WEBVTT - Optus: when offshoring goes horribly wrong 

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<v Speaker 1>From The Australian. Here's what's on the front. I'm Claire Harvey.

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<v Speaker 1>It's Tuesday, novemberfore twenty twenty five. Sixty four percent of

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<v Speaker 1>Australians say they want fewer immigrants to come to this country,

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<v Speaker 1>and the sentiment is spread across all age groups. As

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<v Speaker 1>support bleeds from the Coalition to Paul Enhnson's One Nation

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<v Speaker 1>and Our Big Cities Sea anti immigration rallies. A new

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<v Speaker 1>news poll shows widespread anxiety about the volume of Labour's intake.

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<v Speaker 1>That exclusive is live now at the Australian dot Com.

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<v Speaker 1>Dou Senior heads will roll at Optus over September's fatal

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<v Speaker 1>triple O outage, Just not yet. That's the takeout from

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<v Speaker 1>a Senate inquiry into the three deaths, including a baby,

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<v Speaker 1>that resulted when emergency calls failed after the telco botched

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<v Speaker 1>a routine network upgrade. Documents provided by Optus to the

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<v Speaker 1>revealed it not only failed to properly inform the government

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<v Speaker 1>or the Telecommunications Regulated what was happening, but failed to

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<v Speaker 1>properly keep its own CEO in the loop. That's today's story.

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<v Speaker 2>As a CEO, I'm accountable for Optus's failings and I'm

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<v Speaker 2>deeply sorry.

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<v Speaker 1>This is the boss of Optis, Stephen Rue, and he's

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<v Speaker 1>talking to a Senate inquiry into how on earth OPTAs

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<v Speaker 1>has failed in its obligation to connect people who call

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<v Speaker 1>Triple O two emergency services, particularly on September eighteen, when

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<v Speaker 1>three people died.

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<v Speaker 2>We are all deeply sorry. The tragic events, the tragic

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<v Speaker 2>deaths of people during this outage will stay with us

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<v Speaker 2>as individuals and as a company as we investigate the

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<v Speaker 2>incident and build on our response while progressing a sweeping

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<v Speaker 2>transformation of Optus. I joined this company a year ago

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<v Speaker 2>because I know it is important for Australia that op

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<v Speaker 2>TO succeeds. When I arrived, Optus was implementing learnings from

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<v Speaker 2>the twenty twenty two cyber attack and the twenty twenty

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<v Speaker 2>three national outage.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, so he's been busy, but Optus has been here before,

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<v Speaker 1>and now rusays the companies identified ten failings that led

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<v Speaker 1>to this disaster.

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<v Speaker 2>The outage on September eighteen was not a complex system failure,

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<v Speaker 2>but it was a unique circumstance where Triple zero was

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<v Speaker 2>down while other cause continued normally. The initial mistake, a

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<v Speaker 2>human error, occurred when the wrong process. Plan was selected

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<v Speaker 2>for a routine firewall upgrade. The selected plan did not

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<v Speaker 2>divert traffic before locking equipment inside the exchange that routes

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<v Speaker 2>triple zero calls. This is an explanation, not an excuse.

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<v Speaker 3>Always said it all.

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<v Speaker 1>Or Jared Lynch is the Australian's Technology editor.

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<v Speaker 3>He said it not that long ago when the Australian

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<v Speaker 3>Competition and Consumer Commission sued Option for one hundred million

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<v Speaker 3>dollars in one of Australia's biggest unconscionable conduct cases. This

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<v Speaker 3>is when they know only sold plans to people they

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<v Speaker 3>knew could not afford them. They sold a plan to

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<v Speaker 3>a deaf man, They sold a phone plan to a

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<v Speaker 3>homeless person, they sold a phone plan to a man

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<v Speaker 3>with dementia. They've been here before. And Stephen Rue's response,

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<v Speaker 3>and rightly so, is to acknowledge, apologize and then say

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<v Speaker 3>he's working to rebuild public trust. But then this outage happened,

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<v Speaker 3>and he said the same thing. What we need to

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<v Speaker 3>see now is tangible action. How much money are they

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<v Speaker 3>investing in capital expenditure to ensure that there isn't another

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<v Speaker 3>triple zero outage? How much money are they spending in

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<v Speaker 3>their network to build resilience, to ensure that people do

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<v Speaker 3>not die again because they could not get help when

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<v Speaker 3>they needed at most.

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<v Speaker 1>The last time an CEO fronted parliamentarians in a crisis,

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<v Speaker 1>she was out the door very shortly afterwards. Stephen Rue's

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<v Speaker 1>predecessor quit in twenty twenty three after grilling at a

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<v Speaker 1>very similar inquiry when optics and systems failed to prevent

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<v Speaker 1>a giant hack of customers details and a national outage.

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<v Speaker 3>I think calls that Stephen Rue should be sacked. You

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<v Speaker 3>need to ask what will the end result be, What

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<v Speaker 3>will it achieve? Will instigate the change that is required

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<v Speaker 3>to ensure that people can rely on Optus when they

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<v Speaker 3>need it most? Probably not? And the reason why is

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<v Speaker 3>because there are clear systemic failures within Optus. We saw

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<v Speaker 3>it in twenty twenty two with that big cyber attack

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<v Speaker 3>which resulted in more than nine million Australians having their

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<v Speaker 3>personal and sensitive information plunned it by hackers. We saw

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<v Speaker 3>it twelve months later when there was that nationwide outage

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<v Speaker 3>and more than two thousand people could not contact Triple zero.

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<v Speaker 3>We saw it with the Unconscionable Conduct case, and only

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<v Speaker 3>in September, we saw it again. The only difference was

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<v Speaker 3>three people tragically lost their lives. The question is is

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<v Speaker 3>Sintel Optice's Singaporean owner a fit and proper owner of

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<v Speaker 3>Australian critical infrastructure. That is what the issue is, because

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<v Speaker 3>that will go a long way to ensure the systemic

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<v Speaker 3>failures with him Optus are addressed. Because the buck has

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<v Speaker 3>to stop with the owner.

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<v Speaker 1>Rusay's Optice has now taken serious steps to make sure

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<v Speaker 1>this can never happen again.

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<v Speaker 2>Every network change now requires explicit confirmation that emergency call

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<v Speaker 2>rating is functioning, both before and after the work is completed.

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<v Speaker 2>We've implemented twenty four to seven state by state monitoring

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<v Speaker 2>of triple zero call failures, volumes and failure rates too

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<v Speaker 2>enable faster detection of anomalies. Our contact center procedures have

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<v Speaker 2>been overhauled, including a mandatory escalation process for any customer

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<v Speaker 2>reports of triple zero issues, ensuring they're immediately referred to

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<v Speaker 2>our network's team for investigation. We've introduced daily manual triple

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<v Speaker 2>zero test calls in every state and territory.

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<v Speaker 3>I think what we're seeing is what happens when offshoring.

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<v Speaker 3>The loss of Australian's sovereignty. What happens when that goes

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<v Speaker 3>horribly wrong. It wasn't that long ago that there used

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<v Speaker 3>to be boots on the ground in like every phone

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<v Speaker 3>exchange in every town. Well now there aren't those boots

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<v Speaker 3>on the ground in not only the same town, but

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<v Speaker 3>the same state and same country. I mean this was

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<v Speaker 3>the result of engineers in Chennai, India who, in Stephen

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<v Speaker 3>Rue's words, failed to follow the proper processes. And just

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<v Speaker 3>to give you an idea, those processes aren't exactly rocket science.

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<v Speaker 3>I was speaking to Tolco soon after Office's outage, and

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<v Speaker 3>one of those processes is for an engineer with boots

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<v Speaker 3>on the ground actually pick up the phone when they

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<v Speaker 3>doing a software upgrade and call Triple zero to see

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<v Speaker 3>if it's still working. This isn't high tech stuff. It's

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<v Speaker 3>about having the capability within country to ensure that when

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<v Speaker 3>you do these sorts of software upgrades, and you know

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<v Speaker 3>there are thousands that happened each week heacross Australian telcos

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<v Speaker 3>that when you do these upgrades, things don't go wrong

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<v Speaker 3>and people don't lose their lives as a result.

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<v Speaker 1>These inquiries are a search for truth, but they're also

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<v Speaker 1>an opportunity for senators to get their high dudgeon on.

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<v Speaker 1>Senator Sarah Hanson Young, a member of the Greens, turned

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<v Speaker 1>the grilling to OPTUS chair John Arthur after it emerged

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<v Speaker 1>ru wasn't informed by his own employees of the magnitude

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<v Speaker 1>of the problem.

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<v Speaker 4>Mister Arthur.

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<v Speaker 5>But mister Arthur, you've heard all of this, and this

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<v Speaker 5>says to me, your management team is not up to

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<v Speaker 5>the job. And there was members of the team who

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<v Speaker 5>knew that it was a whole lot worse, that they'd

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<v Speaker 5>given misleading information, wrong information to the government. They knew

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<v Speaker 5>that completing the welfare checks that two people had died,

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<v Speaker 5>and their CEO was totally out of the loop.

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<v Speaker 1>Like, how can you.

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<v Speaker 5>Sit here as the chairperson of OPTAs and say that

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<v Speaker 5>this executive team are doing their job.

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<v Speaker 4>Senator, As the chief executive pointed out, there were I

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<v Speaker 4>think ten failures here, ten failures And if you're asking

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<v Speaker 4>me whether I am alarmed at that, I can assure

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<v Speaker 4>you I am. However, this man was brought into this

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<v Speaker 4>company to make sure we became a company that didn't

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<v Speaker 4>have ten failures like that. That's his job. Now he's

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<v Speaker 4>partway through this job, and I'm expecting him to finish

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<v Speaker 4>it because I never in my life want to be

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<v Speaker 4>in the position I'm in today where I have to

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<v Speaker 4>answer these sorts of questions about a company I'm associated.

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<v Speaker 5>With, or is there anyone else on the executive team

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<v Speaker 5>who's going to get the sack, because from what I

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<v Speaker 5>can see, there's been failure from the corporate communications element

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<v Speaker 5>right through to the CEO.

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<v Speaker 4>Senator, if you're asking me whether or not there will

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<v Speaker 4>be accountabilities here, and accountabilities not just for junior people,

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<v Speaker 4>then I can assure you that there will be.

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<v Speaker 1>Coming up. Why the watchdog says it's not to blame.

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<v Speaker 1>A couple of times during his evidence, Stephen Rue said

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<v Speaker 1>the success of the system was on everyone.

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<v Speaker 2>Telcos must make sure their own networks are reliable. That's

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<v Speaker 2>on each of us. But we must also ensure the

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<v Speaker 2>backup systems like camp On, which is a credit. The

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<v Speaker 2>mobile network function that allows a mobile phone to connect

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<v Speaker 2>to the Triple zero emergency call service using another carrier's

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<v Speaker 2>network when the user's own network is unavailable also works

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<v Speaker 2>for Australians. That's on all of us as an industry,

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<v Speaker 2>including telco's, the device manufacturers, the industry, the regulator and government.

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<v Speaker 1>But the regulators not copying the blame. Narita or Lauchlan,

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<v Speaker 1>chair and Agency head of the Australian Communications in Media Authority,

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<v Speaker 1>was grilled by Sarah Hanson Young.

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<v Speaker 5>Octors clearly don't think they have to inform you of

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<v Speaker 5>serious outages or the numbers of the numbers don't matter,

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<v Speaker 5>and they obviously didn't think that they have an illegal

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<v Speaker 5>obligation to inform you of whether there's a deadly result.

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<v Speaker 5>And doesn't that say something about how they view you

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<v Speaker 5>as a regulator And they clearly don't take you.

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<v Speaker 4>Seriously, Senator, that's a question you have to put d

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<v Speaker 4>opts not to me.

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<v Speaker 5>They're arguing that regulatory requirements they had fulfilled. But because

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<v Speaker 5>you didn't pick up the phone and you didn't chase

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<v Speaker 5>them up, they've been let off the hook, Senator.

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<v Speaker 3>They won't be let off the hook. They're the police,

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<v Speaker 3>they're the regulator. They should have been watching them very

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<v Speaker 3>very closely to ensure that the changes that they said

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<v Speaker 3>that they were adopting across their network to ensure such

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<v Speaker 3>an outage did not happen. Again, those changes were actually happening.

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<v Speaker 3>It's not like it was unprecedented. It wasn't that long

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<v Speaker 3>ago that we had an outage of similar proportions. The regulator,

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<v Speaker 3>the police should have been doing their job, monitoring optors closely.

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<v Speaker 3>For them to say well, it's not our fault. Opt

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<v Speaker 3>has failed, not us, that just doesn't wash.

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<v Speaker 1>Joe Lynch is The Australian's Technology editor. You can check

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<v Speaker 1>out all our reporting and analysis from Jared reported, Quailing

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<v Speaker 1>Canbra and the team right now at the Australian dot

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<v Speaker 1>Com dot a hu