Speaker 1: Hi, I'm Daniel James and you're listening to seven Am.
Speaker 1: Australia is called in a perilous balancing act. This week,
Speaker 1: Anthony Alberezi met with Jijing Ping to stabilize ties with China,
Speaker 1: as leagues from Washington revealed the steep demands of our
Speaker 1: Defense Pact within the United States in the shadow of
Speaker 1: rising tensions over Taiwan. The question of where Australia stands
Speaker 1: and who we stand with has never been more complicated. Today,
Speaker 1: host of the ABC podcast Global Roaming, Hey miss McDonald,
Speaker 1: on how the Alberzi government is navigating our fraud alliances
Speaker 1: and whether we could be headed for war. It's Friday,
Speaker 1: July eighteenth. Hey a, missh thanks for speaking with me.
Speaker 1: It was interesting timing for the Prime Minister's meeting with
Speaker 1: Jiji Ping this week. It came just as we were
Speaker 1: expecting to hear how the Trump administration's review into the
Speaker 1: Orcat Agreement went. And while that wasn't released, there were
Speaker 1: leaks out of the Pentagon. So what do we know
Speaker 1: about what the review is likely to say at this stage?
Speaker 2: Yeah, So this is curious and I guess we have
Speaker 2: to take this with all the usual caveats, one being
Speaker 2: that they're leaks. We haven't seen what the report, the
Speaker 2: review suggested to the White House. And the other really
Speaker 2: big caveat is who knows what Donald Trump will do
Speaker 2: or will make of it. Ilbridge Colby is the guy
Speaker 2: that has conducted this review. He's someone that has expressed some,
Speaker 2: if not quite skepticism about orcas skepticism about the delivery
Speaker 2: of it.
Speaker 3: This is actually the single most important conventional military asset
Speaker 3: we have for a Taiwan fight or for a contest
Speaker 3: against the Chinese center on the first silent chain, which
Speaker 3: is conventional nuclear powered attack submarines, and we are talking
Speaker 3: about selling them. So my concern is why are we
Speaker 3: giving away this crowndewl asset when we most need it now?
Speaker 2: That is, if we believe the leaks. What Donald Trump
Speaker 2: might be asked to do is tell Australia to pay
Speaker 2: more for the submarines, the nuclear powered submarines, and to
Speaker 2: get a guarantee, an explicit guarantee from Australia that they
Speaker 2: would be used if America were to go into conflict
Speaker 2: with China, in particular over Taiwan on the side of
Speaker 2: the Americans.
Speaker 1: And while the Americans are reviewing Aucus. There's also been
Speaker 1: a lot of criticism of the deal here in Australia.
Speaker 1: So if we are to stick with it, how important
Speaker 1: is it for the Australian government to lay out exactly
Speaker 1: why they think ORCAS is the answer.
Speaker 2: Look, I think, to be fair, a lot of Australian politicians,
Speaker 2: both on the conservative side and the more progressive side,
Speaker 2: have laid out the reasons for UCAS. It's just that
Speaker 2: they tend not to be very explicit about what the
Speaker 2: threat is. It's China, It's China's role in our region,
Speaker 2: China's growth as a military power, its growth as a
Speaker 2: naval power. The concern is that, look, if China, for example,
Speaker 2: will tried to take Taiwan by force, that it might
Speaker 2: also disrupt trade in the South China Sea and that
Speaker 2: would have a profound impact on Australia immediately. Because we
Speaker 2: rely on trade both export and import. We have very
Speaker 2: limited long term fuel supplies. It would be very easy
Speaker 2: if you disrupted the trade routes to really make life
Speaker 2: very difficult for Australia in a pretty short space of time.
Speaker 2: The argument is that the nuclear powered submarines are the
Speaker 2: APEX predators of the sea, they can go further, they
Speaker 2: need less refueling. In fact, the nuclear fuel rods within
Speaker 2: them last for the lifetime of the submarine. That means
Speaker 2: that they need to come up to the surface less
Speaker 2: often to take air in to allow their systems to reenergize.
Speaker 2: It's less easy for China to know where our nuclear
Speaker 2: powered submarines are at any given time, and so that
Speaker 2: might make it more risky for them, for example, to
Speaker 2: launch an invasion of Taiwan. That purely and simply is
Speaker 2: the risk calculus.
Speaker 1: So if, as the League suggests, the US requests US
Speaker 1: to commit to using our submarines in the war over Taiwan,
Speaker 1: what do we know about where the Australian government stands
Speaker 1: on that.
Speaker 2: But weirdly, our government kind of stands where the US
Speaker 2: government stands, which is a place of relative strategic ambiguity.
Speaker 2: It's one of those weird foreign policy terms. What it
Speaker 2: means essentially is not committed either way. You will have
Speaker 2: heard Anthony Albanezi this week say well, Australia on the
Speaker 2: question of Taiwan, supports the status quo. We support the
Speaker 2: status quo by definition, we don't support any unilateral action.
Speaker 1: On Taiwan.
Speaker 2: That is no attempt by the mainland Chinese government to
Speaker 2: invade Taiwan. The United States position has always been in
Speaker 2: thisrategic ambiguity idea that you don't really say whether there's
Speaker 2: a security guarantee for Taiwan, but you give the Chinese
Speaker 2: the impression that there would be a very high cost
Speaker 2: if they attempted to take it.
Speaker 1: You said, the government is ambiguous on purpose when it
Speaker 1: comes to his position on Taiwan. But if China did
Speaker 1: invade Taiwan, what's the likelihood of us actually getting involved? Amish?
Speaker 2: I think that's a really good question, and I think
Speaker 2: it's one our leaders haven't clearly answered. I was really
Speaker 2: looking at the language from Anthony Albanezi this week during
Speaker 2: his visit.
Speaker 1: It kind of seemed to catch him off guard. The
Speaker 1: questions around that didn't the look.
Speaker 2: It's a vexed issue. It's a particularly vexed issue on
Speaker 2: the left of Australian politics because you know, there is
Speaker 2: a more dubvish approach amongst some of the senior labor
Speaker 2: figures today, but also some of the labor luminaries like
Speaker 2: keeping like Gareth Evans. You know, they do have these
Speaker 2: more nuanced positions on Taiwan. They you know, see these
Speaker 2: arguments from the Chinese about Taiwan being part of the Motherland.
Speaker 2: Some of the liberals seem to be more clear sighted
Speaker 2: about this. They say, this is exactly like Russia wanting Ukraine.
Speaker 2: This is a great power saying we're bigger and we
Speaker 2: have historical ties here and if we want them, we'll
Speaker 2: get them. I was in Taiwan recently and asked a
Speaker 2: question to someone about the possibility of China retaking Taiwan,
Speaker 2: and they picked me up actually on the language and said,
Speaker 2: what do you mean, retake Taiwan? Communists, China can't retake
Speaker 2: Taiwan because it never held it in the first place.
Speaker 2: But you know, there's a lot of people in Taiwan
Speaker 2: that really value their democracy. And I guess it is
Speaker 2: a question for us to what extent do we believe
Speaker 2: that the people of Taiwan have the right to self determination.
Speaker 1: After the break the preparations underweigh in Taiwan as the
Speaker 1: threat of the Chinese invasion looms, and how the US
Speaker 1: will respond ay this, You have just returned from a
Speaker 1: trip to Taiwan. How real does the possibility of conflicts
Speaker 1: seem to the people there a.
Speaker 2: Lot more real and present to I think what we
Speaker 2: see this threat as it's definitely a very frequent topic
Speaker 2: of conversation. You see the posters on the streets, you
Speaker 2: see people turning up to self defense classes, people preparing
Speaker 2: themselves for what may or may not happen. But I
Speaker 2: think beyond that, there's actually already a view in Taiwan
Speaker 2: amongst some that China's making its advances today not necessarily
Speaker 2: physically militarily, even though there's drills that go on and
Speaker 2: rehearsals as some people describe them as, but that cognitive
Speaker 2: warfare is already underway. There is this huge body of
Speaker 2: di and misinformation that's spewing out into the Taiwanese public
Speaker 2: discourse through social media, through mainstream media, even to some
Speaker 2: extent which some viewers deliberate attempt by mainland China to
Speaker 2: shape the discourse in Taiwanese politics and to I guess,
Speaker 2: make people look more favorably upon the China model than
Speaker 2: what they might otherwise.
Speaker 1: So this attempted softening of the Taiwanese people from China
Speaker 1: ahead of any potential conflict is taking place. Can you
Speaker 1: tell me a little bit more about what that looks
Speaker 1: like in practice.
Speaker 2: Yeah, there are some people that say, look, China doesn't
Speaker 2: really want to physically go to war to take Taiwan.
Speaker 2: They think there are other ways to do this. You
Speaker 2: might be able to soften the population. We see examples
Speaker 2: of disinformation being used to discredit more pro independence politicians.
Speaker 2: You saw a lot of this during the recent elections
Speaker 2: that were held there in Taiwan. They had one of
Speaker 2: the world's first Ministers for disinformation in their government to
Speaker 2: try and deal with some of this. It is happening
Speaker 2: all the time. You know, I was told there. If
Speaker 2: you buy a new TV and you just open it up,
Speaker 2: generally these TVs might be made in China.
Speaker 1: If you just.
Speaker 2: Open it up, the generic version of YouTube will just
Speaker 2: start spewing Chinese nationalist miss and disinformation at you.
Speaker 1: Well, if trying to tries to take over Taiwan, what
Speaker 1: do you know about how the US will respond.
Speaker 2: So Joe Biden actually, during his term as president, was
Speaker 2: the one that probably moved America a bit closer the woods,
Speaker 2: saying that America would defend Taiwan if, in fact China
Speaker 2: tried to invade. Donald Trump's been you know, reasonably cautious
Speaker 2: as far as Donald Trump can be cautious in his
Speaker 2: language around these things, so I think it's kind of unclear.
Speaker 2: But what we do know is that there's a lot
Speaker 2: of very China hawkish operatives with quite a lot of
Speaker 2: power in the Trump administration, and when you look at
Speaker 2: the broader arc of Trump's foreign policy, it does suggest
Speaker 2: rather more affixation on China as a rising power. Part
Speaker 2: of the argument, if there is an intellectual argument underpinning
Speaker 2: Trump's foreign policy around Europe and particularly Ukraine, is that
Speaker 2: they want the Europeans to deal with that corner of
Speaker 2: the world a bit more because they see China as
Speaker 2: the big, emerging, rising threat to US hegemony, and so
Speaker 2: the likelihood might be that they would take a greater
Speaker 2: interest in what happens in this part of the world.
Speaker 2: They may also, i think it needs to be said,
Speaker 2: make a calculation that they don't mind so much what
Speaker 2: happens to Taiwan because they're taking all of these steps
Speaker 2: around the manufacturing of microchips and semiconductors.
Speaker 1: You might recall that the big.
Speaker 2: Taiwanese semiconductor company has been forced to open an operation
Speaker 2: in the United States to start producing them there. So
Speaker 2: you know, there's a debate in Taiwan about whether this
Speaker 2: was a smart move to try and appease Trump and
Speaker 2: make him see that Taiwan's really valuable. Others say, well,
Speaker 2: maybe it made Taiwan physically less important to Trump because
Speaker 2: some of this stuff's being made there.
Speaker 1: How much of our strategy is just trying to when
Speaker 1: it comes to this thinking beyond a Trump presidency, how
Speaker 1: are we thinking of the US as a strategic ally
Speaker 1: in the longer term post Trump?
Speaker 2: Look, I think maybe in the first Trump administration there
Speaker 2: was quite a bit of thinking that he was kind
Speaker 2: of a one hit wonder and things would return to
Speaker 2: business as usual afterwards. I don't think so many Australian
Speaker 2: politicians are assuming that any longer. You'd have to say that,
Speaker 2: on the face of things, JD. Vance is quite a
Speaker 2: likely contender for the next presidency. He may go even
Speaker 2: further on some of this foreign policy stuff, and so
Speaker 2: I don't think we can necessarily assume that post Trump
Speaker 2: will get back to a kind of era of America
Speaker 2: always playing a role on the world stage that might
Speaker 2: benefit Australia. Just don't think we can run along with
Speaker 2: that calculus any longer. Peter our Geezy, former head of DEFACT,
Speaker 2: very respected figure in Australian foreign policy, write an article
Speaker 2: in The finn Review this week saying our politicians don't
Speaker 2: have the guts. This is very loose and rough paraphrasing.
Speaker 2: But our politicians don't have the guts to cut and
Speaker 2: run from Orcus. But maybe the Americans will do us
Speaker 2: a favor and ditch the deal to force our hand
Speaker 2: to think more broadly. Certainly, Orcus strategically ties us to
Speaker 2: the Americans for a very long time. In many ways,
Speaker 2: this is the central question for Australia's leaders today, the
Speaker 2: degree to which we can carve our own foreign policy.
Speaker 2: Can we, as a middle power manage these relationships in
Speaker 2: such a way that we are not always at the
Speaker 2: mercy of the wind, that we're somehow able to carve
Speaker 2: a place for ourselves where we can continue to extract
Speaker 2: advantage from both of those relationships. How do we exist
Speaker 2: in that world of intense, deep strategic competition between the
Speaker 2: United States and.
Speaker 1: China, Amish, thank you so much for your time, My
Speaker 1: absolute pleasure. Also in the news, Independent New South Wales
Speaker 1: MP Mark Latham is the subject of fresh controversy following
Speaker 1: allegations that he participated in a sex video filmed in
Speaker 1: his office at Parliament House. Further allegations claim Latham also
Speaker 1: took photos of female colleagues, made disparaging comments about them,
Speaker 1: and claimed to have inappropriately pinched one in p In response,
Speaker 1: New South Wales Housing Minister Rose Jackson was quoted calling
Speaker 1: Latham a pig and went on to say in any
Speaker 1: other workplace, you'd be shown the door immediately and rightfully so.
Speaker 1: An unemployment is that with the rate rising to four
Speaker 1: point three percent in the June figure, yes, that means
Speaker 1: that there are approximately six hundred and fifty nine thousand,
Speaker 1: six hundred Australians currently unemployed, the highest we've seen since
Speaker 1: COVID lockdowns in twenty twenty one. Pressure is down mounting
Speaker 1: on the Reserve Bank. The Caving crisrads had that next
Speaker 1: meeting in August, following their recent decision to hold steady
Speaker 1: at three point eight five percent. Treasurer Jim Chalmers said
Speaker 1: the figures show Australia is not immune to economic uncertainty.
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Speaker 2: No no,