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Speaker 1: I'm i Boris and this is straight Talk mcran. Welcome

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Speaker 1: back to straight Talk. Mate.

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Speaker 2: It's good to see you. Mark.

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Speaker 1: Now, this is we're going to give this out today

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Speaker 1: because it's pretty current, so we're doing this podcast now.

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Speaker 1: We're going to rip it out later this afternoon. Obviously

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Speaker 1: I'm wanting to talk to you about the Iran Israel

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Speaker 1: USA conflict, but probably then then, of course, you know Katar,

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Speaker 1: you know, there's a little bit of a skirmish and

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Speaker 1: Qatar overnight. But then I just saw that there was

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Speaker 1: announcement on truth by the President of the United States

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Speaker 1: saying that there is a ceasefire. Oh my god, Like,

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Speaker 1: how quickly you get brain damage trying to follow this.

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Speaker 3: It's it's whiplash. I mean, the strategic environments moving very

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Speaker 3: quickly at the moment. And that's modern modern war and

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Speaker 3: modern politics written large. I think, you know, there's a

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Speaker 3: very close relationship between war and politics, and that's what

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Speaker 3: we've seen out in the last eleven days or so

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Speaker 3: that this.

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Speaker 2: New Israel Iran war has been going.

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Speaker 1: Let's sort of go backwards as opposed to looking at

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Speaker 1: the today's announcement and I'll come back to you on

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Speaker 1: that one. But if when I just look at it,

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Speaker 1: and I have no idea about warfare strategies and all

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Speaker 1: that sort of stuff, but when I look at it,

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Speaker 1: it looks like to me that this would have been

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Speaker 1: planned months ago, probably alongside Israel, and maybe the plan was, look,

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Speaker 1: we're just going to we're going to go and do

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Speaker 1: this because we already know that they've got enough uranium

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Speaker 1: to make a nuclear warhead, and you go out and

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Speaker 1: sort of, Israel, you go out and start it off,

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Speaker 1: and we'll sneak in over the top somehow, I mean,

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Speaker 1: am I sort of being naive about this or that's

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Speaker 1: probably how it did work.

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Speaker 3: Firstly, this is an operation that will have been planned

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Speaker 3: years ago. I mean, particularly the Israelis have been rehearsing

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Speaker 3: out over the Mediterranean for a very long time, and

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Speaker 3: there will have been talks with America.

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Speaker 2: I'm pretty sure.

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Speaker 3: America would not have signed up to anything, but there

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Speaker 3: would have been a variety of different planes with different

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Speaker 3: levels of American involvement at least discussed over time, and

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Speaker 3: a lot of these plans would have sat on shelves

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Speaker 3: ready for the right moment politically and militarily. And it

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Speaker 3: appears last week the President of the United States has

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Speaker 3: commander in chief decided it was the right time for

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Speaker 3: a limited military operation to achieve his political outcome, which

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Speaker 3: was actually to end the war but also prevent Iran

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Speaker 3: from gaining a nuclear weapon, which he has actually been

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Speaker 3: very clear and forceful about over a long period of time.

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Speaker 1: But that's interesting because I remember for the Iraqi War,

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Speaker 1: we talked about chemical weapons that Satimassein. Everyone in the

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Speaker 1: world was convinced through the media that Satamussein actually had

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Speaker 1: these can be weapons of warfare. Surely, I think I'm

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Speaker 1: correct that it turned out he didn't, but they went

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Speaker 1: to war. Is that corecked?

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Speaker 2: Yeah?

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Speaker 3: I mean, there's been a lot of reviews in the

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Speaker 3: US the UK about the Iraq War and the intelligence

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Speaker 3: failures that led up to it, and without rehashing those

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Speaker 3: old lessons, they are actually useful lessons because there's no

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Speaker 3: such thing as one hundred percent certainty going into these

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Speaker 3: kind of things. You can never be totally certain what

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Speaker 3: the enemy's doing, what they're hiding, what they're building. Unfortunately,

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Speaker 3: in the lead up to the Iraqi War, some people

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Speaker 3: convinced a lot of us that we were certain and

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Speaker 3: that just wasn't the case. So you know, we always

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Speaker 3: need to be careful as citizens, as do politicians and

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Speaker 3: military leaders. Do not think that there are any certainties

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Speaker 3: in war. There are more uncertainties than not, and I

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Speaker 3: think we've seen that born out in this conflict as well.

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Speaker 1: So what do you think about the let's call it

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Speaker 1: the certainties in inverted commas than in relation to enrich

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Speaker 1: a certain level of enrichment relative to iranium uranium which

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Speaker 1: needs to be done in order to build a nuclear weapon.

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Speaker 1: There's a few steps after that, Richmond, of course, But

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Speaker 1: how do you feel about that? When you first heard that,

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Speaker 1: did you feel shocked or did you say, well, that's

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Speaker 1: Elada MASI I expected that. What did you feel then?

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Speaker 3: No, I wasn't really surprised by the latest International Atomic

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Speaker 3: Energy Agency reports just before Israel kicked off its operations.

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Speaker 3: I mean, Irean has has had a program for a

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Speaker 3: very long time to develop the ability to build a

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Speaker 3: nuclear weapon.

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Speaker 2: How close they.

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Speaker 3: Were to that will remain subject to some conjecture for

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Speaker 3: a while. There's disagreements between Israeli and American intelligence communities

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Speaker 3: on that, but one thing is absolutely certain. Iran has

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Speaker 3: been very clear about wanting to destroy Israel about wanting

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Speaker 3: to perpetrate another genocide on the Jewish people. So you know,

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Speaker 3: if you put those things together, if you're the Prime

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Speaker 3: minister of Israel, how else can you act but to

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Speaker 3: try and destroy your sworn enemies desire to destroy you

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Speaker 3: and your people. I mean, Israel's a small place, It's

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Speaker 3: uniquely vulnerable to a nuclear weapon. So you know, I

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Speaker 3: understand the Israeli imperatives. The questions really are around was

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Speaker 3: this the right time and how proximate was the threat

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Speaker 3: of Iran building a nuclear weapon right now?

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Speaker 1: So when Israel says the Iran Iranian regime, and I'm

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Speaker 1: not talking about Iranian people, I'm talking about the theocratic

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Speaker 1: regime that controls Iran and therefore controls the defense forces too,

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Speaker 1: I guess when they say that they are an exexstential

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Speaker 1: threat to us is what you sort of just explain.

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Speaker 1: Someone says to me, mate, Mark, I'm going to come

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Speaker 1: around and murder you in your household and all your family. Immediately,

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Speaker 1: I would think that's an existential threat, whether or not

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Speaker 1: it's right or wrong, where they going to do it

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Speaker 1: or not? Right away, I'm immediately thinking, well, what am

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Speaker 1: I going to do? So first thing you can do

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Speaker 1: is you can play defense. So Israel has this so

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Speaker 1: called Iron Dome. Do you mind explaining what that is?

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Speaker 1: I mean, because we keep hearing the word, but I

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Speaker 1: don't even know what it means.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Firstly, I mean Israel's whole strategy with dealing with Iran

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Speaker 3: change fundamentally on seven October twenty twenty three.

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Speaker 2: I mean it.

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Speaker 3: You know, I don't think Australians really understand the shock

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Speaker 3: it caused to the Israeli society and to their military

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Speaker 3: and to their government. So that fundamentally changes strategic calculus

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Speaker 3: when it comes to defense. Obviously every country is, but

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Speaker 3: you know, Australia wants to focus on defense rather than

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Speaker 3: having to undertake offensive operations. So that's also a given

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Speaker 3: in democracies, which means we often get surprised by our adversaries. Now,

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Speaker 3: when it comes to the era and missile defense network

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Speaker 3: that Israel has, it has multiple layers. The most basic

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Speaker 3: layer is Iron Dome. It's really focused on intercepting short

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Speaker 3: and medium range missiles that come over the border from

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Speaker 3: places like Gaza from Hezbola territory in southern Lebanon. But

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Speaker 3: it has other more capable missiles David sling and missiles

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Speaker 3: that can intercept very capable enemy ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere,

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Speaker 3: which have been used more widely in the last few days.

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Speaker 3: With this have also been American high altitude ballistic missile

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Speaker 3: interceptors the FAD system, as well as US Navy ships

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Speaker 3: with their ballistic missile capabilities, which have been integral and

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Speaker 3: crucial to not only intercepting many of these Iranian missiles

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Speaker 3: targeted at Israeli cities and citizens, but in saving probably

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Speaker 3: hundreds of lives over the last couple of weeks.

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Speaker 1: So what does that mean, though, Do you mean that

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Speaker 1: there are inceptor missiles, if that's the right word, sort

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Speaker 1: of placed in strategic places all around let's call it

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Speaker 1: Tel Aviv or Israel, in the ground, maybe next door

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Speaker 1: to someone lives, or perhaps in the street. We just

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Speaker 1: put the US naval stuff aside for a second, and

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Speaker 1: then when the missile is sort of approaching somehow, it's

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Speaker 1: detected by radar and then it sends a message to wherever,

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Speaker 1: and then all of a sudden, these missiles just come

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Speaker 1: out of the ground and start firing off to intercept

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Speaker 1: the missiles that are coming coming towards Israel. I mean,

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Speaker 1: I'm trying to simplify it, but because we don't know

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Speaker 1: what irondome means here in Australia, I've got no ideas.

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Speaker 1: Is that sort of the setup.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, Basically you have a detection network, which is a

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Speaker 3: bunch of radars and other senses which go into a

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Speaker 3: central command and control network. It's human lead but also

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Speaker 3: supported by AI and other computer analysis systems. The first

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Speaker 3: decision it makes is where's the missile going. Is it

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Speaker 3: going to hit anything important or is it just going

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Speaker 3: to hit in the desert or hit in the ocean.

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Speaker 1: So does the calculation.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely, it calculates where the missile will land. If

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Speaker 3: it's not going to hit anything, generally they ignore it.

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Speaker 3: Why waste a million dollar interceptor that's something that's not

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Speaker 3: going to hurt you. So that's the first big decision

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Speaker 3: that's made. It has to be made in microseconds. The

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Speaker 3: next decision is what kind of missile is it? And

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Speaker 3: what have we got that can intercept it? And it

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Speaker 3: can be a short, medium, or long range or outside

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Speaker 3: the atmosphere missile that the Israelis and the Americans have.

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Speaker 3: This is the kind of system that Australia does not possess,

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Speaker 3: and that we are very vulnerable to. I mean, we

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Speaker 3: just don't have the kind of air missile defenses or

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Speaker 3: defenses against drones that the Israelis have developed over many decades.

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Speaker 1: So, mick, but are those missiles where they originate from?

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Speaker 1: Is that like, would it be in the middle of

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Speaker 1: tele Avif somewhere, or is there army bases all around

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Speaker 1: tell Aviv, for example, that they get fired from. Is

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Speaker 1: it in the civilian area.

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Speaker 2: No.

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Speaker 3: Generally these are located on military establishments and government establishments

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Speaker 3: wherever possible. I mean I visited one when I was

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Speaker 3: there in Israel last I spoke with an extraordinarily smart

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Speaker 3: Air Force officer who runs an iron dome battery and

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Speaker 3: about all the things they need to do to keep

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Speaker 3: these things capable. These are generally held on military bases.

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Speaker 3: I mean, they are very expensive, so they also need

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Speaker 3: to be defended. So they don't want these sitting out

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Speaker 3: on the street, and they're just located in the best

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Speaker 3: places to intercept missiles from their most likely places of origin.

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Speaker 1: And what I presume they do is they blow them

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Speaker 1: up in the sky.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, Generally, they hit them and they get either a

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Speaker 3: proximity kill where the interceptor explodes and the fragmentation destroys

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Speaker 3: the incoming ballistic missile, or they get a kinetic hill,

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Speaker 3: which is where they actually hit each other, which is

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Speaker 3: an extraordinary achievement when you think about it. The last

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Speaker 3: time I was in Jerusalem, you know, I looked up

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Speaker 3: and within a minute there'd been an interception right above us.

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Speaker 3: So this is the kind of thing Israelis have become

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Speaker 3: used to. Unfortunately it happens all the time.

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Speaker 1: So have the arrangement. It looks like to me here

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Speaker 1: we're looking at a technology war too, because clearly Israel

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Speaker 1: is building incredibly fast microprocesses to make decisions about what

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Speaker 1: should happen within split seconds, but equally Iran or any

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Speaker 1: other enemy of Israel trying to make decisions about how

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Speaker 1: can we evade that detection. So there sounds like there's

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Speaker 1: a technology war. And by the way, everybody, not everywhere,

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Speaker 1: a lot of people know that Israel's technological ability, not

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Speaker 1: just in warfare, but just across the board is incredible.

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Speaker 1: Do you see there is there a race between the

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Speaker 1: two in terms of Israel vers anyone else in terms

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Speaker 1: of their technology. Is this a race is to race

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Speaker 1: itt Israel seems to be winning.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's certainly an adaptation battle. Each side is learning

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Speaker 3: and adapting constantly. Each side every day is looking at

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Speaker 3: the performance of the other side's technology and then changing

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Speaker 3: the capabilities of both their defensive and offensive systems, whether

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Speaker 3: it's software, hardware, human processes, political guidance to adapt to that.

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Speaker 3: So this has been something that's been going on for

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Speaker 3: some time. It certainly has a technological aspect, but there's

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Speaker 3: a whole range of human elements about humans being willing

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Speaker 3: to learn and change as quickly as necessary.

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Speaker 1: So if if I look at what's going on in

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Speaker 1: relation to the last skirmish is within Israel from Iran,

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Speaker 1: they then decided to start sending drones, And of course

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Speaker 1: we all we don't. I don't know if it's true

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Speaker 1: or not. I've heard you heard that Iran supplied Russia

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Speaker 1: the first lot of drones to go into the Ukraine.

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Speaker 1: Iranswers me pre advanced, correct me if' wrong in relation

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Speaker 1: to the drone technology.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, Iran is a fairly it was a

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Speaker 3: well educated society. It's had a very strong industrial and

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Speaker 3: scientific on R and D base for a very long time,

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Speaker 3: it did provide the Shahaed drones to Russia, which Russia have.

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Speaker 2: Used ever since.

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Speaker 3: It now has, with the assistance of the Iranians, built

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Speaker 3: factories in Russia. In fact, my last to Ukraine a

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Speaker 3: couple of months ago, I was presented with part of

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Speaker 3: one of these drones.

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Speaker 2: I wasn't able to bring it in, of course, to Australia.

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Speaker 3: But Russia now fires these by the hundreds every night

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Speaker 3: into Ukraine to kill Ukrainian civilians. That is specifically why

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Speaker 3: Iran gave them these drones, and it's specifically how Iran

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Speaker 3: has used these drones against Israel over the last week

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Speaker 3: or so.

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Speaker 1: And of those drones more effective at avoiding the let's

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Speaker 1: call it the idome or the defensive systems within Israel,

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Speaker 1: is that one of the reasons they chose that.

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Speaker 2: Well, they fly a different trajectory.

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Speaker 3: But the the real thing with these drones is you

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Speaker 3: use them in large quantities to saturate your adversaries air

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Speaker 3: defense system, so they have to make difficult choices about

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Speaker 3: which ones they intercept. Now the Ukrainians now have very

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Speaker 3: cheap interceptors. The Israelis will clearly want to do something

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Speaker 3: the same now, but they're all about saturating and overwhelming

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Speaker 3: an air defense network. I mean, this is not the

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Speaker 3: first time the Iranians have done this. I was in

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Speaker 3: Baghdad in two thousand and five when the Iranians inserted

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Speaker 3: very advanced IDs to the insurgents and helped insurgents against

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Speaker 3: the Americans use these. I saw the impact of how

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Speaker 3: Iran helps our adversaries. They've done it again with Russia.

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Speaker 3: They've done it against Israel now, and if we don't

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Speaker 3: stop them, they'll do it again.

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Speaker 1: So that sort of covers off the defensive side of things.

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Speaker 1: When you feel like there's an existential threat against you,

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Speaker 1: let's just move on to the offensive side. Other words,

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Speaker 1: strike first. When a nation like Israel decides that they're

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Speaker 1: going to make this call, and you, as you said,

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Speaker 1: they've probably been planning for these sorts of decision making

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Speaker 1: for many, many years. It's sort of sitting there on

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Speaker 1: the shelf. It's been you know, rehearse, rehearse, rehearse, rehearse,

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Speaker 1: plant plant plan. Now is the time to make the call.

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Speaker 1: I know you won't know the answer this, but just

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Speaker 1: speculate around this. Given your experience, what would have been

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Speaker 1: the reason that Israel felt more vulnerable a couple of

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Speaker 1: weeks ago, would however, a long ago, thirteen days ago,

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Speaker 1: when they first started their assault onto Iran in relation

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Speaker 1: to the nuclear and the military capabilities of Iran, what

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Speaker 1: would have been the thought process.

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Speaker 3: Well, I think there would have been a bunch of

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Speaker 3: things that contributed to the final decision. The first thing is,

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Speaker 3: you know, just this long standing deep unease that the

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Speaker 3: Iranians are moving towards the capability to assemble a nuclear warhead.

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Speaker 2: So that's always there.

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Speaker 3: You know, the IAEA report that came out two weeks ago,

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Speaker 3: which indicated that the Iranians probably have more hidden facilities,

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Speaker 3: that would have induced a fair amount of uncertainty and

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Speaker 3: more unease in the Israeli leadership about Iran's capacity to

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Speaker 3: build a nuclear weapon. I think too, that you know,

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Speaker 3: the Israeli Prime Minister has been working on the American

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Speaker 3: President about degrading Iran's nuclear program for some time. I mean,

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Speaker 3: Netnya who's never been a great fan of negotiations, is

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Speaker 3: more a fan of using military action. And I think

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Speaker 3: that you know, Trump's statements about Iran not getting a

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Speaker 3: nuclear weapon played into that. So these all came together

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Speaker 3: and you know, we can't discount domestic political considerations of

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Speaker 3: Netna who They're always part of his calculus. We shouldn't

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Speaker 3: forget that. So all these things probably came together, and

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Speaker 3: we don't know what other intelligence they might have seen,

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Speaker 3: but they would have been key elements of the decision

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Speaker 3: that the Israeli cabinet and prime minister would have made

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Speaker 3: a couple of weeks ago.

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Speaker 1: So when the Israeli prime ministers, I mean, in your experience,

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Speaker 1: what would happen the Israeli Prime minister and his cabinet

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Speaker 1: makes it the call, They then instruct the generals or

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Speaker 1: the military. But would he have sort of picked up

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Speaker 1: the phone and said, listen, DJT Donald, mister Trump, we're

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Speaker 1: thinking about doing this. I need your you know, your

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Speaker 1: sanction or whatever the words are. Is that a normal

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Speaker 1: thing or do they just say they we're doing this

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Speaker 1: and we'll let them find it down the track.

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Speaker 3: No, I mean there would have been a dialogue there.

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Speaker 3: You know, as tough and forward leaning as the Israeli

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Speaker 3: Prime minister is, even he would like to have the

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Speaker 3: support of the Americans. So there would have been a

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Speaker 3: die log gone on for weeks, maybe even months about

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Speaker 3: this I mean, there are some reports we're seeing now

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Speaker 3: on the Washington Post that this was a dialogue that

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Speaker 3: went on for many, many months, So you know, the

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Speaker 3: Americans would have been across the planning. You know, we

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Speaker 3: saw the Americans start to withdraw dependence from embassies a

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Speaker 3: couple of weeks before Israel commenced its operations, So they

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Speaker 3: clearly had an inkling that it was very likely, even

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Speaker 3: if they didn't know the exact timing of Israel's attack,

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Speaker 3: and they probably weren't across the full details of the

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Speaker 3: weapons that Israel had inserted into Arena over a long

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Speaker 3: period of time to conduct these attacks on the air

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Speaker 3: defense network in the first hours of the Israeli assault.

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Speaker 1: So Micki, you saying that Israel had already got weapons

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Speaker 1: inside Iran. I thought everything came out from Israel or

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Speaker 1: from outside Iran. They were actually inside Iran already.

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Speaker 2: Yep.

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Speaker 3: They had inserted over many months and years, trucks with drones,

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Speaker 3: remotely operated anti tank missiles, and other capabilities, intelligence agents

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Speaker 3: on the ground, probably special forces, and what they did

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Speaker 3: were the initial attacks that destroyed Iranian radars and air

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Speaker 3: defense sites. That ensued that the following waves of crude

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Speaker 3: Israeli Air Force aircraft could get into Iran conduct their

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Speaker 3: attacks with minimal interference from the Iranians. I mean, this

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Speaker 3: is one of the lessons of this and Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb,

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Speaker 3: that our bases in our home lands are uniquely vulnerable

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Speaker 3: to these kind of attacks and we need to pay

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Speaker 3: very serious attention to this method.

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Speaker 1: So they sort of stitched them up. Basically in Australian terms,

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Speaker 1: they basically said, we're going to normal you, sorry the

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Speaker 1: better word homble you before we even send our first plane.

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Speaker 1: And so but how do they get away with that?

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Speaker 1: I can't imagine. I mean, like, you know, you're in

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Speaker 1: if some truck arrived here. As you know, we had

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Speaker 1: a caravan here, which was bad enough here in Sydney,

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Speaker 1: but a whole series of trucks were sitting in weird places.

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Speaker 1: Someone who would say, well, what the hell is that

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Speaker 1: truck sitting out the front of my house doing there

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Speaker 1: or in that factory industrial zone because I would go

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Speaker 1: past it every morning to work or whatever the case

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Speaker 1: I be. How do they get how does that happen?

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Speaker 1: Like this sounds crazy to me, like that they can

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Speaker 1: actually happen without anybody asking a question.

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Speaker 3: Well, it's happened in Russia and Iran in the last

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Speaker 3: three weeks, and they're both authoritarian regimes that have restrictions

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Speaker 3: on the movement of people internally. So if it can

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Speaker 3: happen in them, in a democracy, this would be very

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Speaker 3: easy to pull off.

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Speaker 2: I mean, in.

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Speaker 3: Democracies we're not inclined to pull over every truck and

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Speaker 3: question the truck driver or search their bill of goods,

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Speaker 3: and nor should we be. But you know, there is

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Speaker 3: a vulnerability here to these kind of attacks because they're

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Speaker 3: very easy to hide, and frankly, they're extraordinarily cheap. With

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Speaker 3: you know, five hundred dollars drones, with a kilogram or

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Speaker 3: two of explosive you can fly over the fence of

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Speaker 3: an air base and destroy your really badly damage one

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Speaker 3: hundred million dollar aircraft.

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Speaker 1: So in a military strategic sense, what would various militaries

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Speaker 1: around the world studying this consider they've learned.

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Speaker 3: Well, I think they'll be learning about detection first and

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Speaker 3: foremost of small drones that might be approaching or coming

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Speaker 3: over the perimeters of their bases. I mean, the detection

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Speaker 3: alone is a major gap. We need to be able

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Speaker 3: to do that. Now it's not easy. But there are

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Speaker 3: small short range radars which Ukrainians use in their thousands now,

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Speaker 3: which are very good at this.

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Speaker 2: And then the.

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Speaker 3: Second thing is be able to destroy these things. Now,

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Speaker 3: there's a whole lot, especially in Australia where we love

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Speaker 3: bureaucracy at state and federal level, a multitude of different

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Speaker 3: rules that prevent the ADF at the moment from using

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Speaker 3: electromagnetic or kinetic ways of intercepting these drones. We're really

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Speaker 3: going to have to have a hard look at our

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Speaker 3: legislative underpinnings to allow our soldiers as well as our

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Speaker 3: police to use weapons to destroy offensive drones that might

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Speaker 3: be going against critical infrastructure, against military bases or major

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Speaker 3: public events.

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Speaker 1: So you said there's regulations, like, we have regulations that

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Speaker 1: say we can't protect ourselves absolutely.

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Speaker 3: I mean, you know, just spectrum management in Australia is

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Speaker 3: highly centralized. The Federal Aviation Authorities CASSA have a very

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Speaker 3: hard approach to the use of drones and particularly countering drones.

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Speaker 3: So there's a bunch of legislation about the use of jamming,

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Speaker 3: GPS jamming, electromagnetic jamming in Australia.

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Speaker 2: I mean, there should be.

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Speaker 3: You don't want everyone doing it, but there's going have

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Speaker 3: to be some carve outs for military and police forces.

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Speaker 3: There are some limited ones for major events, but we're

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Speaker 3: going to have to have a more holistic approach and

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Speaker 3: then look at, well, what can we do to intercept

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Speaker 3: these things. If you have someone on a military base

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Speaker 3: firing a weapon at a drone and the rounds from

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Speaker 3: that weapon goes over the perimeter into civilian housing areas,

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Speaker 3: where you have a problem. So this isn't exactly a

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Speaker 3: simple problem to solve, but we've got to get ourselves

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Speaker 3: on the path to solving it.

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Speaker 1: And there's Australia somewhere that we are, given our proximity

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Speaker 1: in the world, is a drone attack feasible for us.

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Speaker 1: We're not attached to anybody's what I.

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Speaker 3: Meant, well, we're very attached to the American Alliance and

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Speaker 3: to our partners in places like Japan and Europe. So

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Speaker 3: we're actually uniquely vulnerable to this because someone could do

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Speaker 3: this against us without the fear of any kind of

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Speaker 3: long range response from Australia. We don't have long range

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Speaker 3: attack capabilities, we don't have weapons of masters struction. So

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Speaker 3: as a way to curse the behavior of the Australian government.

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Speaker 3: This could be a very effective way for a potential

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Speaker 3: enemy to act against us.

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Speaker 1: And are you saying that they would actually insert themselves

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Speaker 1: into Australia similar to the way Israel has done in

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Speaker 1: Iran with trucks full of drones for example, or are

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Speaker 1: they going to do it from team or they were

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Speaker 1: in Genetia.

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Speaker 3: They would fly in people through Mascot Airport or Brisbane

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Speaker 3: International Airport. They would go and buy trucks from a

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Speaker 3: normal truck salesman. You can buy them without any problems.

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Speaker 3: In this country, they would go buy a few hundred

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Speaker 3: drones from the latest dji store, which I walked past

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Speaker 3: at the shops all the time, and then they could

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Speaker 3: probably pretty simply acquire a few hundred or a few

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Speaker 3: dozens of kilos of explosives from criminal gains or mind

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Speaker 3: sights around the country. That's all you need and then

439
00:24:56,240 --> 00:24:59,120
Speaker 3: a little bit of creativity. This is why it's such

440
00:24:59,119 --> 00:25:02,720
Speaker 3: a profound issue, because that's the very This is not

441
00:25:03,000 --> 00:25:07,800
Speaker 3: a difficult or expensive undertaking. With a million dollars, you

442
00:25:07,840 --> 00:25:10,639
Speaker 3: could pull this off without any problems whatsoever.

443
00:25:11,200 --> 00:25:15,520
Speaker 1: Wow, that's mad. That's well. Hopefully that there are people

444
00:25:16,520 --> 00:25:19,040
Speaker 1: listening to you, are there more people like you forming

445
00:25:19,080 --> 00:25:21,680
Speaker 1: groups who are actually reaching out to the government or

446
00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:24,360
Speaker 1: reaching out to your counterparts, who are you know, sort

447
00:25:24,359 --> 00:25:26,760
Speaker 1: of active in duty. I mean, do you guys talk

448
00:25:26,800 --> 00:25:28,240
Speaker 1: about these things or how does it work?

449
00:25:28,840 --> 00:25:30,239
Speaker 2: Well? A lot of people talk about it.

450
00:25:30,760 --> 00:25:32,800
Speaker 3: You know, the government talked about it in the National

451
00:25:32,840 --> 00:25:37,240
Speaker 3: Defense Strategy, but you know it's an extraordinarily weak document

452
00:25:38,480 --> 00:25:41,000
Speaker 3: with you know, defense spending that's just not up to it,

453
00:25:41,080 --> 00:25:44,760
Speaker 3: and our bases, unfortunately, are extraordinarily vulnerable to this kind

454
00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:45,160
Speaker 3: of threat.

455
00:25:46,720 --> 00:25:50,920
Speaker 1: When I look at what happened before the ceasefire announced

456
00:25:50,920 --> 00:25:53,320
Speaker 1: today this morning, when I look at what happened leading

457
00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:57,399
Speaker 1: up to that, I saw that Iran might have been

458
00:25:57,400 --> 00:25:59,640
Speaker 1: a minister of Defense or Minister Foreign Affairs or something

459
00:25:59,640 --> 00:26:03,320
Speaker 1: like that to Russia and sat down with Putin. What

460
00:26:03,359 --> 00:26:06,080
Speaker 1: do you think about Putin's response or lack of response,

461
00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:08,400
Speaker 1: or do you think he'd already been called by Trump?

462
00:26:08,520 --> 00:26:10,560
Speaker 1: I mean, it just looked like a stitch up to me.

463
00:26:10,800 --> 00:26:14,159
Speaker 1: In fact, when I was watching the engagement between the

464
00:26:14,200 --> 00:26:15,920
Speaker 1: two across the table, I was watching it on Fox

465
00:26:15,960 --> 00:26:18,160
Speaker 1: News last night. Because these things get you, they tend

466
00:26:18,240 --> 00:26:22,000
Speaker 1: to occupy my mind. I was watching his body language

467
00:26:22,080 --> 00:26:24,640
Speaker 1: when he was being spoken to by the Iranian representatives,

468
00:26:24,920 --> 00:26:27,400
Speaker 1: and he looked kept looking down. He looked like he'd

469
00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:29,160
Speaker 1: already made a decision. I'm not going to do anything.

470
00:26:29,280 --> 00:26:32,639
Speaker 1: I'm just going through this process to for face and

471
00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:34,760
Speaker 1: to make sure you still think I'm in your team.

472
00:26:35,440 --> 00:26:38,600
Speaker 1: But dude, I'm not going to do anything. What did

473
00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:39,239
Speaker 1: you think about that?

474
00:26:39,600 --> 00:26:40,720
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's pretty much it.

475
00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:44,080
Speaker 3: I mean, the Russians and Chinese have sent thoughts and

476
00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:48,439
Speaker 3: prayers to Tayhran and not much else. You know, we

477
00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:51,280
Speaker 3: know the UN Security Council as a two tiger. He

478
00:26:51,560 --> 00:26:56,560
Speaker 3: really didn't result in anything despite Tyran's best efforts. You know,

479
00:26:56,600 --> 00:27:00,000
Speaker 3: if you're Putin, you're looking at this situation at well,

480
00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:03,800
Speaker 3: I've already got one war. I know Trump's pretty serious

481
00:27:03,800 --> 00:27:06,760
Speaker 3: about taking these guys out, and he's not serious about me.

482
00:27:06,880 --> 00:27:10,320
Speaker 3: So I don't want to align too closely with them.

483
00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:13,879
Speaker 3: You know, it's not really in Putin Norge's interest to

484
00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:17,880
Speaker 3: get too involved in this other than you know, sending

485
00:27:18,080 --> 00:27:21,640
Speaker 3: good wishes to their authoritarian fellow traveler.

486
00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:25,520
Speaker 1: Did at any stage did you think to yourself, make

487
00:27:25,680 --> 00:27:28,800
Speaker 1: this could be World War three before today I'm talking

488
00:27:28,800 --> 00:27:30,399
Speaker 1: about Well, I.

489
00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:33,040
Speaker 3: Think it's been clear that we've we're probably in the

490
00:27:33,080 --> 00:27:37,320
Speaker 3: early phases of what future historians might term World War three.

491
00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:40,480
Speaker 3: I think that started February twenty twenty two. You know,

492
00:27:40,520 --> 00:27:42,320
Speaker 3: it's not like World War One or World War two,

493
00:27:42,359 --> 00:27:45,000
Speaker 3: but we are in the midst of a global conflict

494
00:27:45,359 --> 00:27:51,080
Speaker 3: and confrontation between democracies and authoritarians. There are some violent

495
00:27:51,160 --> 00:27:55,080
Speaker 3: parts of it, which is Ukraine and the Middle East,

496
00:27:55,200 --> 00:27:57,960
Speaker 3: and there are some ideological parts of it which we

497
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:01,879
Speaker 3: see in the Pacific and elsewhere. So it's probably closer

498
00:28:01,920 --> 00:28:04,480
Speaker 3: to the phony war that occurred in Europe in nineteen

499
00:28:04,560 --> 00:28:07,320
Speaker 3: thirty nine than the full out war that occurred later.

500
00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:10,919
Speaker 3: But you know, future historians might see what we're living

501
00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:13,600
Speaker 3: through now was the early phases of what might be

502
00:28:13,640 --> 00:28:14,480
Speaker 3: called World War three.

503
00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:16,000
Speaker 2: In the future, we'll see.

504
00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:19,600
Speaker 1: It seems to me that globally, in lots of respects,

505
00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:24,480
Speaker 1: we have division. You know, do we look after Palestina

506
00:28:24,560 --> 00:28:27,960
Speaker 1: or do we look after Israel or the Jewish community.

507
00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:31,159
Speaker 1: Do we back Russia or do we back Ukraine. Do

508
00:28:31,240 --> 00:28:32,960
Speaker 1: we back China or do we back in the US?

509
00:28:33,000 --> 00:28:35,359
Speaker 1: Do we back Taiwan. It just seems to me there's

510
00:28:35,359 --> 00:28:38,640
Speaker 1: this massive division everywhere. I wouldn't call it a Cold war,

511
00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:42,160
Speaker 1: but definitely it looks to me as over there's division.

512
00:28:42,880 --> 00:28:47,200
Speaker 1: Do you think the division is being ideologically driven actually,

513
00:28:47,440 --> 00:28:49,760
Speaker 1: you know, made to happen, or do you think it's

514
00:28:49,840 --> 00:28:51,600
Speaker 1: just the world dividing itself.

515
00:28:52,640 --> 00:28:52,720
Speaker 2: No.

516
00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:55,480
Speaker 3: I think this is an ideological struggle that's been going

517
00:28:55,480 --> 00:28:58,960
Speaker 3: on for some time. The Chinese have been in an

518
00:28:58,960 --> 00:29:02,200
Speaker 3: ideological struggle with US for decades. We just haven't noticed

519
00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:07,320
Speaker 3: until recently. You know, only got to read G's speeches

520
00:29:07,360 --> 00:29:10,760
Speaker 3: to see the struggle and conflict that he talks about

521
00:29:10,920 --> 00:29:14,080
Speaker 3: against the West and how the East is rising and

522
00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:17,160
Speaker 3: the West is declining. I think Russia, China are in

523
00:29:17,200 --> 00:29:20,080
Speaker 3: a North Korea see an opportunity to undermine the system

524
00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:23,120
Speaker 3: that we've all greatly benefited from since nineteen forty five.

525
00:29:23,480 --> 00:29:26,720
Speaker 3: They're not proposing any better system, just that they hate

526
00:29:26,760 --> 00:29:30,080
Speaker 3: the US led world order because they're not leading it.

527
00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:32,920
Speaker 3: So we are in the midst of an ideological war.

528
00:29:33,360 --> 00:29:36,400
Speaker 3: We're seeing it play out on TikTok and social media

529
00:29:36,600 --> 00:29:40,160
Speaker 3: and other means around the world with misinformation, and we're

530
00:29:40,160 --> 00:29:42,640
Speaker 3: seeing it play out on streets in Australia with some

531
00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:45,440
Speaker 3: of these demonstrations that get out there and want to

532
00:29:45,480 --> 00:29:47,400
Speaker 3: support hamas and other causes.

533
00:29:48,080 --> 00:29:51,600
Speaker 1: So when you look at what happened over the past

534
00:29:52,640 --> 00:29:57,880
Speaker 1: thirteen days, particularly with what the USA did in their

535
00:29:58,120 --> 00:30:05,080
Speaker 1: one endeavor, do you think militarily does that send a

536
00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:09,280
Speaker 1: message to the rest of the world, because like China

537
00:30:09,320 --> 00:30:12,960
Speaker 1: and North Korea and Russia, but probably the former two

538
00:30:13,440 --> 00:30:18,920
Speaker 1: that the United States is still militarily not only significant,

539
00:30:18,960 --> 00:30:27,160
Speaker 1: but probably superior. Was it enough the way it was organized, executed, planned,

540
00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:31,280
Speaker 1: the planes they used, the bombs they dropped, is that

541
00:30:31,360 --> 00:30:33,920
Speaker 1: a big enough signal in the world for other people go, wow,

542
00:30:34,280 --> 00:30:35,840
Speaker 1: let's just pull back here and be careful.

543
00:30:36,600 --> 00:30:39,560
Speaker 3: Well, I think it is a key message from the

544
00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:46,120
Speaker 3: United States that despite the isolationist inclinations of the Marga movement,

545
00:30:46,440 --> 00:30:49,080
Speaker 3: they're not fully disengaged from the world, and that they

546
00:30:49,120 --> 00:30:52,960
Speaker 3: are prepared. They do have the will and the capability

547
00:30:53,080 --> 00:30:55,880
Speaker 3: to act if it isn't in their interests or in

548
00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:58,920
Speaker 3: the interest of their closest friends. So, you know, I

549
00:30:58,960 --> 00:31:02,840
Speaker 3: think the US saw in its interest to ensure Iran

550
00:31:02,920 --> 00:31:05,840
Speaker 3: did does not get a nuclear weapon, it would cascade

551
00:31:05,840 --> 00:31:08,000
Speaker 3: into all kinds of problems in the Middle East and

552
00:31:08,040 --> 00:31:12,520
Speaker 3: more broadly and in greater proliferation we must add. So

553
00:31:12,760 --> 00:31:14,720
Speaker 3: you know, when the US sees it in its direct

554
00:31:14,760 --> 00:31:18,120
Speaker 3: interest in lack, I think President g will be more

555
00:31:18,160 --> 00:31:21,720
Speaker 3: worried about this than putin there is you know, one

556
00:31:21,760 --> 00:31:24,479
Speaker 3: of the few things the American polity agrees on is

557
00:31:24,560 --> 00:31:28,479
Speaker 3: the competition with China, and he will be looking at

558
00:31:28,480 --> 00:31:34,080
Speaker 3: this goalon Okay, so Trump is serious. I need to

559
00:31:34,280 --> 00:31:37,600
Speaker 3: rethink my decision calculus when dealing with the United States.

560
00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:42,240
Speaker 1: Henceforwarth because a lot of people were saying, well, if

561
00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:44,920
Speaker 1: this turns into a war, maybe this is China's opportunity

562
00:31:44,960 --> 00:31:49,800
Speaker 1: to go assert its dominance over taiwan Is. In other words,

563
00:31:49,920 --> 00:31:53,560
Speaker 1: US gets engaged in another place, So you know, the

564
00:31:53,600 --> 00:31:55,960
Speaker 1: old diversion attack there over here will just go over

565
00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:59,440
Speaker 1: there and do our best. Do you think though, make

566
00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:02,160
Speaker 1: I don't have any sense of this, But is the

567
00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:06,640
Speaker 1: US capability greater than everyone else in the world. I mean,

568
00:32:06,680 --> 00:32:08,920
Speaker 1: I've looked at the number of planes. The US by

569
00:32:09,080 --> 00:32:11,680
Speaker 1: far has many more fighter jets in any other place

570
00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:14,000
Speaker 1: in the world as understand it. I saw a stat

571
00:32:14,120 --> 00:32:18,600
Speaker 1: come out the other day like ridiculously more so much

572
00:32:18,600 --> 00:32:20,360
Speaker 1: more that Mevini and I don't know if we know

573
00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:23,280
Speaker 1: actually what China has but anyway, But in terms of

574
00:32:23,320 --> 00:32:29,040
Speaker 1: the technological capability, is China clipping at the hills in

575
00:32:29,360 --> 00:32:30,600
Speaker 1: days or is it a long way away?

576
00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:34,400
Speaker 3: Well, when it comes to the size of the US military,

577
00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:38,240
Speaker 3: remember the US has global commitments, so it can't concentrate

578
00:32:38,320 --> 00:32:41,680
Speaker 3: its entire military in one or even two places. It's dispersed,

579
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:45,400
Speaker 3: whereas China and Russia can concentrate their entire military in

580
00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:48,720
Speaker 3: a small swathe of the Earth's surface. So that's a

581
00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:53,160
Speaker 3: challenge for the United States. Secondly, its industrial capacity has

582
00:32:53,360 --> 00:32:56,960
Speaker 3: waned significantly since the end of the Cold War. Its

583
00:32:57,000 --> 00:33:03,000
Speaker 3: ability to produce large quantities of military material at an

584
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:06,480
Speaker 3: affordable price has declined, as has Europe, although they're trying

585
00:33:06,480 --> 00:33:09,560
Speaker 3: to turn that around. Russia and China have maintained the

586
00:33:09,640 --> 00:33:13,800
Speaker 3: capacity to be what I call an arsenal of authoritarians.

587
00:33:14,200 --> 00:33:17,440
Speaker 3: So these are two big problems. And then technologically, I

588
00:33:17,480 --> 00:33:20,880
Speaker 3: mean Russia is not near the United States or even

589
00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:25,880
Speaker 3: Europe technologically or even economically. But China is close to

590
00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:30,480
Speaker 3: the United States economically and technologically. It is the most

591
00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:35,480
Speaker 3: wealthy and technologically advanced competitor the United States has ever had,

592
00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:38,800
Speaker 3: and that means that you know, there's no way to

593
00:33:38,920 --> 00:33:42,680
Speaker 3: spend your way to victory against China. You've got to

594
00:33:43,040 --> 00:33:45,360
Speaker 3: produce a lot of stuff, but you've got to outthink

595
00:33:45,400 --> 00:33:47,040
Speaker 3: them as well, So you've.

596
00:33:46,920 --> 00:33:49,600
Speaker 1: Got to Yeah, so you know, you see all these

597
00:33:49,920 --> 00:33:55,440
Speaker 1: various technological advances in terms of the military capabilities. Is

598
00:33:55,520 --> 00:33:59,040
Speaker 1: the US winning that war or winning that game? Because

599
00:33:59,040 --> 00:34:02,240
Speaker 1: there there's another The second War is a technological war.

600
00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:07,040
Speaker 1: That's the we can now think you war. And the

601
00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:10,240
Speaker 1: United States always has been the technological leader in the world.

602
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:14,600
Speaker 1: But in terms of military do you think that China's

603
00:34:14,640 --> 00:34:17,680
Speaker 1: slowly was surely sneaking up with US? And therefore any

604
00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:20,800
Speaker 1: alliances they might have with Russia, Iran or North Korea

605
00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:24,399
Speaker 1: sort of enables those countries as well.

606
00:34:25,200 --> 00:34:29,239
Speaker 3: No, they certainly are very technologically sophisticated. The research and

607
00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:33,359
Speaker 3: development base in China is extraordinary, and they can move

608
00:34:33,400 --> 00:34:38,000
Speaker 3: with great speed in both researching and rolling out a

609
00:34:38,040 --> 00:34:38,920
Speaker 3: new technology.

610
00:34:38,920 --> 00:34:39,640
Speaker 2: But there are some.

611
00:34:39,480 --> 00:34:45,320
Speaker 3: Critical technologies where China is behind or well behind the

612
00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:48,839
Speaker 3: United States. I mean AI. The US is the undisputed

613
00:34:48,880 --> 00:34:51,880
Speaker 3: world leader or the major companies doing AI research and

614
00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:54,839
Speaker 3: development in the United States, and that is a very

615
00:34:54,920 --> 00:34:59,120
Speaker 3: significant advantage not just for AI but for using AI.

616
00:34:59,320 --> 00:35:04,880
Speaker 3: To research and develop other technologies, things like submarine warfare

617
00:35:05,080 --> 00:35:08,560
Speaker 3: and stealth is an area that provides a very significant

618
00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:12,160
Speaker 3: qualitative advantage for the US military forces and its allies

619
00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:15,920
Speaker 3: that it will share those capabilities with.

620
00:35:16,120 --> 00:35:18,280
Speaker 2: So I think that's important.

621
00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:23,279
Speaker 3: And so I think those two things are very important.

622
00:35:23,320 --> 00:35:26,600
Speaker 3: And you know, I think we should be very cautious

623
00:35:26,680 --> 00:35:30,600
Speaker 3: about questioning US will. You know, we've seen before where

624
00:35:30,719 --> 00:35:35,000
Speaker 3: America has preferred an isolationist approach, but if it is

625
00:35:35,200 --> 00:35:39,080
Speaker 3: challenged in any significant way, it's the kind of country

626
00:35:39,120 --> 00:35:43,040
Speaker 3: that can surprise us with how it can unify rally

627
00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:49,200
Speaker 3: and build capacity to overwhelm and adversary. So we should

628
00:35:49,520 --> 00:35:53,279
Speaker 3: never write off the American capacity to do that in

629
00:35:53,320 --> 00:35:56,520
Speaker 3: the right circumstances. And the Chinese will have to be

630
00:35:56,680 --> 00:36:00,120
Speaker 3: very very careful, indeed, if they want to make assumptions

631
00:36:00,400 --> 00:36:02,040
Speaker 3: about American will in the future.

632
00:36:02,840 --> 00:36:07,440
Speaker 1: So where do field Taiwan might be now or China

633
00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:10,880
Speaker 1: the Taiwan or relative to Taiwan, do you think that

634
00:36:10,920 --> 00:36:13,080
Speaker 1: they might have this whole event may have put them

635
00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:15,400
Speaker 1: back a few steps, Yeah.

636
00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:15,680
Speaker 2: I think so.

637
00:36:15,760 --> 00:36:18,360
Speaker 3: I mean, the Chinese have obviously watched the war in

638
00:36:18,440 --> 00:36:21,440
Speaker 3: Ukraine closely, but they've watched all our wars all the

639
00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:25,080
Speaker 3: way back to the Falklands War, so you know, they've

640
00:36:25,080 --> 00:36:28,879
Speaker 3: been learning from other people's wars for some time. Some

641
00:36:29,200 --> 00:36:32,000
Speaker 3: lessons from Ukraine would have given them heart, others would

642
00:36:32,000 --> 00:36:35,160
Speaker 3: have given them pause, particularly quality of people and these

643
00:36:35,280 --> 00:36:39,240
Speaker 3: kind of things. You know, the US policy for Taiwan

644
00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:42,920
Speaker 3: is not to encourage independence for Taiwan and not to

645
00:36:43,040 --> 00:36:46,720
Speaker 3: encourage a Chinese takeover. And you know, it hasn't changed

646
00:36:46,719 --> 00:36:50,480
Speaker 3: that policy. It's still walking that careful line. But you know,

647
00:36:50,560 --> 00:36:52,960
Speaker 3: I think there are enough signals there that if China

648
00:36:53,080 --> 00:36:58,120
Speaker 3: was to do something militarily aggressive against Taiwan, America would

649
00:36:58,120 --> 00:37:03,799
Speaker 3: certainly view that dimly and would probably seek to intervene

650
00:37:03,920 --> 00:37:08,560
Speaker 3: to protect one of two large island democracies of twenty

651
00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:11,440
Speaker 3: six million people in the Pacific, the other one being Australia.

652
00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:16,319
Speaker 1: Of course, can we just quickly talk about the way

653
00:37:16,760 --> 00:37:22,319
Speaker 1: the USA snuck up on Iran? They had sort of

654
00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:26,000
Speaker 1: all these diversionory tactics going on, as sending B two

655
00:37:26,120 --> 00:37:28,800
Speaker 1: bombers all around the joint. Maybe you could just quickly

656
00:37:28,840 --> 00:37:33,319
Speaker 1: take us through that, because whilst some of us, some

657
00:37:33,400 --> 00:37:36,040
Speaker 1: of us have read about it, we don't really understand

658
00:37:36,120 --> 00:37:37,440
Speaker 1: what they were trying to do. It just sounds like

659
00:37:37,480 --> 00:37:41,279
Speaker 1: the old curve ball. But maybe you just take us

660
00:37:41,280 --> 00:37:41,759
Speaker 1: through that, Mick.

661
00:37:42,640 --> 00:37:45,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean a couple of weeks ago, ironically, I

662
00:37:45,719 --> 00:37:48,280
Speaker 3: published a major report in the US on the future

663
00:37:48,320 --> 00:37:51,360
Speaker 3: of military deception with my friend Peter Singer Wow, and

664
00:37:51,400 --> 00:37:53,719
Speaker 3: we talked about these kind of things that, you know,

665
00:37:53,880 --> 00:37:58,120
Speaker 3: contrary to the prognostications of the ten minute military experts

666
00:37:58,480 --> 00:38:01,880
Speaker 3: that we often see talking about these issues, the battlefield

667
00:38:01,920 --> 00:38:05,360
Speaker 3: isn't totally transparent. You can't see everything, and you can't

668
00:38:05,400 --> 00:38:07,960
Speaker 3: always see what the enemy plans to do against you,

669
00:38:08,520 --> 00:38:12,239
Speaker 3: So surprise and deceptions still matter. And the Americans with

670
00:38:12,360 --> 00:38:16,239
Speaker 3: this bomber raid, I think employed the deception in a

671
00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:18,600
Speaker 3: couple of ways. One at the political level by saying, oh,

672
00:38:18,600 --> 00:38:20,560
Speaker 3: we're going to think about this for a couple of weeks,

673
00:38:21,640 --> 00:38:26,200
Speaker 3: which induced the Iranians to think they had time, whereas

674
00:38:26,239 --> 00:38:29,160
Speaker 3: they didn't. And secondly, on the military side, I mean,

675
00:38:29,200 --> 00:38:32,040
Speaker 3: the Americans allowed word to get out that some bombers

676
00:38:32,040 --> 00:38:35,200
Speaker 3: were heading across the Pacific when the real bombers had

677
00:38:35,239 --> 00:38:39,280
Speaker 3: actually turned around out of sight and were heading across

678
00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:43,080
Speaker 3: Europe towards Iran. So there are a couple of levels

679
00:38:43,080 --> 00:38:46,160
Speaker 3: of deception, and in Iran, they as the Chairman of

680
00:38:46,200 --> 00:38:50,640
Speaker 3: the Joint Chiefs outlined, they used decoy aircraft as well

681
00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:54,160
Speaker 3: ahead of the crewed aircraft, just as a final measure

682
00:38:54,200 --> 00:38:59,040
Speaker 3: to deceive any remaining Iranian air defense radars and interceptors.

683
00:39:00,640 --> 00:39:03,880
Speaker 3: Is still an important part of war, It's an important

684
00:39:03,960 --> 00:39:09,040
Speaker 3: part of being successful and is vital to achieving surprise

685
00:39:09,080 --> 00:39:11,960
Speaker 3: against an enemy. And the more surprise you achieve, the

686
00:39:12,000 --> 00:39:14,759
Speaker 3: more successful you are, and the more of your own

687
00:39:14,840 --> 00:39:17,440
Speaker 3: people you bring back alive, which is always important for

688
00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:19,440
Speaker 3: military commanders.

689
00:39:19,160 --> 00:39:22,320
Speaker 1: And particularly also politically. I think, to let get it,

690
00:39:22,400 --> 00:39:24,919
Speaker 1: the political impact of no one getting injured or hurt

691
00:39:25,360 --> 00:39:27,719
Speaker 1: is a big deal. And that's sort of what Trump

692
00:39:27,800 --> 00:39:30,759
Speaker 1: would call success. You just hit on something, as I

693
00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:34,279
Speaker 1: found quite interesting. So in terms of deception, the B

694
00:39:34,440 --> 00:39:36,880
Speaker 1: two bombers were sort of, by the sounds of what

695
00:39:36,920 --> 00:39:38,479
Speaker 1: you just said, they were sort of at the back

696
00:39:38,960 --> 00:39:42,160
Speaker 1: of the parade. In other words, they sent out I

697
00:39:42,239 --> 00:39:45,759
Speaker 1: think he is used to a decoy decoy aircraft. Were

698
00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:47,280
Speaker 1: they Israeli or were they American?

699
00:39:47,960 --> 00:39:52,640
Speaker 3: No, the Americans got very detailed brief on this yesterday morning.

700
00:39:52,719 --> 00:39:56,759
Speaker 3: This was an entirely an American operation with about one

701
00:39:56,800 --> 00:40:02,520
Speaker 3: hundred and twenty aircraft overall, dropping bombs and precision munitions

702
00:40:02,560 --> 00:40:06,480
Speaker 3: as they went to suppress any Iranian defenses, as well

703
00:40:06,520 --> 00:40:12,839
Speaker 3: as precision cruise missiles launched from American submarines. So you know,

704
00:40:12,880 --> 00:40:16,480
Speaker 3: this would have been complex to orchestrate in time and space,

705
00:40:17,360 --> 00:40:21,280
Speaker 3: but was an American operation where they basically said, the Israelis,

706
00:40:21,360 --> 00:40:23,799
Speaker 3: get out of Iranian airspace for this time. We're going

707
00:40:23,880 --> 00:40:26,440
Speaker 3: to do some stuff, and once we're gone, you can

708
00:40:26,560 --> 00:40:31,200
Speaker 3: return to your previous engagements over Iran. So that's the

709
00:40:31,320 --> 00:40:33,000
Speaker 3: rough details of how it all went down.

710
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:37,080
Speaker 1: And then the B two bombers did this so called

711
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:40,560
Speaker 1: Midnight Hammer, which I guess is dropping those thirty thousand

712
00:40:40,600 --> 00:40:42,840
Speaker 1: pound bombs I think there was fourteen of them or

713
00:40:42,840 --> 00:40:48,440
Speaker 1: something like that into these facilities. Is this ever happened before?

714
00:40:49,719 --> 00:40:52,560
Speaker 1: Is this a thing? Thirty thousand pound bombs like sounds

715
00:40:52,560 --> 00:40:53,200
Speaker 1: pretty big to me.

716
00:40:53,520 --> 00:40:56,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, no, it's pretty big. I mean, the last time

717
00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:00,919
Speaker 3: weapons of this size we used was World War Two.

718
00:41:00,960 --> 00:41:02,279
Speaker 2: I mean, the.

719
00:41:02,239 --> 00:41:05,560
Speaker 3: British had some pretty big bombs they dropped on submarine

720
00:41:05,600 --> 00:41:09,560
Speaker 3: panes and dms in Germany during the Second World War.

721
00:41:10,239 --> 00:41:14,600
Speaker 3: But these bombs were designed and built specifically for this

722
00:41:14,760 --> 00:41:18,520
Speaker 3: kind of target, primarily in Iran, but potentially in North

723
00:41:18,560 --> 00:41:21,719
Speaker 3: Korea as well, because over the last twenty years been

724
00:41:21,880 --> 00:41:25,120
Speaker 3: very clear that certain countries, in order to hide and

725
00:41:25,200 --> 00:41:30,520
Speaker 3: to protect weapons of master stuck instruction programs nuclear but

726
00:41:30,680 --> 00:41:37,200
Speaker 3: could be others, we would need to get through not

727
00:41:37,360 --> 00:41:40,640
Speaker 3: hundreds of feet of rock and concrete to destroy them.

728
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:43,279
Speaker 3: And these weapons were designed and built twenty years ago

729
00:41:43,320 --> 00:41:46,440
Speaker 3: for it, and this is their first real operational employer.

730
00:41:47,040 --> 00:41:50,000
Speaker 1: So I was watching TV last night in anticipation of

731
00:41:50,040 --> 00:41:52,800
Speaker 1: you and I speaking today, and they were showing vision

732
00:41:52,840 --> 00:41:57,160
Speaker 1: of the places where they were some of the places

733
00:41:57,160 --> 00:42:00,360
Speaker 1: where these three thousand pounds bombs had dropped. I just

734
00:42:00,400 --> 00:42:02,120
Speaker 1: looked like it looked like they just knocked a few

735
00:42:02,160 --> 00:42:06,399
Speaker 1: buildings out. But when you see it, maybe you could

736
00:42:06,400 --> 00:42:08,160
Speaker 1: give us a bit more insight as to whether or

737
00:42:08,160 --> 00:42:09,960
Speaker 1: not you thought it was complete destruction. So I kept

738
00:42:09,960 --> 00:42:12,040
Speaker 1: seeing the myself, well, actually get what was going on

739
00:42:12,120 --> 00:42:12,839
Speaker 1: underground or not?

740
00:42:14,480 --> 00:42:17,200
Speaker 3: Well, it will depend whether these bombs were actually able

741
00:42:17,239 --> 00:42:20,719
Speaker 3: to penetrate into the voids under these mountains where these

742
00:42:20,719 --> 00:42:25,279
Speaker 3: facilities are. If they were, they would have caused very,

743
00:42:25,400 --> 00:42:29,319
Speaker 3: very significant destruction that old scene from Armageddon when they

744
00:42:29,320 --> 00:42:31,319
Speaker 3: talk about you know, you have a firecracker in your hand.

745
00:42:31,320 --> 00:42:33,560
Speaker 3: If it goes off when it's open, no damage. If

746
00:42:33,560 --> 00:42:36,120
Speaker 3: it goes off when it's closed, no more hand. You know,

747
00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:38,280
Speaker 3: it's the same kind of things with these bunker buses.

748
00:42:38,280 --> 00:42:41,799
Speaker 3: If they get into those enclosed spaces and set off

749
00:42:41,840 --> 00:42:46,200
Speaker 3: all that explosives, the damage will be extraordinary. We just

750
00:42:46,280 --> 00:42:49,960
Speaker 3: don't know yet whether that has occurred, because at the

751
00:42:50,040 --> 00:42:52,600
Speaker 3: end of the day, you can't confirm this from space.

752
00:42:52,920 --> 00:42:54,759
Speaker 3: You're probably going to need people on the ground to

753
00:42:54,840 --> 00:42:55,360
Speaker 3: confirm this.

754
00:42:56,000 --> 00:42:58,200
Speaker 1: So what would the next steps to be theymic would

755
00:42:59,000 --> 00:43:02,360
Speaker 1: the ceasefire was sort of alluded to today by Trump.

756
00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:05,200
Speaker 1: I don't think Ryan has confirmed it at this stage

757
00:43:05,400 --> 00:43:10,279
Speaker 1: with whilst you and I are talking, nor Israel. Does

758
00:43:10,320 --> 00:43:14,440
Speaker 1: the International Atomic Agency do they do someone say, well,

759
00:43:14,480 --> 00:43:16,880
Speaker 1: we want them to have access going inside those bunkers

760
00:43:16,880 --> 00:43:18,720
Speaker 1: and have a look at what happens next.

761
00:43:19,680 --> 00:43:24,200
Speaker 3: Well, I would hope that Iran would allow the IAEA access.

762
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:26,160
Speaker 3: I mean, they're probably not going to get people him.

763
00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:29,200
Speaker 3: They'll probably have to send robots or remote senses in

764
00:43:29,400 --> 00:43:32,520
Speaker 3: to ascertain the status of these facilities, not just to

765
00:43:32,520 --> 00:43:34,400
Speaker 3: see if they're working or not, but the degree of

766
00:43:34,480 --> 00:43:38,680
Speaker 3: radiological contamination that might be present, well, clearly be monitoring

767
00:43:38,760 --> 00:43:41,440
Speaker 3: the atmosphere for that, but they'll want to see if

768
00:43:41,440 --> 00:43:47,000
Speaker 3: there's radiological contamination that's enclosed within these facilities, or indeed

769
00:43:47,040 --> 00:43:50,640
Speaker 3: if these facilities have suffered damage. I think that's probably

770
00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:53,960
Speaker 3: the way ahead for getting the best assessment, But that

771
00:43:54,080 --> 00:43:56,160
Speaker 3: will be up to the Iranians whether they allow the

772
00:43:56,200 --> 00:43:58,000
Speaker 3: IAEA to do.

773
00:43:57,880 --> 00:44:03,040
Speaker 1: This, because you know, there the Iranian leadership probably is

774
00:44:03,080 --> 00:44:06,000
Speaker 1: looking and feeling a little bit overwhelmed at the moment.

775
00:44:06,840 --> 00:44:10,120
Speaker 1: I might imagine a either got surprised, be either got

776
00:44:10,160 --> 00:44:13,960
Speaker 1: hit by the rings, which they weren't expecting Israel. I

777
00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:17,520
Speaker 1: think there's another twelve hours of fighting between the two

778
00:44:17,640 --> 00:44:21,400
Speaker 1: until the seasfire actually commences, So in Israel's already gone

779
00:44:21,440 --> 00:44:23,439
Speaker 1: and given a good whack to them over the past

780
00:44:23,520 --> 00:44:28,880
Speaker 1: couple of weeks. Anyway, would what normally happens there they

781
00:44:28,960 --> 00:44:31,280
Speaker 1: sit down and have a meeting or something sounds ridiculous,

782
00:44:31,320 --> 00:44:32,960
Speaker 1: but like they're in there trying to blast each other

783
00:44:33,000 --> 00:44:35,000
Speaker 1: off the face of the earth. Then they go and

784
00:44:35,040 --> 00:44:37,560
Speaker 1: have a meeting. Is that what happens after war season?

785
00:44:38,080 --> 00:44:38,600
Speaker 2: Well, you have.

786
00:44:38,600 --> 00:44:41,400
Speaker 3: Meetings all throughout war unless the animal attacks your meeting

787
00:44:41,400 --> 00:44:44,040
Speaker 3: and you're all dead. But I mean, we shouldn't forget

788
00:44:44,120 --> 00:44:48,239
Speaker 3: too that the Iranian leadership have been chased as individuals

789
00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:50,439
Speaker 3: by the Israelis. There's a great report in New York

790
00:44:50,480 --> 00:44:53,200
Speaker 3: Times today about how the Israelis have been emailing all

791
00:44:53,239 --> 00:44:56,319
Speaker 3: the senior Iranian leaders saying, you have twelve hours to

792
00:44:56,400 --> 00:44:58,960
Speaker 3: post a video renouncing the regime or we're going to

793
00:44:59,040 --> 00:45:02,399
Speaker 3: kill wow. So they also have that looking over their

794
00:45:02,400 --> 00:45:06,480
Speaker 3: shoulders as well, which will kind of coerce them to

795
00:45:06,560 --> 00:45:09,160
Speaker 3: decide one way or the other. But you know, I'd

796
00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:12,760
Speaker 3: expect that the Iranians would be keen to firstly project

797
00:45:12,800 --> 00:45:14,919
Speaker 3: to their own people that they haven't lost, that it's

798
00:45:14,960 --> 00:45:19,560
Speaker 3: not over. But secondly, they'll they'll want to conduct an

799
00:45:19,600 --> 00:45:22,200
Speaker 3: assessment of just how much damage has been caused. It

800
00:45:22,239 --> 00:45:25,279
Speaker 3: would have been hard to produce an accurate assessment of

801
00:45:25,360 --> 00:45:29,400
Speaker 3: damage to the nuclear as well as conventional military capabilities

802
00:45:29,440 --> 00:45:31,960
Speaker 3: of Iran over the last week or so. They'll want

803
00:45:32,000 --> 00:45:34,480
Speaker 3: to do that just to see, well, what defenses have

804
00:45:34,560 --> 00:45:37,480
Speaker 3: we got less. I mean, that will be one of

805
00:45:37,480 --> 00:45:39,839
Speaker 3: the first couple of questions that the Eyatla will ask,

806
00:45:39,960 --> 00:45:42,480
Speaker 3: is one do we still have a nuclear program in general?

807
00:45:43,400 --> 00:45:47,040
Speaker 3: Do we still have a viable defense of Iran general?

808
00:45:47,360 --> 00:45:49,520
Speaker 3: Is probably the first two questions they'll ask.

809
00:45:51,640 --> 00:45:54,359
Speaker 1: Do you reckon it? Actually the ceasefire what probably isn't

810
00:45:54,360 --> 00:45:56,160
Speaker 1: going to be a SEISFI makes sense? But do you

811
00:45:56,200 --> 00:45:59,200
Speaker 1: actually if the Iranians come out and confirm what Trump

812
00:45:59,200 --> 00:46:03,759
Speaker 1: has said today, do you actually believe that it is

813
00:46:03,840 --> 00:46:07,040
Speaker 1: a It's not called it permanent, but do you would

814
00:46:07,080 --> 00:46:10,759
Speaker 1: you believe it will ennure for the benefit of the

815
00:46:10,760 --> 00:46:13,440
Speaker 1: whole world for years to come? Or if this is

816
00:46:13,560 --> 00:46:15,759
Speaker 1: just do you think the Iranians are just going to say,

817
00:46:15,920 --> 00:46:19,959
Speaker 1: We'll just say we're there's a ceasefire and we'll start

818
00:46:20,000 --> 00:46:20,480
Speaker 1: to rebuild.

819
00:46:22,960 --> 00:46:25,520
Speaker 3: We'd all like to hope for the former, but we

820
00:46:25,640 --> 00:46:27,920
Speaker 3: probably have to plan for the latter. I mean, the

821
00:46:27,960 --> 00:46:31,240
Speaker 3: Iranians have been pretty unreliable when it comes to declaring

822
00:46:31,239 --> 00:46:34,600
Speaker 3: the full scope of their military and nuclear programs. The

823
00:46:34,640 --> 00:46:37,680
Speaker 3: only thing they've been reliable in is their dedication to

824
00:46:37,719 --> 00:46:40,839
Speaker 3: the destruction of Israel. So it's hard to see them

825
00:46:40,880 --> 00:46:46,480
Speaker 3: giving them giving up on those objectives. But despite desire,

826
00:46:47,000 --> 00:46:50,839
Speaker 3: hopefully the last ten days has taken away their capability

827
00:46:50,880 --> 00:46:52,200
Speaker 3: to do that for some time.

828
00:46:52,239 --> 00:46:52,560
Speaker 2: To come.

829
00:46:53,239 --> 00:46:59,080
Speaker 1: But surely they would. I mean, the concept of total

830
00:46:59,120 --> 00:47:05,120
Speaker 1: destruction of this of Israel in order to no longer

831
00:47:05,120 --> 00:47:07,920
Speaker 1: be a threat somehow, you'd have to convince the regime.

832
00:47:08,440 --> 00:47:11,000
Speaker 1: We'd have to believe that the regime has actually moved

833
00:47:11,000 --> 00:47:14,160
Speaker 1: away from that concept. And I don't. I would have

834
00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:17,759
Speaker 1: thought now, after having had the crap be bombed out

835
00:47:17,760 --> 00:47:23,200
Speaker 1: of them and sort of being completely made legless and

836
00:47:23,280 --> 00:47:26,480
Speaker 1: ashamed in front of their own people, that that would

837
00:47:26,480 --> 00:47:31,879
Speaker 1: actually galvanize the regime, the current regime into what they've

838
00:47:31,880 --> 00:47:34,600
Speaker 1: always believed and get rid of Israel altogether. The Zionists,

839
00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:38,040
Speaker 1: devil or whatever they call them. Can you see it,

840
00:47:38,120 --> 00:47:40,200
Speaker 1: like you know, you've had a lot of experience in

841
00:47:40,239 --> 00:47:44,120
Speaker 1: these regions, can you see them actually changing their conceptual

842
00:47:44,200 --> 00:47:46,040
Speaker 1: view the philosophy around Israel.

843
00:47:47,560 --> 00:47:51,160
Speaker 3: No, in a word, I don't see anything that's happened

844
00:47:51,160 --> 00:47:54,640
Speaker 3: that will change their view of Israel and their desire

845
00:47:54,840 --> 00:47:59,640
Speaker 3: to exterminate the Jewish state from the face of the earth.

846
00:48:00,640 --> 00:48:03,759
Speaker 3: It's and I think the Israelis accept that they're never

847
00:48:03,800 --> 00:48:07,880
Speaker 3: going to change the Iranian calculus unless there's some fundamental

848
00:48:07,920 --> 00:48:13,440
Speaker 3: political shift in that country and another change, a regime change,

849
00:48:13,440 --> 00:48:16,280
Speaker 3: and even then you've got to be careful with regime change.

850
00:48:16,360 --> 00:48:16,600
Speaker 2: One.

851
00:48:16,960 --> 00:48:18,880
Speaker 3: We're not very good at it, as we've proved in

852
00:48:18,920 --> 00:48:21,600
Speaker 3: the last twenty five years. And sometimes you can get

853
00:48:21,600 --> 00:48:24,160
Speaker 3: a regime that's even worse, not one that's better. So

854
00:48:24,840 --> 00:48:27,279
Speaker 3: you know, by beware if you want to go down

855
00:48:27,320 --> 00:48:30,120
Speaker 3: the path of regime change, because it could work out

856
00:48:30,239 --> 00:48:33,000
Speaker 3: much much worse than you anticipated, not much much better.

857
00:48:33,560 --> 00:48:36,160
Speaker 1: They're saying that better the devil, you know. I mean,

858
00:48:36,160 --> 00:48:39,399
Speaker 1: we've seen a regime change in Syria. Has that been

859
00:48:39,719 --> 00:48:41,120
Speaker 1: for the better? Do you think so far?

860
00:48:43,400 --> 00:48:46,120
Speaker 3: It's hard to tell. It's probably too early to tell.

861
00:48:46,440 --> 00:48:52,360
Speaker 3: In some respects Israel has newed Syria's conventional capabilities, but

862
00:48:52,400 --> 00:48:57,800
Speaker 3: whether Syria becomes a chaotic, unstable state that's a breeding

863
00:48:57,840 --> 00:49:00,960
Speaker 3: ground for terrorism remains to be seen. I mean, that's

864
00:49:00,960 --> 00:49:04,360
Speaker 3: certainly one of the potential future scenarios for it good.

865
00:49:04,840 --> 00:49:08,239
Speaker 1: I noticed that because I follow Trump on X but

866
00:49:08,440 --> 00:49:12,960
Speaker 1: Trump said on truth rather, Trump said something like he

867
00:49:13,040 --> 00:49:16,680
Speaker 1: wanted to thank prior to the ceasefire announcement, or Trump's

868
00:49:16,680 --> 00:49:20,680
Speaker 1: cease fire announcement, I should say he said that he

869
00:49:20,760 --> 00:49:27,160
Speaker 1: wanted to thank the Iranian administration for pre warning the

870
00:49:27,239 --> 00:49:30,440
Speaker 1: United States that they were going to hit Katah with

871
00:49:31,840 --> 00:49:35,680
Speaker 1: at a military based US military base, and that allowed

872
00:49:35,719 --> 00:49:39,000
Speaker 1: the US to get everyone out, so to speak, So

873
00:49:39,040 --> 00:49:44,799
Speaker 1: there were no casualties personal casualties. Would that be right doing?

874
00:49:44,960 --> 00:49:46,520
Speaker 1: What's the point of doing that? What's the point of

875
00:49:46,600 --> 00:49:48,840
Speaker 1: Iran signaling that they're going to go and hit a

876
00:49:48,840 --> 00:49:50,879
Speaker 1: military base and I'll get all your people at because

877
00:49:50,920 --> 00:49:52,799
Speaker 1: we just want to bash your base up. What's the

878
00:49:52,800 --> 00:49:53,200
Speaker 1: point of that?

879
00:49:53,600 --> 00:49:57,200
Speaker 3: No, that there's a certain logic to Iran doing that. Now,

880
00:49:57,480 --> 00:50:01,319
Speaker 3: the mechanism by which it did that could just be

881
00:50:02,160 --> 00:50:07,040
Speaker 3: openly missiles and stuff like that. But you know, I

882
00:50:07,080 --> 00:50:10,720
Speaker 3: think it's Iran signaling to the United States that, Okay,

883
00:50:11,200 --> 00:50:12,200
Speaker 3: you know, we're.

884
00:50:12,040 --> 00:50:13,880
Speaker 2: Kind of done in this round.

885
00:50:14,160 --> 00:50:16,760
Speaker 3: We're happy for it to be over, but you need

886
00:50:16,800 --> 00:50:19,440
Speaker 3: to allow us to demonstrate to our partners and our

887
00:50:19,480 --> 00:50:23,400
Speaker 3: people that you know, we've at least responded ceremonially to

888
00:50:23,960 --> 00:50:28,759
Speaker 3: what's gone on here, and that's what's happened. So you

889
00:50:28,760 --> 00:50:32,000
Speaker 3: know that there's always a performative elements in many of

890
00:50:32,040 --> 00:50:36,120
Speaker 3: these these attacks. You know, it's not just about in war.

891
00:50:36,160 --> 00:50:38,200
Speaker 3: Its not just about winning the war. It's winning the

892
00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:41,920
Speaker 3: story of the war and the Iranians with this attack

893
00:50:41,960 --> 00:50:45,719
Speaker 3: on Qatar a engaged on winning their version of the

894
00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:46,800
Speaker 3: story of the war.

895
00:50:46,960 --> 00:50:49,920
Speaker 1: Sort like saving face a little bit. So we did respond.

896
00:50:50,360 --> 00:50:53,200
Speaker 3: That's a that's a term to use, but it's the

897
00:50:53,320 --> 00:50:58,520
Speaker 3: Ranium way of building a story around their their war

898
00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:02,320
Speaker 3: against Israel and America, who they still call the Great Statan.

899
00:51:02,400 --> 00:51:06,600
Speaker 1: Of course, yes, if we just come back home domestically

900
00:51:06,680 --> 00:51:10,040
Speaker 1: for a moment. I mean you've sort of highlighted you've

901
00:51:10,040 --> 00:51:12,359
Speaker 1: done this in the previous times and a lot, you know,

902
00:51:12,400 --> 00:51:14,120
Speaker 1: you've said a lot over a long period of time

903
00:51:14,160 --> 00:51:18,640
Speaker 1: about Australias vulnerability. What do you think given that you

904
00:51:18,680 --> 00:51:22,200
Speaker 1: know Albanese is now out there needing to speak about

905
00:51:22,200 --> 00:51:24,520
Speaker 1: August to the United States President. I mean, obviously now

906
00:51:24,520 --> 00:51:28,120
Speaker 1: we know why the president was so busy. What do

907
00:51:28,160 --> 00:51:30,040
Speaker 1: you think August. Where do you think August stands? Now?

908
00:51:30,440 --> 00:51:33,040
Speaker 1: What effect or if nothing at all, perhaps, but of

909
00:51:33,160 --> 00:51:35,759
Speaker 1: all this last week or so, what effect would that

910
00:51:35,840 --> 00:51:36,840
Speaker 1: have on the Aucust agreement?

911
00:51:38,520 --> 00:51:41,239
Speaker 2: Well, I think a lot of people will look at it.

912
00:51:41,600 --> 00:51:44,880
Speaker 3: You know, it's a very expensive undertaking, and because the

913
00:51:44,920 --> 00:51:50,840
Speaker 3: government is unwilling to really substantially increase defense spending, certainly

914
00:51:50,880 --> 00:51:55,719
Speaker 3: not beyond the impacts of inflation. AUCUS is being a

915
00:51:55,840 --> 00:51:58,480
Speaker 3: much much larger part of the defense budget, which means

916
00:51:58,520 --> 00:52:02,040
Speaker 3: the rest of the Australian Defense Force becomes less capable,

917
00:52:02,120 --> 00:52:06,400
Speaker 3: less ready, less lethal. So you know, in a decade

918
00:52:06,480 --> 00:52:08,319
Speaker 3: or so, you know, it could well be that we

919
00:52:08,400 --> 00:52:11,760
Speaker 3: have three second hand American nuclear submarines and two dogs

920
00:52:11,760 --> 00:52:16,239
Speaker 3: in the Australian Defense Force. There's a skewing impact of

921
00:52:16,280 --> 00:52:19,920
Speaker 3: the Orchestra program on both force structure and budgets which

922
00:52:20,000 --> 00:52:22,239
Speaker 3: needs to be addressed if we want to have an

923
00:52:22,320 --> 00:52:25,879
Speaker 3: ADF and nuclear submarines. The only way to address that

924
00:52:26,000 --> 00:52:28,480
Speaker 3: is more money, because we clearly need more in the

925
00:52:28,520 --> 00:52:33,640
Speaker 3: ADF than just three submarines. There's a whole range of contingencies, challenges,

926
00:52:34,040 --> 00:52:37,040
Speaker 3: military and otherwise that the ADF need to be ready

927
00:52:37,080 --> 00:52:42,919
Speaker 3: for that. You know, the budget is less and less

928
00:52:42,960 --> 00:52:45,759
Speaker 3: able to meet. So you know, the three to four

929
00:52:45,800 --> 00:52:50,240
Speaker 3: percent range for GDP is about right according to pretty

930
00:52:50,320 --> 00:52:53,160
Speaker 3: much every defense expert in this country.

931
00:52:53,480 --> 00:52:55,360
Speaker 1: So we should be spending three to four percent of

932
00:52:55,400 --> 00:52:58,759
Speaker 1: our GDP on defense. What are we currently spending.

933
00:52:59,440 --> 00:53:00,360
Speaker 2: About two percent?

934
00:53:01,200 --> 00:53:03,440
Speaker 3: You know, sometimes it edges open to two point one,

935
00:53:03,560 --> 00:53:07,919
Speaker 3: sometimes just under depends on exchange rates and inflation. But unfortunately,

936
00:53:08,320 --> 00:53:11,400
Speaker 3: most of the defense increases we've seen have been entirely

937
00:53:11,440 --> 00:53:15,640
Speaker 3: absorbed by inflation. You know, Marcus Hellier's work on this,

938
00:53:15,800 --> 00:53:20,920
Speaker 3: I think is both substantial and very well informed. So

939
00:53:20,960 --> 00:53:24,320
Speaker 3: we need to get beyond this and start looking very

940
00:53:24,360 --> 00:53:27,920
Speaker 3: seriously at the kind of force structure one that is

941
00:53:27,960 --> 00:53:30,960
Speaker 3: required to defend the Australian homely particularly from missile and

942
00:53:31,040 --> 00:53:34,319
Speaker 3: drone attacks, but as well from other Chinese coercion, like

943
00:53:34,840 --> 00:53:38,840
Speaker 3: you know the Chinese naval circle work around Australia that

944
00:53:38,960 --> 00:53:41,160
Speaker 3: occurred a little while ago.

945
00:53:41,120 --> 00:53:43,839
Speaker 1: Well during the election period that was actually not that

946
00:53:43,880 --> 00:53:45,480
Speaker 1: far long ago, yes.

947
00:53:45,360 --> 00:53:47,640
Speaker 3: And the government did everything they possibly could to keep

948
00:53:47,640 --> 00:53:51,160
Speaker 3: that from the Australian people. So you know, we need

949
00:53:51,200 --> 00:53:54,560
Speaker 3: to have those kind of defensive capabilities as well as

950
00:53:54,600 --> 00:53:58,200
Speaker 3: contribute to operations in the region where China might decide

951
00:53:58,200 --> 00:54:02,360
Speaker 3: that the sobig to you of other nations should be challenged.

952
00:54:03,120 --> 00:54:06,160
Speaker 1: Do you think our intelligence community, because all this still

953
00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:08,880
Speaker 1: starts with intelligence. Intelligence first you got to find it

954
00:54:08,880 --> 00:54:10,560
Speaker 1: what the hell's going on. So you know, moss AD's

955
00:54:10,680 --> 00:54:12,680
Speaker 1: very good at this sort of stuff, and Israelis are

956
00:54:12,760 --> 00:54:14,920
Speaker 1: very good of this, as are the US. But in

957
00:54:15,000 --> 00:54:17,320
Speaker 1: terms of Australia. Do you think our intelligent capability is

958
00:54:18,280 --> 00:54:20,440
Speaker 1: as much as it fits under that whole topic of

959
00:54:20,440 --> 00:54:24,520
Speaker 1: defense is our intelligence community also need to have much

960
00:54:24,560 --> 00:54:27,720
Speaker 1: more funding and much more training and much more attention.

961
00:54:29,200 --> 00:54:32,319
Speaker 3: I think the Australian intelligence community in a qualitative sense

962
00:54:32,400 --> 00:54:35,960
Speaker 3: is extraordinarily good. I mean, we certainly are able to

963
00:54:36,280 --> 00:54:38,200
Speaker 3: there's one area where I think we do punch above

964
00:54:38,239 --> 00:54:38,680
Speaker 3: our weight.

965
00:54:38,760 --> 00:54:39,880
Speaker 2: To be honest.

966
00:54:40,640 --> 00:54:43,719
Speaker 3: Could it be bigger, absolutely, Could it have more technology

967
00:54:43,760 --> 00:54:47,239
Speaker 3: and more people, yes, But pound for pound, I think

968
00:54:47,280 --> 00:54:50,560
Speaker 3: it's a very good intelligence community that's pretty straight with

969
00:54:50,640 --> 00:54:53,440
Speaker 3: the government. And as you've seen with the head of ASIO,

970
00:54:53,840 --> 00:54:57,120
Speaker 3: you know, I really welcome the public statements by him

971
00:54:57,560 --> 00:55:01,040
Speaker 3: about the kinds of threats from countries and capabilities that

972
00:55:01,120 --> 00:55:04,720
Speaker 3: Australia faces. So, you know, I don't think the problem

973
00:55:04,800 --> 00:55:06,920
Speaker 3: in this country is our intelligence community. I think it's

974
00:55:06,920 --> 00:55:10,319
Speaker 3: pretty good. It's the problem is responding to what the

975
00:55:10,360 --> 00:55:14,720
Speaker 3: intelligence community are identifying and recommending to government.

976
00:55:15,520 --> 00:55:18,160
Speaker 1: In other words, our ability to execute and I don't

977
00:55:18,360 --> 00:55:21,080
Speaker 1: execute a person, but execute a strategy.

978
00:55:21,719 --> 00:55:23,880
Speaker 3: Well, I think there's a couple of these. One the

979
00:55:23,920 --> 00:55:26,759
Speaker 3: ability of the Australian government to have an honest conversation

980
00:55:26,960 --> 00:55:30,360
Speaker 3: with Australian citizens about the nature of the threats we face,

981
00:55:30,640 --> 00:55:33,160
Speaker 3: which is far more profound than the Government is willing

982
00:55:33,239 --> 00:55:37,840
Speaker 3: to discuss with the Australian people. And secondly, their ability

983
00:55:37,880 --> 00:55:40,960
Speaker 3: to have an honest conversation about the resourcing needed to

984
00:55:41,080 --> 00:55:43,319
Speaker 3: respond to those threats. They are two things that are

985
00:55:43,360 --> 00:55:44,520
Speaker 3: really missing at the moment.

986
00:55:45,080 --> 00:55:48,080
Speaker 1: What do you think about our Prime minister's sort of

987
00:55:48,160 --> 00:55:53,680
Speaker 1: lack of public commentary in relation to what's currently going on,

988
00:55:53,840 --> 00:55:57,799
Speaker 1: particularly what went on the other night when the US

989
00:55:57,880 --> 00:56:01,560
Speaker 1: dropped the b twodrop bombs dropped the thirty thousand pound bomb.

990
00:56:03,120 --> 00:56:05,440
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean it's you know, when these kind of

991
00:56:05,440 --> 00:56:07,719
Speaker 3: things happen, a lot of us go straight and see

992
00:56:08,040 --> 00:56:10,040
Speaker 3: when is the government going to make a statement on this,

993
00:56:10,080 --> 00:56:11,839
Speaker 3: When's a foreign minutter going to tweet out a state?

994
00:56:12,280 --> 00:56:14,600
Speaker 3: When's the PM going to say something? I mean, the

995
00:56:14,680 --> 00:56:18,440
Speaker 3: day long delay was very difficult to fathom other than

996
00:56:18,800 --> 00:56:21,839
Speaker 3: they were doing a careful political calculus about is it

997
00:56:22,200 --> 00:56:26,840
Speaker 3: domestically better for them to say nothing than to support

998
00:56:26,880 --> 00:56:29,640
Speaker 3: our American allies in what was a very limited and

999
00:56:29,680 --> 00:56:36,160
Speaker 3: successful military action. So you know, their considerations are all

1000
00:56:36,200 --> 00:56:40,200
Speaker 3: around domestic politics, as are most politicians, and I appreciate

1001
00:56:40,280 --> 00:56:43,520
Speaker 3: that the problem is their inclinations at the moment to

1002
00:56:43,640 --> 00:56:46,240
Speaker 3: lean back from the threat posed by countries like Russia

1003
00:56:46,320 --> 00:56:49,520
Speaker 3: and China is the wrong inclination. They need to lean forward.

1004
00:56:49,719 --> 00:56:53,440
Speaker 3: They need to engage in more deterrence against these threats. Otherwise,

1005
00:56:53,640 --> 00:56:56,919
Speaker 3: you know, an expensive bit of deterrence now will look

1006
00:56:57,000 --> 00:56:59,400
Speaker 3: cheap compared to what might have to be spent on

1007
00:56:59,440 --> 00:57:00,440
Speaker 3: defense in fetu.

1008
00:57:00,719 --> 00:57:04,440
Speaker 1: As a former major general in Australia and if you're

1009
00:57:04,560 --> 00:57:09,120
Speaker 1: let's say you're current, do people of your ilk and

1010
00:57:09,520 --> 00:57:14,920
Speaker 1: status get disappointed with the politics in relation to money

1011
00:57:14,920 --> 00:57:17,840
Speaker 1: allocated to defense. Things that are obvious, you know, the

1012
00:57:17,880 --> 00:57:25,560
Speaker 1: world has changed. Commentary by our leader relative to our alliances,

1013
00:57:26,520 --> 00:57:29,560
Speaker 1: even saying something like congratulations America, well done or something

1014
00:57:29,680 --> 00:57:33,000
Speaker 1: like that. Do people of your status who are in

1015
00:57:33,040 --> 00:57:36,560
Speaker 1: the currently in the in the army, for example, or

1016
00:57:36,560 --> 00:57:39,120
Speaker 1: in the military, and also former people who are like you,

1017
00:57:39,160 --> 00:57:44,400
Speaker 1: who are still active in strategic analysis and reports and commentary,

1018
00:57:44,960 --> 00:57:47,320
Speaker 1: do you feel a bit disappointed? Do your colleagues get

1019
00:57:47,360 --> 00:57:48,080
Speaker 1: a bit disappointed?

1020
00:57:49,560 --> 00:57:53,120
Speaker 3: Everyone has their own personal views on these kind of things,

1021
00:57:53,160 --> 00:57:56,520
Speaker 3: but it's important to note that in a democracy, civil

1022
00:57:56,560 --> 00:58:01,440
Speaker 3: military relations are about civil primacy. And you know, soldiers

1023
00:58:01,560 --> 00:58:04,840
Speaker 3: don't get to publicly disagree with the government for very

1024
00:58:04,880 --> 00:58:07,560
Speaker 3: good reason. You know, even if the government makes a

1025
00:58:07,640 --> 00:58:10,480
Speaker 3: stupid decision, it's still better that they make a stupid

1026
00:58:10,520 --> 00:58:13,480
Speaker 3: decision in a democracy than the military come out and

1027
00:58:13,520 --> 00:58:16,520
Speaker 3: says that. So, you know, this is something that Elliott

1028
00:58:16,560 --> 00:58:20,800
Speaker 3: Cohen calls the unequal dialogue. It is a very important

1029
00:58:21,680 --> 00:58:25,240
Speaker 3: principle in our democracy and others that the military gets

1030
00:58:25,240 --> 00:58:30,080
Speaker 3: to offer best military advice, but ultimately the government decides

1031
00:58:30,160 --> 00:58:33,400
Speaker 3: and acts on that advice. And that's a system that

1032
00:58:33,920 --> 00:58:36,640
Speaker 3: I strongly agree with. It's something that we should probably

1033
00:58:36,720 --> 00:58:39,680
Speaker 3: educate Austrayans about more. But at the end of the day,

1034
00:58:39,840 --> 00:58:44,240
Speaker 3: civil primacy is the most important and overwhelming principle in

1035
00:58:44,360 --> 00:58:49,160
Speaker 3: those kind of in those kind of discussions and negotiations.

1036
00:58:49,760 --> 00:58:51,640
Speaker 1: And what do you mean, Mick by that In terms

1037
00:58:51,640 --> 00:58:56,720
Speaker 1: of civil primacy, that means the civil the the the

1038
00:58:56,800 --> 00:58:59,480
Speaker 1: rights of the civilians, and the process of the civilians.

1039
00:59:00,120 --> 00:59:04,240
Speaker 1: She overrides everything that the military might want to do

1040
00:59:04,320 --> 00:59:06,680
Speaker 1: or might want to say. In other words, the military

1041
00:59:06,720 --> 00:59:11,760
Speaker 1: is basically an arm of the total. In other words,

1042
00:59:11,800 --> 00:59:15,040
Speaker 1: just doesn't the tail, which is the military doesn't wag

1043
00:59:15,120 --> 00:59:18,080
Speaker 1: the body. It's the body or the head decides what's

1044
00:59:18,120 --> 00:59:20,720
Speaker 1: going to happen down downstream. So to speak of it

1045
00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:22,800
Speaker 1: don't mean that being lesser downstream.

1046
00:59:23,400 --> 00:59:27,720
Speaker 3: Absolutely, you know, the democratically elected government of the day

1047
00:59:28,000 --> 00:59:32,680
Speaker 3: is the lead and the final decision maker. That is

1048
00:59:32,720 --> 00:59:35,960
Speaker 3: extraordinarily important in our democracy and many others. It's it's

1049
00:59:35,960 --> 00:59:39,480
Speaker 3: a principle that I strongly agree with and have supported

1050
00:59:39,600 --> 00:59:42,520
Speaker 3: through my own service over thirty five years, and it's

1051
00:59:42,560 --> 00:59:46,440
Speaker 3: the only way a democracy can function. Military can only

1052
00:59:47,000 --> 00:59:51,240
Speaker 3: act to achieve the policy and political outcomes of the

1053
00:59:51,280 --> 00:59:55,760
Speaker 3: democratically elected government, even if those outcomes don't see the

1054
00:59:55,800 --> 00:59:59,000
Speaker 3: size or capability the military that some of us would prefer.

1055
01:00:00,440 --> 01:00:03,320
Speaker 3: There's always tensions in this and that tension is generally

1056
01:00:03,360 --> 01:00:07,000
Speaker 3: pretty healthy because it leads to better and more creative solutions.

1057
01:00:07,440 --> 01:00:09,800
Speaker 3: And it's hardly a new problem. I'm pretty sure a

1058
01:00:09,800 --> 01:00:14,280
Speaker 3: couple thousand years ago to Russian, sorry to Roman soldiers

1059
01:00:14,320 --> 01:00:18,120
Speaker 3: standing on Hadrian's War were debating those politicians they didn't

1060
01:00:18,200 --> 01:00:20,880
Speaker 3: like in Rome. This is an old story for soldiers,

1061
01:00:20,960 --> 01:00:25,720
Speaker 3: but it is certainly an environment and a situation that's

1062
01:00:25,760 --> 01:00:27,200
Speaker 3: preferable to the alternative.

1063
01:00:27,960 --> 01:00:31,160
Speaker 1: Well, Mick Ryan once again, thanks for your insights. May

1064
01:00:31,200 --> 01:00:33,440
Speaker 1: have been fantastic. You've actually cleared up a lot of

1065
01:00:34,200 --> 01:00:37,320
Speaker 1: the nuances, but you've also cleared up a lot of

1066
01:00:37,360 --> 01:00:39,320
Speaker 1: the dust that's sort of floating around these sorts of

1067
01:00:39,480 --> 01:00:42,880
Speaker 1: conversations because media tends to get hold of it and

1068
01:00:42,920 --> 01:00:46,200
Speaker 1: it goes all over the joint. One good thing is, Mick,

1069
01:00:46,240 --> 01:00:47,840
Speaker 1: as we're sitting here now, at least we know that

1070
01:00:47,880 --> 01:00:52,480
Speaker 1: Donald Trump is called for a ceasefire. And that's probably

1071
01:00:52,680 --> 01:00:55,720
Speaker 1: whether it depends what irrespect of what happens in the future.

1072
01:00:56,560 --> 01:00:59,520
Speaker 1: Sitting here right now today, that's a better position for

1073
01:00:59,560 --> 01:01:00,800
Speaker 1: you and I be in and for the rest of

1074
01:01:00,800 --> 01:01:03,320
Speaker 1: Australia being then it would be otherwise. So once again,

1075
01:01:03,400 --> 01:01:05,280
Speaker 1: thanks very much, Thanks for all your service, Thanks for

1076
01:01:05,320 --> 01:01:08,640
Speaker 1: everything you contribute to Australia, and you've never stop. You

1077
01:01:08,720 --> 01:01:10,240
Speaker 1: just keep contributing it and I appreciate it.

1078
01:01:10,760 --> 01:01:12,640
Speaker 2: Thanks Mark, it's great to talk to you again. And yeah,

1079
01:01:12,680 --> 01:01:14,080
Speaker 2: let's all hope this six five weeks.

1080
01:01:14,640 --> 01:01:15,120
Speaker 1: Goodnight,