:03:27.000 --> 0:03:31.280 early on in JCT, we realized that our crooks weren't 0:03:31.320 --> 0:03:35.560 using phones anymore. They were using Internet and data. So 0:03:35.600 --> 0:03:37.680 we had to change the way we did business. And 0:03:37.720 --> 0:03:39.800 I remember I put a business case up to my 0:03:39.880 --> 0:03:42.520 then commander and tried to get some money to set 0:03:42.560 --> 0:03:45.160 up a cyber operations team and basically go it laughed 0:03:45.200 --> 0:03:47.480 at and I was told I could set one up, 0:03:47.640 --> 0:03:50.880 but I had to fund it. With no funding, I 0:03:50.920 --> 0:03:54.160 had some reallyous a guy there, James Short, one of 0:03:54.160 --> 0:03:58.440 the world's best CT cyber operators safety and a really 0:03:58.440 --> 0:04:00.280 good team. They're put together with some of the guys 0:04:00.280 --> 0:04:02.520 from the AFP. So what we did was we started 0:04:02.560 --> 0:04:05.600 scrounging and we went to the exhibit Exhibit Stars and 0:04:05.840 --> 0:04:09.119 at Surrey Hills Police station found a couple of old 0:04:09.120 --> 0:04:11.520 servers they were going to destroy, so they gave them 0:04:11.560 --> 0:04:13.960 to us, and I get grift of them to us. 0:04:14.280 --> 0:04:19.560 We've got some computers that we're secondhand, bought ourselves, some 0:04:19.760 --> 0:04:25.039 online mobile data lines, and away we went. That team 0:04:25.080 --> 0:04:26.560 grew to be one of the best teams at that 0:04:26.640 --> 0:04:30.400 time throughout the country. In fact, the Americans, the Germans, 0:04:30.400 --> 0:04:32.760 the Brits, the French would come to us to do 0:04:32.839 --> 0:04:36.040 work in this region in the cyber online space, and 0:04:36.080 --> 0:04:37.800 that was a credit, a real feather in their cap 0:04:38.160 --> 0:04:41.040 never been done before. We were at that stage at 0:04:41.080 --> 0:04:42.840 world best standard, best prayers. 0:04:43.040 --> 0:04:44.760 I like the fact that you pay homage to all 0:04:44.800 --> 0:04:47.120 the people that play a part in the investigations. And 0:04:47.480 --> 0:04:51.479 the first one you did was intelligence officers. I honestly 0:04:51.520 --> 0:04:54.960 believe in the intelligence office worth three good detectives. If 0:04:55.000 --> 0:04:58.440 you get one quick intel officer, it can make so 0:04:58.560 --> 0:05:01.240 much different, especially if you leading the investigation. If you've 0:05:01.240 --> 0:05:03.960 got someone you can rely on that can receive all 0:05:04.000 --> 0:05:08.040 the information which is overwhelming, dissect the information, then analyze 0:05:08.240 --> 0:05:11.320 what's going on, and then give you a report on it, 0:05:11.440 --> 0:05:14.279 that's a world of difference. Not only is my wife 0:05:14.320 --> 0:05:16.360 and until this will get you in the good books 0:05:16.360 --> 0:05:18.480 at home, So shout out to listen to. 0:05:19.920 --> 0:05:23.080 That. Look, they're worth their weight in gold. And then 0:05:23.080 --> 0:05:25.320 when you get them from other agencies and they've got 0:05:25.360 --> 0:05:29.599 accesses to more extensive databases, the amount of information you 0:05:29.600 --> 0:05:32.040 can pull them on time. So when we're at the JCT, 0:05:32.400 --> 0:05:38.000 we had Commonwealth databases, national security databases, police databases from 0:05:38.040 --> 0:05:41.880 around the country, databases from other law enforcement agencies, and 0:05:41.880 --> 0:05:45.360 then crime Commission those other ages. That was a tremendous 0:05:45.360 --> 0:05:48.280 engine that we could get information in real time and 0:05:48.360 --> 0:05:50.640 that made us and so one of the beauties about 0:05:50.680 --> 0:05:53.359 and we'll hopefully get into one of the things about 0:05:53.640 --> 0:05:56.520 make what's different about CT is you have to make 0:05:56.800 --> 0:05:59.680 good informed decisions. In fact, half the book talks about 0:05:59.680 --> 0:06:03.200 the dish because it is a pivotal process. You can't 0:06:03.240 --> 0:06:05.080 make any good decisions without good information. 0:06:05.200 --> 0:06:08.240 Yeah, we'll talk on that decision making process a little 0:06:08.279 --> 0:06:10.360 bit later on, because it is crucial to the type 0:06:10.360 --> 0:06:12.719 of work. But we were talking in part one about 0:06:12.760 --> 0:06:16.560 threats and the threats shift. Is there a shifting threat? 0:06:17.040 --> 0:06:19.440 CT is a shallow pool. There's a lot of people 0:06:19.560 --> 0:06:22.080 with a lot of functions in there, and there's a 0:06:22.120 --> 0:06:26.679 lot of it's a very shallow The only way CT 0:06:26.960 --> 0:06:30.680 works is that if everyone stays in their lane, and 0:06:30.720 --> 0:06:32.679 what that means is that you stay on your lane, 0:06:32.760 --> 0:06:36.119 and when the job goes from your lane to another lane, 0:06:36.480 --> 0:06:41.080 that threat shifts to the next team or the next discipline. Example, 0:06:41.760 --> 0:06:45.000 if I look at Seals. Seals was the plot to 0:06:45.000 --> 0:06:50.320 blow up the airline passenger When we initially got that information, 0:06:51.400 --> 0:06:55.719 that was intelligence led and they owned that lane. Then 0:06:55.800 --> 0:06:58.760 when we found out that the threat was real, that 0:06:58.880 --> 0:07:04.080 threat was shifted to the investigators. When the investigators built 0:07:04.120 --> 0:07:06.719 up a brief of evidence, the threat was then shifted 0:07:06.760 --> 0:07:10.720 to the tactical team that arrested them. Once the tactical 0:07:10.760 --> 0:07:14.360 team had done their job, that threat was shifted back 0:07:14.680 --> 0:07:17.520 to the investigators to get the brief together. Now that's 0:07:17.560 --> 0:07:24.440 within a team. Now you then multiply that by multiple government, state, national, 0:07:24.560 --> 0:07:28.120 international agencies. That threatshift shifting is happening all through the 0:07:28.160 --> 0:07:32.120 last ban of investigation. What happens is that if you 0:07:32.360 --> 0:07:36.720 give certain information or you don't give information, you shifted 0:07:36.760 --> 0:07:40.760 the threat, either intentionally or unintentionally. The ownership of that 0:07:40.920 --> 0:07:44.400 is on to another organization. And that is a real 0:07:45.560 --> 0:07:48.280 a crux and a cause of great problems within the 0:07:48.320 --> 0:07:52.600 CT space of threat shifting, and a lot of relationships 0:07:52.640 --> 0:07:55.880 have broken down because people have either through neglect or 0:07:55.920 --> 0:07:59.160 not thinking about the consequences, shifted threat under other agencies, 0:07:59.200 --> 0:08:00.800 which wasn't a appropriate. 0:08:00.600 --> 0:08:03.960 Okay, just on that, and I understand what you're saying there. 0:08:04.000 --> 0:08:06.920 When I was reading your book, when you first mentioned 0:08:07.120 --> 0:08:11.240 of staying your lane, I thought, yes, sometimes with investigations, 0:08:11.280 --> 0:08:13.760 I like the uniform cop that thinks outside of the 0:08:13.800 --> 0:08:16.960 square and go hey boss, if you considered this or whatever, 0:08:17.240 --> 0:08:19.880 But you think it's paramount. In the space of counter 0:08:20.000 --> 0:08:23.800 terrorism investigation, everyone knows their role. Stick to those lanes. 0:08:24.600 --> 0:08:29.200 It's a choreographed dance and it's not about analogy. We 0:08:29.280 --> 0:08:32.679 all have specialties and we do that and that enriches 0:08:32.920 --> 0:08:36.120 the next person along the line. So we all feed 0:08:36.160 --> 0:08:39.079 into each other. Now, when you start taking ownership of 0:08:39.120 --> 0:08:42.480 things that's not your lane, that's when the lanes become 0:08:42.559 --> 0:08:44.320 muddy and the ownership gets mixed. 0:08:44.320 --> 0:08:46.360 So by way over the example. So we break it 0:08:46.400 --> 0:08:49.840 down so people understand. An intelligence officer that I'm curious 0:08:49.920 --> 0:08:52.560 what this person would have to say, makes a call. 0:08:52.600 --> 0:08:54.840 This is an experient, makes a call to that person 0:08:54.880 --> 0:08:57.959 and I look, I made this inquiry. No, that should 0:08:57.960 --> 0:08:59.800 be for the investigation groups. 0:09:00.040 --> 0:09:03.080 So exactly, So let's say inn Inintello gets some information 0:09:03.440 --> 0:09:07.079 and then goes outside their lane and contacts another agency. Yes, right, 0:09:07.120 --> 0:09:09.439 and so that other agency is now brought in, right, 0:09:09.480 --> 0:09:11.520 So they're now coming in and doing their job. Now 0:09:11.559 --> 0:09:14.160 they haven't been brief yet. Now that may not have 0:09:14.200 --> 0:09:17.280 been brief because the briefing the brief so we do 0:09:17.320 --> 0:09:20.720 formal briefings. Those briefings take time for pair. So they've 0:09:20.720 --> 0:09:22.760 all of a sudden brought into a job that they're 0:09:22.760 --> 0:09:25.480 not a party to yet. So all of a sudden 0:09:25.520 --> 0:09:28.200 they start reporting. And so there's now two or three 0:09:28.200 --> 0:09:31.559 different streams to government, So government is getting two different 0:09:31.559 --> 0:09:35.760 stories about what's going on and information. We start developing 0:09:35.800 --> 0:09:38.760 an area where we call it assumed facts. Where someone 0:09:38.800 --> 0:09:42.720 says something and because there's multiple streams, that becomes the 0:09:42.800 --> 0:09:48.400 fact and it's not. It fails, and so it really 0:09:48.440 --> 0:09:52.040 needs to be clear. And those lanes and those communication 0:09:52.160 --> 0:09:54.720 lanes need to be clear. One of the greatest things 0:09:54.720 --> 0:09:57.120 I find, or one of the greatest failings, is that 0:09:57.640 --> 0:10:00.760 you know, in a normal day, everyone's calm and they 0:10:00.800 --> 0:10:04.560 go these are communication paths. When a CT incident happens, 0:10:04.840 --> 0:10:08.720 there is a thirst for information that is in quenchable. 0:10:08.920 --> 0:10:12.960 People wanted. Now, some people panic and start giving briefing 0:10:13.000 --> 0:10:16.679 outside of outside of processes, and that causes the breakdown. 0:10:16.760 --> 0:10:21.319 Dave I saw that, and yeah, it's been discussed ad 0:10:21.400 --> 0:10:25.920 nause in. But the Link Cafe that I was watching 0:10:25.920 --> 0:10:28.920 people react, I'm thinking, you're not handling this well on 0:10:29.000 --> 0:10:32.160 different things. And it was probably as sad as it was. 0:10:32.200 --> 0:10:35.000 It was such a tragedy that whole set of circumstances. 0:10:35.880 --> 0:10:38.240 I think we learned a lot from that one experience. 0:10:38.520 --> 0:10:41.920 Look, we did. Look, that was a terrible day and 0:10:42.040 --> 0:10:44.320 my role on that day, so I had the task. 0:10:44.520 --> 0:10:48.240 So go back the morning of Link Cafe, we kicked 0:10:48.240 --> 0:10:50.400 off a job at five o'clock in the morning. We 0:10:51.320 --> 0:10:54.120 did a search rant on a fellow part of the 0:10:54.120 --> 0:10:57.240 Apple Be investigation and it was a terrorism financing proof. 0:10:57.559 --> 0:11:00.600 Did the search warrant, got the information, locked him up, 0:11:00.640 --> 0:11:03.440 knocked it over, and we went back to the office 0:11:03.679 --> 0:11:06.280 nine nine thirty and we're having the celebratory cup of coffee. 0:11:06.360 --> 0:11:10.120 Great job boys, And we turned on seven News and 0:11:10.160 --> 0:11:12.360 there was a picture of what they call the shahada, 0:11:12.520 --> 0:11:14.480 which is the black and white flag that Monus had. 0:11:14.840 --> 0:11:17.000 It was up against the window and we read the 0:11:17.600 --> 0:11:21.200 telly type underneath saying arm robbery gone wrong, hostage is taken. 0:11:21.640 --> 0:11:25.079 Now we knew straight away that was a shahada, that's 0:11:25.120 --> 0:11:28.360 a terrorist flag. So it was in that opportunity that 0:11:28.400 --> 0:11:30.600 we started making the calls. This is a terrorist event, 0:11:30.840 --> 0:11:33.960 so normally we wait to receive the call. In this instance, 0:11:34.000 --> 0:11:36.199 we were briefing up saying, this is what's happening here. 0:11:37.280 --> 0:11:40.880 So then we went into an investigative pattern and my 0:11:41.040 --> 0:11:44.599 task in the day was to identify who the hostages 0:11:44.600 --> 0:11:47.439 were and who the offender was. Now that might seem 0:11:47.480 --> 0:11:51.880 really simple, but random people in a cafe in the 0:11:51.920 --> 0:11:55.880 heart of Sydney just before Christmas, I think I had 0:11:56.040 --> 0:11:58.280 I think there was probably we had about a thousand 0:11:58.320 --> 0:12:01.880 people were ringing up saying I can't contact my brother, 0:12:02.000 --> 0:12:04.360 I haven't seen my sister, My auntie went into the city. 0:12:04.440 --> 0:12:06.760 So if people couldn't contact someone, there was assumption they 0:12:06.800 --> 0:12:10.200 were there. So we had to really slowly dissect through 0:12:10.240 --> 0:12:12.800 all those people who was and wasn't there. We used 0:12:12.800 --> 0:12:17.240 all our technical capabilities, all those tricky methodologies that we had, 0:12:17.440 --> 0:12:18.760 and then we had to identify the shooter. 0:12:18.960 --> 0:12:22.800 Yeah, I remember from the first time I heard that 0:12:22.960 --> 0:12:25.480 was we were watching it in the homicide office and 0:12:25.520 --> 0:12:29.040 one of the female detectives said, man minus. 0:12:29.679 --> 0:12:32.080 Yah and she did contact us and we took it down. 0:12:32.200 --> 0:12:35.400 So now this is a confusing thing. Right, So if 0:12:35.440 --> 0:12:39.000 I go back to Islamic faith, there is a number 0:12:39.040 --> 0:12:41.960 of sex within the Islamic Faith, the two predominant sex 0:12:41.960 --> 0:12:46.840 would be Sunny and Sheer. Now Man Minus purported to 0:12:46.880 --> 0:12:52.000 be a person of high ranking within the Shea community. 0:12:53.320 --> 0:12:56.520 Islamic State, for those that aren't aware, is a Sunny 0:12:56.559 --> 0:13:00.520 based group. We don't see cross We see people crossing 0:13:00.559 --> 0:13:04.840 from Christianity to Muslim, from Muslim to Orthodox, or we 0:13:05.000 --> 0:13:08.640 don't see the crossing over between Sunny and Shea. It's 0:13:08.640 --> 0:13:11.520 a real rare occasion. So he was on the list, 0:13:11.600 --> 0:13:14.880 but at the bottom because he wasn't there. We also 0:13:14.920 --> 0:13:17.520 had the problem that he had the shahidah. Now, those 0:13:17.559 --> 0:13:20.080 that know what the shahda is, that was the flag 0:13:20.240 --> 0:13:23.800 for bin Laden and our Kaider. He was purporting to 0:13:23.800 --> 0:13:27.640 be representing Islamic State. They had a different flag. Islamic 0:13:27.760 --> 0:13:30.440 State and our Kaider were at war with each other. 0:13:30.520 --> 0:13:34.880 They were killing each other in in Shiria. So he's 0:13:34.880 --> 0:13:36.520 got a guy saying on one group, but I've got 0:13:36.520 --> 0:13:38.760 the wrong flag. So there was all these confusing things, 0:13:38.800 --> 0:13:42.600 so the story wasn't making sense to us. So whilst 0:13:42.600 --> 0:13:44.400 he was on the list, it was we just had 0:13:44.400 --> 0:13:46.640 to work through and again we talk about the value 0:13:46.640 --> 0:13:49.839 of intelligence. They went through some Facebook pages. They found 0:13:49.840 --> 0:13:53.280 a photograph of a rally he'd only just recently converted 0:13:53.320 --> 0:13:55.240 to Sunni, which we weren't aware of at the time. 0:13:55.800 --> 0:13:58.520 There was a rally that he was at with Hesbutteria. 0:13:58.920 --> 0:14:01.160 He had a particular band his head on the Soldier 0:14:01.200 --> 0:14:04.679 of Muhammad that he was wearing at the time at 0:14:04.720 --> 0:14:07.240 Link Cafe, And that was the critical point that we 0:14:07.240 --> 0:14:09.640 could say, right now we've got who it is. Now 0:14:09.720 --> 0:14:12.840 we can relay that to the negs, the negotiators, and 0:14:12.840 --> 0:14:14.880 they can start trying to negotiate with a person to 0:14:14.920 --> 0:14:17.679 whom they know because something to that point, we'd investigated 0:14:17.760 --> 0:14:20.840 man man Monus for eight years, so we knew him 0:14:20.920 --> 0:14:21.480 very very well. 0:14:21.640 --> 0:14:24.680 Yeah. Yeah, it was an interesting one and it was 0:14:24.960 --> 0:14:27.280 a way for all of us have to switch on 0:14:27.760 --> 0:14:29.720 and see how we operated. And I think a lot 0:14:29.840 --> 0:14:31.960 was learned from that, which it should, you know, when 0:14:32.000 --> 0:14:35.320 the pressures on the mistakes are made or people react 0:14:35.320 --> 0:14:37.000 a certain way. But I think it ened out a 0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:38.440 few faults on the way that. 0:14:39.080 --> 0:14:43.480 Look, it did a lot of false chain of command 0:14:44.440 --> 0:14:47.560 decision making. All those things come into play. 0:14:47.400 --> 0:14:49.960 And in that one what you've referenced, you know, stay 0:14:49.960 --> 0:14:52.400 in your lane was very important too, because there were 0:14:52.440 --> 0:14:55.080 so many people wanted to have a piece of it 0:14:55.120 --> 0:14:57.840 because it was the biggest thing in town and everyone's 0:14:57.880 --> 0:14:58.880 on the phone running around. 0:14:59.120 --> 0:15:02.360 Yeah, so we had and everyone does. It's a slip 0:15:02.880 --> 0:15:04.560 you slip into all. I can do this, but that's 0:15:04.560 --> 0:15:07.120 not what you're there to do, and in doing that, 0:15:07.120 --> 0:15:10.640 you dilute the process and you get in the way. Look, 0:15:10.800 --> 0:15:12.680 it was a great learning process. We learn a lot. 0:15:12.760 --> 0:15:15.080 So that's where we developed the concept of the strands 0:15:15.120 --> 0:15:19.040 of regalization. Out of that, we also looked at reception 0:15:19.240 --> 0:15:23.080 centers for witnesses and families important. So one of the 0:15:23.080 --> 0:15:25.840 filings and one of the main failings in my career 0:15:26.000 --> 0:15:31.240 is that terrorism uses fear and violence as their main 0:15:31.360 --> 0:15:36.720 tools that manifests into victims. So terrorisms, terrorism doesn't occur 0:15:36.800 --> 0:15:39.760 without victims. And what probably we need to do is 0:15:39.800 --> 0:15:42.640 look more at a victim centric approach. And Link showed 0:15:42.720 --> 0:15:44.680 us that that we failed. That we failed both the 0:15:44.720 --> 0:15:47.720 families in that regard and those that were coming out 0:15:47.720 --> 0:15:50.520 in the witnesses. So we started to develop better protocols 0:15:50.560 --> 0:15:52.840 for that and I think that was again taking it 0:15:52.880 --> 0:15:55.160 further and again maturing in this space. We're all maturing, 0:15:55.520 --> 0:15:57.600 so you don't learn it in a hurry, but when you, 0:15:58.000 --> 0:16:00.000 as we slowly go through it, we get better and better. 0:16:00.280 --> 0:16:03.640 Well, there's something I've learned here in the podcast, like 0:16:03.680 --> 0:16:07.120 speaking to Peter Morony and yourself and going through the book. 0:16:07.240 --> 0:16:10.640 There has been a learning process. It's just changed. We've 0:16:10.640 --> 0:16:13.360 had to adopt a new way of policing, a new 0:16:13.600 --> 0:16:14.560 strand of policing. 0:16:14.680 --> 0:16:17.400 It's a new strand of policing. So just in investigations 0:16:17.440 --> 0:16:22.160 in CT, we've got three different types. Now there's investigations, 0:16:22.160 --> 0:16:25.880 well in CT, there's reactive investigations, there's product investigations, and 0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:29.440 there's prevented investigations. These are three separate disciplines that have 0:16:29.680 --> 0:16:32.600 just emerged that we now have to master. And then 0:16:32.640 --> 0:16:36.000 you've then you overlay that with the intelligence, and intelligence 0:16:36.040 --> 0:16:39.680 is getting complicated as well. And then the dynamic nature 0:16:39.720 --> 0:16:43.120 of terrorism. Now, whilst it stays, you know that the 0:16:43.200 --> 0:16:46.640 trends stay, the motivations and how they do business is 0:16:46.680 --> 0:16:49.960 constantly moving. I was constantly asked, Dave, what are you 0:16:49.960 --> 0:16:54.040 still there after twenty years? And so because it never stopped, 0:16:54.680 --> 0:16:57.160 I would write a manual. So one of my jobs 0:16:57.200 --> 0:17:00.240 was to write training manuals. I'd write a manual and 0:17:00.280 --> 0:17:02.720 within six months that manual was out of date and 0:17:02.800 --> 0:17:06.280 had to rewrite a new one because the environment had 0:17:06.320 --> 0:17:06.639 moved on. 0:17:06.920 --> 0:17:10.000 Well, I know you're busy because you've virtually disappeared and 0:17:10.359 --> 0:17:15.520 whenever we saw you look stressed. So yeah, you must 0:17:15.520 --> 0:17:17.360 have been doing something. I didn't think you were bludding 0:17:17.400 --> 0:17:23.920 over there, but yeah, you just disappear on ideology left 0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:25.960 and right. Let's talk through that. 0:17:26.480 --> 0:17:30.040 So looks there's always been and look, as long as 0:17:30.040 --> 0:17:33.680 I've been in CT, right right wing, extreme right wing 0:17:33.720 --> 0:17:38.359 has always been there. Now there there is there is 0:17:38.520 --> 0:17:42.760 a mis comprehension that because right wing is based on hate, 0:17:43.000 --> 0:17:45.800 they hate the people they're opposed to, that it's worse 0:17:45.920 --> 0:17:49.119 than other forms of extremism. They're all equally as bad 0:17:50.480 --> 0:17:55.000 the right. The one constant in the world of ideological 0:17:55.119 --> 0:17:57.800 terrorism is if there is a rise in the right, 0:17:58.240 --> 0:18:01.120 there will be a rise corresponding rise in left wing 0:18:01.480 --> 0:18:04.200 extreme left wing terrorism. Now, it doesn't get the media 0:18:04.240 --> 0:18:08.280 attention that it deserves. So when I hear the AJADG 0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:12.000 talk about a rise in right wing My next conversation is, well, 0:18:12.200 --> 0:18:13.880 what are you doing then about the left? Of course, 0:18:13.920 --> 0:18:16.680 if the right right rises, so does the left. 0:18:16.880 --> 0:18:18.720 They go relationship together. 0:18:19.240 --> 0:18:21.959 And if the left rises, then the right comes up. 0:18:22.320 --> 0:18:24.719 It makes sense when you're talking in extreme views, like 0:18:24.760 --> 0:18:26.639 if someone throws that up, there will be a counter. 0:18:26.680 --> 0:18:30.320 And the example we see if there's a Palestinian protest, 0:18:30.480 --> 0:18:34.240 we see encounter is Israeli protest. If there's an Israeli protest, 0:18:34.280 --> 0:18:37.639 there's a counter. It's the same process, it's the same dynamic, 0:18:38.000 --> 0:18:39.199 just in different ideologies. 0:18:39.560 --> 0:18:42.800 A lot of what we hear as young males being 0:18:42.840 --> 0:18:45.720 caught up in it and they're trying to prove themselves. 0:18:45.760 --> 0:18:48.919 They're probably more easy to influence and an older person 0:18:48.960 --> 0:18:51.159 than the ones that some of the things that have 0:18:51.240 --> 0:18:54.000 played out in recent times young males and what happened 0:18:54.040 --> 0:18:57.719 out the front of the police headquarters a young young person. 0:18:58.400 --> 0:19:02.000 Do they deliberately get targeted because they're vulnerable, because they 0:19:02.040 --> 0:19:02.879 can be influenced? 0:19:03.240 --> 0:19:11.080 Yeah, look so in short, yes, so culturally yes they are. Now, 0:19:11.200 --> 0:19:16.040 each particular ideology will have its nuances. So if you 0:19:16.040 --> 0:19:20.680 look at the culture, say of Islamic culture, the males 0:19:20.880 --> 0:19:26.040 are probably the leading face outwardly, so therefore they will 0:19:26.040 --> 0:19:29.280 take responsibility. Now that said, I am fully aware that 0:19:29.359 --> 0:19:32.760 females are radicalised and are just as big as part 0:19:32.800 --> 0:19:34.840 of the process as the males are. 0:19:34.920 --> 0:19:37.280 Okay, talk us through that, because we don't when the 0:19:37.280 --> 0:19:40.560 word terrorism comes to for we don't often relate it 0:19:40.560 --> 0:19:41.640 to the female. 0:19:41.840 --> 0:19:45.000 No, And so what we find is that because of 0:19:45.480 --> 0:19:48.720 in the Islamic faith, they take a you know, they 0:19:48.760 --> 0:19:52.600 take a backward step. That in that regard is that 0:19:52.600 --> 0:19:54.720 they're not going to be forward thinking that you know, 0:19:54.960 --> 0:19:58.480 that they're not going to expose themselves as a male would. 0:19:58.520 --> 0:20:01.040 Now that doesn't mean they don't agree the ideology and 0:20:01.080 --> 0:20:01.920 they don't agree. 0:20:01.680 --> 0:20:06.480 With the support perhaps, don't you know. 0:20:06.520 --> 0:20:09.280 I can remember during pandemics and we were listening to 0:20:09.560 --> 0:20:12.720 all these conversations, and all I can say is that 0:20:12.760 --> 0:20:16.000 there were individuals in those rooms in those houses that 0:20:16.040 --> 0:20:20.240 were female that were just as into the extreme ideology 0:20:20.280 --> 0:20:23.560 as the blokes, and they many times were inspiring them 0:20:23.560 --> 0:20:26.240 and encouraging them to pursue what they wanted to do 0:20:26.280 --> 0:20:28.639 and pursue their goals. And they take a sort of 0:20:28.640 --> 0:20:31.720 a secondary role in that aspect. Now you see say 0:20:31.720 --> 0:20:35.119 in left wing where it's a culturally, culturally different group. 0:20:35.440 --> 0:20:38.600 You will see a lot of females, you know, running 0:20:38.800 --> 0:20:42.199 running the protests, stepping up and making those actions. And 0:20:42.240 --> 0:20:45.280 you also see that too and right wing and political 0:20:45.400 --> 0:20:49.720 again whichever that goes. Again, we see women involved in 0:20:49.760 --> 0:20:53.800 that as well. So whilst males seem to be the 0:20:53.840 --> 0:20:57.720 most prominent ones, females have their fair fair hand in 0:20:57.760 --> 0:20:58.280 it as well. 0:20:58.680 --> 0:21:01.960 Do we look, I take on board what you're saying there, 0:21:01.960 --> 0:21:04.480 because it's just the perception with the males, and you've 0:21:04.520 --> 0:21:08.440 explained that. Do we ignore the risk that potential let's say, 0:21:08.640 --> 0:21:12.320 white terraces, that type of extreme behavior that we don't 0:21:12.320 --> 0:21:16.000 see it because I'm talking generally here, but the community 0:21:16.000 --> 0:21:19.200 look at okay, these terrorsts, where are they from? From 0:21:19.240 --> 0:21:21.240 the Middle East or or that type of thing. That's 0:21:21.280 --> 0:21:24.840 our thinking of terrorists that's been ingrained into the general public. 0:21:24.880 --> 0:21:27.880