1 00:00:05,881 --> 00:00:07,281 Speaker 1: Appoche production. 2 00:00:14,361 --> 00:00:16,480 Speaker 2: Welcome to Real Crime with Adam shannd I'm your host, 3 00:00:16,481 --> 00:00:20,841 Speaker 2: Adam Shann. Let's talk about illegal tobacco today. It's absolutely 4 00:00:20,961 --> 00:00:22,241 Speaker 2: swamping our market here. 5 00:00:22,841 --> 00:00:26,201 Speaker 3: Please say, out of three hundred tobaccoos in Victoria, one 6 00:00:26,241 --> 00:00:27,841 Speaker 3: thousand sells Michael cigarettes. 7 00:00:28,561 --> 00:00:32,721 Speaker 2: Back in twenty fifteen, it represented just fourteen percent of consumption. 8 00:00:33,241 --> 00:00:37,001 Speaker 2: This year it's expected to hit fifty percent. The crooks 9 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:40,560 Speaker 2: rked in ten billion dollars last year, and the trade 10 00:00:40,601 --> 00:00:45,400 Speaker 2: is fueling violence, murder, arson as two syndicates seek to 11 00:00:45,441 --> 00:00:47,440 Speaker 2: monopolize the trade. 12 00:00:47,321 --> 00:00:53,641 Speaker 3: Firebombings, violent turf groups, and even murder. 13 00:00:54,681 --> 00:00:58,241 Speaker 2: The profits are absolutely staggering, more than what the crooks 14 00:00:58,281 --> 00:01:00,121 Speaker 2: make from the top five drugs. 15 00:01:00,281 --> 00:01:03,761 Speaker 4: Combined efforts by organized crime groups to control the illicit 16 00:01:03,761 --> 00:01:06,361 Speaker 4: tobacco and beat market led to over two hundred fire 17 00:01:06,441 --> 00:01:10,401 Speaker 4: bombings at least three homicides, including an innocent civilian. 18 00:01:11,321 --> 00:01:15,081 Speaker 2: The illegal trade is literally facilitated by the federal government. 19 00:01:15,560 --> 00:01:18,641 Speaker 2: The excise on smokes has taken a packet to fifty dollars, 20 00:01:19,041 --> 00:01:22,920 Speaker 2: whereas you can buy the illegal version for just fourteen bucks. 21 00:01:23,321 --> 00:01:28,080 Speaker 2: Same product, just as deadly, just as addictive. It's so 22 00:01:28,241 --> 00:01:32,361 Speaker 2: widespread and entrenched. Your average law abiding citizen has no 23 00:01:32,521 --> 00:01:35,681 Speaker 2: qualms in going to the illicit market. I've seen this 24 00:01:35,721 --> 00:01:38,240 Speaker 2: in shops in my local area, about one hundred meters 25 00:01:38,241 --> 00:01:41,640 Speaker 2: from the local cop shop, and they do absolutely nothing 26 00:01:41,761 --> 00:01:44,080 Speaker 2: about it. Later in the program, I'm going to talk 27 00:01:44,121 --> 00:01:48,001 Speaker 2: to former Australian Federal Police officer Rowan Pike about why 28 00:01:48,041 --> 00:01:51,641 Speaker 2: the good guys are losing the battle. But first let's 29 00:01:51,681 --> 00:01:54,161 Speaker 2: talk about how these smokes are getting into this country. 30 00:01:54,681 --> 00:01:58,081 Speaker 2: Kelly Crossley is in the freight forwarding business, which is 31 00:01:58,161 --> 00:01:59,601 Speaker 2: right at the frontline of the trade. 32 00:01:59,761 --> 00:02:02,241 Speaker 5: She's a director of Perth based Transittainer. 33 00:02:02,801 --> 00:02:06,361 Speaker 2: Welcome to real crime, Kelly, thank you, thanks for having me, Adam, 34 00:02:06,921 --> 00:02:10,081 Speaker 2: absolute pleasure. Now tell me what is freight forwarding. Let's 35 00:02:10,081 --> 00:02:11,560 Speaker 2: get the definitions right here. 36 00:02:12,081 --> 00:02:15,121 Speaker 3: Freight forwarding so we are the people that do the 37 00:02:15,401 --> 00:02:20,041 Speaker 3: importing and exporting for the actual importers or exporters. So 38 00:02:20,081 --> 00:02:23,761 Speaker 3: we arrange the containers on the vessel book the slots, 39 00:02:24,161 --> 00:02:26,601 Speaker 3: ship it over here and then we clear it through 40 00:02:26,641 --> 00:02:29,281 Speaker 3: customs and quarantine and deliver it to their door. So 41 00:02:29,361 --> 00:02:32,680 Speaker 3: all the moving parts of the supply chain basically. 42 00:02:32,800 --> 00:02:36,961 Speaker 2: And so what we're discovering is this illegal trade is 43 00:02:36,960 --> 00:02:41,361 Speaker 2: not coming in boats smuggled into the vast distances of Australia. 44 00:02:41,441 --> 00:02:44,761 Speaker 2: It's coming in through the container trade. How is it 45 00:02:44,800 --> 00:02:47,481 Speaker 2: getting in in your experience, Well, it's. 46 00:02:47,361 --> 00:02:50,041 Speaker 3: Coming in through the container trade, but it's also coming 47 00:02:50,081 --> 00:02:53,120 Speaker 3: in through air freight. So there's two ways that's coming in. 48 00:02:53,641 --> 00:02:55,680 Speaker 3: There's a few things that are happening at the moment. 49 00:02:55,761 --> 00:02:58,361 Speaker 3: There's one thing that's I guess is pretty big. Is 50 00:02:58,361 --> 00:03:04,160 Speaker 3: called piggybacking or ABN fraud or ABN identity theft. So 51 00:03:05,041 --> 00:03:10,161 Speaker 3: people are taking a legitimate importer's ABN, pretending to be 52 00:03:10,361 --> 00:03:16,081 Speaker 3: that business and then using the ABN commercial documents, presenting 53 00:03:16,081 --> 00:03:19,241 Speaker 3: those documents two way freightfulder, a customs broker like us, 54 00:03:19,520 --> 00:03:22,521 Speaker 3: and then clearing the cargo none the wiser to the 55 00:03:22,520 --> 00:03:26,161 Speaker 3: poor importer. So the poor importer's ABN and somebody's details 56 00:03:26,161 --> 00:03:27,521 Speaker 3: have literally just been used. 57 00:03:27,680 --> 00:03:30,721 Speaker 1: They have no clue and a lot of it's coming 58 00:03:30,721 --> 00:03:31,201 Speaker 1: in like that. 59 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:35,881 Speaker 2: So these illegal importers are using the AABN numbers of 60 00:03:36,001 --> 00:03:37,241 Speaker 2: legitimate importers. 61 00:03:37,441 --> 00:03:40,881 Speaker 5: Why are they not aware this is happening using their ABN. 62 00:03:41,321 --> 00:03:43,441 Speaker 3: Suppose in the way, who's alerting them? Like, how do 63 00:03:43,481 --> 00:03:47,001 Speaker 3: they know it's ab and look up my ABN, your 64 00:03:47,041 --> 00:03:49,441 Speaker 3: ab and everybody ABN is. It's available to the public. 65 00:03:49,481 --> 00:03:53,961 Speaker 3: It's there and LinkedIn. All your details are there. You 66 00:03:54,001 --> 00:03:56,441 Speaker 3: can go on a business's web page and you can 67 00:03:56,441 --> 00:03:59,441 Speaker 3: have a look at their company logos, letterheads, you can 68 00:03:59,441 --> 00:04:04,601 Speaker 3: copy all their details. ABN's right there for the taking. 69 00:04:05,081 --> 00:04:08,481 Speaker 3: And that's the way we do a customs entry is 70 00:04:08,641 --> 00:04:12,681 Speaker 3: via a ABN. So yeah, if we get that ABN, 71 00:04:12,761 --> 00:04:16,121 Speaker 3: or if a broker gets that ABN, an importer just 72 00:04:16,121 --> 00:04:16,601 Speaker 3: wouldn't know. 73 00:04:16,841 --> 00:04:18,081 Speaker 1: A business would not know. 74 00:04:18,281 --> 00:04:21,481 Speaker 3: Because an ABN is there for everybody to see on 75 00:04:21,521 --> 00:04:24,041 Speaker 3: a public website from ab and look up. 76 00:04:24,361 --> 00:04:25,561 Speaker 5: And so correct me if I'm wrong. 77 00:04:25,761 --> 00:04:30,281 Speaker 2: The importer, the illegal importer goes through a freight forwarding 78 00:04:30,361 --> 00:04:31,880 Speaker 2: company that facilitates this. 79 00:04:32,561 --> 00:04:37,521 Speaker 3: Yes, correct, So anything that comes into the country must 80 00:04:37,521 --> 00:04:42,161 Speaker 3: be declared to ABF Customs and Quarantine. So in order 81 00:04:42,201 --> 00:04:44,521 Speaker 3: to do that, you would engage a customs broker or 82 00:04:44,521 --> 00:04:47,961 Speaker 3: a freight folder. As a customs broker, we need to 83 00:04:48,001 --> 00:04:50,161 Speaker 3: be doing our due diligence and doing all the correct 84 00:04:50,241 --> 00:04:52,801 Speaker 3: checks to make sure that that person has been identified. 85 00:04:53,561 --> 00:04:56,481 Speaker 3: It is getting harder and harder to do, so we've 86 00:04:56,481 --> 00:04:59,080 Speaker 3: got to go through the processes and everything is from 87 00:04:59,121 --> 00:05:02,361 Speaker 3: our side is electronic. So we're looking at a set 88 00:05:02,361 --> 00:05:06,761 Speaker 3: of commercial documents that is a commercial invoice of packing, 89 00:05:06,761 --> 00:05:09,081 Speaker 3: list of packing, declaration and a bill. 90 00:05:08,961 --> 00:05:12,401 Speaker 1: Of lading for example, that is declaring what the goods are. 91 00:05:13,001 --> 00:05:16,401 Speaker 3: We're classifying the goods, putting him into home consumption and 92 00:05:17,641 --> 00:05:22,921 Speaker 3: collecting the revenue from the importers. So it's us, it's ABF. 93 00:05:23,001 --> 00:05:24,681 Speaker 3: We're on the front line of what's happening. 94 00:05:26,681 --> 00:05:29,961 Speaker 2: You talk about due diligence. How much due diligence can 95 00:05:30,001 --> 00:05:32,201 Speaker 2: you do? Are there any red flags? Or I mean, 96 00:05:32,281 --> 00:05:35,081 Speaker 2: is it practical that you could be checking every single 97 00:05:35,121 --> 00:05:37,481 Speaker 2: ABN but it's not being used by a crook. 98 00:05:38,761 --> 00:05:42,601 Speaker 3: My business, we have a very very strict procedure with 99 00:05:42,721 --> 00:05:45,401 Speaker 3: what we do in terms of checking the ABN, and 100 00:05:45,481 --> 00:05:49,001 Speaker 3: there are multiple steps for checking that. And we have 101 00:05:49,121 --> 00:05:52,721 Speaker 3: picked up piggybacking and we've alerted importers to the piggybacking 102 00:05:52,961 --> 00:05:53,960 Speaker 3: several occasions. 103 00:05:54,921 --> 00:05:56,321 Speaker 1: Do other companies do it? 104 00:05:56,561 --> 00:05:59,921 Speaker 3: Look, I would hope so, But you know we're all 105 00:05:59,961 --> 00:06:03,681 Speaker 3: that we're under resource. People may not be or importers 106 00:06:04,081 --> 00:06:07,200 Speaker 3: or freight forwards and brokers may not be doing as 107 00:06:07,281 --> 00:06:10,521 Speaker 3: much I would hope. So, but you know it's up 108 00:06:10,521 --> 00:06:12,801 Speaker 3: to the business, I guess, and that business has to 109 00:06:12,841 --> 00:06:15,281 Speaker 3: have their own procedure in place, and it needs to 110 00:06:15,281 --> 00:06:18,321 Speaker 3: be a bit more education about what's happening. But you know, 111 00:06:18,481 --> 00:06:21,121 Speaker 3: we have maybe bigger folders and things that might not 112 00:06:21,161 --> 00:06:23,320 Speaker 3: have that time or might not have the resources. So 113 00:06:23,961 --> 00:06:26,160 Speaker 3: what checks they do, I don't know. I can't speak 114 00:06:26,201 --> 00:06:26,520 Speaker 3: for those. 115 00:06:26,641 --> 00:06:30,241 Speaker 1: For US strict, very strict process, but. 116 00:06:30,201 --> 00:06:31,921 Speaker 2: The crooks this is always an arms rates and the 117 00:06:31,921 --> 00:06:35,921 Speaker 2: crooks find ways to dupe other elements in the supply 118 00:06:36,081 --> 00:06:40,681 Speaker 2: chain to facilitate this. So it's a huge volume of 119 00:06:40,721 --> 00:06:44,601 Speaker 2: trade coming in and I know it's physically impossible for 120 00:06:44,641 --> 00:06:48,001 Speaker 2: the Australian Border Force and Customs to actually check every container, 121 00:06:48,281 --> 00:06:49,801 Speaker 2: check every air freight coming in. 122 00:06:50,161 --> 00:06:53,561 Speaker 5: So this really plays towards the crook's strengths. 123 00:06:53,081 --> 00:06:56,281 Speaker 2: Doesn't it that It's add lots of costs to the 124 00:06:56,361 --> 00:07:00,081 Speaker 2: system were we to check every container, check every ABN. 125 00:07:00,521 --> 00:07:03,521 Speaker 3: Correct, Yes, I mean, look, it's a too pronged approach 126 00:07:03,521 --> 00:07:05,880 Speaker 3: where the forwarder needs to be obviously doing it because 127 00:07:05,961 --> 00:07:09,001 Speaker 3: if it doesn't get past the folder or the broker, 128 00:07:09,561 --> 00:07:12,921 Speaker 3: that feed or that customs entry can get flagged and 129 00:07:12,921 --> 00:07:16,081 Speaker 3: not get lodged, so it can stop, you know, at 130 00:07:16,161 --> 00:07:19,361 Speaker 3: our level, should it not stop at our level? Obviously 131 00:07:19,401 --> 00:07:22,641 Speaker 3: ABF have also their own ways of doing checks, you know, 132 00:07:22,881 --> 00:07:26,041 Speaker 3: see cargo and manifests, and it's quite complex, but they 133 00:07:26,081 --> 00:07:28,681 Speaker 3: have other ways. And of course we have ABF and 134 00:07:28,721 --> 00:07:31,841 Speaker 3: things on the ground where containers and loose cargo and 135 00:07:31,881 --> 00:07:35,161 Speaker 3: air freight goes through X ray machines, so many would 136 00:07:35,161 --> 00:07:39,641 Speaker 3: be randomly selected and obviously targeted. But again, yeah, we 137 00:07:39,721 --> 00:07:43,840 Speaker 3: can't X ray every single container that comes off the terminal. 138 00:07:44,121 --> 00:07:46,881 Speaker 3: It's just not possible. So we're playing right into their 139 00:07:46,881 --> 00:07:47,521 Speaker 3: hands for sure. 140 00:07:48,401 --> 00:07:52,161 Speaker 2: And when you have picked up these piggybacked shipments, what 141 00:07:52,201 --> 00:07:53,761 Speaker 2: were the tells that you saw? 142 00:07:55,641 --> 00:07:58,321 Speaker 3: For me, it's a bit of experience, but you know 143 00:07:58,361 --> 00:08:00,961 Speaker 3: there's some things that we have in place and you 144 00:08:01,001 --> 00:08:03,681 Speaker 3: can see. Is getting hold of an importer it should 145 00:08:03,721 --> 00:08:06,001 Speaker 3: never be hard. You should be able to pick up 146 00:08:06,001 --> 00:08:07,641 Speaker 3: the phone and actually speak to somebody on the other 147 00:08:07,721 --> 00:08:10,841 Speaker 3: end of the phone right moving addresses several times, so 148 00:08:11,281 --> 00:08:13,561 Speaker 3: you might have contact, or our staff ember may have 149 00:08:13,641 --> 00:08:17,441 Speaker 3: contact via mobile. You might even have a conversation with somebody, 150 00:08:17,481 --> 00:08:21,001 Speaker 3: so it may sound legitimate. But if the address changes 151 00:08:21,161 --> 00:08:24,681 Speaker 3: three four, five, times, and it's last minute that starts 152 00:08:24,681 --> 00:08:28,801 Speaker 3: to raise a few red flags. Sometimes the urgency which 153 00:08:28,881 --> 00:08:32,441 Speaker 3: you know again judgment, there are very urgencyments that that happen. 154 00:08:32,881 --> 00:08:35,081 Speaker 3: But the urgency can be where is it, I need 155 00:08:35,121 --> 00:08:37,321 Speaker 3: it now, what's happening with it? Why is it on hold? 156 00:08:37,361 --> 00:08:37,601 Speaker 1: Why? 157 00:08:38,241 --> 00:08:43,201 Speaker 3: So I guess reading somebody's vibe through through conversation. The 158 00:08:43,241 --> 00:08:45,481 Speaker 3: other thing is, though, when documents come through, is you 159 00:08:45,561 --> 00:08:50,001 Speaker 3: have to be really stringent with your checks and domain. 160 00:08:50,161 --> 00:08:54,001 Speaker 3: For example, for a business name, it will be changed 161 00:08:54,081 --> 00:08:57,921 Speaker 3: ever so slightly, So we need to look at the 162 00:08:58,001 --> 00:09:00,641 Speaker 3: domain on a website address and if the domain on 163 00:09:00,681 --> 00:09:04,761 Speaker 3: the real import or the business's website addresses, say at 164 00:09:04,841 --> 00:09:07,721 Speaker 3: train Entertainer WA, dot com dot au, that's. 165 00:09:07,521 --> 00:09:08,081 Speaker 1: The real one. 166 00:09:08,521 --> 00:09:12,521 Speaker 3: The fake one may be slightly missing an eye in transittainer. 167 00:09:13,041 --> 00:09:15,401 Speaker 3: That's how clever they are, Like who's going to pick 168 00:09:15,441 --> 00:09:17,761 Speaker 3: that up? And that's how they get away with it. 169 00:09:17,881 --> 00:09:20,481 Speaker 3: So they will literally use they could use my ABN, 170 00:09:20,601 --> 00:09:23,921 Speaker 3: my logos and the little eye in transittainer could be missing. 171 00:09:24,401 --> 00:09:29,201 Speaker 1: It's easily oversea, so you have to do those real 172 00:09:29,881 --> 00:09:30,881 Speaker 1: detailed checks. 173 00:09:31,641 --> 00:09:34,321 Speaker 2: And of course the freight forwarder is not committing a 174 00:09:34,361 --> 00:09:38,161 Speaker 2: crime by being duped by the dodgy importer. 175 00:09:38,721 --> 00:09:41,241 Speaker 5: So it's not up to your. 176 00:09:41,041 --> 00:09:44,321 Speaker 2: Side of things to be the police as it were. 177 00:09:44,361 --> 00:09:46,281 Speaker 2: You're just doing your part of the process. 178 00:09:46,841 --> 00:09:50,081 Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely, definitely not up to us. We obviously have 179 00:09:50,241 --> 00:09:54,161 Speaker 3: a responsibility to holding a corporate license and a customers 180 00:09:54,161 --> 00:09:56,561 Speaker 3: broker has a responsibility to the Commonwealth and to the 181 00:09:56,561 --> 00:09:59,681 Speaker 3: government to collect the revenue all those sorts of things. 182 00:09:59,681 --> 00:10:02,081 Speaker 3: So whilst we can't police it and it's not our job, 183 00:10:02,201 --> 00:10:05,921 Speaker 3: it is our job to be checking for vicious activity, 184 00:10:05,921 --> 00:10:09,041 Speaker 3: and if we are suspicious, we should not lodge the entry. 185 00:10:09,361 --> 00:10:12,241 Speaker 3: And that's pretty much what it comes down to. It 186 00:10:12,241 --> 00:10:14,201 Speaker 3: should be flagged and we don't launch it, and we 187 00:10:14,241 --> 00:10:17,001 Speaker 3: should be raising alarm bells about it. So we can't 188 00:10:17,001 --> 00:10:19,361 Speaker 3: police it, but we certainly have a responsibility to do 189 00:10:19,441 --> 00:10:21,961 Speaker 3: something about it and take our responsibility serious. 190 00:10:22,561 --> 00:10:24,641 Speaker 5: Yeah, but it seems like it's there. 191 00:10:24,681 --> 00:10:27,481 Speaker 2: I say, it's more a moral responsibility than a binding 192 00:10:27,561 --> 00:10:28,481 Speaker 2: legal one. 193 00:10:29,361 --> 00:10:31,921 Speaker 3: No, we still have you know, there's legislation in place, 194 00:10:32,041 --> 00:10:33,961 Speaker 3: to be honest, I think that's why there's that's a 195 00:10:34,001 --> 00:10:36,241 Speaker 3: whole other story we can cover one day. The shortage 196 00:10:36,281 --> 00:10:39,841 Speaker 3: on customs brokers because of the legislation and the pressure 197 00:10:39,881 --> 00:10:41,161 Speaker 3: that they are put under. 198 00:10:41,761 --> 00:10:43,961 Speaker 1: It's tough. It's a tough gig. They can be. 199 00:10:43,961 --> 00:10:46,801 Speaker 3: Held responsible if we don't do the right checks and 200 00:10:46,881 --> 00:10:49,041 Speaker 3: we are lodging entries and you know, look to be 201 00:10:49,081 --> 00:10:50,601 Speaker 3: seen giving a false statement. 202 00:10:51,001 --> 00:10:52,241 Speaker 1: They come down hard on us. 203 00:10:52,321 --> 00:10:55,321 Speaker 3: It's tough, and that's why the customs brokers are probably 204 00:10:55,361 --> 00:10:57,361 Speaker 3: putting their hands up now and saying, I don't want 205 00:10:57,361 --> 00:10:58,521 Speaker 3: to be doing this gig anymore. 206 00:10:59,041 --> 00:11:00,441 Speaker 1: We have an industry shortage. 207 00:11:00,601 --> 00:11:02,361 Speaker 3: People are walking away from wanting to take on that 208 00:11:02,401 --> 00:11:06,601 Speaker 3: responsibility and you know, looking at or losing their career 209 00:11:06,761 --> 00:11:08,921 Speaker 3: or who knows, end up in jail for it. 210 00:11:09,001 --> 00:11:10,561 Speaker 1: So it is tough. 211 00:11:10,801 --> 00:11:13,521 Speaker 5: It's hard because it's pretty rich. 212 00:11:13,601 --> 00:11:16,921 Speaker 2: I think to be blaming the freight forwarder who might 213 00:11:16,961 --> 00:11:20,801 Speaker 2: have been duped by a very sophisticated, very clever bunch 214 00:11:20,881 --> 00:11:21,441 Speaker 2: of crooks. 215 00:11:21,881 --> 00:11:24,481 Speaker 5: You're not making any money out of it. The crooks are. 216 00:11:24,761 --> 00:11:27,921 Speaker 3: You've got all the risk, absolutely, you know that's one 217 00:11:28,001 --> 00:11:30,961 Speaker 3: hundred percent spot on. The risk is on us and 218 00:11:31,001 --> 00:11:34,561 Speaker 3: you know ABF under resource. So the risk is it 219 00:11:34,601 --> 00:11:36,961 Speaker 3: really does it falls on us, and it's tough, and 220 00:11:37,121 --> 00:11:39,121 Speaker 3: you know what happens if it does pass us? As 221 00:11:39,201 --> 00:11:43,521 Speaker 3: maybe the initial gatekeeper. Why should we be held responsible. 222 00:11:43,921 --> 00:11:47,001 Speaker 3: Why isn't it ABF's problem or why isn't it But 223 00:11:47,161 --> 00:11:50,201 Speaker 3: I guess as a business and you know your own morals, 224 00:11:50,241 --> 00:11:52,921 Speaker 3: you know you have to take those seriously and certainly 225 00:11:52,921 --> 00:11:53,361 Speaker 3: not on us. 226 00:11:53,441 --> 00:11:56,601 Speaker 1: But we have processes and things we must do. 227 00:11:56,681 --> 00:12:00,801 Speaker 2: Still, we're seeing a lot of these cigarettes coming through 228 00:12:00,881 --> 00:12:05,841 Speaker 2: Dubai and particularly a free trade area in Dubai, and 229 00:12:06,041 --> 00:12:09,801 Speaker 2: the brand we're seeing is Manchester. Quite often it's a 230 00:12:09,801 --> 00:12:13,201 Speaker 2: Syrian company, I've understand. Do you start to look at 231 00:12:13,241 --> 00:12:16,241 Speaker 2: the source of the shipments as a possible red flag? 232 00:12:17,041 --> 00:12:20,641 Speaker 3: Yeah, locations absolutely, I think all the other indicators have 233 00:12:20,721 --> 00:12:23,641 Speaker 3: to be first. Getting a random set of documents from 234 00:12:23,681 --> 00:12:28,201 Speaker 3: a random email address, you know, gmails, hot miles, those sorts. 235 00:12:27,961 --> 00:12:30,041 Speaker 1: Of things are straight away for me. 236 00:12:30,321 --> 00:12:33,561 Speaker 3: And look, it's hard because we have a lot of gmails, 237 00:12:33,601 --> 00:12:36,641 Speaker 3: and especially dealing with with China and all sorts of countries, 238 00:12:36,761 --> 00:12:39,441 Speaker 3: we have them all the time. But a random set 239 00:12:39,481 --> 00:12:43,321 Speaker 3: of documents straight away from a Gmail address is a problem. Yes, 240 00:12:43,441 --> 00:12:47,321 Speaker 3: Jabilali and those sorts of places, and we've had one 241 00:12:47,481 --> 00:12:50,401 Speaker 3: from there, to be honest with you, Commodities that we 242 00:12:50,481 --> 00:12:52,921 Speaker 3: need to be looking at, definitely for us, we just 243 00:12:53,001 --> 00:12:55,081 Speaker 3: need to look at those documents where they've come from 244 00:12:55,121 --> 00:12:59,201 Speaker 3: and do all the checks. Load ports, countries, commodities definitely 245 00:12:59,241 --> 00:13:03,201 Speaker 3: do come under scrutiny, probably more for ABF. I guess 246 00:13:03,601 --> 00:13:06,121 Speaker 3: we are doing our normal process. ABF would probably look 247 00:13:06,161 --> 00:13:07,081 Speaker 3: at that more than what we do. 248 00:13:07,801 --> 00:13:12,521 Speaker 2: We've seen a talk fest, various police ministers and industry 249 00:13:12,681 --> 00:13:15,561 Speaker 2: folks getting together to talk about this problem, but they 250 00:13:15,601 --> 00:13:20,361 Speaker 2: won't address the elephant in the room. The exercise is 251 00:13:20,441 --> 00:13:23,521 Speaker 2: driving this trade and they're doing nothing to affect the 252 00:13:23,601 --> 00:13:26,641 Speaker 2: demand for the product. Would you expect to see anything 253 00:13:26,801 --> 00:13:30,481 Speaker 2: change simply by another Let's get tough, let's tighten the rules, 254 00:13:30,481 --> 00:13:33,401 Speaker 2: possibly even put more owners on the freight forwarders and 255 00:13:33,441 --> 00:13:34,681 Speaker 2: the innocent parts. 256 00:13:34,401 --> 00:13:35,121 Speaker 5: Of this trade. 257 00:13:35,521 --> 00:13:36,841 Speaker 1: Ye, that's tough. 258 00:13:36,881 --> 00:13:41,321 Speaker 3: I mean, yeah, potentially, and it's not helping, that's for sure. 259 00:13:41,521 --> 00:13:44,441 Speaker 3: And that's probably another issue and not from my area 260 00:13:44,481 --> 00:13:47,081 Speaker 3: to say, I guess, but yeah, the rates on the 261 00:13:47,161 --> 00:13:51,641 Speaker 3: judy are just astronomical and yeah, obviously that leads to 262 00:13:52,201 --> 00:13:54,561 Speaker 3: what is happening now. And you know criminals aren't going 263 00:13:54,561 --> 00:13:55,961 Speaker 3: to do it if they're not going to make money, right, 264 00:13:56,041 --> 00:14:01,281 Speaker 3: So do we lower those rates? Do we change that? 265 00:14:00,361 --> 00:14:02,241 Speaker 3: That's a tough one. 266 00:14:03,001 --> 00:14:05,441 Speaker 2: Well, it's the definition of madness not to change something 267 00:14:05,441 --> 00:14:08,121 Speaker 2: when you see it's not working. And they claim to 268 00:14:08,201 --> 00:14:11,601 Speaker 2: have reduced smoking rates. I think Hegret's still killed twenty 269 00:14:11,721 --> 00:14:15,041 Speaker 2: thousand strains every year. That's not changing too much. I mean, 270 00:14:15,081 --> 00:14:19,681 Speaker 2: we've always seen this prohibition in America creates the Chicago underworld. 271 00:14:19,841 --> 00:14:21,521 Speaker 5: I mean, you can blame that the crooks for what 272 00:14:21,521 --> 00:14:21,921 Speaker 5: they're doing. 273 00:14:21,921 --> 00:14:24,521 Speaker 2: They're setting fires, they're murdering people, there's all this violence 274 00:14:24,561 --> 00:14:24,921 Speaker 2: going on. 275 00:14:25,201 --> 00:14:27,561 Speaker 5: But where the government doesn't want to change. 276 00:14:27,321 --> 00:14:30,641 Speaker 2: Particularly where it seems very irksome to me that more 277 00:14:30,681 --> 00:14:33,761 Speaker 2: owners should fall on the legal parts of the trade 278 00:14:34,081 --> 00:14:37,761 Speaker 2: in other words of freightforward as the retailers, when it's 279 00:14:37,841 --> 00:14:40,521 Speaker 2: the government take it that's facilitating this at it's. 280 00:14:40,321 --> 00:14:43,161 Speaker 3: Heart, Yeah, I would like to see it change, Yeah, 281 00:14:43,281 --> 00:14:46,441 Speaker 3: because you know, I think also that the funds from this, 282 00:14:46,641 --> 00:14:49,041 Speaker 3: what people have to realize is the amount of money 283 00:14:49,041 --> 00:14:51,641 Speaker 3: that they are making and then the other criminal activity 284 00:14:51,681 --> 00:14:53,921 Speaker 3: that it goes to is probably more frightening as well. 285 00:14:53,961 --> 00:14:57,281 Speaker 3: So with the government take a backstep though, you know 286 00:14:57,321 --> 00:14:59,641 Speaker 3: they're not going to, which is sad, because you're right, 287 00:14:59,761 --> 00:15:02,121 Speaker 3: something has to change. This is only going to get worse. 288 00:15:02,481 --> 00:15:05,361 Speaker 3: The criminal activity is going to get worse. About the 289 00:15:05,401 --> 00:15:09,081 Speaker 3: figures already, it's going to get worse. How much more 290 00:15:09,121 --> 00:15:11,041 Speaker 3: can we do? We're doing enough as it is. Now 291 00:15:11,521 --> 00:15:13,281 Speaker 3: something has got to change. 292 00:15:13,961 --> 00:15:14,801 Speaker 5: Thanks for that, Kelly. 293 00:15:15,161 --> 00:15:19,321 Speaker 2: That's Kelly Crossley from Transittainer in Perth on how the 294 00:15:19,361 --> 00:15:22,001 Speaker 2: illegal cigarettes are getting into this country. 295 00:15:22,361 --> 00:15:23,321 Speaker 5: In a moment, we'll talk. 296 00:15:23,201 --> 00:15:27,161 Speaker 2: To Rowan Pike, a former Australian Federal Police officer who 297 00:15:27,201 --> 00:15:31,081 Speaker 2: was involved in the first task force into illegal tobacco. 298 00:15:31,481 --> 00:15:33,401 Speaker 5: That'll be Rowan Pike after the break. 299 00:15:37,161 --> 00:15:40,161 Speaker 2: It's a truism that you can prohibit something, but you 300 00:15:40,201 --> 00:15:45,081 Speaker 2: can't make it unpopular. Government intervention in the market for alcohol, drugs, now, 301 00:15:45,121 --> 00:15:48,361 Speaker 2: tobacco has always driven the black markets. 302 00:15:48,801 --> 00:15:49,361 Speaker 5: There would have. 303 00:15:49,281 --> 00:15:52,841 Speaker 2: Been no al Capone if it wasn't for prohibition of alcohol. 304 00:15:53,481 --> 00:15:56,721 Speaker 2: Tobacco is still legal, of course, but the excise regime 305 00:15:57,001 --> 00:16:00,361 Speaker 2: has literally created the underworld war we're seeing across this 306 00:16:00,481 --> 00:16:05,201 Speaker 2: country as syndicates battle for control of this lucrative market. 307 00:16:05,241 --> 00:16:08,841 Speaker 6: Financial year, the Australian Border Force intercepted over two point 308 00:16:08,921 --> 00:16:13,161 Speaker 6: five billion illegal cigarettes, enough to avoid four point three 309 00:16:13,321 --> 00:16:15,441 Speaker 6: six billion dollars in duty. 310 00:16:16,681 --> 00:16:19,721 Speaker 2: Rowan Pike is a former Australian federal police officer who 311 00:16:19,801 --> 00:16:23,921 Speaker 2: established Australia's tobacco Strike Team while working at Border Force. 312 00:16:24,561 --> 00:16:26,641 Speaker 5: But ten years he's. 313 00:16:26,441 --> 00:16:30,681 Speaker 2: Been saying government cannot continue to increase tobacco excise without 314 00:16:30,721 --> 00:16:35,001 Speaker 2: boosting the resources for enforcement. They didn't listen, and exactly 315 00:16:35,001 --> 00:16:37,561 Speaker 2: what Roan predicted has come to pass. 316 00:16:38,281 --> 00:16:43,041 Speaker 6: Organized crime now has a stranglehold on the illicit tobacco market. 317 00:16:44,321 --> 00:16:48,041 Speaker 2: We're now seeing summits and task forces, new laws and 318 00:16:48,121 --> 00:16:50,281 Speaker 2: crackdowns to combat this scourge. 319 00:16:50,481 --> 00:16:53,641 Speaker 5: But is it too little? Two leg? Let me welcome 320 00:16:53,721 --> 00:16:57,001 Speaker 5: Rowan to real crime? Can I run? Hi? How are 321 00:16:57,001 --> 00:17:00,681 Speaker 5: you going? Good? Thank you bikey. You must be bored 322 00:17:01,161 --> 00:17:02,321 Speaker 5: of saying I told you so? 323 00:17:03,401 --> 00:17:05,801 Speaker 2: Yes, well, I have said that a few times recently, 324 00:17:05,921 --> 00:17:08,561 Speaker 2: but to be honest, doesn't give me much satisfaction in 325 00:17:08,681 --> 00:17:11,240 Speaker 2: doing so. I'd rather just help fix the problem in 326 00:17:11,241 --> 00:17:16,321 Speaker 2: Australia and overseas. But they haven't been listening. Doesn't say 327 00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:20,321 Speaker 2: much for my advocacy in the topic. But they have 328 00:17:20,561 --> 00:17:24,121 Speaker 2: finally put turning their minds to enforcement. But as you say, 329 00:17:24,120 --> 00:17:26,561 Speaker 2: it may well be too little, too late. Well, yeah, 330 00:17:26,640 --> 00:17:29,721 Speaker 2: I tend to think governments are as addicted to the 331 00:17:29,961 --> 00:17:34,321 Speaker 2: excise revenue. As smokers are to nicotine, they can't kick 332 00:17:34,360 --> 00:17:37,561 Speaker 2: the habit, and that's the crux of the issue. How 333 00:17:37,640 --> 00:17:41,080 Speaker 2: much enforcement is enough to make a dent on this, 334 00:17:41,801 --> 00:17:45,000 Speaker 2: that's a good question. So the answer is we don't know, 335 00:17:45,241 --> 00:17:48,961 Speaker 2: because we've never had a decent crack at the enforcement. 336 00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:52,880 Speaker 2: Even the convention that we signed twenty two years ago 337 00:17:52,961 --> 00:17:57,600 Speaker 2: which started the high taxing regime and hundreds of other 338 00:17:57,681 --> 00:18:02,241 Speaker 2: regulations that surround the tobacco industry that twenty two years later, 339 00:18:02,400 --> 00:18:06,360 Speaker 2: that actually said that we should upscale our enforcement activities 340 00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:10,280 Speaker 2: in order to protect against elicit tobacco, but we ignored that. 341 00:18:10,321 --> 00:18:13,321 Speaker 2: Then there was another convention came out ten years later 342 00:18:13,721 --> 00:18:18,321 Speaker 2: specifically targeted at elicit tobacco from the World Health Authority, 343 00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:22,121 Speaker 2: and Australia has refused to sign that. So that has 344 00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:25,840 Speaker 2: been our attitude up until recently. And it's only really 345 00:18:25,921 --> 00:18:28,840 Speaker 2: the criminals blowing each other up and murdering each other, 346 00:18:28,961 --> 00:18:33,201 Speaker 2: which has focused the attention of authorities and really embarrassed 347 00:18:33,201 --> 00:18:35,080 Speaker 2: them into some sort of action. 348 00:18:35,241 --> 00:18:39,081 Speaker 5: So is it going to work. I'm not overly confident. 349 00:18:38,840 --> 00:18:40,960 Speaker 2: It could have worked ten to fifteen years ago when 350 00:18:41,001 --> 00:18:43,161 Speaker 2: we first started talking about it, But as I say, 351 00:18:43,400 --> 00:18:47,200 Speaker 2: no one's ever had a real decent shot at the 352 00:18:47,321 --> 00:18:51,360 Speaker 2: enforcement side, and certainly it won't hurt. Certainly, the way 353 00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:54,401 Speaker 2: that criminals are getting their product to market through thousands 354 00:18:54,400 --> 00:18:57,321 Speaker 2: of shops on the high Street is just simply embarrassing, 355 00:18:57,721 --> 00:19:01,920 Speaker 2: and that access and availability is driving smoking rates to 356 00:19:01,961 --> 00:19:05,680 Speaker 2: actually go up. So that can certainly be dressed, but 357 00:19:05,761 --> 00:19:08,880 Speaker 2: it's going to take a sustained larger enforcement effort than 358 00:19:08,921 --> 00:19:10,080 Speaker 2: what we currently envisage. 359 00:19:10,481 --> 00:19:10,961 Speaker 5: Well, I was. 360 00:19:10,880 --> 00:19:14,360 Speaker 2: Seeing recently all these big press conferences and talk about 361 00:19:14,681 --> 00:19:18,801 Speaker 2: new state laws and increasing the fines on retailers and 362 00:19:18,840 --> 00:19:20,840 Speaker 2: so and so forth, and it all sounds great, And 363 00:19:20,840 --> 00:19:23,360 Speaker 2: they've been show and tells where they've seized all this tobacco, 364 00:19:23,441 --> 00:19:28,440 Speaker 2: but no one's talking about excise. No, well, excis is 365 00:19:28,481 --> 00:19:31,961 Speaker 2: clearly the driver. They've got their head in the sand 366 00:19:31,961 --> 00:19:35,441 Speaker 2: about that. There needs to be a holistic review of 367 00:19:35,521 --> 00:19:39,041 Speaker 2: our tobacco control policy and that includes exercise, which is 368 00:19:39,041 --> 00:19:42,441 Speaker 2: clearly driven it. You said at the top that they're 369 00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:45,961 Speaker 2: addicted to the revenue, but the revenue is gone, if 370 00:19:46,001 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 2: not entirely, but it's well on the way. So it's 371 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:52,041 Speaker 2: dropped from sixteen billion to seven point seven and on 372 00:19:52,080 --> 00:19:55,440 Speaker 2: the current trajectory. It'll be one or two billion in 373 00:19:55,521 --> 00:19:57,441 Speaker 2: a couple of years, and no one will be smoking 374 00:19:57,681 --> 00:20:00,080 Speaker 2: the legal product. Why would you when it's four or 375 00:20:00,080 --> 00:20:03,120 Speaker 2: five times more than the illegal product, so they won't 376 00:20:03,120 --> 00:20:06,200 Speaker 2: have that to fall back on. But say, every state 377 00:20:06,521 --> 00:20:09,921 Speaker 2: and territory is doing something different, So so much for 378 00:20:10,041 --> 00:20:14,521 Speaker 2: the coordinated collaborative response that the federal government's supposed to 379 00:20:14,521 --> 00:20:17,920 Speaker 2: be coordinating. Everyone's doing something different, and we're yet to 380 00:20:18,001 --> 00:20:21,041 Speaker 2: see whether any of those things that they're doing going 381 00:20:21,080 --> 00:20:24,801 Speaker 2: to have a positive effect. You again, you mentioned seizures 382 00:20:24,801 --> 00:20:27,200 Speaker 2: that they love standing behind a big table full of 383 00:20:27,241 --> 00:20:30,840 Speaker 2: sizars or rolling out the numbers the X million dollars 384 00:20:30,840 --> 00:20:34,161 Speaker 2: of cigarettes. What I've come to know through my time 385 00:20:34,241 --> 00:20:37,281 Speaker 2: in the public service and beyond, is that cazars have 386 00:20:37,441 --> 00:20:40,960 Speaker 2: no effect on the availability of the product. They're just 387 00:20:41,001 --> 00:20:45,401 Speaker 2: simply bombarding the border with billions of cigarettes. And they 388 00:20:45,441 --> 00:20:48,161 Speaker 2: sound like big numbers. They are big numbers, but when 389 00:20:48,201 --> 00:20:51,761 Speaker 2: the profit margins thirty or more to one, they can 390 00:20:51,801 --> 00:20:55,561 Speaker 2: afford to lose ten twenty container loads and the next 391 00:20:55,561 --> 00:20:58,400 Speaker 2: one is still going to make a profit. So caizures 392 00:20:58,721 --> 00:21:02,960 Speaker 2: have little disruptive effect on the organized crime syndicates. I 393 00:21:03,001 --> 00:21:06,280 Speaker 2: think yes, because this goes a lot further than just 394 00:21:06,321 --> 00:21:08,360 Speaker 2: supplying tobacco to consumers. 395 00:21:08,681 --> 00:21:12,160 Speaker 5: We're seeing a whole new criminal underworld. I note that 396 00:21:12,241 --> 00:21:15,840 Speaker 5: Kashamad is one of the big syndicate leaders. He was 397 00:21:15,961 --> 00:21:19,160 Speaker 5: deported after being busted for heroin. If he'd knowed about tobacco, 398 00:21:19,201 --> 00:21:21,160 Speaker 5: he wouldn't have bothered with heroin. He would have gone 399 00:21:21,160 --> 00:21:25,281 Speaker 5: straight to tobacco, and he's making literally billions. Now, yeah, 400 00:21:25,281 --> 00:21:25,721 Speaker 5: that's right. 401 00:21:25,840 --> 00:21:29,401 Speaker 2: So some of the criminal syndicates are diversifying away from 402 00:21:29,521 --> 00:21:32,880 Speaker 2: drugs into tobacco because it's much lower risk and just 403 00:21:32,921 --> 00:21:36,081 Speaker 2: as high profit. Kaz As, you say as the classic 404 00:21:36,120 --> 00:21:39,720 Speaker 2: example from a heroin importer now tobacco deal. But there 405 00:21:39,761 --> 00:21:43,721 Speaker 2: were syndicates in the past. It just hasn't exploded overnight 406 00:21:44,120 --> 00:21:47,001 Speaker 2: this problem. It's been going for decades. But the criminals 407 00:21:47,001 --> 00:21:51,281 Speaker 2: previously were clever enough to not alert authorities to what 408 00:21:51,321 --> 00:21:53,880 Speaker 2: they were doing and flew under the radar and just 409 00:21:54,001 --> 00:21:58,880 Speaker 2: quietly accumulated vast sums of wealth without upsetting authorities. 410 00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:01,121 Speaker 5: But Kazas sort of upset the apple cart. 411 00:22:01,160 --> 00:22:04,961 Speaker 2: Are now all of those syndicates who were previously doing it, 412 00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:08,360 Speaker 2: but also new ones and opportunists are coming into the market, 413 00:22:08,441 --> 00:22:12,600 Speaker 2: realizing how easy it is. We had this moment where 414 00:22:12,921 --> 00:22:16,880 Speaker 2: the syndicates began to talk about the Commission, which getting 415 00:22:16,921 --> 00:22:18,721 Speaker 2: together and regulating the market together. 416 00:22:18,761 --> 00:22:19,640 Speaker 5: It's kind of scary. 417 00:22:19,721 --> 00:22:24,801 Speaker 2: But also we saw previously when gangsters try to do that, 418 00:22:25,400 --> 00:22:27,801 Speaker 2: they end up shooting each other, they end up blowing 419 00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:28,400 Speaker 2: each other up. 420 00:22:28,441 --> 00:22:31,521 Speaker 5: They don't play well together. So I wonder whether. 421 00:22:31,481 --> 00:22:36,001 Speaker 2: Disunity is really an ally to enforcement here to arrest 422 00:22:36,120 --> 00:22:40,241 Speaker 2: enough people to get resources inside these empires, to map 423 00:22:40,281 --> 00:22:42,640 Speaker 2: an enforcement strategy that might actually work. 424 00:22:43,840 --> 00:22:45,480 Speaker 5: Yes, I agree, totally agree. 425 00:22:45,561 --> 00:22:50,681 Speaker 2: As I said, there was an unwritten agreement between syndicates 426 00:22:50,801 --> 00:22:54,240 Speaker 2: going back decades to not upset the apple cart. But 427 00:22:54,441 --> 00:22:57,841 Speaker 2: Kas has certainly done that and the commission. I mean, 428 00:22:57,840 --> 00:23:00,480 Speaker 2: it's just pure greed. He's wanted to take over a 429 00:23:00,521 --> 00:23:05,321 Speaker 2: lot that has brought attention to himself and has meant 430 00:23:05,321 --> 00:23:05,921 Speaker 2: that there's. 431 00:23:05,681 --> 00:23:07,281 Speaker 5: Been a law enforcement response. 432 00:23:07,321 --> 00:23:10,521 Speaker 2: So here in Victoria, in particular Victoria Police are doing 433 00:23:10,561 --> 00:23:13,680 Speaker 2: a great job, spending lots of resources and money tackling 434 00:23:14,001 --> 00:23:18,561 Speaker 2: this organized crime skirt. And in fact, even yesterday Kaz's 435 00:23:18,721 --> 00:23:21,840 Speaker 2: uncle was arrested, so he's clearly one of according to 436 00:23:21,961 --> 00:23:24,480 Speaker 2: Victoria Police, probably one of the main players here, but 437 00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:28,440 Speaker 2: Kaz needs people on the ground to assist his activities, 438 00:23:28,521 --> 00:23:31,281 Speaker 2: so it goes on. You know, we heard the terms 439 00:23:31,481 --> 00:23:33,920 Speaker 2: you can't arrest your way out of a problem, and 440 00:23:33,961 --> 00:23:37,880 Speaker 2: that's a nice thing to say, but again, we've never really. 441 00:23:37,681 --> 00:23:39,281 Speaker 5: Tried in the tobacco space. 442 00:23:39,321 --> 00:23:41,880 Speaker 2: So it'll be interesting if we do start locking up 443 00:23:41,921 --> 00:23:44,680 Speaker 2: some of the big players, what effect that does have 444 00:23:44,721 --> 00:23:47,761 Speaker 2: on these syndicates and whether that pulls them up a bit. 445 00:23:48,640 --> 00:23:48,840 Speaker 5: Well. 446 00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:52,400 Speaker 7: Indeed, his uncle who's alleged to be his number one 447 00:23:52,481 --> 00:23:55,481 Speaker 7: lieutenant on the ground, I know he's a former policeman, 448 00:23:57,120 --> 00:23:59,840 Speaker 7: but I wonder whether you just make a vacancy for 449 00:23:59,880 --> 00:24:02,160 Speaker 7: somebody else. I mean they're doing that certainly with the 450 00:24:02,241 --> 00:24:05,321 Speaker 7: arson squads that are running around. They're giving Paul Tree 451 00:24:05,360 --> 00:24:08,600 Speaker 7: sums to people to run around, standing over shopkeepers and 452 00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:11,200 Speaker 7: burning down shops that won't comply. 453 00:24:11,921 --> 00:24:13,761 Speaker 5: I'd be interested to see what an all out blitz 454 00:24:13,761 --> 00:24:14,440 Speaker 5: would look like. 455 00:24:16,201 --> 00:24:19,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't think they, well, the state governments around 456 00:24:19,721 --> 00:24:24,481 Speaker 2: the country really really understand the resources and funding required 457 00:24:24,561 --> 00:24:27,281 Speaker 2: for an all out blitz when there's thousands of shops. 458 00:24:27,321 --> 00:24:31,001 Speaker 2: I mean, Victoria's talking about fourteen inspectors with they don't 459 00:24:31,041 --> 00:24:34,681 Speaker 2: have powers or weapons, or security or training. I don't 460 00:24:34,681 --> 00:24:37,000 Speaker 2: think they're going to make much of a dentt in 461 00:24:37,080 --> 00:24:40,360 Speaker 2: the thousands of shops. There's thirty within two columns of 462 00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:44,600 Speaker 2: my house here, so it's everywhere, and it takes a 463 00:24:44,721 --> 00:24:47,760 Speaker 2: much bigger effort to make a dentt in it, certainly 464 00:24:48,321 --> 00:24:52,480 Speaker 2: than what authorities currently understand. But yes, it's going to 465 00:24:52,481 --> 00:24:55,481 Speaker 2: be interesting times coming forth. But as you say, someone 466 00:24:55,481 --> 00:24:58,521 Speaker 2: else will step up if people get arrested. And that's 467 00:24:58,561 --> 00:25:01,001 Speaker 2: why I say it's easy to say this when you've 468 00:25:01,080 --> 00:25:04,321 Speaker 2: left law enforcement. When you're in law enforcement, making arrests 469 00:25:04,400 --> 00:25:08,360 Speaker 2: and charging people and locking them up is the bill 470 00:25:08,400 --> 00:25:10,200 Speaker 2: and end all of what you do. You're following the 471 00:25:10,281 --> 00:25:12,840 Speaker 2: legislation and so on, and you think that this is 472 00:25:13,160 --> 00:25:14,200 Speaker 2: going to have a great effect. 473 00:25:14,241 --> 00:25:16,801 Speaker 5: But after you leave, you think that there might be 474 00:25:16,840 --> 00:25:17,440 Speaker 5: a better way. 475 00:25:17,761 --> 00:25:19,961 Speaker 2: And there are a couple of better ways in addressing 476 00:25:19,961 --> 00:25:23,881 Speaker 2: the policy which needs to change in order for this 477 00:25:24,001 --> 00:25:27,760 Speaker 2: to not continue on. Okay, Well, in a parallel universe, 478 00:25:27,840 --> 00:25:31,440 Speaker 2: Rowan Pike becomes the chief commissioner of this Raini Vidual 479 00:25:31,441 --> 00:25:34,321 Speaker 2: Police or the Border Force, and he said unlimited resources. 480 00:25:34,360 --> 00:25:36,761 Speaker 5: He's speaking to the states. What does he do. 481 00:25:38,281 --> 00:25:41,321 Speaker 2: Well, he goes to the government for a start and says, 482 00:25:41,761 --> 00:25:44,600 Speaker 2: there's three ways of fixing this. Firstly, you have to 483 00:25:44,681 --> 00:25:48,400 Speaker 2: admit that the policy that you've been following for the 484 00:25:48,441 --> 00:25:51,401 Speaker 2: last ten years has failed and is incorrect and needs 485 00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:54,241 Speaker 2: to be reviewed. So the government hasn't actually admitted that yet. 486 00:25:54,281 --> 00:25:57,480 Speaker 2: So as the commissioner, they would have the power to 487 00:25:57,761 --> 00:26:02,041 Speaker 2: influence government thinking on this matter. But remembering that's the 488 00:26:02,041 --> 00:26:06,561 Speaker 2: Health Department that is still in charge of tobacco control policy. 489 00:26:07,160 --> 00:26:09,760 Speaker 2: So that's one of the many difficulties in this space 490 00:26:09,840 --> 00:26:13,921 Speaker 2: for law enforcement agency to influence health policy. But let's 491 00:26:13,961 --> 00:26:17,281 Speaker 2: just say they did, they would say that the excise 492 00:26:17,600 --> 00:26:22,241 Speaker 2: has to come down, the enforcement has to increase multiple 493 00:26:22,241 --> 00:26:26,480 Speaker 2: times over. And thirdly, we have to start thinking about 494 00:26:26,521 --> 00:26:30,961 Speaker 2: harm reduction. So even though everyone has been rainwashed to 495 00:26:31,001 --> 00:26:32,721 Speaker 2: think that bapes are the worst thing on the world 496 00:26:32,761 --> 00:26:34,720 Speaker 2: and everyone's going to die if you're taking vote and 497 00:26:34,761 --> 00:26:39,001 Speaker 2: also nicotine pouches, if you look overseas, which Australia rarely 498 00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:41,880 Speaker 2: do in this space, the countries that have succeeded in 499 00:26:41,961 --> 00:26:45,321 Speaker 2: reducing their smoking rate, which is the endgame at the 500 00:26:45,360 --> 00:26:47,441 Speaker 2: end of the day, because smoking is the worst possible thing. 501 00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:50,721 Speaker 2: L the countries that have succeeded are the ones that 502 00:26:50,921 --> 00:26:55,920 Speaker 2: have embraced harm reduction in terms of transitioning smokers away 503 00:26:56,120 --> 00:27:00,641 Speaker 2: from deadly cigarettes into safer nicotine products, and we need 504 00:27:00,721 --> 00:27:05,201 Speaker 2: to address that issue. So those three things all I'm 505 00:27:05,201 --> 00:27:09,120 Speaker 2: into play. It's not just simply a matter of enforcement. Yeah, 506 00:27:09,201 --> 00:27:10,761 Speaker 2: as you say you're out of the job, would you 507 00:27:10,801 --> 00:27:12,161 Speaker 2: want to take on that job? 508 00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:13,801 Speaker 5: Are you a massochist? 509 00:27:14,681 --> 00:27:14,721 Speaker 4: No? 510 00:27:14,921 --> 00:27:17,081 Speaker 2: I think there's a Well, there's a new commissioner there, 511 00:27:17,160 --> 00:27:19,960 Speaker 2: and I'm sure she looks very sensible, But yeah, if 512 00:27:20,041 --> 00:27:22,160 Speaker 2: she wants to take this on, it's a bit of 513 00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:25,161 Speaker 2: a poison chalice, given that, as I say, she's battling 514 00:27:25,721 --> 00:27:30,120 Speaker 2: against agencies that are not under her influence. The Health 515 00:27:30,160 --> 00:27:33,600 Speaker 2: Department is just dead set on carrying on doubling down 516 00:27:33,840 --> 00:27:37,481 Speaker 2: on this bad policy, and until that changes, no matter 517 00:27:37,481 --> 00:27:39,641 Speaker 2: how much enforcement you throw at it, I don't think 518 00:27:39,681 --> 00:27:44,120 Speaker 2: it'll be fixed. I don't have much confidence that it 519 00:27:44,201 --> 00:27:46,280 Speaker 2: is going to be fixed. And I think we're going 520 00:27:46,321 --> 00:27:49,241 Speaker 2: to continue to see. I think there's governments with tax 521 00:27:49,241 --> 00:27:52,680 Speaker 2: a bit like junkies. They'll keep consuming their tax revenue 522 00:27:52,801 --> 00:27:55,241 Speaker 2: even if it's diminishing. They'll continue to do the same 523 00:27:55,241 --> 00:27:58,440 Speaker 2: thing till it's all gone. Basically, and under that scenario 524 00:27:58,681 --> 00:28:02,440 Speaker 2: where we don't address the actual issue, what does this 525 00:28:02,481 --> 00:28:06,201 Speaker 2: look like? Because I can see this illegal tobacco revenue 526 00:28:06,360 --> 00:28:11,120 Speaker 2: funding the underworld all other kinds of offenses, guns, money laundering, 527 00:28:11,521 --> 00:28:13,880 Speaker 2: you name it, and we're going to have a seriously 528 00:28:14,080 --> 00:28:19,080 Speaker 2: entrenched underworld that will affect everybody. Well, yes, that's exactly. 529 00:28:20,120 --> 00:28:23,360 Speaker 2: It's easy to envisage that happening. In fact, I would 530 00:28:23,360 --> 00:28:26,720 Speaker 2: suggest that it's entrenched now. We're already at that point. 531 00:28:27,041 --> 00:28:29,600 Speaker 2: There are just a few smokers that are just hanging 532 00:28:29,681 --> 00:28:33,001 Speaker 2: on to their favorite brands and so on. But given 533 00:28:33,120 --> 00:28:37,680 Speaker 2: cost of living, crisis inflation, just access and availability of 534 00:28:37,721 --> 00:28:42,561 Speaker 2: the illicit product, those last smokers are likely to move over. 535 00:28:43,081 --> 00:28:46,881 Speaker 2: It's easy to predict that the end of the legal 536 00:28:46,921 --> 00:28:50,200 Speaker 2: market for various reasons. One is obviously the excise and 537 00:28:50,241 --> 00:28:53,240 Speaker 2: people don't want to pay it. But there's also shopkeepers 538 00:28:53,801 --> 00:28:57,960 Speaker 2: who are being threatened every day, multiple people, with the 539 00:28:58,001 --> 00:29:00,841 Speaker 2: fact that they've got tens of thousands of dollars a product, 540 00:29:00,841 --> 00:29:02,361 Speaker 2: a very valuable product. 541 00:29:02,241 --> 00:29:03,401 Speaker 5: Sitting behind their counter. 542 00:29:03,761 --> 00:29:06,001 Speaker 2: And I certainly wouldn't want to be doing that in 543 00:29:06,041 --> 00:29:08,081 Speaker 2: a service station or a seven eleven late at night. 544 00:29:08,441 --> 00:29:10,960 Speaker 2: It's a really dangerous business to be in now, so 545 00:29:11,041 --> 00:29:12,921 Speaker 2: there's going to be less people actually want to sell 546 00:29:12,921 --> 00:29:16,161 Speaker 2: the product, and at the end of the perhaps in 547 00:29:16,201 --> 00:29:19,281 Speaker 2: a couple of years, the criminals will run the entire 548 00:29:19,601 --> 00:29:22,401 Speaker 2: tobacco market. There will be just as many people smoking, 549 00:29:22,801 --> 00:29:25,241 Speaker 2: but the government won't be getting any of the revenue. 550 00:29:25,361 --> 00:29:30,641 Speaker 8: So there's a little talk about targeting the offshore syndicate 551 00:29:30,721 --> 00:29:35,081 Speaker 8: leaders into pole all this type of stuff, but you 552 00:29:35,201 --> 00:29:37,721 Speaker 8: catch one, the market still exists. 553 00:29:38,201 --> 00:29:42,721 Speaker 2: Excise is the only way to address this. Really, it's 554 00:29:42,721 --> 00:29:46,561 Speaker 2: certainly a key one. The criminals are attracted by bad policy, 555 00:29:46,801 --> 00:29:50,001 Speaker 2: so all around the globe they sit there and look 556 00:29:50,241 --> 00:29:55,241 Speaker 2: for vulnerability in tax policy for a commodity at tobacco 557 00:29:55,401 --> 00:29:58,521 Speaker 2: or alcohol or anything else. They've obviously targeted. Australia has 558 00:29:59,081 --> 00:30:03,481 Speaker 2: been vulnerable and they're throwing all their vast resources at us, 559 00:30:03,641 --> 00:30:07,721 Speaker 2: which has overcome the ability of our law enforcement to 560 00:30:07,761 --> 00:30:11,241 Speaker 2: stop that happening. So, yes, you can lock up five 561 00:30:11,241 --> 00:30:13,401 Speaker 2: to ten of them, but the product is going to 562 00:30:13,441 --> 00:30:17,041 Speaker 2: keep coming to satisfy the market of people who actually 563 00:30:17,081 --> 00:30:20,281 Speaker 2: want this product, and that's increasing now that it's so 564 00:30:20,401 --> 00:30:21,401 Speaker 2: cheap as well. 565 00:30:21,521 --> 00:30:23,841 Speaker 5: Well, that's right. I mean, I think this is a 566 00:30:23,841 --> 00:30:27,681 Speaker 5: bit like s book making. The sp bookmaker was a 567 00:30:27,681 --> 00:30:29,881 Speaker 5: friend to people in the community. They weren't going to 568 00:30:29,881 --> 00:30:30,361 Speaker 5: put him in. 569 00:30:30,521 --> 00:30:33,401 Speaker 2: If you're buying cheap smoke from the retail around the corner, 570 00:30:33,401 --> 00:30:36,041 Speaker 2: whether it's a crook or not, you're very reluctant to 571 00:30:36,041 --> 00:30:39,081 Speaker 2: get involved and point the finger. I mean, I've got 572 00:30:39,081 --> 00:30:42,881 Speaker 2: one shop operating in my area about fifty meters from 573 00:30:42,921 --> 00:30:45,720 Speaker 2: a police station and they're happy as larry. 574 00:30:45,921 --> 00:30:47,041 Speaker 5: So I mean, in an. 575 00:30:46,921 --> 00:30:50,841 Speaker 2: Already stretched police force in the States, you can't see 576 00:30:50,881 --> 00:30:53,801 Speaker 2: the resources. I mean, Victoria can't get enough officers to 577 00:30:53,841 --> 00:30:55,841 Speaker 2: do the basic stuff now, let alone take on a 578 00:30:55,881 --> 00:30:58,200 Speaker 2: whole nother gangland war if you like. 579 00:30:58,641 --> 00:31:03,161 Speaker 5: So something has to change and it's not changing. No, no, 580 00:31:03,281 --> 00:31:03,561 Speaker 5: it's not. 581 00:31:03,681 --> 00:31:06,720 Speaker 2: And the Victoria place rather be doing one of the 582 00:31:07,081 --> 00:31:10,601 Speaker 2: multiple other responsibilities they have. But as you say, the 583 00:31:11,081 --> 00:31:14,720 Speaker 2: government occasionally brings out that argument about do you realize 584 00:31:14,721 --> 00:31:18,321 Speaker 2: what you're doing. You're just promoting organized crime and making 585 00:31:18,361 --> 00:31:22,761 Speaker 2: them stronger. But that has zero effect on your average 586 00:31:22,801 --> 00:31:25,321 Speaker 2: consumer who just sees a ten dollars product and a 587 00:31:25,361 --> 00:31:27,841 Speaker 2: fifty dollars product and says it's a no brainer. So 588 00:31:28,441 --> 00:31:31,881 Speaker 2: I mean, even though Australians are generally laura abiding, there 589 00:31:32,001 --> 00:31:34,760 Speaker 2: is a limit to the faith, I guess, and the 590 00:31:34,761 --> 00:31:39,361 Speaker 2: trust they have in government policy. And when that faith 591 00:31:39,481 --> 00:31:43,281 Speaker 2: is broken, which it obviously is now, then people will 592 00:31:43,401 --> 00:31:46,720 Speaker 2: have no qualms about breaking the law or moving to 593 00:31:46,761 --> 00:31:49,601 Speaker 2: the illegal product. And they're doing that in droves, and yeah, 594 00:31:49,641 --> 00:31:53,960 Speaker 2: that trust, if you like, and even their reliance on 595 00:31:54,241 --> 00:31:57,601 Speaker 2: the product itself. You know, they're happy with a certain 596 00:31:57,641 --> 00:31:59,921 Speaker 2: brand that they might have had for ten or twenty years. 597 00:32:00,081 --> 00:32:03,721 Speaker 2: That's broken as well, and now it's just all downhill. Really, 598 00:32:04,121 --> 00:32:07,001 Speaker 2: that's right, because I mean talk about a safe smoking product. 599 00:32:07,041 --> 00:32:10,041 Speaker 2: I mean, tobacco is bad for you, whether it's good 600 00:32:10,121 --> 00:32:12,440 Speaker 2: quality or bad quality, and people will buy it as 601 00:32:12,481 --> 00:32:14,361 Speaker 2: long as it's got nicotine and you know it doesn't 602 00:32:14,361 --> 00:32:15,960 Speaker 2: make you sick as soon as you smoke it. 603 00:32:16,041 --> 00:32:18,521 Speaker 5: So I think a hiding to nothing, Roan. 604 00:32:18,561 --> 00:32:20,440 Speaker 2: I hope we aren't having this conversation in two or 605 00:32:20,441 --> 00:32:23,321 Speaker 2: three years time when the legal tobacco is now sponsoring 606 00:32:23,321 --> 00:32:24,681 Speaker 2: the footy or something. 607 00:32:27,561 --> 00:32:28,921 Speaker 5: Yes, no, I think they've had that. 608 00:32:29,681 --> 00:32:31,960 Speaker 2: We're not going to reverse our policy to that extent, 609 00:32:32,041 --> 00:32:34,881 Speaker 2: but I'm not really sure what it's going to take 610 00:32:34,921 --> 00:32:37,401 Speaker 2: for the government to wake up that the policy has failed. 611 00:32:37,441 --> 00:32:42,081 Speaker 2: So you know, there's murders, there's innocent victims, there's shopkeepers destroyed, 612 00:32:42,641 --> 00:32:49,161 Speaker 2: there's no revenue, there's tobacco smoking rates going up. Yeah. 613 00:32:49,401 --> 00:32:51,041 Speaker 2: I just don't know how bad it has to get 614 00:32:51,081 --> 00:32:53,481 Speaker 2: before the government says, oh, okay, we might have got 615 00:32:53,481 --> 00:32:56,161 Speaker 2: this wrong and reverse some of these policies. But my 616 00:32:56,241 --> 00:32:59,561 Speaker 2: experiences was the Gangland War down here in Victoria and 617 00:32:59,841 --> 00:33:03,241 Speaker 2: the proliferation of party drugs back then. We really haven't 618 00:33:03,281 --> 00:33:08,161 Speaker 2: seen advances in UG reform to address the demand for 619 00:33:08,201 --> 00:33:10,681 Speaker 2: these product That's where it begins. And so I can 620 00:33:10,721 --> 00:33:13,801 Speaker 2: see the same thing rolling through again that the governments 621 00:33:13,881 --> 00:33:17,961 Speaker 2: are unlucky to reform these deeply entrenched policies. Like you say, 622 00:33:18,081 --> 00:33:21,041 Speaker 2: I mean the fact that the Health Department, for God's sakes, 623 00:33:21,401 --> 00:33:23,801 Speaker 2: is in charge of this. This should be under justice, 624 00:33:23,841 --> 00:33:26,681 Speaker 2: it should be under the border agencies, but it's not. 625 00:33:26,801 --> 00:33:29,241 Speaker 2: I mean, how do we get that simple change to 626 00:33:29,561 --> 00:33:32,361 Speaker 2: get the right public bodies to be enforcing it. 627 00:33:33,481 --> 00:33:34,000 Speaker 5: I don't know. 628 00:33:34,041 --> 00:33:37,401 Speaker 2: We've had multiple federal inquiries that have all said the 629 00:33:37,401 --> 00:33:41,401 Speaker 2: same thing, that the Home Affairs Department or law enforcement 630 00:33:41,441 --> 00:33:45,041 Speaker 2: agencies should be running the show. This is an organized 631 00:33:45,081 --> 00:33:47,881 Speaker 2: crime problem which is clearly out of the remit of 632 00:33:47,961 --> 00:33:51,760 Speaker 2: the health department, and yet health departments still are running 633 00:33:51,881 --> 00:33:54,481 Speaker 2: the show. So we should just thank them for creating 634 00:33:54,481 --> 00:33:57,200 Speaker 2: a problem, and then they need to stand aside and 635 00:33:57,281 --> 00:33:59,721 Speaker 2: let the groin ups into the room and to try 636 00:33:59,761 --> 00:34:04,801 Speaker 2: to fix this. Unfortunately, fixing it includes changing the policy 637 00:34:04,841 --> 00:34:08,960 Speaker 2: that health started, and they're highly reluctant to do so. 638 00:34:08,401 --> 00:34:09,121 Speaker 5: They certainly are. 639 00:34:09,121 --> 00:34:10,681 Speaker 2: And I can't see you going back into the fray 640 00:34:10,761 --> 00:34:12,401 Speaker 2: row and you'd be better off on the sideline at 641 00:34:12,401 --> 00:34:12,761 Speaker 2: this stage. 642 00:34:12,841 --> 00:34:15,881 Speaker 5: So thanks for your time today, my pleasure. Thank you. 643 00:34:18,481 --> 00:34:19,241 Speaker 5: That's right on park. 644 00:34:19,321 --> 00:34:22,561 Speaker 2: Former Australian Federal Police and Border Force run the Tobacco 645 00:34:22,641 --> 00:34:26,121 Speaker 2: Strike Team Thinca's issue here, of course, is our tax system. 646 00:34:26,561 --> 00:34:29,401 Speaker 2: We don't get our richest people to pay their fair 647 00:34:29,401 --> 00:34:32,761 Speaker 2: share of tax, so traditionally the burden has fallen on 648 00:34:32,921 --> 00:34:35,801 Speaker 2: the sinners, the drinkers, the smokers, the betters, this sort 649 00:34:35,801 --> 00:34:38,281 Speaker 2: of thing. So, as Rowan says, until we get a 650 00:34:38,401 --> 00:34:41,801 Speaker 2: change in emphasis, look at excise, we're just going to 651 00:34:41,801 --> 00:34:44,241 Speaker 2: be playing catch up here and all the coppers in 652 00:34:44,321 --> 00:34:46,121 Speaker 2: the world and all the show and tells and all 653 00:34:46,161 --> 00:34:48,961 Speaker 2: the siegures will make no difference whatsoever, because, as I 654 00:34:49,001 --> 00:34:51,121 Speaker 2: said of the outset, you can prohibit something, but you 655 00:34:51,161 --> 00:34:52,681 Speaker 2: can't make it unpopular. 656 00:34:53,161 --> 00:34:54,761 Speaker 5: Are you buying illegal smokes? 657 00:34:54,801 --> 00:34:56,841 Speaker 2: Let me know in the comments, or you can also 658 00:34:56,921 --> 00:35:00,121 Speaker 2: send me an email Adam Shanner writer at gmail dot com. 659 00:35:00,481 --> 00:35:02,481 Speaker 2: If you happen to want to point the finger, can 660 00:35:02,521 --> 00:35:04,881 Speaker 2: always call crime stoppers two one and out of Triple three, 661 00:35:05,041 --> 00:35:07,761 Speaker 2: Triple zero. I'm not sure many people are doing that though, 662 00:35:08,081 --> 00:35:10,041 Speaker 2: but thankfully this has been al and chan for real 663 00:35:10,241 --> 00:35:10,641 Speaker 2: crime