WEBVTT - Labor’s guilt in the Triple Zero failures

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Daniel James and you're listening to seven AM. Another

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<v Speaker 1>major Taalco outage has raised the question what happens when

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<v Speaker 1>you call triple zero and the call doesn't get through.

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<v Speaker 1>This week, Telstra blamed a software the Effect for a

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<v Speaker 1>national outage that disrupted phones, payments and transport and left

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<v Speaker 1>more than three hundred Triple zero calls failing or unable

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<v Speaker 1>to connect. The Communications Watchdog is now investigating, but this

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<v Speaker 1>isn't the first time Australia has been here. Last year,

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<v Speaker 1>Optus had his own catastrophic failure after a thirteen hour

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<v Speaker 1>outage bole hundreds of emergency calls across South Australia, Western

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<v Speaker 1>Australia and the Northern Territory and was linked to deaths

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<v Speaker 1>AKIMA opened an investigation into Optus, but still hasn't published

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<v Speaker 1>final findings. So today we're bringing you Ruby Jones's conversation

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<v Speaker 1>from last year with journalists and Crikey contributor Michael Sainsbury,

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<v Speaker 1>What went wrong in Optics and how the government's choices

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<v Speaker 1>let us hear? It's Sunday, July twelfth. This episode was

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<v Speaker 1>originally published in September twenty twenty five.

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<v Speaker 2>So Michael last week, hundreds of Australians discovered that they

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<v Speaker 2>couldn't get through when they tried to call Triple zero

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<v Speaker 2>with catastrophic and we now know some fatal consequences. So

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<v Speaker 2>tell me about what we know about what was happening

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<v Speaker 2>with Optus's network while this was going on.

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<v Speaker 3>So it was just a regular network up bro and

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<v Speaker 3>the telto networks thirty thousands of these a week, so

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<v Speaker 3>there's all sorts of stuff they're doing every day. There's

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<v Speaker 3>obviously thousands of base stations across the country. They're very

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<v Speaker 3>sophisticated software systems that connect those things to the fiber

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<v Speaker 3>optics underground, to the big computers that go out to

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<v Speaker 3>your phone. So that's very very complex networks and there's

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<v Speaker 3>always stuff going on. This was a regular sort of

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<v Speaker 3>upgrade that went wrong.

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<v Speaker 4>Today it was revealed the deadly outage the result of

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<v Speaker 4>a botch firewall upgrade that lasted thirteen hours. Six hundred

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<v Speaker 4>customers across three states without access to Triple zero.

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<v Speaker 3>The outage only affected people in the Northern Territory, Western

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<v Speaker 3>Australia and South Australia. Initially, they thought it affected about

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<v Speaker 3>six hundred calls made to emergency.

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<v Speaker 5>Services good evening.

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<v Speaker 6>We have a major story developing as we go to wear.

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<v Speaker 6>Just moments ago, we learned that three people have died

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<v Speaker 6>during a major Optus network outage that affected triple zero calls.

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<v Speaker 3>Something in their processes was either bad, could have been

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<v Speaker 3>a badly written piece of software, or it could just

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<v Speaker 3>have been a very simple human era where things just

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<v Speaker 3>weren't followed properly and weren't checked. If it had been

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<v Speaker 3>a national thing, again, that may have been picked up

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<v Speaker 3>more quickly by system.

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<v Speaker 5>But do those systems have enough red flags? It sounds

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<v Speaker 5>like they.

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<v Speaker 2>Don't, okay, And I mean you can see how these

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<v Speaker 2>things might happen, but you would assume that in the

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<v Speaker 2>case of human error or a bad update that there

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<v Speaker 2>would be a backup, something would kick in if a

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<v Speaker 2>network you know isn't working like this, particularly when it

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<v Speaker 2>comes to triple zero calls.

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<v Speaker 1>So what should have.

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<v Speaker 3>Happened, Well, there is actually a backup across all of

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<v Speaker 3>the networks in Australia where if for some reason your

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<v Speaker 3>networks aren't connecting to the Triple O system, the calls.

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<v Speaker 5>Will be routed into Celster or voter phone so they

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<v Speaker 5>can access that system.

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<v Speaker 3>Now, the Triple O system is actually run by Chelster

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<v Speaker 3>under contract to the government, so all the calls go

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<v Speaker 3>into a call center Chelster, which is known as Triple

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<v Speaker 3>O or the Emergency Call Person. Officially, what seems to

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<v Speaker 3>have happened is that the customers and office were able

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<v Speaker 3>to call make normal calls, but they weren't able to

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<v Speaker 3>make Triple zero calls, and this wasn't flagged immediately. There

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<v Speaker 3>were also people who rang and at least five people,

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<v Speaker 3>possibly more, rang off just call centers to tell them

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<v Speaker 3>that the Triple O wasn't working. And again there was

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<v Speaker 3>a failure of process there that that wasn't escalated straight away.

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<v Speaker 4>The customers tried five times to warn the company that

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<v Speaker 4>emergency calls were not going through.

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<v Speaker 1>In the past few hours, Optus has confirmed those complaints

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<v Speaker 1>were received by its offshore call centers.

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<v Speaker 3>Now, I was foken just an engineer upon the other

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<v Speaker 3>networks and he said, look the Triple O. When they've

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<v Speaker 3>got a checklist of network up drags, TRIPLO is absolutely

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<v Speaker 3>the top of the list. It should be the first

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<v Speaker 3>thing that's checked in, double checked before anything happens, and

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<v Speaker 3>that didn't happen.

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<v Speaker 2>So in the wake of all of this, there are

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of questions being asked about Optis and about

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<v Speaker 2>its governance. So tell me about the company and how

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<v Speaker 2>it is responding to this particular outage.

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<v Speaker 3>Most people probably know it's the second biggest Solcone Australia.

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<v Speaker 3>It's the second biggest mobile network its own and by

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<v Speaker 3>Singaporretegal Communications, so it's not a publicly listed company in

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<v Speaker 3>Australia and Singapore. Cheltroms is owned by Singapore government, so

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<v Speaker 3>ultimately Singapore's responsible for everything that happens at Optus. But

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<v Speaker 3>this is not the first time this has happened. This

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<v Speaker 3>happened with Optus two years ago.

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<v Speaker 1>We have more on that.

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<v Speaker 6>Breaking news on the massive Optus outage.

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<v Speaker 4>Ten million Optors customers are still without mobile and broadband

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<v Speaker 4>services amid a massive nationwide outage.

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<v Speaker 1>There is a lot developing.

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<v Speaker 5>There was a government inquiry.

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<v Speaker 4>The Federal government has released the terms of reference of

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<v Speaker 4>an investigation into this month's major Optis outage.

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<v Speaker 5>The eighteen recommendations handed down.

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<v Speaker 7>At its core is ensuring the integrity of the Triple zero.

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<v Speaker 2>Service and that it continues to operate effectively in the

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<v Speaker 2>interests of all Australians.

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<v Speaker 5>That process hasn't been finished properly.

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<v Speaker 3>Only about two thirds of those recommendations been implemented in

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<v Speaker 3>some of the key ones had not been implemented. And

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<v Speaker 3>then a year before that outage, they had that dreadful

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<v Speaker 3>a breach where the data about nine million people was stolen.

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<v Speaker 3>The head of OPTAs says she is devastated by the

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<v Speaker 3>cyber attack which has potentially compromised the personal information of

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<v Speaker 3>nearly ten million customers. Octus now has got very much

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<v Speaker 3>a reputation of being a company that is kind of

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<v Speaker 3>making some big technical fails every couple of years. Stephen

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<v Speaker 3>Rue is the CEO. He was brought in about nine

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<v Speaker 3>months ago. They got rid of the last CEO who

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<v Speaker 3>was in charge of those last two disasters. He came

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<v Speaker 3>from NBN, so he's pretty familiar with self communications networks

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<v Speaker 3>and he's pretty familiar with dealing with government, so it's

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<v Speaker 3>kind of a dent in his record early on.

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<v Speaker 7>I want to offer a sincere apology to all customers

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<v Speaker 7>who could not connect to emergency services when they needed

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<v Speaker 7>them most.

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<v Speaker 5>But nine months is not a hell of a lot

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<v Speaker 5>of time in a big company like opt just to

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<v Speaker 5>fix things.

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<v Speaker 3>There's obviously some deep seated cultural problems of just that

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<v Speaker 3>allow these sorts of process issues to happen.

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<v Speaker 2>Nevertheless, we did hear the Prime Minister Anthony Albanezi saying

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<v Speaker 2>that he would be surprised if Stephen Rue the CEO,

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<v Speaker 2>wasn't considering his position.

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<v Speaker 4>I'd be surprised if that wasn't occurring.

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<v Speaker 2>We also heard from the Communications Minister Annika Wells talking

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<v Speaker 2>about accountability and consequences. Optis and all telecommunications providers have

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<v Speaker 2>obligations under Australian law to make sure emergency services calls

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<v Speaker 2>go through. The South Australian Premier Peter Melanaskis called it

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<v Speaker 2>in competence.

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<v Speaker 8>I mean the fact that Optis were crafting media statements

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<v Speaker 8>and arranging press conferences.

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<v Speaker 4>Without alerting Satisfraine Animalance Service.

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<v Speaker 2>About this, tell me what you make of the political response.

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<v Speaker 5>It was pretty fast and it's pretty brutal.

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<v Speaker 3>Look, people die, so I think political leaders feels that

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<v Speaker 3>they have to react. But we we are, as you know,

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<v Speaker 3>living in a world where it's very much buying first,

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<v Speaker 3>asked questions later, and I just don't think it's terribly

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<v Speaker 3>helpful when you've got politicians, you know, talking about significant consequences.

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<v Speaker 5>They want to sound tough there's a whole.

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<v Speaker 3>Lot of legislation around these sorts of things, and there

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<v Speaker 3>are some pretty hefty fines that the companies can get,

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<v Speaker 3>and I think I've just has been fined ten and

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<v Speaker 3>twelve million dollars I think for the last two of

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<v Speaker 3>it's problems.

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<v Speaker 5>That being said, for big companies like.

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<v Speaker 3>These, with billions of dollars of revenue every year, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>those sorts of fines are kind of slaps on the

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<v Speaker 3>wrist too. So we've seen problems in banking, we've seen

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<v Speaker 3>problems with quonscious and there's been some pretty hefty fines,

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<v Speaker 3>but they don't really make a big dent in those

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<v Speaker 3>big companies. But this triple zero problem keeps coming up.

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<v Speaker 3>And when governments tend to just coast along and people.

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<v Speaker 5>Say, well, yeah, this is very serious.

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<v Speaker 3>People could die, one dies, nothing seems to happen, so

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<v Speaker 3>they tend to be very reactive, and I think it's

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<v Speaker 3>probably time that the government had a bit of a

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<v Speaker 3>bigger look at this. So you've got in action by

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<v Speaker 3>the government on quite a lot of things as well

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<v Speaker 3>as the chilkos. So it's really it's kind of a

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<v Speaker 3>joint responsibility in a lot of ways. But Ultimately, for

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<v Speaker 3>something as critical as this, the government kind of got

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<v Speaker 3>to be the last person.

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<v Speaker 2>Standing coming up. Why the government is dragging its feet

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<v Speaker 2>on recommendations that could have prevented this. Michael, I want

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<v Speaker 2>to talk a little more about the government's role here,

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<v Speaker 2>because while it is clear that Optus failed, what is

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<v Speaker 2>the government's responsibility in ensuring that triple zero calls can

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<v Speaker 2>always get through?

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<v Speaker 3>Once upon a time, it wasn't till very long ago

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<v Speaker 3>we had one chelco, which was Telecom Australia that Turenne

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<v Speaker 3>a Telstra.

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<v Speaker 4>Last year, Australia's Telecom invested more in Australia and Australian

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<v Speaker 4>made products than any other company.

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<v Speaker 3>It was privatized into how government competition was introduced before that,

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<v Speaker 3>which is how we got Optus, and we've had a

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<v Speaker 3>reasonably competitive environment in the telecommunications sector, although the incumbent

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<v Speaker 3>still is the one that makes all profits. But yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>these sorts of critical infrastructure services like telecommunications energy, there

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<v Speaker 3>was a lot of privatization that went on without enough

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<v Speaker 3>accountability coming back. I mean, we did have the inquiry

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<v Speaker 3>into Optus, but the fact that eighteen months after that,

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<v Speaker 3>all of those recommendations have not been fulfilled it's supposed

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<v Speaker 3>to have occurred.

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<v Speaker 5>They haven't, and this is all about a lack of urgency.

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<v Speaker 3>I think most of the funding for triple zero comes

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<v Speaker 3>either directly from the government or from a government levy

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<v Speaker 3>that's from the telcos, So that triple zero stuff, he's

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<v Speaker 3>actually government responsibility and improving that system.

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<v Speaker 5>Was part of what came out of that. The previous

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<v Speaker 5>office ATAGE.

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<v Speaker 3>And the government you know, let it linger, and so

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<v Speaker 3>I think they do bear some responsibility here.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, tell me more about that. As you say, when

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<v Speaker 2>this happened in the past, it triggered an inquiry, the

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<v Speaker 2>Bean Review.

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<v Speaker 1>So why do you think.

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<v Speaker 2>It is that that has not resulted in the change

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<v Speaker 2>that would be needed to have prevented what has just occurred.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, there are eighteen recommendations about a whole bunch of stuff.

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<v Speaker 3>The harder stuff was still not being implemented, particularly this

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<v Speaker 3>setting up of the Triplo custodian inside the department, and

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<v Speaker 3>that to me seems like a really tea recommendation that

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<v Speaker 3>you've actually got someone that is really having a good

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<v Speaker 3>look at the system, talking to the telcos making sure

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<v Speaker 3>their testing is right.

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<v Speaker 5>Now.

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<v Speaker 3>I think anacot Well said that has been set up,

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<v Speaker 3>but it's actually not yet underway. What that actually means

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<v Speaker 3>I don't know, but clearly it's not working yet and

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<v Speaker 3>you would think that eighteen months after something like that happened.

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<v Speaker 3>For that not to be in place after eight months,

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<v Speaker 3>I think is that's a little bit of a shame

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<v Speaker 3>you on the government and.

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<v Speaker 2>The Communications Minister Annaka Wells. She's fairly new to that portfolio,

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<v Speaker 2>so what sense do you get of her of how

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<v Speaker 2>likely she is to look into these issues.

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<v Speaker 5>Well, certainly to sharpen up her interest in the portfolio.

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<v Speaker 3>Look, people inside the sector have said that she's not

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<v Speaker 3>as engaged with the sector as the previous minister, who

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<v Speaker 3>did have a background in telecoms. Indeed, if you look

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<v Speaker 3>back to the previous ministers, we had Paul Fletcher for

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<v Speaker 3>quite some time in the coalition government before, Mishare Royland,

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<v Speaker 3>Mitch Firefield before him, and Malcolm Turnbull. All of those

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<v Speaker 3>people did have quite a lot of experience or background

0:12:59.679 --> 0:13:01.320
<v Speaker 3>in either tell coos or technology.

0:13:02.400 --> 0:13:03.720
<v Speaker 5>Amateur Wealth doesn't.

0:13:03.400 --> 0:13:05.760
<v Speaker 3>Have any of that experience and tell thoms is a

0:13:05.840 --> 0:13:08.800
<v Speaker 3>very very very complex business. I mean, as we've talked

0:13:08.800 --> 0:13:12.120
<v Speaker 3>about this, with a mobile network then you've got landline

0:13:12.160 --> 0:13:15.640
<v Speaker 3>networkson that, you've got to run internet services. There's customer

0:13:15.720 --> 0:13:19.640
<v Speaker 3>call centers, there's marketing, there's office and talks to have

0:13:19.640 --> 0:13:23.120
<v Speaker 3>a bunch of shops. So they're vertically integrated businesses with

0:13:23.240 --> 0:13:26.960
<v Speaker 3>lots of different moving parts. And it requires a very

0:13:27.200 --> 0:13:33.319
<v Speaker 3>engaged minister and staff and department to make sure that

0:13:33.600 --> 0:13:38.920
<v Speaker 3>the companies that are looking after telecommunications are doing their

0:13:39.000 --> 0:13:43.080
<v Speaker 3>jobs properly. And this incident, and it's such a dreadful

0:13:43.120 --> 0:13:47.679
<v Speaker 3>thing when you know people are dead because infrastructure fails.

0:13:48.160 --> 0:13:51.800
<v Speaker 3>But this incident really should make I think the government

0:13:52.200 --> 0:13:55.800
<v Speaker 3>have a very good look at what's happening in teller communications.

0:13:56.440 --> 0:13:59.400
<v Speaker 3>It's always been problematic because we have such a huge

0:13:59.440 --> 0:14:05.959
<v Speaker 3>country with not too many people, so it's expensive compared

0:14:05.960 --> 0:14:09.959
<v Speaker 3>to somewhere like Hong Kong or Singapore to provide communications

0:14:09.960 --> 0:14:11.200
<v Speaker 3>infrastructure in Australia.

0:14:15.200 --> 0:14:16.439
<v Speaker 5>The only thing that can stop this.

0:14:16.480 --> 0:14:21.160
<v Speaker 3>Happening is for companies like Office and Telster and votifone

0:14:21.160 --> 0:14:25.200
<v Speaker 3>and the other big telecommunications companies TPG to make sure

0:14:25.480 --> 0:14:28.520
<v Speaker 3>all their processes work, to make sure they've got fail

0:14:28.680 --> 0:14:31.560
<v Speaker 3>safe and back up and all that sort of thing.

0:14:31.680 --> 0:14:34.000
<v Speaker 3>And let's just look at it through what happened with

0:14:34.040 --> 0:14:38.000
<v Speaker 3>the NBN. Yeah, successive governments were very frustrated that the

0:14:38.040 --> 0:14:42.000
<v Speaker 3>big telecommunications companies weren't rolling up out fast enough broadband

0:14:42.800 --> 0:14:45.400
<v Speaker 3>quickly enough, so they took the decision.

0:14:44.960 --> 0:14:47.800
<v Speaker 5>In the end to use public money to build the NBN.

0:14:48.560 --> 0:14:50.400
<v Speaker 5>Perhaps they need to have.

0:14:50.280 --> 0:14:54.480
<v Speaker 3>A look at the mobile networks as well, which would

0:14:54.480 --> 0:14:58.400
<v Speaker 3>take a lot of the pain away from companies trying

0:14:58.440 --> 0:15:00.880
<v Speaker 3>to service a handful of people very far away that

0:15:00.960 --> 0:15:03.680
<v Speaker 3>puts a lot of money, and just to take some

0:15:03.760 --> 0:15:06.720
<v Speaker 3>of that financial pressure off the networks so they can

0:15:06.800 --> 0:15:09.560
<v Speaker 3>really focus on getting these things right, the things that

0:15:09.600 --> 0:15:10.520
<v Speaker 3>they're supposed.

0:15:10.200 --> 0:15:11.480
<v Speaker 5>To be doing well.

0:15:11.520 --> 0:15:13.040
<v Speaker 2>Michael, thank you so much for your time.

0:15:13.440 --> 0:15:14.160
<v Speaker 5>Thank you very much.

0:15:14.200 --> 0:15:25.000
<v Speaker 1>Really seven I am. We'll be back tomorrow with an

0:15:25.000 --> 0:15:28.920
<v Speaker 1>interview with New York Times journalist Jonathan Swann. He's revealing

0:15:28.960 --> 0:15:31.840
<v Speaker 1>your book, co authored by Maggie Haberman, takes us inside

0:15:31.880 --> 0:15:34.920
<v Speaker 1>Donald Trump's second term, a presidency that he says is

0:15:34.960 --> 0:15:39.960
<v Speaker 1>more disciplined, more secretive, and more dangerous than the first when.

0:15:39.760 --> 0:15:42.600
<v Speaker 8>You understand it through the lens of you know, I

0:15:42.600 --> 0:15:45.400
<v Speaker 8>want to be Napoleon. I'm being slightly glipped saying that,

0:15:45.480 --> 0:15:47.920
<v Speaker 8>but not really I want to be the capital g

0:15:47.920 --> 0:15:51.000
<v Speaker 8>great man of history of our time. I want to

0:15:51.080 --> 0:15:55.080
<v Speaker 8>expand the American land mass, make Venezuela into a fifty

0:15:55.120 --> 0:15:58.760
<v Speaker 8>first state with a pliant leader who's more like a governor.

0:15:59.160 --> 0:16:03.440
<v Speaker 8>Take their oil, reshape ran, take greenland, you know whatever.

0:16:03.640 --> 0:16:06.200
<v Speaker 8>You start to understand why he's willing to roll the

0:16:06.240 --> 0:16:08.920
<v Speaker 8>dice in the way that he's rolling the dice this term,

0:16:08.960 --> 0:16:11.080
<v Speaker 8>which he certainly wasn't willing to do it the first time.

0:16:11.400 --> 0:16:13.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm Daniel James. Thanks for listening.