WEBVTT - Labor's guilt in the Optus failure

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Ruby Jones and you're listening to seven AM. The

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<v Speaker 1>Communications Watchdog has opened a formal investigation into Optus after

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<v Speaker 1>a thirteen hour failure blocked about six hundred Triple zero calls,

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<v Speaker 1>now linked to three deaths. The government is furious, calling

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<v Speaker 1>it completely unacceptable and warning of significant consequences. But is

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<v Speaker 1>it actually their fault too? Today journalist and contributor to

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<v Speaker 1>Cracky Michael Sainsbury on what went wrong and how the

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<v Speaker 1>government's choices led to this disaster. It's Friday, September twenty six, So, Michael,

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<v Speaker 1>last week hundreds of Australians discovered that they couldn't get

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<v Speaker 1>through when they tried to call Triple zero with catastrophic

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<v Speaker 1>and we now know some fatal consequences. So tell me

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<v Speaker 1>about what we know about what was happening with Optus's

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<v Speaker 1>network while this was going on.

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<v Speaker 2>So it was just a regular network upgrade and the

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<v Speaker 2>telto networks thirty thousands of these a week, so there's

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<v Speaker 2>all sorts of stuff they're doing every day. There's obviously

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<v Speaker 2>thousands of base stations across the country.

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<v Speaker 3>They're very sophisticated.

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<v Speaker 2>Software systems that connect those things to the fiber optics

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<v Speaker 2>underground to the big computers that go out to your phone.

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<v Speaker 2>So that's very very complex networks and there's always stuff

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<v Speaker 2>going on. This was a regular sort of upgrade that

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<v Speaker 2>went wrong.

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<v Speaker 4>Today it was revealed the deadly outage the result of

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<v Speaker 4>a botch firewall upgrade that lasted thirteen hours, six hundred

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<v Speaker 4>customers across three states without access to Triple zero.

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<v Speaker 2>The outage only affected people in the Northern Territory, Western

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<v Speaker 2>Australia and South Australia. Initially they thought it affected about

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<v Speaker 2>six hundred calls made to emergency serve.

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<v Speaker 5>Good evening, we have a major story developing as we

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<v Speaker 5>go to wear. Just moments ago, we learned that three

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<v Speaker 5>people have died during a major Optus network outage that

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<v Speaker 5>affected Triple zero calls.

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<v Speaker 2>Something in their processes was either bad, could have been

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<v Speaker 2>a badly written.

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<v Speaker 3>Piece of software, or it could just.

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<v Speaker 2>Have been a very simple human era where things just

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<v Speaker 2>weren't followed properly and weren't checked. If it had been

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<v Speaker 2>a national thing, again, that may have been picked up

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<v Speaker 2>more quickly by a system. But do those systems have

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<v Speaker 2>enough red flags? It sounds like they don't.

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<v Speaker 1>Okay, And I mean you can see how these things

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<v Speaker 1>might happen, But you would assume that in the case

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<v Speaker 1>of human error or a bad update, that there would

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<v Speaker 1>be a backup, something would kick in if a network

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<v Speaker 1>you know isn't working like this, particularly when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>to triple zero calls. So what should have.

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<v Speaker 2>Happened, Well, there is actually a backup across all of

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<v Speaker 2>the networks in Australia where if for some reason your

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<v Speaker 2>networks aren't connecting to the Triple I SO system, the

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<v Speaker 2>calls will be routed into Celster or voter Phone so

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<v Speaker 2>they can access that system. Now, the TRILEO system is

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<v Speaker 2>actually run by Chelster under contract to the government, so

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<v Speaker 2>all the calls go into a call center Atchelster, which

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<v Speaker 2>is known as Triple O or the Emergency Call Person Officially,

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<v Speaker 2>what seems to have happened is that the customers and

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<v Speaker 2>optists were able to make normal calls, but they weren't

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<v Speaker 2>able to make triple zero calls and this wasn't flagged immediately.

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<v Speaker 2>There were also people who rang and at least five

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<v Speaker 2>people possibly more rang office call centers to tell them

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<v Speaker 2>that the Triple O wasn't working. And again there was

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<v Speaker 2>a failure of process there that that wasn't escalated straight away.

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<v Speaker 4>The customers tried five times to warn the company that

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<v Speaker 4>emergency calls were not going through.

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<v Speaker 2>In the past few hours has confirmed those complaints were

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<v Speaker 2>received by its offshore call center. Now it's Fokes, just

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<v Speaker 2>an engineer one of the other networks, and he said

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<v Speaker 2>the Triple O. When they've got a checklist of network

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<v Speaker 2>up grags, Triplo is absolutely the top of the list.

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<v Speaker 2>It should be the first thing that's checked in, double

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<v Speaker 2>checked before anything happens, and that didn't happen.

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<v Speaker 1>So in the wake of all of this, there are

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of questions being asked about Optus and about

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<v Speaker 1>its governance. So tell me about the company and how

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<v Speaker 1>it is responding to this particular outage.

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<v Speaker 2>Most people probably know it's the second biggest solcon in Australia,

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<v Speaker 2>it's the second biggest mobile network. It's owned by Singaportegal Communications,

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<v Speaker 2>so it's not a publicly listed company in Australia, and

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<v Speaker 2>the Singapore tell Forms is owned by Singapore government, so

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<v Speaker 2>ultimately Singapore's responsible for everything that happens at Altus. But

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<v Speaker 2>this is not the first time this is happen. This

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<v Speaker 2>happened with Optus two years ago.

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<v Speaker 5>We have more on that breaking news on the massive

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<v Speaker 5>Optors outage.

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<v Speaker 4>Ten million OPTS customers are still without mobile and broadband

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<v Speaker 4>services amid a massive nationwide out There is a lot developing.

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<v Speaker 3>There was a government inquiry.

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<v Speaker 4>The Federal government has released the terms of reference of

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<v Speaker 4>an investigation into this month's major optispoutage.

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<v Speaker 3>The eighteen recommendations handed down.

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<v Speaker 5>At its core is ensuring the integrity of the Triple

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<v Speaker 5>zero service and that it continues to operate effectively in

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<v Speaker 5>the interests of all Australians.

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<v Speaker 3>That process hasn't been finished properly.

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<v Speaker 2>Only about two thirds of those recommendations have been implemented.

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<v Speaker 2>In some of the key ones had not been implemented.

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<v Speaker 2>And then a year before that outage, they had that

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<v Speaker 2>dreadful data breach where the data about nine million people

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<v Speaker 2>was stolen. Head of OPTAs says she is devastated by

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<v Speaker 2>the cyber attack which has potentially compromised the personal information

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<v Speaker 2>of nearly ten million customers. But yeah, Octus now has

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<v Speaker 2>got very much a reputation of being a company that

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<v Speaker 2>is kind of making some big technical fails every couple

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<v Speaker 2>of years. Stephen Rue is the CEO who was brought

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<v Speaker 2>in about nine months ago they got rid of the

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<v Speaker 2>last CEO who was in charge of those last two disasters.

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<v Speaker 2>He came from NBN, so he's pretty familiar with self

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<v Speaker 2>communications networks and he's pretty familiar with dealing with government,

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<v Speaker 2>so it's kind of a dent in his record early on.

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<v Speaker 6>I want to offer a sincere apology to all customers

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<v Speaker 6>who could not connect to emergency services when they needed

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<v Speaker 6>them most.

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<v Speaker 2>But nine months is not a hell of a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of time in a big company like I've just to

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<v Speaker 2>fix things. There's obviously some deep seated cultural problems of

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<v Speaker 2>just that allow these sorts of process issues to happen.

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<v Speaker 1>Nevertheless, we did hear the Prime Minister Anthony Albanezi saying

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<v Speaker 1>that he would be surprised if Stephen Rue the CEO,

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't considering his position.

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<v Speaker 3>I'd be surprised if that wasn't occurring.

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<v Speaker 1>We also heard from the Communications Minister Annika Wells talking

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<v Speaker 1>about accountability and concert quences. Optis and all telecommunications providers

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<v Speaker 1>have obligations under Australian law to make sure emergency services

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<v Speaker 1>calls go through the South Australian Premier Peter Melanaskis called

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<v Speaker 1>it incompetence.

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<v Speaker 6>I mean the fact that optics were crafting media.

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<v Speaker 3>Statements and arranging press conferences.

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<v Speaker 4>Without alerting satisfy anibalance service.

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<v Speaker 1>About this, tell me what you make of the political response.

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<v Speaker 3>It was pretty fast and it's pretty brutal.

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<v Speaker 2>Look, people die, So I think political leaders feels that

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<v Speaker 2>they have to react. But we we are, as you know,

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<v Speaker 2>living in a world where it's very much blame first,

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<v Speaker 2>asked questions later, and I just don't think it's terribly

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<v Speaker 2>helpful when you've got politicians, you know, talking about significant consequences.

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<v Speaker 3>They want to sound tough.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a whole lot of legislation around these sorts of things,

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<v Speaker 2>and there are some pretty hefty fines that the companies

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<v Speaker 2>can get, and I think I've just has been fined

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<v Speaker 2>ten and twelve million dollars I think for the last

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<v Speaker 2>two of it's problems.

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<v Speaker 3>That being said, for big companies.

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<v Speaker 2>Like these, with bigions of dollars of revenue every year,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, those sorts of fines are kind of slaps

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<v Speaker 2>on the wrists too. So we've seen problems in banking,

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<v Speaker 2>we've seen problems with quanscious, and there've been some pretty

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<v Speaker 2>hefty fines. But they don't really make a big dent

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<v Speaker 2>in those big companies. But this triple zero problem keeps

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<v Speaker 2>coming up, and when governments tend to just coast along

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<v Speaker 2>and people.

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<v Speaker 3>Say, well, yeah, this is very serious. People could die.

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<v Speaker 2>Until someone dies, nothing seems to happen, So they tend

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<v Speaker 2>to be very reactive, and I think it's probably time

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<v Speaker 2>that the government had a bit of a bigger look

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<v Speaker 2>at this. So you've got inaction by the government on

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<v Speaker 2>quite a lot of things as well as the chelcos,

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<v Speaker 2>So it's really it's kind of a joint responsibility in

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of ways, but ultimately, for something as critical

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<v Speaker 2>as this, the government kind of got to be the last.

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<v Speaker 3>Person standing.

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<v Speaker 1>Coming up. Why the government is dragging its feet on

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<v Speaker 1>recommendations that could have prevented this. Michael, I want to

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<v Speaker 1>talk a little more about the government's role here, because

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<v Speaker 1>while it is clear that Optus failed, what is the

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<v Speaker 1>government's responsibility in ensuring that triple zero calls can always

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<v Speaker 1>get through?

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<v Speaker 2>Once upon a time, it wasn't tevery long ago. We

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<v Speaker 2>had one chelco, which was Telecom Australia.

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<v Speaker 3>That changed at Telstra last year.

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<v Speaker 2>Australia's Telecom invested more in Australia and Australian made products

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<v Speaker 2>than any other company. It was privatized and how government

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<v Speaker 2>competition was introduced before that, which is how we got

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<v Speaker 2>off just and we've had a reasonably competitive environment in

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<v Speaker 2>the child communications sector, although you know, the incumbent still

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<v Speaker 2>is the one that makes soll profits. But yeah, these

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<v Speaker 2>sorts of critical infrastructure services like telecommunications, energy, there was

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of privatization that went on without enough accountability

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<v Speaker 2>coming back. I mean, we did have the inquiry into Optus,

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<v Speaker 2>but the fact that eighteen months after that, all of

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<v Speaker 2>those recommendations have not been fulfilled. It's supposed to have occurred,

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<v Speaker 2>they haven't, and this is all about a lack of urgency.

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<v Speaker 2>I think most of the funding for triple zero comes

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<v Speaker 2>either directly from the government or from a government levy

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<v Speaker 2>that's from the telcos, So that triple zero stuff is

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<v Speaker 2>actually government responsibility.

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<v Speaker 3>And improving that system was part of what came out.

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<v Speaker 2>Of that the previous office outage, and the government you know,

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<v Speaker 2>let it linger, and so I think they do bear

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<v Speaker 2>some responsibility here.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, tell me more about that. As you say, when

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<v Speaker 1>this happened in the past, it triggered an inquiry the

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<v Speaker 1>bean review. So why do you think it is that

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<v Speaker 1>that has not resulted in the change would be needed

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<v Speaker 1>to have prevented what has just occurred.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there are eighteen recommendations about a whole bunch of stuff.

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<v Speaker 2>The harder stuff was still not being implemented, particularly this

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<v Speaker 2>setting up of the Tripoo custodian inside the department, and

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<v Speaker 2>that to me seems like a really tea recommendation that

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<v Speaker 2>you've actually got someone that is really having a good

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<v Speaker 2>look at the system, talking to the telcos making sure

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<v Speaker 2>their testing is right Now. I think Anacot Well said

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<v Speaker 2>that has been set up, but it's actually not yet underway.

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<v Speaker 2>What that actually means I don't know, but clearly it's

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<v Speaker 2>not working yet. And you would think that eighteen months

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<v Speaker 2>after something like that happened. For that not to be

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<v Speaker 2>in place after eight months, I think is that's a

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<v Speaker 2>little bit of a shame you on the government and.

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<v Speaker 1>The Communications Minister. Anika Wells. She's fairly new to that portfolio,

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<v Speaker 1>So what sense do you get of her of how

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<v Speaker 1>likely she is to look into these issues.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, certainly to sharpen up her interest in the portfolio. Look,

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<v Speaker 2>people inside the sector have said that she's not as

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<v Speaker 2>engaged with the sector as the previous minister who did

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<v Speaker 2>have a background in telecoms. Indeed, if you look back

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<v Speaker 2>to the previous ministers, we had Paul Fletcher for quite

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<v Speaker 2>some time in the coalition government before Mishare Royland, Mitch

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<v Speaker 2>Firefield before him, and Malcolm Turnbull. All of those people

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<v Speaker 2>did have quite a lot of experience or background in

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<v Speaker 2>either telcos or technology. Amateur Wells doesn't have any of

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<v Speaker 2>that experience. And telecoms is a very very very complex business.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, as we talked about this, with a mobile network,

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<v Speaker 2>then you've got landline Netwilson that you've got to run

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<v Speaker 2>internet services. There's customer call centers, there's marketing, there's office

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<v Speaker 2>and talk to have a bunch of shops. So they're

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<v Speaker 2>vertically integrated businesses with lots of different moving parts. And

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<v Speaker 2>it requires a very engaged minister and staff and department

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<v Speaker 2>to make sure that the companies that are looking after

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<v Speaker 2>telecommunications are doing their jobs properly. And this incident, and

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<v Speaker 2>it's such a dreadful thing when you know people are

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<v Speaker 2>dead because infrastructure fails, but this incident really should make

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<v Speaker 2>I think the government have a very good look at

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<v Speaker 2>what's happening in telecommunications. It's always been problematic because we

0:13:31.280 --> 0:13:35.200
<v Speaker 2>have such a huge country with not too many people,

0:13:35.320 --> 0:13:40.280
<v Speaker 2>so it's expensive compared to somewhere like Hong Kong or

0:13:40.280 --> 0:13:48.560
<v Speaker 2>Singapore to provide communications infrastructure in Australia. The only thing

0:13:48.600 --> 0:13:51.760
<v Speaker 2>that can stop this happening is for companies like Office

0:13:51.840 --> 0:13:56.120
<v Speaker 2>and Telster and Votefone and the other big telecommunications companies

0:13:56.200 --> 0:13:59.760
<v Speaker 2>TPG to make sure all their processes work, to make

0:13:59.760 --> 0:14:03.560
<v Speaker 2>sure they've got fail saved and back up and all

0:14:03.679 --> 0:14:05.800
<v Speaker 2>that sort of thing, and just look at it through

0:14:06.280 --> 0:14:09.560
<v Speaker 2>what happened with the NBN. Yeah, successive governments were very

0:14:09.600 --> 0:14:13.680
<v Speaker 2>frustrated that the big telecommunications companies weren't rolling up out

0:14:13.720 --> 0:14:17.840
<v Speaker 2>fast enough broadband quickly enough, so they took the decision

0:14:17.840 --> 0:14:20.680
<v Speaker 2>in the end to use public money to build the NBN.

0:14:21.440 --> 0:14:24.640
<v Speaker 2>Perhaps they need to have a look at the mobile

0:14:24.720 --> 0:14:28.000
<v Speaker 2>networks as well, which would take a lot of the

0:14:28.040 --> 0:14:32.640
<v Speaker 2>pain away from companies trying to service a handful of

0:14:32.640 --> 0:14:34.760
<v Speaker 2>people very far away that puts a lot of money,

0:14:35.800 --> 0:14:38.600
<v Speaker 2>and just to take some of that financial pressure off

0:14:38.600 --> 0:14:41.400
<v Speaker 2>the networks so they can really focus on getting these

0:14:41.440 --> 0:14:42.000
<v Speaker 2>things right.

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<v Speaker 3>The things that they're supposed to be doing well.

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<v Speaker 1>Michael, thank you so much for your time.

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<v Speaker 3>Thank you very much. Really.

0:14:57.640 --> 0:15:00.720
<v Speaker 1>Also in the news today, Anthony Albanezi has addressed the

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<v Speaker 1>United Nations General Assembly in New York, using the occasion

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<v Speaker 1>to renew Australia's push for a seat on the UN

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<v Speaker 1>Security Council ahead of elections in June twenty twenty eight.

0:15:10.360 --> 0:15:14.000
<v Speaker 1>The Security Council has five permanent members China, France, Russia,

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<v Speaker 1>the United Kingdom and the United States, with ten other

0:15:16.880 --> 0:15:20.480
<v Speaker 1>countries selected for two year terms. The last time Australia

0:15:20.520 --> 0:15:23.280
<v Speaker 1>sat on the Council was in twenty fourteen, occupied by

0:15:23.280 --> 0:15:28.120
<v Speaker 1>then Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Liberal Front venture Andrew

0:15:28.120 --> 0:15:30.560
<v Speaker 1>Hasty has brushed off suggestions that he's a threat to

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<v Speaker 1>Susan Lee's leadership after a series of outspoken social media posts.

0:15:35.120 --> 0:15:38.040
<v Speaker 1>Andrew Hasty has grown increasingly outspoken on a number of

0:15:38.040 --> 0:15:41.680
<v Speaker 1>policy issues in recent weeks, campaigning against net zero, on

0:15:41.800 --> 0:15:46.400
<v Speaker 1>migration and domestic manufacturing. Seven Am is a daily show

0:15:46.400 --> 0:15:50.040
<v Speaker 1>from Solstice Media. It's made by Atticus Bastow, Chris Dengate,

0:15:50.160 --> 0:15:54.200
<v Speaker 1>Daniel James, Sarah mcvee, Travis Evans, Zaltfecho and me Ruby

0:15:54.280 --> 0:15:57.000
<v Speaker 1>Jones at the music is by nd Beckley and Josh

0:15:57.040 --> 0:16:00.360
<v Speaker 1>Hogan of Envelope Audio. Thanks for listening, Seeing sake