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Speaker 1: Approach production.

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Speaker 2: Welcome to Real Crime with Adam Shanna.

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Speaker 3: I'm your host, Adam shan Let's talk about surveillance CCTV

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Speaker 3: in particular. It's estimated the average Australian inurban areas passes

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Speaker 3: under the gaze of seventy five cameras every day. It's

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Speaker 3: become a given that surveillance technologies permeate every aspect of

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Speaker 3: our lives, whether we like it or not.

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Speaker 1: China now has the largest surveillance network on Earth, with

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Speaker 1: more than half of the world CCTV cameras watching its citizens.

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Speaker 2: It's a global phenomenon.

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Speaker 3: Look at China, They've got more than fifty percent of

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Speaker 3: all the surveillance cameras in the world, about thirty four

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Speaker 3: cameras per one thousand people.

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Speaker 2: But Australian cities are catching up.

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Speaker 1: In twenty twenty one, Sydney had four point sixty seven

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Speaker 1: surveillance cameras per thousand residents, with Melbourne close behind with

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Speaker 1: two point one three.

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Speaker 3: You do hear a lot of complaints about the impact

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Speaker 3: on privacy from this blanket coverage. That is, until someone

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Speaker 3: goes missing and then the cameras provide key evidence that

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Speaker 3: tells the story.

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Speaker 2: Then you'll see police appeal.

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Speaker 3: For CCTV to help them piece together the key moments.

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Speaker 3: We're asking the public to review their CCTV or doorbell

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Speaker 3: cameras for any footage that may help us locate the

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Speaker 3: missing woman. Precious time is spent gathering this footage. What

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Speaker 3: if all those cameras were linked in a network that

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Speaker 3: allowed police to follow the path of an offender or

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Speaker 3: a missing person. How many lives would be saved? How

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Speaker 3: many crimes would be self?

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Speaker 2: Go to China.

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Speaker 3: It's impossible to commit a crime there, You'll be on camera.

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Speaker 3: So how far do we want to go with this?

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Speaker 3: What are we prepared to accept in terms of perceived

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Speaker 3: loss of privacy, in terms of making our streets more safe?

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Speaker 3: This is the dream of one form of Victoria Police

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Speaker 3: officer David Barbert, who's building just such a network called

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Speaker 3: the Safer Places Network. To welcome David to the program, gooday,

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Speaker 3: how I very well, thanks thanks for having me. We

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Speaker 3: could have a crime free society right now if we

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Speaker 3: grasp the metal around linking our cameras and putting more

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Speaker 3: I guess where.

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Speaker 2: Are we now? How much are we prepared to accept?

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Speaker 2: And what's your mission?

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Speaker 4: That's a lot in that actual had an interesting meeting

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Speaker 4: yesterday with the previous Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner, Angeline Folk, and

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Speaker 4: she was saying a lot of this surveillance technology and

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Speaker 4: the way we accepted his context driven and facial recognition

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Speaker 4: is currently in the press, and think as a society

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Speaker 4: we have to accept that surveillance is part of our lives.

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Speaker 4: He just said that we pass seventy five cameras on

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Speaker 4: the way to work every day. We're installing them otselves.

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Speaker 4: I mean, we're putting cameras in our houses. We've got

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Speaker 4: cameras on our phones. People use face ID to open

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Speaker 4: their phones every day, so we're kind of already using

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Speaker 4: it organically. But I think from a crime fighting perspective,

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Speaker 4: the struggle is that law enforcement agencies can't keep up

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Speaker 4: with technology, and I think that's our main gap. I

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Speaker 4: think in the private sector. You know, we've got amazing

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Speaker 4: tech even here today for our interview, and I think

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Speaker 4: the police just don't know what's happening in the private

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Speaker 4: sector and they need to catch up.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, really important point. Let's roll back.

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Speaker 3: September twenty twelve, Jill mar goes missing Sydney Road, Brunswick,

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Speaker 3: that case was sold with The breakthrough came because of

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Speaker 3: one CCTV camera at the Bridal shop which pictured Adrian

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Speaker 3: Ernest Bailey, her abductor and murderer, speaking to her, which

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Speaker 3: then set off an investigative trails.

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Speaker 4: But on that's my number one case study. It took

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Speaker 4: eighty five hours to get that footage into the hands

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Speaker 4: of police, and I think we were lucky in that

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Speaker 4: case because Jill Maher being a journalist and her network

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Speaker 4: of media contacts that accelerated the exposure in social media

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Speaker 4: and her Facebook page this twenty twelve gained I think

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Speaker 4: it was twelve thousand followers in about twenty four hours,

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Speaker 4: and that led to what I believe the Dutchess Britique

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Speaker 4: owner submitting that footage to police. So my mission is

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Speaker 4: to bring it from eighty five hours to eighty five minutes.

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Speaker 4: And I've said this even as recently as yesterday at

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Speaker 4: a breakfast I presented at when her husband first reported

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Speaker 4: her missing at two am on the twenty second of September.

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Speaker 4: If my network had have been in place at that time,

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Speaker 4: the watchhouse keeper taking the missing person report could have

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Speaker 4: requested the footage from the Duchess boutique owner immediately and

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Speaker 4: potentially even got a print out of a CCTV still

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Speaker 4: of Adrian walking past Durr walking past and even presented

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Speaker 4: that to her husband and said, do you see your

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Speaker 4: wife in any of this footage? And that could have

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Speaker 4: brought everything to a hold right then and there.

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Speaker 2: Because the technology was pretty critical in that case.

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Speaker 3: Critical we saw also the I think was the toll

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Speaker 3: gantry picking up Bailey's car linked to him known sex offender.

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Speaker 2: He becomes a suspect.

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Speaker 3: But it's just skeletal, just little patches of light here

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Speaker 3: and there in that case. And you wonder if that

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Speaker 3: case happened today, are things much different? I saw a

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Speaker 3: story recently where a email was reflecting on the fact

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Speaker 3: that in that ten or twelve years since Jill Mar's

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Speaker 3: abduction of murder, are we any safer?

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Speaker 2: Do you think we are?

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Speaker 3: Are we getting closer to the kind of coverage you

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Speaker 3: think will make us safer?

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Speaker 4: Probably got a mixed response to that. I use that

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Speaker 4: case study because my argument is things haven't changed enough

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Speaker 4: in my opinion, you know, my first initial thoughts around

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Speaker 4: using that as a case study for our business wash

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Speaker 4: but it's fairly dated. But I thought, hang on a second,

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Speaker 4: if this happened again today, what would actually be different.

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Speaker 4: I think there'd be more cameras. I think there might

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Speaker 4: have been more footage available sooner. But I also think

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Speaker 4: that there's a chance, it's a strong chance that the

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Speaker 4: footage from that particular shop could still take eighty five

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Speaker 4: hours to get into the hands of police today.

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Speaker 3: Right, because I'm not quite sure how this goes. I

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Speaker 3: understand they go along and try to find where the

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Speaker 3: cameras are. Are they walking the streets looking for the

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Speaker 3: little blue lights or what are they doing?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, we estimate that police spend anywhere from two to

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Speaker 4: four hours per investigation just looking for where the cameras are.

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Speaker 4: There's many hours spent after that trying to actually access

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Speaker 4: the footage. So at the moment police door knock, they

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Speaker 4: walk the streets, They walk the streets of shops or residents,

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Speaker 4: depending on where the offense occurred. That's if they even

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Speaker 4: have the time to do that. We know that Victoria

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Speaker 4: Police in particular is extremely stretch, with resources, morales pretty low.

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Speaker 4: They've got a new chief commissioner, there's a restructure planned,

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Speaker 4: They're already under a huge amount of stress. And I

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Speaker 4: remember when I was a detective or even a young

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Speaker 4: connie in uniform that if you don't have avenues of inquiry,

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Speaker 4: you write a file off, so you have to look

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Speaker 4: for avenues inquiry. If you don't have any, you can

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Speaker 4: write the file off and the sergeant approves it and

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Speaker 4: the file just gets closed or unsolved. So if police

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Speaker 4: can argue that they don't have time to go on

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Speaker 4: door knock, they'll just write cases off. And we know

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Speaker 4: that over sixty percent of crimes in Australia go unsolved.

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Speaker 4: So what this network plans to do is actually increase

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Speaker 4: the closure rate of investigations. So it may not even

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Speaker 4: increase police time, but it might actually solve more crimes.

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Speaker 3: Police budgets are stretch beyond breaking points. They can't even

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Speaker 3: fill jobs that they have the struggle in this technological

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Speaker 3: arms race. Yeah, what is the value proposition that you're

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Speaker 3: presenting to them?

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Speaker 4: It's interesting I presented this to Victoria Police earlier this

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Speaker 4: year and I said, well, it's looking likely it could

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Speaker 4: save your members around a million hours a year of

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Speaker 4: personnel time. And I won't say who I was talking to,

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Speaker 4: but the response from them was, well, there's some costs anyway,

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Speaker 4: because they have to employ the staff. So is it

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Speaker 4: really inefficiency. I'm like, oh, yes, it is because they

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Speaker 4: can be redeployed. So I think there's this mentality that

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Speaker 4: unless it's an extraordinarily clear ROI, they find it hard

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Speaker 4: to wrap their head around because they have to employ

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Speaker 4: the stuff anyway. But my argument is they're constantly pushing

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Speaker 4: for new recruits and new recruitment campaigns and new police.

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Speaker 4: But if they make the current police more efficient, of

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Speaker 4: course that would avoid them having to hire another four

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Speaker 4: hundred recruits.

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Speaker 2: Well, so they can't find anyway.

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Speaker 4: Well, yeah, that's a whole other challenge. Yeah, whole other challenge.

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Speaker 3: I mean that response to me tells me why they're

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Speaker 3: not economists working for the Reserve Bank and they're police

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Speaker 3: officers and in the hierarchy Victoria Police is slow.

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Speaker 4: Yes it is. It is And I worked in the

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Speaker 4: IT area of vic Pol for a year in twenty

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Speaker 4: nineteen and it was a hard slog. They're not a

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Speaker 4: tech company, you know, They're a law enforcement agency. And

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Speaker 4: I think this is where New Zealand Police has done

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Speaker 4: really well because they and Mike Bush and your chief

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Speaker 4: commissioner here in Melbourne has come from New Zealand Police.

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Speaker 4: They've got a long history of working very closely with

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Speaker 4: the private sector, so they're willing to engage companies like

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Speaker 4: ours that are small startups or private business that are

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Speaker 4: doing things really well. They bring them into the tent.

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Speaker 4: So how can we work together. I think what we're

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Speaker 4: guilty of in Australia is we go after the big

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Speaker 4: four consultancy, we go after Microsoft and all these big

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Speaker 4: tech companies, and I just think they're as slow moving

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Speaker 4: as the organizations are, so I think from a technology perspective,

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Speaker 4: they just don't really get it.

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Speaker 2: This is a big dream and it's twofold.

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Speaker 3: You've got to persuade businesses, individuals, companies whatever to come

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Speaker 3: on board, and then for police to now accept this

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Speaker 3: network and become a part of it.

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Speaker 4: Where are you at great question? I consider it that

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Speaker 4: we're trying to raise all boats at once. You know,

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Speaker 4: I'm getting feedback from members of our network saying what

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Speaker 4: are the success stories from police? And I'm getting feedback

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Speaker 4: from police saying why don't you have more cameras on

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Speaker 4: the network and more people on the network. And so

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Speaker 4: I'm trying to just incrementally grow both audiences at the moment.

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Speaker 4: It's going to take some time, but I'm very closely

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Speaker 4: partnered with Neighborhood Watch Victoria A. Neighborhood Watch is an

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Speaker 4: institution that we know has been around for decades, but

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Speaker 4: they are very underresourced. They're very passionate, but very underresourced.

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Speaker 4: They get a lot less money from the government than

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Speaker 4: crime stoppers do. They are predominantly staffed by volunteers sixty

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Speaker 4: five seventy year old plus, so they are not as

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Speaker 4: great technology and what's going on with social media, so

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Speaker 4: Neighborhood Watch is really struggling. But I still think they

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Speaker 4: are an important part of our crime prevention ecosystem. And

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Speaker 4: I hope that Mike Bush, the new chief, sees that

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Speaker 4: because I know he's been briefed by Neighborhood Watch But

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Speaker 4: they've been a great partner of ours in just getting

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Speaker 4: the word out at a grass its level amongst community.

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Speaker 4: Social media has also been good for us. But what

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Speaker 4: I'm really looking for is what I call enterprise contributors,

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Speaker 4: people like will Worth's Coals had to mean with monash

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Speaker 4: Unity the other day. Monash Uni has about five thousand

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Speaker 4: cameras across Melbourne across their seven campuses so I'm looking

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Speaker 4: for these multipliers that I can have one contact, but

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Speaker 4: thousands of cameras come on to the network, so that's

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Speaker 4: a bit easier than trying to get five thousand households

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Speaker 4: onto the network. Takes a bit longer. Yeah, sad reality.

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Speaker 3: Money drives everything it does, so you've got to build

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Speaker 3: a business of sufficient scale to make this work.

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Speaker 2: Big task.

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Speaker 4: It is unfortunate that I've got fifteen years of networking

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Speaker 4: from law enforce in both state and federal. So I

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Speaker 4: worked with the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission for seven years,

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Speaker 4: so I've got links into the AFP, I've got links

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Speaker 4: into most states, and I'm starting to leverage some of

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Speaker 4: those connections. I think if you're starting from scratch outside

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Speaker 4: of the law enforce industry, you'd find it a lot

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Speaker 4: more difficult. But I'm able to open doors to commissioners

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Speaker 4: pretty much in everything state and that's what I'm doing

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Speaker 4: at the moment, so that's a bit of an accelerating

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Speaker 4: factor for me. I've got some early investment, which is great,

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Speaker 4: but that's probably giving me a six month runway before

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Speaker 4: I get revenue. So another major part of our model

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Speaker 4: is helping with retail crime. So retail crime, as we

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Speaker 4: know is that it's worst ever in Victoria at the moment.

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Speaker 4: We also know that Victoria has more retail crime than

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Speaker 4: all the other states and territories combined at the moment,

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Speaker 4: and that it's hurting small businesses and meetium businesses and.

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Speaker 2: Large businesses shoplifting basically.

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Speaker 4: Shoplifting, but also threats to staff and harassment that is

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Speaker 4: through the roof at the moment as well. And I

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Speaker 4: think that's driven by just a living crisis. Could be

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Speaker 4: interest rates, could be people losing their jobs. They just

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Speaker 4: take it out on the local checkout person. And that's

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Speaker 4: a sad reality for a lot of retail workers. And

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Speaker 4: as we know, a lot of those workers are gen z,

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Speaker 4: they're younger, they're new to the workforce. Getting spat on

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Speaker 4: or slapped or hit or worn out is not part

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Speaker 4: of the job description.

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Speaker 3: And we saw this during COVID. I had a friend

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Speaker 3: working i can say office works, and what she was

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Speaker 3: bringing home stories of people trying to steal things and

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Speaker 3: when they were caught, they were bashing staff and there

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Speaker 3: were some really serious injuries. And the cameras provided an

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Speaker 3: audit trail, an evidentiary trail in those cases, so it's

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Speaker 3: really important. I did a book a number of years

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Speaker 3: ago on the Kangaroo Gang shoplifters who went to Britain

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Speaker 3: in the sixties and robbed and stealed the way across there,

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Speaker 3: and the study that I did on that revealed the

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Speaker 3: fact that the staff were the champion robbers.

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Speaker 2: They're working with.

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Speaker 3: So again for your big organizations to be able to

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Speaker 3: link and because the staff know where the camera's are,

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Speaker 3: they know how things operate.

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Speaker 2: So that's another frontier.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, the larger retailers are pretty good at

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Speaker 4: keeping an eye on that, but as you kind of

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Speaker 4: go down from enterprise down to medium and small businesses,

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Speaker 4: it's very hard to keep track of that. They don't

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Speaker 4: have the systems in place, they don't have CCTV, they

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Speaker 4: don't have lost prevention offices or security staff. There's kind

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Speaker 4: of this market that we're looking at anyway, where the

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Speaker 4: small and medium retailers that can't afford more sophisticated loss

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Speaker 4: prevention tools can work with us and we can support

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Speaker 4: them through some crime recording and incident recording tools that

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Speaker 4: we've got using WhatsApp and some other technology. And then

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Speaker 4: what the benefit of all we do is that For example,

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Speaker 4: if something happens, say a small IDA supermarket, and next

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Speaker 4: door to the IDA there might be a bakery and

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Speaker 4: optometrist and maybe a mechanic. If all of those businesses

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Speaker 4: are on our network, whether they have CCTV or not,

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Speaker 4: if something happens at the IDA, those other businesses get

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Speaker 4: alerted immediately. And that's a gap in our current crime

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Speaker 4: reporting ecosystem in Australia where if you report something to

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Speaker 4: the police, the police don't then go and tell the

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Speaker 4: neighbors that it's happened, Or if you report something to

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Speaker 4: crime stoppers, that doesn't immediately tell anyone in your suburb

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Speaker 4: that that's occurred. So if you see it suspicious of

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Speaker 4: out outside your house and tell crime stoppers, unless you've

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Speaker 4: got a WhatsApp group with your neighbors, they don't know

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Speaker 4: that you've made that report. So how do you keep

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Speaker 4: your local community safe? And that was the me of

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Speaker 4: Neighborhood Watch when it started, and I think we've lost that.

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Speaker 4: We've lost that localized support for each other at a

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Speaker 4: suburb level or a street level. And I've heard countless

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Speaker 4: stories of WhatsApp groups being set up, but there's nothing

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Speaker 4: more sophisticated than that, and our systems like neighborhood Watch

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Speaker 4: and crime stoppers and police reporting, none of that's caught up.

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Speaker 4: That's all still stuck decades ago.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: I've worked a lot in Africa and in particularly We've

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Speaker 3: got our place in Zimbabwe and we're quite remote and

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Speaker 3: the only security we have is that WhatsApp group and

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Speaker 3: two way radios. The police are miles away, So there

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Speaker 3: has to be a self reliance. We're getting a bit

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Speaker 3: too civilized here, aren't we. We live it to somebody else. Yeah,

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Speaker 3: nothing to see here. Let's go back to my job

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Speaker 3: and my family whatever else. Do you think there's got

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Speaker 3: to be I guess some re engagement on those sort

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Speaker 3: of neighborhood watch vatues, but with technology one.

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Speaker 4: Hundred percent, it's exactly what it is. A neighborhood watch

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Speaker 4: tagline is looking out for each other. And I think

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Speaker 4: when you start doing that, And I heard Chris Costas

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Speaker 4: talk recently at Frankston at a neighborhood Watch event. He

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Speaker 4: started neighborhood Watch back in the seventies, I think, and

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Speaker 4: he was saying that exact thing. It's like, we've got

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Speaker 4: to get back to those basic levels of looking out

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Speaker 4: for each other. I think we have become a bit lazy.

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Speaker 4: I mean an example of being lazy is that I

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Speaker 4: think it's something like seventy percent of burglaries the houses

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Speaker 4: are unlocked, so people aren't locking their doors. It's such

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Speaker 4: a simple thing. And I heard a police officer tell

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Speaker 4: me recently at a community event, someone stood up after

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Speaker 4: the police had finished talking and said, oh, my house

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Speaker 4: got broken into last week, and you know, a bit

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Speaker 4: angry at the police. And the police said was the

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Speaker 4: house locked? And he goes, oh, no, it wasn't. So

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Speaker 4: I'm like, well you have to. There's an element of

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Speaker 4: self responsibility in this, but also an element of localized

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Speaker 4: community support because these big organizations like the police agencies

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Speaker 4: are it's too big and slow moving and they've got

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Speaker 4: a lot on their plate. They can't be there to

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Speaker 4: drive that community spirit, which is what neighbor would watch

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Speaker 4: started out.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I've just got bad flashbacks of being a rob

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Speaker 3: five times at our place here in Melbourne that have

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Speaker 3: fourth time the same police officer and he says, your

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Speaker 3: window was open again? Might lock your windows? I turn

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Speaker 3: them all life.

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Speaker 4: Exactly, So look, we are guilty of just missing those

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Speaker 4: things as humans, because you know, life gets ahead of us.

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Speaker 4: But and again, education is a key part of that.

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Speaker 4: And with police, I kind of I know Mike Bush

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Speaker 4: and the new chief commissioner, he thinks crime prevention is key,

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Speaker 4: and I certainly agree with him. But I kind of think, well,

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Speaker 4: police is a law enforcement agency. They're kind of doing

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Speaker 4: the tail end of it. Who's doing the education and

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Speaker 4: actual crime prevention work? Because you've got crime stoppers that

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Speaker 4: are a reporting portal essentially, and then you've got a neighborhood

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Speaker 4: watch which is really strong in education. I kind of

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Speaker 4: don't know where police sit with that education piece. Like

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Speaker 4: I just feel like police are they to kind of

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Speaker 4: clean up the mess?

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Speaker 3: Well, they're just reactive the Yeah, I think they're struggling

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Speaker 3: and we're seeing we live in the year of aggravated burglaries.

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Speaker 3: We're young men usually breaking it at homes and getting

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Speaker 3: the keys and taking the car for a jolly down

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Speaker 3: the freeway and drawing all those police.

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Speaker 2: Resources in there. Sometimes they catch themselves, so they don't.

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Speaker 3: But I guess under your scenario, you'd be able to

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Speaker 3: track that vehicle through the cameras, through the street. I mean,

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Speaker 3: I'm getting visions of the movies where the guys and

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Speaker 3: the black skivvas are there where the big screen, and

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Speaker 3: they're following and they're switching between cameras all the way

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Speaker 3: through the network.

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Speaker 2: That's what's your sort of dreaming of.

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Speaker 4: Isn't it looks that's very long term. I think one

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Speaker 4: of the issues we'll have there is connecting to residential cameras.

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Speaker 4: That's not something that we currently do, and it's not

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Speaker 4: connecting from a technical sense. I mean, so having a

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Speaker 4: world where we can just dip into someone's Ring camera

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Speaker 4: or Google camera, I think that's a long way down

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Speaker 4: the track. The US are testing it a little bit

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Speaker 4: in some areas with Ring because Rings are owned by Amazon.

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Speaker 4: They've got a big tech They linked into some police systems,

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Speaker 4: especially with the Human Rights Charter here in Victoria. There's

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Speaker 4: so many privacy and ethical considerations to go into a

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Speaker 4: system like that. Even if we had all of the

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Speaker 4: locations recorded of where cameras were, and an efficient way

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Speaker 4: of speaking to the owners of all of those cameras,

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Speaker 4: that would drastically increase closure rates of investigations. And that's

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Speaker 4: what we're doing right now. So I think of it

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Speaker 4: as a job. Rolodex of names and locations and where

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Speaker 4: cameras are. And my system has like a Google map,

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Speaker 4: It's like Google for CCTV, show me where the cameras

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Speaker 4: are in Brighton and it comes up. You click notify

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Speaker 4: and it notifies all those camera owners by SMS and email.

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Speaker 4: So they all get a little texts saying Victoria Police

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Speaker 4: have asked you to check your footage over the last

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Speaker 4: hour looking for a red van. So that happens within

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Speaker 4: an instant. It could even happen from trip low as

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Speaker 4: soon as the call comes in. So even that in itself,

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Speaker 4: without a technical connection to the cameras, that in itself

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Speaker 4: you could see the footage coming in getting uploaded within

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Speaker 4: the next ten minutes from residents. Even that would be

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Speaker 4: a huge, huge win. And that avoids the ethical privacy

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Speaker 4: considerations of police remote accessing into someone's camera, because that's

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Speaker 4: a lot more tricky because people think that we're going

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Speaker 4: to spy on them and that kind of thing. But

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Speaker 4: if people are notified, they're given the option to cooperate.

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Speaker 4: And that's what our system is so important that they

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Speaker 4: are given the option to upload footage and cooperate if

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Speaker 4: they feel comfortable doing so.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, democracy and privacy very inconvenient these situations.

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Speaker 2: But of course everyone.

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Speaker 3: Wants it to be rolled out one hundred percent when

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Speaker 3: they need it, yes, But mostly they're not prepared to

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Speaker 3: buy into it. And I think this is it becomes

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Speaker 3: a political issue as much as a policing one as well.

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Speaker 3: Or do you see a willingness to use the China

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Speaker 3: example before? You don't want to be a crooked in

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Speaker 3: China anymore because they will get on to you really

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Speaker 3: quickly and you will be found. I mean the level

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Speaker 3: of facial recognition software in the cameras and the ability

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Speaker 3: to create a perimeter away from the crime scene and

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Speaker 3: work their way back in and you will be caught.

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Speaker 2: I mean, law and.

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Speaker 3: Order is always a big thing in our state elections.

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Speaker 3: We hear it every time that the crooks run the

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Speaker 3: streets and so forth. We've got to put the fearback

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Speaker 3: in the crooks. But are we really prepared to do

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Speaker 3: what our technology allows us to do already?

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Speaker 4: I guess that's what I'm testing right now, and I

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Speaker 4: think it's going to be an interesting social experiment. I

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Speaker 4: mean I showed it to an assistant commissioner yesterday Victorian Police,

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Speaker 4: and she was quite shocked that so many people had

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Speaker 4: voluntarily registered, and I was like, well, it's indicating a

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Speaker 4: willingness to get involved in something like that. And you know,

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Speaker 4: we've gone to great lengths to be clear that when

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Speaker 4: we don't have remote access to cameras, it's all voluntary.

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Speaker 4: You've opted into this system, and you still have the

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Speaker 4: option to cooperate or not cooperate with the police. And then, strangely,

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Speaker 4: only a few weeks ago, one of our users directed

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Speaker 4: police to us, and police came to us and said, oh,

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Speaker 4: this person said that she's on the network and can

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Speaker 4: you just get the footage for us. So even this

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Speaker 4: member of our network thought we had remote access to

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Speaker 4: her cameras, and she'd signed up under that premise, which

436
00:20:32,721 --> 00:20:34,600
Speaker 4: is wrong because we don't have remote access to our cameras.

437
00:20:34,761 --> 00:20:36,600
Speaker 4: She thought we did, and she still signed up. So

438
00:20:36,640 --> 00:20:39,080
Speaker 4: I've actually got people signing up that think we already

439
00:20:39,120 --> 00:20:41,080
Speaker 4: do have remote access. So I think it is a

440
00:20:41,120 --> 00:20:43,001
Speaker 4: bit of a social experiment. And that's why talking to

441
00:20:43,041 --> 00:20:46,681
Speaker 4: the Privacy Commissioner yesterday was interesting because as a privacy commissioner,

442
00:20:46,681 --> 00:20:49,721
Speaker 4: how do you make these giant decisions about what society

443
00:20:49,761 --> 00:20:52,641
Speaker 4: thinks about surveillance? And what society thinks about facial recognition,

444
00:20:52,761 --> 00:20:55,160
Speaker 4: and she said it's context driven and it has to

445
00:20:55,160 --> 00:20:58,400
Speaker 4: be proportionate. And proportionate is a big word that happens

446
00:20:58,441 --> 00:21:01,321
Speaker 4: in police with self defense and what people are talking

447
00:21:01,321 --> 00:21:05,001
Speaker 4: about castle law and their houses and protecting their homes.

448
00:21:05,041 --> 00:21:08,561
Speaker 4: Sovereigns yes, kind of sovereign citizen. But people are saying

449
00:21:08,921 --> 00:21:10,680
Speaker 4: I want the right to protect my family and my

450
00:21:10,721 --> 00:21:13,120
Speaker 4: home and fight back if someone breaks in. Well, the

451
00:21:13,201 --> 00:21:15,961
Speaker 4: law already protects them. So I yell at the TV

452
00:21:16,080 --> 00:21:18,721
Speaker 4: pretty regularly about this because and social media, because I

453
00:21:18,761 --> 00:21:21,080
Speaker 4: see these comments come in and people saying I want

454
00:21:21,080 --> 00:21:22,360
Speaker 4: to be able to bash the crook when they kick

455
00:21:22,400 --> 00:21:24,121
Speaker 4: my door in. I'm like, you can bash the crook

456
00:21:24,120 --> 00:21:27,840
Speaker 4: when you're already protected under law, as long as it's proportionate.

457
00:21:28,360 --> 00:21:30,801
Speaker 4: If you kick the crap out of them and they're

458
00:21:30,801 --> 00:21:32,561
Speaker 4: on the ground and you keep going, that's when you

459
00:21:32,600 --> 00:21:35,201
Speaker 4: break the law. But if someone comes in with a machete,

460
00:21:35,640 --> 00:21:37,761
Speaker 4: you are allowed to use leader force to protect you

461
00:21:37,801 --> 00:21:40,400
Speaker 4: and your family because you're under fear of being killed.

462
00:21:41,001 --> 00:21:44,120
Speaker 4: That's proportionate and they are protected. And I think I

463
00:21:44,160 --> 00:21:47,201
Speaker 4: don't think police really advertise that fact very well because

464
00:21:47,241 --> 00:21:48,840
Speaker 4: people are saying they want this castle law and you

465
00:21:48,840 --> 00:21:51,721
Speaker 4: should be able to somehow do something else to protect

466
00:21:51,761 --> 00:21:53,721
Speaker 4: your family. But if someone's coming at me and my family,

467
00:21:53,721 --> 00:21:55,440
Speaker 4: I'll do whatever I need to do to stop them.

468
00:21:55,840 --> 00:21:58,360
Speaker 3: I'm all a view that most people are unprepared for

469
00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:01,321
Speaker 3: these situations. Can't use their firearms or their or their

470
00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:03,001
Speaker 3: knives and things, and the best thing they could do

471
00:22:03,001 --> 00:22:04,281
Speaker 3: is jump over the back fence.

472
00:22:04,041 --> 00:22:05,481
Speaker 4: And get out and make distance. And when aught that

473
00:22:05,561 --> 00:22:07,920
Speaker 4: as a young police officer, distance is the number one

474
00:22:07,961 --> 00:22:11,281
Speaker 4: savior and I completely agree. But getting back to surveillance,

475
00:22:11,360 --> 00:22:14,761
Speaker 4: it has to be proportionate. And Kmart recently got a

476
00:22:14,801 --> 00:22:18,281
Speaker 4: whack for using facial recognition cameras without making people aware

477
00:22:18,321 --> 00:22:21,201
Speaker 4: they were using them. Bunning's had the same issue, and

478
00:22:21,761 --> 00:22:24,481
Speaker 4: one of the things they ran into was they couldn't

479
00:22:24,561 --> 00:22:29,880
Speaker 4: prove that the facial recognition software was going to stop

480
00:22:30,001 --> 00:22:32,400
Speaker 4: enough crime. Basically it was a little bit too much

481
00:22:32,441 --> 00:22:35,120
Speaker 4: of a luxury for them. In the Privacy Commissioner's opinion.

482
00:22:35,360 --> 00:22:38,401
Speaker 4: The current Privacy commissioner, so what our system is doing, Yes,

483
00:22:38,441 --> 00:22:41,521
Speaker 4: it's kind of connecting the surveillance network, but like you've

484
00:22:41,521 --> 00:22:44,480
Speaker 4: said throughout this the amount of crime we could solve.

485
00:22:45,001 --> 00:22:47,880
Speaker 4: Any amount of harm we could reduce is significant. So

486
00:22:47,921 --> 00:22:50,801
Speaker 4: that's where the proportionality comes into it. The surveillance is large,

487
00:22:51,001 --> 00:22:53,361
Speaker 4: where the impact is large, and that's where I think

488
00:22:53,360 --> 00:22:55,880
Speaker 4: the community could come on the journey because they know

489
00:22:56,241 --> 00:22:59,321
Speaker 4: or the impact has been demonstrated or proven that if

490
00:22:59,321 --> 00:23:02,201
Speaker 4: they do get involved, yes, he will be sixty percent

491
00:23:02,241 --> 00:23:03,721
Speaker 4: safer than you are now walking at night.

492
00:23:04,281 --> 00:23:04,680
Speaker 2: What's right.

493
00:23:04,801 --> 00:23:10,920
Speaker 3: I think the often CCTV is a great post crime tool.

494
00:23:11,160 --> 00:23:12,640
Speaker 4: Yes, see what happened.

495
00:23:13,281 --> 00:23:15,721
Speaker 3: But I think in the case of our aging population,

496
00:23:16,360 --> 00:23:19,961
Speaker 3: with the elderly people leaving hospitals, leaving nursing homes, often

497
00:23:20,001 --> 00:23:22,640
Speaker 3: with dementia and so forth, and the clock is ticking,

498
00:23:23,321 --> 00:23:26,840
Speaker 3: people perish in these situations. We're already seeing police forces

499
00:23:26,880 --> 00:23:30,041
Speaker 3: trying to get into this space by doing geolocation of

500
00:23:30,120 --> 00:23:32,401
Speaker 3: messages and so forth and things. And I can see

501
00:23:32,441 --> 00:23:35,041
Speaker 3: your system being something that could be used in real

502
00:23:35,120 --> 00:23:38,680
Speaker 3: time to say, check your camera right now, as an

503
00:23:38,681 --> 00:23:40,521
Speaker 3: elderly person could have walked past.

504
00:23:40,281 --> 00:23:42,801
Speaker 4: One hundred percent. And I actually use that case study

505
00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:45,080
Speaker 4: sometimes as well, and I do have I think I

506
00:23:45,120 --> 00:23:47,880
Speaker 4: have two missing person detectives signed up using the system

507
00:23:47,880 --> 00:23:50,600
Speaker 4: at the moment with Victoria Police, which is great. So yeah,

508
00:23:50,600 --> 00:23:52,641
Speaker 4: that's the use case that people are surprised to hear

509
00:23:52,761 --> 00:23:55,201
Speaker 4: because they forget that police are often used for that

510
00:23:55,600 --> 00:23:57,400
Speaker 4: exact scenario. And when I worked at PRAWN, I do

511
00:23:57,441 --> 00:23:59,561
Speaker 4: remember a story of an elderly woman going missing from

512
00:23:59,561 --> 00:24:01,561
Speaker 4: her Windsor flats and I found her sitting at a

513
00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:03,841
Speaker 4: bus stop in her ninety and it's when sat next

514
00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:06,480
Speaker 4: to her and said hello you Mavis whatever her name was,

515
00:24:06,521 --> 00:24:08,200
Speaker 4: and had a lovely chat with her, and then I

516
00:24:08,241 --> 00:24:10,080
Speaker 4: took a home. And this happens all the time in

517
00:24:10,120 --> 00:24:13,161
Speaker 4: the community. Don't realize how often that happens. But yeah,

518
00:24:13,201 --> 00:24:16,600
Speaker 4: our network could potentially just see the whole path of

519
00:24:16,640 --> 00:24:19,840
Speaker 4: someone leaving their residents, walking down the street and ending

520
00:24:19,961 --> 00:24:22,041
Speaker 4: up in a park, so you could find someone within

521
00:24:22,080 --> 00:24:23,240
Speaker 4: two hours just sitting ashore.

522
00:24:23,321 --> 00:24:25,881
Speaker 3: And we've seen situation with the autistic children as well, yep,

523
00:24:25,921 --> 00:24:29,521
Speaker 3: who have allegedly disappeared from a property. I need to

524
00:24:29,561 --> 00:24:32,641
Speaker 3: be found later on in the property, often in danger

525
00:24:33,321 --> 00:24:35,960
Speaker 3: when if you could establish a perimeter, but all the

526
00:24:36,001 --> 00:24:37,201
Speaker 3: cameras in the area.

527
00:24:37,281 --> 00:24:41,161
Speaker 2: There's no ingress or regress. That's also a real time use.

528
00:24:41,321 --> 00:24:44,041
Speaker 4: That's exactly right, and I think I think I know

529
00:24:44,201 --> 00:24:47,241
Speaker 4: that police already love this tool because, like I've said earlier,

530
00:24:47,281 --> 00:24:49,041
Speaker 4: they don't have time to dawn off. They would love

531
00:24:49,080 --> 00:24:51,240
Speaker 4: to if that all the time in the world, they

532
00:24:51,241 --> 00:24:53,801
Speaker 4: would send twenty cops out, dawn off every property, get

533
00:24:53,801 --> 00:24:56,080
Speaker 4: every piece of footage and find the missing person or

534
00:24:56,120 --> 00:24:59,761
Speaker 4: the missing child immediately. You don't join the police force

535
00:25:00,321 --> 00:25:02,960
Speaker 4: not to solve crime or not to find missing people.

536
00:25:03,001 --> 00:25:05,041
Speaker 4: You wanted to do the best thing, best job you can.

537
00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:08,121
Speaker 4: But especially in Victoria, you know they're under a huge

538
00:25:08,120 --> 00:25:10,761
Speaker 4: amount of strain. So having a tool weakness, open up

539
00:25:10,761 --> 00:25:14,080
Speaker 4: a map and get it all. I mean, it's a

540
00:25:14,080 --> 00:25:16,521
Speaker 4: no brainer in my opinion, and even me as a

541
00:25:16,521 --> 00:25:18,880
Speaker 4: community member, I want police using this like regardless of

542
00:25:18,921 --> 00:25:21,640
Speaker 4: the fact that I'm running the business and it's a

543
00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:25,201
Speaker 4: commercial entity, I want police using it. It's just been

544
00:25:25,201 --> 00:25:29,801
Speaker 4: heartwarming to see the support from community, from organizations. I

545
00:25:29,840 --> 00:25:32,440
Speaker 4: think I'm yet to hear anyone really have a problem

546
00:25:32,441 --> 00:25:34,561
Speaker 4: with what I'm doing, and I think that comes down

547
00:25:34,561 --> 00:25:36,840
Speaker 4: to the fact that it's a voluntary network. If you

548
00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:38,561
Speaker 4: don't want to be involved, there'll always be a portion

549
00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:41,201
Speaker 4: of the community that doesn't want to cooperate with police,

550
00:25:41,761 --> 00:25:43,400
Speaker 4: and you know that was some of the early feedback

551
00:25:43,441 --> 00:25:46,120
Speaker 4: I got from Victoria Police again was that you're not

552
00:25:46,561 --> 00:25:48,521
Speaker 4: ever going to have everyone on the network, And I said,

553
00:25:48,521 --> 00:25:51,360
Speaker 4: well that's fine, but you also don't have everyone's fingerprints,

554
00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:53,640
Speaker 4: and you also don't have everyone's DNA, So how's that

555
00:25:53,681 --> 00:25:56,161
Speaker 4: working out for you? Like, it's all part of it's

556
00:25:56,201 --> 00:25:59,000
Speaker 4: all avenues of inquiry, and at least with our system

557
00:25:59,041 --> 00:26:02,361
Speaker 4: you can say, well, along this street we've got ten houses,

558
00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:06,200
Speaker 4: five are registered. I can say we five aren't. So

559
00:26:06,281 --> 00:26:08,640
Speaker 4: with the limited resources you do have, howbout we go

560
00:26:08,681 --> 00:26:11,321
Speaker 4: after the houses that aren't registered instead of door knocking

561
00:26:11,281 --> 00:26:14,961
Speaker 4: your ten. So I'm like, there's all these all these examples.

562
00:26:15,120 --> 00:26:17,680
Speaker 2: Yeah, back to the Jill mar example. Yes, one camera,

563
00:26:18,481 --> 00:26:19,760
Speaker 2: a couple of cameras made all the difference.

564
00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:23,200
Speaker 3: And you think about what's an acceptable level of voluntary

565
00:26:24,041 --> 00:26:26,321
Speaker 3: inclusion in this system would.

566
00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:27,000
Speaker 2: Make a huge difference.

567
00:26:27,041 --> 00:26:28,761
Speaker 4: Doesn't have to be blanket, as you say, It could

568
00:26:28,761 --> 00:26:31,321
Speaker 4: be one camera that makes a difference. I'm speaking to

569
00:26:31,321 --> 00:26:33,400
Speaker 4: the Bedfordshire Police in London in two weeks and I

570
00:26:33,481 --> 00:26:36,041
Speaker 4: got an email from my contact over there and there

571
00:26:36,120 --> 00:26:38,840
Speaker 4: was a synagogue attack that just happened in Manchester. I

572
00:26:38,921 --> 00:26:42,360
Speaker 4: think and I got sent the latest media and it

573
00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:46,920
Speaker 4: was a ring camera that captured the offender's car going

574
00:26:46,961 --> 00:26:49,801
Speaker 4: past a house and a hubcap was missing on the car.

575
00:26:50,281 --> 00:26:52,360
Speaker 4: And apparently that was a critical piece of evidence to

576
00:26:52,400 --> 00:26:54,721
Speaker 4: confirm the identity of that offender. And that just came

577
00:26:54,761 --> 00:26:57,280
Speaker 4: from a tiny ring camera on someone's front door and

578
00:26:57,281 --> 00:27:00,160
Speaker 4: it saw a cargo past four minutes before the attack happened,

579
00:27:00,441 --> 00:27:02,201
Speaker 4: and for whatever reason, I don't know the full story,

580
00:27:02,201 --> 00:27:03,640
Speaker 4: but that was a critical piece of eviden It's the

581
00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:06,801
Speaker 4: same as Jill Mar and that's innocuous two hundred dollars

582
00:27:07,041 --> 00:27:09,761
Speaker 4: doorbell camera on someone's front door, and the Dull Mar

583
00:27:09,801 --> 00:27:12,561
Speaker 4: example is it's casing point for me, It really is.

584
00:27:12,921 --> 00:27:15,120
Speaker 4: And what's interesting is that that was an internal camera.

585
00:27:15,481 --> 00:27:17,400
Speaker 4: That was a camera actually inside and I use the

586
00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:19,561
Speaker 4: screenshot all the time and we all it's probably all

587
00:27:19,681 --> 00:27:23,200
Speaker 4: ingrained in our memory. It was an internal store camera

588
00:27:23,241 --> 00:27:25,321
Speaker 4: looking at their front door. You can even see annequins

589
00:27:25,360 --> 00:27:28,160
Speaker 4: and stock. It's a camera that traditionally you wouldn't think

590
00:27:28,201 --> 00:27:31,361
Speaker 4: would be of any value and walking past, even as

591
00:27:31,441 --> 00:27:33,480
Speaker 4: doing a canvas as a police officer, you could look

592
00:27:33,521 --> 00:27:35,720
Speaker 4: into that store and not see it. Because some of

593
00:27:35,721 --> 00:27:39,241
Speaker 4: these stores have quite discrete cameras for obvious reason, for

594
00:27:39,321 --> 00:27:41,880
Speaker 4: Robby's reasons, but sometimes they're quite overt. But as an

595
00:27:41,921 --> 00:27:45,001
Speaker 4: investigator might well pass looking the store, I can't see

596
00:27:45,001 --> 00:27:46,960
Speaker 4: any cameras, so you actually write that address off and

597
00:27:47,001 --> 00:27:49,721
Speaker 4: go no cameras. So on your log you say there's

598
00:27:49,721 --> 00:27:52,001
Speaker 4: no cameras found at the Dutchess Boutique. Wrongly there was

599
00:27:52,041 --> 00:27:55,041
Speaker 4: a camera. So that kind of thing is dangerous. And

600
00:27:55,080 --> 00:27:57,600
Speaker 4: again even whether can impact to this if there's been

601
00:27:57,600 --> 00:28:00,440
Speaker 4: an incident in someone's street and it's pouring with rain

602
00:28:00,600 --> 00:28:02,481
Speaker 4: and you're not going to get a team of police

603
00:28:02,481 --> 00:28:05,360
Speaker 4: going out there and door knocking au So notify all

604
00:28:05,360 --> 00:28:08,561
Speaker 4: the houses by SMS and by email perfect and they

605
00:28:08,561 --> 00:28:09,521
Speaker 4: could be able to see. So they could be in

606
00:28:09,561 --> 00:28:12,600
Speaker 4: the Greek Islands having a cocktail, get a notification from us.

607
00:28:13,001 --> 00:28:16,120
Speaker 4: Can you see Checkie Cameron's for a red cargoing past.

608
00:28:16,481 --> 00:28:18,481
Speaker 4: They could approve all of that from anywhere in the world.

609
00:28:19,880 --> 00:28:22,080
Speaker 3: One of my great heroes in policing was the former

610
00:28:22,120 --> 00:28:25,001
Speaker 3: Chief commission Victoria mic Miller. He's to talk about the

611
00:28:25,001 --> 00:28:28,200
Speaker 3: fact that in a totalitarian society, the police for the

612
00:28:28,241 --> 00:28:33,681
Speaker 3: instrument of totalitarianism and equally when it's working right, police

613
00:28:34,001 --> 00:28:34,561
Speaker 3: work with the.

614
00:28:34,521 --> 00:28:38,081
Speaker 2: Assent of the community appeals principles. If you go back

615
00:28:38,081 --> 00:28:39,281
Speaker 2: to you let those the acntemts.

616
00:28:39,361 --> 00:28:40,681
Speaker 4: Yeah, that set me right back. Yeah.

617
00:28:41,321 --> 00:28:43,401
Speaker 3: Yeah, Well, you know, you are just the community in

618
00:28:43,441 --> 00:28:46,081
Speaker 3: a uniform doing what the community wants. And we've had

619
00:28:46,081 --> 00:28:48,681
Speaker 3: a bit of a drift away from some of those principles,

620
00:28:48,721 --> 00:28:52,601
Speaker 3: and people want to live compartmentalized lives, but away from

621
00:28:52,601 --> 00:28:55,761
Speaker 3: their social responsibilities. And I think what you're talking about

622
00:28:55,401 --> 00:28:58,761
Speaker 3: is fundamental to reviving some of those vibes.

623
00:28:59,281 --> 00:29:00,841
Speaker 2: I suspect you're going to spend a lot of time

624
00:29:00,841 --> 00:29:01,881
Speaker 2: talking to politicians.

625
00:29:02,281 --> 00:29:03,960
Speaker 4: Yeah. I was only talking to someone about that yesterday.

626
00:29:03,961 --> 00:29:05,801
Speaker 4: I've tried to avoid it a full experience.

627
00:29:07,561 --> 00:29:10,081
Speaker 2: I teach them fans for about two seconds like mine.

628
00:29:10,441 --> 00:29:14,280
Speaker 4: I think, yes, it's inevitable. And I was told very

629
00:29:14,321 --> 00:29:16,681
Speaker 4: early on that this would end up being a political

630
00:29:17,081 --> 00:29:18,720
Speaker 4: hot potato at some point in your way, and it

631
00:29:18,721 --> 00:29:21,281
Speaker 4: hasn't quite hit that yet. I've had opportunities to speak

632
00:29:21,361 --> 00:29:24,241
Speaker 4: with some ministers which I haven't activated yet because I'm

633
00:29:24,241 --> 00:29:26,321
Speaker 4: just trying to refine my message for that because it's

634
00:29:26,361 --> 00:29:27,801
Speaker 4: the thing I have to do very carefully.

635
00:29:28,081 --> 00:29:29,641
Speaker 2: How did this come out of your police and career.

636
00:29:29,881 --> 00:29:31,521
Speaker 3: Why did you join the police in the first place,

637
00:29:31,521 --> 00:29:33,361
Speaker 3: and did you see yourself ending up in this place?

638
00:29:33,801 --> 00:29:34,601
Speaker 2: Sure you didn't.

639
00:29:35,641 --> 00:29:37,881
Speaker 4: You mentioned a missing child earlier. I made a very

640
00:29:37,881 --> 00:29:39,641
Speaker 4: early decision to join the police force when I was

641
00:29:39,641 --> 00:29:42,121
Speaker 4: about six. You might remember this. A little boy went

642
00:29:42,161 --> 00:29:46,121
Speaker 4: missing at Tidle River in Wilson's prom in the late eighties.

643
00:29:46,601 --> 00:29:48,881
Speaker 4: He was a young autistic boy. I think he was nine.

644
00:29:49,281 --> 00:29:51,720
Speaker 4: He went missing on a walk with his family. Police

645
00:29:51,721 --> 00:29:53,521
Speaker 4: came down his es did a search. We were staying

646
00:29:53,521 --> 00:29:55,361
Speaker 4: there at the time as a family. I was about six,

647
00:29:55,721 --> 00:29:57,720
Speaker 4: and there's a famous photo of me sitting in the

648
00:29:57,721 --> 00:30:01,481
Speaker 4: air wing tropper at Tidle River and big beaming smile

649
00:30:01,521 --> 00:30:02,720
Speaker 4: on my face. And I think that might have been

650
00:30:02,721 --> 00:30:04,081
Speaker 4: when I decided to join the police.

651
00:30:04,161 --> 00:30:07,521
Speaker 5: The hild Brand fam yes, nine year old Patrick Hildebrand

652
00:30:07,561 --> 00:30:10,440
Speaker 5: went missing in nineteen eighty seven while in a family

653
00:30:10,481 --> 00:30:15,361
Speaker 5: bushwalk at Wilson's Promontory in Victoria. Patrick, who was mildly autistic,

654
00:30:15,681 --> 00:30:18,281
Speaker 5: when ahead of the family and was never seen again

655
00:30:18,601 --> 00:30:20,521
Speaker 5: despite a massive search.

656
00:30:20,681 --> 00:30:23,841
Speaker 4: I think that was my earliest memory, and my family

657
00:30:23,841 --> 00:30:25,681
Speaker 4: got me a little cut down uniform and I had

658
00:30:25,681 --> 00:30:28,241
Speaker 4: a hat after all that, and then.

659
00:30:28,761 --> 00:30:30,121
Speaker 2: You got to send me a picture of that You've

660
00:30:30,121 --> 00:30:30,601
Speaker 2: got somewhere.

661
00:30:30,641 --> 00:30:32,641
Speaker 4: Yeah, I've one. I was actually sitting it in front

662
00:30:32,681 --> 00:30:36,401
Speaker 4: of my TV at home, cut down the old ceremonial

663
00:30:36,481 --> 00:30:38,161
Speaker 4: cap when I was just when I got back from

664
00:30:38,161 --> 00:30:39,921
Speaker 4: Wilson's prom when I realized I wanted to be a cop.

665
00:30:40,281 --> 00:30:42,241
Speaker 4: So yeah, I went into technology. I got sucked into

666
00:30:42,241 --> 00:30:44,440
Speaker 4: tech in the late nineties. Started a business when I

667
00:30:44,521 --> 00:30:48,081
Speaker 4: was sixteen, building websites in nineteen ninety eight. So I've

668
00:30:48,121 --> 00:30:51,841
Speaker 4: always been kind of that minded that I want to

669
00:30:51,921 --> 00:30:55,681
Speaker 4: use tech for good. And when I left Union did

670
00:30:55,681 --> 00:30:58,081
Speaker 4: a tech degree. I left Union, worked in I create

671
00:30:58,121 --> 00:31:00,521
Speaker 4: another business for two and a half years, again building websites,

672
00:31:00,561 --> 00:31:03,321
Speaker 4: but I left that to join the police force because

673
00:31:03,321 --> 00:31:07,440
Speaker 4: I wanted more, and ironically that's the recruitment campaign at

674
00:31:07,441 --> 00:31:10,041
Speaker 4: the moment, built for more. But I didn't see any

675
00:31:10,161 --> 00:31:12,201
Speaker 4: social impact in what I was doing. And I often

676
00:31:12,281 --> 00:31:15,201
Speaker 4: joke about websites. I was just changing different shades of orange.

677
00:31:15,361 --> 00:31:16,961
Speaker 4: I'm like, why am I doing this? What purpose? There's

678
00:31:16,961 --> 00:31:18,841
Speaker 4: got to be more to life than this. I saw

679
00:31:18,881 --> 00:31:20,361
Speaker 4: a friend who was in the job and I'm like,

680
00:31:20,401 --> 00:31:21,521
Speaker 4: hang on a second, if he can do it, I

681
00:31:21,561 --> 00:31:23,041
Speaker 4: can do it. And then I set back all these

682
00:31:23,081 --> 00:31:25,161
Speaker 4: memories from when I was a kid, and then yeah,

683
00:31:25,121 --> 00:31:26,801
Speaker 4: I had a few sleepless nights and joined the police

684
00:31:26,801 --> 00:31:30,441
Speaker 4: force two thousand and five on the van. On the van,

685
00:31:30,721 --> 00:31:33,521
Speaker 4: How was that interesting? I was lucky. I went to

686
00:31:33,561 --> 00:31:35,561
Speaker 4: transit for the first year, so when I joined, we

687
00:31:35,601 --> 00:31:37,841
Speaker 4: didn't actually have PSOs. It was a few years before

688
00:31:37,841 --> 00:31:40,720
Speaker 4: PSOs came in, so I had an interesting first year.

689
00:31:40,761 --> 00:31:43,361
Speaker 4: I was on trains, riding up and down train lines,

690
00:31:43,361 --> 00:31:45,201
Speaker 4: and we had cars at different stations, so i'd play

691
00:31:45,241 --> 00:31:49,161
Speaker 4: close playing clothes. About three months in, but initially in uniform,

692
00:31:49,281 --> 00:31:51,801
Speaker 4: and then I got into a specialist department where I

693
00:31:51,881 --> 00:31:53,961
Speaker 4: was chasing people who were wanted on warrants, and that's

694
00:31:53,961 --> 00:31:56,521
Speaker 4: where I got my taste of catching crooks. Yeah, less

695
00:31:56,521 --> 00:31:58,161
Speaker 4: than six months out, I was stoked.

696
00:31:58,601 --> 00:31:58,761
Speaker 2: Yeah.

697
00:31:58,761 --> 00:32:00,281
Speaker 4: I went and found a woman who did not want

698
00:32:00,281 --> 00:32:03,121
Speaker 4: to be found out and a weird caravan park out

699
00:32:03,121 --> 00:32:06,081
Speaker 4: in Yarrow Junction somewhere really did not want to be

700
00:32:06,081 --> 00:32:09,561
Speaker 4: found found her. I found another guy who we'd been

701
00:32:09,601 --> 00:32:11,601
Speaker 4: wanted for over two years, I think, and I found

702
00:32:11,601 --> 00:32:14,841
Speaker 4: out he needed methadone, and I think we still have

703
00:32:14,961 --> 00:32:17,001
Speaker 4: the methodone program where you've got a register to get

704
00:32:17,001 --> 00:32:20,121
Speaker 4: methadone from a pharmacy. And I'm like, well, that makes sense.

705
00:32:20,201 --> 00:32:23,401
Speaker 4: So I spoke to the methadone registry. Basically, I said

706
00:32:23,441 --> 00:32:25,561
Speaker 4: is this person registered? And they said yes. I said,

707
00:32:25,601 --> 00:32:28,041
Speaker 4: where does he pick up his methodone? Where's the authorized pharmacy?

708
00:32:28,201 --> 00:32:30,281
Speaker 4: And I was in Corfield. So I went to the

709
00:32:30,281 --> 00:32:32,801
Speaker 4: pharmacy and they keep a log of everyone that comes

710
00:32:32,801 --> 00:32:34,440
Speaker 4: in to collect their methadone. I said, when does this

711
00:32:34,481 --> 00:32:37,601
Speaker 4: person generally come in to collect and they said, you know,

712
00:32:37,681 --> 00:32:40,801
Speaker 4: every Tuesday between ten and twelve. So we just hung

713
00:32:40,881 --> 00:32:43,961
Speaker 4: outside the pharmacy. The next Tuesday from nine point thirty,

714
00:32:44,281 --> 00:32:46,161
Speaker 4: sure enough walks past with a hatt and Sunny's on

715
00:32:46,161 --> 00:32:48,201
Speaker 4: and we just jumped on him. And I thought, that's awesome.

716
00:32:48,641 --> 00:32:51,161
Speaker 4: And that was six months after graduating, And yeah, I

717
00:32:51,241 --> 00:32:52,161
Speaker 4: just got a real taste for that.

718
00:32:52,481 --> 00:32:55,161
Speaker 2: Excuse the part drug uses us certainly creatures of habit.

719
00:32:55,321 --> 00:32:57,561
Speaker 4: Yeah, thank god in that in that scenario, I didn't

720
00:32:57,601 --> 00:33:00,200
Speaker 4: change his routine, but yeah, I love that. And then

721
00:33:00,481 --> 00:33:02,001
Speaker 4: on the van a year later in two thousand and

722
00:33:02,081 --> 00:33:06,601
Speaker 4: six at Paran, that was an experience. Loved it. Chappel Street,

723
00:33:07,081 --> 00:33:10,921
Speaker 4: the hospitality scene and had everything in brand. But he

724
00:33:11,081 --> 00:33:13,241
Speaker 4: loved that and then did some attempts at Bona, the

725
00:33:13,361 --> 00:33:16,841
Speaker 4: Arm Crime Task Force at box Hill, wrote at Borundara

726
00:33:16,921 --> 00:33:19,480
Speaker 4: for a little while and then went to the Regional

727
00:33:19,521 --> 00:33:22,521
Speaker 4: Response Unit in two thousand and nine for two years

728
00:33:22,841 --> 00:33:25,041
Speaker 4: that was in the city, so we're basically drug unit.

729
00:33:25,441 --> 00:33:27,961
Speaker 4: Everything we did was structs. But that introduced me to

730
00:33:28,001 --> 00:33:32,200
Speaker 4: the world of telephan intercepts surveillance. Absolutely loved that. I

731
00:33:32,201 --> 00:33:35,321
Speaker 4: had a sergeant who's exim robbery squad back in the day,

732
00:33:35,401 --> 00:33:37,601
Speaker 4: John Kerno. He was a great sergeant, very gung ho,

733
00:33:37,801 --> 00:33:40,041
Speaker 4: got us into everything, big jobs Johnny as we used

734
00:33:40,041 --> 00:33:42,641
Speaker 4: to call him. He was my great sergeant at the time.

735
00:33:43,081 --> 00:33:45,161
Speaker 4: But yeah, I got introduced to televihon interceptions s falance

736
00:33:45,161 --> 00:33:46,480
Speaker 4: and that's where I loved that because that was a

737
00:33:46,521 --> 00:33:49,041
Speaker 4: really good hybrid of my tech background and my love

738
00:33:49,081 --> 00:33:53,361
Speaker 4: of law enforcement. So listening to people's phones and understanding

739
00:33:53,401 --> 00:33:57,281
Speaker 4: how phones are tracked around the mobile network was fascinating.

740
00:33:57,521 --> 00:34:00,161
Speaker 4: And back to Jill mar that was a key part

741
00:34:00,161 --> 00:34:02,361
Speaker 4: of that investigation as well, was tracking his phone as

742
00:34:02,401 --> 00:34:05,041
Speaker 4: it headed up to Gisbon. Loved the exposure of that

743
00:34:05,161 --> 00:34:07,401
Speaker 4: and That was fantastic. I got my first detectives stop

744
00:34:07,481 --> 00:34:10,801
Speaker 4: at the Stadi Intele Division under Stuart Bateson, and he

745
00:34:10,841 --> 00:34:11,321
Speaker 4: was legend of.

746
00:34:11,281 --> 00:34:13,480
Speaker 2: The Paranotas sports. There were gangline war. Yeah.

747
00:34:13,601 --> 00:34:15,521
Speaker 4: Yeah, I've stayed in touch and I didn't always.

748
00:34:15,601 --> 00:34:18,441
Speaker 2: Get on Please give him my bed, tell him, you know,

749
00:34:19,041 --> 00:34:20,241
Speaker 2: let bygones be by gone.

750
00:34:20,401 --> 00:34:22,641
Speaker 3: He was wonderful because they want listen to my calls

751
00:34:22,681 --> 00:34:26,401
Speaker 3: with Carl Williams and it was completely infuriating because there

752
00:34:26,441 --> 00:34:28,481
Speaker 3: I was, jolly and Carl Williams along, you know, it

753
00:34:28,641 --> 00:34:32,001
Speaker 3: was a thought in this side and I just cecerely apologize.

754
00:34:32,321 --> 00:34:34,521
Speaker 4: I'll tell him. Yeah, it was great learning from him

755
00:34:34,521 --> 00:34:37,281
Speaker 4: as a young detective. Neil Patterson was the AC at

756
00:34:37,321 --> 00:34:39,801
Speaker 4: the time. I'm still good friends with Neil as well.

757
00:34:39,841 --> 00:34:42,561
Speaker 4: He's now obviously left the police force, but did two

758
00:34:42,641 --> 00:34:44,801
Speaker 4: years there. It stayed in tele division and that was fascinating.

759
00:34:44,801 --> 00:34:48,161
Speaker 4: That's probably a whole other story. But I had portfolios,

760
00:34:48,201 --> 00:34:52,321
Speaker 4: so I wasn't investigating crime. I was investigating themes. So

761
00:34:52,481 --> 00:34:55,641
Speaker 4: one of my themes was environmental terrorism, so it was

762
00:34:55,721 --> 00:35:00,121
Speaker 4: my job to actually go out and befriend protesters. So

763
00:35:00,201 --> 00:35:02,601
Speaker 4: I spent a lot of time in Gippsland with forestry

764
00:35:02,641 --> 00:35:08,121
Speaker 4: protesters literally sitting around a campfire just trying to understand undercover.

765
00:35:08,801 --> 00:35:12,841
Speaker 4: No they knew I was police. Yeah, yeah, so strange,

766
00:35:12,921 --> 00:35:14,041
Speaker 4: But I got.

767
00:35:14,001 --> 00:35:16,480
Speaker 3: That kind of persona to be honest that where people

768
00:35:16,521 --> 00:35:18,201
Speaker 3: would say, why am I telling.

769
00:35:17,921 --> 00:35:18,281
Speaker 2: You all this?

770
00:35:18,721 --> 00:35:21,520
Speaker 4: It's very funny you say that because that My wife

771
00:35:21,561 --> 00:35:23,241
Speaker 4: gives me a lot of stick about that. But people

772
00:35:23,361 --> 00:35:25,241
Speaker 4: tell me to say that exact thing all my life.

773
00:35:25,281 --> 00:35:25,761
Speaker 2: They always have.

774
00:35:25,841 --> 00:35:27,281
Speaker 4: I don't know why I'm telling you this, but I am.

775
00:35:27,881 --> 00:35:29,721
Speaker 4: And the next part of the story is that when

776
00:35:29,761 --> 00:35:31,321
Speaker 4: I went to the FED, so I became a full

777
00:35:31,401 --> 00:35:33,961
Speaker 4: time human source handler, so we call them case managers.

778
00:35:34,001 --> 00:35:37,041
Speaker 4: But I spent three years managing some of the most

779
00:35:37,201 --> 00:35:40,761
Speaker 4: high risk international human sources on the planet in conjunction

780
00:35:40,921 --> 00:35:46,321
Speaker 4: with the DEA and FBI, Homeland Security, NCAA, And obviously

781
00:35:46,361 --> 00:35:48,361
Speaker 4: I can't talk about a lot of it, but that

782
00:35:48,561 --> 00:35:51,001
Speaker 4: was some of the most fascinating years of my life.

783
00:35:51,121 --> 00:35:53,441
Speaker 4: My wife and friends might say otherwise, because I couldn't

784
00:35:53,441 --> 00:35:56,081
Speaker 4: go anywhere without taking phone calls. I had a gun

785
00:35:56,161 --> 00:35:58,801
Speaker 4: with me all the time, had a car laptop, I

786
00:35:58,881 --> 00:36:01,361
Speaker 4: had five phones. At one point, I had three different wallets,

787
00:36:02,441 --> 00:36:06,121
Speaker 4: had all kinds of stuff and that was fascinating, fascinating

788
00:36:06,161 --> 00:36:06,841
Speaker 4: part of my career.

789
00:36:08,161 --> 00:36:08,921
Speaker 2: The one at an end.

790
00:36:09,401 --> 00:36:12,281
Speaker 4: It's another good question. I spent about eighteen months in

791
00:36:12,361 --> 00:36:14,881
Speaker 4: Canberra on promotion into different areas. I worked on a

792
00:36:14,961 --> 00:36:18,401
Speaker 4: national biometric system back to facial recognition. I was called

793
00:36:18,441 --> 00:36:21,081
Speaker 4: up to give operational support to a system that NEC

794
00:36:21,281 --> 00:36:25,401
Speaker 4: was building for facial recognition nationally, and all of my

795
00:36:25,481 --> 00:36:28,041
Speaker 4: promotional opportunities longer term were in Canberra. Then I had

796
00:36:28,081 --> 00:36:29,961
Speaker 4: young kids and I just was not in a position

797
00:36:30,041 --> 00:36:32,361
Speaker 4: to move to Canberra, so I went back to vic Pole,

798
00:36:32,601 --> 00:36:35,001
Speaker 4: just temporarily as a senior IT manager there in the

799
00:36:35,041 --> 00:36:37,481
Speaker 4: surveillance area. And then my wife got a little bit

800
00:36:37,481 --> 00:36:39,601
Speaker 4: ill and I had to resign from Big Pole to

801
00:36:39,641 --> 00:36:41,241
Speaker 4: help run her company. And that's what I've been doing

802
00:36:41,241 --> 00:36:43,601
Speaker 4: all through COVID, and that's why I'm probably back into

803
00:36:43,641 --> 00:36:45,721
Speaker 4: this now, because she's better and the company's fine, and

804
00:36:46,201 --> 00:36:48,321
Speaker 4: I can get back into law enforcement again from the

805
00:36:48,361 --> 00:36:50,041
Speaker 4: other side of the fence, other side.

806
00:36:49,881 --> 00:36:54,281
Speaker 3: Because like, you're the kind of officer who Vic Pole

807
00:36:54,321 --> 00:36:57,201
Speaker 3: would would cry tears of blood to lose fifteen years

808
00:36:57,201 --> 00:36:59,361
Speaker 3: of investment in you, all the high tech, all the

809
00:36:59,441 --> 00:37:02,881
Speaker 3: experience all that great stuff and you walk out the door.

810
00:37:03,441 --> 00:37:05,921
Speaker 4: Yeah. I actually spoke to someone very similar to me

811
00:37:06,001 --> 00:37:08,401
Speaker 4: who has just gone off sit long term sickly from

812
00:37:08,441 --> 00:37:10,401
Speaker 4: vic Pole and that's exactly how I would describe him.

813
00:37:10,841 --> 00:37:13,121
Speaker 4: A huge loss for Victoria Police. And yeah, he's a

814
00:37:13,201 --> 00:37:15,401
Speaker 4: perfect example of someone they really should have not let

815
00:37:15,601 --> 00:37:18,641
Speaker 4: slip through their fingers. And it's happening really regularly. I

816
00:37:18,761 --> 00:37:20,561
Speaker 4: was having a conversation with the New Zealand police officer

817
00:37:20,641 --> 00:37:22,281
Speaker 4: a couple of days ago, and she's only a year

818
00:37:22,321 --> 00:37:24,761
Speaker 4: into the job in New Zealand, but she's struggling with

819
00:37:24,841 --> 00:37:27,961
Speaker 4: the culture there and things. And I said, well, she

820
00:37:28,041 --> 00:37:29,681
Speaker 4: said the same thing. You know, people tell me things

821
00:37:29,721 --> 00:37:32,121
Speaker 4: that they don't know why they're telling me. I said, perfect,

822
00:37:32,321 --> 00:37:34,601
Speaker 4: stick with the job, look for an intel job, look

823
00:37:34,641 --> 00:37:37,121
Speaker 4: for a human sauce job. Like you love being in

824
00:37:37,161 --> 00:37:39,201
Speaker 4: the police, but maybe you're not suited for uniform Not

825
00:37:39,241 --> 00:37:41,960
Speaker 4: everyone's suited for general duties policing. That's not everyone's vibe.

826
00:37:42,081 --> 00:37:44,121
Speaker 4: So when I told her about my career, she was

827
00:37:44,201 --> 00:37:45,641
Speaker 4: just like, oh my god, I hadn't thought about that.

828
00:37:46,241 --> 00:37:48,401
Speaker 4: And I said, give the dedicated source unit a call

829
00:37:48,441 --> 00:37:49,961
Speaker 4: and see if there's tempts you can do, see if

830
00:37:49,961 --> 00:37:54,081
Speaker 4: there's courses you can do that. Softer side of policing

831
00:37:54,201 --> 00:37:57,161
Speaker 4: isn't a weakness. And you know, whenever I spoke to crooks,

832
00:37:57,201 --> 00:37:59,361
Speaker 4: i'd remove the table. It's the old probably Stewart bateson

833
00:37:59,401 --> 00:38:02,281
Speaker 4: a homicide investigation style. I picked that up very early.

834
00:38:02,561 --> 00:38:04,401
Speaker 4: Get the table out of the way, move the chairs

835
00:38:04,441 --> 00:38:07,001
Speaker 4: next to each other, like all of that really subtle stuff.

836
00:38:07,561 --> 00:38:09,361
Speaker 4: And I loved that. And I got my first human

837
00:38:09,441 --> 00:38:10,921
Speaker 4: source when I was a prans it would have been

838
00:38:10,921 --> 00:38:13,641
Speaker 4: two thousand and six, as a young kid. He was

839
00:38:13,761 --> 00:38:16,121
Speaker 4: drug dealing at the Love Machine. We picked him up.

840
00:38:16,121 --> 00:38:18,641
Speaker 4: He was just trying to move counterfeit currency through the

841
00:38:18,721 --> 00:38:21,321
Speaker 4: nightclub and we picked him up and charged him. But

842
00:38:21,961 --> 00:38:24,161
Speaker 4: same thing. He started telling me things he'd never told anyone,

843
00:38:24,201 --> 00:38:26,961
Speaker 4: and he became my human source. And that was eight

844
00:38:27,001 --> 00:38:28,921
Speaker 4: ten months out of the academy and I'd already recruited

845
00:38:28,961 --> 00:38:30,881
Speaker 4: a source. I was lucky that I had a senior

846
00:38:30,921 --> 00:38:33,481
Speaker 4: Connie that allowed that, and he didn't take that person on.

847
00:38:33,561 --> 00:38:35,521
Speaker 4: He could have tried to do it himself, but he

848
00:38:35,641 --> 00:38:37,321
Speaker 4: was a very supportive senior Connie. So I think I

849
00:38:37,361 --> 00:38:41,241
Speaker 4: was lucky. But yeah, that human element I've always loved.

850
00:38:41,801 --> 00:38:43,881
Speaker 2: Please tell me you were involved in the lawyer ex

851
00:38:44,001 --> 00:38:45,801
Speaker 2: Nicola Gobbo human source.

852
00:38:45,601 --> 00:38:46,921
Speaker 4: And Debarcle no comment.

853
00:38:48,241 --> 00:38:51,001
Speaker 3: Wow, it's such a difficult So we're getting off track

854
00:38:51,001 --> 00:38:52,481
Speaker 3: a little bit here, But I think this it's important

855
00:38:52,481 --> 00:38:56,521
Speaker 3: because the human element is so important and managing these

856
00:38:56,601 --> 00:39:00,241
Speaker 3: people is so critical, and giving police officers the latitude

857
00:39:00,281 --> 00:39:02,561
Speaker 3: to be able to create these relationships without the fear

858
00:39:02,921 --> 00:39:05,241
Speaker 3: not just of making a mistake, but their colleagues going

859
00:39:05,361 --> 00:39:07,601
Speaker 3: there's some fishy gun and then suddenly got the internal

860
00:39:07,801 --> 00:39:09,561
Speaker 3: investigations on them and all kind of stuff, and I

861
00:39:09,601 --> 00:39:12,201
Speaker 3: think that has put everything back a long way.

862
00:39:13,041 --> 00:39:14,041
Speaker 2: The stuff up around that.

863
00:39:14,241 --> 00:39:17,281
Speaker 4: Well, it's actually quite relevant to CCTV and surveillance because

864
00:39:17,321 --> 00:39:20,001
Speaker 4: back to my point about avenues of inquiry for an investigation,

865
00:39:20,441 --> 00:39:23,481
Speaker 4: they're dwindling. I mean, police can't listen to phones like

866
00:39:23,561 --> 00:39:26,161
Speaker 4: they used to. And now with the Lawyer X issue,

867
00:39:26,641 --> 00:39:29,241
Speaker 4: I know for a fact that Victoria Police is struggling

868
00:39:29,321 --> 00:39:32,081
Speaker 4: to recruit human sources. And for a long time they've

869
00:39:32,121 --> 00:39:34,481
Speaker 4: been critical to major investigations, as you would know from

870
00:39:34,561 --> 00:39:39,441
Speaker 4: your Parana days. So if you've got encryption stopping electronic

871
00:39:39,481 --> 00:39:43,121
Speaker 4: surveillance or hindering it to a large degree less human sources.

872
00:39:43,801 --> 00:39:47,001
Speaker 4: What are your other traditional avenues of inquiry. You've got fingerprints,

873
00:39:47,081 --> 00:39:51,481
Speaker 4: DNA witnesses, CCTV, So CCTV is basically a digital witness

874
00:39:51,561 --> 00:39:54,401
Speaker 4: that's recording twenty four to seven and police aren't making

875
00:39:54,401 --> 00:39:56,281
Speaker 4: the best use of it. So they kind of already

876
00:39:56,281 --> 00:39:59,321
Speaker 4: got one anti behind the back and without maximizing the

877
00:39:59,401 --> 00:40:02,601
Speaker 4: avenue's inquiry they do have. They've just seen cases slip

878
00:40:02,641 --> 00:40:03,521
Speaker 4: through their fingers.

879
00:40:03,521 --> 00:40:04,801
Speaker 2: Because having all that material.

880
00:40:05,721 --> 00:40:07,841
Speaker 3: I imagine when you go into the interview room with

881
00:40:07,961 --> 00:40:11,281
Speaker 3: your suspect and you already know the answers to the

882
00:40:11,361 --> 00:40:12,601
Speaker 3: questions you're asking him.

883
00:40:13,281 --> 00:40:16,001
Speaker 2: So if you can let him know that, you're much

884
00:40:16,041 --> 00:40:18,241
Speaker 2: more likely to be able to bend.

885
00:40:18,081 --> 00:40:20,681
Speaker 4: Him into working with you. And imagine, Yeah, we call

886
00:40:20,721 --> 00:40:23,441
Speaker 4: it leverage. It depends on the type of person and

887
00:40:23,561 --> 00:40:26,081
Speaker 4: what you want them to do. You know, there's agencies

888
00:40:26,121 --> 00:40:30,321
Speaker 4: like the DEA that use leverage extremely partially because sentencing

889
00:40:30,401 --> 00:40:32,801
Speaker 4: in the US is extraordinary. Like, you get caught with marijuana,

890
00:40:32,841 --> 00:40:35,001
Speaker 4: you go to prison for ten years. So for someone

891
00:40:35,081 --> 00:40:37,241
Speaker 4: caught with a little bit of cannabis facing ten years prison,

892
00:40:37,281 --> 00:40:39,881
Speaker 4: they're always going to work with you. Whereas in Australia

893
00:40:39,961 --> 00:40:41,481
Speaker 4: we don't have that kind of sentencing, which I think

894
00:40:41,561 --> 00:40:44,081
Speaker 4: is a good thing, but that leverage can be hard

895
00:40:44,161 --> 00:40:46,921
Speaker 4: to identify what will work for what person. Some people

896
00:40:46,961 --> 00:40:49,201
Speaker 4: will be motivated by money, some people will motivate it

897
00:40:49,241 --> 00:40:51,601
Speaker 4: by revenge. You kind of got to figure out the

898
00:40:51,641 --> 00:40:54,321
Speaker 4: psychological aspect more than just a legal aspect.

899
00:40:55,481 --> 00:40:57,121
Speaker 3: There is that moment you can go look, listen, I

900
00:40:57,241 --> 00:40:59,561
Speaker 3: know what you're saying, but here's the picture of you

901
00:41:00,321 --> 00:41:02,161
Speaker 3: walking on the street right near that, and here's the

902
00:41:02,201 --> 00:41:04,761
Speaker 3: next picture of you there, and you know, all we

903
00:41:04,801 --> 00:41:07,841
Speaker 3: need is to confirm this and let's let me do it.

904
00:41:08,001 --> 00:41:10,801
Speaker 4: Go, Yeah, exactly. So I mean I say this a

905
00:41:10,801 --> 00:41:12,841
Speaker 4: little bit about our bail laws as well in Victoria,

906
00:41:12,961 --> 00:41:16,521
Speaker 4: and another use for our CCTV system is exactly what

907
00:41:16,641 --> 00:41:20,481
Speaker 4: you described where I remember doing ramand briefs or remand

908
00:41:20,561 --> 00:41:23,121
Speaker 4: hearings in front of a bail justice at pran where

909
00:41:23,961 --> 00:41:25,480
Speaker 4: you haven't got a lot of evidence. At that point.

910
00:41:25,521 --> 00:41:27,481
Speaker 4: You kind of know that they've been charged, they've been

911
00:41:27,481 --> 00:41:29,001
Speaker 4: caught on the hop, but you don't know the full

912
00:41:29,081 --> 00:41:32,761
Speaker 4: extent of how violent the crime was or how they

913
00:41:32,921 --> 00:41:35,801
Speaker 4: really behaved. Something that would be on CCTV for example.

914
00:41:36,161 --> 00:41:38,321
Speaker 4: So you're giving a very small amount of evidence to

915
00:41:38,441 --> 00:41:40,481
Speaker 4: a magistrate or a bail justice to try and remard

916
00:41:40,561 --> 00:41:44,801
Speaker 4: that person. My system would give those informants more evidence

917
00:41:44,841 --> 00:41:47,761
Speaker 4: at that early stage to make that remand hearing stronger,

918
00:41:48,721 --> 00:41:51,401
Speaker 4: which in turn would make them less likely to get bail.

919
00:41:52,201 --> 00:41:54,401
Speaker 4: Because it never really gets talked about in the media

920
00:41:54,481 --> 00:41:57,561
Speaker 4: that this magistrate gave this person bail or this bail

921
00:41:57,721 --> 00:41:59,601
Speaker 4: justice gave this person bail. It's like, well, it's up

922
00:41:59,641 --> 00:42:03,201
Speaker 4: to the informant to put a strong enough case to

923
00:42:03,481 --> 00:42:07,281
Speaker 4: that person to and if you're putting slop in front

924
00:42:07,281 --> 00:42:09,441
Speaker 4: of a bail justice or in front of a magistrate,

925
00:42:09,481 --> 00:42:11,681
Speaker 4: of course they're going to get bail because you've only

926
00:42:11,721 --> 00:42:14,361
Speaker 4: had a few hours to start setting up that investigation.

927
00:42:14,441 --> 00:42:16,721
Speaker 4: If you've caught them, you know, just around in the

928
00:42:16,801 --> 00:42:19,361
Speaker 4: corner from a burg or whatever, so you haven't got

929
00:42:19,401 --> 00:42:21,081
Speaker 4: a lot of evidence to put to them yet, it

930
00:42:21,321 --> 00:42:24,801
Speaker 4: might generate enough cause for them to be reminded. So

931
00:42:24,841 --> 00:42:27,401
Speaker 4: if you can put camera footage from MY network to

932
00:42:27,481 --> 00:42:29,481
Speaker 4: them where it shows them holding a massive machete, it

933
00:42:29,561 --> 00:42:32,481
Speaker 4: shows the victim screaming and how close they were to

934
00:42:32,601 --> 00:42:36,641
Speaker 4: murdering them. In actual vivid detail. As a magistrate, I'd

935
00:42:36,681 --> 00:42:39,041
Speaker 4: be like, oh, that's that's very serious. I mean you

936
00:42:39,081 --> 00:42:41,721
Speaker 4: can put it in writing, but seeing it in video footage,

937
00:42:41,761 --> 00:42:43,961
Speaker 4: I might be actually, I'm not going to I'm not

938
00:42:43,961 --> 00:42:46,521
Speaker 4: going to give you bail. So I think whatever we

939
00:42:46,601 --> 00:42:49,281
Speaker 4: can do to support our informants to make a stronger case,

940
00:42:50,161 --> 00:42:53,161
Speaker 4: that essentially will also make people make it harder for

941
00:42:53,201 --> 00:42:53,881
Speaker 4: people to get bail.

942
00:42:54,481 --> 00:42:57,841
Speaker 3: Sadly, I feel like you're going to need another Jill

943
00:42:57,961 --> 00:43:01,481
Speaker 3: mar case or a Clio in Western Australia, one of

944
00:43:01,521 --> 00:43:04,641
Speaker 3: these ones that captures I'll never forget that the days

945
00:43:05,561 --> 00:43:07,601
Speaker 3: when that fill my investigation was going on, and the

946
00:43:07,841 --> 00:43:10,561
Speaker 3: whole city was grouped by this we want an answer,

947
00:43:10,601 --> 00:43:13,201
Speaker 3: we want an answer, and if you could just distill

948
00:43:13,361 --> 00:43:16,961
Speaker 3: that unified feeling you had no problems.

949
00:43:17,081 --> 00:43:19,521
Speaker 4: Well that's interesting. After Jill mar there was millions of

950
00:43:19,561 --> 00:43:22,961
Speaker 4: dollars pumped into CCTV, so the federal government chipped in,

951
00:43:23,201 --> 00:43:25,881
Speaker 4: stakement chipped in. I don't have the figures, but it

952
00:43:26,001 --> 00:43:28,401
Speaker 4: was somewhere around five million dollars, which is in a

953
00:43:28,401 --> 00:43:31,041
Speaker 4: lot in these maybe it's more now, but a lot

954
00:43:31,081 --> 00:43:34,081
Speaker 4: of cameras got installed after Jill Mar, so I think

955
00:43:34,121 --> 00:43:37,001
Speaker 4: we just get complacent and we just we settle back

956
00:43:37,041 --> 00:43:38,921
Speaker 4: down to our old ways and we don't invest in

957
00:43:39,001 --> 00:43:42,121
Speaker 4: these things. It's like any after era terrorist after September eleven,

958
00:43:42,161 --> 00:43:45,361
Speaker 4: how much security changed in airports. It's just a it's

959
00:43:45,401 --> 00:43:47,961
Speaker 4: a reflex thing. And like you've said all along that

960
00:43:48,441 --> 00:43:50,161
Speaker 4: you kind of don't want to make these changes unless

961
00:43:50,161 --> 00:43:50,641
Speaker 4: you're forced to.

962
00:43:51,241 --> 00:43:51,721
Speaker 2: Well, it's right.

963
00:43:51,761 --> 00:43:53,721
Speaker 3: I mean, you see, on the DNA side, we've already

964
00:43:53,761 --> 00:43:58,121
Speaker 3: got the technology around forensic investory of genealogical searching, which

965
00:43:58,201 --> 00:44:02,921
Speaker 3: means that all those offended DNA that's unknown, unknown human remains,

966
00:44:03,401 --> 00:44:06,241
Speaker 3: there's answers to all those cases right now. If we

967
00:44:06,361 --> 00:44:10,761
Speaker 3: could get the commercial databases like ancestry to my Heritage

968
00:44:10,761 --> 00:44:12,921
Speaker 3: and so forth to actually hand it over.

969
00:44:12,921 --> 00:44:14,681
Speaker 4: And isn't that fascinating? People are willing to hand the

970
00:44:14,801 --> 00:44:17,801
Speaker 4: DNA over to those organizations, and people aren't willing to

971
00:44:17,881 --> 00:44:20,041
Speaker 4: say to my network, they've got cameras. It's just like

972
00:44:20,521 --> 00:44:22,601
Speaker 4: this is what I mean about people pick and choose

973
00:44:22,961 --> 00:44:24,881
Speaker 4: where they want to get into this technology, but they're

974
00:44:24,921 --> 00:44:27,361
Speaker 4: absorbing it anyway. They're giving the DNA to a private

975
00:44:27,481 --> 00:44:30,241
Speaker 4: organization just to see who their great grandparents were been

976
00:44:30,281 --> 00:44:33,161
Speaker 4: speaking of DNA. You know, we're talking today in Easy Street.

977
00:44:33,521 --> 00:44:35,681
Speaker 4: Fitzroy and Easy Street murders were a few hundred meters

978
00:44:35,681 --> 00:44:38,201
Speaker 4: away back in nineteen seventy seven and that was solved

979
00:44:38,361 --> 00:44:38,881
Speaker 4: through DNA.

980
00:44:39,281 --> 00:44:42,561
Speaker 3: What's right on the knife alleged go to the core

981
00:44:42,641 --> 00:44:46,041
Speaker 3: process and the case is based around DNA which they've

982
00:44:46,041 --> 00:44:48,561
Speaker 3: had for a very long time. And the forensic unit

983
00:44:48,561 --> 00:44:51,481
Speaker 3: at McLeod has a whole cold case full of I

984
00:44:51,561 --> 00:44:54,841
Speaker 3: mean identified in the Mister Cruel series of abductions that

985
00:44:54,961 --> 00:44:57,721
Speaker 3: they had DNA in at least two cases. And yet

986
00:44:57,761 --> 00:45:00,681
Speaker 3: we're still talking about one offender when we could be

987
00:45:00,841 --> 00:45:04,361
Speaker 3: now looking at three or four different scenarios and locking

988
00:45:04,361 --> 00:45:05,041
Speaker 3: people upstairs.

989
00:45:05,321 --> 00:45:06,081
Speaker 2: Yep, you know.

990
00:45:06,201 --> 00:45:09,241
Speaker 3: I think it's the technology is there, The public debate

991
00:45:09,281 --> 00:45:10,561
Speaker 3: has to be had and you're part of that.

992
00:45:11,041 --> 00:45:12,041
Speaker 2: Do you feel like a pioneer?

993
00:45:12,521 --> 00:45:14,721
Speaker 4: I do a little bit. I feel sick some days

994
00:45:14,721 --> 00:45:17,361
Speaker 4: because I realize I'm getting into something. I say to

995
00:45:17,441 --> 00:45:20,001
Speaker 4: my wife sometimes like what am I doing? Like I

996
00:45:20,081 --> 00:45:22,281
Speaker 4: have these days where I just have this mini panic

997
00:45:22,321 --> 00:45:24,960
Speaker 4: attacks for a microsecond and then I'll get myself together.

998
00:45:25,081 --> 00:45:28,961
Speaker 4: But I do feel like that I have always been

999
00:45:29,001 --> 00:45:36,481
Speaker 4: a visionary, but I'm waiting into a very complex environment privacy, ethics, stakeholders,

1000
00:45:37,041 --> 00:45:39,480
Speaker 4: like our platform is basically built. I've spent the last

1001
00:45:39,681 --> 00:45:43,201
Speaker 4: two months just making phone calls, emails, flying to camera,

1002
00:45:43,481 --> 00:45:47,161
Speaker 4: find a Sydney, educating people. That's where I think most

1003
00:45:47,161 --> 00:45:48,041
Speaker 4: of the time will be spent.

1004
00:45:48,241 --> 00:45:51,401
Speaker 3: Yeah, because you think of it, there's waking moments. He's

1005
00:45:51,441 --> 00:45:53,921
Speaker 3: making micro panics and whatnot. You know, if I was

1006
00:45:53,961 --> 00:45:55,921
Speaker 3: still in the forest, i'd probably be a superintendent.

1007
00:45:56,041 --> 00:45:57,001
Speaker 2: Now, I'll be on the way to.

1008
00:45:57,041 --> 00:45:59,521
Speaker 3: Being an assistant commission I'll be involved away and i'd

1009
00:45:59,561 --> 00:46:01,681
Speaker 3: be involved in maintaining the status quiet.

1010
00:46:03,001 --> 00:46:05,401
Speaker 4: You weren't happy with that, No, I don't think I could.

1011
00:46:05,401 --> 00:46:08,681
Speaker 4: I've toyed with going back, you know, potentially rose colored glasses.

1012
00:46:08,921 --> 00:46:10,241
Speaker 4: I talk to a lot of people still on the

1013
00:46:10,321 --> 00:46:13,841
Speaker 4: job clearly, and what I love being in the private

1014
00:46:13,881 --> 00:46:16,601
Speaker 4: sector is our atility to do what we need to

1015
00:46:16,641 --> 00:46:19,960
Speaker 4: do when we need to do it. And I would

1016
00:46:20,041 --> 00:46:22,121
Speaker 4: categorically not get that privilege of I went back to

1017
00:46:22,201 --> 00:46:25,841
Speaker 4: Victoria Belie. You know, I think they're a big, slow

1018
00:46:25,921 --> 00:46:29,201
Speaker 4: moving organization. I think i'd find that inherently frustrating, and

1019
00:46:29,281 --> 00:46:31,201
Speaker 4: I did in twenty nineteen when I was there I'm

1020
00:46:31,281 --> 00:46:31,761
Speaker 4: very frustrated.

1021
00:46:31,761 --> 00:46:33,761
Speaker 2: I think after this interview that door was closed. Anyways,

1022
00:46:35,041 --> 00:46:36,440
Speaker 2: I love it, I love vic poll part.

1023
00:46:36,561 --> 00:46:37,601
Speaker 4: Yeah, but I times it it.

1024
00:46:37,561 --> 00:46:39,041
Speaker 3: Takes courage because I think what we're going to see

1025
00:46:39,081 --> 00:46:41,521
Speaker 3: in police forces around the world, most public institutions is

1026
00:46:41,601 --> 00:46:44,041
Speaker 3: outsourcing of all kinds of things. Yeah, it's going to

1027
00:46:44,121 --> 00:46:46,161
Speaker 3: have to happen, and so I think you're part of

1028
00:46:46,241 --> 00:46:47,961
Speaker 3: that whole trend that's happening.

1029
00:46:48,281 --> 00:46:49,681
Speaker 2: What are your goals have you have you got a

1030
00:46:49,721 --> 00:46:50,361
Speaker 2: timeline for this?

1031
00:46:50,761 --> 00:46:54,521
Speaker 4: I don't have a timeline, but I am very impatient

1032
00:46:54,601 --> 00:46:56,121
Speaker 4: and I do have a sense of urgency to this

1033
00:46:56,281 --> 00:46:59,521
Speaker 4: because I know how important it could be or it

1034
00:46:59,681 --> 00:47:03,201
Speaker 4: is to community. I'd like to see it operational within

1035
00:47:03,241 --> 00:47:05,561
Speaker 4: eighteen months across Australia. That's what I'm like to see.

1036
00:47:06,281 --> 00:47:09,401
Speaker 4: But I've just got to be patient with these organizations

1037
00:47:09,441 --> 00:47:12,081
Speaker 4: that take time. So as much as I'm I have

1038
00:47:12,161 --> 00:47:13,881
Speaker 4: a sense of urgency, I need to work within the

1039
00:47:13,961 --> 00:47:18,961
Speaker 4: constraints of government and politics and just keep working with them,

1040
00:47:19,081 --> 00:47:21,401
Speaker 4: not against them. And that's really important. Like I can't

1041
00:47:21,441 --> 00:47:24,041
Speaker 4: do this without Laura for Saint, he's getting on board,

1042
00:47:24,121 --> 00:47:25,961
Speaker 4: and like you've said earlier, I want this to be

1043
00:47:26,041 --> 00:47:28,521
Speaker 4: community led, but I want it to be government trusted.

1044
00:47:29,321 --> 00:47:30,481
Speaker 4: So it's a journey.

1045
00:47:31,321 --> 00:47:35,361
Speaker 3: It is, use the cliche journey without mass, but the

1046
00:47:35,441 --> 00:47:37,161
Speaker 3: sort of situations you don't need maps, you just need

1047
00:47:37,201 --> 00:47:37,681
Speaker 3: good shoes.

1048
00:47:38,041 --> 00:47:40,761
Speaker 4: Yeah, exactly, and I think I'll be replacing my shoes regularly.

1049
00:47:41,001 --> 00:47:41,481
Speaker 2: Fantastic.

1050
00:47:41,521 --> 00:47:43,481
Speaker 3: Well, thanks you, Tom that It's been fantastic, really interesting

1051
00:47:43,481 --> 00:47:45,561
Speaker 3: and debted, and I wish you all the very best

1052
00:47:45,641 --> 00:47:46,401
Speaker 3: of success in this.

1053
00:47:46,561 --> 00:47:47,881
Speaker 2: It's going to be a tough, but I think it's

1054
00:47:47,881 --> 00:47:48,521
Speaker 2: an important thing.

1055
00:47:48,521 --> 00:47:52,441
Speaker 3: I think it typifies what we need to do with

1056
00:47:52,521 --> 00:47:56,481
Speaker 3: the community and police to work together towards positive outcomes.

1057
00:47:56,521 --> 00:47:56,881
Speaker 4: Exactly.

1058
00:47:57,161 --> 00:47:58,841
Speaker 2: The problem is people don't want to get onto this

1059
00:47:59,001 --> 00:48:00,481
Speaker 2: until they need it.

1060
00:48:04,001 --> 00:48:07,281
Speaker 3: That's David Bartleer, this Safer Places network, and you know

1061
00:48:07,521 --> 00:48:09,001
Speaker 3: the technology is all their people.

1062
00:48:09,281 --> 00:48:11,201
Speaker 2: We've just got to allow it to be used.

1063
00:48:11,441 --> 00:48:15,161
Speaker 3: And balance off these privacy issues with the greater good,

1064
00:48:15,361 --> 00:48:17,961
Speaker 3: which is solving crimes, getting our elderly folks back home,

1065
00:48:18,041 --> 00:48:21,041
Speaker 3: getting autistic children back with their families. You know, have

1066
00:48:21,161 --> 00:48:23,881
Speaker 3: you had experiences of this? Do you have CCTV? Are

1067
00:48:23,921 --> 00:48:27,201
Speaker 3: you prepared to share that footage even in real time?

1068
00:48:27,681 --> 00:48:30,161
Speaker 3: I think this is the future. People, Please get in touch.

1069
00:48:30,641 --> 00:48:32,520
Speaker 3: If you have information that can solve a crime, please

1070
00:48:32,601 --> 00:48:35,521
Speaker 3: call crime Stoppers when it's under a triple three, triple zero.

1071
00:48:36,001 --> 00:48:37,561
Speaker 3: If you've got a story that you don't trust the

1072
00:48:37,601 --> 00:48:40,481
Speaker 3: police with, please email me Adam Shander writer at gmail

1073
00:48:40,561 --> 00:48:43,441
Speaker 3: dot com. This has been real time with Adam Shanned.

1074
00:48:43,801 --> 00:48:45,921
Speaker 3: Thanks for listening and make sure you subscribe and share

1075
00:48:45,961 --> 00:48:47,641
Speaker 3: that podcast for more independent journalism.

1076
00:48:47,801 --> 00:48:48,081
Speaker 2: Thank you.