1 00:00:01,930 --> 00:00:05,880 Speaker 1: The public has had a long-held fascination with detectives. Detectives 2 00:00:05,900 --> 00:00:08,060 Speaker 1: see a side of life the average person is never 3 00:00:08,140 --> 00:00:12,300 Speaker 1: exposed to. I spent 34 years as a cop. For 4 00:00:12,300 --> 00:00:14,800 Speaker 1: 25 of those years, I was catching killers. That's what 5 00:00:14,840 --> 00:00:17,220 Speaker 1: I did for a living. I was a homicide detective. 6 00:00:17,980 --> 00:00:21,050 Speaker 1: I'm no longer just interviewing bad guys. Instead, I'm taking 7 00:00:21,070 --> 00:00:23,959 Speaker 1: the public into the world in which I operated. The 8 00:00:24,000 --> 00:00:26,540 Speaker 1: guests I talk to each week have amazing stories from 9 00:00:26,600 --> 00:00:29,250 Speaker 1: all sides of the law. The interviews are raw and honest, 10 00:00:29,530 --> 00:00:31,770 Speaker 1: just like the people I talk to. Some of the 11 00:00:31,850 --> 00:00:34,970 Speaker 1: content and language might be confronting. That's because no one 12 00:00:34,990 --> 00:00:38,390 Speaker 1: who comes into contact with crime is left unchanged. Join 13 00:00:38,409 --> 00:00:46,920 Speaker 1: me now as I take you into this world. A 14 00:00:46,960 --> 00:00:52,570 Speaker 1: decentralised online cult is coercing Australian children into self-harm. torturing 15 00:00:52,610 --> 00:00:57,350 Speaker 1: their pets, and even taking their own lives. They're an extremist, right-wing, 16 00:00:57,450 --> 00:01:01,930 Speaker 1: Satanist network called 764, and they are a top priority 17 00:01:01,950 --> 00:01:07,459 Speaker 1: for authorities worldwide. Former WA detective Rebecca Nyssen has spent 18 00:01:07,540 --> 00:01:10,759 Speaker 1: almost two decades protecting kids on the front line, and 19 00:01:10,800 --> 00:01:15,040 Speaker 1: today she reveals how 764 operates and how law enforcement 20 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:19,420 Speaker 1: is trying to tackle it. Take a listen. Rebecca Nyssen, 21 00:01:19,640 --> 00:01:21,139 Speaker 1: welcome to I Catch Killers. 22 00:01:21,690 --> 00:01:23,929 Speaker 2: Thank you, Gary. Good to be on your show. 23 00:01:24,450 --> 00:01:26,670 Speaker 1: Well, I'm looking forward to having a chat with you 24 00:01:26,709 --> 00:01:30,850 Speaker 1: because I've got to say in the preparation for the podcast, 25 00:01:30,970 --> 00:01:33,490 Speaker 1: my eyes have been opened up to a lot that's 26 00:01:33,530 --> 00:01:35,630 Speaker 1: going on in the cybercrime space. 27 00:01:36,709 --> 00:01:41,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, there is certainly some pretty dark spaces on the internet. 28 00:01:42,220 --> 00:01:45,720 Speaker 2: And I guess my role is to try and uncover 29 00:01:45,920 --> 00:01:48,660 Speaker 2: those spaces to bring them into the light so that 30 00:01:48,780 --> 00:01:49,680 Speaker 2: people are aware of them. 31 00:01:50,190 --> 00:01:53,059 Speaker 1: Yeah, well, perfect background. You spent a long time in 32 00:01:53,080 --> 00:01:57,200 Speaker 1: the WA police and now you've got your own business, 33 00:01:57,280 --> 00:02:00,860 Speaker 1: Lighthouse Cyber Education, and that's what you're out there doing. 34 00:02:00,900 --> 00:02:05,330 Speaker 1: But I've got to say from the way that crime's changed, 35 00:02:05,410 --> 00:02:07,810 Speaker 1: isn't it, from the traditional, the way that we looked 36 00:02:07,850 --> 00:02:10,850 Speaker 1: at crime that occurred on the streets, now the battle 37 00:02:10,910 --> 00:02:13,910 Speaker 1: against crime is very much in this cyberspace area. 38 00:02:14,660 --> 00:02:20,700 Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely. I think there's... Any crime now always has 39 00:02:20,760 --> 00:02:24,380 Speaker 2: an online element to it and some sort of technical 40 00:02:24,560 --> 00:02:29,740 Speaker 2: aspect to it. Plus, now we're also talking about cross-jurisdictional. 41 00:02:30,139 --> 00:02:33,440 Speaker 2: So what I mean by that is you might have, say, 42 00:02:33,500 --> 00:02:37,859 Speaker 2: a victim in WA, Western Australia, but the offender might 43 00:02:37,919 --> 00:02:41,440 Speaker 2: be in a completely different country. And how do you 44 00:02:41,500 --> 00:02:45,600 Speaker 2: navigate that when the offender in their country, it's not 45 00:02:45,780 --> 00:02:49,400 Speaker 2: a criminal offence. But over in Western Australia, it is 46 00:02:49,500 --> 00:02:53,359 Speaker 2: or vice versa. So you can make it very complex. Yeah. 47 00:02:53,520 --> 00:02:56,940 Speaker 1: And as both as former cops, we know how difficult 48 00:02:56,960 --> 00:03:01,100 Speaker 1: it is working cross-jurisdictional and how matters can be lost 49 00:03:01,530 --> 00:03:04,930 Speaker 1: because we operate sort of in a silo in our 50 00:03:04,990 --> 00:03:07,549 Speaker 1: own jurisdiction. It makes it very hard. 51 00:03:08,190 --> 00:03:11,250 Speaker 2: Yeah, definitely. I mean, I think even in Australia, we 52 00:03:11,290 --> 00:03:15,480 Speaker 2: have different state laws that to other states. So even 53 00:03:15,540 --> 00:03:18,300 Speaker 2: within Australia, it can certainly be challenging. 54 00:03:18,980 --> 00:03:24,010 Speaker 1: It's a different world now for parents raising children. You're 55 00:03:24,030 --> 00:03:26,150 Speaker 1: watching a kid play on the phone, you're thinking, oh, well, 56 00:03:26,210 --> 00:03:28,330 Speaker 1: at least I can keep an eye on my child. 57 00:03:28,410 --> 00:03:30,609 Speaker 1: I know what they're doing, where they're up to, or 58 00:03:30,630 --> 00:03:34,150 Speaker 1: they're in their room. But it's a changing landscape very much, 59 00:03:34,230 --> 00:03:34,490 Speaker 1: isn't it? 60 00:03:35,330 --> 00:03:39,350 Speaker 2: It is. I mean, as parents, our number one aim 61 00:03:39,390 --> 00:03:41,589 Speaker 2: is to try and protect our children, right? And we 62 00:03:41,650 --> 00:03:45,470 Speaker 2: think that if we shut the door and not let 63 00:03:45,690 --> 00:03:48,130 Speaker 2: people in or not let them out late at night, 64 00:03:48,190 --> 00:03:51,990 Speaker 2: that they're going to be safe. But the internet, whilst 65 00:03:52,050 --> 00:03:57,540 Speaker 2: it has been a positive thing and really enriched our lives, 66 00:03:58,140 --> 00:04:03,760 Speaker 2: it's also created certain complications and I guess threats. When 67 00:04:03,820 --> 00:04:06,840 Speaker 2: we connect to the internet, we open up a portal 68 00:04:07,360 --> 00:04:10,440 Speaker 2: to the outside world. And we just don't know where 69 00:04:10,480 --> 00:04:14,080 Speaker 2: that could be. And not every place online is safe. 70 00:04:14,780 --> 00:04:16,620 Speaker 2: And I think that that's one of the most important 71 00:04:16,640 --> 00:04:18,040 Speaker 2: messages we can get out there. 72 00:04:19,160 --> 00:04:22,950 Speaker 1: I looked at this group called 764. Now, my ears 73 00:04:23,010 --> 00:04:25,310 Speaker 1: pricked up when I heard about them in the media 74 00:04:25,750 --> 00:04:27,690 Speaker 1: at different times, but I hadn't had a close look 75 00:04:27,750 --> 00:04:31,920 Speaker 1: at them. I had prior to doing this podcast. I'm 76 00:04:31,980 --> 00:04:34,580 Speaker 1: horrified what they're up to. Can you give us a 77 00:04:34,620 --> 00:04:38,419 Speaker 1: bit of understanding of what this 764 group is all 78 00:04:38,460 --> 00:04:39,500 Speaker 1: about and what they do? 79 00:04:40,140 --> 00:04:44,300 Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely. So probably about February, March this year, it 80 00:04:44,339 --> 00:04:50,359 Speaker 2: started really being highlighted in Australia. But it started years 81 00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:54,500 Speaker 2: ago and it started in Texas. And so the name 82 00:04:54,500 --> 00:04:59,650 Speaker 2: 764 comes from the postcode or zip code. of where 83 00:05:00,270 --> 00:05:05,310 Speaker 2: the original person who was charged in relation to online offences, 84 00:05:05,390 --> 00:05:08,440 Speaker 2: and he was 15 years old. So what it is, 85 00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:15,060 Speaker 2: is it's a right-wing extremist group that is operating in 86 00:05:15,279 --> 00:05:25,219 Speaker 2: online communities that has tendencies for neo-Nazi idealisation. and very 87 00:05:25,460 --> 00:05:30,970 Speaker 2: sadistic abuse attached to the group. And what they do 88 00:05:31,110 --> 00:05:35,609 Speaker 2: is they operate in two areas. There's a comm network, 89 00:05:35,830 --> 00:05:40,869 Speaker 2: which is the recruiting arm, and that operates in online 90 00:05:40,890 --> 00:05:43,970 Speaker 2: gaming arenas. So we talk about where are our kids 91 00:05:44,010 --> 00:05:46,919 Speaker 2: going to be. They're going to be playing Fortnite. They're 92 00:05:46,950 --> 00:05:50,620 Speaker 2: going to be on the Roblox gaming platform, playing all 93 00:05:50,660 --> 00:05:56,150 Speaker 2: those different games, and on Minecraft. And this group operates 94 00:05:56,250 --> 00:06:01,080 Speaker 2: from a recruitment level on those games. And they're chatting 95 00:06:01,320 --> 00:06:06,680 Speaker 2: with kids, looking for kids that might be desensitized to violence, 96 00:06:06,860 --> 00:06:10,270 Speaker 2: meaning that they probably play a lot of violent video games. 97 00:06:11,550 --> 00:06:13,969 Speaker 2: Because even though it's 18 plus, it can be very 98 00:06:14,110 --> 00:06:18,229 Speaker 2: easy to access it online. They have a real desire 99 00:06:18,270 --> 00:06:21,849 Speaker 2: for status. They want to be that apex predator, that 100 00:06:21,930 --> 00:06:26,539 Speaker 2: top dog, always kind of winning and and bettering their 101 00:06:26,580 --> 00:06:30,289 Speaker 2: peers and so what they do is is they find 102 00:06:30,330 --> 00:06:33,150 Speaker 2: these kids that are looking to connect and they connect 103 00:06:33,190 --> 00:06:35,489 Speaker 2: with them and they get a bit of a rapport 104 00:06:35,529 --> 00:06:40,150 Speaker 2: going and then they go hey let's move to a 105 00:06:40,430 --> 00:06:44,990 Speaker 2: different platform an encrypted platform and that could be discord 106 00:06:45,070 --> 00:06:48,710 Speaker 2: or that could be telegram and they pick these platforms 107 00:06:48,850 --> 00:06:54,220 Speaker 2: because they have high functionality they have high privacy and security, 108 00:06:54,720 --> 00:06:57,860 Speaker 2: and you can actually have secret groups that nobody else 109 00:06:57,920 --> 00:07:00,950 Speaker 2: knows about. And so they move these kids onto these 110 00:07:01,029 --> 00:07:05,650 Speaker 2: platforms and that's where the radicalization happens. That's when they 111 00:07:05,730 --> 00:07:09,130 Speaker 2: send them their manifesto and they send them all the 112 00:07:09,190 --> 00:07:15,220 Speaker 2: information that backs up their right-wing ideology. And then they say, okay, 113 00:07:15,380 --> 00:07:19,330 Speaker 2: if you want to join 764, there needs to be 114 00:07:19,350 --> 00:07:22,510 Speaker 2: an initiation process. And so what they say is now 115 00:07:22,530 --> 00:07:25,630 Speaker 2: you have to go back to the online gaming platforms 116 00:07:26,290 --> 00:07:31,130 Speaker 2: and you need to find a victim to abuse online, essentially. 117 00:07:31,370 --> 00:07:37,820 Speaker 2: So generally they're looking for teenage girls that might be 118 00:07:37,880 --> 00:07:45,120 Speaker 2: struggling with their appearance, body image. They are struggling to 119 00:07:45,180 --> 00:07:49,429 Speaker 2: connect themselves and asking questions, who am I? They might've 120 00:07:49,490 --> 00:07:55,390 Speaker 2: gone through family separation or mental health issues. And then 121 00:07:55,430 --> 00:08:00,740 Speaker 2: they start chatting to these girls and they then use 122 00:08:00,820 --> 00:08:04,960 Speaker 2: a term called love bombing, which is essentially they move 123 00:08:04,980 --> 00:08:10,160 Speaker 2: them to a different platform. Generally, again, we're talking Discord, Telegram, 124 00:08:10,680 --> 00:08:16,350 Speaker 2: and they just bombard them with contact and communication. over 125 00:08:16,390 --> 00:08:19,150 Speaker 2: a really short period of time. So they're sending, you know, 126 00:08:19,430 --> 00:08:21,670 Speaker 2: they might find their mobile number and send them text 127 00:08:21,730 --> 00:08:27,210 Speaker 2: messages or calls or constant messaging to make the person 128 00:08:27,370 --> 00:08:29,890 Speaker 2: feel that this is the only person in the world. 129 00:08:30,570 --> 00:08:33,449 Speaker 2: And they do that because they want to isolate their 130 00:08:33,770 --> 00:08:39,170 Speaker 2: trusted network. They want to isolate them from their peers 131 00:08:39,429 --> 00:08:42,189 Speaker 2: or from their parents. So it feels like that this 132 00:08:42,290 --> 00:08:45,209 Speaker 2: is the only person in their world. And then once 133 00:08:45,270 --> 00:08:49,350 Speaker 2: they do that, then they kind of start manipulating and control. 134 00:08:49,910 --> 00:08:53,170 Speaker 2: And so they do things like they won't answer any 135 00:08:53,270 --> 00:08:57,850 Speaker 2: calls for, say, 24 hours. And the victim's left going, 136 00:08:57,890 --> 00:08:59,850 Speaker 2: what have I done? What have I done? How do 137 00:08:59,990 --> 00:09:05,910 Speaker 2: I fix this relationship? And then they come in and go, okay, well, 138 00:09:06,030 --> 00:09:11,890 Speaker 2: if you self-harm, if you cut yourself and live stream 139 00:09:11,910 --> 00:09:14,940 Speaker 2: it to me, then I know that You care about me. 140 00:09:15,660 --> 00:09:15,860 Speaker 1: Yeah. 141 00:09:16,740 --> 00:09:19,280 Speaker 2: And then what they do is they record that and 142 00:09:19,340 --> 00:09:22,860 Speaker 2: then send it or they even live stream it onto 143 00:09:23,480 --> 00:09:28,380 Speaker 2: the Telegram or the Discord channels for all these members 144 00:09:28,440 --> 00:09:31,260 Speaker 2: to watch. And we're talking about members all over the world. 145 00:09:32,070 --> 00:09:35,010 Speaker 2: And remember, we're dealing with, I guess, an ideology that 146 00:09:35,350 --> 00:09:38,710 Speaker 2: they're always trying to do more and more and more 147 00:09:38,870 --> 00:09:41,930 Speaker 2: and more. So it gets more sadistic and darker. 148 00:09:43,590 --> 00:09:47,740 Speaker 1: Yeah, well, Rebecca, what you've just outlined there, it's horrifying. 149 00:09:47,860 --> 00:09:50,500 Speaker 1: Like I look at crime and I think crime, you've 150 00:09:50,520 --> 00:09:53,239 Speaker 1: got a bad person, they commit a bad offence. You're 151 00:09:53,280 --> 00:09:57,630 Speaker 1: talking a group of people that are manipulating vulnerable people, 152 00:09:58,150 --> 00:10:01,540 Speaker 1: not just in one small town, or one city, across 153 00:10:01,580 --> 00:10:05,140 Speaker 1: the globe. The people that set it up, the boy 154 00:10:05,160 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: that you referred to, Bradley Candonhead, he was 15 at 155 00:10:09,179 --> 00:10:13,000 Speaker 1: the time, and he's currently serving 80 years in prison. So, 156 00:10:14,770 --> 00:10:19,320 Speaker 1: that's how serious they take it. And we're talking self-harm. 157 00:10:19,790 --> 00:10:25,740 Speaker 1: We're talking, I've read an article about killing the family 158 00:10:25,780 --> 00:10:28,200 Speaker 1: pet to prove their loyalty to this group that they 159 00:10:28,240 --> 00:10:30,380 Speaker 1: want to become part of. Yes. 160 00:10:30,460 --> 00:10:35,700 Speaker 2: So animal cruelty, being cruel to their siblings is some 161 00:10:35,740 --> 00:10:39,040 Speaker 2: of the common traits of what they do. And fortunately, 162 00:10:39,140 --> 00:10:44,100 Speaker 2: some of the The victims have actually committed suicide because of, 163 00:10:45,600 --> 00:10:48,180 Speaker 2: I guess, this group and this abuse that has taken place. 164 00:10:48,640 --> 00:10:51,800 Speaker 1: Is this a product of what kids have been exposed to? 165 00:10:51,820 --> 00:10:55,059 Speaker 1: Because I'm thinking at that age growing up, yeah, a 166 00:10:55,100 --> 00:11:00,740 Speaker 1: generation ago, unless you had the outlier, the pure evil person, 167 00:11:01,700 --> 00:11:03,380 Speaker 1: no one was thinking along these lines. 168 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:07,620 Speaker 2: I think it's an innate will for us to feel 169 00:11:07,800 --> 00:11:14,250 Speaker 2: like we belong. and to have community. And what's happened 170 00:11:14,270 --> 00:11:19,190 Speaker 2: with the digital space is, you know, in 2020 COVID 171 00:11:19,210 --> 00:11:22,130 Speaker 2: hit us and all of a sudden now we're telling 172 00:11:22,190 --> 00:11:24,949 Speaker 2: our kids, okay, it's not safe for you to go 173 00:11:24,990 --> 00:11:27,010 Speaker 2: down to the park and hang out with your mates. 174 00:11:27,490 --> 00:11:31,929 Speaker 2: You have to connect online. And whilst that was happening, 175 00:11:32,030 --> 00:11:34,800 Speaker 2: then from a policing side of view, We were in 176 00:11:34,840 --> 00:11:39,280 Speaker 2: a state of emergency, so we were focusing our efforts 177 00:11:39,940 --> 00:11:45,890 Speaker 2: away from the predatory behaviours online and towards trying to 178 00:11:47,070 --> 00:11:49,990 Speaker 2: make sure the state was safe. And as a result, 179 00:11:50,190 --> 00:11:55,710 Speaker 2: all these online predators had essentially a full rein on 180 00:11:55,790 --> 00:11:59,550 Speaker 2: our kids that we were being telling go online, and 181 00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:04,870 Speaker 2: then mainstream social media were telling kids about different hidden 182 00:12:04,910 --> 00:12:08,480 Speaker 2: platforms like Discord and saying, hey, come check this out. 183 00:12:09,220 --> 00:12:12,860 Speaker 2: And it's just not a safe necessarily place, I guess, 184 00:12:12,880 --> 00:12:13,700 Speaker 2: for kids to be. 185 00:12:14,720 --> 00:12:16,260 Speaker 1: Let's wind it back a bit. And I want to 186 00:12:16,280 --> 00:12:19,940 Speaker 1: get further into 764 and some of the stuff that 187 00:12:19,960 --> 00:12:25,080 Speaker 1: they've done. But your background, why did you become a cop? 188 00:12:25,679 --> 00:12:29,459 Speaker 1: What inspired you to pursue that career? 189 00:12:30,559 --> 00:12:35,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, so... I joined the police in Perth, Western Australia 190 00:12:35,300 --> 00:12:40,260 Speaker 2: when I was 20. I always had a desire to 191 00:12:40,300 --> 00:12:43,970 Speaker 2: become a police officer and a bit strange because none 192 00:12:43,990 --> 00:12:47,330 Speaker 2: of my family are sort of in the policing arena, 193 00:12:47,929 --> 00:12:51,470 Speaker 2: but I've always wanted to be a voice for people 194 00:12:51,530 --> 00:12:54,480 Speaker 2: who felt like they've lost their voice and I always 195 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:58,400 Speaker 2: wanted to help people. So the main reasons I joined 196 00:12:58,480 --> 00:12:58,819 Speaker 2: was to. 197 00:13:00,929 --> 00:13:04,829 Speaker 2: To help the community, to protect the community and be 198 00:13:04,890 --> 00:13:09,790 Speaker 2: a support in situations where, you know, they really needed it. 199 00:13:10,840 --> 00:13:14,099 Speaker 1: What areas in WA did you work? Because it's a 200 00:13:14,140 --> 00:13:17,679 Speaker 1: big state and there's many different roles you can have 201 00:13:17,740 --> 00:13:19,870 Speaker 1: in WA Police. Where did you work? 202 00:13:20,590 --> 00:13:25,110 Speaker 2: Yeah, so I just worked Metro. I didn't work rural, 203 00:13:25,730 --> 00:13:29,410 Speaker 2: but I started off in Belmont. And that was a 204 00:13:29,420 --> 00:13:34,410 Speaker 2: bit of a baptism of fire, learning the streets there. 205 00:13:34,570 --> 00:13:38,330 Speaker 2: And then I moved to a burglary task force that 206 00:13:38,350 --> 00:13:41,429 Speaker 2: was set up in the district to try and curve 207 00:13:41,490 --> 00:13:44,840 Speaker 2: the amount of burglaries that was happening. That was quite 208 00:13:44,860 --> 00:13:48,080 Speaker 2: a fond, I guess, time of my career. We had 209 00:13:48,120 --> 00:13:51,900 Speaker 2: a really good partnership with our detectives in the district. 210 00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 2: So the uniformed officers would go out and deal with 211 00:13:55,460 --> 00:13:58,420 Speaker 2: the burglaries and the property side and And then the 212 00:13:58,480 --> 00:14:03,000 Speaker 2: detectives would deal with more the drug-related aspect of it. 213 00:14:03,500 --> 00:14:06,860 Speaker 2: And it was a really good aspect, I guess, a 214 00:14:07,100 --> 00:14:10,400 Speaker 2: positive of being a female in the police force is 215 00:14:10,830 --> 00:14:13,130 Speaker 2: when you do a search warrant, you generally need a 216 00:14:13,190 --> 00:14:17,550 Speaker 2: female to attend the search warrant in case there's female 217 00:14:17,750 --> 00:14:22,690 Speaker 2: occupants there. So I did get some great opportunities to 218 00:14:22,710 --> 00:14:27,340 Speaker 2: be able to learn from the detectives who attended these 219 00:14:27,400 --> 00:14:31,300 Speaker 2: search warrants because they needed me to come along to 220 00:14:31,340 --> 00:14:34,620 Speaker 2: cover that sort of aspect. So there was certainly, I guess, 221 00:14:34,660 --> 00:14:37,880 Speaker 2: some positives involved in that as well. 222 00:14:38,380 --> 00:14:41,890 Speaker 1: You went into plainclothes. What areas did you work in 223 00:14:42,070 --> 00:14:42,830 Speaker 1: as a detective? 224 00:14:44,030 --> 00:14:47,270 Speaker 2: So I worked in child protection. And I think that 225 00:14:47,330 --> 00:14:51,350 Speaker 2: that was probably the first area that I saw that 226 00:14:52,010 --> 00:14:55,380 Speaker 2: exploitation of children was happening online as well and not 227 00:14:55,440 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 2: just physically and so I really enjoyed my time there 228 00:15:01,020 --> 00:15:04,280 Speaker 2: but I found it very confronting and difficult as well 229 00:15:05,040 --> 00:15:07,830 Speaker 2: particularly when you're dealing with children and it can be 230 00:15:07,890 --> 00:15:16,070 Speaker 2: difficult when they can't disclose and in criminality you have 231 00:15:16,090 --> 00:15:18,240 Speaker 2: an offence you have to be able to prove every 232 00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:21,250 Speaker 2: element and if you can't prove every element then you 233 00:15:21,290 --> 00:15:26,010 Speaker 2: can't charge. And when you're dealing with children as, I guess, 234 00:15:26,130 --> 00:15:29,390 Speaker 2: the complainant or the victim, it can be very hard 235 00:15:29,470 --> 00:15:32,080 Speaker 2: to kind of get that over the line. So it 236 00:15:32,120 --> 00:15:35,600 Speaker 2: was challenging, but it was definitely rewarding work. Then I 237 00:15:35,640 --> 00:15:38,460 Speaker 2: sort of moved to Midland and did some work out 238 00:15:38,500 --> 00:15:42,660 Speaker 2: there and back then into the city before sort of then, 239 00:15:42,680 --> 00:15:46,640 Speaker 2: I guess, taking the turn of my career where I 240 00:15:46,700 --> 00:15:49,980 Speaker 2: moved more into computer crime and technology crime. 241 00:15:50,720 --> 00:15:56,160 Speaker 1: With just holding the spot on child protection, that's, and 242 00:15:56,350 --> 00:15:59,290 Speaker 1: every time I speak to police officers and I saw 243 00:15:59,330 --> 00:16:01,650 Speaker 1: it in my own career, it seems like an area 244 00:16:01,690 --> 00:16:07,750 Speaker 1: that's grossly under-resourced. Everyone there seems busy. They're always juggling 245 00:16:07,820 --> 00:16:12,859 Speaker 1: multiple cases and their cases are not, homicides are bad investigation, 246 00:16:12,900 --> 00:16:17,950 Speaker 1: but invariably when the homicides occurred, you're not preventing a crime. 247 00:16:17,970 --> 00:16:21,110 Speaker 1: You're trying to find the perpetrator. With child protection, a 248 00:16:22,190 --> 00:16:25,100 Speaker 1: lot of hard calls for you because you've got kids 249 00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:29,040 Speaker 1: at risk. And I would imagine Friday afternoon, you're looking 250 00:16:29,080 --> 00:16:32,060 Speaker 1: forward to knocking off and some information comes in and 251 00:16:32,100 --> 00:16:34,660 Speaker 1: it would be very hard to walk away from that 252 00:16:35,240 --> 00:16:38,950 Speaker 1: information and not do what you could do to save 253 00:16:38,970 --> 00:16:39,330 Speaker 1: the children. 254 00:16:40,450 --> 00:16:43,270 Speaker 2: Yeah, definitely. I think hit the nail on the head 255 00:16:43,340 --> 00:16:46,580 Speaker 2: Friday afternoon, the priority one jobs always seem to sort 256 00:16:46,620 --> 00:16:53,800 Speaker 2: of rock into the desk. And they were always very complex. Generally, 257 00:16:53,860 --> 00:16:59,140 Speaker 2: they involve people in authority. And, you know, that could be, 258 00:16:59,420 --> 00:17:04,520 Speaker 2: you know, school teachers in government, in high profile positions. 259 00:17:05,119 --> 00:17:08,460 Speaker 2: There was generally an aspect to it that made it 260 00:17:09,710 --> 00:17:12,310 Speaker 2: And it could just be a family as well. I mean, 261 00:17:12,330 --> 00:17:15,930 Speaker 2: the amount of times she would rock up and, you know, 262 00:17:16,350 --> 00:17:19,490 Speaker 2: either partner, the wife or the husband had no idea 263 00:17:20,090 --> 00:17:23,390 Speaker 2: what was going on. And the amount of times that 264 00:17:23,450 --> 00:17:26,410 Speaker 2: they would back each other up and not believe that 265 00:17:26,530 --> 00:17:30,030 Speaker 2: their kids was definitely an eye-opener. 266 00:17:30,780 --> 00:17:34,640 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's a thing that we've got to all take 267 00:17:34,660 --> 00:17:38,580 Speaker 1: a good hard look at ourselves on that because I 268 00:17:38,840 --> 00:17:42,020 Speaker 1: see people that would support their partner and not believe 269 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,199 Speaker 1: the kid. And a lot of it's about, well, if 270 00:17:45,220 --> 00:17:49,810 Speaker 1: you take the partner away, invariably it's the male. So 271 00:17:49,850 --> 00:17:51,650 Speaker 1: they're the money earner. What are we going to do? 272 00:17:52,430 --> 00:17:57,609 Speaker 1: The shame of being a partner that's been sexually assaulting children. 273 00:17:57,990 --> 00:18:00,990 Speaker 1: There's so many complexities to it, but it's a crime 274 00:18:01,030 --> 00:18:03,770 Speaker 1: that I think it helps to talk about. I think 275 00:18:04,170 --> 00:18:06,690 Speaker 1: we sweep it under the carpet because it is so confronting, 276 00:18:06,710 --> 00:18:09,640 Speaker 1: but we need to talk about it because it's so prevalent. 277 00:18:10,300 --> 00:18:13,620 Speaker 1: And you would have seen, as I've seen, the impact 278 00:18:13,680 --> 00:18:17,879 Speaker 1: that people that have been abused as children, the destructive 279 00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:20,730 Speaker 1: patterns in their life years later, they carry it for 280 00:18:20,770 --> 00:18:22,970 Speaker 1: a very long time, if not for their whole life. 281 00:18:23,609 --> 00:18:27,300 Speaker 2: Yeah, definitely. And I think for me, my sort of 282 00:18:27,359 --> 00:18:31,240 Speaker 2: detective and policing career, it helped me to see that side. 283 00:18:32,140 --> 00:18:37,040 Speaker 2: So that later on when I was dealing with, you know, 284 00:18:37,100 --> 00:18:44,550 Speaker 2: drug offences or someone that's, you know, a priority offender 285 00:18:44,590 --> 00:18:47,950 Speaker 2: that is in and out of jail, and then sort 286 00:18:48,010 --> 00:18:51,390 Speaker 2: of you could drag it all the way back and... 287 00:18:52,850 --> 00:18:56,770 Speaker 2: a lot of the time they actually were exposed to 288 00:18:57,050 --> 00:19:03,149 Speaker 2: or were victims of child sexual abuse themselves. And so 289 00:19:03,670 --> 00:19:07,240 Speaker 2: from that perspective of dealing with these people as victims, 290 00:19:08,060 --> 00:19:12,020 Speaker 2: not the offender, it gave you a look into their 291 00:19:12,080 --> 00:19:15,919 Speaker 2: life and certainly didn't excuse what they did or their behaviour, 292 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:18,960 Speaker 2: but it gave you a bit of understanding and I 293 00:19:19,020 --> 00:19:22,470 Speaker 2: think a bit of empathy to see We're all just 294 00:19:22,510 --> 00:19:28,300 Speaker 2: humans and some people have just had horrific things happen 295 00:19:28,359 --> 00:19:31,440 Speaker 2: to them. Certainly doesn't excuse the decisions that they've made 296 00:19:31,480 --> 00:19:35,460 Speaker 2: in their life, but it helps you get, I guess, 297 00:19:35,500 --> 00:19:39,659 Speaker 2: a little bit more empathy for them or to be 298 00:19:39,740 --> 00:19:42,030 Speaker 2: able to deal with them as a human, which is 299 00:19:42,109 --> 00:19:44,230 Speaker 2: so important as a police officer. 300 00:19:44,970 --> 00:19:48,389 Speaker 1: Look, I've seen it since I've left the police. I 301 00:19:48,470 --> 00:19:50,950 Speaker 1: identified it when I was 18. in the police, but 302 00:19:51,330 --> 00:19:55,030 Speaker 1: since I've left the police and interviewing ex-cops on the 303 00:19:55,070 --> 00:19:58,970 Speaker 1: podcast or just speaking to people, all the police officers 304 00:19:59,119 --> 00:20:03,000 Speaker 1: I look up to, no matter what area they work in, 305 00:20:03,530 --> 00:20:05,690 Speaker 1: are ones that have that empathy. I think it's so 306 00:20:05,750 --> 00:20:09,500 Speaker 1: important in policing and we've really got to look for that. 307 00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:12,100 Speaker 1: And that doesn't mean you're soft or weak or, you know, 308 00:20:12,260 --> 00:20:15,420 Speaker 1: empathy is just an understanding. And I think it carries 309 00:20:15,460 --> 00:20:17,250 Speaker 1: you a long way in policing. 310 00:20:17,890 --> 00:20:18,410 Speaker 2: Absolutely. 311 00:20:19,280 --> 00:20:24,340 Speaker 1: Working in child protection, whether it's child protection, homicide, sex crimes, 312 00:20:24,380 --> 00:20:28,460 Speaker 1: or whatever, it's very victim orientated. Did you realize going 313 00:20:28,500 --> 00:20:31,230 Speaker 1: into cyber crime that it was going to be very 314 00:20:31,450 --> 00:20:34,330 Speaker 1: victim orientated too? Because I've got to adjust my thinking. 315 00:20:34,650 --> 00:20:37,870 Speaker 1: I think cyber crime, I'm thinking bank frauds, that type 316 00:20:37,910 --> 00:20:42,590 Speaker 1: of thing, which there are victims in that. But Cybercrime 317 00:20:42,609 --> 00:20:45,550 Speaker 1: has changed now. We've got to change our thinking that 318 00:20:45,820 --> 00:20:48,820 Speaker 1: you've got victims, like when we talk about that 764 319 00:20:48,820 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 1: group and the type of things that can happen. Sexploitation 320 00:20:53,100 --> 00:20:56,560 Speaker 1: of young kids. And you hear some horrendous stories where 321 00:20:56,619 --> 00:20:59,680 Speaker 1: kids take their own lives because they've been shamed by 322 00:21:00,400 --> 00:21:02,629 Speaker 1: what's been posted. Yeah. 323 00:21:02,710 --> 00:21:06,130 Speaker 2: So that can be very challenging because I think when 324 00:21:06,170 --> 00:21:10,330 Speaker 2: I first kind of got into technology crime and computer crime, 325 00:21:10,390 --> 00:21:12,359 Speaker 2: it was It was more a chance for me to 326 00:21:12,400 --> 00:21:14,900 Speaker 2: sort of step back away from the front line for 327 00:21:14,940 --> 00:21:18,340 Speaker 2: a bit. But as I sort of sat there for 328 00:21:18,380 --> 00:21:22,840 Speaker 2: a bit and learnt more of what was going on, 329 00:21:24,200 --> 00:21:28,950 Speaker 2: you would have victims in WA, for example, and they 330 00:21:28,990 --> 00:21:35,609 Speaker 2: would be terribly extorted online because they've sent sexual images 331 00:21:35,950 --> 00:21:38,590 Speaker 2: and now all of a sudden a black male is saying, hey, 332 00:21:38,630 --> 00:21:40,709 Speaker 2: pay us this money. or we're going to share your 333 00:21:40,810 --> 00:21:45,210 Speaker 2: images with all your friends and family. And majority of 334 00:21:45,300 --> 00:21:49,440 Speaker 2: the time, the offender was overseas. And I'll say majority 335 00:21:49,460 --> 00:21:52,740 Speaker 2: of the time, because we do know examples where there 336 00:21:52,780 --> 00:21:56,200 Speaker 2: has been victim and offender actually in the state. But 337 00:21:56,280 --> 00:22:02,760 Speaker 2: generally speaking, most of the offenders were overseas. So it 338 00:22:03,260 --> 00:22:06,560 Speaker 2: makes it very hard because whilst there is an element 339 00:22:07,170 --> 00:22:09,929 Speaker 2: that has happened in WA which is the victim and 340 00:22:09,990 --> 00:22:14,010 Speaker 2: it's very real what's happened to them from a state 341 00:22:14,070 --> 00:22:19,040 Speaker 2: policing perspective there was very little we could do in 342 00:22:19,140 --> 00:22:23,940 Speaker 2: terms of the criminality and actually charging someone and holding 343 00:22:24,020 --> 00:22:29,870 Speaker 2: someone to account to that so it was difficult from 344 00:22:29,930 --> 00:22:34,500 Speaker 2: the policing perspective that you had I guess, an organization 345 00:22:34,540 --> 00:22:37,140 Speaker 2: and bosses that went, well, if we can't charge anyone, 346 00:22:37,160 --> 00:22:39,720 Speaker 2: you have to move on and deal with the next 347 00:22:39,760 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 2: crime because we've got so much to deal with and 348 00:22:42,060 --> 00:22:44,980 Speaker 2: not enough resources. But then at the same time, you're 349 00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:48,580 Speaker 2: still dealing with a real person. And what's the fallback 350 00:22:48,660 --> 00:22:53,580 Speaker 2: from that? The schools, the parents, the kids themselves, and 351 00:22:53,840 --> 00:22:58,010 Speaker 2: they're left kind of in this lurch of no one's 352 00:22:58,070 --> 00:23:00,830 Speaker 2: really supporting us. No one really understands. What do we 353 00:23:00,869 --> 00:23:06,570 Speaker 2: do with this? And that's probably where I first got 354 00:23:06,609 --> 00:23:11,250 Speaker 2: the passion to kind of go, I want to do 355 00:23:11,330 --> 00:23:14,310 Speaker 2: something about this. It doesn't feel right to me to 356 00:23:14,369 --> 00:23:15,689 Speaker 2: just leave these people. 357 00:23:16,210 --> 00:23:18,869 Speaker 1: Give me an example of someone that's been exploited in 358 00:23:18,910 --> 00:23:19,310 Speaker 1: that way. 359 00:23:19,670 --> 00:23:24,399 Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely. So you've got a teenager, say they're 14 360 00:23:24,400 --> 00:23:27,360 Speaker 2: years old. We'll use the example of a young man, 361 00:23:27,359 --> 00:23:31,950 Speaker 2: 14 years old. He's on Instagram. And he's looking at 362 00:23:32,030 --> 00:23:34,790 Speaker 2: Instagram reels every day and then all of a sudden 363 00:23:35,490 --> 00:23:39,530 Speaker 2: up pops a DM, a direct message. And they look 364 00:23:39,570 --> 00:23:42,330 Speaker 2: at it and it's from someone they don't know. And 365 00:23:42,450 --> 00:23:47,609 Speaker 2: they have a look and this person looks like a beautiful, 366 00:23:47,790 --> 00:23:51,930 Speaker 2: attractive young lady. And they start chatting with each other 367 00:23:52,130 --> 00:23:57,429 Speaker 2: and within a short few minutes, the conversation turns sexual, 368 00:23:57,450 --> 00:24:01,910 Speaker 2: it turns intimate. And they go, well, you look hot, 369 00:24:02,210 --> 00:24:07,169 Speaker 2: I'm hot, let's, you know, exchange some pictures together. And 370 00:24:07,290 --> 00:24:10,670 Speaker 2: they don't really think with their critical thinking brain. They 371 00:24:11,010 --> 00:24:15,730 Speaker 2: just think on impulses. And they put their video or 372 00:24:16,330 --> 00:24:18,770 Speaker 2: we've got a phone now, right? You just hit record, 373 00:24:19,830 --> 00:24:25,550 Speaker 2: record yourself doing, you know, sexual poses like masturbating or 374 00:24:25,590 --> 00:24:29,129 Speaker 2: something like that. And then they on send it to 375 00:24:29,170 --> 00:24:34,300 Speaker 2: this person. The other person, generally speaking, would come up 376 00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:38,200 Speaker 2: with ideas of, oh, my camera is broken. I can't 377 00:24:38,260 --> 00:24:40,980 Speaker 2: do it. But I want to caveat that to say 378 00:24:41,040 --> 00:24:46,470 Speaker 2: now with AI, they are getting, they are receiving similar 379 00:24:46,530 --> 00:24:50,260 Speaker 2: content back. So they feel like it's legitimate. 380 00:24:50,940 --> 00:24:54,570 Speaker 1: So I'm the 14-year-old kid sending photos of myself and 381 00:24:54,590 --> 00:24:57,450 Speaker 1: then you're getting something back and that's AI now. So 382 00:24:57,530 --> 00:24:59,889 Speaker 1: it's before it used to be an excuse why they 383 00:24:59,910 --> 00:25:03,609 Speaker 1: couldn't send it. So the kid's lapping it up going, oh, 384 00:25:03,630 --> 00:25:05,670 Speaker 1: this is great and I can trust this person because 385 00:25:05,690 --> 00:25:07,949 Speaker 1: they've made themselves vulnerable as I am. 386 00:25:08,810 --> 00:25:09,169 Speaker 2: Exactly. 387 00:25:09,250 --> 00:25:10,310 Speaker 1: And feeling comfortable, yeah. 388 00:25:11,090 --> 00:25:14,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, and sometimes it's first. So they send through a 389 00:25:14,840 --> 00:25:18,150 Speaker 2: topless photo. Yeah. And then the other person's like, well, 390 00:25:18,170 --> 00:25:21,690 Speaker 2: it must be real. And then they send their, you know, video. 391 00:25:22,030 --> 00:25:25,840 Speaker 2: And then all of a sudden they're getting sent loads 392 00:25:25,900 --> 00:25:29,399 Speaker 2: of messages saying, we know what you've done. We're going 393 00:25:29,420 --> 00:25:31,780 Speaker 2: to send, here's all your videos and your photos that 394 00:25:31,800 --> 00:25:35,300 Speaker 2: we've just taken. Here's a snapshot of your friends list 395 00:25:35,340 --> 00:25:39,139 Speaker 2: from your TikTok profile, from your Instagram profile. We're going 396 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:41,380 Speaker 2: to share this with all your friends and family. They're 397 00:25:41,400 --> 00:25:44,139 Speaker 2: going to know all about what you do online. Uh, 398 00:25:45,859 --> 00:25:46,780 Speaker 2: unless you pay us money. 399 00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:47,480 Speaker 1: Yeah. 400 00:25:48,440 --> 00:25:51,550 Speaker 2: And, you know, and when we talk about adults, it 401 00:25:51,609 --> 00:25:56,410 Speaker 2: could even be that adults are getting scammed with sextortion 402 00:25:56,590 --> 00:25:58,820 Speaker 2: and they turn around and go, did you know I'm 403 00:25:59,190 --> 00:26:01,800 Speaker 2: a 13-year-old child and I'm going to share with everyone 404 00:26:01,840 --> 00:26:02,880 Speaker 2: now that you're a pedophile? 405 00:26:03,619 --> 00:26:08,320 Speaker 1: Yeah. So that's a big threat on someone, isn't it? Yeah. Yeah. 406 00:26:08,640 --> 00:26:09,659 Speaker 2: That's huge, right? 407 00:26:10,430 --> 00:26:13,189 Speaker 1: You can see how people become vulnerable very easily. And 408 00:26:13,260 --> 00:26:16,379 Speaker 1: it's just human nature to be sucked into something like that. 409 00:26:17,300 --> 00:26:21,560 Speaker 1: And yeah, the consequences. And I would imagine, and tell 410 00:26:21,580 --> 00:26:26,020 Speaker 1: me in your experience, even if they paid the blackmail 411 00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:31,669 Speaker 1: money or did whatever, in my experience with kidnappings or extortions, 412 00:26:31,790 --> 00:26:33,730 Speaker 1: it's never just a one-off payment and we're going to 413 00:26:33,770 --> 00:26:35,810 Speaker 1: go away. Once they know they can get some money 414 00:26:35,890 --> 00:26:37,050 Speaker 1: out of you, it's going to come back. 415 00:26:37,490 --> 00:26:40,369 Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely. You're almost on a list saying this person 416 00:26:40,390 --> 00:26:43,709 Speaker 2: will pay. So they share that with other people and 417 00:26:43,730 --> 00:26:49,180 Speaker 2: then other people will then target the poor victim because 418 00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:50,620 Speaker 2: they're likely to pay. 419 00:26:52,020 --> 00:26:56,240 Speaker 1: Can we get back to 764 again? Because I've been 420 00:26:56,260 --> 00:26:59,020 Speaker 1: going down the rabbit hole of that now that I've 421 00:26:59,040 --> 00:27:01,540 Speaker 1: looked how bad it is. As I said, I heard 422 00:27:01,600 --> 00:27:05,360 Speaker 1: it mentioned in the media of recent times, but some 423 00:27:05,380 --> 00:27:09,780 Speaker 1: of the things that are occurring and like the AFP 424 00:27:09,840 --> 00:27:13,830 Speaker 1: have recently flagged the 764 group as a high priority. 425 00:27:14,470 --> 00:27:17,230 Speaker 1: So yeah, this is the AFP saying this is a 426 00:27:17,270 --> 00:27:21,090 Speaker 1: real threat. Well, We know of the type of things 427 00:27:21,170 --> 00:27:24,310 Speaker 1: where the traditional cults that, say, we had in the 428 00:27:24,369 --> 00:27:26,909 Speaker 1: 70s and 80s that, you know, you could identify it 429 00:27:26,990 --> 00:27:29,690 Speaker 1: and that sort of, okay, pack of weirdos, you stay 430 00:27:29,760 --> 00:27:32,179 Speaker 1: over there, we'll stay away from you. But this is, 431 00:27:32,440 --> 00:27:35,020 Speaker 1: they are almost operating like a cult, the way you 432 00:27:35,040 --> 00:27:39,399 Speaker 1: described it, indoctrinating people into their beliefs and trapping people 433 00:27:39,460 --> 00:27:39,720 Speaker 1: in there. 434 00:27:40,600 --> 00:27:44,939 Speaker 2: Yeah, very much so. And they're not just then indoctrinating 435 00:27:45,420 --> 00:27:50,200 Speaker 2: the kids that they are recruiting. they're also then indoctrinating 436 00:27:50,460 --> 00:27:55,220 Speaker 2: the victims. So the victims are also being indoctrinated with 437 00:27:55,660 --> 00:28:04,030 Speaker 2: the right-wing ideology whilst also being abused and exploited through 438 00:28:04,070 --> 00:28:07,550 Speaker 2: the different means that we've spoken about. So why do 439 00:28:07,590 --> 00:28:11,690 Speaker 2: they do that? Well, control. Because it's all about control 440 00:28:11,910 --> 00:28:17,359 Speaker 2: and manipulation. It's all about getting someone... to feel like 441 00:28:17,619 --> 00:28:23,100 Speaker 2: I totally submit to the dominant person, to the alpha male. 442 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:29,670 Speaker 2: And that's ultimately what it looks like, that domination-submissive sort 443 00:28:29,750 --> 00:28:31,430 Speaker 2: of relationship, I guess. 444 00:28:32,090 --> 00:28:35,869 Speaker 1: How does the ideology come into it too, like the 445 00:28:35,950 --> 00:28:40,670 Speaker 1: ideology that got going with this 764 group? What's sad 446 00:28:40,730 --> 00:28:44,010 Speaker 1: about it? Are they trying to disrupt the world, like 447 00:28:44,310 --> 00:28:49,470 Speaker 1: the way that they're spreading? And yeah, it's worldwide. What 448 00:28:49,570 --> 00:28:52,000 Speaker 1: are they actually trying to achieve? Or are they just 449 00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:55,440 Speaker 1: getting their cheap kicks from destroying people's lives? 450 00:28:56,500 --> 00:29:01,040 Speaker 2: I think this group is connecting with each other because 451 00:29:01,100 --> 00:29:06,190 Speaker 2: of pain. So it's pain that they feel themselves because 452 00:29:06,250 --> 00:29:10,260 Speaker 2: they feel that they have been harshly dealt with or 453 00:29:10,320 --> 00:29:13,610 Speaker 2: they don't fit in the world. And so they want 454 00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:17,630 Speaker 2: to then inflict that pain on others because they sort 455 00:29:17,670 --> 00:29:20,610 Speaker 2: of have a feel of, well, I don't like where 456 00:29:20,650 --> 00:29:23,270 Speaker 2: this world is. I'm going to try and mess it 457 00:29:23,330 --> 00:29:26,350 Speaker 2: up as much as I can to make it as 458 00:29:26,490 --> 00:29:29,840 Speaker 2: worse as it can be for everyone out there because 459 00:29:30,520 --> 00:29:32,640 Speaker 2: I think the world is like that for me. 460 00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:33,660 Speaker 1: Right. 461 00:29:34,510 --> 00:29:36,620 Speaker 2: If that makes sense. So it's kind of like they're 462 00:29:36,680 --> 00:29:37,700 Speaker 2: trying to increase. 463 00:29:40,410 --> 00:29:45,530 Speaker 2: The amount of violence and not just online, right? So 464 00:29:45,590 --> 00:29:50,990 Speaker 2: we've got examples where, not in Australia, but in overseas 465 00:29:51,150 --> 00:29:54,950 Speaker 2: where some of these group members have actually then taken 466 00:29:54,970 --> 00:30:00,990 Speaker 2: the online world of 764 and and actually committed violent 467 00:30:01,370 --> 00:30:05,350 Speaker 2: attacks on random people that they don't even know in 468 00:30:05,390 --> 00:30:10,130 Speaker 2: the public and live streaming it to say, well, see, 469 00:30:10,190 --> 00:30:13,630 Speaker 2: I've one-upped you. I've done something that's even worse or 470 00:30:13,710 --> 00:30:18,850 Speaker 2: more cruel or more sadistic. And it's just this, I guess, 471 00:30:19,430 --> 00:30:22,430 Speaker 2: persona that they just want to be almost gone. 472 00:30:23,350 --> 00:30:28,260 Speaker 1: That's... Interesting, but also very scary. They're trying to one-up 473 00:30:28,380 --> 00:30:31,420 Speaker 1: because I'm looking at some of the stuff they've been 474 00:30:31,660 --> 00:30:37,140 Speaker 1: involved in, and it's not just the blackmailing and sextortion. 475 00:30:38,040 --> 00:30:43,110 Speaker 1: We've touched on that, but self-inflicting harm and getting them 476 00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:45,930 Speaker 1: to live stream that and getting them to carve their 477 00:30:45,970 --> 00:30:52,000 Speaker 1: names in blood and killing the family pet. This is sadism. 478 00:30:52,040 --> 00:30:55,280 Speaker 1: This is sadistic. And where does it stop? Because I 479 00:30:55,300 --> 00:31:00,080 Speaker 1: would imagine a precursor to someone that's getting off on 480 00:31:00,140 --> 00:31:02,620 Speaker 1: killing the family pet might be, next thing, well, how 481 00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:05,610 Speaker 1: about you kill your brother, kill your sister, or do 482 00:31:05,660 --> 00:31:06,390 Speaker 1: something like that? 483 00:31:07,410 --> 00:31:11,690 Speaker 2: Yeah. And the scary thing is the structure of this 484 00:31:11,810 --> 00:31:15,130 Speaker 2: group is they're always trying to do more and more 485 00:31:15,290 --> 00:31:19,130 Speaker 2: and more. And so when does it stop? Because There's 486 00:31:19,170 --> 00:31:22,450 Speaker 2: always going to be someone that does something and someone 487 00:31:22,470 --> 00:31:25,870 Speaker 2: will go, oh, I've got to better that. And I think, well, 488 00:31:25,890 --> 00:31:29,520 Speaker 2: how does it grow? Well, we talk about the online 489 00:31:29,560 --> 00:31:34,280 Speaker 2: world and we talk about there's no limits. You might 490 00:31:34,360 --> 00:31:40,300 Speaker 2: have someone in Perth that has ideas that they don't 491 00:31:40,360 --> 00:31:43,120 Speaker 2: like the world or they want to inflict pain on 492 00:31:43,220 --> 00:31:47,479 Speaker 2: someone and isolated, it wouldn't go anywhere. But now all 493 00:31:47,500 --> 00:31:52,000 Speaker 2: of a sudden we have this in digital communities online 494 00:31:52,080 --> 00:31:57,560 Speaker 2: where we can find anyone that agrees with our worldviews 495 00:31:57,980 --> 00:32:02,570 Speaker 2: or what we believe as great or as cruel as 496 00:32:02,650 --> 00:32:05,590 Speaker 2: that could be. And so now all of a sudden 497 00:32:05,670 --> 00:32:12,010 Speaker 2: we have a mechanism where people can connect and make 498 00:32:12,050 --> 00:32:15,630 Speaker 2: their own digital communities about anything. 499 00:32:16,440 --> 00:32:19,350 Speaker 1: That's the scary part, isn't it? With the outliers that 500 00:32:19,610 --> 00:32:24,490 Speaker 1: used to be the village idiot or the person that 501 00:32:24,630 --> 00:32:29,930 Speaker 1: everyone don't listen to him, virtually any tangent someone wants 502 00:32:29,950 --> 00:32:32,840 Speaker 1: to go off on, they can find like-minded people that 503 00:32:32,860 --> 00:32:33,580 Speaker 1: will support them. 504 00:32:34,060 --> 00:32:34,640 Speaker 2: Absolutely. 505 00:32:34,940 --> 00:32:41,280 Speaker 1: In their crazy beliefs. Yeah. I read an article, Swedish 506 00:32:41,340 --> 00:32:44,940 Speaker 1: court documents obtained reveal that groups involved in attacks in 507 00:32:45,000 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 1: several countries included repeated abuse of an Australian girl who's 508 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:54,550 Speaker 1: blackmailed into strangling her family pet and committing self-mutilation. So, yeah, 509 00:32:55,230 --> 00:32:59,010 Speaker 1: people in Sweden have been locked up for crimes they've 510 00:32:59,070 --> 00:33:00,210 Speaker 1: committed over in Australia. 511 00:33:01,250 --> 00:33:05,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, and that's why it's so crucial that parents know 512 00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:08,920 Speaker 2: that what their kids are doing online and who they're 513 00:33:08,980 --> 00:33:14,380 Speaker 2: interacting with and to make sure that they're not just 514 00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:19,610 Speaker 2: hearing one voice, you know, because that's how indoctrination happens, right? 515 00:33:19,650 --> 00:33:22,690 Speaker 2: They're only hearing one voice and they're hearing it over 516 00:33:22,750 --> 00:33:25,730 Speaker 2: and over again, the same message. And that's why it's 517 00:33:25,790 --> 00:33:30,390 Speaker 2: important that our kids are online, sure, and have their 518 00:33:30,430 --> 00:33:34,450 Speaker 2: digital communities, but they also have real world connections and 519 00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:38,870 Speaker 2: And it's vital that our kids do not lose real 520 00:33:38,900 --> 00:33:44,490 Speaker 2: world connections, particularly now that AI is taking over. And 521 00:33:44,550 --> 00:33:48,690 Speaker 2: we know that kids are using AI as friends and 522 00:33:48,850 --> 00:33:54,490 Speaker 2: as guidance and as therapy and for help. And that 523 00:33:54,550 --> 00:33:57,070 Speaker 2: is alarming in itself, right? We need to make sure 524 00:33:57,110 --> 00:33:59,950 Speaker 2: that kids are talking to real people. 525 00:34:00,700 --> 00:34:05,080 Speaker 1: The digital world is evolving so quickly. Is law enforcement 526 00:34:05,200 --> 00:34:06,700 Speaker 1: keeping up with the changes? 527 00:34:07,740 --> 00:34:11,680 Speaker 2: I think that they're trying. They are really trying and 528 00:34:11,719 --> 00:34:16,020 Speaker 2: they want to, but it's a moving beast and it's 529 00:34:16,120 --> 00:34:22,090 Speaker 2: evolving at such pace that to change legislation is not quick. 530 00:34:23,110 --> 00:34:28,230 Speaker 2: And then on top of that, they have to work 531 00:34:28,290 --> 00:34:29,710 Speaker 2: within the boundaries of the law. 532 00:34:29,969 --> 00:34:30,129 Speaker 1: Yeah. 533 00:34:30,680 --> 00:34:35,969 Speaker 2: Right? So if we're talking about things rapidly happening online 534 00:34:36,170 --> 00:34:40,450 Speaker 2: and they're happening on, you know, platforms like Telegram where 535 00:34:40,469 --> 00:34:44,610 Speaker 2: you've got secret groups, meaning that you can only access 536 00:34:44,670 --> 00:34:50,010 Speaker 2: these areas with an invite only, then how do you 537 00:34:50,070 --> 00:34:52,820 Speaker 2: then get police to have a seat at that table? 538 00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:57,600 Speaker 2: Then you have to do all your covert operations and 539 00:34:57,620 --> 00:35:01,140 Speaker 2: things like that. And that takes time. And then that 540 00:35:01,640 --> 00:35:04,100 Speaker 2: has to then be signed off to say, okay, well, 541 00:35:04,140 --> 00:35:09,459 Speaker 2: these police officers can commit these offences, but not these offences. 542 00:35:10,100 --> 00:35:12,860 Speaker 2: And then there's risk involved in that. Because what if 543 00:35:12,920 --> 00:35:16,879 Speaker 2: that then gets out and it's on the West Australian 544 00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:20,339 Speaker 2: on Monday morning, they're trying to do the right thing, 545 00:35:20,380 --> 00:35:22,560 Speaker 2: but they still have to work within the bounds of 546 00:35:22,760 --> 00:35:27,370 Speaker 2: the law, which makes it extremely difficult. Now, in saying that, 547 00:35:27,410 --> 00:35:29,930 Speaker 2: the law is there for a reason, right? We can't 548 00:35:29,989 --> 00:35:33,670 Speaker 2: go rogue or be vigilantes and just say, well, for 549 00:35:33,690 --> 00:35:37,410 Speaker 2: the greater good, we can do this because where does 550 00:35:37,510 --> 00:35:44,710 Speaker 2: that end? And I think that that's where the confliction is. No, 551 00:35:45,190 --> 00:35:47,830 Speaker 2: nobody is keeping up with it because it's moving so 552 00:35:47,890 --> 00:35:51,870 Speaker 2: rapidly because criminals and the predators, they don't have to 553 00:35:51,930 --> 00:35:55,089 Speaker 2: worry about the law and the boundaries of the law. 554 00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:59,280 Speaker 2: So they have carte blanche to do whatever they want. Granted, 555 00:35:59,340 --> 00:36:03,060 Speaker 2: if they get caught, there will be consequences, but they 556 00:36:03,100 --> 00:36:06,319 Speaker 2: can still work at that rapid pace where you look 557 00:36:06,360 --> 00:36:09,440 Speaker 2: at law enforcement and they have to work within that 558 00:36:09,480 --> 00:36:11,880 Speaker 2: bounds of the law, which has always got to hold 559 00:36:11,980 --> 00:36:16,069 Speaker 2: them back from really being at the forefront of where 560 00:36:16,110 --> 00:36:16,350 Speaker 2: it's at. 561 00:36:17,469 --> 00:36:19,910 Speaker 1: I also have a concern that this is a silent 562 00:36:19,989 --> 00:36:23,250 Speaker 1: crime too, that there would be a lot that goes on. 563 00:36:23,410 --> 00:36:26,049 Speaker 1: Like if there's an arson in the street, a car 564 00:36:26,070 --> 00:36:27,880 Speaker 1: gets burnt out, you know police are going to have 565 00:36:27,910 --> 00:36:31,140 Speaker 1: to respond. If someone's been assaulted, you know police are 566 00:36:31,600 --> 00:36:35,920 Speaker 1: going to respond. This potentially is a silent crime. And 567 00:36:35,940 --> 00:36:39,840 Speaker 1: I think you as an experienced former cop and myself, 568 00:36:40,400 --> 00:36:43,779 Speaker 1: we know that the police tend to respond when there's 569 00:36:43,820 --> 00:36:47,180 Speaker 1: a public urgency about it. Like if there's a high profile, yeah, 570 00:36:47,530 --> 00:36:50,069 Speaker 1: It might even, in a local area, it might even 571 00:36:50,110 --> 00:36:52,930 Speaker 1: be a spate of break and enters, but police need 572 00:36:52,969 --> 00:36:57,230 Speaker 1: to respond if it's reported in the media. With this, 573 00:36:57,350 --> 00:37:01,130 Speaker 1: it's almost a silent crime. And I dare say there's 574 00:37:01,170 --> 00:37:03,170 Speaker 1: a lot of things that haven't been reported that have 575 00:37:03,210 --> 00:37:05,630 Speaker 1: gone on that's caused a lot of drama in people's lives, 576 00:37:05,770 --> 00:37:10,110 Speaker 1: but they feel stupid or the shame of what's occurred 577 00:37:10,150 --> 00:37:11,870 Speaker 1: to them. What's your take on that? 578 00:37:12,630 --> 00:37:17,090 Speaker 2: Yeah, definitely. I mean, we know that kids and generally 579 00:37:17,190 --> 00:37:19,680 Speaker 2: kids and the elderly are the most vulnerable when it 580 00:37:19,739 --> 00:37:23,620 Speaker 2: comes online. And the reason for that is because generally 581 00:37:23,660 --> 00:37:27,140 Speaker 2: they stay silent. They don't even share it. We're talking kids. 582 00:37:27,219 --> 00:37:29,900 Speaker 2: They don't even share it with their peers, let alone 583 00:37:29,980 --> 00:37:35,620 Speaker 2: telling their trusted adults or their parents that can actually 584 00:37:35,680 --> 00:37:40,700 Speaker 2: help them. So we look at the statistics and go, wow, yeah, 585 00:37:41,410 --> 00:37:45,580 Speaker 2: online extortion of kids, it's pretty bad, but it's 10 586 00:37:45,580 --> 00:37:50,040 Speaker 2: times worse than that because probably majority of the kids 587 00:37:50,260 --> 00:37:54,480 Speaker 2: aren't actually reporting. What we found when we were investigating 588 00:37:54,980 --> 00:37:57,850 Speaker 2: the cybercrime and it was just kind of the tip 589 00:37:57,890 --> 00:38:01,330 Speaker 2: of the iceberg in online extortion when I was sort 590 00:38:01,370 --> 00:38:04,490 Speaker 2: of there is you would go speak to a victim 591 00:38:04,510 --> 00:38:08,160 Speaker 2: at school and you'd find out it's not an isolated case. 592 00:38:09,100 --> 00:38:12,230 Speaker 2: In fact, you know, a third of the classroom had 593 00:38:12,270 --> 00:38:16,730 Speaker 2: experienced similar things online because what the online predators do 594 00:38:16,790 --> 00:38:19,730 Speaker 2: is they target a school or they target a class 595 00:38:19,790 --> 00:38:23,529 Speaker 2: in a school. They don't just randomly pick kids here 596 00:38:23,590 --> 00:38:27,350 Speaker 2: and there. They have more targeted, I guess, approach to that. 597 00:38:28,050 --> 00:38:34,489 Speaker 2: So it's definitely a silent crime out there, and I 598 00:38:34,550 --> 00:38:37,830 Speaker 2: think that that's where it's our job to, one, educate 599 00:38:37,870 --> 00:38:41,060 Speaker 2: the parents to say, this is happening and to try 600 00:38:41,120 --> 00:38:44,660 Speaker 2: and try and get the kids to see that they 601 00:38:44,680 --> 00:38:47,460 Speaker 2: need to speak up because when they speak up, people 602 00:38:47,540 --> 00:38:50,549 Speaker 2: can help them and we can shine a light on it, 603 00:38:50,640 --> 00:38:53,969 Speaker 2: like you're saying. So we can have a public outcry 604 00:38:54,870 --> 00:38:56,790 Speaker 2: so that something is done about it. 605 00:38:57,650 --> 00:39:01,430 Speaker 1: I've heard stories of, yeah, with sextortion where the kids 606 00:39:01,840 --> 00:39:06,060 Speaker 1: from the moment it's happened, um, There was one sad one, 607 00:39:06,160 --> 00:39:08,380 Speaker 1: and I won't say the name, but I saw it 608 00:39:08,600 --> 00:39:13,410 Speaker 1: in the media where within 12 hours, a kid had 609 00:39:13,489 --> 00:39:17,270 Speaker 1: taken his own life because of the embarrassment and shame 610 00:39:17,330 --> 00:39:21,190 Speaker 1: of what the threats were against him. That's how rapidly 611 00:39:21,250 --> 00:39:22,230 Speaker 1: it can play out. 612 00:39:23,330 --> 00:39:27,549 Speaker 2: Yeah, and I think with the use of AI and 613 00:39:27,750 --> 00:39:32,800 Speaker 2: AI-generated content, it getting quicker. Yeah. You know, it's taking, 614 00:39:32,920 --> 00:39:37,860 Speaker 2: it's not months now to grown kids. It's much quicker 615 00:39:38,960 --> 00:39:44,529 Speaker 2: and the serious harm and exploitation and abuse is happening 616 00:39:44,620 --> 00:39:47,390 Speaker 2: much quicker than we were seeing before. 617 00:39:48,600 --> 00:39:53,000 Speaker 1: Has the legislation caught up with fake porn? You hear 618 00:39:53,040 --> 00:39:57,090 Speaker 1: a lot of situations with fake porn. Is legislation catching 619 00:39:57,150 --> 00:39:57,430 Speaker 1: up there? 620 00:39:57,450 --> 00:40:00,590 Speaker 2: Yeah. So the legislation is there. 621 00:40:01,030 --> 00:40:01,210 Speaker 1: Yep. 622 00:40:01,850 --> 00:40:06,130 Speaker 2: The hard part is identity. So what that means is 623 00:40:06,210 --> 00:40:11,130 Speaker 2: trying to put a offender behind the keyboard or behind 624 00:40:11,170 --> 00:40:15,469 Speaker 2: the phone who actually commits the offence. So most of 625 00:40:15,510 --> 00:40:19,370 Speaker 2: the time, we know something's happened and we can prove 626 00:40:19,410 --> 00:40:22,779 Speaker 2: an offence has happened and the legislation is there to 627 00:40:22,820 --> 00:40:26,460 Speaker 2: be able to hold that person to account. The difficulty 628 00:40:27,700 --> 00:40:30,339 Speaker 2: is being able to pin it to a person. And 629 00:40:30,380 --> 00:40:36,400 Speaker 2: that's because, you know, there's so much keeping anonymous online, 630 00:40:36,719 --> 00:40:43,070 Speaker 2: you know, hiding your IP, using VPNs, you know, using 631 00:40:43,410 --> 00:40:47,200 Speaker 2: proxies to kind of hide, your location of where you're 632 00:40:47,280 --> 00:40:53,200 Speaker 2: sending things. You can use different softwares to say you're 633 00:40:53,219 --> 00:40:56,980 Speaker 2: in a different country. There's so many ways to hide 634 00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:01,900 Speaker 2: the fact that it's a local offender. And then we 635 00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:05,340 Speaker 2: talk about the cloud, right? So most people don't store 636 00:41:05,680 --> 00:41:09,609 Speaker 2: their information on their computer or on a hard drive, 637 00:41:09,650 --> 00:41:13,630 Speaker 2: a physical copy in their home. They store it on 638 00:41:13,650 --> 00:41:18,750 Speaker 2: the cloud. So where is their data? It's actually over 639 00:41:19,630 --> 00:41:22,010 Speaker 2: half of it's over in America, half of it's over 640 00:41:22,070 --> 00:41:26,000 Speaker 2: in Sweden. And then again, we're talking about that jurisdictional 641 00:41:26,060 --> 00:41:33,120 Speaker 2: battle to then try and legally access that information to 642 00:41:33,200 --> 00:41:35,759 Speaker 2: actually pin it to a person. And I think that 643 00:41:35,800 --> 00:41:40,840 Speaker 2: that's where the difficulty can be. It is definitely getting better, 644 00:41:41,660 --> 00:41:46,450 Speaker 2: but it's also then trying to educate police officers to 645 00:41:46,630 --> 00:41:51,390 Speaker 2: understand how it works. And it moves so quickly that 646 00:41:52,469 --> 00:41:56,550 Speaker 2: how it was a year ago has completely changed. 647 00:41:57,290 --> 00:42:00,030 Speaker 1: Rebecca, the fact that you mentioned that, because that's what 648 00:42:00,140 --> 00:42:03,000 Speaker 1: I just wanted to jump in on it and say, 649 00:42:03,600 --> 00:42:08,870 Speaker 1: the technical expertise required to investigate these crimes are not 650 00:42:08,989 --> 00:42:12,109 Speaker 1: what I remember was readily available within the police. We 651 00:42:12,150 --> 00:42:17,320 Speaker 1: had our technical branches and cyber areas relatively small because 652 00:42:17,340 --> 00:42:20,460 Speaker 1: they weren't used a great deal. What you have described there, 653 00:42:20,900 --> 00:42:26,410 Speaker 1: I'm thinking on any virtually any homicide investigation. I would 654 00:42:26,430 --> 00:42:29,180 Speaker 1: be wanting an expert to come in and we have 655 00:42:29,239 --> 00:42:32,739 Speaker 1: analysts as you're aware, but there's really an expertise that's 656 00:42:32,780 --> 00:42:35,899 Speaker 1: required to stay ahead of the game because we can't play, well, 657 00:42:36,040 --> 00:42:38,739 Speaker 1: we shouldn't as law enforcement be playing catch up. We 658 00:42:38,780 --> 00:42:42,160 Speaker 1: should be ahead of the game. And we have been 659 00:42:42,200 --> 00:42:45,590 Speaker 1: in the past when we're brought in the technical experts 660 00:42:45,630 --> 00:42:48,310 Speaker 1: that can outsmart the crooks that we're after. But I'm 661 00:42:48,370 --> 00:42:53,500 Speaker 1: worried that law enforcement won't have the expertise required To 662 00:42:53,780 --> 00:42:54,140 Speaker 1: match it. 663 00:42:54,140 --> 00:42:58,980 Speaker 2: Yeah, well, it's hard, right? Because money talks. And we 664 00:42:59,020 --> 00:43:02,120 Speaker 2: talk about a lot of these platforms and they're making 665 00:43:02,800 --> 00:43:06,350 Speaker 2: so much money that they can afford to have the 666 00:43:06,390 --> 00:43:10,049 Speaker 2: best legal coverage and they can afford to have the 667 00:43:10,110 --> 00:43:15,750 Speaker 2: best technical people to support, you know, their defense. 668 00:43:16,290 --> 00:43:16,430 Speaker 1: Yeah. 669 00:43:17,370 --> 00:43:21,700 Speaker 2: As a state or a federal government, you're very limited 670 00:43:21,960 --> 00:43:25,779 Speaker 2: in your budget, which can make it very hard that 671 00:43:26,100 --> 00:43:28,620 Speaker 2: how do we then get access to these technical people 672 00:43:28,680 --> 00:43:32,609 Speaker 2: unless they almost do it on a pro bono basis. 673 00:43:33,610 --> 00:43:36,299 Speaker 1: Well, I suppose that's where the government's got to come in. 674 00:43:36,380 --> 00:43:41,300 Speaker 1: And I'm throwing back years gone by, but telephone services 675 00:43:41,680 --> 00:43:44,100 Speaker 1: were required to keep their records for a certain period 676 00:43:44,120 --> 00:43:47,020 Speaker 1: of time. So for police to be able to investigate 677 00:43:47,120 --> 00:43:49,839 Speaker 1: the records had to be kept stored. That's the type 678 00:43:49,860 --> 00:43:54,239 Speaker 1: of legislation that we need the government pushing for. So 679 00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:59,569 Speaker 1: law enforcement aren't disadvantaged going up against multi-billion, I should say, 680 00:44:00,050 --> 00:44:04,350 Speaker 1: organizations that can employ the smartest and best people. 681 00:44:05,239 --> 00:44:09,739 Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely. I think the data storage and being able 682 00:44:09,760 --> 00:44:13,780 Speaker 2: to actually access the information that they need is so vital. 683 00:44:14,580 --> 00:44:21,030 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah. It makes me wonder how far we're away 684 00:44:21,110 --> 00:44:26,890 Speaker 1: from like a cyber homicides someone being charged, not physically 685 00:44:26,930 --> 00:44:30,650 Speaker 1: there for the homicide, like we've got conspiracies to commit homicide. 686 00:44:30,670 --> 00:44:34,489 Speaker 1: But what we're talking about here, it's not that far away. 687 00:44:34,550 --> 00:44:39,210 Speaker 1: Like you're murdering, talking someone into murdering their, or murdering, 688 00:44:39,690 --> 00:44:42,630 Speaker 1: to taking the life of the family pet. It's not 689 00:44:42,670 --> 00:44:46,830 Speaker 1: that far away from when they're encouraging people to take 690 00:44:46,850 --> 00:44:47,410 Speaker 1: a human life. 691 00:44:48,010 --> 00:44:50,609 Speaker 2: No, it's not. And I think that that's where law 692 00:44:50,680 --> 00:44:54,150 Speaker 2: enforcement needs to be bold. To be able to push 693 00:44:54,190 --> 00:44:57,129 Speaker 2: the boundaries. Like you and I both know, you had 694 00:44:57,170 --> 00:45:01,200 Speaker 2: those cases where you needed to push the boundaries to 695 00:45:01,219 --> 00:45:02,060 Speaker 2: get the case law. 696 00:45:02,420 --> 00:45:03,260 Speaker 1: Set the precedents. 697 00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:08,480 Speaker 2: Exactly. And so we need our law enforcement, we need 698 00:45:08,540 --> 00:45:14,140 Speaker 2: our lawyers to be bold, to go, we're going to 699 00:45:14,180 --> 00:45:18,270 Speaker 2: push this to make a precedent that it's not right 700 00:45:18,450 --> 00:45:22,590 Speaker 2: and it is legal and they should be held accountable. Absolutely. Yeah. 701 00:45:24,070 --> 00:45:28,279 Speaker 1: We spoke 764. Is there other groups that are notorious 702 00:45:28,400 --> 00:45:31,920 Speaker 1: or other platforms that are coming up that are creating 703 00:45:31,940 --> 00:45:33,000 Speaker 1: the same type of problems? 704 00:45:33,880 --> 00:45:38,600 Speaker 2: Yeah, so I think with online extremism, you obviously have 705 00:45:38,640 --> 00:45:41,640 Speaker 2: the left side and you have the right side. And 706 00:45:41,680 --> 00:45:46,339 Speaker 2: there's definitely groups, I think, on both. And they do 707 00:45:46,680 --> 00:45:52,350 Speaker 2: use the online platforms to do that. Definitely Telegram, Discord 708 00:45:52,570 --> 00:45:55,140 Speaker 2: are two of your main ones, but you've got any 709 00:45:55,760 --> 00:46:01,300 Speaker 2: encrypted platform that has your secret groups, your private groups, 710 00:46:01,360 --> 00:46:05,879 Speaker 2: your invite only, they're going to be using that. 711 00:46:06,640 --> 00:46:12,819 Speaker 1: With Telegram and Discord, how their platforms are being used 712 00:46:12,920 --> 00:46:16,180 Speaker 1: and the problems they're creating, Are they getting on board 713 00:46:16,540 --> 00:46:19,120 Speaker 1: and helping address this problem or are they putting up 714 00:46:19,200 --> 00:46:22,700 Speaker 1: barriers to prevent law enforcement getting involved? 715 00:46:23,570 --> 00:46:27,930 Speaker 2: Yeah, so you look at Discord. Discord is a unique 716 00:46:28,030 --> 00:46:32,370 Speaker 2: platform in the sense that it's open source, which means 717 00:46:32,510 --> 00:46:38,799 Speaker 2: that it's not per se like Meta that's proprietary and 718 00:46:38,840 --> 00:46:41,880 Speaker 2: you have, you know, Mark Zuckerberg that is the CEO 719 00:46:42,040 --> 00:46:42,239 Speaker 2: of it. 720 00:46:42,260 --> 00:46:43,460 Speaker 1: Could you be held responsible? 721 00:46:43,880 --> 00:46:50,180 Speaker 2: Yeah. So the way that Discord is structured is anyone 722 00:46:50,300 --> 00:46:54,970 Speaker 2: can create their own channel and then you come up 723 00:46:55,030 --> 00:46:59,450 Speaker 2: with your own rules, boundaries of how that channel is structured. 724 00:47:00,350 --> 00:47:04,910 Speaker 2: So Discord kind of go, well, that's not our responsibility 725 00:47:04,989 --> 00:47:08,540 Speaker 2: because we leave it up to, a community member to 726 00:47:08,600 --> 00:47:12,080 Speaker 2: kind of create their group the best way that they 727 00:47:12,160 --> 00:47:16,919 Speaker 2: see fit. They do have parental controls on Discord, which 728 00:47:17,020 --> 00:47:20,940 Speaker 2: is good. And before they didn't have that. And so 729 00:47:20,980 --> 00:47:26,950 Speaker 2: that's a positive. But in saying that, the age assurance 730 00:47:27,730 --> 00:47:35,350 Speaker 2: that social media companies are using can be bypassed really easy. 731 00:47:36,500 --> 00:47:39,620 Speaker 1: This is under the age of 15 or whatever the 732 00:47:39,700 --> 00:47:40,279 Speaker 1: age is set? 733 00:47:40,760 --> 00:47:45,100 Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely. So generally it's an age estimation where the 734 00:47:45,260 --> 00:47:51,110 Speaker 2: user has to consent to AI taking a video or 735 00:47:51,120 --> 00:47:54,890 Speaker 2: an image of that user and then they go through 736 00:47:55,030 --> 00:47:58,430 Speaker 2: and determine an age and based on what the age is, 737 00:47:58,630 --> 00:48:02,390 Speaker 2: is what the account's set at and then what permissions 738 00:48:02,570 --> 00:48:05,830 Speaker 2: that they can and can't do. But kids being kids 739 00:48:06,070 --> 00:48:09,830 Speaker 2: are more tech savvy than we are because they're digital natives. 740 00:48:09,930 --> 00:48:12,810 Speaker 2: They've grown up in this world and they've figured out 741 00:48:12,850 --> 00:48:16,290 Speaker 2: ways how to beat it. And so now we've got 742 00:48:16,330 --> 00:48:19,910 Speaker 2: a whole bunch of kids that, you know, shouldn't be 743 00:48:19,950 --> 00:48:24,160 Speaker 2: on these platforms because they're age-restricted platforms, but they are 744 00:48:24,239 --> 00:48:26,600 Speaker 2: because they've figured out how to beat it and now 745 00:48:26,660 --> 00:48:32,060 Speaker 2: they have adult unrestricted accounts, which almost makes it worse. 746 00:48:33,530 --> 00:48:38,590 Speaker 2: So that's Discord. Then you've got Telegram. And the creator 747 00:48:38,890 --> 00:48:42,930 Speaker 2: of Telegram, he's all about privacy and security. And he's 748 00:48:43,010 --> 00:48:49,850 Speaker 2: all about being anti-government, censoring what's put on the internet 749 00:48:49,930 --> 00:48:53,230 Speaker 2: and what's put on his app. So his main focus 750 00:48:53,489 --> 00:48:58,660 Speaker 2: is not money. It is security and privacy. So that 751 00:48:58,700 --> 00:49:04,840 Speaker 2: will always be a program. that has nefarious people on 752 00:49:04,860 --> 00:49:09,020 Speaker 2: it because of privacy and security being such a big, 753 00:49:09,760 --> 00:49:11,560 Speaker 2: I guess, aspect of that platform. 754 00:49:12,620 --> 00:49:13,989 Speaker 1: Complex. 755 00:49:14,590 --> 00:49:15,370 Speaker 2: Very complex. 756 00:49:15,610 --> 00:49:18,629 Speaker 1: It was easier just seeing the bad guy run down 757 00:49:18,670 --> 00:49:20,660 Speaker 1: the street with the balaclava on. on and the sawn 758 00:49:20,680 --> 00:49:24,969 Speaker 1: off shotgun. That was the easy days of law enforcement. 759 00:49:25,030 --> 00:49:30,860 Speaker 1: So many different layers. We'll take a break now, if 760 00:49:30,920 --> 00:49:33,700 Speaker 1: that's okay. And when we get back, we've talked about, 761 00:49:34,180 --> 00:49:37,450 Speaker 1: and I've got to say, I'm somewhat shocked. And I'm 762 00:49:37,489 --> 00:49:39,970 Speaker 1: just thinking as you're talking the whole time, I'm thinking, 763 00:49:40,410 --> 00:49:42,089 Speaker 1: how do you stop this? How do you stop that? 764 00:49:42,650 --> 00:49:45,670 Speaker 1: When we get back in part two, I'd like you 765 00:49:45,770 --> 00:49:49,350 Speaker 1: to instruct us on the best things that you can 766 00:49:49,410 --> 00:49:52,969 Speaker 1: do to prevent your children falling victim to this. I 767 00:49:53,010 --> 00:49:56,609 Speaker 1: also want to talk about Manosphere and the impact that 768 00:49:56,670 --> 00:49:59,239 Speaker 1: has and how this plays into the digital world that 769 00:49:59,380 --> 00:50:02,960 Speaker 1: we're talking about and what you're doing in your business 770 00:50:03,000 --> 00:50:07,680 Speaker 1: and getting out and educating people because, well, I need 771 00:50:07,760 --> 00:50:10,180 Speaker 1: educating and you're educating me. I think there's a lot 772 00:50:10,219 --> 00:50:14,060 Speaker 1: of people out there that need it. Okay, we'll be 773 00:50:14,100 --> 00:50:14,620 Speaker 1: back shortly. 774 00:50:14,640 --> 00:50:16,319 Speaker 2: Music