Speaker 1: The public has had a long held fascination with detectives.
Speaker 1: Detective see a side of life the average persons never
Speaker 1: exposed to. I spent thirty four years as a cop.
Speaker 1: For twenty five of those years I was catching killers.
Speaker 1: That's what I did for a living. I was a
Speaker 1: homicide detective. I'm no longer just interviewing bad guys, said,
Speaker 1: I'm taking the public into the world in which I operated.
Speaker 1: The guests I talk to each week have amazing stories
Speaker 1: from all sides of the law. The interviews are raw
Speaker 1: and honest, just like the people I talk to. Some
Speaker 1: of the content and language might be confronting. That's because
Speaker 1: no one who comes into contact with crime is left unchanged.
Speaker 1: Join me now as I take you into this world.
Speaker 1: Dr Dave Gore, welcome back to I Catch Killers.
Speaker 2: Thank you.
Speaker 1: In case people didn't listen to part one, they might
Speaker 1: think of you as an academic, So I just want
Speaker 1: to clarify you're not just an academic. We'll call you
Speaker 1: an academic. But you also worked in the New South
Speaker 1: Els Police for thirty five years, I believe, and a
Speaker 1: large portion of that was as a count the terrorists investigator.
Speaker 2: So yeah, it was the last twenty years and so
Speaker 2: what I did was being in the authorities and on
Speaker 2: the front line of ct we got direct access to data.
Speaker 2: Now that data wasn't being used appropriately and because of
Speaker 2: the classification of that material, it couldn't be disseminated to
Speaker 2: other academics. So there was a need there to conduct
Speaker 2: research with real data to get real results. So that's
Speaker 2: where I figured out. I figured out that if I
Speaker 2: could understand the world of academia, I could apply this
Speaker 2: data to the problems we're facing and come up with solutions,
Speaker 2: which in essence is what the book is about as
Speaker 2: a solution.
Speaker 1: Congratulations to you, Dave, because it's a powerful tool to
Speaker 1: have both sides, of the practical side working in the
Speaker 1: field and also the academic side and bringing them together.
Speaker 1: As our good mate Nick identified now in part one,
Speaker 1: there was one thing that I should have should have
Speaker 1: raised because I was watching your speech in researching for
Speaker 1: the podcast for twenty fifteen Police Officer of the Year
Speaker 1: Radary Police Officer of the Year, and you made a
Speaker 1: very strong point that counter terrorism is the greatest team
Speaker 1: sport in criminal investigations because so many people play a part.
Speaker 1: Do you want to just talk us through what that
Speaker 1: was about.
Speaker 2: Yeah, So look, we're both detectives. Yeah, and you know,
Speaker 2: detectives are because there's a high reliance on us from
Speaker 2: the prosecution aspect. There's a general acceptance that the detectives
Speaker 2: will run the brief because of that responsibility and burden
Speaker 2: placed on us. But we're only the tip of the sphere.
Speaker 2: We're you know, a good intelligence or team of intelligence
Speaker 2: supports work and a lot of them go unsung heroes.
Speaker 2: And in the CTO world there's security intelligence agencies or
Speaker 2: spies now here are some fantastic people that do great
Speaker 2: work that never hear or see the light of day.
Speaker 2: Of course, of the nature of their work. We rely
Speaker 2: on surveillance, the surveillance teams. We flog them to Pillar
Speaker 2: and Post to get us results. They work around the
Speaker 2: clock and get us product that gets us over line
Speaker 2: for our Bruce, our tactical boyson. We spoke a little
Speaker 2: bit about pandemics. They were always on call and we
Speaker 2: put them in horrendous circumstances with very minimal time to prepare,
Speaker 2: and they never say no. They always stand up Our techs.
Speaker 2: They walk around and put devices in and do things
Speaker 2: that we could never do. And in the CT space,
Speaker 2: there's a world that there's an area that we really
Speaker 2: took off on, and that was cyber operations. So very
Speaker 2: early on in JCT, we realized that our crooks weren't
Speaker 2: using phones anymore. They were using Internet and data. So
Speaker 2: we had to change the way we did business. And
Speaker 2: I remember I put a business case up to my
Speaker 2: then commander and tried to get some money to set
Speaker 2: up a cyber operations team and basically go it laughed
Speaker 2: at and I was told I could set one up,
Speaker 2: but I had to fund it. With no funding, I
Speaker 2: had some reallyous a guy there, James Short, one of
Speaker 2: the world's best CT cyber operators safety and a really
Speaker 2: good team. They're put together with some of the guys
Speaker 2: from the AFP. So what we did was we started
Speaker 2: scrounging and we went to the exhibit Exhibit Stars and
Speaker 2: at Surrey Hills Police station found a couple of old
Speaker 2: servers they were going to destroy, so they gave them
Speaker 2: to us, and I get grift of them to us.
Speaker 2: We've got some computers that we're secondhand, bought ourselves, some
Speaker 2: online mobile data lines, and away we went. That team
Speaker 2: grew to be one of the best teams at that
Speaker 2: time throughout the country. In fact, the Americans, the Germans,
Speaker 2: the Brits, the French would come to us to do
Speaker 2: work in this region in the cyber online space, and
Speaker 2: that was a credit, a real feather in their cap
Speaker 2: never been done before. We were at that stage at
Speaker 2: world best standard, best prayers.
Speaker 1: I like the fact that you pay homage to all
Speaker 1: the people that play a part in the investigations. And
Speaker 1: the first one you did was intelligence officers. I honestly
Speaker 1: believe in the intelligence office worth three good detectives. If
Speaker 1: you get one quick intel officer, it can make so
Speaker 1: much different, especially if you leading the investigation. If you've
Speaker 1: got someone you can rely on that can receive all
Speaker 1: the information which is overwhelming, dissect the information, then analyze
Speaker 1: what's going on, and then give you a report on it,
Speaker 1: that's a world of difference. Not only is my wife
Speaker 1: and until this will get you in the good books
Speaker 1: at home, So shout out to listen to.
Speaker 2: That. Look, they're worth their weight in gold. And then
Speaker 2: when you get them from other agencies and they've got
Speaker 2: accesses to more extensive databases, the amount of information you
Speaker 2: can pull them on time. So when we're at the JCT,
Speaker 2: we had Commonwealth databases, national security databases, police databases from
Speaker 2: around the country, databases from other law enforcement agencies, and
Speaker 2: then crime Commission those other ages. That was a tremendous
Speaker 2: engine that we could get information in real time and
Speaker 2: that made us and so one of the beauties about
Speaker 2: and we'll hopefully get into one of the things about
Speaker 2: make what's different about CT is you have to make
Speaker 2: good informed decisions. In fact, half the book talks about
Speaker 2: the dish because it is a pivotal process. You can't
Speaker 2: make any good decisions without good information.
Speaker 1: Yeah, we'll talk on that decision making process a little
Speaker 1: bit later on, because it is crucial to the type
Speaker 1: of work. But we were talking in part one about
Speaker 1: threats and the threats shift. Is there a shifting threat?
Speaker 2: CT is a shallow pool. There's a lot of people
Speaker 2: with a lot of functions in there, and there's a
Speaker 2: lot of it's a very shallow The only way CT
Speaker 2: works is that if everyone stays in their lane, and
Speaker 2: what that means is that you stay on your lane,
Speaker 2: and when the job goes from your lane to another lane,
Speaker 2: that threat shifts to the next team or the next discipline. Example,
Speaker 2: if I look at Seals. Seals was the plot to
Speaker 2: blow up the airline passenger When we initially got that information,
Speaker 2: that was intelligence led and they owned that lane. Then
Speaker 2: when we found out that the threat was real, that
Speaker 2: threat was shifted to the investigators. When the investigators built
Speaker 2: up a brief of evidence, the threat was then shifted
Speaker 2: to the tactical team that arrested them. Once the tactical
Speaker 2: team had done their job, that threat was shifted back
Speaker 2: to the investigators to get the brief together. Now that's
Speaker 2: within a team. Now you then multiply that by multiple government, state, national,
Speaker 2: international agencies. That threatshift shifting is happening all through the
Speaker 2: last ban of investigation. What happens is that if you
Speaker 2: give certain information or you don't give information, you shifted
Speaker 2: the threat, either intentionally or unintentionally. The ownership of that
Speaker 2: is on to another organization. And that is a real
Speaker 2: a crux and a cause of great problems within the
Speaker 2: CT space of threat shifting, and a lot of relationships
Speaker 2: have broken down because people have either through neglect or
Speaker 2: not thinking about the consequences, shifted threat under other agencies,
Speaker 2: which wasn't a appropriate.
Speaker 1: Okay, just on that, and I understand what you're saying there.
Speaker 1: When I was reading your book, when you first mentioned
Speaker 1: of staying your lane, I thought, yes, sometimes with investigations,
Speaker 1: I like the uniform cop that thinks outside of the
Speaker 1: square and go hey boss, if you considered this or whatever,
Speaker 1: But you think it's paramount. In the space of counter
Speaker 1: terrorism investigation, everyone knows their role. Stick to those lanes.
Speaker 2: It's a choreographed dance and it's not about analogy. We
Speaker 2: all have specialties and we do that and that enriches
Speaker 2: the next person along the line. So we all feed
Speaker 2: into each other. Now, when you start taking ownership of
Speaker 2: things that's not your lane, that's when the lanes become
Speaker 2: muddy and the ownership gets mixed.
Speaker 1: So by way over the example. So we break it
Speaker 1: down so people understand. An intelligence officer that I'm curious
Speaker 1: what this person would have to say, makes a call.
Speaker 1: This is an experient, makes a call to that person
Speaker 1: and I look, I made this inquiry. No, that should
Speaker 1: be for the investigation groups.
Speaker 2: So exactly, So let's say inn Inintello gets some information
Speaker 2: and then goes outside their lane and contacts another agency. Yes, right,
Speaker 2: and so that other agency is now brought in, right,
Speaker 2: So they're now coming in and doing their job. Now
Speaker 2: they haven't been brief yet. Now that may not have
Speaker 2: been brief because the briefing the brief so we do
Speaker 2: formal briefings. Those briefings take time for pair. So they've
Speaker 2: all of a sudden brought into a job that they're
Speaker 2: not a party to yet. So all of a sudden
Speaker 2: they start reporting. And so there's now two or three
Speaker 2: different streams to government, So government is getting two different
Speaker 2: stories about what's going on and information. We start developing
Speaker 2: an area where we call it assumed facts. Where someone
Speaker 2: says something and because there's multiple streams, that becomes the
Speaker 2: fact and it's not. It fails, and so it really
Speaker 2: needs to be clear. And those lanes and those communication
Speaker 2: lanes need to be clear. One of the greatest things
Speaker 2: I find, or one of the greatest failings, is that
Speaker 2: you know, in a normal day, everyone's calm and they
Speaker 2: go these are communication paths. When a CT incident happens,
Speaker 2: there is a thirst for information that is in quenchable.
Speaker 2: People wanted. Now, some people panic and start giving briefing
Speaker 2: outside of outside of processes, and that causes the breakdown.
Speaker 1: Dave I saw that, and yeah, it's been discussed ad
Speaker 1: nause in. But the Link Cafe that I was watching
Speaker 1: people react, I'm thinking, you're not handling this well on
Speaker 1: different things. And it was probably as sad as it was.
Speaker 1: It was such a tragedy that whole set of circumstances.
Speaker 1: I think we learned a lot from that one experience.
Speaker 2: Look, we did. Look, that was a terrible day and
Speaker 2: my role on that day, so I had the task.
Speaker 2: So go back the morning of Link Cafe, we kicked
Speaker 2: off a job at five o'clock in the morning. We
Speaker 2: did a search rant on a fellow part of the
Speaker 2: Apple Be investigation and it was a terrorism financing proof.
Speaker 2: Did the search warrant, got the information, locked him up,
Speaker 2: knocked it over, and we went back to the office
Speaker 2: nine nine thirty and we're having the celebratory cup of coffee.
Speaker 2: Great job boys, And we turned on seven News and
Speaker 2: there was a picture of what they call the shahada,
Speaker 2: which is the black and white flag that Monus had.
Speaker 2: It was up against the window and we read the
Speaker 2: telly type underneath saying arm robbery gone wrong, hostage is taken.
Speaker 2: Now we knew straight away that was a shahada, that's
Speaker 2: a terrorist flag. So it was in that opportunity that
Speaker 2: we started making the calls. This is a terrorist event,
Speaker 2: so normally we wait to receive the call. In this instance,
Speaker 2: we were briefing up saying, this is what's happening here.
Speaker 2: So then we went into an investigative pattern and my
Speaker 2: task in the day was to identify who the hostages
Speaker 2: were and who the offender was. Now that might seem
Speaker 2: really simple, but random people in a cafe in the
Speaker 2: heart of Sydney just before Christmas, I think I had
Speaker 2: I think there was probably we had about a thousand
Speaker 2: people were ringing up saying I can't contact my brother,
Speaker 2: I haven't seen my sister, My auntie went into the city.
Speaker 2: So if people couldn't contact someone, there was assumption they
Speaker 2: were there. So we had to really slowly dissect through
Speaker 2: all those people who was and wasn't there. We used
Speaker 2: all our technical capabilities, all those tricky methodologies that we had,
Speaker 2: and then we had to identify the shooter.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I remember from the first time I heard that
Speaker 1: was we were watching it in the homicide office and
Speaker 1: one of the female detectives said, man minus.
Speaker 2: Yah and she did contact us and we took it down.
Speaker 2: So now this is a confusing thing. Right, So if
Speaker 2: I go back to Islamic faith, there is a number
Speaker 2: of sex within the Islamic Faith, the two predominant sex
Speaker 2: would be Sunny and Sheer. Now Man Minus purported to
Speaker 2: be a person of high ranking within the Shea community.
Speaker 2: Islamic State, for those that aren't aware, is a Sunny
Speaker 2: based group. We don't see cross We see people crossing
Speaker 2: from Christianity to Muslim, from Muslim to Orthodox, or we
Speaker 2: don't see the crossing over between Sunny and Shea. It's
Speaker 2: a real rare occasion. So he was on the list,
Speaker 2: but at the bottom because he wasn't there. We also
Speaker 2: had the problem that he had the shahidah. Now, those
Speaker 2: that know what the shahda is, that was the flag
Speaker 2: for bin Laden and our Kaider. He was purporting to
Speaker 2: be representing Islamic State. They had a different flag. Islamic
Speaker 2: State and our Kaider were at war with each other.
Speaker 2: They were killing each other in in Shiria. So he's
Speaker 2: got a guy saying on one group, but I've got
Speaker 2: the wrong flag. So there was all these confusing things,
Speaker 2: so the story wasn't making sense to us. So whilst
Speaker 2: he was on the list, it was we just had
Speaker 2: to work through and again we talk about the value
Speaker 2: of intelligence. They went through some Facebook pages. They found
Speaker 2: a photograph of a rally he'd only just recently converted
Speaker 2: to Sunni, which we weren't aware of at the time.
Speaker 2: There was a rally that he was at with Hesbutteria.
Speaker 2: He had a particular band his head on the Soldier
Speaker 2: of Muhammad that he was wearing at the time at
Speaker 2: Link Cafe, And that was the critical point that we
Speaker 2: could say, right now we've got who it is. Now
Speaker 2: we can relay that to the negs, the negotiators, and
Speaker 2: they can start trying to negotiate with a person to
Speaker 2: whom they know because something to that point, we'd investigated
Speaker 2: man man Monus for eight years, so we knew him
Speaker 2: very very well.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, it was an interesting one and it was
Speaker 1: a way for all of us have to switch on
Speaker 1: and see how we operated. And I think a lot
Speaker 1: was learned from that, which it should, you know, when
Speaker 1: the pressures on the mistakes are made or people react
Speaker 1: a certain way. But I think it ened out a
Speaker 1: few faults on the way that.
Speaker 2: Look, it did a lot of false chain of command
Speaker 2: decision making. All those things come into play.
Speaker 1: And in that one what you've referenced, you know, stay
Speaker 1: in your lane was very important too, because there were
Speaker 1: so many people wanted to have a piece of it
Speaker 1: because it was the biggest thing in town and everyone's
Speaker 1: on the phone running around.
Speaker 2: Yeah, so we had and everyone does. It's a slip
Speaker 2: you slip into all. I can do this, but that's
Speaker 2: not what you're there to do, and in doing that,
Speaker 2: you dilute the process and you get in the way. Look,
Speaker 2: it was a great learning process. We learn a lot.
Speaker 2: So that's where we developed the concept of the strands
Speaker 2: of regalization. Out of that, we also looked at reception
Speaker 2: centers for witnesses and families important. So one of the
Speaker 2: filings and one of the main failings in my career
Speaker 2: is that terrorism uses fear and violence as their main
Speaker 2: tools that manifests into victims. So terrorisms, terrorism doesn't occur
Speaker 2: without victims. And what probably we need to do is
Speaker 2: look more at a victim centric approach. And Link showed
Speaker 2: us that that we failed. That we failed both the
Speaker 2: families in that regard and those that were coming out
Speaker 2: in the witnesses. So we started to develop better protocols
Speaker 2: for that and I think that was again taking it
Speaker 2: further and again maturing in this space. We're all maturing,
Speaker 2: so you don't learn it in a hurry, but when you,
Speaker 2: as we slowly go through it, we get better and better.
Speaker 1: Well, there's something I've learned here in the podcast, like
Speaker 1: speaking to Peter Morony and yourself and going through the book.
Speaker 1: There has been a learning process. It's just changed. We've
Speaker 1: had to adopt a new way of policing, a new
Speaker 1: strand of policing.
Speaker 2: It's a new strand of policing. So just in investigations
Speaker 2: in CT, we've got three different types. Now there's investigations,
Speaker 2: well in CT, there's reactive investigations, there's product investigations, and
Speaker 2: there's prevented investigations. These are three separate disciplines that have
Speaker 2: just emerged that we now have to master. And then
Speaker 2: you've then you overlay that with the intelligence, and intelligence
Speaker 2: is getting complicated as well. And then the dynamic nature
Speaker 2: of terrorism. Now, whilst it stays, you know that the
Speaker 2: trends stay, the motivations and how they do business is
Speaker 2: constantly moving. I was constantly asked, Dave, what are you
Speaker 2: still there after twenty years? And so because it never stopped,
Speaker 2: I would write a manual. So one of my jobs
Speaker 2: was to write training manuals. I'd write a manual and
Speaker 2: within six months that manual was out of date and
Speaker 2: had to rewrite a new one because the environment had
Speaker 2: moved on.
Speaker 1: Well, I know you're busy because you've virtually disappeared and
Speaker 1: whenever we saw you look stressed. So yeah, you must
Speaker 1: have been doing something. I didn't think you were bludding
Speaker 1: over there, but yeah, you just disappear on ideology left
Speaker 1: and right. Let's talk through that.
Speaker 2: So looks there's always been and look, as long as
Speaker 2: I've been in CT, right right wing, extreme right wing
Speaker 2: has always been there. Now there there is there is
Speaker 2: a mis comprehension that because right wing is based on hate,
Speaker 2: they hate the people they're opposed to, that it's worse
Speaker 2: than other forms of extremism. They're all equally as bad
Speaker 2: the right. The one constant in the world of ideological
Speaker 2: terrorism is if there is a rise in the right,
Speaker 2: there will be a rise corresponding rise in left wing
Speaker 2: extreme left wing terrorism. Now, it doesn't get the media
Speaker 2: attention that it deserves. So when I hear the AJADG
Speaker 2: talk about a rise in right wing My next conversation is, well,
Speaker 2: what are you doing then about the left? Of course,
Speaker 2: if the right right rises, so does the left.
Speaker 1: They go relationship together.
Speaker 2: And if the left rises, then the right comes up.
Speaker 1: It makes sense when you're talking in extreme views, like
Speaker 1: if someone throws that up, there will be a counter.
Speaker 2: And the example we see if there's a Palestinian protest,
Speaker 2: we see encounter is Israeli protest. If there's an Israeli protest,
Speaker 2: there's a counter. It's the same process, it's the same dynamic,
Speaker 2: just in different ideologies.
Speaker 1: A lot of what we hear as young males being
Speaker 1: caught up in it and they're trying to prove themselves.
Speaker 1: They're probably more easy to influence and an older person
Speaker 1: than the ones that some of the things that have
Speaker 1: played out in recent times young males and what happened
Speaker 1: out the front of the police headquarters a young young person.
Speaker 1: Do they deliberately get targeted because they're vulnerable, because they
Speaker 1: can be influenced?
Speaker 2: Yeah, look so in short, yes, so culturally yes they are. Now,
Speaker 2: each particular ideology will have its nuances. So if you
Speaker 2: look at the culture, say of Islamic culture, the males
Speaker 2: are probably the leading face outwardly, so therefore they will
Speaker 2: take responsibility. Now that said, I am fully aware that
Speaker 2: females are radicalised and are just as big as part
Speaker 2: of the process as the males are.
Speaker 1: Okay, talk us through that, because we don't when the
Speaker 1: word terrorism comes to for we don't often relate it
Speaker 1: to the female.
Speaker 2: No, And so what we find is that because of
Speaker 2: in the Islamic faith, they take a you know, they
Speaker 2: take a backward step. That in that regard is that
Speaker 2: they're not going to be forward thinking that you know,
Speaker 2: that they're not going to expose themselves as a male would.
Speaker 2: Now that doesn't mean they don't agree the ideology and
Speaker 2: they don't agree.
Speaker 1: With the support perhaps, don't you know.
Speaker 2: I can remember during pandemics and we were listening to
Speaker 2: all these conversations, and all I can say is that
Speaker 2: there were individuals in those rooms in those houses that
Speaker 2: were female that were just as into the extreme ideology
Speaker 2: as the blokes, and they many times were inspiring them
Speaker 2: and encouraging them to pursue what they wanted to do
Speaker 2: and pursue their goals. And they take a sort of
Speaker 2: a secondary role in that aspect. Now you see say
Speaker 2: in left wing where it's a culturally, culturally different group.
Speaker 2: You will see a lot of females, you know, running
Speaker 2: running the protests, stepping up and making those actions. And
Speaker 2: you also see that too and right wing and political
Speaker 2: again whichever that goes. Again, we see women involved in
Speaker 2: that as well. So whilst males seem to be the
Speaker 2: most prominent ones, females have their fair fair hand in
Speaker 2: it as well.
Speaker 1: Do we look, I take on board what you're saying there,
Speaker 1: because it's just the perception with the males, and you've
Speaker 1: explained that. Do we ignore the risk that potential let's say,
Speaker 1: white terraces, that type of extreme behavior that we don't
Speaker 1: see it because I'm talking generally here, but the community
Speaker 1: look at okay, these terrorsts, where are they from? From
Speaker 1: the Middle East or or that type of thing. That's
Speaker 1: our thinking of terrorists that's been ingrained into the general public.
Speaker 1: I think whether it's a unconscious bias that we hold
Speaker 1: on to. But what about these white extremes offer the
Speaker 1: same sort of threat?
Speaker 2: So look, each terrace offers the same spread. Yeah, okay, so,
Speaker 2: and I not want to be glib, but it's like
Speaker 2: ice cream. Violence is like ice cream. We're only changing
Speaker 2: the flavor of the ice cream. It's still ice cream.
Speaker 2: Violence is still violence, regardless.
Speaker 1: Of we'd be talking about ice cream on my catch killers.
Speaker 2: Stay but you with me, so you know what we
Speaker 2: see is that they just as deadly, yes, just as change.
Speaker 2: Now what we're seeing so we're terrors and comes in
Speaker 2: what they call ways, and there's the identify as the
Speaker 2: four waves at the moment, and at the moment we're
Speaker 2: in a religious phase and that phase is coming out
Speaker 2: and we're seeing the emergence of new left and right
Speaker 2: wing terrorism. So predominantly at the moment, we're in the
Speaker 2: middle of religious terrorism, and in particular it's those that
Speaker 2: have a corrupted, extreme interpretation of the Islamic faith. Now
Speaker 2: that this is just a period in time so that
Speaker 2: you know, if the modeling is true, that will start
Speaker 2: to dissipate and those as you call it, Anglo saxons
Speaker 2: of white orientated terrorists will start to take more predinents
Speaker 2: or more prominence, and then we'll see more of that,
Speaker 2: and hopefully when that occurs, we'll see more of a
Speaker 2: balanced position of what terrorism is. And it's not a
Speaker 2: Middle Eastern thing. It is a human thing, and depending
Speaker 2: on their ideology.
Speaker 1: I think that's an important point to bring up and
Speaker 1: to get across that we've got to look at it
Speaker 1: that way. I don't know about the ice cream analogy,
Speaker 1: but I'll sit on that. Which color did you prefer
Speaker 1: with vanilla? All right, let's talk about recruitment the way
Speaker 1: that as law enforcement you can stop recruitment. Now you
Speaker 1: talked early in part one about religious leaders come out
Speaker 1: and support it. How can we stop stop people being recruited?
Speaker 2: So recruitment's like recruitment is the basis and future success
Speaker 2: of any organization is based on recruitment. There is a
Speaker 2: thousand different models about recruitment, and all those people that
Speaker 2: are recruitment agencies. How you recruit people in business is
Speaker 2: exactly how you recruit people into terrorism. The only difference
Speaker 2: here is that we're recruiting people into high risk activity.
Speaker 2: So therefore there must be a reward. So you know,
Speaker 2: they're looking at those stages of how do I get
Speaker 2: the reward for that person? So they'll use tricks like
Speaker 2: noble cause it's for the greater good of humanity. It's
Speaker 2: for your salvation of your soul and salvation of your
Speaker 2: family soul. It will be you know you're doing the
Speaker 2: right thing by another minority group, so they will look
Speaker 2: for those motivations to do it. Now, recruitment has its
Speaker 2: own set of indicators, and they happen in parallel with radicalization.
Speaker 2: They happened at the same time, and a lot of
Speaker 2: the processes crossover. One of the absolutes in both radicalization
Speaker 2: and recruitment is the presence of a corruptor, the person
Speaker 2: that pulling the strings. Now that could be in person,
Speaker 2: that could be online, it could be by any form
Speaker 2: of communication, but that presence of that corruptor. And what
Speaker 2: we see is that once the person is they look
Speaker 2: at frame alignment. That is, get the person to acknowledge
Speaker 2: and their thought process agrees with the processes of the group,
Speaker 2: and then through the process of persuasion, the person decides
Speaker 2: to join the group and get accepted by the group.
Speaker 2: The recruitment process ceases, but the radicalization process continues. The
Speaker 2: radicalization is an infinite issue. It doesn't go away. It
Speaker 2: ebbs and flows. Level of racalization will go up and down,
Speaker 2: courting on how their life is going and how it's
Speaker 2: being managed. So if we look at terrorism, where I
Speaker 2: get a little bit academic here, it is a complex
Speaker 2: infinite problem, so that when I identify, in this instance,
Speaker 2: Garry Jubilin as a terrorist suspect, you never go away.
Speaker 2: You're always there. And the complexity, because you're an individual,
Speaker 2: you get influenced by people in the studio, your home, life,
Speaker 2: ex colleagues. All those little threads are pulling on you,
Speaker 2: that impact on you, that make you unique. So that complexity,
Speaker 2: together with the infinite side of it, makes this a
Speaker 2: real challenging environment. Police.
Speaker 1: It's fascinating the depth of it. I want to raise
Speaker 1: another thing, and I've got the head in the public
Speaker 1: do they play a part in the fight against terrorism?
Speaker 1: I want to bring out a quote from your book.
Speaker 1: Terrorism has evolved, expanding the responsibilities of counteraction beyond just
Speaker 1: law enforcement and security intelligence agencies to include all enterity
Speaker 1: in the public and private sector. The prevailing principle now
Speaker 1: counter terrorism is shared responsibility of government and the community
Speaker 1: at large. Okay, I get where you're coming from there,
Speaker 1: but can we break that break that down.
Speaker 2: So very simply, You, me and every one of your
Speaker 2: listeners is part of the process. It's no longer a
Speaker 2: police matter, it's no longer a security intelligence matter. We
Speaker 2: all play a role. We all see things. You know,
Speaker 2: the old saying see something, say something, there is no
Speaker 2: true or saying in this world. If something is unusual,
Speaker 2: we should be reporting it. If you know, I've got
Speaker 2: concerns about my neighbor, I should be making an effort.
Speaker 2: I should be inquiring. This is part of being part
Speaker 2: of the community. You know, they're old saying that you
Speaker 2: can't arrest your way of a problem is true. Also,
Speaker 2: you can't rely on We can't be everywhere. You know,
Speaker 2: there's eight million people in New South Wales alone. We
Speaker 2: don't have those resources to be there. So as a
Speaker 2: community we need to band together. And that's what that
Speaker 2: process is.
Speaker 1: And in saying that, the type of things without so
Speaker 1: you're not inundated with calls. But if something that doesn't
Speaker 1: seem quite right, you're saying to the public, well, look,
Speaker 1: if you've got doubts about it, doesn't hurt to pick
Speaker 1: the phone up and make a call as the information.
Speaker 2: Of the best test. If it doesn't look right, it's
Speaker 2: probably not and make a call. You know, like there's
Speaker 2: a thing we call it unknown knowns that is, we
Speaker 2: don't know why we know something. And part of anticipation,
Speaker 2: there's a reason when you and I walk in a
Speaker 2: room and we see a crook that we don't know
Speaker 2: is a crook, but our hairs are standing on the
Speaker 2: back of under he's doing something or she's doing something
Speaker 2: that indicates to us this person is someone I can't trust.
Speaker 2: So when you get that feeling, there's a basis for it.
Speaker 2: There really is, and that intuition that you feel, yeah,
Speaker 2: maybe you should act on that. And I encourage people
Speaker 2: they should not that I want to see the phone lines,
Speaker 2: milt it down. But if you think you've got information,
Speaker 2: make the call the authorities. Just think if you don't
Speaker 2: make the call and something happens, it's you that's got
Speaker 2: to look at yourself in the mirror the next day.
Speaker 1: And I think it's fair to say, and I'd use
Speaker 1: this when we're appealing to the public with homicide investigations.
Speaker 1: It's like a jigsaw putting it together. A jigsaw and
Speaker 1: some small little part on its own doesn't have any relevance.
Speaker 1: But if you pass that information on, you might be
Speaker 1: the third or fourth person that's called about that person.
Speaker 2: So true, So we took at you know, even we'll
Speaker 2: talk about man Moness just prior to link CAFA, he
Speaker 2: made a post on Facebook and it was a it
Speaker 2: was a provocative post. Now I think there was ten
Speaker 2: people that rung the police and reported it. Now we
Speaker 2: looked at that as a result of that. So it's
Speaker 2: that action. Direct action causes a reaction. So when I
Speaker 2: was there, and again I'm not there, but if someone
Speaker 2: was prepared to give me information, I was prepared to
Speaker 2: look into it. Yeah, So if you're prepared to make
Speaker 2: the call, it is my understanding that they will make
Speaker 2: an effort to look into that and assess that on
Speaker 2: its merit.
Speaker 1: Yeah, now we should encourage people to do it. It's
Speaker 1: not dissimilar to you know, in the basic form of
Speaker 1: neighbour would watch someone someone's wandering around the street that
Speaker 1: doesn't look like they belong.
Speaker 2: Here, exactly right, And the Senate works.
Speaker 1: As simple as that. Okay, I'm interested in the ratings.
Speaker 1: You know, when they say, you know, from the government
Speaker 1: announces the risk of terrorism terrorism attack is high low
Speaker 1: or whatever, what do they base that on.
Speaker 2: So the a C which is the Australian Intelligence Community,
Speaker 2: they're our intelligence agency. So that's asasis O, NA, Defense
Speaker 2: Signals Directorate and a myriad of other government agencies that
Speaker 2: all have alphabetics names, they get together and they determine
Speaker 2: that threat process. Now the brekerage house or the front
Speaker 2: of front of office when their words Asia, and they
Speaker 2: will put that rating up and see at the moment
Speaker 2: where it possible. Now, so that means that Australia remains
Speaker 2: a potential target.
Speaker 1: Okay.
Speaker 2: Now, given recent events in Gaza, in Wakeley, the six
Speaker 2: and in Perth, I think we're probably moving beyond what
Speaker 2: possible is and probably moving to the And it's not
Speaker 2: my job, but you know it would probably have to
Speaker 2: review that now. That has ramifications both nationally and internationally.
Speaker 2: So it's a big deal and it's something that government
Speaker 2: and the intelligence agencies spend a lot of resources on
Speaker 2: to determine that and to make sure they get that
Speaker 2: balance right. So it's not fright Night, yet it's informally
Speaker 2: so the community is forewarned and armed to make appropriate decisions.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, when you say it's not fright night, when
Speaker 1: you look at what the aim of terrorism is to
Speaker 1: cause concern in the community, So you don't want everyone
Speaker 1: to live in fear constantly.
Speaker 2: No, and and if we do, then they win, they win. Yeah,
Speaker 2: And it's that's that's the tool. That's why it's done.
Speaker 2: So it's it's it's a market employee to be front
Speaker 2: of mind, you know, and that creates the momentum for
Speaker 2: them to further their cause. Uh and and and that's
Speaker 2: a that's a that's a tree obviously that we let
Speaker 2: that happen.
Speaker 1: What's some of the what you would consider significant terrorists
Speaker 1: acts that have occurred in Australia that people often, you know,
Speaker 1: we forget things, we move on from things pretty quickly.
Speaker 1: But the type of terrast incidents that occurred that yeah.
Speaker 2: So look, look, let's we'll go back the cast a
Speaker 2: little uprising I think in eighteen o five, where you
Speaker 2: like your history, fifteen convicts we tried to uprise against
Speaker 2: the government. Fifteen convicts were killed. Yeah, nine are hunt
Speaker 2: we Then we had the shooting of Royal Prince Alfred.
Speaker 2: Now he was shot at contact, shot in the back,
Speaker 2: oh sorry shot that that attack and his treatment had
Speaker 2: a public subscription that resulted in the establishment of the
Speaker 2: Royal Prince Alfred Hospital. So it impacts on our society.
Speaker 2: In nineteen seventy eight we had the Hilton bombing that
Speaker 2: created the redrafting of the ASIO Act and the establishment
Speaker 2: of the AFP in the format that we see it today.
Speaker 2: We've had numerous bombings throughout the time we saw Pendennis
Speaker 2: Pandanis was a major watershed moment where a couple of
Speaker 2: days and this is the interesting part. I think two
Speaker 2: or three days before we went to resolution, they had
Speaker 2: to recall government to change the legislation because it didn't work.
Speaker 2: So we did that one of the other major attament.
Speaker 1: And just in case people haven't heard the podcast they
Speaker 1: did with Peter the Moroni Pendennis. A couple of things
Speaker 1: that he was saying about that that you came across
Speaker 1: this group that were planning something and you had to
Speaker 1: move because it was getting inevitable. And it was not
Speaker 1: just based here in New South Wales. There was connections
Speaker 1: down in Victoria. But one thing that I found chilling
Speaker 1: was it seven thousand rounds of ammunition were found.
Speaker 2: Well, actually, look, I was actually looking. I was looking
Speaker 2: at Pandanas.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: The other day, Look we've got thirty eight thousand rounds,
Speaker 2: we've got forty firearms. They tempted to purchase over eight
Speaker 2: hundred and fifty kilo grands of chemicals that make bombs.
Speaker 2: We found a hand we couldn't find a handful of
Speaker 2: other guns and rifles and we couldn't find seven rocket launchers.
Speaker 2: So they had access to this material. It's it's it's
Speaker 2: frightening what they could get access to and what they
Speaker 2: were trying to could have been And so we learn
Speaker 2: a lot from that. So what we learned from Pandemics
Speaker 2: is initially Pete Morani and a guy called Nick Reid
Speaker 2: come to me after Pandenas and said, Dave, we need
Speaker 2: a terrorism training course, so we did. We established the
Speaker 2: New South Wales Terrorism Training Course as a direct result
Speaker 2: of Pandanas and our first manual that we wrote was
Speaker 2: in essence a poa of what went wrong in Pandemics,
Speaker 2: don't do this again. So our training then evolved and
Speaker 2: then we realized importance of decision making, so we then
Speaker 2: put that in a national framework under the Australian New
Speaker 2: Zealand counter Terrorism Committee and their training regime. So it
Speaker 2: really was a catalyst for us to take it up
Speaker 2: a notch and actually get better at our business.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well we all should always should evolve and improved,
Speaker 1: but when you talk decision making, you say that a
Speaker 1: lot because that's crucial to count the terrorism.
Speaker 2: So you get it's one of the only areas in policing,
Speaker 2: and to be fair, all areas of policing get scrutinized
Speaker 2: fairly heavily, but it's one of the other areas where
Speaker 2: the rationale for why I made decisions and when I
Speaker 2: made decisions. I've never seen that level of scrutiny outside
Speaker 2: of the CT space. And the difference between a good
Speaker 2: CT operator and a bad one is one that makes
Speaker 2: good decisions in poor environments. And what we did is
Speaker 2: we developed a framework that would help us to enhance
Speaker 2: our decision making process and also protect us when that occurred.
Speaker 2: So what we did, we're speaking of our colleagues from
Speaker 2: London met and there was a senior officer there and
Speaker 2: a couple of years ago, a decade or so ago,
Speaker 2: after the Seven seven bombings, they received information that there
Speaker 2: was another terrorist attack about to occur and that a
Speaker 2: surveillance team and as a suspect ward act walked out
Speaker 2: of the premises, had a striking appearance to the suspect
Speaker 2: that had been nominated was about to do a terrorist attack.
Speaker 2: He clocked that he was being surveiled and then decamped.
Speaker 2: The police gave Chase, asked for the order and the
Speaker 2: person was shot in fear that he was about to
Speaker 2: do another terrorist attack on the London submember.
Speaker 1: There.
Speaker 2: Now, in this instance, this individual was innocent. This is
Speaker 2: a horrendous act, a tragic set of circumstances. But we
Speaker 2: spoke to the police and they told us about their
Speaker 2: decision making model. It was but when you looked at
Speaker 2: all the circumstances, it was a good decision with a
Speaker 2: bad outcome. If that makes sense.
Speaker 1: It does make sense, Dave, and I do understand what
Speaker 1: you're saying and the level that you're talking at encounter terrorism,
Speaker 1: but that was the same with homicide. I make decisions.
Speaker 1: They are always informed decisions. The decisions I made, and
Speaker 1: I could justify it because I could be sure as
Speaker 1: hell I'd be in the witness box five years down
Speaker 1: the track or so. There'd be some inquiry, why did
Speaker 1: you do this? Why did you do that? And the
Speaker 1: same would have to apply.
Speaker 2: And a good decision doesn't always meet a greater name. No,
Speaker 2: that's and that's that's what you've got to and you've
Speaker 2: got to appreciate that. Yeah, that I could make the
Speaker 2: world's best decision with a terrible outcome, that's the luck
Speaker 2: of the draw.
Speaker 1: We were looking at a group of a group of
Speaker 1: people that contract killers and they ended up when we're
Speaker 1: looking they've killed someone someone else. But I'm comfortable with
Speaker 1: all the decisions that were made based on the information
Speaker 1: that we had at the time. The hindsight, it's a
Speaker 1: wonderful benefit that.
Speaker 2: You don't have that don't have that luxury.
Speaker 1: You don't don't have that luxury, So I can understand,
Speaker 1: but it is crucial Jesus. I wouldn't want to be
Speaker 1: I wouldn't want to be the person that ignored something
Speaker 1: a red flag and you just flicked at nothing.
Speaker 2: To see d And that's that's that's the way. That's
Speaker 2: the burden upon ct.
Speaker 1: I see it, I feel it, And yeah, how did
Speaker 1: you lasted probably as long as anyone has in that field,
Speaker 1: how did you manage that burden?
Speaker 2: Because look, it's not an easy it's not easy. And
Speaker 2: then that would probably one would suggests had something to
Speaker 2: do with my retirement. But it's it's a constant. You're
Speaker 2: always on and you're seeking professional help. You're seeing spike
Speaker 2: psychologists and others to go how do we manage the
Speaker 2: burden we're under Because here's a burden of expectations you're
Speaker 2: not going to fail. It's the Americans call it a
Speaker 2: zero fail operation. Now that's aspirational because if we accept
Speaker 2: that terrorism is a crime, we haven't stopped any crime
Speaker 2: type yet, so the perception that we're going to be
Speaker 2: able to stop terrorism is just unrealistic. So that burden,
Speaker 2: and what we do is that we reverse the burden
Speaker 2: of responsibility again on our operators, so that we know
Speaker 2: that if we fail, we will be held accountable. And
Speaker 2: that really starts ratching it up, and that makes for
Speaker 2: an unhealthy environment. That's the nature of the beast.
Speaker 1: How do you I would imagine how when I was
Speaker 1: under pressure, I tried to share the pressure in that
Speaker 1: getting having people having these briefings, not just briefings where
Speaker 1: you're seeing down having a coffee for no reason, getting
Speaker 1: everyone's thoughts. So when you make that decision, you've got
Speaker 1: all the information. If you're the boss, you happen to
Speaker 1: be the one that's got to sign off on it,
Speaker 1: you make the final decision. That I found it helped
Speaker 1: me in the pressure spots where at least I've sought
Speaker 1: counsel or other people's views and then take it all
Speaker 1: in and then sit with my.
Speaker 2: Decision, so that we go back to threat ownership there,
Speaker 2: and so we're in a multi agency approach, you know,
Speaker 2: we'd have to sit there in a room and go,
Speaker 2: do you have any more information? And then so that's
Speaker 2: what we've got, and we'd have to document that so
Speaker 2: we could say at this point in time that this
Speaker 2: decision is made, this is what we know. So if
Speaker 2: that changes so another So let's say an agency comes
Speaker 2: back later and says, oh, We've forgot to tell you
Speaker 2: about this, or that wasn't on the that wasn't on
Speaker 2: the table. So we can only do what we can.
Speaker 2: It's not a perfect model, but given the dynamic nature,
Speaker 2: it's the only way that will work. And so that's
Speaker 2: that corroboration with your colleagues and teams, and that's when
Speaker 2: the beauty of joint agencies come together. And whilst they're
Speaker 2: challenging working with other agencies, the operational benefits and efficiencies
Speaker 2: outstrip the challenges.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well probably more so than any sort of law enforcement.
Speaker 1: The counter terrorism has to work with all those other agencies.
Speaker 1: So yeah, I've heard the wines come out with this
Speaker 1: person working with that person, but it's ne that this
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Speaker 1: Do you think we're set up well for our counter
Speaker 1: terrorism investigation in this country? So?
Speaker 2: I do. When I left, one of my major roles
Speaker 2: was training and development. When we saw opportunities, we took it.
Speaker 2: We endeavored to train as many people as we could
Speaker 2: and upskill them as best we could. So I'm aware
Speaker 2: that people have taken over my role since I've left.
Speaker 2: I have every confidence in their abilities. These are really
Speaker 2: good operators. Yeah, and they believe in the cause. They
Speaker 2: believe in stopping terrorism public safety. So I think, yeah,
Speaker 2: we are in a good place.
Speaker 1: And you've got to have that time. Like this rotation
Speaker 1: policy that they bought in, I never agreed with it
Speaker 1: or understood that be in New South Wales, police, like homicide,
Speaker 1: I learned something every day, but I think in counter
Speaker 1: terrorism you can't replace years and years of experience.
Speaker 2: And nor should we. We need to tap into that
Speaker 2: and realize that, you know, it's the lessons you learned
Speaker 2: from ten years ago are applicable today. You know, it
Speaker 2: takes you years before you've become just understanding the dynamics
Speaker 2: of the different cultures that are involved takes a long
Speaker 2: time to appreciate, and then putting that within a criminal
Speaker 2: framework and an intelligence framework. It's incredibly complicated. So I
Speaker 2: don't understand the rotation policy. It's it's inefficient to the process.
Speaker 2: And I think that's one of the filings in a
Speaker 2: number of agencies that rotate people through to simply go
Speaker 2: to get on the CV. My CVS done, I've done
Speaker 2: ct You know that's crazy. There should be consideration that
Speaker 2: it is a career path and if you go down
Speaker 2: that path, you're a specialist. That's where you go. And
Speaker 2: you know, rather than punishing specialists, we should be encouraging it.
Speaker 1: One hundred percent, Dave, And I'm comfortable I think we've
Speaker 1: both the right to talk about that and offer an
Speaker 1: opinion or that I'm going to offer another opinion that
Speaker 1: the risk of embarrassing you and probably getting this both
Speaker 1: in the trouble or someone will winch this book. I've
Speaker 1: read it. I'm experienced major crime investigator. I know the
Speaker 1: value of something like that. I understand the world that
Speaker 1: you're operating. Why hasn't this been purchased for every officer?
Speaker 1: And this is not You're not going to get you
Speaker 1: in the trouble here, Dave, But I saying that this
Speaker 1: has just come up in my thought process, not Dave,
Speaker 1: And he certainly didn't ask me to spook his book.
Speaker 1: But it seems like I must read. If you're going
Speaker 1: to if you're going to turn an answer yet, let
Speaker 1: me get in the trouble, then you can answer. If
Speaker 1: you're going to work in counter terrorism, you have to
Speaker 1: read this book. Have to.
Speaker 2: Well, thanks, I'm glad you read it. I find it.
Speaker 2: It can be a little bit TEENI because there's a
Speaker 2: lot of details, but no, thank you for those comments.
Speaker 2: And look, and that's what it's written for. It's written
Speaker 2: for to increase the knowledge of both the private sector
Speaker 2: and public sector, and that's the authorities, that's police. Look,
Speaker 2: you know there's application here in this book. So if
Speaker 2: I'm working for, say education, we see if we're talking
Speaker 2: about children and juveniles in the current environment, Well, they're
Speaker 2: at schools. Therefore there's indicators there that we should be
Speaker 2: aware of. I'm looking at potential flags. If I'm working
Speaker 2: for a corporation where they have mass gatherings, there's information
Speaker 2: there that can this. Then you know that it does
Speaker 2: have some things in there for practical application. It has
Speaker 2: been written for it to be practically applied, because again,
Speaker 2: I want it to be useful. I didn't want it
Speaker 2: to be.
Speaker 1: It's not the academic waffle that you lose interesting. It's
Speaker 1: practical and it's it's something that you can use and
Speaker 1: knowledge is power, and having that knowledge it hardens the
Speaker 1: target if everyone has has this type of knowledge. But no,
Speaker 1: I just asked us that, and I'm not trying to
Speaker 1: cause problems for you, and you haven't come on to
Speaker 1: promote this book. But why the hell aren't everyone reading
Speaker 1: that if they're working in counter terrorism? I think I
Speaker 1: think it's a good book. Let's drift back to you now, Dave.
Speaker 1: You look back at your career. Are you glad you
Speaker 1: discovered counter terrorism? Oh?
Speaker 2: Look, it's it's been It's a passion and look to
Speaker 2: work in that environment with some incredibly talented people dedicated.
Speaker 2: So you've spoke with Peter, We spoke at you know, Moroni,
Speaker 2: you know all the people that he would have mentioned,
Speaker 2: we have worked with, our colleagues that we've worked with. Yeah, look,
Speaker 2: see T it is one of those It's like homicide.
Speaker 2: You get involved and it becomes a passion and you
Speaker 2: want to better the profession and ce T unfortunately is
Speaker 2: just bigger than the police. It is in every aspect
Speaker 2: of our lives now. It's you know, it's in the
Speaker 2: tertiary factor sector, it's in government sectors, it's in the
Speaker 2: private sector, it's in travel, you know, transport, in every aspect,
Speaker 2: this unfortunately is coming to be and that's where that
Speaker 2: whole of community needs to embrace it because everyone can
Speaker 2: be exposed to it and so hopefully a little bit
Speaker 2: of knowledge, a little bit of information might help us
Speaker 2: along the one.
Speaker 1: And I say this, to work in the field like that,
Speaker 1: and you know the way I work homicide, you've got
Speaker 1: to be passionate about the field that you're working in.
Speaker 1: And you can't do count the terrorism just half in,
Speaker 1: half out. You've got to full fully commit and look,
Speaker 1: I look at you, how you've changed from the day
Speaker 1: of Gore on you. Jesus, what's happened.
Speaker 2: To you day? I'm a happy guy.
Speaker 1: You've just gone into this completely. You've absorbed yourself into
Speaker 1: this world. And full credit to you. I know the
Speaker 1: sacrifices you make to do that in a career that
Speaker 1: it needs to be done.
Speaker 2: It's one of these. So when you get to work
Speaker 2: with members of the security intelligence, Look, it's different from
Speaker 2: law enforcement, and our relationships are different, and you know,
Speaker 2: there's it becomes difficult because you've got certain obligations. There's
Speaker 2: legal obligations honest about what we can and can't say.
Speaker 2: There's operational security. There's a lot of things that come
Speaker 2: into play and that you've got to protect not only
Speaker 2: yourself but your other agency members. It's intense. So again
Speaker 2: I think I spoke that at any one time, we'd
Speaker 2: have ten to twenty threats running at anyone times when
Speaker 2: I go to bed. For the last twenty years, there
Speaker 2: were streats and the first thing in the morning, I'm
Speaker 2: hearing the news, waiting for the bad news so that
Speaker 2: doesn't go away and come and go. Now, what people
Speaker 2: don't understand is the majority of the streatch dissipate, so
Speaker 2: very few will get through to fruition that we actually
Speaker 2: lock people up, so we have to act reasonably and
Speaker 2: due diligence. A lot of them go, but you can't
Speaker 2: bank on that. You've got to run each down, each rabbitile.
Speaker 1: You sit on it, and the success is if it
Speaker 1: doesn't happen. Whereas yeah, so our measure you would be
Speaker 1: I would imagine you carry that purdon a lot because
Speaker 1: you know, if you're not getting a result, it's just
Speaker 1: more pressure, more pressure.
Speaker 2: So our measure of success was every day we didn't
Speaker 2: appear in the media, that's a successful day for CT.
Speaker 2: That was our thought process. So we didn't court the media.
Speaker 2: We wanted to avoid the media, and that was the process.
Speaker 1: We had the work work behind the scenes that keep
Speaker 1: the streets safe. Do I know in homicide like we
Speaker 1: had to see a psychologists every six months or twelve
Speaker 1: months or whatever it was. Do they have the same
Speaker 1: thing on offer for you guys?
Speaker 2: So look we look So what we did, so I'll
Speaker 2: go back to pandemics. We retre eaved four terrorbytes of
Speaker 2: extremist material. Now that is insane, Like this is this
Speaker 2: is just insane material, and unfortunately we have to go
Speaker 2: through that. Of course there could be evidence of other offenses,
Speaker 2: of other criminalities, of new plots, so unfortunately someone has
Speaker 2: to go through that. And we had a team of
Speaker 2: ten people six to twelve months going through this material.
Speaker 2: Now I was blase, and this is something that I
Speaker 2: look that my people were becoming sick, they're becoming unwell,
Speaker 2: and I couldn't figure it out. And then I spent
Speaker 2: some time looking at these videos and I got it
Speaker 2: that we were damaging our people in the room and
Speaker 2: they're looking at horrendously and so we had to develop processes.
Speaker 2: So we got the sychs in and we developed processes
Speaker 2: that we still have to view it, but how do
Speaker 2: we minimize the danger and that this isn't being taken home,
Speaker 2: this is not impacting on their family life. So we
Speaker 2: brought in psychometric tests, We brought in those regular council
Speaker 2: We brought in little tricks of the trade where we
Speaker 2: allow people to you know, they could only see it
Speaker 2: for the first couple of hours of the day and
Speaker 2: then be engaged another duty. So yeah, so we've tried
Speaker 2: to put all these strategies, but at the end of
Speaker 2: the day, it's harmful material. It's a hazard's workplace, and
Speaker 2: that's one of the I suppose one of the rubs.
Speaker 2: We have to look at it and it does damage you.
Speaker 2: So it's that dancing out where we try to minimize that,
Speaker 2: but there's no other way around it. We have to
Speaker 2: view the material to see if there's evidence there.
Speaker 1: No, it's a tough gig. What are you doing since
Speaker 1: you've left the place, You've been doing some work.
Speaker 2: So look, when I left, I hooked up with our
Speaker 2: old compadre, mister Countess. I went and gave work for
Speaker 2: him on a contract for twelve months with the Royal
Speaker 2: Commission into Defense and Veteran sour Side.
Speaker 1: That's another heavy look look important thing.
Speaker 2: It's important work. What a challenging environment and the team
Speaker 2: that nick you know, the commissioners Peggy Brown and James Douglas,
Speaker 2: fantastic commissioners doing wonderful work that I think addresses a
Speaker 2: national tragedy. I was happy to be part of that process.
Speaker 2: I only gave a small piece of work, but I
Speaker 2: wish them have success. They're in the process of finalizing
Speaker 2: the report and making the recommendations and I fully support
Speaker 2: the recommendations and the work that's come out because it
Speaker 2: is something that needs to be looked at and supported.
Speaker 2: So that was twelve last twelve months.
Speaker 1: Okay, okay, and the rest of the time you're just
Speaker 1: at home supporting Fienna.
Speaker 2: Well putting my good wife. But look what I have done.
Speaker 2: Look a very good colleague of mine and yours. Kroenin
Speaker 2: oh Ed your chief inspective. Karen also is another ct
Speaker 2: NERD and she identified and talking about victim centric approach.
Speaker 2: There's you know, if you remember about twenty five to
Speaker 2: thirty years ago, Martha Jabor set up a group called
Speaker 2: the Victims of Homicide Support GRIP, and they do wonderful work.
Speaker 2: And Martha has been a trojan of taking that forward.
Speaker 2: And we see in the establishment of other support groups.
Speaker 2: Now we've recognized that terrorism is a crime, but it's
Speaker 2: a unique crime and there's a lot of unique characteristics,
Speaker 2: and there is no group that support these people that
Speaker 2: are victims, you know, that experienced this. So I'm working
Speaker 2: with Carolyn in the establishment of Victims of Terrorism Support Group,
Speaker 2: which hopefully we'll get up and running in August. And look,
Speaker 2: that is I think is beneficial. I think that there
Speaker 2: is a benefit there. There is a gap that we
Speaker 2: need to support these people and it's something that Carolyn
Speaker 2: and I are very passionate about.
Speaker 1: And there's like Australian victims overseas of terrorism too, so
Speaker 1: you've got the families over here. Yeah, I think that's worthwhile.
Speaker 2: It's amazing. I've spoken to people, you know that we're
Speaker 2: overseas and have witnessed terrorist attacks and they've come home
Speaker 2: and never spoken to anyone. And I've sat down next
Speaker 2: to them and they say, what do you do And
Speaker 2: I tell them I'm in CT And next they become
Speaker 2: emotionally upset because they start reliving the experience and they've
Speaker 2: had no support and they've had to do it on
Speaker 2: their own and that we shouldn't be, that we're better
Speaker 2: than that. So the opportunity to support them, I think
Speaker 2: is wonderful.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, again, it's an evolving process that we've got
Speaker 1: to understand this new thing.
Speaker 2: Well maturing and so like we do that now for
Speaker 2: traffic trauma, and we're seeing how that actually supporting these
Speaker 2: people helps them and then helps us in the future.
Speaker 2: That victim centric approach, which is I think the direction
Speaker 2: we need to start adding towards.
Speaker 1: Okay, good stuff. Well, Dave, you've you've upskilled me and
Speaker 1: educated me and you've taken up my weekend reading your book.
Speaker 2: But sorry about that.
Speaker 1: I appreciate it. I'm thinking this is our David. It's
Speaker 1: a detailed rude, but it's a common sense and a
Speaker 1: practical thing, which I like it. You're not lost in
Speaker 1: the academic well, we've still got a little bit of
Speaker 1: your back in the major crime squad, detective. But I
Speaker 1: just want to all jokes aside, thank you for the
Speaker 1: work that you've done. I know the price that you've paid.
Speaker 1: I'm doing the type of work that you've done, and
Speaker 1: the results that you guys do don't often get recognized,
Speaker 1: and it's a team approach. I'm not just talking about
Speaker 1: you individually. You don't get recognized because it doesn't hit
Speaker 1: the media because something's been prevented. So I'm just saying
Speaker 1: to you, thanks for how hard you're working, and thanks
Speaker 1: for coming on my catch killers.
Speaker 2: It's been a pleasure, and thank you for your time.
Speaker 1: Cheers, dope. It's really good catching up with an old friend.
Speaker 1: We sort of lost touch when he was working in
Speaker 1: the world of counter terrorism. But doctor Dave Gore, I
Speaker 1: knew him as well. I knew him as Detective soon
Speaker 1: you're comfortable when we both started working together, and then
Speaker 1: detective Chief Inspector. But now he's doctor Dave gall and
Speaker 1: really is an expert in the field of counter terrorism.
Speaker 1: I enjoyed the chat and enjoyed reading his book. I
Speaker 1: think it's a must for anyone that wants to involve
Speaker 1: themselves in the investigation of counter terrorism. And as you know,
Speaker 1: I always liked talking to X Cop, so it was
Speaker 1: good catching up