1
00:00:01,960 --> 00:00:04,960
Speaker 1: The public has had a long held fascination with detectives.

2
00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:08,119
Speaker 1: Detective see a side of life the average persons never

3
00:00:08,200 --> 00:00:11,160
Speaker 1: exposed to. I spent thirty four years as a cop.

4
00:00:11,640 --> 00:00:14,080
Speaker 1: For twenty five of those years I was catching killers.

5
00:00:14,480 --> 00:00:16,280
Speaker 1: That's what I did for a living. I was a

6
00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:20,599
Speaker 1: homicide detective. I'm no longer just interviewing bad guys, said,

7
00:00:20,640 --> 00:00:23,200
Speaker 1: I'm taking the public into the world in which I operated.

8
00:00:23,880 --> 00:00:26,480
Speaker 1: The guests I talk to each week have amazing stories

9
00:00:26,480 --> 00:00:28,840
Speaker 1: from all sides of the law. The interviews are raw

10
00:00:28,880 --> 00:00:31,560
Speaker 1: and honest, just like the people I talk to. Some

11
00:00:31,640 --> 00:00:34,680
Speaker 1: of the content and language might be confronting. That's because

12
00:00:34,720 --> 00:00:37,720
Speaker 1: no one who comes into contact with crime is left unchanged.

13
00:00:38,240 --> 00:00:40,559
Speaker 1: Join me now as I take you into this world.

14
00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:48,400
Speaker 1: Dr Dave Gore, welcome back to I Catch Killers.

15
00:00:48,880 --> 00:00:49,199
Speaker 2: Thank you.

16
00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:51,840
Speaker 1: In case people didn't listen to part one, they might

17
00:00:51,880 --> 00:00:54,200
Speaker 1: think of you as an academic, So I just want

18
00:00:54,240 --> 00:00:57,040
Speaker 1: to clarify you're not just an academic. We'll call you

19
00:00:57,120 --> 00:00:59,920
Speaker 1: an academic. But you also worked in the New South

20
00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:03,800
Speaker 1: Els Police for thirty five years, I believe, and a

21
00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:07,280
Speaker 1: large portion of that was as a count the terrorists investigator.

22
00:01:07,400 --> 00:01:09,120
Speaker 2: So yeah, it was the last twenty years and so

23
00:01:09,160 --> 00:01:12,680
Speaker 2: what I did was being in the authorities and on

24
00:01:12,760 --> 00:01:15,839
Speaker 2: the front line of ct we got direct access to data.

25
00:01:16,480 --> 00:01:19,320
Speaker 2: Now that data wasn't being used appropriately and because of

26
00:01:19,360 --> 00:01:22,800
Speaker 2: the classification of that material, it couldn't be disseminated to

27
00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:25,679
Speaker 2: other academics. So there was a need there to conduct

28
00:01:25,800 --> 00:01:29,400
Speaker 2: research with real data to get real results. So that's

29
00:01:29,440 --> 00:01:32,200
Speaker 2: where I figured out. I figured out that if I

30
00:01:32,280 --> 00:01:36,120
Speaker 2: could understand the world of academia, I could apply this

31
00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:39,400
Speaker 2: data to the problems we're facing and come up with solutions,

32
00:01:39,440 --> 00:01:41,560
Speaker 2: which in essence is what the book is about as

33
00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:41,959
Speaker 2: a solution.

34
00:01:42,080 --> 00:01:44,520
Speaker 1: Congratulations to you, Dave, because it's a powerful tool to

35
00:01:44,560 --> 00:01:48,080
Speaker 1: have both sides, of the practical side working in the

36
00:01:48,080 --> 00:01:50,480
Speaker 1: field and also the academic side and bringing them together.

37
00:01:50,880 --> 00:01:53,880
Speaker 1: As our good mate Nick identified now in part one,

38
00:01:53,920 --> 00:01:56,160
Speaker 1: there was one thing that I should have should have

39
00:01:56,240 --> 00:02:00,160
Speaker 1: raised because I was watching your speech in researching for

40
00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:04,000
Speaker 1: the podcast for twenty fifteen Police Officer of the Year

41
00:02:04,080 --> 00:02:06,240
Speaker 1: Radary Police Officer of the Year, and you made a

42
00:02:06,320 --> 00:02:10,160
Speaker 1: very strong point that counter terrorism is the greatest team

43
00:02:10,200 --> 00:02:13,519
Speaker 1: sport in criminal investigations because so many people play a part.

44
00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:16,280
Speaker 1: Do you want to just talk us through what that

45
00:02:16,440 --> 00:02:16,840
Speaker 1: was about.

46
00:02:16,960 --> 00:02:21,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, So look, we're both detectives. Yeah, and you know,

47
00:02:21,400 --> 00:02:26,399
Speaker 2: detectives are because there's a high reliance on us from

48
00:02:26,400 --> 00:02:29,880
Speaker 2: the prosecution aspect. There's a general acceptance that the detectives

49
00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:32,440
Speaker 2: will run the brief because of that responsibility and burden

50
00:02:32,480 --> 00:02:35,120
Speaker 2: placed on us. But we're only the tip of the sphere.

51
00:02:35,919 --> 00:02:39,919
Speaker 2: We're you know, a good intelligence or team of intelligence

52
00:02:40,400 --> 00:02:43,320
Speaker 2: supports work and a lot of them go unsung heroes.

53
00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:46,160
Speaker 2: And in the CTO world there's security intelligence agencies or

54
00:02:46,200 --> 00:02:49,919
Speaker 2: spies now here are some fantastic people that do great

55
00:02:49,960 --> 00:02:52,320
Speaker 2: work that never hear or see the light of day.

56
00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:54,920
Speaker 2: Of course, of the nature of their work. We rely

57
00:02:55,000 --> 00:02:58,640
Speaker 2: on surveillance, the surveillance teams. We flog them to Pillar

58
00:02:58,680 --> 00:03:01,000
Speaker 2: and Post to get us results. They work around the

59
00:03:01,000 --> 00:03:03,720
Speaker 2: clock and get us product that gets us over line

60
00:03:03,720 --> 00:03:06,280
Speaker 2: for our Bruce, our tactical boyson. We spoke a little

61
00:03:06,280 --> 00:03:08,480
Speaker 2: bit about pandemics. They were always on call and we

62
00:03:08,520 --> 00:03:12,640
Speaker 2: put them in horrendous circumstances with very minimal time to prepare,

63
00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:16,119
Speaker 2: and they never say no. They always stand up Our techs.

64
00:03:16,280 --> 00:03:19,240
Speaker 2: They walk around and put devices in and do things

65
00:03:19,280 --> 00:03:21,680
Speaker 2: that we could never do. And in the CT space,

66
00:03:21,760 --> 00:03:23,600
Speaker 2: there's a world that there's an area that we really

67
00:03:23,639 --> 00:03:27,000
Speaker 2: took off on, and that was cyber operations. So very

68
00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:31,280
Speaker 2: early on in JCT, we realized that our crooks weren't

69
00:03:31,320 --> 00:03:35,560
Speaker 2: using phones anymore. They were using Internet and data. So

70
00:03:35,600 --> 00:03:37,680
Speaker 2: we had to change the way we did business. And

71
00:03:37,720 --> 00:03:39,800
Speaker 2: I remember I put a business case up to my

72
00:03:39,880 --> 00:03:42,520
Speaker 2: then commander and tried to get some money to set

73
00:03:42,560 --> 00:03:45,160
Speaker 2: up a cyber operations team and basically go it laughed

74
00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:47,480
Speaker 2: at and I was told I could set one up,

75
00:03:47,640 --> 00:03:50,880
Speaker 2: but I had to fund it. With no funding, I

76
00:03:50,920 --> 00:03:54,160
Speaker 2: had some reallyous a guy there, James Short, one of

77
00:03:54,160 --> 00:03:58,440
Speaker 2: the world's best CT cyber operators safety and a really

78
00:03:58,440 --> 00:04:00,280
Speaker 2: good team. They're put together with some of the guys

79
00:04:00,280 --> 00:04:02,520
Speaker 2: from the AFP. So what we did was we started

80
00:04:02,560 --> 00:04:05,600
Speaker 2: scrounging and we went to the exhibit Exhibit Stars and

81
00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:09,119
Speaker 2: at Surrey Hills Police station found a couple of old

82
00:04:09,120 --> 00:04:11,520
Speaker 2: servers they were going to destroy, so they gave them

83
00:04:11,560 --> 00:04:13,960
Speaker 2: to us, and I get grift of them to us.

84
00:04:14,280 --> 00:04:19,560
Speaker 2: We've got some computers that we're secondhand, bought ourselves, some

85
00:04:19,760 --> 00:04:25,039
Speaker 2: online mobile data lines, and away we went. That team

86
00:04:25,080 --> 00:04:26,560
Speaker 2: grew to be one of the best teams at that

87
00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:30,400
Speaker 2: time throughout the country. In fact, the Americans, the Germans,

88
00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:32,760
Speaker 2: the Brits, the French would come to us to do

89
00:04:32,839 --> 00:04:36,040
Speaker 2: work in this region in the cyber online space, and

90
00:04:36,080 --> 00:04:37,800
Speaker 2: that was a credit, a real feather in their cap

91
00:04:38,160 --> 00:04:41,040
Speaker 2: never been done before. We were at that stage at

92
00:04:41,080 --> 00:04:42,840
Speaker 2: world best standard, best prayers.

93
00:04:43,040 --> 00:04:44,760
Speaker 1: I like the fact that you pay homage to all

94
00:04:44,800 --> 00:04:47,120
Speaker 1: the people that play a part in the investigations. And

95
00:04:47,480 --> 00:04:51,479
Speaker 1: the first one you did was intelligence officers. I honestly

96
00:04:51,520 --> 00:04:54,960
Speaker 1: believe in the intelligence office worth three good detectives. If

97
00:04:55,000 --> 00:04:58,440
Speaker 1: you get one quick intel officer, it can make so

98
00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:01,240
Speaker 1: much different, especially if you leading the investigation. If you've

99
00:05:01,240 --> 00:05:03,960
Speaker 1: got someone you can rely on that can receive all

100
00:05:04,000 --> 00:05:08,040
Speaker 1: the information which is overwhelming, dissect the information, then analyze

101
00:05:08,240 --> 00:05:11,320
Speaker 1: what's going on, and then give you a report on it,

102
00:05:11,440 --> 00:05:14,279
Speaker 1: that's a world of difference. Not only is my wife

103
00:05:14,320 --> 00:05:16,360
Speaker 1: and until this will get you in the good books

104
00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:18,480
Speaker 1: at home, So shout out to listen to.

105
00:05:19,920 --> 00:05:23,080
Speaker 2: That. Look, they're worth their weight in gold. And then

106
00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:25,320
Speaker 2: when you get them from other agencies and they've got

107
00:05:25,360 --> 00:05:29,599
Speaker 2: accesses to more extensive databases, the amount of information you

108
00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:32,040
Speaker 2: can pull them on time. So when we're at the JCT,

109
00:05:32,400 --> 00:05:38,000
Speaker 2: we had Commonwealth databases, national security databases, police databases from

110
00:05:38,040 --> 00:05:41,880
Speaker 2: around the country, databases from other law enforcement agencies, and

111
00:05:41,880 --> 00:05:45,360
Speaker 2: then crime Commission those other ages. That was a tremendous

112
00:05:45,360 --> 00:05:48,280
Speaker 2: engine that we could get information in real time and

113
00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:50,640
Speaker 2: that made us and so one of the beauties about

114
00:05:50,680 --> 00:05:53,359
Speaker 2: and we'll hopefully get into one of the things about

115
00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:56,520
Speaker 2: make what's different about CT is you have to make

116
00:05:56,800 --> 00:05:59,680
Speaker 2: good informed decisions. In fact, half the book talks about

117
00:05:59,680 --> 00:06:03,200
Speaker 2: the dish because it is a pivotal process. You can't

118
00:06:03,240 --> 00:06:05,080
Speaker 2: make any good decisions without good information.

119
00:06:05,200 --> 00:06:08,240
Speaker 1: Yeah, we'll talk on that decision making process a little

120
00:06:08,279 --> 00:06:10,360
Speaker 1: bit later on, because it is crucial to the type

121
00:06:10,360 --> 00:06:12,719
Speaker 1: of work. But we were talking in part one about

122
00:06:12,760 --> 00:06:16,560
Speaker 1: threats and the threats shift. Is there a shifting threat?

123
00:06:17,040 --> 00:06:19,440
Speaker 2: CT is a shallow pool. There's a lot of people

124
00:06:19,560 --> 00:06:22,080
Speaker 2: with a lot of functions in there, and there's a

125
00:06:22,120 --> 00:06:26,679
Speaker 2: lot of it's a very shallow The only way CT

126
00:06:26,960 --> 00:06:30,680
Speaker 2: works is that if everyone stays in their lane, and

127
00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:32,679
Speaker 2: what that means is that you stay on your lane,

128
00:06:32,760 --> 00:06:36,119
Speaker 2: and when the job goes from your lane to another lane,

129
00:06:36,480 --> 00:06:41,080
Speaker 2: that threat shifts to the next team or the next discipline. Example,

130
00:06:41,760 --> 00:06:45,000
Speaker 2: if I look at Seals. Seals was the plot to

131
00:06:45,000 --> 00:06:50,320
Speaker 2: blow up the airline passenger When we initially got that information,

132
00:06:51,400 --> 00:06:55,719
Speaker 2: that was intelligence led and they owned that lane. Then

133
00:06:55,800 --> 00:06:58,760
Speaker 2: when we found out that the threat was real, that

134
00:06:58,880 --> 00:07:04,080
Speaker 2: threat was shifted to the investigators. When the investigators built

135
00:07:04,120 --> 00:07:06,719
Speaker 2: up a brief of evidence, the threat was then shifted

136
00:07:06,760 --> 00:07:10,720
Speaker 2: to the tactical team that arrested them. Once the tactical

137
00:07:10,760 --> 00:07:14,360
Speaker 2: team had done their job, that threat was shifted back

138
00:07:14,680 --> 00:07:17,520
Speaker 2: to the investigators to get the brief together. Now that's

139
00:07:17,560 --> 00:07:24,440
Speaker 2: within a team. Now you then multiply that by multiple government, state, national,

140
00:07:24,560 --> 00:07:28,120
Speaker 2: international agencies. That threatshift shifting is happening all through the

141
00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:32,120
Speaker 2: last ban of investigation. What happens is that if you

142
00:07:32,360 --> 00:07:36,720
Speaker 2: give certain information or you don't give information, you shifted

143
00:07:36,760 --> 00:07:40,760
Speaker 2: the threat, either intentionally or unintentionally. The ownership of that

144
00:07:40,920 --> 00:07:44,400
Speaker 2: is on to another organization. And that is a real

145
00:07:45,560 --> 00:07:48,280
Speaker 2: a crux and a cause of great problems within the

146
00:07:48,320 --> 00:07:52,600
Speaker 2: CT space of threat shifting, and a lot of relationships

147
00:07:52,640 --> 00:07:55,880
Speaker 2: have broken down because people have either through neglect or

148
00:07:55,920 --> 00:07:59,160
Speaker 2: not thinking about the consequences, shifted threat under other agencies,

149
00:07:59,200 --> 00:08:00,800
Speaker 2: which wasn't a appropriate.

150
00:08:00,600 --> 00:08:03,960
Speaker 1: Okay, just on that, and I understand what you're saying there.

151
00:08:04,000 --> 00:08:06,920
Speaker 1: When I was reading your book, when you first mentioned

152
00:08:07,120 --> 00:08:11,240
Speaker 1: of staying your lane, I thought, yes, sometimes with investigations,

153
00:08:11,280 --> 00:08:13,760
Speaker 1: I like the uniform cop that thinks outside of the

154
00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:16,960
Speaker 1: square and go hey boss, if you considered this or whatever,

155
00:08:17,240 --> 00:08:19,880
Speaker 1: But you think it's paramount. In the space of counter

156
00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:23,800
Speaker 1: terrorism investigation, everyone knows their role. Stick to those lanes.

157
00:08:24,600 --> 00:08:29,200
Speaker 2: It's a choreographed dance and it's not about analogy. We

158
00:08:29,280 --> 00:08:32,679
Speaker 2: all have specialties and we do that and that enriches

159
00:08:32,920 --> 00:08:36,120
Speaker 2: the next person along the line. So we all feed

160
00:08:36,160 --> 00:08:39,079
Speaker 2: into each other. Now, when you start taking ownership of

161
00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:42,480
Speaker 2: things that's not your lane, that's when the lanes become

162
00:08:42,559 --> 00:08:44,320
Speaker 2: muddy and the ownership gets mixed.

163
00:08:44,320 --> 00:08:46,360
Speaker 1: So by way over the example. So we break it

164
00:08:46,400 --> 00:08:49,840
Speaker 1: down so people understand. An intelligence officer that I'm curious

165
00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:52,560
Speaker 1: what this person would have to say, makes a call.

166
00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:54,840
Speaker 1: This is an experient, makes a call to that person

167
00:08:54,880 --> 00:08:57,959
Speaker 1: and I look, I made this inquiry. No, that should

168
00:08:57,960 --> 00:08:59,800
Speaker 1: be for the investigation groups.

169
00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:03,080
Speaker 2: So exactly, So let's say inn Inintello gets some information

170
00:09:03,440 --> 00:09:07,079
Speaker 2: and then goes outside their lane and contacts another agency. Yes, right,

171
00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:09,439
Speaker 2: and so that other agency is now brought in, right,

172
00:09:09,480 --> 00:09:11,520
Speaker 2: So they're now coming in and doing their job. Now

173
00:09:11,559 --> 00:09:14,160
Speaker 2: they haven't been brief yet. Now that may not have

174
00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:17,280
Speaker 2: been brief because the briefing the brief so we do

175
00:09:17,320 --> 00:09:20,720
Speaker 2: formal briefings. Those briefings take time for pair. So they've

176
00:09:20,720 --> 00:09:22,760
Speaker 2: all of a sudden brought into a job that they're

177
00:09:22,760 --> 00:09:25,480
Speaker 2: not a party to yet. So all of a sudden

178
00:09:25,520 --> 00:09:28,200
Speaker 2: they start reporting. And so there's now two or three

179
00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:31,559
Speaker 2: different streams to government, So government is getting two different

180
00:09:31,559 --> 00:09:35,760
Speaker 2: stories about what's going on and information. We start developing

181
00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:38,760
Speaker 2: an area where we call it assumed facts. Where someone

182
00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:42,720
Speaker 2: says something and because there's multiple streams, that becomes the

183
00:09:42,800 --> 00:09:48,400
Speaker 2: fact and it's not. It fails, and so it really

184
00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:52,040
Speaker 2: needs to be clear. And those lanes and those communication

185
00:09:52,160 --> 00:09:54,720
Speaker 2: lanes need to be clear. One of the greatest things

186
00:09:54,720 --> 00:09:57,120
Speaker 2: I find, or one of the greatest failings, is that

187
00:09:57,640 --> 00:10:00,760
Speaker 2: you know, in a normal day, everyone's calm and they

188
00:10:00,800 --> 00:10:04,560
Speaker 2: go these are communication paths. When a CT incident happens,

189
00:10:04,840 --> 00:10:08,720
Speaker 2: there is a thirst for information that is in quenchable.

190
00:10:08,920 --> 00:10:12,960
Speaker 2: People wanted. Now, some people panic and start giving briefing

191
00:10:13,000 --> 00:10:16,679
Speaker 2: outside of outside of processes, and that causes the breakdown.

192
00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:21,319
Speaker 1: Dave I saw that, and yeah, it's been discussed ad

193
00:10:21,400 --> 00:10:25,920
Speaker 1: nause in. But the Link Cafe that I was watching

194
00:10:25,920 --> 00:10:28,920
Speaker 1: people react, I'm thinking, you're not handling this well on

195
00:10:29,000 --> 00:10:32,160
Speaker 1: different things. And it was probably as sad as it was.

196
00:10:32,200 --> 00:10:35,000
Speaker 1: It was such a tragedy that whole set of circumstances.

197
00:10:35,880 --> 00:10:38,240
Speaker 1: I think we learned a lot from that one experience.

198
00:10:38,520 --> 00:10:41,920
Speaker 2: Look, we did. Look, that was a terrible day and

199
00:10:42,040 --> 00:10:44,320
Speaker 2: my role on that day, so I had the task.

200
00:10:44,520 --> 00:10:48,240
Speaker 2: So go back the morning of Link Cafe, we kicked

201
00:10:48,240 --> 00:10:50,400
Speaker 2: off a job at five o'clock in the morning. We

202
00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:54,120
Speaker 2: did a search rant on a fellow part of the

203
00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:57,240
Speaker 2: Apple Be investigation and it was a terrorism financing proof.

204
00:10:57,559 --> 00:11:00,600
Speaker 2: Did the search warrant, got the information, locked him up,

205
00:11:00,640 --> 00:11:03,440
Speaker 2: knocked it over, and we went back to the office

206
00:11:03,679 --> 00:11:06,280
Speaker 2: nine nine thirty and we're having the celebratory cup of coffee.

207
00:11:06,360 --> 00:11:10,120
Speaker 2: Great job boys, And we turned on seven News and

208
00:11:10,160 --> 00:11:12,360
Speaker 2: there was a picture of what they call the shahada,

209
00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:14,480
Speaker 2: which is the black and white flag that Monus had.

210
00:11:14,840 --> 00:11:17,000
Speaker 2: It was up against the window and we read the

211
00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:21,200
Speaker 2: telly type underneath saying arm robbery gone wrong, hostage is taken.

212
00:11:21,640 --> 00:11:25,079
Speaker 2: Now we knew straight away that was a shahada, that's

213
00:11:25,120 --> 00:11:28,360
Speaker 2: a terrorist flag. So it was in that opportunity that

214
00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:30,600
Speaker 2: we started making the calls. This is a terrorist event,

215
00:11:30,840 --> 00:11:33,960
Speaker 2: so normally we wait to receive the call. In this instance,

216
00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:36,199
Speaker 2: we were briefing up saying, this is what's happening here.

217
00:11:37,280 --> 00:11:40,880
Speaker 2: So then we went into an investigative pattern and my

218
00:11:41,040 --> 00:11:44,599
Speaker 2: task in the day was to identify who the hostages

219
00:11:44,600 --> 00:11:47,439
Speaker 2: were and who the offender was. Now that might seem

220
00:11:47,480 --> 00:11:51,880
Speaker 2: really simple, but random people in a cafe in the

221
00:11:51,920 --> 00:11:55,880
Speaker 2: heart of Sydney just before Christmas, I think I had

222
00:11:56,040 --> 00:11:58,280
Speaker 2: I think there was probably we had about a thousand

223
00:11:58,320 --> 00:12:01,880
Speaker 2: people were ringing up saying I can't contact my brother,

224
00:12:02,000 --> 00:12:04,360
Speaker 2: I haven't seen my sister, My auntie went into the city.

225
00:12:04,440 --> 00:12:06,760
Speaker 2: So if people couldn't contact someone, there was assumption they

226
00:12:06,800 --> 00:12:10,200
Speaker 2: were there. So we had to really slowly dissect through

227
00:12:10,240 --> 00:12:12,800
Speaker 2: all those people who was and wasn't there. We used

228
00:12:12,800 --> 00:12:17,240
Speaker 2: all our technical capabilities, all those tricky methodologies that we had,

229
00:12:17,440 --> 00:12:18,760
Speaker 2: and then we had to identify the shooter.

230
00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:22,800
Speaker 1: Yeah, I remember from the first time I heard that

231
00:12:22,960 --> 00:12:25,480
Speaker 1: was we were watching it in the homicide office and

232
00:12:25,520 --> 00:12:29,040
Speaker 1: one of the female detectives said, man minus.

233
00:12:29,679 --> 00:12:32,080
Speaker 2: Yah and she did contact us and we took it down.

234
00:12:32,200 --> 00:12:35,400
Speaker 2: So now this is a confusing thing. Right, So if

235
00:12:35,440 --> 00:12:39,000
Speaker 2: I go back to Islamic faith, there is a number

236
00:12:39,040 --> 00:12:41,960
Speaker 2: of sex within the Islamic Faith, the two predominant sex

237
00:12:41,960 --> 00:12:46,840
Speaker 2: would be Sunny and Sheer. Now Man Minus purported to

238
00:12:46,880 --> 00:12:52,000
Speaker 2: be a person of high ranking within the Shea community.

239
00:12:53,320 --> 00:12:56,520
Speaker 2: Islamic State, for those that aren't aware, is a Sunny

240
00:12:56,559 --> 00:13:00,520
Speaker 2: based group. We don't see cross We see people crossing

241
00:13:00,559 --> 00:13:04,840
Speaker 2: from Christianity to Muslim, from Muslim to Orthodox, or we

242
00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:08,640
Speaker 2: don't see the crossing over between Sunny and Shea. It's

243
00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:11,520
Speaker 2: a real rare occasion. So he was on the list,

244
00:13:11,600 --> 00:13:14,880
Speaker 2: but at the bottom because he wasn't there. We also

245
00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:17,520
Speaker 2: had the problem that he had the shahidah. Now, those

246
00:13:17,559 --> 00:13:20,080
Speaker 2: that know what the shahda is, that was the flag

247
00:13:20,240 --> 00:13:23,800
Speaker 2: for bin Laden and our Kaider. He was purporting to

248
00:13:23,800 --> 00:13:27,640
Speaker 2: be representing Islamic State. They had a different flag. Islamic

249
00:13:27,760 --> 00:13:30,440
Speaker 2: State and our Kaider were at war with each other.

250
00:13:30,520 --> 00:13:34,880
Speaker 2: They were killing each other in in Shiria. So he's

251
00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:36,520
Speaker 2: got a guy saying on one group, but I've got

252
00:13:36,520 --> 00:13:38,760
Speaker 2: the wrong flag. So there was all these confusing things,

253
00:13:38,800 --> 00:13:42,600
Speaker 2: so the story wasn't making sense to us. So whilst

254
00:13:42,600 --> 00:13:44,400
Speaker 2: he was on the list, it was we just had

255
00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:46,640
Speaker 2: to work through and again we talk about the value

256
00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:49,839
Speaker 2: of intelligence. They went through some Facebook pages. They found

257
00:13:49,840 --> 00:13:53,280
Speaker 2: a photograph of a rally he'd only just recently converted

258
00:13:53,320 --> 00:13:55,240
Speaker 2: to Sunni, which we weren't aware of at the time.

259
00:13:55,800 --> 00:13:58,520
Speaker 2: There was a rally that he was at with Hesbutteria.

260
00:13:58,920 --> 00:14:01,160
Speaker 2: He had a particular band his head on the Soldier

261
00:14:01,200 --> 00:14:04,679
Speaker 2: of Muhammad that he was wearing at the time at

262
00:14:04,720 --> 00:14:07,240
Speaker 2: Link Cafe, And that was the critical point that we

263
00:14:07,240 --> 00:14:09,640
Speaker 2: could say, right now we've got who it is. Now

264
00:14:09,720 --> 00:14:12,840
Speaker 2: we can relay that to the negs, the negotiators, and

265
00:14:12,840 --> 00:14:14,880
Speaker 2: they can start trying to negotiate with a person to

266
00:14:14,920 --> 00:14:17,679
Speaker 2: whom they know because something to that point, we'd investigated

267
00:14:17,760 --> 00:14:20,840
Speaker 2: man man Monus for eight years, so we knew him

268
00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:21,480
Speaker 2: very very well.

269
00:14:21,640 --> 00:14:24,680
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah, it was an interesting one and it was

270
00:14:24,960 --> 00:14:27,280
Speaker 1: a way for all of us have to switch on

271
00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:29,720
Speaker 1: and see how we operated. And I think a lot

272
00:14:29,840 --> 00:14:31,960
Speaker 1: was learned from that, which it should, you know, when

273
00:14:32,000 --> 00:14:35,320
Speaker 1: the pressures on the mistakes are made or people react

274
00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:37,000
Speaker 1: a certain way. But I think it ened out a

275
00:14:37,000 --> 00:14:38,440
Speaker 1: few faults on the way that.

276
00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:43,480
Speaker 2: Look, it did a lot of false chain of command

277
00:14:44,440 --> 00:14:47,560
Speaker 2: decision making. All those things come into play.

278
00:14:47,400 --> 00:14:49,960
Speaker 1: And in that one what you've referenced, you know, stay

279
00:14:49,960 --> 00:14:52,400
Speaker 1: in your lane was very important too, because there were

280
00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:55,080
Speaker 1: so many people wanted to have a piece of it

281
00:14:55,120 --> 00:14:57,840
Speaker 1: because it was the biggest thing in town and everyone's

282
00:14:57,880 --> 00:14:58,880
Speaker 1: on the phone running around.

283
00:14:59,120 --> 00:15:02,360
Speaker 2: Yeah, so we had and everyone does. It's a slip

284
00:15:02,880 --> 00:15:04,560
Speaker 2: you slip into all. I can do this, but that's

285
00:15:04,560 --> 00:15:07,120
Speaker 2: not what you're there to do, and in doing that,

286
00:15:07,120 --> 00:15:10,640
Speaker 2: you dilute the process and you get in the way. Look,

287
00:15:10,800 --> 00:15:12,680
Speaker 2: it was a great learning process. We learn a lot.

288
00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:15,080
Speaker 2: So that's where we developed the concept of the strands

289
00:15:15,120 --> 00:15:19,040
Speaker 2: of regalization. Out of that, we also looked at reception

290
00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:23,080
Speaker 2: centers for witnesses and families important. So one of the

291
00:15:23,080 --> 00:15:25,840
Speaker 2: filings and one of the main failings in my career

292
00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:31,240
Speaker 2: is that terrorism uses fear and violence as their main

293
00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:36,720
Speaker 2: tools that manifests into victims. So terrorisms, terrorism doesn't occur

294
00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:39,760
Speaker 2: without victims. And what probably we need to do is

295
00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:42,640
Speaker 2: look more at a victim centric approach. And Link showed

296
00:15:42,720 --> 00:15:44,680
Speaker 2: us that that we failed. That we failed both the

297
00:15:44,720 --> 00:15:47,720
Speaker 2: families in that regard and those that were coming out

298
00:15:47,720 --> 00:15:50,520
Speaker 2: in the witnesses. So we started to develop better protocols

299
00:15:50,560 --> 00:15:52,840
Speaker 2: for that and I think that was again taking it

300
00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:55,160
Speaker 2: further and again maturing in this space. We're all maturing,

301
00:15:55,520 --> 00:15:57,600
Speaker 2: so you don't learn it in a hurry, but when you,

302
00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:00,000
Speaker 2: as we slowly go through it, we get better and better.

303
00:16:00,280 --> 00:16:03,640
Speaker 1: Well, there's something I've learned here in the podcast, like

304
00:16:03,680 --> 00:16:07,120
Speaker 1: speaking to Peter Morony and yourself and going through the book.

305
00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:10,640
Speaker 1: There has been a learning process. It's just changed. We've

306
00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:13,360
Speaker 1: had to adopt a new way of policing, a new

307
00:16:13,600 --> 00:16:14,560
Speaker 1: strand of policing.

308
00:16:14,680 --> 00:16:17,400
Speaker 2: It's a new strand of policing. So just in investigations

309
00:16:17,440 --> 00:16:22,160
Speaker 2: in CT, we've got three different types. Now there's investigations,

310
00:16:22,160 --> 00:16:25,880
Speaker 2: well in CT, there's reactive investigations, there's product investigations, and

311
00:16:25,920 --> 00:16:29,440
Speaker 2: there's prevented investigations. These are three separate disciplines that have

312
00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:32,600
Speaker 2: just emerged that we now have to master. And then

313
00:16:32,640 --> 00:16:36,000
Speaker 2: you've then you overlay that with the intelligence, and intelligence

314
00:16:36,040 --> 00:16:39,680
Speaker 2: is getting complicated as well. And then the dynamic nature

315
00:16:39,720 --> 00:16:43,120
Speaker 2: of terrorism. Now, whilst it stays, you know that the

316
00:16:43,200 --> 00:16:46,640
Speaker 2: trends stay, the motivations and how they do business is

317
00:16:46,680 --> 00:16:49,960
Speaker 2: constantly moving. I was constantly asked, Dave, what are you

318
00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:54,040
Speaker 2: still there after twenty years? And so because it never stopped,

319
00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:57,160
Speaker 2: I would write a manual. So one of my jobs

320
00:16:57,200 --> 00:17:00,240
Speaker 2: was to write training manuals. I'd write a manual and

321
00:17:00,280 --> 00:17:02,720
Speaker 2: within six months that manual was out of date and

322
00:17:02,800 --> 00:17:06,280
Speaker 2: had to rewrite a new one because the environment had

323
00:17:06,320 --> 00:17:06,639
Speaker 2: moved on.

324
00:17:06,920 --> 00:17:10,000
Speaker 1: Well, I know you're busy because you've virtually disappeared and

325
00:17:10,359 --> 00:17:15,520
Speaker 1: whenever we saw you look stressed. So yeah, you must

326
00:17:15,520 --> 00:17:17,360
Speaker 1: have been doing something. I didn't think you were bludding

327
00:17:17,400 --> 00:17:23,920
Speaker 1: over there, but yeah, you just disappear on ideology left

328
00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:25,960
Speaker 1: and right. Let's talk through that.

329
00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:30,040
Speaker 2: So looks there's always been and look, as long as

330
00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:33,680
Speaker 2: I've been in CT, right right wing, extreme right wing

331
00:17:33,720 --> 00:17:38,359
Speaker 2: has always been there. Now there there is there is

332
00:17:38,520 --> 00:17:42,760
Speaker 2: a mis comprehension that because right wing is based on hate,

333
00:17:43,000 --> 00:17:45,800
Speaker 2: they hate the people they're opposed to, that it's worse

334
00:17:45,920 --> 00:17:49,119
Speaker 2: than other forms of extremism. They're all equally as bad

335
00:17:50,480 --> 00:17:55,000
Speaker 2: the right. The one constant in the world of ideological

336
00:17:55,119 --> 00:17:57,800
Speaker 2: terrorism is if there is a rise in the right,

337
00:17:58,240 --> 00:18:01,120
Speaker 2: there will be a rise corresponding rise in left wing

338
00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:04,200
Speaker 2: extreme left wing terrorism. Now, it doesn't get the media

339
00:18:04,240 --> 00:18:08,280
Speaker 2: attention that it deserves. So when I hear the AJADG

340
00:18:08,440 --> 00:18:12,000
Speaker 2: talk about a rise in right wing My next conversation is, well,

341
00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:13,880
Speaker 2: what are you doing then about the left? Of course,

342
00:18:13,920 --> 00:18:16,680
Speaker 2: if the right right rises, so does the left.

343
00:18:16,880 --> 00:18:18,720
Speaker 1: They go relationship together.

344
00:18:19,240 --> 00:18:21,959
Speaker 2: And if the left rises, then the right comes up.

345
00:18:22,320 --> 00:18:24,719
Speaker 1: It makes sense when you're talking in extreme views, like

346
00:18:24,760 --> 00:18:26,639
Speaker 1: if someone throws that up, there will be a counter.

347
00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:30,320
Speaker 2: And the example we see if there's a Palestinian protest,

348
00:18:30,480 --> 00:18:34,240
Speaker 2: we see encounter is Israeli protest. If there's an Israeli protest,

349
00:18:34,280 --> 00:18:37,639
Speaker 2: there's a counter. It's the same process, it's the same dynamic,

350
00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:39,199
Speaker 2: just in different ideologies.

351
00:18:39,560 --> 00:18:42,800
Speaker 1: A lot of what we hear as young males being

352
00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:45,720
Speaker 1: caught up in it and they're trying to prove themselves.

353
00:18:45,760 --> 00:18:48,919
Speaker 1: They're probably more easy to influence and an older person

354
00:18:48,960 --> 00:18:51,159
Speaker 1: than the ones that some of the things that have

355
00:18:51,240 --> 00:18:54,000
Speaker 1: played out in recent times young males and what happened

356
00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:57,719
Speaker 1: out the front of the police headquarters a young young person.

357
00:18:58,400 --> 00:19:02,000
Speaker 1: Do they deliberately get targeted because they're vulnerable, because they

358
00:19:02,040 --> 00:19:02,879
Speaker 1: can be influenced?

359
00:19:03,240 --> 00:19:11,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, look so in short, yes, so culturally yes they are. Now,

360
00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:16,040
Speaker 2: each particular ideology will have its nuances. So if you

361
00:19:16,040 --> 00:19:20,680
Speaker 2: look at the culture, say of Islamic culture, the males

362
00:19:20,880 --> 00:19:26,040
Speaker 2: are probably the leading face outwardly, so therefore they will

363
00:19:26,040 --> 00:19:29,280
Speaker 2: take responsibility. Now that said, I am fully aware that

364
00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:32,760
Speaker 2: females are radicalised and are just as big as part

365
00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:34,840
Speaker 2: of the process as the males are.

366
00:19:34,920 --> 00:19:37,280
Speaker 1: Okay, talk us through that, because we don't when the

367
00:19:37,280 --> 00:19:40,560
Speaker 1: word terrorism comes to for we don't often relate it

368
00:19:40,560 --> 00:19:41,640
Speaker 1: to the female.

369
00:19:41,840 --> 00:19:45,000
Speaker 2: No, And so what we find is that because of

370
00:19:45,480 --> 00:19:48,720
Speaker 2: in the Islamic faith, they take a you know, they

371
00:19:48,760 --> 00:19:52,600
Speaker 2: take a backward step. That in that regard is that

372
00:19:52,600 --> 00:19:54,720
Speaker 2: they're not going to be forward thinking that you know,

373
00:19:54,960 --> 00:19:58,480
Speaker 2: that they're not going to expose themselves as a male would.

374
00:19:58,520 --> 00:20:01,040
Speaker 2: Now that doesn't mean they don't agree the ideology and

375
00:20:01,080 --> 00:20:01,920
Speaker 2: they don't agree.

376
00:20:01,680 --> 00:20:06,480
Speaker 1: With the support perhaps, don't you know.

377
00:20:06,520 --> 00:20:09,280
Speaker 2: I can remember during pandemics and we were listening to

378
00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:12,720
Speaker 2: all these conversations, and all I can say is that

379
00:20:12,760 --> 00:20:16,000
Speaker 2: there were individuals in those rooms in those houses that

380
00:20:16,040 --> 00:20:20,240
Speaker 2: were female that were just as into the extreme ideology

381
00:20:20,280 --> 00:20:23,560
Speaker 2: as the blokes, and they many times were inspiring them

382
00:20:23,560 --> 00:20:26,240
Speaker 2: and encouraging them to pursue what they wanted to do

383
00:20:26,280 --> 00:20:28,639
Speaker 2: and pursue their goals. And they take a sort of

384
00:20:28,640 --> 00:20:31,720
Speaker 2: a secondary role in that aspect. Now you see say

385
00:20:31,720 --> 00:20:35,119
Speaker 2: in left wing where it's a culturally, culturally different group.

386
00:20:35,440 --> 00:20:38,600
Speaker 2: You will see a lot of females, you know, running

387
00:20:38,800 --> 00:20:42,199
Speaker 2: running the protests, stepping up and making those actions. And

388
00:20:42,240 --> 00:20:45,280
Speaker 2: you also see that too and right wing and political

389
00:20:45,400 --> 00:20:49,720
Speaker 2: again whichever that goes. Again, we see women involved in

390
00:20:49,760 --> 00:20:53,800
Speaker 2: that as well. So whilst males seem to be the

391
00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:57,720
Speaker 2: most prominent ones, females have their fair fair hand in

392
00:20:57,760 --> 00:20:58,280
Speaker 2: it as well.

393
00:20:58,680 --> 00:21:01,960
Speaker 1: Do we look, I take on board what you're saying there,

394
00:21:01,960 --> 00:21:04,480
Speaker 1: because it's just the perception with the males, and you've

395
00:21:04,520 --> 00:21:08,440
Speaker 1: explained that. Do we ignore the risk that potential let's say,

396
00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:12,320
Speaker 1: white terraces, that type of extreme behavior that we don't

397
00:21:12,320 --> 00:21:16,000
Speaker 1: see it because I'm talking generally here, but the community

398
00:21:16,000 --> 00:21:19,200
Speaker 1: look at okay, these terrorsts, where are they from? From

399
00:21:19,240 --> 00:21:21,240
Speaker 1: the Middle East or or that type of thing. That's

400
00:21:21,280 --> 00:21:24,840
Speaker 1: our thinking of terrorists that's been ingrained into the general public.

401
00:21:24,880 --> 00:21:27,880
Speaker 1: I think whether it's a unconscious bias that we hold

402
00:21:27,920 --> 00:21:30,879
Speaker 1: on to. But what about these white extremes offer the

403
00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:31,760
Speaker 1: same sort of threat?

404
00:21:32,080 --> 00:21:36,480
Speaker 2: So look, each terrace offers the same spread. Yeah, okay, so,

405
00:21:36,920 --> 00:21:40,320
Speaker 2: and I not want to be glib, but it's like

406
00:21:40,400 --> 00:21:43,440
Speaker 2: ice cream. Violence is like ice cream. We're only changing

407
00:21:43,440 --> 00:21:45,280
Speaker 2: the flavor of the ice cream. It's still ice cream.

408
00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:47,960
Speaker 2: Violence is still violence, regardless.

409
00:21:47,520 --> 00:21:50,160
Speaker 1: Of we'd be talking about ice cream on my catch killers.

410
00:21:50,160 --> 00:21:54,119
Speaker 2: Stay but you with me, so you know what we

411
00:21:54,200 --> 00:21:57,359
Speaker 2: see is that they just as deadly, yes, just as change.

412
00:21:57,440 --> 00:22:00,399
Speaker 2: Now what we're seeing so we're terrors and comes in

413
00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:03,679
Speaker 2: what they call ways, and there's the identify as the

414
00:22:03,720 --> 00:22:05,800
Speaker 2: four waves at the moment, and at the moment we're

415
00:22:05,840 --> 00:22:08,240
Speaker 2: in a religious phase and that phase is coming out

416
00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:10,880
Speaker 2: and we're seeing the emergence of new left and right

417
00:22:10,880 --> 00:22:14,080
Speaker 2: wing terrorism. So predominantly at the moment, we're in the

418
00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:17,480
Speaker 2: middle of religious terrorism, and in particular it's those that

419
00:22:17,600 --> 00:22:21,720
Speaker 2: have a corrupted, extreme interpretation of the Islamic faith. Now

420
00:22:21,760 --> 00:22:25,280
Speaker 2: that this is just a period in time so that

421
00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:28,359
Speaker 2: you know, if the modeling is true, that will start

422
00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:31,960
Speaker 2: to dissipate and those as you call it, Anglo saxons

423
00:22:31,960 --> 00:22:34,800
Speaker 2: of white orientated terrorists will start to take more predinents

424
00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:37,080
Speaker 2: or more prominence, and then we'll see more of that,

425
00:22:37,320 --> 00:22:40,840
Speaker 2: and hopefully when that occurs, we'll see more of a

426
00:22:41,000 --> 00:22:44,240
Speaker 2: balanced position of what terrorism is. And it's not a

427
00:22:44,280 --> 00:22:48,080
Speaker 2: Middle Eastern thing. It is a human thing, and depending

428
00:22:48,119 --> 00:22:49,560
Speaker 2: on their ideology.

429
00:22:49,280 --> 00:22:51,639
Speaker 1: I think that's an important point to bring up and

430
00:22:51,920 --> 00:22:53,359
Speaker 1: to get across that we've got to look at it

431
00:22:53,400 --> 00:22:55,760
Speaker 1: that way. I don't know about the ice cream analogy,

432
00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:59,719
Speaker 1: but I'll sit on that. Which color did you prefer

433
00:22:59,760 --> 00:23:05,520
Speaker 1: with vanilla? All right, let's talk about recruitment the way

434
00:23:05,560 --> 00:23:08,439
Speaker 1: that as law enforcement you can stop recruitment. Now you

435
00:23:08,520 --> 00:23:11,600
Speaker 1: talked early in part one about religious leaders come out

436
00:23:11,600 --> 00:23:15,480
Speaker 1: and support it. How can we stop stop people being recruited?

437
00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:20,919
Speaker 2: So recruitment's like recruitment is the basis and future success

438
00:23:20,960 --> 00:23:23,560
Speaker 2: of any organization is based on recruitment. There is a

439
00:23:23,640 --> 00:23:27,159
Speaker 2: thousand different models about recruitment, and all those people that

440
00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:30,359
Speaker 2: are recruitment agencies. How you recruit people in business is

441
00:23:30,400 --> 00:23:34,119
Speaker 2: exactly how you recruit people into terrorism. The only difference

442
00:23:34,160 --> 00:23:37,440
Speaker 2: here is that we're recruiting people into high risk activity.

443
00:23:37,840 --> 00:23:41,359
Speaker 2: So therefore there must be a reward. So you know,

444
00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:44,760
Speaker 2: they're looking at those stages of how do I get

445
00:23:44,880 --> 00:23:48,159
Speaker 2: the reward for that person? So they'll use tricks like

446
00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:51,160
Speaker 2: noble cause it's for the greater good of humanity. It's

447
00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:55,200
Speaker 2: for your salvation of your soul and salvation of your

448
00:23:55,200 --> 00:23:59,080
Speaker 2: family soul. It will be you know you're doing the

449
00:23:59,160 --> 00:24:03,200
Speaker 2: right thing by another minority group, so they will look

450
00:24:03,280 --> 00:24:07,400
Speaker 2: for those motivations to do it. Now, recruitment has its

451
00:24:07,440 --> 00:24:13,440
Speaker 2: own set of indicators, and they happen in parallel with radicalization.

452
00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:15,320
Speaker 2: They happened at the same time, and a lot of

453
00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:19,320
Speaker 2: the processes crossover. One of the absolutes in both radicalization

454
00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:22,280
Speaker 2: and recruitment is the presence of a corruptor, the person

455
00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:25,280
Speaker 2: that pulling the strings. Now that could be in person,

456
00:24:25,320 --> 00:24:28,040
Speaker 2: that could be online, it could be by any form

457
00:24:28,080 --> 00:24:31,760
Speaker 2: of communication, but that presence of that corruptor. And what

458
00:24:31,800 --> 00:24:35,120
Speaker 2: we see is that once the person is they look

459
00:24:35,119 --> 00:24:38,440
Speaker 2: at frame alignment. That is, get the person to acknowledge

460
00:24:38,480 --> 00:24:42,000
Speaker 2: and their thought process agrees with the processes of the group,

461
00:24:42,640 --> 00:24:46,200
Speaker 2: and then through the process of persuasion, the person decides

462
00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:48,320
Speaker 2: to join the group and get accepted by the group.

463
00:24:49,400 --> 00:24:53,680
Speaker 2: The recruitment process ceases, but the radicalization process continues. The

464
00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:57,200
Speaker 2: radicalization is an infinite issue. It doesn't go away. It

465
00:24:57,240 --> 00:25:02,800
Speaker 2: ebbs and flows. Level of racalization will go up and down,

466
00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:05,280
Speaker 2: courting on how their life is going and how it's

467
00:25:05,280 --> 00:25:08,159
Speaker 2: being managed. So if we look at terrorism, where I

468
00:25:08,160 --> 00:25:11,200
Speaker 2: get a little bit academic here, it is a complex

469
00:25:11,400 --> 00:25:15,359
Speaker 2: infinite problem, so that when I identify, in this instance,

470
00:25:15,400 --> 00:25:18,879
Speaker 2: Garry Jubilin as a terrorist suspect, you never go away.

471
00:25:19,359 --> 00:25:22,760
Speaker 2: You're always there. And the complexity, because you're an individual,

472
00:25:23,040 --> 00:25:26,840
Speaker 2: you get influenced by people in the studio, your home, life,

473
00:25:27,000 --> 00:25:31,199
Speaker 2: ex colleagues. All those little threads are pulling on you,

474
00:25:31,400 --> 00:25:34,760
Speaker 2: that impact on you, that make you unique. So that complexity,

475
00:25:34,760 --> 00:25:38,080
Speaker 2: together with the infinite side of it, makes this a

476
00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:40,240
Speaker 2: real challenging environment. Police.

477
00:25:41,400 --> 00:25:44,480
Speaker 1: It's fascinating the depth of it. I want to raise

478
00:25:44,520 --> 00:25:46,840
Speaker 1: another thing, and I've got the head in the public

479
00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:48,960
Speaker 1: do they play a part in the fight against terrorism?

480
00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:50,880
Speaker 1: I want to bring out a quote from your book.

481
00:25:51,359 --> 00:25:55,679
Speaker 1: Terrorism has evolved, expanding the responsibilities of counteraction beyond just

482
00:25:55,760 --> 00:25:59,920
Speaker 1: law enforcement and security intelligence agencies to include all enterity

483
00:26:00,440 --> 00:26:03,560
Speaker 1: in the public and private sector. The prevailing principle now

484
00:26:04,119 --> 00:26:07,400
Speaker 1: counter terrorism is shared responsibility of government and the community

485
00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:10,760
Speaker 1: at large. Okay, I get where you're coming from there,

486
00:26:10,760 --> 00:26:12,800
Speaker 1: but can we break that break that down.

487
00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:15,199
Speaker 2: So very simply, You, me and every one of your

488
00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:17,359
Speaker 2: listeners is part of the process. It's no longer a

489
00:26:17,400 --> 00:26:20,639
Speaker 2: police matter, it's no longer a security intelligence matter. We

490
00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:23,320
Speaker 2: all play a role. We all see things. You know,

491
00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:25,520
Speaker 2: the old saying see something, say something, there is no

492
00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:28,960
Speaker 2: true or saying in this world. If something is unusual,

493
00:26:28,960 --> 00:26:32,000
Speaker 2: we should be reporting it. If you know, I've got

494
00:26:32,000 --> 00:26:34,399
Speaker 2: concerns about my neighbor, I should be making an effort.

495
00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:37,040
Speaker 2: I should be inquiring. This is part of being part

496
00:26:37,040 --> 00:26:39,240
Speaker 2: of the community. You know, they're old saying that you

497
00:26:39,280 --> 00:26:41,960
Speaker 2: can't arrest your way of a problem is true. Also,

498
00:26:42,040 --> 00:26:44,600
Speaker 2: you can't rely on We can't be everywhere. You know,

499
00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:48,080
Speaker 2: there's eight million people in New South Wales alone. We

500
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:50,800
Speaker 2: don't have those resources to be there. So as a

501
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:53,480
Speaker 2: community we need to band together. And that's what that

502
00:26:53,560 --> 00:26:54,119
Speaker 2: process is.

503
00:26:54,520 --> 00:26:57,680
Speaker 1: And in saying that, the type of things without so

504
00:26:58,160 --> 00:27:01,000
Speaker 1: you're not inundated with calls. But if something that doesn't

505
00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:03,960
Speaker 1: seem quite right, you're saying to the public, well, look,

506
00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:05,840
Speaker 1: if you've got doubts about it, doesn't hurt to pick

507
00:27:05,880 --> 00:27:09,400
Speaker 1: the phone up and make a call as the information.

508
00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:13,120
Speaker 2: Of the best test. If it doesn't look right, it's

509
00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:17,000
Speaker 2: probably not and make a call. You know, like there's

510
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:20,720
Speaker 2: a thing we call it unknown knowns that is, we

511
00:27:20,760 --> 00:27:24,639
Speaker 2: don't know why we know something. And part of anticipation,

512
00:27:25,160 --> 00:27:26,920
Speaker 2: there's a reason when you and I walk in a

513
00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:28,840
Speaker 2: room and we see a crook that we don't know

514
00:27:28,920 --> 00:27:30,280
Speaker 2: is a crook, but our hairs are standing on the

515
00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:32,879
Speaker 2: back of under he's doing something or she's doing something

516
00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:35,720
Speaker 2: that indicates to us this person is someone I can't trust.

517
00:27:36,160 --> 00:27:38,760
Speaker 2: So when you get that feeling, there's a basis for it.

518
00:27:38,880 --> 00:27:41,880
Speaker 2: There really is, and that intuition that you feel, yeah,

519
00:27:42,119 --> 00:27:44,399
Speaker 2: maybe you should act on that. And I encourage people

520
00:27:44,400 --> 00:27:46,359
Speaker 2: they should not that I want to see the phone lines,

521
00:27:46,359 --> 00:27:49,000
Speaker 2: milt it down. But if you think you've got information,

522
00:27:49,359 --> 00:27:53,600
Speaker 2: make the call the authorities. Just think if you don't

523
00:27:53,600 --> 00:27:56,399
Speaker 2: make the call and something happens, it's you that's got

524
00:27:56,440 --> 00:27:57,960
Speaker 2: to look at yourself in the mirror the next day.

525
00:27:58,160 --> 00:28:00,600
Speaker 1: And I think it's fair to say, and I'd use

526
00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:03,520
Speaker 1: this when we're appealing to the public with homicide investigations.

527
00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:06,280
Speaker 1: It's like a jigsaw putting it together. A jigsaw and

528
00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:09,080
Speaker 1: some small little part on its own doesn't have any relevance.

529
00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:11,560
Speaker 1: But if you pass that information on, you might be

530
00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:13,840
Speaker 1: the third or fourth person that's called about that person.

531
00:28:13,920 --> 00:28:17,280
Speaker 2: So true, So we took at you know, even we'll

532
00:28:17,280 --> 00:28:20,560
Speaker 2: talk about man Moness just prior to link CAFA, he

533
00:28:20,600 --> 00:28:24,600
Speaker 2: made a post on Facebook and it was a it

534
00:28:24,640 --> 00:28:27,920
Speaker 2: was a provocative post. Now I think there was ten

535
00:28:27,960 --> 00:28:31,600
Speaker 2: people that rung the police and reported it. Now we

536
00:28:31,640 --> 00:28:34,400
Speaker 2: looked at that as a result of that. So it's

537
00:28:34,760 --> 00:28:39,320
Speaker 2: that action. Direct action causes a reaction. So when I

538
00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:41,840
Speaker 2: was there, and again I'm not there, but if someone

539
00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:45,120
Speaker 2: was prepared to give me information, I was prepared to

540
00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:47,600
Speaker 2: look into it. Yeah, So if you're prepared to make

541
00:28:47,640 --> 00:28:50,280
Speaker 2: the call, it is my understanding that they will make

542
00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:52,280
Speaker 2: an effort to look into that and assess that on

543
00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:52,840
Speaker 2: its merit.

544
00:28:53,000 --> 00:28:56,680
Speaker 1: Yeah, now we should encourage people to do it. It's

545
00:28:56,720 --> 00:28:59,520
Speaker 1: not dissimilar to you know, in the basic form of

546
00:28:59,640 --> 00:29:02,880
Speaker 1: neighbour would watch someone someone's wandering around the street that

547
00:29:02,880 --> 00:29:04,120
Speaker 1: doesn't look like they belong.

548
00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:07,080
Speaker 2: Here, exactly right, And the Senate works.

549
00:29:06,760 --> 00:29:10,200
Speaker 1: As simple as that. Okay, I'm interested in the ratings.

550
00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:12,600
Speaker 1: You know, when they say, you know, from the government

551
00:29:12,600 --> 00:29:16,160
Speaker 1: announces the risk of terrorism terrorism attack is high low

552
00:29:16,320 --> 00:29:18,200
Speaker 1: or whatever, what do they base that on.

553
00:29:18,560 --> 00:29:22,400
Speaker 2: So the a C which is the Australian Intelligence Community,

554
00:29:22,640 --> 00:29:28,600
Speaker 2: they're our intelligence agency. So that's asasis O, NA, Defense

555
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:32,520
Speaker 2: Signals Directorate and a myriad of other government agencies that

556
00:29:32,640 --> 00:29:36,840
Speaker 2: all have alphabetics names, they get together and they determine

557
00:29:36,880 --> 00:29:41,280
Speaker 2: that threat process. Now the brekerage house or the front

558
00:29:41,320 --> 00:29:43,800
Speaker 2: of front of office when their words Asia, and they

559
00:29:43,920 --> 00:29:45,960
Speaker 2: will put that rating up and see at the moment

560
00:29:45,960 --> 00:29:51,600
Speaker 2: where it possible. Now, so that means that Australia remains

561
00:29:51,640 --> 00:29:52,720
Speaker 2: a potential target.

562
00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:53,240
Speaker 1: Okay.

563
00:29:53,280 --> 00:30:01,080
Speaker 2: Now, given recent events in Gaza, in Wakeley, the six

564
00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:05,520
Speaker 2: and in Perth, I think we're probably moving beyond what

565
00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:08,440
Speaker 2: possible is and probably moving to the And it's not

566
00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:11,160
Speaker 2: my job, but you know it would probably have to

567
00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:15,880
Speaker 2: review that now. That has ramifications both nationally and internationally.

568
00:30:15,960 --> 00:30:18,840
Speaker 2: So it's a big deal and it's something that government

569
00:30:19,040 --> 00:30:23,200
Speaker 2: and the intelligence agencies spend a lot of resources on

570
00:30:23,280 --> 00:30:25,360
Speaker 2: to determine that and to make sure they get that

571
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:28,480
Speaker 2: balance right. So it's not fright Night, yet it's informally

572
00:30:28,480 --> 00:30:32,160
Speaker 2: so the community is forewarned and armed to make appropriate decisions.

573
00:30:32,240 --> 00:30:34,840
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, when you say it's not fright night, when

574
00:30:34,840 --> 00:30:37,200
Speaker 1: you look at what the aim of terrorism is to

575
00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:39,720
Speaker 1: cause concern in the community, So you don't want everyone

576
00:30:39,760 --> 00:30:41,120
Speaker 1: to live in fear constantly.

577
00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:44,480
Speaker 2: No, and and if we do, then they win, they win. Yeah,

578
00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:47,000
Speaker 2: And it's that's that's the tool. That's why it's done.

579
00:30:47,040 --> 00:30:50,240
Speaker 2: So it's it's it's a market employee to be front

580
00:30:50,280 --> 00:30:55,840
Speaker 2: of mind, you know, and that creates the momentum for

581
00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:58,720
Speaker 2: them to further their cause. Uh and and and that's

582
00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:00,720
Speaker 2: a that's a that's a tree obviously that we let

583
00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:01,160
Speaker 2: that happen.

584
00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:05,200
Speaker 1: What's some of the what you would consider significant terrorists

585
00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:08,360
Speaker 1: acts that have occurred in Australia that people often, you know,

586
00:31:08,400 --> 00:31:11,240
Speaker 1: we forget things, we move on from things pretty quickly.

587
00:31:11,280 --> 00:31:17,360
Speaker 1: But the type of terrast incidents that occurred that yeah.

588
00:31:15,720 --> 00:31:20,160
Speaker 2: So look, look, let's we'll go back the cast a

589
00:31:20,160 --> 00:31:22,280
Speaker 2: little uprising I think in eighteen o five, where you

590
00:31:22,480 --> 00:31:27,080
Speaker 2: like your history, fifteen convicts we tried to uprise against

591
00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:30,040
Speaker 2: the government. Fifteen convicts were killed. Yeah, nine are hunt

592
00:31:30,880 --> 00:31:33,480
Speaker 2: we Then we had the shooting of Royal Prince Alfred.

593
00:31:34,000 --> 00:31:36,160
Speaker 2: Now he was shot at contact, shot in the back,

594
00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:41,920
Speaker 2: oh sorry shot that that attack and his treatment had

595
00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:44,880
Speaker 2: a public subscription that resulted in the establishment of the

596
00:31:44,960 --> 00:31:47,960
Speaker 2: Royal Prince Alfred Hospital. So it impacts on our society.

597
00:31:48,440 --> 00:31:52,080
Speaker 2: In nineteen seventy eight we had the Hilton bombing that

598
00:31:52,320 --> 00:31:55,360
Speaker 2: created the redrafting of the ASIO Act and the establishment

599
00:31:55,400 --> 00:31:58,640
Speaker 2: of the AFP in the format that we see it today.

600
00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:05,520
Speaker 2: We've had numerous bombings throughout the time we saw Pendennis

601
00:32:05,960 --> 00:32:10,240
Speaker 2: Pandanis was a major watershed moment where a couple of

602
00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:13,360
Speaker 2: days and this is the interesting part. I think two

603
00:32:13,480 --> 00:32:16,080
Speaker 2: or three days before we went to resolution, they had

604
00:32:16,080 --> 00:32:18,960
Speaker 2: to recall government to change the legislation because it didn't work.

605
00:32:19,360 --> 00:32:22,640
Speaker 2: So we did that one of the other major attament.

606
00:32:22,680 --> 00:32:26,120
Speaker 1: And just in case people haven't heard the podcast they

607
00:32:26,120 --> 00:32:29,800
Speaker 1: did with Peter the Moroni Pendennis. A couple of things

608
00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:32,680
Speaker 1: that he was saying about that that you came across

609
00:32:32,520 --> 00:32:35,600
Speaker 1: this group that were planning something and you had to

610
00:32:35,640 --> 00:32:38,080
Speaker 1: move because it was getting inevitable. And it was not

611
00:32:38,200 --> 00:32:40,720
Speaker 1: just based here in New South Wales. There was connections

612
00:32:40,720 --> 00:32:44,000
Speaker 1: down in Victoria. But one thing that I found chilling

613
00:32:44,120 --> 00:32:46,560
Speaker 1: was it seven thousand rounds of ammunition were found.

614
00:32:46,920 --> 00:32:49,240
Speaker 2: Well, actually, look, I was actually looking. I was looking

615
00:32:49,280 --> 00:32:50,040
Speaker 2: at Pandanas.

616
00:32:50,120 --> 00:32:50,320
Speaker 1: Yeah.

617
00:32:50,400 --> 00:32:53,000
Speaker 2: The other day, Look we've got thirty eight thousand rounds,

618
00:32:53,400 --> 00:32:56,440
Speaker 2: we've got forty firearms. They tempted to purchase over eight

619
00:32:56,520 --> 00:32:59,760
Speaker 2: hundred and fifty kilo grands of chemicals that make bombs.

620
00:33:00,800 --> 00:33:02,880
Speaker 2: We found a hand we couldn't find a handful of

621
00:33:02,880 --> 00:33:06,440
Speaker 2: other guns and rifles and we couldn't find seven rocket launchers.

622
00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:09,680
Speaker 2: So they had access to this material. It's it's it's

623
00:33:09,720 --> 00:33:12,600
Speaker 2: frightening what they could get access to and what they

624
00:33:12,640 --> 00:33:16,680
Speaker 2: were trying to could have been And so we learn

625
00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:19,400
Speaker 2: a lot from that. So what we learned from Pandemics

626
00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:23,320
Speaker 2: is initially Pete Morani and a guy called Nick Reid

627
00:33:23,640 --> 00:33:26,160
Speaker 2: come to me after Pandenas and said, Dave, we need

628
00:33:26,200 --> 00:33:28,800
Speaker 2: a terrorism training course, so we did. We established the

629
00:33:28,800 --> 00:33:31,200
Speaker 2: New South Wales Terrorism Training Course as a direct result

630
00:33:31,240 --> 00:33:33,800
Speaker 2: of Pandanas and our first manual that we wrote was

631
00:33:33,840 --> 00:33:36,400
Speaker 2: in essence a poa of what went wrong in Pandemics,

632
00:33:36,560 --> 00:33:40,000
Speaker 2: don't do this again. So our training then evolved and

633
00:33:40,040 --> 00:33:43,320
Speaker 2: then we realized importance of decision making, so we then

634
00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:46,240
Speaker 2: put that in a national framework under the Australian New

635
00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:49,680
Speaker 2: Zealand counter Terrorism Committee and their training regime. So it

636
00:33:49,720 --> 00:33:52,720
Speaker 2: really was a catalyst for us to take it up

637
00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:54,800
Speaker 2: a notch and actually get better at our business.

638
00:33:54,880 --> 00:33:58,440
Speaker 1: Yeah, well we all should always should evolve and improved,

639
00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:01,120
Speaker 1: but when you talk decision making, you say that a

640
00:34:01,120 --> 00:34:03,600
Speaker 1: lot because that's crucial to count the terrorism.

641
00:34:05,040 --> 00:34:09,600
Speaker 2: So you get it's one of the only areas in policing,

642
00:34:09,800 --> 00:34:15,160
Speaker 2: and to be fair, all areas of policing get scrutinized

643
00:34:15,160 --> 00:34:17,839
Speaker 2: fairly heavily, but it's one of the other areas where

644
00:34:18,239 --> 00:34:20,480
Speaker 2: the rationale for why I made decisions and when I

645
00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:23,880
Speaker 2: made decisions. I've never seen that level of scrutiny outside

646
00:34:23,960 --> 00:34:26,600
Speaker 2: of the CT space. And the difference between a good

647
00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:29,040
Speaker 2: CT operator and a bad one is one that makes

648
00:34:29,080 --> 00:34:33,440
Speaker 2: good decisions in poor environments. And what we did is

649
00:34:33,440 --> 00:34:37,480
Speaker 2: we developed a framework that would help us to enhance

650
00:34:37,520 --> 00:34:42,120
Speaker 2: our decision making process and also protect us when that occurred.

651
00:34:42,360 --> 00:34:44,799
Speaker 2: So what we did, we're speaking of our colleagues from

652
00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:47,880
Speaker 2: London met and there was a senior officer there and

653
00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:52,040
Speaker 2: a couple of years ago, a decade or so ago,

654
00:34:52,560 --> 00:34:55,400
Speaker 2: after the Seven seven bombings, they received information that there

655
00:34:55,440 --> 00:34:58,880
Speaker 2: was another terrorist attack about to occur and that a

656
00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:02,080
Speaker 2: surveillance team and as a suspect ward act walked out

657
00:35:02,120 --> 00:35:06,440
Speaker 2: of the premises, had a striking appearance to the suspect

658
00:35:06,480 --> 00:35:08,560
Speaker 2: that had been nominated was about to do a terrorist attack.

659
00:35:09,120 --> 00:35:11,840
Speaker 2: He clocked that he was being surveiled and then decamped.

660
00:35:12,960 --> 00:35:16,000
Speaker 2: The police gave Chase, asked for the order and the

661
00:35:16,040 --> 00:35:18,279
Speaker 2: person was shot in fear that he was about to

662
00:35:18,320 --> 00:35:21,759
Speaker 2: do another terrorist attack on the London submember.

663
00:35:21,800 --> 00:35:22,040
Speaker 1: There.

664
00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:27,680
Speaker 2: Now, in this instance, this individual was innocent. This is

665
00:35:27,719 --> 00:35:32,040
Speaker 2: a horrendous act, a tragic set of circumstances. But we

666
00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:33,640
Speaker 2: spoke to the police and they told us about their

667
00:35:33,640 --> 00:35:37,319
Speaker 2: decision making model. It was but when you looked at

668
00:35:37,360 --> 00:35:42,000
Speaker 2: all the circumstances, it was a good decision with a

669
00:35:42,040 --> 00:35:43,520
Speaker 2: bad outcome. If that makes sense.

670
00:35:43,760 --> 00:35:46,799
Speaker 1: It does make sense, Dave, and I do understand what

671
00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:49,840
Speaker 1: you're saying and the level that you're talking at encounter terrorism,

672
00:35:49,840 --> 00:35:53,480
Speaker 1: but that was the same with homicide. I make decisions.

673
00:35:54,280 --> 00:35:57,520
Speaker 1: They are always informed decisions. The decisions I made, and

674
00:35:57,560 --> 00:35:59,759
Speaker 1: I could justify it because I could be sure as

675
00:35:59,760 --> 00:36:01,879
Speaker 1: hell I'd be in the witness box five years down

676
00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:04,000
Speaker 1: the track or so. There'd be some inquiry, why did

677
00:36:04,040 --> 00:36:06,160
Speaker 1: you do this? Why did you do that? And the

678
00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:07,480
Speaker 1: same would have to apply.

679
00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:11,879
Speaker 2: And a good decision doesn't always meet a greater name. No,

680
00:36:12,120 --> 00:36:14,160
Speaker 2: that's and that's that's what you've got to and you've

681
00:36:14,160 --> 00:36:16,680
Speaker 2: got to appreciate that. Yeah, that I could make the

682
00:36:16,680 --> 00:36:20,120
Speaker 2: world's best decision with a terrible outcome, that's the luck

683
00:36:20,160 --> 00:36:20,480
Speaker 2: of the draw.

684
00:36:20,719 --> 00:36:22,640
Speaker 1: We were looking at a group of a group of

685
00:36:22,680 --> 00:36:26,640
Speaker 1: people that contract killers and they ended up when we're

686
00:36:26,640 --> 00:36:30,759
Speaker 1: looking they've killed someone someone else. But I'm comfortable with

687
00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:33,000
Speaker 1: all the decisions that were made based on the information

688
00:36:33,040 --> 00:36:34,560
Speaker 1: that we had at the time. The hindsight, it's a

689
00:36:34,600 --> 00:36:36,680
Speaker 1: wonderful benefit that.

690
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:37,600
Speaker 2: You don't have that don't have that luxury.

691
00:36:37,640 --> 00:36:40,360
Speaker 1: You don't don't have that luxury, So I can understand,

692
00:36:40,480 --> 00:36:43,440
Speaker 1: but it is crucial Jesus. I wouldn't want to be

693
00:36:43,960 --> 00:36:46,240
Speaker 1: I wouldn't want to be the person that ignored something

694
00:36:46,360 --> 00:36:48,840
Speaker 1: a red flag and you just flicked at nothing.

695
00:36:48,640 --> 00:36:51,239
Speaker 2: To see d And that's that's that's the way. That's

696
00:36:51,239 --> 00:36:52,600
Speaker 2: the burden upon ct.

697
00:36:53,640 --> 00:36:56,399
Speaker 1: I see it, I feel it, And yeah, how did

698
00:36:56,640 --> 00:36:59,560
Speaker 1: you lasted probably as long as anyone has in that field,

699
00:36:59,800 --> 00:37:01,720
Speaker 1: how did you manage that burden?

700
00:37:01,760 --> 00:37:05,480
Speaker 2: Because look, it's not an easy it's not easy. And

701
00:37:05,520 --> 00:37:08,520
Speaker 2: then that would probably one would suggests had something to

702
00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:13,879
Speaker 2: do with my retirement. But it's it's a constant. You're

703
00:37:13,960 --> 00:37:18,439
Speaker 2: always on and you're seeking professional help. You're seeing spike

704
00:37:18,520 --> 00:37:21,719
Speaker 2: psychologists and others to go how do we manage the

705
00:37:21,760 --> 00:37:25,200
Speaker 2: burden we're under Because here's a burden of expectations you're

706
00:37:25,239 --> 00:37:27,279
Speaker 2: not going to fail. It's the Americans call it a

707
00:37:27,400 --> 00:37:32,280
Speaker 2: zero fail operation. Now that's aspirational because if we accept

708
00:37:32,560 --> 00:37:35,880
Speaker 2: that terrorism is a crime, we haven't stopped any crime

709
00:37:35,920 --> 00:37:38,239
Speaker 2: type yet, so the perception that we're going to be

710
00:37:38,280 --> 00:37:42,760
Speaker 2: able to stop terrorism is just unrealistic. So that burden,

711
00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:45,520
Speaker 2: and what we do is that we reverse the burden

712
00:37:46,040 --> 00:37:49,319
Speaker 2: of responsibility again on our operators, so that we know

713
00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:51,799
Speaker 2: that if we fail, we will be held accountable. And

714
00:37:51,920 --> 00:37:54,560
Speaker 2: that really starts ratching it up, and that makes for

715
00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:57,000
Speaker 2: an unhealthy environment. That's the nature of the beast.

716
00:37:57,560 --> 00:37:59,640
Speaker 1: How do you I would imagine how when I was

717
00:37:59,719 --> 00:38:01,799
Speaker 1: under pressure, I tried to share the pressure in that

718
00:38:01,880 --> 00:38:05,239
Speaker 1: getting having people having these briefings, not just briefings where

719
00:38:05,239 --> 00:38:07,920
Speaker 1: you're seeing down having a coffee for no reason, getting

720
00:38:07,960 --> 00:38:11,279
Speaker 1: everyone's thoughts. So when you make that decision, you've got

721
00:38:11,320 --> 00:38:13,440
Speaker 1: all the information. If you're the boss, you happen to

722
00:38:13,480 --> 00:38:15,160
Speaker 1: be the one that's got to sign off on it,

723
00:38:15,200 --> 00:38:18,200
Speaker 1: you make the final decision. That I found it helped

724
00:38:18,200 --> 00:38:21,160
Speaker 1: me in the pressure spots where at least I've sought

725
00:38:21,600 --> 00:38:24,680
Speaker 1: counsel or other people's views and then take it all

726
00:38:24,680 --> 00:38:25,960
Speaker 1: in and then sit with my.

727
00:38:25,960 --> 00:38:28,080
Speaker 2: Decision, so that we go back to threat ownership there,

728
00:38:28,440 --> 00:38:30,960
Speaker 2: and so we're in a multi agency approach, you know,

729
00:38:31,120 --> 00:38:32,719
Speaker 2: we'd have to sit there in a room and go,

730
00:38:33,280 --> 00:38:35,640
Speaker 2: do you have any more information? And then so that's

731
00:38:35,680 --> 00:38:37,319
Speaker 2: what we've got, and we'd have to document that so

732
00:38:37,480 --> 00:38:40,080
Speaker 2: we could say at this point in time that this

733
00:38:40,239 --> 00:38:42,920
Speaker 2: decision is made, this is what we know. So if

734
00:38:42,960 --> 00:38:45,520
Speaker 2: that changes so another So let's say an agency comes

735
00:38:45,520 --> 00:38:47,239
Speaker 2: back later and says, oh, We've forgot to tell you

736
00:38:47,239 --> 00:38:49,160
Speaker 2: about this, or that wasn't on the that wasn't on

737
00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:51,759
Speaker 2: the table. So we can only do what we can.

738
00:38:52,520 --> 00:38:55,000
Speaker 2: It's not a perfect model, but given the dynamic nature,

739
00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:57,719
Speaker 2: it's the only way that will work. And so that's

740
00:38:57,920 --> 00:39:01,200
Speaker 2: that corroboration with your colleagues and teams, and that's when

741
00:39:01,760 --> 00:39:05,200
Speaker 2: the beauty of joint agencies come together. And whilst they're

742
00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:10,080
Speaker 2: challenging working with other agencies, the operational benefits and efficiencies

743
00:39:10,719 --> 00:39:12,200
Speaker 2: outstrip the challenges.

744
00:39:12,280 --> 00:39:15,520
Speaker 1: Yeah, well probably more so than any sort of law enforcement.

745
00:39:15,560 --> 00:39:18,120
Speaker 1: The counter terrorism has to work with all those other agencies.

746
00:39:18,480 --> 00:39:21,879
Speaker 1: So yeah, I've heard the wines come out with this

747
00:39:21,880 --> 00:39:26,040
Speaker 1: person working with that person, but it's ne that this

748
00:39:26,160 --> 00:39:31,080
Speaker 1: environment just the other way. Hey, guys, have you ever

749
00:39:31,120 --> 00:39:33,440
Speaker 1: wondered what goes on behind the headlines of a gang

750
00:39:33,480 --> 00:39:36,240
Speaker 1: war or shooting? Then you need to listen to crim City.

751
00:39:36,680 --> 00:39:39,920
Speaker 1: Join crime reporters Mark Murray and Josh Hamrahan as they

752
00:39:40,040 --> 00:39:43,440
Speaker 1: uncover the details of crimes unfolding on Sydney streets and

753
00:39:43,440 --> 00:39:46,200
Speaker 1: share the stories that don't make the papers. The latest

754
00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:49,040
Speaker 1: season of crim City is out now. Listen early and

755
00:39:49,080 --> 00:39:52,320
Speaker 1: ad free on Crime x plus on Apple Podcasts Today.

756
00:39:53,200 --> 00:39:56,280
Speaker 1: Do you think we're set up well for our counter

757
00:39:56,440 --> 00:39:58,799
Speaker 1: terrorism investigation in this country? So?

758
00:39:59,280 --> 00:40:01,839
Speaker 2: I do. When I left, one of my major roles

759
00:40:01,920 --> 00:40:06,400
Speaker 2: was training and development. When we saw opportunities, we took it.

760
00:40:06,480 --> 00:40:09,160
Speaker 2: We endeavored to train as many people as we could

761
00:40:09,200 --> 00:40:12,600
Speaker 2: and upskill them as best we could. So I'm aware

762
00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:14,640
Speaker 2: that people have taken over my role since I've left.

763
00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:17,120
Speaker 2: I have every confidence in their abilities. These are really

764
00:40:17,160 --> 00:40:20,120
Speaker 2: good operators. Yeah, and they believe in the cause. They

765
00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:23,799
Speaker 2: believe in stopping terrorism public safety. So I think, yeah,

766
00:40:23,840 --> 00:40:25,040
Speaker 2: we are in a good place.

767
00:40:24,840 --> 00:40:27,760
Speaker 1: And you've got to have that time. Like this rotation

768
00:40:27,880 --> 00:40:30,440
Speaker 1: policy that they bought in, I never agreed with it

769
00:40:30,520 --> 00:40:33,560
Speaker 1: or understood that be in New South Wales, police, like homicide,

770
00:40:33,600 --> 00:40:36,080
Speaker 1: I learned something every day, but I think in counter

771
00:40:36,160 --> 00:40:39,760
Speaker 1: terrorism you can't replace years and years of experience.

772
00:40:39,440 --> 00:40:41,920
Speaker 2: And nor should we. We need to tap into that

773
00:40:42,160 --> 00:40:46,319
Speaker 2: and realize that, you know, it's the lessons you learned

774
00:40:46,320 --> 00:40:49,279
Speaker 2: from ten years ago are applicable today. You know, it

775
00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:53,319
Speaker 2: takes you years before you've become just understanding the dynamics

776
00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:56,319
Speaker 2: of the different cultures that are involved takes a long

777
00:40:56,360 --> 00:40:59,120
Speaker 2: time to appreciate, and then putting that within a criminal

778
00:40:59,440 --> 00:41:05,200
Speaker 2: framework and an intelligence framework. It's incredibly complicated. So I

779
00:41:05,239 --> 00:41:10,680
Speaker 2: don't understand the rotation policy. It's it's inefficient to the process.

780
00:41:10,680 --> 00:41:12,279
Speaker 2: And I think that's one of the filings in a

781
00:41:12,360 --> 00:41:15,319
Speaker 2: number of agencies that rotate people through to simply go

782
00:41:16,160 --> 00:41:19,239
Speaker 2: to get on the CV. My CVS done, I've done

783
00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:23,560
Speaker 2: ct You know that's crazy. There should be consideration that

784
00:41:23,600 --> 00:41:25,399
Speaker 2: it is a career path and if you go down

785
00:41:25,440 --> 00:41:27,680
Speaker 2: that path, you're a specialist. That's where you go. And

786
00:41:28,080 --> 00:41:31,680
Speaker 2: you know, rather than punishing specialists, we should be encouraging it.

787
00:41:32,160 --> 00:41:34,920
Speaker 1: One hundred percent, Dave, And I'm comfortable I think we've

788
00:41:34,960 --> 00:41:37,680
Speaker 1: both the right to talk about that and offer an

789
00:41:37,680 --> 00:41:40,360
Speaker 1: opinion or that I'm going to offer another opinion that

790
00:41:40,400 --> 00:41:42,600
Speaker 1: the risk of embarrassing you and probably getting this both

791
00:41:42,640 --> 00:41:46,279
Speaker 1: in the trouble or someone will winch this book. I've

792
00:41:46,320 --> 00:41:49,560
Speaker 1: read it. I'm experienced major crime investigator. I know the

793
00:41:49,640 --> 00:41:52,080
Speaker 1: value of something like that. I understand the world that

794
00:41:52,080 --> 00:41:56,800
Speaker 1: you're operating. Why hasn't this been purchased for every officer?

795
00:41:56,960 --> 00:41:58,600
Speaker 1: And this is not You're not going to get you

796
00:41:58,640 --> 00:42:00,719
Speaker 1: in the trouble here, Dave, But I saying that this

797
00:42:00,760 --> 00:42:03,120
Speaker 1: has just come up in my thought process, not Dave,

798
00:42:03,160 --> 00:42:06,239
Speaker 1: And he certainly didn't ask me to spook his book.

799
00:42:06,840 --> 00:42:09,400
Speaker 1: But it seems like I must read. If you're going

800
00:42:09,400 --> 00:42:11,399
Speaker 1: to if you're going to turn an answer yet, let

801
00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:14,200
Speaker 1: me get in the trouble, then you can answer. If

802
00:42:14,239 --> 00:42:16,799
Speaker 1: you're going to work in counter terrorism, you have to

803
00:42:16,840 --> 00:42:18,200
Speaker 1: read this book. Have to.

804
00:42:18,880 --> 00:42:23,040
Speaker 2: Well, thanks, I'm glad you read it. I find it.

805
00:42:23,040 --> 00:42:24,600
Speaker 2: It can be a little bit TEENI because there's a

806
00:42:24,600 --> 00:42:27,480
Speaker 2: lot of details, but no, thank you for those comments.

807
00:42:27,520 --> 00:42:29,520
Speaker 2: And look, and that's what it's written for. It's written

808
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:33,600
Speaker 2: for to increase the knowledge of both the private sector

809
00:42:33,640 --> 00:42:37,000
Speaker 2: and public sector, and that's the authorities, that's police. Look,

810
00:42:37,320 --> 00:42:40,520
Speaker 2: you know there's application here in this book. So if

811
00:42:40,560 --> 00:42:43,400
Speaker 2: I'm working for, say education, we see if we're talking

812
00:42:43,440 --> 00:42:47,359
Speaker 2: about children and juveniles in the current environment, Well, they're

813
00:42:47,400 --> 00:42:51,239
Speaker 2: at schools. Therefore there's indicators there that we should be

814
00:42:51,239 --> 00:42:55,200
Speaker 2: aware of. I'm looking at potential flags. If I'm working

815
00:42:55,239 --> 00:42:59,200
Speaker 2: for a corporation where they have mass gatherings, there's information

816
00:42:59,320 --> 00:43:02,200
Speaker 2: there that can this. Then you know that it does

817
00:43:02,320 --> 00:43:04,640
Speaker 2: have some things in there for practical application. It has

818
00:43:04,680 --> 00:43:07,840
Speaker 2: been written for it to be practically applied, because again,

819
00:43:08,000 --> 00:43:09,759
Speaker 2: I want it to be useful. I didn't want it

820
00:43:09,800 --> 00:43:10,040
Speaker 2: to be.

821
00:43:11,719 --> 00:43:14,600
Speaker 1: It's not the academic waffle that you lose interesting. It's

822
00:43:14,640 --> 00:43:17,279
Speaker 1: practical and it's it's something that you can use and

823
00:43:17,440 --> 00:43:21,040
Speaker 1: knowledge is power, and having that knowledge it hardens the

824
00:43:21,120 --> 00:43:25,160
Speaker 1: target if everyone has has this type of knowledge. But no,

825
00:43:25,320 --> 00:43:28,319
Speaker 1: I just asked us that, and I'm not trying to

826
00:43:28,360 --> 00:43:30,200
Speaker 1: cause problems for you, and you haven't come on to

827
00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:33,040
Speaker 1: promote this book. But why the hell aren't everyone reading

828
00:43:33,080 --> 00:43:35,279
Speaker 1: that if they're working in counter terrorism? I think I

829
00:43:35,320 --> 00:43:38,359
Speaker 1: think it's a good book. Let's drift back to you now, Dave.

830
00:43:38,520 --> 00:43:41,040
Speaker 1: You look back at your career. Are you glad you

831
00:43:41,280 --> 00:43:43,080
Speaker 1: discovered counter terrorism? Oh?

832
00:43:43,120 --> 00:43:48,799
Speaker 2: Look, it's it's been It's a passion and look to

833
00:43:48,920 --> 00:43:53,239
Speaker 2: work in that environment with some incredibly talented people dedicated.

834
00:43:53,960 --> 00:43:56,920
Speaker 2: So you've spoke with Peter, We spoke at you know, Moroni,

835
00:43:57,280 --> 00:43:59,280
Speaker 2: you know all the people that he would have mentioned,

836
00:43:59,280 --> 00:44:03,560
Speaker 2: we have worked with, our colleagues that we've worked with. Yeah, look,

837
00:44:03,600 --> 00:44:07,600
Speaker 2: see T it is one of those It's like homicide.

838
00:44:08,200 --> 00:44:10,560
Speaker 2: You get involved and it becomes a passion and you

839
00:44:10,640 --> 00:44:16,000
Speaker 2: want to better the profession and ce T unfortunately is

840
00:44:16,040 --> 00:44:18,480
Speaker 2: just bigger than the police. It is in every aspect

841
00:44:18,520 --> 00:44:21,759
Speaker 2: of our lives now. It's you know, it's in the

842
00:44:21,880 --> 00:44:25,560
Speaker 2: tertiary factor sector, it's in government sectors, it's in the

843
00:44:25,600 --> 00:44:30,320
Speaker 2: private sector, it's in travel, you know, transport, in every aspect,

844
00:44:30,880 --> 00:44:34,480
Speaker 2: this unfortunately is coming to be and that's where that

845
00:44:34,560 --> 00:44:37,880
Speaker 2: whole of community needs to embrace it because everyone can

846
00:44:37,920 --> 00:44:41,400
Speaker 2: be exposed to it and so hopefully a little bit

847
00:44:41,440 --> 00:44:44,000
Speaker 2: of knowledge, a little bit of information might help us

848
00:44:44,000 --> 00:44:44,560
Speaker 2: along the one.

849
00:44:45,000 --> 00:44:47,440
Speaker 1: And I say this, to work in the field like that,

850
00:44:47,560 --> 00:44:50,680
Speaker 1: and you know the way I work homicide, you've got

851
00:44:50,719 --> 00:44:52,839
Speaker 1: to be passionate about the field that you're working in.

852
00:44:52,960 --> 00:44:56,200
Speaker 1: And you can't do count the terrorism just half in,

853
00:44:56,280 --> 00:44:59,239
Speaker 1: half out. You've got to full fully commit and look,

854
00:44:59,520 --> 00:45:01,880
Speaker 1: I look at you, how you've changed from the day

855
00:45:01,920 --> 00:45:04,279
Speaker 1: of Gore on you. Jesus, what's happened.

856
00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:05,960
Speaker 2: To you day? I'm a happy guy.

857
00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:09,640
Speaker 1: You've just gone into this completely. You've absorbed yourself into

858
00:45:09,680 --> 00:45:11,520
Speaker 1: this world. And full credit to you. I know the

859
00:45:11,520 --> 00:45:14,000
Speaker 1: sacrifices you make to do that in a career that

860
00:45:14,600 --> 00:45:15,520
Speaker 1: it needs to be done.

861
00:45:15,840 --> 00:45:17,399
Speaker 2: It's one of these. So when you get to work

862
00:45:17,440 --> 00:45:21,359
Speaker 2: with members of the security intelligence, Look, it's different from

863
00:45:21,440 --> 00:45:25,600
Speaker 2: law enforcement, and our relationships are different, and you know,

864
00:45:25,880 --> 00:45:29,839
Speaker 2: there's it becomes difficult because you've got certain obligations. There's

865
00:45:29,920 --> 00:45:32,600
Speaker 2: legal obligations honest about what we can and can't say.

866
00:45:33,200 --> 00:45:36,719
Speaker 2: There's operational security. There's a lot of things that come

867
00:45:36,719 --> 00:45:38,680
Speaker 2: into play and that you've got to protect not only

868
00:45:38,680 --> 00:45:43,960
Speaker 2: yourself but your other agency members. It's intense. So again

869
00:45:44,239 --> 00:45:46,239
Speaker 2: I think I spoke that at any one time, we'd

870
00:45:46,280 --> 00:45:49,520
Speaker 2: have ten to twenty threats running at anyone times when

871
00:45:49,560 --> 00:45:52,399
Speaker 2: I go to bed. For the last twenty years, there

872
00:45:52,400 --> 00:45:55,319
Speaker 2: were streats and the first thing in the morning, I'm

873
00:45:55,320 --> 00:45:58,439
Speaker 2: hearing the news, waiting for the bad news so that

874
00:45:58,520 --> 00:46:01,080
Speaker 2: doesn't go away and come and go. Now, what people

875
00:46:01,080 --> 00:46:04,400
Speaker 2: don't understand is the majority of the streatch dissipate, so

876
00:46:05,200 --> 00:46:07,120
Speaker 2: very few will get through to fruition that we actually

877
00:46:07,120 --> 00:46:09,680
Speaker 2: lock people up, so we have to act reasonably and

878
00:46:09,760 --> 00:46:12,040
Speaker 2: due diligence. A lot of them go, but you can't

879
00:46:12,080 --> 00:46:15,560
Speaker 2: bank on that. You've got to run each down, each rabbitile.

880
00:46:15,120 --> 00:46:17,920
Speaker 1: You sit on it, and the success is if it

881
00:46:18,000 --> 00:46:21,880
Speaker 1: doesn't happen. Whereas yeah, so our measure you would be

882
00:46:22,120 --> 00:46:24,480
Speaker 1: I would imagine you carry that purdon a lot because

883
00:46:24,600 --> 00:46:26,759
Speaker 1: you know, if you're not getting a result, it's just

884
00:46:27,040 --> 00:46:28,080
Speaker 1: more pressure, more pressure.

885
00:46:28,120 --> 00:46:30,799
Speaker 2: So our measure of success was every day we didn't

886
00:46:30,800 --> 00:46:33,439
Speaker 2: appear in the media, that's a successful day for CT.

887
00:46:33,680 --> 00:46:36,720
Speaker 2: That was our thought process. So we didn't court the media.

888
00:46:36,840 --> 00:46:39,320
Speaker 2: We wanted to avoid the media, and that was the process.

889
00:46:39,320 --> 00:46:42,560
Speaker 1: We had the work work behind the scenes that keep

890
00:46:42,560 --> 00:46:45,640
Speaker 1: the streets safe. Do I know in homicide like we

891
00:46:45,719 --> 00:46:48,640
Speaker 1: had to see a psychologists every six months or twelve

892
00:46:48,640 --> 00:46:50,959
Speaker 1: months or whatever it was. Do they have the same

893
00:46:51,040 --> 00:46:52,040
Speaker 1: thing on offer for you guys?

894
00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:56,239
Speaker 2: So look we look So what we did, so I'll

895
00:46:56,280 --> 00:47:02,480
Speaker 2: go back to pandemics. We retre eaved four terrorbytes of

896
00:47:02,600 --> 00:47:06,600
Speaker 2: extremist material. Now that is insane, Like this is this

897
00:47:07,400 --> 00:47:11,560
Speaker 2: is just insane material, and unfortunately we have to go

898
00:47:11,640 --> 00:47:14,239
Speaker 2: through that. Of course there could be evidence of other offenses,

899
00:47:14,600 --> 00:47:18,759
Speaker 2: of other criminalities, of new plots, so unfortunately someone has

900
00:47:18,800 --> 00:47:20,440
Speaker 2: to go through that. And we had a team of

901
00:47:21,440 --> 00:47:24,480
Speaker 2: ten people six to twelve months going through this material.

902
00:47:24,960 --> 00:47:28,319
Speaker 2: Now I was blase, and this is something that I

903
00:47:28,440 --> 00:47:32,040
Speaker 2: look that my people were becoming sick, they're becoming unwell,

904
00:47:32,040 --> 00:47:34,520
Speaker 2: and I couldn't figure it out. And then I spent

905
00:47:34,560 --> 00:47:36,160
Speaker 2: some time looking at these videos and I got it

906
00:47:36,280 --> 00:47:39,560
Speaker 2: that we were damaging our people in the room and

907
00:47:39,600 --> 00:47:42,759
Speaker 2: they're looking at horrendously and so we had to develop processes.

908
00:47:42,920 --> 00:47:45,200
Speaker 2: So we got the sychs in and we developed processes

909
00:47:45,200 --> 00:47:47,120
Speaker 2: that we still have to view it, but how do

910
00:47:47,160 --> 00:47:49,680
Speaker 2: we minimize the danger and that this isn't being taken home,

911
00:47:49,880 --> 00:47:52,120
Speaker 2: this is not impacting on their family life. So we

912
00:47:52,239 --> 00:47:55,240
Speaker 2: brought in psychometric tests, We brought in those regular council

913
00:47:55,760 --> 00:47:58,440
Speaker 2: We brought in little tricks of the trade where we

914
00:47:58,480 --> 00:48:00,840
Speaker 2: allow people to you know, they could only see it

915
00:48:00,880 --> 00:48:02,440
Speaker 2: for the first couple of hours of the day and

916
00:48:02,440 --> 00:48:06,799
Speaker 2: then be engaged another duty. So yeah, so we've tried

917
00:48:06,840 --> 00:48:08,120
Speaker 2: to put all these strategies, but at the end of

918
00:48:08,160 --> 00:48:12,000
Speaker 2: the day, it's harmful material. It's a hazard's workplace, and

919
00:48:12,160 --> 00:48:14,360
Speaker 2: that's one of the I suppose one of the rubs.

920
00:48:14,440 --> 00:48:17,000
Speaker 2: We have to look at it and it does damage you.

921
00:48:17,040 --> 00:48:19,200
Speaker 2: So it's that dancing out where we try to minimize that,

922
00:48:19,239 --> 00:48:21,719
Speaker 2: but there's no other way around it. We have to

923
00:48:21,800 --> 00:48:23,640
Speaker 2: view the material to see if there's evidence there.

924
00:48:23,680 --> 00:48:25,680
Speaker 1: No, it's a tough gig. What are you doing since

925
00:48:25,719 --> 00:48:28,480
Speaker 1: you've left the place, You've been doing some work.

926
00:48:29,440 --> 00:48:33,440
Speaker 2: So look, when I left, I hooked up with our

927
00:48:33,480 --> 00:48:38,560
Speaker 2: old compadre, mister Countess. I went and gave work for

928
00:48:38,600 --> 00:48:40,839
Speaker 2: him on a contract for twelve months with the Royal

929
00:48:40,840 --> 00:48:43,000
Speaker 2: Commission into Defense and Veteran sour Side.

930
00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:46,759
Speaker 1: That's another heavy look look important thing.

931
00:48:47,520 --> 00:48:53,520
Speaker 2: It's important work. What a challenging environment and the team

932
00:48:53,600 --> 00:48:58,600
Speaker 2: that nick you know, the commissioners Peggy Brown and James Douglas,

933
00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:03,360
Speaker 2: fantastic commissioners doing wonderful work that I think addresses a

934
00:49:03,440 --> 00:49:06,200
Speaker 2: national tragedy. I was happy to be part of that process.

935
00:49:06,640 --> 00:49:09,400
Speaker 2: I only gave a small piece of work, but I

936
00:49:09,440 --> 00:49:12,160
Speaker 2: wish them have success. They're in the process of finalizing

937
00:49:12,160 --> 00:49:15,840
Speaker 2: the report and making the recommendations and I fully support

938
00:49:15,840 --> 00:49:17,880
Speaker 2: the recommendations and the work that's come out because it

939
00:49:17,960 --> 00:49:20,160
Speaker 2: is something that needs to be looked at and supported.

940
00:49:20,280 --> 00:49:22,840
Speaker 2: So that was twelve last twelve months.

941
00:49:22,600 --> 00:49:25,040
Speaker 1: Okay, okay, and the rest of the time you're just

942
00:49:25,080 --> 00:49:26,880
Speaker 1: at home supporting Fienna.

943
00:49:26,640 --> 00:49:29,759
Speaker 2: Well putting my good wife. But look what I have done.

944
00:49:30,040 --> 00:49:32,840
Speaker 2: Look a very good colleague of mine and yours. Kroenin

945
00:49:32,920 --> 00:49:37,080
Speaker 2: oh Ed your chief inspective. Karen also is another ct

946
00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:41,920
Speaker 2: NERD and she identified and talking about victim centric approach.

947
00:49:42,520 --> 00:49:45,239
Speaker 2: There's you know, if you remember about twenty five to

948
00:49:45,280 --> 00:49:48,920
Speaker 2: thirty years ago, Martha Jabor set up a group called

949
00:49:48,920 --> 00:49:52,040
Speaker 2: the Victims of Homicide Support GRIP, and they do wonderful work.

950
00:49:52,040 --> 00:49:55,200
Speaker 2: And Martha has been a trojan of taking that forward.

951
00:49:55,520 --> 00:49:57,880
Speaker 2: And we see in the establishment of other support groups.

952
00:49:58,520 --> 00:50:01,040
Speaker 2: Now we've recognized that terrorism is a crime, but it's

953
00:50:01,040 --> 00:50:03,600
Speaker 2: a unique crime and there's a lot of unique characteristics,

954
00:50:04,000 --> 00:50:06,759
Speaker 2: and there is no group that support these people that

955
00:50:06,800 --> 00:50:11,880
Speaker 2: are victims, you know, that experienced this. So I'm working

956
00:50:11,880 --> 00:50:15,000
Speaker 2: with Carolyn in the establishment of Victims of Terrorism Support Group,

957
00:50:15,239 --> 00:50:20,279
Speaker 2: which hopefully we'll get up and running in August. And look,

958
00:50:20,320 --> 00:50:22,799
Speaker 2: that is I think is beneficial. I think that there

959
00:50:22,880 --> 00:50:25,080
Speaker 2: is a benefit there. There is a gap that we

960
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:29,000
Speaker 2: need to support these people and it's something that Carolyn

961
00:50:29,040 --> 00:50:30,239
Speaker 2: and I are very passionate about.

962
00:50:30,480 --> 00:50:33,880
Speaker 1: And there's like Australian victims overseas of terrorism too, so

963
00:50:33,960 --> 00:50:36,960
Speaker 1: you've got the families over here. Yeah, I think that's worthwhile.

964
00:50:37,160 --> 00:50:40,520
Speaker 2: It's amazing. I've spoken to people, you know that we're

965
00:50:40,600 --> 00:50:44,560
Speaker 2: overseas and have witnessed terrorist attacks and they've come home

966
00:50:44,560 --> 00:50:47,359
Speaker 2: and never spoken to anyone. And I've sat down next

967
00:50:47,360 --> 00:50:48,600
Speaker 2: to them and they say, what do you do And

968
00:50:48,680 --> 00:50:52,759
Speaker 2: I tell them I'm in CT And next they become

969
00:50:53,320 --> 00:50:57,000
Speaker 2: emotionally upset because they start reliving the experience and they've

970
00:50:57,000 --> 00:50:58,480
Speaker 2: had no support and they've had to do it on

971
00:50:58,520 --> 00:51:01,120
Speaker 2: their own and that we shouldn't be, that we're better

972
00:51:01,160 --> 00:51:04,239
Speaker 2: than that. So the opportunity to support them, I think

973
00:51:04,280 --> 00:51:04,760
Speaker 2: is wonderful.

974
00:51:04,800 --> 00:51:07,920
Speaker 1: Yeah. Well, again, it's an evolving process that we've got

975
00:51:07,920 --> 00:51:09,240
Speaker 1: to understand this new thing.

976
00:51:09,200 --> 00:51:12,440
Speaker 2: Well maturing and so like we do that now for

977
00:51:12,480 --> 00:51:16,600
Speaker 2: traffic trauma, and we're seeing how that actually supporting these

978
00:51:16,640 --> 00:51:19,320
Speaker 2: people helps them and then helps us in the future.

979
00:51:19,480 --> 00:51:22,280
Speaker 2: That victim centric approach, which is I think the direction

980
00:51:22,360 --> 00:51:24,000
Speaker 2: we need to start adding towards.

981
00:51:23,760 --> 00:51:27,160
Speaker 1: Okay, good stuff. Well, Dave, you've you've upskilled me and

982
00:51:27,280 --> 00:51:31,160
Speaker 1: educated me and you've taken up my weekend reading your book.

983
00:51:31,239 --> 00:51:32,440
Speaker 2: But sorry about that.

984
00:51:32,880 --> 00:51:37,759
Speaker 1: I appreciate it. I'm thinking this is our David. It's

985
00:51:38,920 --> 00:51:41,239
Speaker 1: a detailed rude, but it's a common sense and a

986
00:51:41,239 --> 00:51:44,640
Speaker 1: practical thing, which I like it. You're not lost in

987
00:51:44,680 --> 00:51:46,440
Speaker 1: the academic well, we've still got a little bit of

988
00:51:46,520 --> 00:51:50,279
Speaker 1: your back in the major crime squad, detective. But I

989
00:51:50,360 --> 00:51:52,560
Speaker 1: just want to all jokes aside, thank you for the

990
00:51:52,600 --> 00:51:55,200
Speaker 1: work that you've done. I know the price that you've paid.

991
00:51:55,440 --> 00:51:57,880
Speaker 1: I'm doing the type of work that you've done, and

992
00:51:57,920 --> 00:52:01,440
Speaker 1: the results that you guys do don't often get recognized,

993
00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:03,640
Speaker 1: and it's a team approach. I'm not just talking about

994
00:52:03,640 --> 00:52:06,400
Speaker 1: you individually. You don't get recognized because it doesn't hit

995
00:52:06,440 --> 00:52:10,040
Speaker 1: the media because something's been prevented. So I'm just saying

996
00:52:10,040 --> 00:52:12,279
Speaker 1: to you, thanks for how hard you're working, and thanks

997
00:52:12,280 --> 00:52:13,760
Speaker 1: for coming on my catch killers.

998
00:52:13,840 --> 00:52:15,439
Speaker 2: It's been a pleasure, and thank you for your time.

999
00:52:15,760 --> 00:52:22,040
Speaker 1: Cheers, dope. It's really good catching up with an old friend.

1000
00:52:22,080 --> 00:52:23,920
Speaker 1: We sort of lost touch when he was working in

1001
00:52:23,960 --> 00:52:26,759
Speaker 1: the world of counter terrorism. But doctor Dave Gore, I

1002
00:52:26,800 --> 00:52:29,160
Speaker 1: knew him as well. I knew him as Detective soon

1003
00:52:29,200 --> 00:52:31,680
Speaker 1: you're comfortable when we both started working together, and then

1004
00:52:32,080 --> 00:52:35,360
Speaker 1: detective Chief Inspector. But now he's doctor Dave gall and

1005
00:52:36,080 --> 00:52:38,440
Speaker 1: really is an expert in the field of counter terrorism.

1006
00:52:38,480 --> 00:52:41,520
Speaker 1: I enjoyed the chat and enjoyed reading his book. I

1007
00:52:41,520 --> 00:52:43,640
Speaker 1: think it's a must for anyone that wants to involve

1008
00:52:43,719 --> 00:52:47,040
Speaker 1: themselves in the investigation of counter terrorism. And as you know,

1009
00:52:47,200 --> 00:52:49,040
Speaker 1: I always liked talking to X Cop, so it was

1010
00:52:49,080 --> 00:52:49,880
Speaker 1: good catching up