WEBVTT - Police trial live face-scanning technology: what could possibly go wrong?

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Daniel James and you're listening to 7am. West Australian

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<v Speaker 1>police recently finished trialling a technology that can identify people

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<v Speaker 1>as they walk past, revealing they scanned nearly 1.4 million

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<v Speaker 1>faces over a period of five months. Police say the

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<v Speaker 1>cameras helped them make 122 arrests and are now considering

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<v Speaker 1>whether to use the technology more widely. But is catching

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<v Speaker 1>122 people worth putting nearly 1.4 million others under surveillance?

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<v Speaker 1>And how much privacy should Australians be expected to give

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<v Speaker 1>up in the name of public safety? Today, we revisit

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<v Speaker 1>our conversation with University of New South Wales cyber security expert,

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<v Speaker 1>Professor Richard Buckland. Recorded at the start of the trial

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<v Speaker 1>on the dangers of live facial recognition and what happens

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<v Speaker 1>when police surveillance powers expand. It's Sunday, November 8th, and

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<v Speaker 1>this episode first aired in June 2026. This is.

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<v Speaker 2>Our custom-built live facial recognition van, which is going to

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<v Speaker 2>be used to assist police operations. The van has a

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<v Speaker 2>number of features inside it, including a computer system, which

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<v Speaker 2>processes images from high-quality cameras, which then compares those images

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<v Speaker 2>against a database.

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<v Speaker 1>Richard, WA Police have announced a trial of live facial

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<v Speaker 1>recognition technology. What can you tell us about the technology

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<v Speaker 1>and how will this trial work?

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<v Speaker 3>So this is a very limited trial they've announced. It's

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<v Speaker 3>just in one van which will be marked saying, according

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<v Speaker 3>to the images we've seen, that there's facial recognition running.

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<v Speaker 3>And how it works is they are looking for particular

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<v Speaker 3>people in this case.

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<v Speaker 4>So they've got presumably a.

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<v Speaker 3>Database somewhere of people faces of people that fit a

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<v Speaker 3>certain category and they're trying to see if any of

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<v Speaker 3>those people walk past the van.

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<v Speaker 5>The important thing for us in our police force working

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<v Speaker 5>with our community is transparency and public safety. That's why

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<v Speaker 5>the van has police written on the side. It has

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<v Speaker 5>very clear signage about what it's doing.

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<v Speaker 3>And the categories they've mentioned are people who are wanted

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<v Speaker 3>for domestic violence, known sex offenders. So pretty reprehensible people

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<v Speaker 3>and the sort of people you'd really want the police

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<v Speaker 3>to be able to catch. And it would seem reasonable

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<v Speaker 3>that they'd be out in public looking for these people.

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<v Speaker 5>This is not about mass surveillance. This is about specifying

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<v Speaker 5>those in our community who are wanted by police because

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<v Speaker 5>there is an arrest warrant out for them, who are

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<v Speaker 5>on sex offender lists, who should not be in the vicinity,

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<v Speaker 5>particularly of young children. But it's also about helping missing people.

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<v Speaker 3>As we understand it, they're obviously a bit coy about

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<v Speaker 3>the details, but the images are scanned in real time.

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<v Speaker 3>If there's a match, then the recording is left showing

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<v Speaker 3>those faces and the police are alerted in real time,

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<v Speaker 3>presumably in the van. And then the other faces that

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<v Speaker 3>don't match anyone on this list are pixelated.

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<v Speaker 5>This is actually a way that we can increase the

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<v Speaker 5>freedoms and the privacy of our community.

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<v Speaker 1>The police commissioner says this is actually a less intrusive

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<v Speaker 1>option than what police currently rely on, which is CCTV

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<v Speaker 1>footage from private citizens.

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<v Speaker 6>Look, I've always been concerned about the spread of CCTV

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<v Speaker 6>around our community, particularly the ownership of the cameras, where

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<v Speaker 6>the information's stored, how long they're stored. We don't even

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<v Speaker 6>know half these cameras and who's using them.

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<v Speaker 4>What do you make of that argument?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, I mean, it's the argument that we always hear

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<v Speaker 3>with privacy-related things. I'm sure the police will continue using

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<v Speaker 3>the methods that they currently have. So there's in no

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<v Speaker 3>sense is adding this into the mix less intrusive. It's

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<v Speaker 3>actually widening the range of.

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<v Speaker 4>Surveillance powers they have.

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<v Speaker 3>The argument's not going to the heart of things for

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<v Speaker 3>a number of reasons. It is certainly the case that

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<v Speaker 3>the police will use this to catch people that everyone

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<v Speaker 3>agrees should be caught. The problem isn't with the software

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<v Speaker 3>doing its job. The problem is what are the consequences

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<v Speaker 3>to everyone else? What's the consequence to a society? of

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<v Speaker 3>having cameras everywhere. And if this goes, continues on this trajectory,

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<v Speaker 3>then this software now could be used once the trials

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<v Speaker 3>run and everyone's happy with the trial, which achieved its no-blame.

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<v Speaker 3>It could then be used to monitor everyone everywhere in

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<v Speaker 3>a way we've never had before. Once you've got technology

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<v Speaker 3>able to do something, then everyone sits around thinking of

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<v Speaker 3>reasons and ways you can use it to do other things.

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<v Speaker 3>And this is scope creep. And we see this over

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<v Speaker 3>and over again with privacy. So the Example I'm really

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<v Speaker 3>familiar with is in New South Wales, we had a

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<v Speaker 3>trial of cameras to detect people using mobile phones because

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<v Speaker 3>a lot of road safety data, as I'm sure everyone knows,

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<v Speaker 3>shows that mobile phone usage by the driver was involved

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<v Speaker 3>in a frightening number of accidents that caused harm to

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<v Speaker 3>lots of other people, innocent people, when the driver was

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<v Speaker 3>using it. So they put these cameras in locations and

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<v Speaker 3>they're very high resolution that can detect if someone's using

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<v Speaker 3>a mobile phone.

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<v Speaker 4>It was a success.

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<v Speaker 3>It identified lots of people using the phone as on

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<v Speaker 3>the basis of that successful identification, those cameras have been

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<v Speaker 3>rolled out and they're increasingly appearing around New South Wales.

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<v Speaker 3>But the scope creep happened when someone said, we've got

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<v Speaker 3>this footage, what else can we use it for? We

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<v Speaker 3>can easily see if someone's wearing a seatbelt using this.

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<v Speaker 3>So now those cameras are used for seatbelt offences, not

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<v Speaker 3>wearing a seatbelt. Sure, it's still a good thing to do,

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<v Speaker 3>I guess, but the difference is with a mobile phone,

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<v Speaker 3>the argument in the trial was, You can kill innocent people.

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<v Speaker 3>Other people suffer from you breaking this law. If you're

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<v Speaker 3>not wearing a seatbelt, you're probably the only one that's

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<v Speaker 3>going to suffer from not wearing the seatbelt. It won't

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<v Speaker 3>go back to the public and it won't be tested again.

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<v Speaker 4>Now they've got that capability, it can be used for

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<v Speaker 4>other things.

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<v Speaker 3>And this is, I guess, what's scary and why it's

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<v Speaker 3>always good to check back after a short period of

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<v Speaker 3>time what the thing's being used for and by someone independent,

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<v Speaker 3>is this in line with our intents and values?

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<v Speaker 1>Right now they're using for this trial a very clearly

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<v Speaker 1>marked police fan, but police haven't ruled out using this

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<v Speaker 1>in a more covert form in future, including at protests.

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<v Speaker 1>How does that change the equation compared to what was

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<v Speaker 1>originally being trialled?

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<v Speaker 4>You're spot on.

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<v Speaker 3>If it's used at protests, for example, imagine we're back

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<v Speaker 3>in the old days where it was illegal to be homosexual,

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<v Speaker 3>a criminal offence. Then if there was a protest for

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<v Speaker 3>gay rights, having a camera there identifying people in real

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<v Speaker 3>time obviously means that a database can be built of people.

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<v Speaker 4>Now, you could argue, well, we could have.

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<v Speaker 3>The camera and not record it in real time. We

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<v Speaker 3>could have the camera and analyze this later. But that's

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<v Speaker 3>a much bigger job once you've got it. You probably

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<v Speaker 3>know yourself, if you get a book and read it,

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<v Speaker 3>it's easy. But if you put it in that pile

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<v Speaker 3>of books and that pile just gets bigger and bigger

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<v Speaker 3>and bigger, it's much harder to search. So giving people

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<v Speaker 3>real-time capability to update databases means you could identify people

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<v Speaker 3>who are violating the law, even when perhaps it's not

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<v Speaker 3>a law we're totally happy with. And it's a chilling effect, really,

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<v Speaker 3>on your ability to protest, like we saw in China

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<v Speaker 3>and Hong Kong.

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<v Speaker 1>Coming up, how facial recognition technology is being used elsewhere

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<v Speaker 1>in Australia and the world. Richard, what can you tell

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<v Speaker 1>us about how this technology is being used by police

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<v Speaker 1>in other parts of the world?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so in the States, they do a lot of

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<v Speaker 3>facial recognition stuff. And it's being used to identify people

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<v Speaker 3>that the police are interested in because they've had a

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<v Speaker 3>long history of doing that. But I do think the

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<v Speaker 3>big problem in the States is the chilling effect, that

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<v Speaker 3>you would now be frightened to protest against things you

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<v Speaker 3>might think are egregious.

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<v Speaker 4>And then there's this other question, which.

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<v Speaker 3>Is once your movements are tracked and known and that

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<v Speaker 3>data is stored somewhere, who has.

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<v Speaker 4>Access to this?

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<v Speaker 3>So in the States, there are examples where the police individuals,

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<v Speaker 3>insiders inside the police, use it for tracking their spouse,

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<v Speaker 3>use it for finding spouses who've escaped them for family

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<v Speaker 3>violence reasons.

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<v Speaker 7>Orange County DA's office says this former Costa Mesa police

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<v Speaker 7>officer not only used these flock cameras to track his mistress,

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<v Speaker 7>her new boyfriends, as well as his current wife, but

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<v Speaker 7>also used confidential law enforcement systems to be able to

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<v Speaker 7>run people a number of times that had nothing to

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<v Speaker 7>do with his work.

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<v Speaker 3>One police officer used it to track down and date

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<v Speaker 3>someone he thought was interesting and work out where they

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<v Speaker 3>lived and where they went and all sorts of things

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<v Speaker 3>like that.

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<v Speaker 8>I have a former Milwaukee police officer pleading guilty today

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<v Speaker 8>to a misdemeanor. It comes after court records show Josue

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<v Speaker 8>Ayala searched the locations of his girlfriend and her boyfriend

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<v Speaker 8>more than 170 times using Milwaukee Police Department's license plate

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<v Speaker 8>reading technology.

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<v Speaker 3>So even if the government and the police as an

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<v Speaker 3>organization say they're going to look after the data and

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<v Speaker 3>it's been used for good purposes, of course, individuals have

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<v Speaker 3>access to the data. And then the extension of that

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<v Speaker 3>is if they break into this database, so do criminals.

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<v Speaker 1>Richard, now a Florida man is suing police after AI

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<v Speaker 1>facial recognition technology led to his wrongful arrest. How likely

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<v Speaker 1>are situations like that to arise with this technology?

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<v Speaker 4>Technology always makes mistakes.

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<v Speaker 3>The only way of stopping and making mistakes is spending

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<v Speaker 3>more money and often to reduce mistakes by a lot

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<v Speaker 3>costs a huge amount more. So usually we solve mistakes

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<v Speaker 3>by shifting them from one type of mistake to the other.

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<v Speaker 3>So there's type one and type two mistakes that this

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<v Speaker 3>software can make. One is where it wrongfully identifies an

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<v Speaker 3>innocent person as being a bad person. And the other

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<v Speaker 3>mistake is where a bad person doesn't get properly identified.

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<v Speaker 3>And really there's a null almost on the software. You

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<v Speaker 3>can choose where you set it. If you set it

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<v Speaker 3>too far, if you're too determined to catch all the

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<v Speaker 3>criminals and not let anyone through, then it will wrongfully

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<v Speaker 3>identify a range of people.

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<v Speaker 1>And with this technology, Richard, what about racial bias? Because

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<v Speaker 1>there's been an issue with technology like this in the past,

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<v Speaker 1>not really taking into account the diversity with communities.

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<v Speaker 4>What can you say to that?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, most of the data sets that things are being

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<v Speaker 3>trained on are white and white. middle-class white males and,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, high-profile people in disadvantaged groups, minority groups in America,

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<v Speaker 3>people with perhaps disabilities. You know, you can just imagine,

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<v Speaker 3>I haven't trained that on everyone in the world. If

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<v Speaker 3>your training data isn't good enough, it's making a guess

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<v Speaker 3>based on what it's saying. So, yeah, absolutely.

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<v Speaker 4>There's all these sort of biases in the software.

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<v Speaker 3>Even facial recognition with human makes mistakes.

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<v Speaker 4>It's not a very good way of identifying people.

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<v Speaker 1>Another one of the police commissioner's arguments was that This

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<v Speaker 1>technology is already being used out in the community. How

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<v Speaker 1>widespread is this both inside and outside of Puliso?

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I mean, it is.

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<v Speaker 3>Can I just say that's not a brilliant argument.

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<v Speaker 4>My children try that one.

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<v Speaker 1>Everyone's doing it is the argument.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, everyone's doing it so I can. I mean, this is,

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<v Speaker 3>I guess, just taking a quick diversion, this is really

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<v Speaker 3>the problem with the cameras, you put your finger on

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<v Speaker 3>it in a nutshell, that we're slowly drifting by a

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<v Speaker 3>series of incremental steps towards And at every point, we

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<v Speaker 3>can make an argument that if you don't look at

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<v Speaker 3>it too carefully, you think, oh, yeah, that's reasonable. But

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<v Speaker 3>as we make step by step by step, people's privacy

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<v Speaker 3>and ability to live a life not being.

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<v Speaker 4>Surveilled is diminished.

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<v Speaker 3>And arguments then are, well, you've already lost it, so

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<v Speaker 3>we can just keep doing it. So this incremental drift

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<v Speaker 3>is actually quite scary. Visual capture is very widespread. There's

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<v Speaker 3>cameras everywhere, if we take it step by step, including

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<v Speaker 3>lots of private cameras pointing onto the street.

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<v Speaker 4>It's very hard to walk around.

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<v Speaker 3>In Sydney, if you drive down the road to the

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<v Speaker 3>Blue Mountains. There used to be one surveillance camera at

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<v Speaker 3>the beginning. There's now one every 200 metres. I don't

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<v Speaker 3>know how they got the budget to do that. So

0:11:39.190 --> 0:11:43.770
<v Speaker 3>then there's facial recognition applied to recordings. And that is

0:11:44.110 --> 0:11:47.250
<v Speaker 3>not so widely done by people. That's more forensic people.

0:11:47.650 --> 0:11:50.839
<v Speaker 3>But real-time facial recognition, that has commercial advantages.

0:11:50.940 --> 0:11:52.339
<v Speaker 4>And people do use that.

0:11:52.460 --> 0:11:57.340
<v Speaker 3>And Bunnings and Kmart is a famous case that happened

0:11:57.380 --> 0:12:00.900
<v Speaker 3>recently where they were using it to identify people that

0:12:00.920 --> 0:12:04.240
<v Speaker 3>would be abusive to their staff or people that committed

0:12:04.280 --> 0:12:07.140
<v Speaker 3>various sorts of fraud, either checkout fraud, not scanning things,

0:12:07.260 --> 0:12:10.309
<v Speaker 3>or people who made multiple fraudulent returns and claimed money

0:12:10.350 --> 0:12:12.030
<v Speaker 3>back on items they hadn't bought in the store.

0:12:12.170 --> 0:12:14.709
<v Speaker 9>Some of our most popular retailers are being accused of

0:12:14.790 --> 0:12:20.990
<v Speaker 9>invading customers' privacy by installing facial recognition cameras in their stores. Kmart,

0:12:21.090 --> 0:12:23.439
<v Speaker 9>Bunnings and the good guys have been blasted by.

0:12:23.630 --> 0:12:27.459
<v Speaker 3>This was met with a lot of public shock that

0:12:27.500 --> 0:12:30.760
<v Speaker 3>they were recording people and identifying people without telling them.

0:12:30.860 --> 0:12:33.980
<v Speaker 9>Kmart has been found to have breached privacy laws in

0:12:34.020 --> 0:12:37.800
<v Speaker 9>its use of facial recognition technology in stores across the country.

0:12:37.920 --> 0:12:40.240
<v Speaker 10>Bunnings has been given the green light to use facial

0:12:40.320 --> 0:12:44.630
<v Speaker 10>recognition technology across its stores. The hardware giant maintains it

0:12:44.670 --> 0:12:48.790
<v Speaker 10>will only use the technology to prevent shoplifting and protect staff.

0:12:49.400 --> 0:12:52.980
<v Speaker 10>It won an appeal in the Administrative Review Tribunal following

0:12:53.000 --> 0:12:55.800
<v Speaker 10>an earlier ruling that it breached customer privacy.

0:12:56.000 --> 0:12:58.720
<v Speaker 3>So yeah, it is being used and I would expect,

0:12:58.780 --> 0:13:00.620
<v Speaker 3>unless there is a stop to it, if we just

0:13:00.660 --> 0:13:03.939
<v Speaker 3>keep saying, yeah, that sounds reasonable, we could eventually live

0:13:03.980 --> 0:13:07.300
<v Speaker 3>in an Orwellian world. Wherever you go, you're recognised and noticed,

0:13:07.320 --> 0:13:10.679
<v Speaker 3>your movements are known. And that's an obvious problem for

0:13:10.720 --> 0:13:13.260
<v Speaker 3>some people, witness protection plans, people who are trying to

0:13:13.320 --> 0:13:17.840
<v Speaker 3>hide from abusive partners, people trying to whistleblow. We've seen

0:13:17.860 --> 0:13:21.800
<v Speaker 3>some whistleblowing happening recently, the KPMG case, they're now saying

0:13:21.820 --> 0:13:24.540
<v Speaker 3>they wouldn't whistleblow again, that the fact of surveillance is

0:13:24.760 --> 0:13:28.450
<v Speaker 3>actually enough to stop people wanting to speak out. So yeah,

0:13:28.530 --> 0:13:31.209
<v Speaker 3>so the world we're moving into, if this is allowed,

0:13:31.370 --> 0:13:33.150
<v Speaker 3>would be a very different world. And it'd be good

0:13:33.170 --> 0:13:35.350
<v Speaker 3>for us to stop and think, is this what we want?

0:13:35.990 --> 0:13:39.229
<v Speaker 1>To that effect, Richard, this is a trial, but history

0:13:39.270 --> 0:13:42.429
<v Speaker 1>shows us that when police are given powers, that those

0:13:42.490 --> 0:13:46.939
<v Speaker 1>powers are usually extended. So What checks and balances are

0:13:46.980 --> 0:13:50.020
<v Speaker 1>currently in place to show that there isn't overreach with

0:13:50.040 --> 0:13:50.760
<v Speaker 1>this technology?

0:13:51.220 --> 0:13:53.580
<v Speaker 3>My understanding, and I could be wrong, is very little.

0:13:54.080 --> 0:13:56.380
<v Speaker 3>We've got some words saying this is what we're going

0:13:56.400 --> 0:13:59.040
<v Speaker 3>to use it for now. And credit to the police

0:13:59.360 --> 0:14:03.320
<v Speaker 3>commissioner for saying this. Most commissioners of police in most

0:14:03.340 --> 0:14:05.470
<v Speaker 3>states do this stuff under the radar as much as

0:14:05.500 --> 0:14:08.530
<v Speaker 3>they can. It's really good that he spoke about what

0:14:08.550 --> 0:14:11.130
<v Speaker 3>they're doing and he has spoken about their intentions, but

0:14:11.150 --> 0:14:12.010
<v Speaker 3>he's refused.

0:14:11.710 --> 0:14:13.990
<v Speaker 4>To rule out other ways other intentions.

0:14:14.150 --> 0:14:17.090
<v Speaker 3>I mean, the things you'd like to see, an independent

0:14:17.130 --> 0:14:20.480
<v Speaker 3>review after a short period of time, constraints on what

0:14:20.600 --> 0:14:22.840
<v Speaker 3>the surveillance could involve, the sorts of things we saw

0:14:22.900 --> 0:14:24.920
<v Speaker 3>in COVID when the government tried to bring out the

0:14:25.600 --> 0:14:27.720
<v Speaker 3>contact tracing app and there was a lot of alarm

0:14:27.740 --> 0:14:30.080
<v Speaker 3>that the government would get everyone's location data in real time.

0:14:30.760 --> 0:14:33.580
<v Speaker 3>The government then put a whole lot of quite good

0:14:33.680 --> 0:14:36.260
<v Speaker 3>restrictions on how it could be used with the sunset clause.

0:14:36.380 --> 0:14:38.940
<v Speaker 3>It would be good to see this sort of thing,

0:14:38.960 --> 0:14:41.160
<v Speaker 3>but it's very hard to get anyone to put constraints

0:14:41.200 --> 0:14:43.870
<v Speaker 3>on the police. Really, both sides of politics are almost

0:14:43.930 --> 0:14:46.850
<v Speaker 3>outdo themselves for giving the police extra powers. I would

0:14:47.030 --> 0:14:50.070
<v Speaker 3>hope that there will be a review, an independent review.

0:14:50.570 --> 0:14:53.090
<v Speaker 3>I would hope there'll be restrictions on who can see

0:14:53.110 --> 0:14:55.530
<v Speaker 3>the data. I would hope there'd be requirements about the

0:14:55.570 --> 0:14:58.940
<v Speaker 3>data being stored in a way that inside is inside

0:14:58.960 --> 0:15:02.080
<v Speaker 3>the police can't access it and that accessing get reviewed.

0:15:03.140 --> 0:15:05.340
<v Speaker 3>I would hope that the data be encrypted in a

0:15:05.680 --> 0:15:08.040
<v Speaker 3>reasonable way. So if hackers break in, they can't access

0:15:08.060 --> 0:15:11.120
<v Speaker 3>the data. I would hope recordings would be destroyed and

0:15:11.220 --> 0:15:14.450
<v Speaker 3>no one ever likes destroying data. So they won't unless

0:15:14.490 --> 0:15:15.390
<v Speaker 3>forced to destroy it.

0:15:15.380 --> 0:15:18.070
<v Speaker 4>They'll keep it. And then the last thing is the pixelation.

0:15:18.490 --> 0:15:21.570
<v Speaker 3>There should be legislative restrictions, not just down to the

0:15:21.630 --> 0:15:25.730
<v Speaker 3>current way it's done, saying this pixelation has to happen

0:15:26.350 --> 0:15:28.630
<v Speaker 3>either on the camera or on device, but certainly before

0:15:28.830 --> 0:15:29.970
<v Speaker 3>any recording is made.

0:15:30.410 --> 0:15:32.210
<v Speaker 4>So there is no way someone can ever get hold

0:15:32.250 --> 0:15:35.450
<v Speaker 4>of the unpixelated version. It's not good enough to say, oh, we.

0:15:35.350 --> 0:15:37.610
<v Speaker 3>Promise we never will, or we have checks and balances

0:15:37.670 --> 0:15:39.510
<v Speaker 3>in place to show it never will. There should be

0:15:39.550 --> 0:15:41.950
<v Speaker 3>an independent audit to make sure you can't get anyone

0:15:41.970 --> 0:15:42.770
<v Speaker 3>else's ID in.

0:15:44.240 --> 0:15:46.480
<v Speaker 1>Well, thank you very much, Richard. We should note that

0:15:46.560 --> 0:15:48.660
<v Speaker 1>the police say that they won't store the data of

0:15:48.680 --> 0:15:52.390
<v Speaker 1>Australians who aren't on their wanted list. But in the meantime,

0:15:52.410 --> 0:15:55.210
<v Speaker 1>what could possibly go wrong? Richard, thank you so much

0:15:55.230 --> 0:15:55.710
<v Speaker 1>for your time.

0:15:56.130 --> 0:16:09.600
<v Speaker 11>Thanks, Daniel.

0:16:09.760 --> 0:16:12.220
<v Speaker 1>7am, we'll be back tomorrow with Midnight Oil frontman and

0:16:12.320 --> 0:16:16.520
<v Speaker 1>former Federal Environment Minister, Peter Garrett. He's led an independent

0:16:16.540 --> 0:16:21.240
<v Speaker 1>inquiry that's calling for Australia's $ 368 billion Orca submarine deal

0:16:21.660 --> 0:16:24.700
<v Speaker 1>to be scrapped and says Australians have been deceived about

0:16:24.740 --> 0:16:25.760
<v Speaker 1>what they're signing up for.

0:16:26.300 --> 0:16:29.760
<v Speaker 12>The deception, Daniel, is that the majority of Australians were

0:16:29.800 --> 0:16:33.100
<v Speaker 12>not aware when Scott Morrison announced the Orca steel five

0:16:33.120 --> 0:16:38.340
<v Speaker 12>years ago that they would have a bill for $ 33

0:16:37.200 --> 0:16:40.710
<v Speaker 12>million a day for the next 30 years for submarines

0:16:40.750 --> 0:16:43.250
<v Speaker 12>that may or may not arrive. This is something which

0:16:43.670 --> 0:16:46.610
<v Speaker 12>we came to realise many, many people were unaware of.

0:16:46.710 --> 0:16:47.770
<v Speaker 4>It was a deception.

0:16:48.330 --> 0:16:51.090
<v Speaker 1>That'll be in your feed on Monday. I'm Daniel James.

0:16:51.630 --> 0:16:52.370
<v Speaker 1>Thanks for listening.