Speaker 1: I'm Ruby Jones and you're listening to seven AM. Australia
Speaker 1: has been everywhere in the Pacific Islands recently, with four
Speaker 1: security agreements underway and a Prime minister turning up for
Speaker 1: signings that didn't eventuate or to keep China's military at
Speaker 1: a distance. At the same time, ORCUS is remaking our
Speaker 1: defense strategy with eight nuclear powered submarines, expanded facilities for
Speaker 1: US forces, and plans for a new East Coast submarine base.
Speaker 1: For some watching on, those two approaches are at odds.
Speaker 1: The diplomacy aims to prevent a Chinese foothold, while ORCUS
Speaker 1: gives them the exact reason why they need one. Today,
Speaker 1: Director of the International Security Program at the Low Institute,
Speaker 1: Sam Rogavin on the contradiction at the heart of Australia's
Speaker 1: Pacific policy and if there's a safer way to defend
Speaker 1: our region. It's Thursday, September twenty five, So Sam, Australia
Speaker 1: is currently working on for security arrangements in the Pacific
Speaker 1: Islands with different nations. So do you mind just laying
Speaker 1: out for me what those arrangements are and why it
Speaker 1: is that we want them.
Speaker 2: Yeah, Well, I think the four you're referring to her
Speaker 2: with Tavalu, Naru, Vanuatu and now Papua New Guinea. It's
Speaker 2: important to note that for Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea,
Speaker 2: those haven't actually been secured yet. There were some slightly
Speaker 2: embarrassing delays for Prime Minister Albanesi when on both occasions
Speaker 2: he went to both those countries for signing ceremonies and
Speaker 2: then the local governments decided at the last minute that
Speaker 2: they weren't quite ready to agree to the fine printed,
Speaker 2: so the signing ceremonies have been delayed.
Speaker 3: It's the government I hope to emerge from the Pacific
Speaker 3: over the last two weeks holding aloft two documents or
Speaker 3: two treaties, one from Vanuatu, the Nakamal Agreement that it
Speaker 3: hoped to sign last week, and this defense treaty that
Speaker 3: has been talked about so widely and so broadly for
Speaker 3: the last three or four weeks in particular, and in
Speaker 3: the end it's emerging with none.
Speaker 2: But nevertheless, the direction of movements pretty clear on all four.
Speaker 2: And in fact you could go beyond those four and
Speaker 2: say Australia's struck new agreements with various Pacific island countries
Speaker 2: and has stepped up its Pacific diplomatic and aid game
Speaker 2: considerably since twenty eighteen, or maybe even slightly before. And
Speaker 2: look to my mind as a security expert, what all
Speaker 2: this effort has in common is a greater sense of
Speaker 2: concern about China's position in the Pacific Islands region. And
Speaker 2: we know that China has been very busy in the
Speaker 2: region in the last decade. China became the second largest
Speaker 2: aid donor in the Pacific Islands region, really from out
Speaker 2: of nowhere. We also know it achieved a security agreement
Speaker 2: with the Solomon Islands in twenty twenty two, and off
Speaker 2: the back of that, proposed a region wide security deal
Speaker 2: with twelve Pacific Island countries, which the Pacific Island countries
Speaker 2: thankfully declined to participate in. But nevertheless, when it comes
Speaker 2: to security, when one side wins, another side tends to lose.
Speaker 2: Security is zero some So we're really worried about China
Speaker 2: setting up new security arrangements in the Pacific Islands region
Speaker 2: and we're trying to counteract that, or in some cases,
Speaker 2: I think in the case of those four that we mentioned,
Speaker 2: we're trying to preempt China.
Speaker 1: And you mentioned that Not all of these deals are
Speaker 1: necessarily going smoothly. Some haven't been finalized yet. So what
Speaker 1: are the sticking points and what role does climate change
Speaker 1: our response to it play.
Speaker 2: Look, climate change plays a part here because while Australia
Speaker 2: is very much consumed with great power politics and we're
Speaker 2: seeing the Pacific Islands region as a kind of board
Speaker 2: for great power politics, the Pacific island countries themselves chafe
Speaker 2: a little bit at that idea because I think it
Speaker 2: kind of excludes them, and they think that what it
Speaker 2: does is it sidelines the very thing that the very
Speaker 2: security issue that they are most worried about, which is
Speaker 2: climate change.
Speaker 4: Climate change and sea level raise is the single greatest
Speaker 4: threat facing small island euloping states, including those in the
Speaker 4: Pacific where Solomon Islands is.
Speaker 2: There's no point worrying about great powers jostling over military
Speaker 2: basing and military influence if your country is itself physically
Speaker 2: disappearing before your eyes.
Speaker 4: It's affecting our communities and it is a very expensive
Speaker 4: excess for us to keep on rebuilding every year whenever
Speaker 4: you have saclans.
Speaker 2: And I think these kind of security agreements do chafe
Speaker 2: a little bit against what they consider to be their
Speaker 2: top priority. And so you can see in some of
Speaker 2: the language that our leaders use around these agreements that
Speaker 2: they at the very least acknowledge the fact that, yes,
Speaker 2: the Pacific Islands countries are worried about climate change. Above all,
Speaker 2: this government has a claim to being a bit more
Speaker 2: a bit more sympathetic to those concerns than the previous
Speaker 2: Liberal National Coalition government.
Speaker 5: We are all members of the Pacific family and it's
Speaker 5: important that we cooperate on economic issues, on national security
Speaker 5: and in dealing with the challenge of climate chain.
Speaker 2: But nevertheless, I'm sure the Pacific Islands countries feel we're
Speaker 2: not doing enough.
Speaker 1: And these arrangements, as you say on Australia's end, are
Speaker 1: designed to try and limit China's influence in the region
Speaker 1: for security purposes. So is that working so far?
Speaker 2: I think it is. I mean, there is good evidence
Speaker 2: that in the case of p and G and Vanawatu,
Speaker 2: that the late in the last decade did make forays,
Speaker 2: did make entreaties to both of those governments suggesting a
Speaker 2: permanent Chinese military presence. Those efforts were headed off, partly
Speaker 2: by Australian diplomatic action. But Australia has some natural advantages here.
Speaker 2: First of all, we're really close to the Pacific Islands
Speaker 2: region physically, so that means if there's either a natural
Speaker 2: disaster or some kind of political crisis where they need
Speaker 2: help from the outside, Australia is always going to be
Speaker 2: there first, as long as we maintain certain basic capabilities.
Speaker 2: The other thing we have in that advantage is a
Speaker 2: certain sort of cultural and economic closeness that the Chinese
Speaker 2: will never have. We're part of the Pacific Islands for
Speaker 2: them and China is not. We have a Pacific Island
Speaker 2: worker scheme and so does New Zealand, which ties us
Speaker 2: economically to the Pacific in the way that again that
Speaker 2: China can't match. But I think above all of that,
Speaker 2: there's an imbalance of resolve in the sense that the
Speaker 2: Pacific Islands are always going to matter more to us
Speaker 2: than it will to China. So China has a lot
Speaker 2: of resources, but at best the Pacific Islands is going
Speaker 2: to be a second and maybe a third order priority
Speaker 2: for China. It's first order for Australian always will be.
Speaker 1: So is there anything in Australia's foreign policy then that
Speaker 1: is getting in the way of that goal to maintain
Speaker 1: our influence and reduce China's well.
Speaker 2: I would argue that ucas in a word, is the
Speaker 2: thing that's getting in the way. So it kind of
Speaker 2: incentivizes China to have a greater presence in the region
Speaker 2: because after all, we are setting up a new submarine
Speaker 2: base on the west coast.
Speaker 5: So crucial Henderson Shipyards in Western Australia will get a
Speaker 5: twelve billion dollar upgrade.
Speaker 2: Early estimates of what Henderson will cost is in the
Speaker 2: order of twenty five millions.
Speaker 1: So this is not the whole.
Speaker 2: In future, we will set up a submarine base on
Speaker 2: the East coast, both for Australia and American and potentially
Speaker 2: British nuclear powered submarines to use. And the upgrade of
Speaker 2: an Air Force base at a leaf Tindall just south
Speaker 2: of Darwin, which is going to be capable of hosting
Speaker 2: American strategic bombers, long range bombers like the B fifty two.
Speaker 2: The purpose of all these capabilities is really to face
Speaker 2: up to China and to operate well north of Australia
Speaker 2: in a possible conflict with China. I mean, that's why
Speaker 2: you get nuclear powered submarines so that you can operate
Speaker 2: thousands of kilometres north of Australia, potentially off the Chinese
Speaker 2: coast and maybe even firing missiles onto the Chinese mainland,
Speaker 2: which the Australian Aucust submarines are going to be capable of.
Speaker 2: So if the objective is to keep China's military out
Speaker 2: of the Pacific Islands region, then I would argue UCUST
Speaker 2: does the opposite.
Speaker 1: Job coming up. What would it take for Australia to
Speaker 1: walk away from Aucust? So sam, this running government is
Speaker 1: going to pretty big lengths here to try and stop
Speaker 1: China from having any sort of military base in the Pacific.
Speaker 1: What would it mean for us as a country if
Speaker 1: we were to fail on that front and a Pacific
Speaker 1: island nation decided that they would allow China to set
Speaker 1: up a base.
Speaker 2: Well, one base in the Pacific Islands region would be
Speaker 2: a squadron of maritime patrol aircraft or potentially a small
Speaker 2: floatilla with a destroyer and a replenishmentship or something similar.
Speaker 2: That would be irritating for Australia. But if there were
Speaker 2: several Chinese military bases in our region, well that's more
Speaker 2: than an irritant. That's then a direct threat to Australia
Speaker 2: because they can be mutually reinforcing, and in wartime they
Speaker 2: could actually be used to threaten the Australian land mass
Speaker 2: and the military bases on our soil, so we'd have
Speaker 2: to beef up our defenses substantially to deal with something
Speaker 2: like that, and so on that level. The diplomatic effort
Speaker 2: that we're making right now is really smart and really
Speaker 2: good because we're making a relatively small diplomatic investment in
Speaker 2: trying to prevent something that would be extremely expensive to
Speaker 2: counteract if we didn't make that diplomatic effort.
Speaker 1: Okay, So while we do that, though, we are also,
Speaker 1: as you say, pursuing ORCAS. You mentioned the submarines and
Speaker 1: their bases that will come with that agreement. Tell me
Speaker 1: more about the capacity of those submarines.
Speaker 2: At the heart of ORCAS is an agreement to supply
Speaker 2: Australia with eight nuclear powered submarines. Important distress, nuclear powered,
Speaker 2: not nuclear armed. Australia is not beging to become a
Speaker 2: nuclear armed country. But these boats would be powered by
Speaker 2: nuclear reactors, which means they have basically infinite range and
Speaker 2: infinite endurance. That's a really potent capability to have if
Speaker 2: your plan is to operate off the Chinese coast alongside
Speaker 2: the US Navy. Right, if you want to simply defend
Speaker 2: the Australian land mass, you know there's a huge opportunity
Speaker 2: cost because they're incredibly expensive. So a very potent capability,
Speaker 2: but a capability that generates interest raises Chinese awareness of us.
Speaker 2: The time to attack a nuclear powered submarine is before
Speaker 2: it goes underwater. The time to do that is in port.
Speaker 2: And so these facilities, the one we're building in Western
Speaker 2: Australia and the one we're proposing to build on the
Speaker 2: East coast, it'll probably be in Port Kembler, those are
Speaker 2: going to be targets for China.
Speaker 1: Right, So you're making the argument that ORCAS ultimately makes
Speaker 1: us less safe in Australia because it makes us more
Speaker 1: of a target to China. So what do you think
Speaker 1: it would take for the Australian government to walk away
Speaker 1: from the deal?
Speaker 2: I think it's possible to imagine a kind of crisis
Speaker 2: that may have been unimaginable under the previous administration. So
Speaker 2: when you consider the way that Trump has treated Zelenski,
Speaker 2: the way he has treated the Canadian government, for instance,
Speaker 2: the South African government as well India, more recently came
Speaker 2: in for some really rough treatment from the Trump administration.
Speaker 2: It's not at all silly to see a crisis occurring
Speaker 2: in the bilateral relationship that sours Australia on the Orchest deal.
Speaker 2: A crisis that could have nothing to do with defense.
Speaker 2: It could be to do with our pharmaceutical benefit scheme,
Speaker 2: for instance, or some other economic or trade measure. It
Speaker 2: could be to do with the sale of iron ore
Speaker 2: to China. It's easy to imagine various scenarios where the
Speaker 2: Americans just say no, sorry, We're not going to put
Speaker 2: up with this anymore. So the scope for a crisis
Speaker 2: is much wider now than it's ever been under any
Speaker 2: previous administration, and that could cause Australia to reconsider. But nevertheless,
Speaker 2: I think the more likely possibility is that cancelation of
Speaker 2: at least the American portion of the submarine deal that's
Speaker 2: initiated by the United States rather than by US. The
Speaker 2: American shipbuilding enterprise is in a bad way and they
Speaker 2: are having trouble ramping up their submarine production. They have
Speaker 2: an ambition to have sixty six submarines of their own
Speaker 2: by the middle of the century. They're currently behind to
Speaker 2: achieve that. So it's a really big question whether they
Speaker 2: can even meet their own audiobook, never mind adding the
Speaker 2: three or maybe as many as five submarines for Australia
Speaker 2: as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah, publicly, at least, you only ever hear the Australian
Speaker 1: government being supportive of the Orcus arrangement. But do you
Speaker 1: think that there is some disquiet.
Speaker 2: Well, there is simply no political motivation or incentive for
Speaker 2: anyone in the Labor Party to break away at the moment.
Speaker 2: There is still a fear I think in the Labor
Speaker 2: Party of looking soft on national security and a kind
Speaker 2: of a breakaway, a big dramatic break from Orcus, would
Speaker 2: open up that territory again for the opposition, and I
Speaker 2: think that scares the.
Speaker 1: Government and so in not wanting to appear a week
Speaker 1: on national security, in your view, we are becoming ultimately weaker.
Speaker 2: I'm yet to persuade ministers in the government, but that
Speaker 2: is certainly my view. Yeah, there are safer and less
Speaker 2: provocative ways for Australia to defend itself. I wrote a
Speaker 2: book a couple of years ago called the Ekidne Strategy.
Speaker 2: You know, the metaphor of the Echidna is that you
Speaker 2: look safe and unthreatening to those that mean you no harm,
Speaker 2: but you look prickly and undigestible to those that do.
Speaker 2: What I'm arguing for is for Australia to adopt a
Speaker 2: defense strategy that is purely defensive. So again the ekidna
Speaker 2: metaphor is useful here because an ekidna doesn't go out
Speaker 2: looking for enemies. It's not a hunter, but you wouldn't
Speaker 2: want to mess with it because it can end badly
Speaker 2: for you if you try to attack it, because it's
Speaker 2: prickly and it's hard to digest. It's a strategy that
Speaker 2: makes it extremely painful and costly and difficult for an
Speaker 2: adversary to operate in the air and maritime approaches around Australia.
Speaker 2: But it's not an approach that is any threat to them.
Speaker 2: And so what that means essentially for Australia is that
Speaker 2: we need a defense force that is really good at
Speaker 2: shooting down missiles and aircraft if they ever come at us,
Speaker 2: and sinking ships if they ever come at us. Now,
Speaker 2: you need various ways to do all those things, but
Speaker 2: that is an affordable defense strategy for in Australia. It's
Speaker 2: even one that we can afford in the event that
Speaker 2: we don't get as much help from the Americans as
Speaker 2: we might currently be relying on. And I think that
Speaker 2: is a future that we need to plan for.
Speaker 1: Well, Sam, thank you so much for your time today.
Speaker 2: I appreciate it. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1: Also in the news today, the ABC has been ordered
Speaker 1: to pay one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for unlawfully
Speaker 1: sacking journalist Antonette Latouf after she shared a Human Rights
Speaker 1: Watch post on Gaza. The penalty has been levied in
Speaker 1: the Federal court, which found the public broadcaster breached workplace
Speaker 1: law when it sacked miss Latoufe from her casual role
Speaker 1: on ABC Radio Sydney's Mornings program in twenty twenty three.
Speaker 1: The ABC has twenty eight days to pay the fine,
Speaker 1: which comes in addition to the seventy thousand dollars in
Speaker 1: damages she was previously awarded. And the Palestinian Envoy at
Speaker 1: the United Nations has used his address to the Security
Speaker 1: Council to plead for humanitarian aid access to Gaza. Riard
Speaker 1: Mansau told the Council that women and children have been
Speaker 1: the primary targets of Israeli military action in Gaza and
Speaker 1: are the most vulnerable. It comes as one hundred and
Speaker 1: fifty seven UN member states have recognized the State of
Speaker 1: Palestine as a sovereign nation.
Speaker 2: I'm Ruby Jones.
Speaker 1: This is seven am. Thanks for listening.