Speaker 1: While the world focuses on the war underway in Iran, Israel,
Speaker 1: and the Gulf, there's another front Lebanon. Israel unleashed another
Speaker 1: wave of intense strikes on the capitol overnight.
Speaker 2: One flattened an apartment building in the center of Beirut.
Speaker 1: Lebanon's Iranian BacT Shia group Hezbola, attacked Israel after a
Speaker 1: joint US Israeli air strike killed Iran supreme leader Iatola
Speaker 1: Ali Hamena. Hesbila launched around two hundred missiles at northern
Speaker 1: Israel overnight in a coordinated attack with Iran, which launched
Speaker 1: four ballistic missiles Salvos. Israel then hit back, bombing bea
Speaker 1: route and domessing tens of thousands of troops on the border.
Speaker 3: Israeli military has announced it began quote focused ground operations
Speaker 3: in southern Lebanon.
Speaker 1: I'm Nicole Johnston and you're listening to seven AM today
Speaker 1: Michael Young, editor of Carnegie's Middle East Center, blog on Lebanon.
Speaker 1: Is it facing a ground invasion and what is Israel's
Speaker 1: plan to reshape the region. It's Friday, March twenty Michael,
Speaker 1: You're in Beirute and living in the middle of this war.
Speaker 1: How are you holding up and what impact is it
Speaker 1: having on daily life.
Speaker 2: Well, we have to understand that the war in Lebanon
Speaker 2: is you know, two countries side by side. Many people
Speaker 2: are not living in areas, and I'm one of them,
Speaker 2: are not living in areas that are being bombed. Having
Speaker 2: said that, the Israelis have bombed within Beirute, for example,
Speaker 2: in recent hours they bombed areas not far from here.
Speaker 2: Israel's government promised retaliation has bon as intensified drone and
Speaker 2: rocket attacks.
Speaker 3: This was it a residential building in Central Bay Route raised.
Speaker 2: But by and large, the Israeli attacks have taken place
Speaker 2: primarily against areas where they say Hezuela is stationed, which
Speaker 2: basically means primarily Shia areas of concentration. So it's a
Speaker 2: tale of two countries. Part of the country is living
Speaker 2: more or less a normal life, I mean as normal
Speaker 2: as can be. But part of the country is being
Speaker 2: devastated by the Israeli attacks and you have you know,
Speaker 2: Abidian displaced from these areas.
Speaker 4: The humanitarian situation and Lebanon has spiraled from a crisis
Speaker 4: into a full blown catastrophe. That's how aid workers on
Speaker 4: the ground are describing the dire situation with more than
Speaker 4: a million people forced out of their homes.
Speaker 1: So could you take us back a little bit to
Speaker 1: how Lebanon's militant group has Belah ended up entering the wall.
Speaker 1: I mean, couldn't they have just set it out? Why
Speaker 1: did they decide to get involved in this war?
Speaker 2: Well, I don't think this was a Haswela decision. I
Speaker 2: think this was an Iranian decision by a large Many,
Speaker 2: including many Shiah, did not want to enter this war.
Speaker 2: But it was clear that because of the ties between
Speaker 2: Hasbala and Iran, it was almost impossible for Hasbala not
Speaker 2: to enter the war. And we have to understand that
Speaker 2: in twenty twenty four, Hasbalala's military leadership as well as
Speaker 2: its political leadership, was devastated by the Israelis.
Speaker 3: Israelly military says that it has assassinated all of these
Speaker 3: senior Hasbala commanders. So just how has this Israeli campaign
Speaker 3: been able to penetrate Hasbala security.
Speaker 2: The Israelis killed its secretary General Hassan Masraala, they killed
Speaker 2: two of his likely successors. So since that time, it
Speaker 2: seems that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard have taken a much
Speaker 2: more direct control of the organization, and given the close
Speaker 2: coordination between Iran and Husbalah, there also appears to be
Speaker 2: even sort of tactical coordination between the two. In other words,
Speaker 2: when Iran launches missiles from Iran, it's coordinating these launchers
Speaker 2: with the launchers from Lebanon. So the decision to enter
Speaker 2: the war was very much an Iranian decision, And there
Speaker 2: are rumors in Beirut that actually the political leadership of Hasbalah,
Speaker 2: even the Secretary General Naim Krassem, that they did not
Speaker 2: want Hasbala to enter the conflict.
Speaker 1: And for some of our listeners, could you actually give
Speaker 1: us some background on who is Hesblah and how much
Speaker 1: they've been weakened over the last few years of war
Speaker 1: with Israel.
Speaker 2: What Haswell is essentially a military political organization that the
Speaker 2: Iranians essentially organized in Lebanon basically emerged in the nineteen
Speaker 2: eighties and played a key role during the nineteen nineties
Speaker 2: in fighting Israeli occupation of southern and Hasbullah in the
Speaker 2: last two and a half decades has emerged in a
Speaker 2: way as a symbol of growing Shia power in Lebanon.
Speaker 2: The party has you know, played a very key role
Speaker 2: in the Lebanese state, I would say, in almost imposing
Speaker 2: hegemonic control over the Lebanese state in the last fifteen years.
Speaker 2: So in a way, many shiah identified with Hasbala because
Speaker 2: in the sectarian Lebanese system, has Bala gave them a
Speaker 2: great deal of influence and a great deal of power.
Speaker 2: But Haswola has been weakened in twenty twenty four, it
Speaker 2: suffered a major defeat. But we shouldn't overestimate this because
Speaker 2: it's anchored in a in one of Lebanon's larger communities.
Speaker 2: The party has been able to a certain extent. It
Speaker 2: seems to continue paying its combatants and to re arm
Speaker 2: in such a way that today it seems that they
Speaker 2: are surprising the Israeles in terms of their firepower.
Speaker 1: Now, Michael, as you were saying, there's division within Hesbela
Speaker 1: among Lebanon's political leaders about whether or not to be
Speaker 1: involved in this war, but clearly they're in the war. Now.
Speaker 1: Is it tearing the country apart politically? And do you
Speaker 1: think there are any signs at all that the Lebanese
Speaker 1: army would ever end up fighting Hesbela.
Speaker 2: Well, it's not. We're not at a stage yet where
Speaker 2: it's tearing the country up. There are deep divisions within
Speaker 2: the country. But we have to understand that Lebanon went
Speaker 2: through a very, very bloody civil war between nineteen seventy
Speaker 2: five and nineteen ninety. This was once the richest part
Speaker 2: of the richest city in the Middle East. Now it's
Speaker 2: the front line of the war in the Lebanon and
Speaker 2: there is great reluctance within the country to go back
Speaker 2: to such a situation. We had an economic collapse in
Speaker 2: twenty nineteen.
Speaker 5: Twenty twenty, Lebanon has grappled with its worst economic crisis
Speaker 5: in modern history. It's pushed tens of thousands of people
Speaker 5: into poverty and triggered the largest anti government protests in
Speaker 5: more than a decade.
Speaker 2: Most Lebinese are worried about declining standard of living. I mean,
Speaker 2: there are many many problems in the country. One thing
Speaker 2: we certainly did not need was a new war. So
Speaker 2: there is a great deal of anger that Hasbala has
Speaker 2: once again carried Lebanon into a war with Israel. Now,
Speaker 2: with respect to the Lebinese army, we have to be realistic.
Speaker 2: For the Lebanese army to enter into a confrontation with Hasbulah. First,
Speaker 2: it does not have a decisive advantage that would allow
Speaker 2: it necessarily to prevail in such a conflict. Number one.
Speaker 2: Number two, we have to understand that entering into a
Speaker 2: military confrontation with Hasbula would entail entering really into a
Speaker 2: military confrontation with the Shiah community. Although there are many
Speaker 2: Shiah who may not be happy today with what Hasbulah
Speaker 2: has done, there is also a growth feeding in the
Speaker 2: community that it is a community under siege. So I
Speaker 2: think this would be disastrous for the army and for
Speaker 2: the Lebanese state.
Speaker 1: Michael. After the Gaza War, we had the ceasefire between
Speaker 1: Israel and Lebanon that required that Hesbela be disarmed and
Speaker 1: its forces pushed further north of the de facto border,
Speaker 1: north of an area known as the Latani River. Has
Speaker 1: any of that actually happened.
Speaker 2: This army has well lies different than what has happened
Speaker 2: up to now. The Lebanese army up to now has
Speaker 2: basically removed Heswolla weapons south of the Litani River, its
Speaker 2: emptied arms caches in that area. Maybe some still remain,
Speaker 2: but we have to understand that part of the problem
Speaker 2: is that the Lebanese army doesn't necessarily have good intelligence
Speaker 2: to identify all the arms caches of Heswola, but by
Speaker 2: and large the operation south of the Litani appears to
Speaker 2: have been fairly successful in terms of disarmy. Is the
Speaker 2: Lebanese army going to enter into mainly Shia areas of Lebanon,
Speaker 2: where Hezbullah is well armed and capable of defending itself,
Speaker 2: to basically disarm its members and empty its strategic arms caches,
Speaker 2: by which I mean missiles and longer term weapons. This
Speaker 2: would be a very different proposition than what we've seen
Speaker 2: up to now, and as I said earlier, I think
Speaker 2: the chances of succeeding would be much smaller, and I
Speaker 2: think the Lebanese state has to be aware that it
Speaker 2: would be a disaster if it could not win a
Speaker 2: confrontation with Heswala. It would be disastrous for the state,
Speaker 2: for the army, and it would only bolster Hesbula.
Speaker 1: Coming up. Will Israel invade Lebanon? Michael? So we now
Speaker 1: have this situation with Israel bombing by route Hasbal of
Speaker 1: firing rockets at Israel. What does Israel say that it's
Speaker 1: trying to achieve in Lebanon, and what do you think
Speaker 1: they're doing. What's their real aim?
Speaker 2: Well, this is a good question because up to now
Speaker 2: Eve and I have engaged in speculation, but it's very
Speaker 2: unclear what the Israelis want to do. We heard that
Speaker 2: Israel was mobilizing four hundred and fifty thousand soldiers for
Speaker 2: a possible entry into Lebanon, but this doesn't indicate that
Speaker 2: they're going to go through with that. There are Israeli
Speaker 2: units operating in Lebanon, advancing on certain areas, but it's
Speaker 2: not a major engagement. So the Israelis have said, for example,
Speaker 2: that all the area south of the Lithani, and then
Speaker 2: they added to that all the area south of the
Speaker 2: Zaharani River, which is north of the Litani, should be
Speaker 2: cleared out by the population. But up to now there
Speaker 2: doesn't seem to be enough troops to really take these areas.
Speaker 2: I know that within Israel there is a big debate
Speaker 2: on how far the Israeli military can go. We know
Speaker 2: this from you know, open press reports and commentaries by
Speaker 2: people who have been to Israel speaking to the military.
Speaker 2: But I really don't know what worries me and what
Speaker 2: I think we can say with a fair amount of
Speaker 2: certainty is that the Israelis will try to create a
Speaker 2: buffer zone, almost a killing zone, probably south of the
Speaker 2: Litani and basically say to the Lebanese we're staying in
Speaker 2: this area until you can clear disarmed Hazwalda. But if
Speaker 2: the Lebinese state cannot disarm Hasbala, then suddenly what the
Speaker 2: Israelis are effectively saying is We're going to hold on
Speaker 2: to Lebanese territory and you can manage north of this territory.
Speaker 2: It's up to you, you know, figure it out yourself.
Speaker 2: And in which case Lebanon would be left with a
Speaker 2: major problem with the displaced population. You would have sectarian
Speaker 2: tensions because much of the Shia population would have to
Speaker 2: basically live somewhere. The Lebanese state today is very weak,
Speaker 2: it's bankrupt, so you know, you would have a host
Speaker 2: of problems for the Lebanese state, which has very limited
Speaker 2: means to resolve.
Speaker 1: Now the way this war is going, even if there's
Speaker 1: a ceasefire with Iran, do you think that the Lebanon
Speaker 1: Israel war that that front would continue And how do
Speaker 1: you see Israel using this crisis now? Is it an
Speaker 1: opportunity for them to try and totally redraw the regional
Speaker 1: security order.
Speaker 2: Look, I'm very skeptical about the Israeli ability to reshape
Speaker 2: the region. My own reading of the war with Iran
Speaker 2: is that it has been a failure in terms of
Speaker 2: the stated objectives at the start of the war. It
Speaker 2: was the idea of the Iran nuclear program, the ballistic
Speaker 2: missile program, and Iran's relationship with its regional allies or proxies.
Speaker 2: None of these objectives, to my mind, have been achieved.
Speaker 2: But certainly the war is not over, so we have
Speaker 2: to see ultimately where it leads. But I think redrawing
Speaker 2: is a big word. They are trying to create what
Speaker 2: they call buffer zones in Syria, in Lebanon, I think,
Speaker 2: in Lebanon, and in Gaza. But buffer zones mean what
Speaker 2: does it mean? It means basically, you enter into foreign
Speaker 2: countries or areas not controlled by Israel and you impose
Speaker 2: on these areas massive displacement destruction to create a buffer
Speaker 2: between your territory and any potential threat. Does this constitute
Speaker 2: redrawing the map of the region? As I said, I
Speaker 2: think that the Israelis felt that they could do this
Speaker 2: by bringing down the Iranian regime. I think this has
Speaker 2: failed and I think the United States is now beginning
Speaker 2: to realize that this operation with Iran may not be
Speaker 2: a successful one, so we shouldn't overstate I think the
Speaker 2: Israelis are very ambitious. They would like to impose hegemony
Speaker 2: as much as possible on the region, but the lack
Speaker 2: of a clear outcome in Iran doesn't show really their
Speaker 2: ability to do so. So I think that in the
Speaker 2: absence of this major transformation which they would like to impose,
Speaker 2: what we may see them do is fall back on
Speaker 2: sort of lesser objectives. But there is also a good
Speaker 2: chance that the Iranians will not stop bombing the Gulf
Speaker 2: States and Israel until there is acceptance that a ceasefire
Speaker 2: in Iran must also include a ceasefire in Lebanon.
Speaker 1: Michael, thank you so much for joining us.
Speaker 2: Thank you.
Speaker 1: Tomorrow on seven am, one nation's first real test since
Speaker 1: it's stunning rise in the polls.
Speaker 3: You know, these stupid politicians. What they go out and
Speaker 3: say they're in fear of one nation, callsed right across
Speaker 3: the whole country. Even this way, we've increased again in
Speaker 3: our polling.
Speaker 1: Some are predicting that this weekend's at South Australian election
Speaker 1: will be hit by an orange wave of One Nation voters,
Speaker 1: but will those poll numbers convert into actual votes. We
Speaker 1: chat with the editor of in Daily, Belinda Willis, on
Speaker 1: how South Australians are feeling and what the state election
Speaker 1: results could tell us about One Nation's chances of winning
Speaker 1: more seats across the country. I'm Nicole Johnston. This is
Speaker 1: seven AM Catulator
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