WEBVTT - Police trial live face-scanning technology: what could possibly go wrong?

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Daniel James and you're listening to seven AM. In

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<v Speaker 1>Western Australia, police have just started trialing a technology that

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<v Speaker 1>can identify people as they walk past a marked police

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<v Speaker 1>fan will scan faces outside major events, cross checking them

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<v Speaker 1>against a watch list of people want to buy authorities,

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<v Speaker 1>police states targeted and that innocent people have nothing to fear.

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<v Speaker 1>But once this kind of surveillance has switched on, the

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<v Speaker 1>question becomes how far it spreads and who decides when

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<v Speaker 1>it stops. Today, University of New South Wales cybersecurity expert

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<v Speaker 1>Professor Richard Bucklin on the scope creep of live facial

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<v Speaker 1>recognition and the danger of normalizing police powers before the

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<v Speaker 1>public understands them. It's Tuesday, June twenty three.

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<v Speaker 2>Our custom built facial recognition VAN, which is going to

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<v Speaker 2>be used to assist police operations. VAN has a number

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<v Speaker 2>of features inside it, including a computer system which processes

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<v Speaker 2>images from high quality cameras, which then compares those images

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<v Speaker 2>against the database.

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<v Speaker 1>Richard. WA Police have announced a trial of live facial

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<v Speaker 1>recognition technology. What can you tell us about the technology

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<v Speaker 1>and how will this trial work?

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<v Speaker 3>So this is a very limited trial they've announced, It's

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<v Speaker 3>just in one van. Which will be marked, saying according

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<v Speaker 3>to the images we've seen that there's facial recognition running

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<v Speaker 3>and how it works is they are looking for particular

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<v Speaker 3>people in this case, so they've got presumably a database

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<v Speaker 3>somewhere of faces of people feed a certain category and

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<v Speaker 3>they're trying to see if any of those people walk

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<v Speaker 3>past the van.

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<v Speaker 4>Important thing for us in our police force working with

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<v Speaker 4>our community is transparency and public safety. That's why the

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<v Speaker 4>has police written on the side. It has very clear

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<v Speaker 4>signage about what it's doing.

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<v Speaker 3>And the categories that've mentioned are people who are wanted

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<v Speaker 3>for domestic plots, known sex offenders, so pretty reprehensible people

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<v Speaker 3>and the sort of people you'd really want the police

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<v Speaker 3>to be able to catch, and it would seem reasonable

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<v Speaker 3>that they'd be out in public looking for these people.

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<v Speaker 4>This is not about mass surveillance. This is about specifying

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<v Speaker 4>those in our community who are wanted by police because

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<v Speaker 4>there is an arrest warrant out for them, who are

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<v Speaker 4>on sex offender lists, who should not be in the vicinity,

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<v Speaker 4>particularly of young children. But it's also about helping missing

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<v Speaker 4>people as.

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<v Speaker 3>We understand it. They're obviously a bit cooe about the details,

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<v Speaker 3>but the images are scanned in real time. If there's

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<v Speaker 3>a match, then the recording is left showing those faces

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<v Speaker 3>and the police are alerted in real time, presumely in

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<v Speaker 3>the van, and then the other faces that don't match

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<v Speaker 3>anyone on this list are pixelated.

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<v Speaker 4>This is actually a way that we can increase the

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<v Speaker 4>freedoms and the privacy of our community.

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<v Speaker 1>The Police commissioner says, this is actually a less intrusive

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<v Speaker 1>option than what police currently rely on, which is CCTV

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<v Speaker 1>footage from private citizens.

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<v Speaker 5>Look, I've always been concerned about the spread of CCTV

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<v Speaker 5>around our community, particularly the ownership of the cameras where

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<v Speaker 5>the information stored. How long this story. We don't even

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<v Speaker 5>know half these cameras and who's using them.

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<v Speaker 1>What do you make of that argument?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean it's the argument that we always hear

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<v Speaker 3>with privacy related things. I'm sure the police will continue

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<v Speaker 3>using the methods that they currently have, so there's in

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<v Speaker 3>no sense is adding this into the mix less intrusive.

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<v Speaker 3>It's actually widening the range of surveillance powers they have.

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<v Speaker 3>The argument's not going to the harder things for a

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<v Speaker 3>number of reasons. It is certainly the case that the

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<v Speaker 3>police will use this to catch people that everyone agrees

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<v Speaker 3>should be caught. The problem isn't with the software doing

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<v Speaker 3>its job, So the problem is what are the consequences

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<v Speaker 3>to everyone else? What's a consequence to a society of

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<v Speaker 3>having cameras everywhere? And if this continues on this trajectory,

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<v Speaker 3>then this software now could be used once the trials

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<v Speaker 3>run and everyone's happy with the trial which achieved its snublanes,

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<v Speaker 3>it could then be used to monitor everyone everywhere in

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<v Speaker 3>a way we've never had before. Once you've got technology

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<v Speaker 3>able to do something, then everyone sits around think of

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<v Speaker 3>reasons and ways you can use it to do other things.

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<v Speaker 3>And this is scope creep and we see this over

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<v Speaker 3>and over again with privacy. So the example I'm really

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<v Speaker 3>familiar with is in New South Wales, we had a

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<v Speaker 3>trial of cameras to detect people using mobile phones because

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<v Speaker 3>a lot of road safety data, as I'm sure everyone knows,

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<v Speaker 3>shows that mobile phone usage by the driver was involved

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<v Speaker 3>in a frightening number of accidents that caused harm to

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<v Speaker 3>lots of other people, innocent people when the drive was

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<v Speaker 3>using it. So they put these cameras in locations and

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<v Speaker 3>they're very high resolution that can detect if someone's using

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<v Speaker 3>a mobile phone. It was a success. It identified lots

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<v Speaker 3>of people using the phone as. On the basis of

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<v Speaker 3>that successful identification, those cameras have been rolled out and

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<v Speaker 3>they're increasingly appearing around New South Wales. But the scope

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<v Speaker 3>creep happened when someone said, we've got this footage, what

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<v Speaker 3>else can we use it for? We can easily see

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<v Speaker 3>if someone's wearing a seat belt using this, So now

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<v Speaker 3>those cameras are used for seat belt offenses not wearing

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<v Speaker 3>a seat belt. Sure, it's still a good thing to do,

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<v Speaker 3>I guess, but the difference is with a mobile phone.

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<v Speaker 3>The argument in the trial was you can kill innocent people.

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<v Speaker 3>Other people suffer from you breaking this law. If you're

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<v Speaker 3>not wearing a seat belt, you're probably the only one

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<v Speaker 3>that's going to suffer from not wearing a seat belt.

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<v Speaker 3>It won't go back to the public and it won't

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<v Speaker 3>be tested again. It's now they've got that capability. It

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<v Speaker 3>can be used for other things, and this is I guess,

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<v Speaker 3>what's scaring and why it's always good to check back

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<v Speaker 3>after a short period of time what the thing's being

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<v Speaker 3>used for and by someone independent. Is this in line

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<v Speaker 3>with our intents and values right now?

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<v Speaker 1>They're using for this trial a very clearly marked police fan.

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<v Speaker 1>Police haven't ruled out using this in a more covert

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<v Speaker 1>form and future including a protests. How does that change

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<v Speaker 1>the equation compared to what was originally being trialed.

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<v Speaker 3>You're spot on. If it's used at protests, for example, imagine,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, we're back in the old days where it

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<v Speaker 3>was illegal to be home sexual at criminal offense. Then

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<v Speaker 3>if there was a protest for gay rights. Having a

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<v Speaker 3>camera they're identifying people in real time, you know, obviously

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<v Speaker 3>means that a database can be built of people. Now

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<v Speaker 3>you could argue, well, we could have the camera and

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<v Speaker 3>not recorded in real time. You know, we could have

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<v Speaker 3>the camera and analyzi this later, but that's a much

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<v Speaker 3>bigger job once you've got to you know, you probably

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<v Speaker 3>know yourself. If you get a book and read, it's easy.

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<v Speaker 3>But if you put it in that pile of books

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<v Speaker 3>and that pol just gets bigger and bigger and bigger,

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<v Speaker 3>it's much harder to search. So giving people real time

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<v Speaker 3>capability to update databases means you could identify people who

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<v Speaker 3>are violating the law, even when perhaps it's not a

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<v Speaker 3>law we're totally happy with, and it's a chilling effect

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<v Speaker 3>really on your ability to protest, like we saw in

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<v Speaker 3>China and Hong Kong.

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<v Speaker 1>Coming up, how facial recognition technology is being used elsewhere

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<v Speaker 1>in Australia and the world, Richard, what can you tell

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<v Speaker 1>us about how this technology has been used by police

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<v Speaker 1>and other parts of the world.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so in the States, they do a lot of

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<v Speaker 3>facial recognition stuff, and it's being used to identify people

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<v Speaker 3>that the police are interested in and because they've had

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<v Speaker 3>a long history of doing that. But I do think

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<v Speaker 3>the big problem in the States is the chilling effect

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<v Speaker 3>that you would now be frightened to protest against things

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<v Speaker 3>you might think are egregious. And then there's this other question,

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<v Speaker 3>which is once your movements are tracked and known and

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<v Speaker 3>that data is stored somewhere, who has access to this.

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<v Speaker 3>So in the States, there are examples where the police,

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<v Speaker 3>individuals insiders inside the police, use it for tracking their spouse,

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<v Speaker 3>use it for finding spouses who have escaped them for

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<v Speaker 3>family violence.

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<v Speaker 6>Reasons are of DIA's office. As this former coast to

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<v Speaker 6>me as a police officer, not only is these flot

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<v Speaker 6>cameras to track his mistress, her new boyfriends, as well

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<v Speaker 6>as his current wife, but also use confidential law enforcement

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<v Speaker 6>systems to be able to run people a number of

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<v Speaker 6>times that had nothing to do with his work.

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<v Speaker 3>One police officer used it to track down and date

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<v Speaker 3>someone he thought was interesting and work out where they

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<v Speaker 3>lived and where they went, and all sorts of things

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<v Speaker 3>like that.

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<v Speaker 7>Have a former Milwaukee police officer pleading guilty today to

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<v Speaker 7>a misdemeanor. It comes after court record show Joe suay

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<v Speaker 7>Ayala seerves the locations of his girlfriend and her boyfriend

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<v Speaker 7>more than one hundred and seventy times using Milwaukee Police

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<v Speaker 7>Department's license plate reading technology.

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<v Speaker 3>So even if the government and the police as an

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<v Speaker 3>organization say they're going to look after the data and

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<v Speaker 3>it's been used for good purposes, of course individuals have

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<v Speaker 3>access to the data. And then the extension of that

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<v Speaker 3>is if they break into this database. So the criminals.

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<v Speaker 1>Richard Now, a Florida man, is suing police after II

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<v Speaker 1>facial recognition technology led to his wrongful arrest. How lockily

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<v Speaker 1>a situations lot that to arise with his technolog.

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<v Speaker 3>Technology always makes mistakes. The only way of stopping it

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<v Speaker 3>making mistakes is spending more money and often to reduce

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<v Speaker 3>mistakes by a lot costs a huge amount. More So,

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<v Speaker 3>usually we solve mistakes by shifting them from one type

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<v Speaker 3>of mistake to the other. So the type one and

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<v Speaker 3>type two mistakes that this software can make. One is

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<v Speaker 3>where it wrongfully identifies an innocent person as being a

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<v Speaker 3>bad person, and the other mistake is where a bad

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<v Speaker 3>person doesn't get properly identified. And really there's a knoll

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<v Speaker 3>almost on the software that you can choose where you

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<v Speaker 3>set it. If you set it too far, if you're

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<v Speaker 3>too determined to catch all the criminals and not let

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<v Speaker 3>anyone through, then it will wrongfully identify a range of.

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<v Speaker 1>People with this technology. Richard, what about racial bias, because

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<v Speaker 1>there's been an issue with technology like this in the

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<v Speaker 1>past not really taking into account the diversity within communities. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>what can you say to that.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, most of the data sets that things have been

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<v Speaker 3>trained on are white, middle class white males and a

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<v Speaker 3>high profile people in disadvantaged groups, minority groups in America,

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<v Speaker 3>people with perhaps disabilities. You know, you could just imagine,

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<v Speaker 3>I haven't trained it on everyone in the world. If

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<v Speaker 3>your training data isn't good enough, it's making a guess

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<v Speaker 3>based on what it's seen. So yeah, absolutely, there's all

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<v Speaker 3>these sort of biases in the software, and even facial

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<v Speaker 3>recognition with human makes mistakes. It's not a very good

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<v Speaker 3>way of identifying people.

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<v Speaker 1>Another one of the police commissioners arguments was that this

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<v Speaker 1>technology is already being used out in the community. How

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<v Speaker 1>widespread is this both inside and outside of policing?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean it, it is been Can I just

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<v Speaker 3>say that's not a brilliant argument. My children try that one.

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<v Speaker 1>Everyone's doing it is the idea.

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<v Speaker 3>Everyone's doing it, so I can I mean, this is

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<v Speaker 3>I guess just taking a quick diversion. This is really

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<v Speaker 3>the problem with the cameras. You put your finger on

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<v Speaker 3>it in a nutshell, that we're slowly drifting by a

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<v Speaker 3>series of incremental steps, and at every point we can

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<v Speaker 3>make an argument that if you don't look at it

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<v Speaker 3>too carefully, you think, oh, that's reasonable. But as we

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<v Speaker 3>make step by step by step, people's privacy and ability

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<v Speaker 3>to live a life not being surveiled is diminished, and

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<v Speaker 3>arguments then are, well, you've already lost it, so we

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<v Speaker 3>can just keep doing it. So this incremental drift is

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<v Speaker 3>actually quite scary. Visual capture is very widespread. There's cameras everywhere.

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<v Speaker 3>If we take it step by step, including lots of

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<v Speaker 3>private cameras pointing onto the street. It's very hard to

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<v Speaker 3>walk around in Sydney. If you drive down the road

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<v Speaker 3>to the Blue Mountains. It used to be one surveillance

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<v Speaker 3>camera at the beginning. There's now one every two hundred meters.

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<v Speaker 3>I don't know how they got the budget to do that.

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<v Speaker 3>So then there's facial recognition applied to recordings, and that

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<v Speaker 3>is not so widely done by people that's more forensic people,

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<v Speaker 3>but real time facial recognition that has commercial advantages and

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<v Speaker 3>people do use that. And Bunnings and Kmarts as a

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<v Speaker 3>famous case that happened recently, where they were using it

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<v Speaker 3>to identify people that would be abusive to their staff,

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<v Speaker 3>or people that committed very sorts of fraud either check

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<v Speaker 3>out fraud not scanning things, or people who made multiple

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<v Speaker 3>fraudulent returns and plaim money back on items they hadn't

0:12:01.800 --> 0:12:02.439
<v Speaker 3>brought in the store.

0:12:02.559 --> 0:12:05.120
<v Speaker 8>Some of the most popular retailers are being accused of

0:12:05.160 --> 0:12:11.360
<v Speaker 8>invading customers privacy by installing facial recognition cameras in their stores. Kmart,

0:12:11.440 --> 0:12:14.439
<v Speaker 8>Bunnings and the good guys have been blasted by This.

0:12:14.440 --> 0:12:18.000
<v Speaker 3>Was met with a lot of public shock that they

0:12:18.000 --> 0:12:21.120
<v Speaker 3>were recording people and identifying people without telling them.

0:12:21.240 --> 0:12:24.320
<v Speaker 8>Kmart has been found to have breached privacy laws in

0:12:24.360 --> 0:12:28.199
<v Speaker 8>its use of facial recognition technology in stores across the country.

0:12:28.280 --> 0:12:30.640
<v Speaker 9>Bunnings has been given the green light to use facial

0:12:30.679 --> 0:12:34.960
<v Speaker 9>recognition technology across its stores. The hardware giant maintains it

0:12:35.000 --> 0:12:39.280
<v Speaker 9>will only use the technology to prevent shoplifting and protect staff.

0:12:39.679 --> 0:12:43.360
<v Speaker 9>It won an appeal in the Administrative Review Tribunal following

0:12:43.360 --> 0:12:46.239
<v Speaker 9>an earlier ruling that it breached customer privacy.

0:12:46.360 --> 0:12:49.040
<v Speaker 3>So, yeah, it is being used, and I would expect

0:12:49.120 --> 0:12:50.920
<v Speaker 3>unless there is a stop to it. If we just

0:12:51.000 --> 0:12:54.280
<v Speaker 3>keep saying yeah, that sounds reasonable, we could eventually live

0:12:54.320 --> 0:12:57.239
<v Speaker 3>in an all willing world wherever you go, you're recognized

0:12:57.240 --> 0:13:00.760
<v Speaker 3>and noticed, Your movements are known. And that's so obvious

0:13:00.800 --> 0:13:03.600
<v Speaker 3>from some people, witness protection plans, people who are trying

0:13:03.600 --> 0:13:07.720
<v Speaker 3>to hide from abusive partners, people are trying to whistle blow.

0:13:07.760 --> 0:13:10.640
<v Speaker 3>We've seen some whistleblowing happening recently, the KP and G

0:13:10.800 --> 0:13:13.280
<v Speaker 3>case that are now saying they wouldn't whistle blow again,

0:13:13.360 --> 0:13:16.520
<v Speaker 3>that the fact of surveillance is actually enough to stop

0:13:16.559 --> 0:13:19.320
<v Speaker 3>people wanting to speak out. So yeah, So the world

0:13:19.360 --> 0:13:22.079
<v Speaker 3>we're moving into if this is allowed, would be a

0:13:22.160 --> 0:13:23.880
<v Speaker 3>very different world, and it'd be good for us to

0:13:23.880 --> 0:13:26.400
<v Speaker 3>stop and think, is this what we want to.

0:13:26.480 --> 0:13:29.960
<v Speaker 1>That effect Richard, this is a trial, but history shows

0:13:30.040 --> 0:13:33.240
<v Speaker 1>us that when police are given powers that those powers

0:13:33.280 --> 0:13:37.760
<v Speaker 1>are usually extended. So what checks and balances are currently

0:13:37.760 --> 0:13:41.239
<v Speaker 1>in place to sure that there isn't overreach with this technology?

0:13:41.559 --> 0:13:44.040
<v Speaker 3>My understanding, and I could be wrong, is very little.

0:13:44.400 --> 0:13:46.760
<v Speaker 3>We've got some words saying this is what we're going

0:13:46.800 --> 0:13:49.480
<v Speaker 3>to use it for now. And credit to the police

0:13:49.640 --> 0:13:53.640
<v Speaker 3>commissioner for saying this. Most commissioners of police in most

0:13:53.720 --> 0:13:55.920
<v Speaker 3>acts do this stuff under the radar as much as

0:13:55.920 --> 0:13:58.880
<v Speaker 3>they can. It's really good that he spoke about what

0:13:58.920 --> 0:14:01.440
<v Speaker 3>they're doing, and he has spoken about their intentions, but

0:14:01.480 --> 0:14:04.920
<v Speaker 3>he's refused to rule out other intentions. I mean, the

0:14:05.000 --> 0:14:08.200
<v Speaker 3>things you'd like to see an independent review after a

0:14:08.200 --> 0:14:12.280
<v Speaker 3>short period of time, constraints on what the surveillance could involve,

0:14:12.320 --> 0:14:13.960
<v Speaker 3>the sorts of things we saw in COVID when the

0:14:13.960 --> 0:14:16.960
<v Speaker 3>government tried to bring out the contact tracing app and

0:14:16.960 --> 0:14:18.760
<v Speaker 3>there was a lot of alarm that the government would

0:14:18.760 --> 0:14:21.680
<v Speaker 3>get an it's location data in real time. The government

0:14:21.800 --> 0:14:24.800
<v Speaker 3>then put a whole lot of quite good restrictions on

0:14:24.840 --> 0:14:26.840
<v Speaker 3>how it could be used with the sunset clause, and

0:14:27.880 --> 0:14:29.320
<v Speaker 3>it would be good to see this sort of thing,

0:14:29.360 --> 0:14:31.560
<v Speaker 3>but it's very hard to get anyone to put constraints

0:14:31.560 --> 0:14:34.640
<v Speaker 3>on the police. Really, both sides of politics almost outdo

0:14:34.720 --> 0:14:37.800
<v Speaker 3>themselves for giving the police extra powers. I would hope

0:14:38.000 --> 0:14:40.960
<v Speaker 3>that there will be a review, an independent review. I

0:14:41.000 --> 0:14:44.080
<v Speaker 3>would hope there'll be restrictions on who can see the data.

0:14:44.200 --> 0:14:46.480
<v Speaker 3>I would hope there'd be requirements about the data being

0:14:46.520 --> 0:14:49.960
<v Speaker 3>stored in a way that insiders inside the police can't

0:14:50.000 --> 0:14:54.000
<v Speaker 3>access it, and that accessing get reviewed. I would hope

0:14:54.000 --> 0:14:56.840
<v Speaker 3>that the data be encrypted in a reasonable way so

0:14:56.880 --> 0:14:59.200
<v Speaker 3>if packers break in, they can't access the data. I

0:14:59.200 --> 0:15:02.320
<v Speaker 3>would hope recording would be destroyed, and no one ever

0:15:02.480 --> 0:15:05.760
<v Speaker 3>likes destroying data, so they won't unless forced to destroy it,

0:15:05.760 --> 0:15:08.360
<v Speaker 3>they'll keep it. And then the last thing is a pixelation.

0:15:08.520 --> 0:15:11.960
<v Speaker 3>There should be leglas restrictions, not just down to the

0:15:11.960 --> 0:15:16.120
<v Speaker 3>current way it's done, saying this pixelation has to happen

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:19.080
<v Speaker 3>either on the camera or on device, but certainly before

0:15:19.120 --> 0:15:21.880
<v Speaker 3>any recording is made, so there is no way someone

0:15:21.880 --> 0:15:24.680
<v Speaker 3>can ever get hold of the unpixelated version. It's not

0:15:24.720 --> 0:15:26.640
<v Speaker 3>good enough to say, oh, we promise, we never will,

0:15:26.800 --> 0:15:28.680
<v Speaker 3>or we have checks and balances in places sure and

0:15:28.720 --> 0:15:30.920
<v Speaker 3>never will. There should be an independent order to make

0:15:30.920 --> 0:15:34.000
<v Speaker 3>sure you can't get anyone else's idea.

0:15:34.600 --> 0:15:36.880
<v Speaker 1>Well, thank you very much, Richard. We should note that

0:15:36.920 --> 0:15:39.640
<v Speaker 1>the police say that they won't store the data Reustralians

0:15:39.640 --> 0:15:42.720
<v Speaker 1>who aren't on their wanted lists. But in the meantime,

0:15:42.800 --> 0:15:45.600
<v Speaker 1>what could possibly go wrong? Richard, Thank you so much

0:15:45.600 --> 0:15:46.120
<v Speaker 1>for your time.

0:15:46.440 --> 0:15:47.080
<v Speaker 3>Thanks Daniel.

0:16:00.280 --> 0:16:03.200
<v Speaker 1>In the news, Ingham's has announced a complete lockdown in

0:16:03.200 --> 0:16:06.200
<v Speaker 1>western Australia after a second case of H five in

0:16:06.280 --> 0:16:09.520
<v Speaker 1>one bird flu was confirmed. So far, the cases have

0:16:09.560 --> 0:16:13.280
<v Speaker 1>been contained to wild birds, but experts fear the outbreak

0:16:13.360 --> 0:16:15.800
<v Speaker 1>may be larger than we know, with more than fifty

0:16:15.800 --> 0:16:19.640
<v Speaker 1>calls to a hotline reporting sick and dead birds. Before

0:16:19.680 --> 0:16:22.320
<v Speaker 1>the cases, Australia had been the only continent free of

0:16:22.360 --> 0:16:25.680
<v Speaker 1>the virus, which has killed millions of birds and thousands

0:16:25.720 --> 0:16:29.320
<v Speaker 1>of mammals. And Zale's DEGO has reportedly set to launch

0:16:29.320 --> 0:16:32.000
<v Speaker 1>a new party as soon as this week. After months

0:16:32.040 --> 0:16:35.120
<v Speaker 1>of secret talks about a seal party, the Independent MP

0:16:35.280 --> 0:16:38.480
<v Speaker 1>is apparently ready to pull the trigger. It may initially

0:16:38.480 --> 0:16:42.360
<v Speaker 1>be a party of one, but Allegras Bender, Sophie Scomps,

0:16:42.480 --> 0:16:47.120
<v Speaker 1>and Nicolette Bulla are all reportedly open to joining. I'm

0:16:47.160 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 1>Daniel James. Thanks for listening to seven AM. We'll be

0:16:50.000 --> 0:16:50.600
<v Speaker 1>back tomorrow