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Speaker 1: Welcome to Fearing Greed, Q and A. Whill we ask

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Speaker 1: and answer questions about business, investing, economics, politics and more.

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Speaker 1: I'm Sean Alma. Executive pay is one of those topics

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Speaker 1: that always sparks debate, whether it's CEO bonuses, shareholder pushback,

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Speaker 1: or questions about whether pay really reflects performance. And increasingly,

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Speaker 1: it's not just about how much executives are paid, but

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Speaker 1: how those decisions are made, explained and justified to investors

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Speaker 1: and the broader community. Last year, there were dozens of

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Speaker 1: strikes against remuneration reports at agms for some of our

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Speaker 1: biggest companies, including mcquarie Group, CSL, James Hardy, zero A

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Speaker 1: and z al Jerngpathy is a principle at Corn Ferry,

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Speaker 1: specializing in executive pay and governance OL. Welcome to Fear

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Speaker 1: and Greed Q and A.

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Speaker 2: Thanksan, It's great to be with you. I think you've

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Speaker 2: almost done my job for me with the intro. Sound

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Speaker 2: you like an exact pay and governance consultant.

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Speaker 1: Already you've thrown me off all that is one thing

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Speaker 1: I'm definitely not Let's jump into it. What are the

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Speaker 1: key factors shaping executive pay decisions nowadays?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, great, great questions from maybe if I just start

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Speaker 2: a quick contact setting is why executive pay matters? And

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Speaker 2: then some of the key consequential items off the back

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Speaker 2: of that. So the reality is that executive pay is

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Speaker 2: a construct. You know, most Australians probably have a fairly

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Speaker 2: abstract understanding of it, but the reality is that still

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Speaker 2: impacts every day Aussie. So if you look at the

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Speaker 2: retirement balances, for example, the superannuation balances of most Australians

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Speaker 2: have a strong waiting and investment in global and local equities,

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Speaker 2: and when you think about the structure of executive pay,

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Speaker 2: a significant portion that is in equity. And therefore, you know,

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Speaker 2: when you see a number reported in the media of

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Speaker 2: a CEO or executives realize pay outcome, the tall poppy

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Speaker 2: inside all of us has an initially negative reaction. But

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Speaker 2: I think that the content there is important, which is

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Speaker 2: that if a company has delivered sustainable share price and

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Speaker 2: stakeholder returns over long period of time, that usually means

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Speaker 2: that Australians have benefited as well through their surgranderation balances.

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Speaker 2: But like anything in life that's good, there must be bad,

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Speaker 2: and there are absolutely are cases where executives are overpaid,

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Speaker 2: which is where the slight nuance comes in, which is

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Speaker 2: that executives should be viewed as being overpaid where their

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Speaker 2: pay out comes are not commensurate with their actual results

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Speaker 2: they've been responsible for delivering. And so that's at overach

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Speaker 2: perspective as to what executive pays. And what we do

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Speaker 2: is we help boards and remuneration committees to design robust

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Speaker 2: remuneration structures aligned to their strategy, shareholder and stakeholder value

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Speaker 2: and then effectively govern those arrangements.

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Speaker 1: Okay, So at the moment though, is it more about

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Speaker 1: base pay plus short term plus long term incentives or

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Speaker 1: is it more about short term long term incentives plus

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Speaker 1: base pay kind of chops and changes depending on the

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Speaker 1: mood of investors. Yeah, I'm just interested right now. How

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Speaker 1: much of an executive's remuneration is based on performance as

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Speaker 1: opposed to base pay?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, great question, shel. And so from a structural perspective,

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Speaker 2: when an executive pay structure is designed for say a

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Speaker 2: vanilla A six one hundred remunerational structure, you'll typically see

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Speaker 2: a third in fixed pay, a third in STI, and

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Speaker 2: then a third in LTI. Now that's the structure of

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Speaker 2: the pay from day zero. But then in terms of

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Speaker 2: the realized pay outcome, which again given long term incentives,

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Speaker 2: haven't annual grant which then you invests over say four

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Speaker 2: to five years. The ultimate payout from a realized actual

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Speaker 2: pay perspective is typically driven by significant performance linked instruments.

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Speaker 2: But then that's not to say, for example, if a

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Speaker 2: company had a poor performance here that again by nature

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Speaker 2: of the design, a greater portion would be in fixed pay.

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Speaker 2: But I think what sharehold investors are certainly looking for

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Speaker 2: is that significant ownership mindset from executives from day one.

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Speaker 1: I just want to go to the people who are

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Speaker 1: CEOs now or potential CEOs. The actual marketplace in Australia.

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Speaker 1: How much competition is there for talent. If I'm a

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Speaker 1: business and I want really good CEO, are there lots

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Speaker 1: of CEOs out there that can do the job or

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Speaker 1: are there only a handful. We've had in the last

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Speaker 1: week or so, we had Woodside, we had BHP, both

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Speaker 1: announcing new CEOs. In both cases they were internal. I'm

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Speaker 1: just kind of interested in the marketplace for CEOs.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, great question. I think that's probably one of the

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Speaker 2: most topical questions, and there's probably a million different answers

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Speaker 2: to that. But the two points that I will make

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Speaker 2: is that again, as you've touched on, there's been quite

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Speaker 2: a turnover of CEOs in Australia over the past few weeks,

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Speaker 2: in the past few months, and I think that's broader

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Speaker 2: reflection of the economy. I think a lot of boards

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Speaker 2: are in process of doing a strategic reset, and then

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Speaker 2: at part that is also finding the right leaders as

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Speaker 2: well as the right remuneration structure to drive that strategy.

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Speaker 2: And then the other contextual point to note is that

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Speaker 2: again within Australia, we have what's own as the two

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Speaker 2: strikes rule, which is where if you get against vote

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Speaker 2: of twenty five percent against your remuneration report, that constitutes

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Speaker 2: to strike. And what that has probably unintendedly led to

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Speaker 2: is greater homogeny in the reward structures in Australia. And

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Speaker 2: if you think about the purpose of reward, it should

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Speaker 2: be driving corporate strategy. And again, if every company strategy

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Speaker 2: is different, it's not logical that every company should have

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Speaker 2: the same reward structure. And then where the rubber has

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Speaker 2: effectively hit the road in a very tangible recent examples

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Speaker 2: with zero, so zero has a business model and a

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Speaker 2: competitive talent landscape that is very much index towards the US,

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Speaker 2: and therefore they adopted a US style at remuneration package.

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Speaker 2: And again you think that sound logical rationale, but they

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Speaker 2: still received a strike. And so I think that the

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Speaker 2: key question or implications there is I think the current

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Speaker 2: regime for assessing executive pay is potentially producing an economic

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Speaker 2: inefficiency as well as barriers to attracting the best talent

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Speaker 2: regardless of geography. And then ultimately how that plays out

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Speaker 2: is again it's potentially limiting from a GDPD productivity and

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Speaker 2: a living standards perspective as well.

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Speaker 1: You're talking about two strikes. I can't get my head

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Speaker 1: around whether it's a good thing or a bad thing,

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Speaker 1: and a couple of reasons. Firstly, if there is a

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Speaker 1: second strike and there's a board spill, inevitably the board

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Speaker 1: is returned. And it hasn't actually happened that much in Australia.

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Speaker 1: But the thing that I kind of think it seems

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Speaker 1: that shareholders and investors are using that mechanism for things

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Speaker 1: outside remuneration or Am I too cynical?

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Speaker 2: L No, You're probably spot on, and I think that

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Speaker 2: cynicism is felt by a lot of people in the industry.

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Speaker 2: So the two strikes realize you correctly identified if you

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Speaker 2: get and against vote in consecutive years, there is a

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Speaker 2: climent to put a spill motion for the board. So

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Speaker 2: again it's quite consequential, but you've rightly identified that there's

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Speaker 2: never actually been a skill motion at least in recent

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Speaker 2: years that have actually been passed. And so I guess

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Speaker 2: the overarching question then is what is the utility off

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Speaker 2: the two strikes rule. I think firstly, it absolutely is

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Speaker 2: an imperative instrument to hold boards and remuneration committees accountable

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Speaker 2: for their decisions and their designing off the remuneration framework.

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Speaker 2: I think though, if we think about what that produces,

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Speaker 2: so in period, what that means is that a vote

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Speaker 2: on remuneration report is a vote on the practices from

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Speaker 2: a retrospective perspective as well as prospective perspective in terms of, say,

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Speaker 2: for example, a new incentive structure and LTI that was

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Speaker 2: introduced that year, what we're effectively doing is on day

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Speaker 2: zero or day one off that new LTI, we're presuming

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Speaker 2: that we know what the effectiveness of those outcomes are

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Speaker 2: going to be over say four or five year period,

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Speaker 2: and so I don't think anyone can say they can

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Speaker 2: predict the future, particularly given the current context. So I

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Speaker 2: think it does want to question of whether we need

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Speaker 2: to tweak the orientation of the remuneration report, for example

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Speaker 2: an annual advisory vote and then maybe a triannual binding

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Speaker 2: a vote on the implementation off the remuneration policy, again

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Speaker 2: not too dissimilar to the UK. And then that the

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Speaker 2: third point that you touched on was in terms of

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Speaker 2: the remuneration report being used to voice border vexation. We

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Speaker 2: certainly see that being the case. So say, for example,

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Speaker 2: where a company has a minor moderate remuneration deficiencies in

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Speaker 2: the context of port performance or perceived inappropriate to acquisitions

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Speaker 2: or other m and A activity, the remuneration report vote

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Speaker 2: is used to voice that dissatisfaction. And again it comes

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Speaker 2: to the whole razum for assessing paid. Again raises a question,

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Speaker 2: for example, if we need a vote on so broader

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Speaker 2: management or board decision making outside of reward do.

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Speaker 1: You think many Australian CEOs are underpaid? And I suppose

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Speaker 1: I'm thinking of this in a global perspective where Australia

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Speaker 1: sits and you gave an example of zero there and

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Speaker 1: obviously local shareholders didn't like the idea of the global

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Speaker 1: market in that case. But I would imagine you could

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Speaker 1: make some not being sympathetic to anyone in particular, but

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Speaker 1: the big banks, those guys, given they run the four

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Speaker 1: of the five biggest companies, I don't think they're overpaid personally,

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Speaker 1: not compared to the csls and the macquaries of the world.

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Speaker 1: But can you make that case.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, great question. So how I would define that is

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Speaker 2: defining what is overpaid. So I think in terms of

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Speaker 2: remuneration settings, the ubiquitous approach that organizations take is that

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Speaker 2: they will construct a peer group of comparably size organizations,

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Speaker 2: so be it on a market cap metric or a

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Speaker 2: revenue measure, and then what they'll use is then they

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Speaker 2: pay philosophy, if for their target position, for example, then

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Speaker 2: they want to pay at the fiftieth percent tole and

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Speaker 2: therefore they're round about the middle in terms of that

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Speaker 2: pay setting. But then I think where again the real question,

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Speaker 2: and that the cruts have been overpaid. Again, I think

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Speaker 2: that we do need to be careful of how we're

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Speaker 2: or specific and how we're defining overpaid. So the example

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Speaker 2: I talked about earlier. I don't think when you see

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Speaker 2: a CEO's pay number reported in the media, which should

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Speaker 2: necessarily have an adverse reaction to it, because typically, again

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Speaker 2: given how superanneration balances are index it would usually mean

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Speaker 2: that Australians have benefited. I think though, where executives or

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Speaker 2: CEOs are overpaid is if the company can't make a

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Speaker 2: tangible link between the realized pay outcomes and the responsible

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Speaker 2: and the efforts that they have been responsible for delivering.

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Speaker 2: And then also in the example of CBA and the

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Speaker 2: other big four banks, CBA, if you look at their

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Speaker 2: reuneration reports, they have increased their transparency as to how

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Speaker 2: they've determined that the CEO's pay setting, so they actually

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Speaker 2: disclosed transparently the benchmarking results of the CBA CEO relative

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Speaker 2: to their global and local peers. And if you again

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Speaker 2: look at a lot of their peers, Matt Commons around

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Speaker 2: the market and I think against some of the global peers,

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Speaker 2: who is significantly below the pay things of first global peers.

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Speaker 2: But again if you think about the remit that the

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Speaker 2: CBO has, it of course is comparable from a business

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Speaker 2: perspective relative to those global peers, and I think that's

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Speaker 2: absolutely where we see the trajectory in terms of disclosure

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Speaker 2: going in Australia. So in the US they are mandated

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Speaker 2: to disclose under SEC rules at paying performance linkage. So

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Speaker 2: for example, JP Morgan discloses that JB Diamond's total remuneration

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Speaker 2: package is forty million dollars, and then one of the

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Speaker 2: data points that they also disclosed is that if you

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Speaker 2: look at the CEO spend as a portion of profits,

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Speaker 2: so the retourn or investment that the board of JP

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Speaker 2: Morgan is getting it is far greater than all of

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Speaker 2: the comparable peers. So while for example, the forty million

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Speaker 2: dollar number can seem exorbitant, when you justify that, you

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Speaker 2: can make an argument that the return on investment has

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Speaker 2: been significantly greater and therefore that is a sound remuneration decision.

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Speaker 1: We are totally out of time, but I just have

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Speaker 1: to folow as the thread that you're talking through on

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Speaker 1: Elon Musk potentially is it hundreds of billions or is

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Speaker 1: it trillions of dollars. It's a lot of money right now,

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Speaker 1: incredible hurdles to overcome over the next ten years. So

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Speaker 1: is there an argument that he's actually worth the money

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Speaker 1: if you're can achieve those goals?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely so. I think it's a trillion dollar pay package.

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Speaker 2: And again, the current market value of that award is

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Speaker 2: zero dollars, which is the key point here. And so

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Speaker 2: if he does truly achieve those highly aggressively challenging targets

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Speaker 2: as well as the share price growth hurdles which are immense,

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Speaker 2: then I think you would make an argument that it

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Speaker 2: is a reasonable outcome. But again these are absolute moonshot

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Speaker 2: pirdals and targets. And again I think if you think

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Speaker 2: about the flow on implication of that, the living standards

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Speaker 2: and productivity and the retirement balances, particularly of Australia in

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Speaker 2: the US would definitely have benefited if that does eventuate.

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Speaker 1: Al thanks for talking to Fear and Greed.

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Speaker 2: Thanks Sean.

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Speaker 1: That was ol jerng Pathy principal at corn Faery. I'm

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Speaker 1: Sean Almer, and this is fearing greed Q and a